[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 7]
[Senate]
[Pages 9475-9477]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                              SIERRA LEONE

  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I want to speak about the issue of what is 
happening in Africa, specifically in Sierra Leone. Recently, I have 
become involved in this issue because, as chairman of the Commerce, 
Justice, State, and the Judiciary Subcommittee, we have jurisdiction 
over the funds that flow to the U.N. for peacekeeping activity. In 
order to adequately do the job as chairman of that subcommittee, our 
job involves oversight of those funds, to make sure they are being used 
effectively. After all, they are American tax dollars; Congress has 
control of the purse strings; and we have a major role in how those 
dollars are spent.
  I recognize fully, as all Members of Congress do, that the key 
individual who sets foreign policy is our President. Even though we may 
disagree with our President, he does have that priority position. But 
there are, obviously, issues on which the Congress has a role in 
foreign policy--very significant issues. One of them happens to be the 
funding of peacekeeping activities and the role the United States 
should play in that. So I have had very serious concerns about our 
policies in Sierra Leone specifically--on a number of peacekeeping 
activities, but specifically our policies in Sierra Leone. This is 
because of a number of issues that have been raised there.
  Last year, the United States, regrettably, played a key role in 
imposing the Lome Accord on a brutalized Sierra Leone. The accord 
granted a total amnesty to the Revolutionary United Front, RUF, which 
is basically a gang of thugs that murders, rapes, and mutilates people. 
Just about everybody in their path has come under their severe act of 
violence. In fact, they actually empower their soldiers--and they are 
not really soldiers; many are very young boys--to cut off the arms of 
women and children in order to make a point. This is a very common 
practice with this alleged military group called RUF, this gang of 
thugs. They have been terrorizing the country of Sierra Leone. There is 
no question about that. Their leader, Foday Sankoh, and his 
lieutenants, as part of the Lome agreement, as part of the 
understanding of the Lome agreement--and this is why it was such a 
horrendous agreement--were given top spots in the ``transition'' 
government and guaranteed RUF control over the Sierra Leone diamond 
mines, which is basically the core of the element of how they generate 
their revenues.
  It is inexcusable that we were party to the Lome agreement and that 
we therefore empowered these war criminals to take office and to have 
control over basically the only significant economic resource of the 
country of Sierra Leone. So I was more than upset about this. I 
believed it was essentially a surrender in the face of criminal 
violence. As a result, I did put a hold --not technically a hold, but I 
actually refused to approve a transfer of peacekeeping funds for the 
Sierra Leone initiative. I began exploring alternatives to this, what I 
believed was an extraordinarily unjust accord. In response to my 
concerns, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Holbrooke and his staff took on 
the difficult task of crafting a better approach to this issue.
  Since my ``hold'' became news, I have been sharply criticized by 
some, including some in the U.N. and the State Department, and even--
not even, but not surprisingly, really--the Washington Post, which 
recently accused me of ``playing at foreign policy,'' implying that 
serious students of world affairs would not question U.S. support for 
the Lome Accord. I simply point out that I think a lot of serious 
students of foreign policy question the decision to support that 
accord.
  Meanwhile, in Sierra Leone itself, the RUF, as a result of Lome in 
large part, continued to terrorize civilians and even challenge the 
U.N. peacekeepers. By last month, the RUF was marching on Freetown in 
complete violation of the Lome Accord. In fact, of course, they have 
humiliated the U.N. mission in Sierra Leone, which was supposed to 
disarm them. It actually ended up being disarmed by them, and much of 
the military equipment that is being used there by the RUF is U.N. 
equipment taken from U.N. advisers. Thus, the mission of the U.N., as a 
result of being an outgrowth of the Lome Accords, which were so 
disgraceful, is in disarray. Today, all that stands between the RUF and 
total control of Sierra Leone is the British and Nigerian troops who 
have come in to try to stabilize the situation.
  And what of the U.S. policy? Following our most recent meeting 2 
weeks ago, Ambassador Holbrooke has sent me a letter laying out a new 
strategy for a more just and lasting approach to peace in Sierra Leone 
that gives me some reason for hope. I would like to read from what his 
letter says because I think it is an important adjustment in American 
policy in Sierra Leone. I congratulate him for it.
  First, he notes in his opening paragraph that he has taken this issue 
and walked it through the administration and that he has support for 
his letter from Secretary Albright, National Security Adviser Berger, 
and the head of the OMB, Jack Lew. Reading paragraphs from his letter:

       You asked for a letter encapsulating our discussion on 
     Sierra Leone and Congo. After close consultation with 
     Secretary Albright, let me review where we stand on each 
     issue:
       First, Sierra Leone. Let me posit five principles that we 
     will use to govern our policy. First, the United States does 
     not believe that Foday Sankoh should play any role whatsoever 
     in the future political process in Sierra Leone, and we will 
     continue to press this point. He must be held accountable for 
     his actions.

