[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 7]
[Senate]
[Pages 9304-9310]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                   EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Georgia, Senator 
Cleland, for his role in our ongoing, bipartisan foreign policy dialog. 
As we approach Memorial Day, I also thank him for his personal 
sacrifice and example for our great country.
  This is our fourth foreign policy dialog. It is called the employment 
of U.S. military forces or what could be better described as the use of 
force. It couldn't come at a better time, the week prior to the 
Memorial Day celebration, a day of solemn celebration and reflection, a 
day to remember our fallen family members, our friends, and our fellow 
Americans, a day that always makes me very proud of our country and 
humbled by the self-sacrifice of our men and women who paid the 
ultimate price so that we may live free.
  As my good friend from Georgia has seen with his own eyes, it is not 
the U.S. Constitution that really keeps us free, for it is merely a 
piece of paper. The marble headstones at Arlington National Cemetery 
and cemeteries all across America and throughout the world mark what 
truly has kept us free. And our freedoms will continue to be secured by 
the brave men and women of our Armed Forces.
  Samuel P. Huntington, the renowned author and historian in the 1950s, 
articulated in his book ``The Soldier and the State'' two important 
military characteristics. The first is expertise to prevail at the art 
of war; the second is the responsibility for protecting our freedoms, 
similar to the responsibility that lawyers have to protect American 
justice and the rule of law and that doctors have to save lives and 
protect the health of their patients. Quite simply: The role of our 
Armed Forces is to fight and to win the Nation's wars.
  Eleven times in our history the United States has formally declared 
war against foreign adversaries. There have been hundreds of instances, 
however, in which the United States has utilized military forces abroad 
in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to protect our 
U.S. citizens or to promote our U.S. interests. Of those hundreds of 
uses of military force where the U.S. did not declare war, some have 
obviously been successful and some obviously have not.
  Today, I am not going to discuss the use of military force for the 
purpose of protecting our vital national interests. Those uses of force 
in our history have occurred rarely and usually without much opposition 
due to the future of the Nation. Our forces are equipped and train 
every day to carry out this task. Those types of conflicts of national 
survival have easily been defined in terms of the political objectives, 
clear military strategies to achieve those objectives, and the 
definition of victory or success is the capitulation of the enemy.
  The U.S. Armed Forces are no stranger to limited contingency 
operations, military operations other than war, but the changes in 
political context of the commitments pose new problems of legitimacy, 
mission creep, operational tempo, and multilateral cooperation. 
Although limited contingency operations may produce short-term 
benefits, history has shown the lasting results of long-term 
commitments are very limited at best.
  The ideas developed by Carl von Clausewitz, famous military theorist 
of the early 19th century, are profoundly relevant today. The criteria 
of appropriateness and proportionality are crucial concerns in any 
military operation other than war.
  Clausewitz identified any protracted operation that involves 
enlargement or lengthening of troop commitment is likely to cause 
multiple rationales for the intervention. When a marine landing party 
went ashore at Port-au-Prince in Haiti in 1915, neither the Wilson 
administration nor the Marine Corps nor the Congress would have 
predicted that they began an operation to protect the foreign lives and 
property and to stop a civil war that would end 30 years later with an 
admission of failure in reforming the public institutions of Haiti.
  Does this sound familiar? Currently, the United States has troops in 
141 nations and at sea; 55 percent of the nations of the world have 
U.S. troops stationed within their borders. From

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1956--that is the second term of President Eisenhower--to 1992, the 
United States used military forces abroad 51 times. Since 1992, the 
U.S. has used military force 51 times.
  During that same timeframe of roughly a 400-percent increase in the 
use of the military as an instrument of power, the military has been 
forced to downsize and decrease force structure by 40 percent. That 
type of planning and management of the military reflects poorly on the 
civilian leadership. All of our services are at the breaking point. I 
fear there is no more give or elasticity in the force structure of our 
most valued treasure, the men and women who serve.
  The can-do, never-say-die attitude of the military and its leadership 
and the very competence that the U.S. military has displayed in 
successfully responding to a wide variety of contingencies seems to 
have encouraged its further use by this administration, acquiesced to 
by this Congress.
  A recent study from the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies of military culture identifies seven areas of concern within 
our military today. Service members expressed a commitment to values 
related to effectiveness and sacrifice and discipline, but they had 
deep concerns about the imbalance between the missions and the 
resources to perform those missions to a high standard. They felt the 
Pentagon was out of touch. Quite frankly, they questioned the command 
support in the face of social concerns. They had concerns about the 
sense of dwindling understanding of the military so rampant today in 
our society. They indicated a lot of disgust with civilian leadership 
behavior not tolerated in their units in the military.
  Thomas Jefferson said: Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Our 
military has always exemplified that statement.
  However, I am concerned that the current use of military force is 
undermining the trust of leadership at all levels. We cannot continue 
to accept the status quo. We cannot continue to appropriate the 
contingency funds for emergency deployments with no end in sight or no 
planned exit strategy.
  General Zinni, who is the CINC of the Central Command, expressed 
concern about the pace of these operations and what it is doing to our 
service members. He said:

       We don't have the resources to meet the strategy. It's 
     plain and simple. We don't have enough people, we don't have 
     enough force structure, we don't have the right kinds of 
     things we need to meet the strategy.