  This is a significant change in policy, in my opinion, and it is a 
positive one.

       Second, we strongly support the British military presence 
     in Sierra Leone, which has played a key role in restoring a 
     measure of stability to Freetown. We are discussing with the 
     British their continuing role, and on May 23 London announced 
     an important training program for Sierra Leone army, 
     something that they will undertake at their own expense 
     outside the U.N. system.

  This, again, is positive news that the British will be a stabilizing 
force there, which will be armed and know how to defend itself.

       Third, the objective should be to ensure that regional and 
     international forces in Sierra Leone, together with the armed 
     forces of the government of Sierra Leone, have the capacity 
     to disrupt RUF control of Sierra Leone's diamond producing 
     areas, the main source of RUF income. Completely eliminating 
     them as a military force is not likely to be possible as an 
     acceptable cost, but sharply reducing their sources of 
     financial support and restricting their capability to 
     threaten the people or government of Sierra Leone is within 
     reach of sufficient numbers of properly trained, equipped, 
     and well-led troops and is vitally important.

  That is to paraphrase a much more robust mission directive and 
portfolio and is exactly what needs to be done.

       The most likely nations to carry the burden would be 
     Nigeria and Ghana, with the backing of other ECOWAS states. 
     Other nations who are already rushing troops to Sierra Leone 
     include India, Jordan and Bangladesh. Most potential troop 
     contributors from the region are likely to require better 
     equipment and training if they are to contribute 
     meaningfully. Pentagon and EUCOM assessment teams are 
     studying the issue urgently. If our objectives are to be 
     accomplished, the U.S. will need to be ready, with 
     congressional support and funding, to provide our share of 
     international effort to provide equipment and training to 
     those who are willing to do the military job--including the 
     government of Sierra Leone and other countries in the region. 
     Any direct training of contributing country troops by U.S. 
     military personnel would be done outside Sierra Leone and no 
     U.S. combat troops would be deployed to Sierra Leone. We will 
     have to work out the relationships between such an operation 
     and the UN, recognizing that for many countries a UN role is 
     preferable--but we must ensure that the mandate is robust. 
     Fourth, since there is virtually no real government structure 
     left in Sierra Leone, if the security situation can be 
     stabilized a longer term international effort will be needed 
     to help build viable institutions in Sierra Leone. It will 
     take time, but in the long run, the rest of the effort will 
     be unsuccessful if it is not accompanied by this component.

[[Page 9476]]

     However, this cannot start until the situation is stabilized, 
     and there is no present funding request for this function. 
     Fifth (this is a point I failed to mention in our meeting) we 
     must develop a corresponding political strategy for dealing 
     appropriately with Liberia's President, Charles Taylor, and 
     with the illicit diamond trade that fuels conflict and 
     criminality in the region.