  Since 1991, we have spent over $25 billion on peacekeeping 
operations. The impact on the war-fighting capability of each of the 
services, including the time to recover war-fighting skills after 
peacekeeping operations, is reflected in the current readiness concerns 
expressed by the Joint Chiefs.
  As an example, the United States continues to dedicate three 
divisions in the Balkans rotation: One division training to deploy for 
peacekeeping operations, one division in the area of responsibility, 
and one division retraining after deployment--three divisions not ready 
to execute their primary tasks.
  Here is an account from a commander in Kosovo, a peacekeeping 
operation, which is very troubling to me. This is a quote, an e-mail 
that went from one commander to another. He was reflecting to his 
friend, who was going to take over his command, what went on in terms 
of his daily operation:

       After getting hit in the head by a large rock and getting 
     smashed across the back with a tree limb, I gave the order 
     for the soldiers to open fire with nonlethal munitions. This 
     worked pretty well clearing the crowd back initially. As we 
     continued to fight and move with the people on the hill, I 
     looked over to the landing zone and saw a mob swarming toward 
     the subject and five soldiers. The soldiers started to move 
     out of the landing zone, but they had people around them 
     throwing everything. I grabbed 10 guys and went to help get 
     the five soldiers. When we were 15 meters away, I saw a 
     soldier get smashed over the head with a huge tree limb. He 
     was fine. Thank God for Kevlar. At this point, I took out my 
     9mm with the intent to shoot. However, I fired several 
     warning shots. The crowd cleared out, and we walked everyone 
     out, including the injured.

  I want to ask a question. What if those rocks and tree limbs would 
have been AK-47s and RPGs? I think the debate about a week ago 
regarding Kosovo and our involvement there would have dramatically 
changed had that been the case.
  We continue to maintain multiple wings of aircraft in southwest Asia, 
and we continue to place American aviators in harm's way every day in 
Iraq. What most Americans don't know is that although airpower seems 
sterile, clean, and bloodless on CNN that is not the case--that is not 
the case. The mission tapes of the men and women flying missions over 
Iraq reflect the risk. A war America thought we won 10 years ago slowly 
rages on.
  Mr. President, 75 percent of our military today joined after 1989. 
They have known nothing but turmoil in terms of their missions. They 
have been deployed away from their families for 6-month rotations and, 
in some cases, three, four, and five times. Their war-fighting 
capabilities and readiness to execute military operations is not as 
sharp as it should be. Their morale is low because they are leaving 
their families. Seventy percent of the force today is married, and they 
are leaving them for very questionable missions. No wonder sailors and 
airmen and soldiers are leaving the force and voting with their feet. 
Only the Marine Corps has maintained their recruiting and retention 
goals, and they have had a very difficult time achieving that goal.
  The current military is stressed, it is strained, and it is hollow. 
As our armed services activity levels have increased and force 
structure has decreased time for realistic combat training is lost, 
supply stocks are diminished, and personnel are displaced. Military 
leadership at all levels suffers from the current strain; leadership 
crucial in regard to the goal of winning wars.
  The key to leadership is trust: Trust from the civilian leadership 
and the public that the military will put together the proper plan to 
win, trust from the military that the civilian leadership--those of us 
in the Congress and in the administration--will provide the proper 
tools to win, and trust to use force judiciously and to gain the 
political and public support.
  Congress must trust the President, and the President must trust the 
Congress to ensure the use of force is necessary, after all other 
instruments of power and diplomacy have failed. And our national 
interests dictate that the political objectives still must be achieved.
  I commend our military leaders for weathering the current storm. I 
also commend the men and women of the Armed Forces. Whenever I visit a 
base in Kansas, or overseas, I am always impressed with our citizens in 
uniform. Their service, integrity, self-discipline, respect for 
authority, honor, and sacrifice is inspirational; it is a battery 
charger. I know we have honest disagreements and differences of 
opinions, and that is good for the system. Debate will continue to 
occur. Even General Washington had severe disagreements with the 
Congress about allowing him to perform summary punishments. However, we 
must mend, heal, and restore harmony to the system by rebuilding the 
respect, trust, and understanding in the civilian-military relations.
  In the post-cold-war era, limited contingency operations have become 
our predominant military endeavor. There are no easy answers to the 
problems of limited contingency operations. Deciding to intervene and 
use our military force is a very difficult problem; it is very 
perplexing.
  The distinguished Senator from Georgia and I have had long talks 
about this, trying to set up some kind of a criterion, set up some kind 
of a list that would make sense, outlining the various reasons for 
intervention abroad. Listing all of the questions the President ought 
to ask before the Marines are sent in can best be characterized now as 
an ``it depends'' doctrine.
  I acknowledge that the post-cold-war recommendations and the public 
debate between the foreign policy elite, the Congress, the Secretary of 
State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot agree upon and do not provide a clear set 
of tests that should be applied before deciding to commit troops to 
combat in support of less

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than vital national interests. I wish there were a test or a criterion.
  That is really the reason Senator Cleland and I entered into the 
foreign policy dialog. We always seem to be stuck with foregone 
conclusions in terms of foreign policy and sending our men and women in 
uniform in harms way.
  The former Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, identified six 
tests that he said should be applied when weighing the use of U.S. 
combat forces abroad. Three of the tests--number one, when vital 
interests are at stake; number five, with public support; and number 
six, as a last resort--concern the foreign policy and the political 
circumstances in regard to the use of force. Tests number two, three, 
and four concern the relationship between the military means and the 
political ends.
  Former Secretary of State, George Shultz on the ``vital interests'' 
test argued that a wide range of international challenges justify U.S. 
use of force. And, the last two administrations have uniformly rejected 
the first vital interest test.
  Former Secretary of Defense William Perry argued that the use of 
force might be necessary to support coercive diplomacy when national 
interests that do not rise to the level of vital are at stake.
  Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has asserted that decisions can 
only be made on a case by case basis, and it would be counterproductive 
to define rigidly in advance the conditions in which a decision to use 
force would be made.
  But if vital interests need not be at stake, the question remains 
what degree of U.S. interests justify the use of force, at what level, 
and with what risks.
  Mr. President, I would contend that the use of force for other than 
vital or extremely important national interests, as defined in our 
second dialogue, has not worked in the post-cold-war period. The role 
of the military is not to act as the cop on the beat for the whole 
world. The non-prudent use of force in support of less than vital 
interests is not worth the current costs to our readiness and military 
morale.
  C. Mark Brinkley in the Marine Corps Times said it best when he 
identified with no other form of government to turn to, Serbs and 
ethnic Albanians alike turned to the Marines for help. In addition, to 
more traditional roles of securing the area and suppressing civil 
unrest, the unit recreated basic elements of daily life: restoring law 
and order and reopening schools and hospitals, garbage collection, and 
counselling. The Marines also evolved into a police force for the 
American sector, patrolling the night and responding to emergencies.
  However, these operations require significantly different skills than 
what the armed forces are currently trained to execute. If we are 
training our peacekeepers to be more like MP's than combat troops, 
don't we run the risk that the skills needed by a policeman may get 
them killed when there is combat?
  Two schools of thought on the use of force have developed, the 
national interests school which argues that military force should be 
used only when there is clear cut political and military objectives and 
in an overwhelming fashion.
  The other school, the limited objectives school, which would use 
military force even in ambiguous situations as a means of enforcing 
international decisions or quelling ethnic conflict.
  General Colin Powell contended in 1993, the key to using military 
force is to first match political expectations to military means in a 
wholly realistic way, and, second to attain decisive results. A 
decision to use force must be made with a clear purpose in mind, and 
then adding that if it is too murky, as is often the case, know that 
leaders will eventually have to find clarity.
  We are having a hard time doing that in the Balkans today.
  The decision to use force must also be supported by the public. 
Presidential leadership requires working with Congress and the American 
people requires Congress to work with the President to provide 
essential domestic groundwork if U.S. military commitments are to be 
sustainable. General Powell asserted the troops must go into battle 
with the support or understanding of the American people.
  Mr. President, the pendulum's path has definitely displaced toward 
the limited objectives school. President Clinton's doctrine of ``global 
vigilance'' and ``aggressive multilaterialism'' is the current example 
and policy.
  Mr. President, the current precision strike and technological 
advantage that we enjoy today has led to its increased use due to the 
perceived minimal risk to American aviators. A few cruise missiles or 
laser guided bombs may fix a short term problem but do not address the 
underlying long term problems. I would contend that if the intervention 
is not worth the cost of one American service member then we ought to 
be thinking about the worth of using military force in the first place.
  If the U.S. decides to use military force and unleash our military 
might then the cause had better be commensurate with American national 
interests and analogous to the risk to American service members.
  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton 
pronounced the ``Dover Test'' must be used when deciding to send troops 
in harms way, and, if the use of force is not worth the consequences of 
American service members making the ultimate sacrifice arriving at 
Dover Air Force Base then the military should not be used.
  If the cause is not worth the risk of one American life then the 
results and handcuffs placed on the military rules of engagement in an 
effort to curtail risk actually increase the risk. The situation over 
time, and the situation we are now faced with in the Balkans and in 
Iraq.
  Mr. President, I believe the pendulum of the use of force doctrine 
needs to swing towards the national interest school of thought. 
Humanitarian military intervention, in violation of the U.N. charter 
from attacking other states to remedy violations of human rights, will 
not rectify the underlying human rights problems. When there is no 
peace to keep then American service members become targets, not 
peacekeepers.
  Our challenge is to understand the need for prudent, limited, 
proportionate use of military force as an instrument of national power.
  I now want to offer a very strong and very thought provoking words 
from the book ``Fighting for the Future,'' by Ralph Peters, former Army 
lieutenant colonel. It is controversial. I offer it as food for 
thought.
  Colonel Peters said:

       We face opponents, from warlords to druglords, who operate 
     in environments of tremendous moral freedom, unconstrained by 
     laws, internationally recognized treaties, and civilized 
     customs, or by the approved behaviors of the international 
     military brotherhood. These men beat us. Terrorists who 
     rejected our worldview defeated us in Lebanon. ``General'' 
     Aideed, defeated us in Somalia. And Saddam, careless of his 
     own people, denied us the fruits of our battlefield victory. 
     In the Balkans and on its borders, intransigents continue to 
     hold our troops hostage to a meandering policy. Our enemies 
     play the long game, while we play jailbird chess--never 
     thinking more than one move ahead. Until we change the rules, 
     until we stop attacking foreign masses to punish by proxy 
     protected-status murderers, we will continue to lose. And 
     even as we lose, our cherished ethics do not stand up to 
     hardheaded examination. We have become not only losers but 
     random murderers, willing to kill several hundred Somalis in 
     a single day but unwilling to kill the chief assassin, 
     willing to uproot the coca fields of struggling peasants but 
     without the stomach to retaliate meaningfully against the 
     druglords who savage our children and our society.

  He went on to say,

       Tomorrow's enemies will be of two kinds--those who have 
     seen their hopes disappointed, and those who have no hope. Do 
     not worry about a successful China, worry about a failing 
     China.

  Those are words to think about.
  Limited contingency operations consisting of crisis management, power 
projection, peacekeeping, localized military action, support for 
allies, or responding to terrorism require well-defined objectives, 
consistent strategies to achieve objectives, and a clear, concise exit 
strategy once those objectives are attained. Otherwise, our