  That is a reading of two of the major paragraphs in this letter.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the letter be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         The Representative of the United States of America to the 
           United Nations,
                                                     May 30, 2000.
     Hon. Judd Gregg,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Allow me to thank you again for your 
     courtesy and for our exchange of views on peacekeeping 
     issues. I know the Secretary also appreciates your discussion 
     with her on May 20, and I would like to follow up on both 
     conversations. I have shared our discussions with Secretary 
     Albright, Sandy Berger, and Jack Lew, all of whom expressed 
     their appreciation of your decision to release the funds for 
     Kosovo and for your readiness to meet with the Australian 
     Ambassador to resolve the East Timor peacekeeping ``hold.''
       You asked for a letter encapsulating our discussion on 
     Sierra Leone and Congo. After close consultation with 
     Secretary Albright, let me review where we stand on each 
     issue:
       First, Sierra Leone. Let me posit five principles that we 
     will use to govern our policy. First, the United States does 
     not believe that Foday Sankoh should play any role whatsoever 
     in the future political process in Sierra Leone, and we will 
     continue to press this point. He must be held accountable for 
     his actions. Second, we strongly support the British military 
     presence in Sierra Leone, which has played a key role in 
     restoring a measure of stability to Freetown. We are 
     discussing with the British their continuing role, and on May 
     23 London announced an important training program for the 
     Sierra Leone army, something that they will undertake at 
     their own expense outside the UN system. Third, the objective 
     should be to ensure that regional and international forces in 
     Sierra Leone, together with the armed forces of the 
     Government of Sierra Leone, have the capacity to disrupt RUF 
     control of Sierra Leone's diamond producing areas, the main 
     source of RUF income. Completely eliminating them as a 
     military force is not likely to be possible at an acceptable 
     cost, but sharply reducing their sources of financial support 
     and restricting their capability to threaten the people or 
     Government of Sierra Leone is within reach of sufficient 
     numbers of properly trained, equipped, and well-led troops 
     and is vitally important.
       The most likely nations to carry the burden would be 
     Nigeria and Ghana, with the backing of other ECOWAS states. 
     Other nations who are already rushing troops to Sierra Leone 
     include India, Jordan and Bangladesh. Most potential troop 
     contributors from the region are likely to require better 
     equipment and training if they are to contribute 
     meaningfully. Pentagon and EUCOM assessment teams are 
     studying the issue urgently. If our objectives are to be 
     accomplished, the U.S. will need to be ready, with 
     congressional support and funding, to provide our share of an 
     international effort to provide equipment and training to 
     those who are willing to do the military job--including the 
     governments of Sierra Leone and other countries in the 
     region. Any direct training of contributing country troops by 
     U.S. military personnel would be done outside Sierra Leone 
     and no U.S. combat troops would be deployed to Sierra Leone. 
     We will have to work out the relationship between such an 
     operation and the UN, recognizing that for many countries a 
     UN role is preferable--but we must ensure that the mandate is 
     robust. Fourth, since there is virtually no real government 
     structure left in Sierra Leone, if the security situation can 
     be stabilized a longer term international effort will be 
     needed to help build viable institutions in Sierra Leone. It 
     will take time, but in the long run, the rest of the effort 
     will be unsuccessful if it is not accompanied by this 
     component. However, this cannot start until the situation is 
     stabilized, and there is no present funding request for this 
     function. Fifth (this is a point I failed to mention in our 
     meeting) we must develop a corresponding political strategy 
     for dealing appropriately with Liberia's President, Charles 
     Taylor, and with the illicit diamond trade that fuels 
     conflict and criminality in the region.
       On the Congo, the problems are still daunting, but there 
     has been some real movement since I first discussed this 
     issue with you in late February:
       (A) On May 4, in my presence, the Kabila Government signed 
     the Status of Forces Agreement with the UN--an essential 
     precondition for any UN deployment;
       (B) Kabila has said he would accept South African troops;
       (C) The Lusaka parties signed a new cease-fire agreement 
     effective April 14, calming the situation on the ground 
     considerably;
       (D) The UN Security Council Mission negotiated on May 8 a 
     cease-fire between the Ugandans and Rwandans who were 
     fighting in Kisangani (Congo's third largest, and perhaps 
     most strategic, city); Regional leaders subsequently secured 
     agreement between Rwanda and Uganda on a detailed 
     disengagement plan;
       (E) The Presidents of Rwanda and Uganda asked for immediate 
     UN assistance in support of demilitarizing Kisangani;
       (F) All the parties to the war in the Congo have asked for 
     the UN observer mission as soon as possible to implement the 
     Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement;
       (G) The South Africans sent a high-level military mission 
     in New York to discuss their role in Congo, and the 
     Pakistanis (among others) are about to send troops. The South 
     Africans met with a joint State Pentagon-NSC team to discuss 
     close coordination.
       Of course, not all the news from Congo is positive. While 
     progressing, the political dialogue called for by Lusaka is 
     off to a slow start; the UN and the OAU military observer 
     missions have not meshed sufficiently; some of the rebels 
     still violate the cease-fire on occasion; and there are many 
     other lesser problems. Still there is a real desire for some 
     resolution to these issues by most parties. What is required 
     next is a step-by-step test of their commitments to implement 
     their own ``African agreement for an African problem.'' This 
     is one of our highest priorities.
       As we both said to you, neither the Secretary nor I are 
     certain that Lusaka will succeed. But we are certain that 
     Lusaka will fail if the UN does not take the next series of 
     steps to support it, as called for by all parties. The recent 
     progress supports this view, I believe.
       For the United States, this will require the unblocking of 
     $41 million of reprogrammed peacekeeping funds for the 
     current fiscal year for Congo. We believe that this request 
     does not put our national prestige on the line; it is a UN 
     operation (with no U.S. troops in the UN operation). However, 
     if we do not pay our share, we are concerned that the UN will 
     be unable to bring in adequate and properly equipped troops, 
     and the resulting failure of the mission will be attributed, 
     however unfairly, to the United States.
       Our arrears on the current operation in Sierra Leone limit 
     our ability to promote effectively the critical policy 
     objectives outlined in this letter. More broadly, failure to 
     pay our share of these missions risks seriously undermining 
     our all-out effort to carry the Helms-Biden reform package, 
     on which we are making real progress. You will note several 
     recent news articles regarding our forward movement on a wide 
     range of issues, including the admission of Israel to a UN 
     regional grouping (after 40 years!), the new GAO report that 
     shows UN progress, and the first debate in 27 years on 
     revising the UN peacekeeping scale. All this forward movement 
     will greatly benefit from your support and I thank you for 
     your thoughtful involvement in this process.
       I hope this letter is responsive to your request. If I can 
     be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to 
     contact me or my colleagues in the State Department.
           Sincerely,
                                             Richard C. Holbrooke.