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country will get involved in operations like those in the Balkans with 
no end in sight and no peace to keep.
  Mr. President, in closing, our service members are, in fact, America, 
they reflect our diverse origins and they are the embodiment of the 
American spirit of courage and dedication. Their forebears went by the 
names of doughboys, Yanks, buffalo soldiers, Johnny Reb, Rough Riders, 
and GI's. For over 200 years they have answered our Nation's call to 
fight. Our citizen soldiers today continue to carry America's value 
system and commitment to freedom and democracy.
  The world we face is still full of uncertainty and threats. It is not 
a safe world. However, all Americans sleep soundly at night because of 
the young men and women standing ready to fight and die, if necessary, 
for our freedoms. It is our duty in this body to ensure they are used 
appropriately. We have an obligation to do just that in the future, for 
our sake and theirs.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I wish every American could have heard 
that distinguished lecture, dialog, and discussion of what I think is 
the most important action this Government can ever take, and that is 
the question of committing young Americans in harm's way. It is the 
most serious decision that I as a Member of the Senate can take. It is 
one of the reasons that brings me here to share the podium and the 
floor in the Senate with the distinguished Senator from Kansas, Pat 
Roberts, my colleague, my friend. We work together so well on the Armed 
Services Committee on behalf of young Americans in the military and 
retired military and Guard and Reservists, we thought we would bring 
our thoughts, our concerns, to the floor of this body and stand 
shoulder to shoulder as we are today discussing at the question of 
American intervention abroad.
  I will recap a couple of items that Senator Roberts, in his eloquence 
and in his great research, has pulled together for Members to consider 
as we look at the question of America's intervention abroad today. He 
mentioned that we were involved militarily in 141 places around the 
globe. I deal with these issues most every day. That is even a shocking 
statistic to me. Additionally, we were involved militarily in more than 
55 percent of all the nations on the globe. One wonders if we are not 
becoming the new Rome. My greatest fear is we will become part of a Pax 
Americana, or as 2,000 years ago, Pax Romana, where Rome kept the peace 
in the known world. Is that our role today? Is that our mission? Are we 
called upon to be the new Rome or is that part of our intervention 
strategy?
  I thought it was fascinating that Senator Roberts pointed out since 
Eisenhower we have intervened in the world some 51 times; just since 
1992 we have had 51 interventions. We have had an increase in American 
military commitments in the last 10 to 15 years of some 400 percent, 
but we have downsized the American military's ability to meet those 
commitments by some 40 percent. A classic case is the Balkans. I just 
got back from Macedonia, Kosovo, and visited the airbase where we 
launched the attacks into Kosovo and Serbia at Aviano, Italy. We have 
three U.S. Army divisions, as the distinguished Senator from Kansas has 
pointed out, in effect, bogged down in the Balkans. That is almost a 
third of our entire U.S. Army. They are bogged down in the Balkans with 
no end in sight. As the distinguished Senator has pointed out, it is 
hard to keep the peace when there is no peace to keep.
  I think also fascinating is his point that some 75 percent of our 
young Americans in active duty military service joined the service 
since 1989. All they have known is turmoil, deployments, commitments, 
time away from their family. I think that is a powerful point and one 
of the things that stresses and strains our American military today.
  That brings us to the floor today on this key question of trust, 
trust in the leadership, especially the civilian leadership of this 
Government, and trying to increase that trust among our young men and 
women deployed all over the world. His point is certainly well taken 
today, that if we don't judiciously use the American military, then we 
will see it attrited over time to where we cannot use it. So that 
element of trust is a key element that I keep close to my heart. I 
appreciate the Senator mentioning it.
  The distinguished Senator mentioned that next Monday is Memorial Day, 
May 29. Pursuant to a joint resolution approved by the Congress in 
1950, the President of the United States will issue a proclamation 
calling upon the people of the United States to observe a day of prayer 
for permanent peace in remembrance of all those brave Americans who 
have died in our Nation's service. That is what Memorial Day is 
supposed to be all about--a day of remembrance. As someone who almost 
wound up on the Vietnam veteran wall, I can say that Memorial Day 
honoring those who never made it back from our wars is something 
special to me.
  With this, our fourth discussion on the role of the United States in 
today's world, Senator Roberts and I come to what is probably the core 
issue motivating us to take on this entire project. The key question 
is, Under what circumstances should the Government of the United States 
employ military force as an instrument of national policy? I can think 
of no more fitting subject for the Congress to contemplate as we 
prepare for the Memorial Day recess.
  We have quoted Clausewitz, the great German theoretician on war, 
numerous times, but this is a quote that I think is appropriate as we 
approach Memorial Day. Clausewitz said of war,

       Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some 
     ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much 
     bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art 
     of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be 
     exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes 
     which come from kindness are the very worst . . . It would be 
     futile--even wrong--to try to shut one's eyes to what war 
     really is from sheer distress of its brutality.

  General Sherman said it best: War is hell. For those who participate 
they understand it must only be undertaken under the most serious 
circumstances. My partner in these dialogues, the distinguished Senator 
from Kansas, Senator Roberts, has often cited the following quotation 
from one of my personal heroes, Senator Richard B. Russell, from thirty 
years ago, during the war in Vietnam. At that time I was serving in 
that war. Senator Russell said:

       While it is a sound policy to have limited objectives, we 
     should not expose our men to unnecessary hazards to life and 
     limb in pursuing them. As for me, my fellow Americans, I 
     shall never knowingly support a policy of sending even a 
     single American boy overseas to risk his life in combat 
     unless the entire civilian population and wealth of our 
     country--all that we have and all that we are--is to bear a 
     commensurate responsibility in giving him the fullest support 
     and protection of which we are capable.

  That was Senator Russell 30 years ago. As Senator Roberts has 
observed, ``That is a most powerful statement of truth that has direct 
applications to the challenges we face today . . . The only thing that 
has changed is that today we refer to American men and women.''
  I share Senator Roberts' sentiment completely.
  Richard Haass, a former official in the Bush administration and now 
director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and 
also someone whom both Senator Roberts and I have frequently cited 
during these discussions, has written a wonderful primer called 
``Intervention, The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War 
World.'' In it Mr. Haass provides an overview of the evolution of 
American thinking about intervention, followed by an analysis of 
current policies on the subject and a set of pragmatic guidelines which 
Mr. Haass proposes to improve the conduct of future American 
interventions. It is well worth the attention of every Member of this 
distinguished body.
  Mr. Haass writes:

       The changes intrinsic to the post-Cold War world have 
     created new, intense conflicts that complicate any 
     prospective use of force by the United States. On the other 
     hand, a number of political and technological developments 
     enhance opportunities for the

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     United States to use its military might effectively. . . . 
     But if there are new reasons as well as new opportunities for 
     the United States to use force, there are no longer any clear 
     guidelines for when and how to do it. . . . Intervening too 
     often poses an obvious danger. Any government indulging in 
     what might be described as wanton uses of force would be 
     guilty of acting irresponsibly, particularly toward those in 
     uniform. . . . At the same time, setting too high a bar 
     against intervention has costs as well. Defining interests 
     too narrowly or prerequisites for employing force too broadly 
     would be tantamount to adopting a policy of isolationism.

  In my view, this is a very lucid discussion of where we are and of 
the difficult choices we face when--and unfortunately I must add if--
the Congress of the United States is included in these deliberations on 
intervention. We saw these issues largely recapitulated here on the 
Senate floor as recently as last week with our belated but still 
illuminating debate on the ongoing Kosovo intervention.
  I wish my distinguished friend from Kansas and I could have had that 
kind of debate before we engaged in the first military strike in 
Kosovo. I still remember well, as the Senator from Kansas has 
indicated, virtually by the time we got the ball here in the Senate, 
the prestige of the United States and NATO was already at stake. The 
horse was already out of the barn. We debated military intervention 
into Kosovo, an offensive strike by NATO, which is a basically 
defensive military organization--we debated it here only a couple of 
days. We had a very fine debate, pro and con, about the future of that 
military engagement in Kosovo in the last few days. Those debates will 
continue as long as that force is there, and properly so. But our point 
here is let's make those debates on the floor of the Senate before we 
commit military force, and not after.
  As I mentioned before, the Haass book also offers a useful 
presentation on the evolution of American thinking on intervention, 
starting with our heritage under what he calls Christian ``just wars,'' 
or the ``just war'' theory as enunciated by such luminaries as St. 
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and others. As defined by Haass, under this 
approach, ``wars are considered to be just if they are fought for a 
worthy cause, likely to achieve it, sponsored by legitimate authority, 
undertaken as a last resort, and conducted in a way that uses no more 
force than necessary or proportionate and that respects the welfare of 
noncombatants.''
  While the ``just war'' theory has never been the sole criterion by 
which America or other western nations have waged war, it is 
nonetheless still a standard moral benchmark, if you will, which we can 
and should apply to individual proposed interventions. It is something 
we ought to keep in mind.
  As we have discussed before in this series, the end of World War II 
and the onset of the cold war produced great tension, the threat of a 
global nuclear Armageddon, and a vast expenditure of resources. But it 
also created a very clear standard of military interventionism for the 
United States; namely, the containment of the Soviet Union and its 
allies. It was under this overall framework that the two largest post-
World War II American interventions took place, in Korea and Vietnam.
  The eminent military historian of the war in Vietnam, Colonel Harry 
G. Summers, Jr., discussed the failure--on many different levels--of 
that American intervention in his book ``On Strategy: The Vietnam War 
in Context.''
  I have read this book thoroughly. I just wish I had read it before I 
went to Vietnam and not after.
  It is not my purpose today to revisit that conflict in detail, but 
for purposes of today's discussion on the general subject of American 
intervention abroad, let me quote briefly from Summers' work. He says:

       By our own definition, we failed to properly employ our 
     Armed Forces so as to secure U.S. national objectives in 
     Vietnam. Our strategy failed the ultimate test, for, as 
     Clausewitz said, the ends of strategy, in the final analysis 
     ``are those objectives that will finally lead to peace.''

  Given the magnitude of our defeat in Vietnam, and attendant human, 
financial, and political costs, there was a very understandable 
recoiling from military interventionism in the public and Congress, 
among various Presidential administrations and among the American 
military itself. Nearly a decade passed from the end of U.S. combat 
participation in Vietnam in 1973 until the deployment of the U.S. 
Marines as part of the Multinational Force in Lebanon in August of 
1982. However, this was also a period when many of the post-cold-war 
conditions described by Haass as facilitating U.S. interventions were 
first taking hold, including the diminution of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact 
threat, the development of greater U.S. capacity to sustain long-
distance military operations, and the resurgence of national and ethnic 
tensions around the globe.
  A little less than a decade after the Lebanon debacle, in the 
aftermath of other interventions in Grenada in 1983, Libya in 1986, 
Panama in 1989-1990, and in the 1990-1991 timeframe in the gulf war, 
and after the final end of the cold war, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, who had lived through this entire era, 
propounded a list of six questions which must be addressed before we 
commit to a military intervention.
  I submit General Powell's summation here is a summation based on his 
own experience and his own history in looking at this turbulent time.
  No. 1, is the political objective important, clearly defined, and 
well understood?
  No. 2, have all nonviolent means been tried and failed?
  No. 3, will military force achieve the objective?
  No. 4, what will be the cost?
  Next, Have the gains and risks been thoroughly analyzed?
  Next, After the intervention, how will the situation likely evolve 
and what will the consequences be?
  That is, I guess, my biggest problem with some of our interventions. 
We have not thought through the end game, sometimes called the exit 
strategy. But what would be the result of failure? What will be the 
result of success? I am not sure we are thinking through our 
interventions.
  In a similar vein, falling on the side of what I would call restraint 
with respect to U.S. military interventions, in 1993, then-Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher outlined four prerequisites for the use of 
force by the United States:
  No. 1, the presence of clearly articulated objectives;
  No. 2, a high probability of success;
  No. 3, the likelihood of congressional and public support; and No. 4, 
the inclusion of a clear exit strategy.
  Not bad advice. However, even before the start of the Clinton 
administration, developments in Africa and in the Balkans were leading 
to a reassessment of the limits on U.S. military interventions. At the 
same time his administration was deciding in favor of intervention in 
Somalia but against military involvement in Bosnia, President Bush 
articulated a somewhat lower bar for U.S. military intervention. As 
described by Haass:

       Bush argued for a case-by-case approach in deciding when 
     and where to use force. He argued against using interests as 
     an absolute guide, noting that ``military force may not be 
     the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using 
     force might be the best way to protect an interest that 
     qualifies as important but less than vital.''

  That is Haass.

       Instead, Bush set out five requirements for military 
     intervention to make sense: force should only be used, he 
     said, where the stakes warrant it, where and when it can be 
     effective, where the application can be limited in scope and 
     time, and where the benefits justify the potential costs and 
     sacrifice. Multilateral support is desirable but not 
     essential. What is essential in every case is a clear and 
     achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the 
     mission, and realistic criteria for withdrawing U.S. forces 
     once the mission is complete.

  That is a pretty thorough analysis of the thought process that must 
be undergone if we are to be successful in our interventions.
  During the Clinton administration, there have been military 
interventions in Iraq on several occasions, and continuing to this day: 
In Somalia from 1992 to 1995, in Bosnia and Macedonia since 1993, in 
Haiti from 1993 to 1996, in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, and of 
course in Kosovo beginning last year.

[[Page 9309]]

  There has been an accompanying evolution away from the more 
restrictive view of interventions expressed by Secretary Christopher 
and toward the less restrictive stance perhaps expressed most clearly 
recently by British Prime Minister Blair in an April speech last year 
in Chicago.
  Prime Minister Blair said:

       The principle of non-interference must be qualified in 
     important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a purely 
     internal matter. When oppression produces massive flows of 
     refugees which unsettle neighboring countries then they can 
     probably be described as ``threats to international peace and 
     security. . . .'' So how do we decide when and whether to 
     intervene. I think we need to bear in mind five major 
     considerations. First, are we sure of our case? War is an 
     imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress, but 
     armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing with 
     dictators. Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? 
     Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the 
     situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and 
     prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long 
     term? In the past, we talked too much about exit strategies. 
     But having made a commitment we cannot simply walk away once 
     the fight is over, better to stay with moderate numbers of 
     troops--

  Does that sound familiar?

     than return for repeat performances with large numbers. And 
     finally, do we have national interests involved? The mass 
     expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo demanded the notice 
     of the rest of the world. But it does make a difference that 
     this is taking place in such a combustible part of Europe.