  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, this letter obviously, in my opinion, is a 
very positive step in the redirection of American policy in Sierra 
Leone. I congratulate Ambassador Holbrooke for organizing the letter.
  Whereas the Article V and IX of the Lome Accord granted Foday Sankoh 
the Vice Presidency of Sierra Leone and an ``absolute and free 
pardon,'' Ambassador Holbrooke's plan makes it clear that Foday Sankoh 
can play no role in the politics or government of Sierra Leone and that 
``he must be held accountable for his actions.'' This when as late as a 
month ago State Department officials were still being quoted as saying 
that Sankoh's ``voice was positive'' and that he ``has a chance to play 
a positive role.'' Now, we will recognize him for what he is, a war 
criminal, and treat him as such.
  Whereas Annex 1 and Articles V and VII of the Lome Accord left Foday 
Sankoh and the RUF in control of Sierra Leone's diamonds, Ambassador 
Holbrooke's plan rightly strips Sankoh of his chairmanship of the 
diamond control board and insists that ``allied'' forces ``have the 
capacity to disrupt RUF control of Sierra Leone's diamond producing 
areas, the main source of RUF income.'' Under Lome, peacekeepers did no 
more than oversee the looting of Sierra Leone. Now, international 
troops will fight alongside local forces to expel the RUF from the 
diamond fields.
  Whereas the Lome Accord was silent on root causes of violence in 
Sierra

[[Page 9477]]

Leone and the region, Ambassador Holbrooke's plan seeks a ``political 
strategy for dealing appropriately with Liberia's President, Charles 
Taylor, and with the illicit diamond trade that fuels conflict and 
criminality in the region.'' The RUF is in large part Taylor's proxy. 
Under Lome, Taylor's success in seizing the riches of Sierra Leone 
could invite a similar attack on Guinea.
  Lome is dead. The U.S. will not turn a blind eye to the rape of a 
people and a land. We will demand that brutal thugs are held 
accountable for their atrocities, and regional trouble-makers.
  Why the change? I do not flatter myself that my ``hold'' did all of 
this, but it did give those of us who opposed the Lome Accord a chance 
to right a terrible wrong. And to his credit, Ambassador Holbrooke has 
crafted a forceful plan, and vetted it through the inter-agency process 
in record time. It is a plan that I believe Americans can and should 
support, and can be proud of.
  Therefore, I am releasing my hold on the $50,000,000 owed the U.N. 
for peacekeeping in Sierra Leone. I will also press ahead to ensure 
that my provision blocking the illicit sale of diamonds from Sierra 
Leone and other war-torn countries is included in the final version of 
the fiscal year 2001 military construction appropriations bill. 
Finally, I look forward to working with Ambassador Holbrooke and his 
staff to ensure that the strategy laid out in his letter is supported 
by Congress.
  I thank the Chair. I thank the Senator from Idaho for his courtesy.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, thank you very much.

                          ____________________