  That is the end of Blair's statement. Interesting.
  Clearly, we have come a long way from Vietnam, and today's world is 
quite different than the world of the sixties and seventies. Questions 
about the use of force are, by their very nature, difficult ones. There 
are no easy answers and no easy choices for any President, and 
certainly not us in the Congress. Part of this is a product of the 
disorderly post-cold-war order, or a new world disorder. Every American 
and every inhabitant of this planet is certainly better off than we 
were in the cold war which threatened the very survival of global 
civilization. That ended, but the termination of that phase of 
international politics has made the world actually more complex for 
foreign policymakers.
  In the cold war, the superpower rivalry and its mutually assured 
destruction doctrine, in terms of nuclear war, imposed strong 
constraints on interventions by either superpower. Korea, Vietnam, and 
Afghanistan were notable exceptions.
  In the pre-cold-war history of the United States, the question of 
U.S. intervention outside of the Western Hemisphere rarely arose, short 
of a Pearl Harbor or a Lusitania incident that began the First World 
War. In the new post-cold-war disorder, we largely face only self-
imposed constraints to our actions abroad. Thus, we now need answer 
only whether we should undertake such an action, not whether we can do 
so.
  That is a clear distinction. In the cold war, we had a line that we 
knew we could not cross or should not cross. Now there are no lines. If 
my colleagues read Tom Friedman in the book ``Lexus and the Olive 
Tree,'' barriers of all kinds, not only the Berlin Wall, are coming 
down all over the world. So the question more and more on American 
intervention is, Should we do it? What Senator Roberts and I are trying 
to say is that it is not only a Presidential decision, it is a decision 
in which all of us have to participate and, hopefully, one that we can 
arrive at a consensus on before we send young Americans into harm's 
way. That is why we are here. That is why we are taking the Senate's 
time today.
  The two administrations which have confronted the post-Soviet Union 
world have grappled mightily with the complexities in places such as 
Iraq, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Haiti, and now Kosovo. And 
almost every step in these areas have been subjected to questioning and 
controversy before, during, and after the operation in question. 
Opposition to the Presidential policies has not offered a clear-cut 
alternative, with some opponents calling for greater and some for 
lesser exertions of American power. As I have said before on several 
occasions, I approach the debate on intervention with the greatest 
respect for the difficulties which the current or, indeed, any other 
post-cold-war administration and Congress must face when deciding 
Americans should go to war.
  However, I must say that I believe any departure from the principle 
of using our military intervention solely in defense of vital national 
interests is a slippery slope. Let me say that again. I have to say 
that I personally believe that any departure from the principle of 
using American military intervention solely in defense of vital 
national interests is a slippery slope. Let's recall from our previous 
discussions the very small ``A'' list of truly vital interests. As 
articulated by the 1996 Commission on America's National Interests--and 
Senator Roberts and I are engaging ourselves with that commission that 
is cranking up again and we hope to have some input--the Commission on 
America's National Interests articulated that those interests are 
``strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance the well-being of 
Americans in a free and secure Nation,'' and include only the 
following: Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States. That is 
simple. That is clear.
  Two, prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Europe or Asia. As 
Senator Roberts the other day said, hegemon means the big bully, the 
lead dog, the big dog.
  Three, prevent the emergence of a hostile major power on U.S. borders 
or in control of the seas.
  Four, prevent the catastrophic collapse of major global systems such 
as trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and so forth.
  Five, ensure the survival of U.S. allies.
  In pursuit of these objectives, the ``United States should be 
prepared to commit itself to fight,'' the commission says, ``even if it 
has to do so unilaterally and without the assistance of allies.'' I 
understand my friend and colleague, Senator Roberts, says this list 
might be slightly modified and updated by a new commission, but the 
content will basically be similar.
  In short, I believe we can and must be prepared to commit all 
available American resources--including military forces--in the defense 
of truly vital national interests. In such cases, I believe Presidents 
should seek congressional approval, and I cannot imagine a Congress not 
granting such authority in these cases. But in all other cases, I 
believe we have to impose a much higher bar before we put American 
service men and women into harm's way--a much higher bar and a much 
higher standard than we have used in the last 10 or 15 years.
  General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it 
beautifully in an address to the Kennedy School at Harvard recently:

       In every case when we contemplate the use of force, we 
     should consider a number of important questions. These are 
     not new questions, as most are articulated formally in the 
     National Security Strategy. They are:
       Is there a clearly defined mission?
       Is the mission achievable, and are we applying the 
     necessary means to decisively achieve it?
       Do we have milestones against which we can measure or judge 
     our effectiveness?
       Is there an exit strategy? Or, put another way, a strategy 
     for success within a reasonable period?
       Do we have an alternate course of action should the 
     military action fail or take too long?
       Are we willing to resource for the long haul?
       If our military efforts are successful, are the appropriate 
     national and international agencies prepared to take 
     advantage of the success of the intervention?

  We see that in the Balkans right now.

       Have we conducted the up-front coordination with our 
     allies, friends, and international institutions to ensure our 
     response elicits the necessary regional support to ensure 
     long-term success?

  These are powerful questions, as articulated by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  He goes on to say:

       The military is the hammer in America's foreign policy 
     toolbox . . . and it is a very

[[Page 9310]]

     powerful hammer. But not every problem we face is a nail.

  That is critical.

       We may find that sorting out the good guys from the bad is 
     not as easy as it seems. We also may find that getting in is 
     much easier than getting out.

  Boy, is that true.

       These are the issues we need to confront when we make the 
     decision to commit our military forces. And that is as it 
     should be because, when we use our military forces, we lay 
     our prestige, our word, our leadership and--most 
     importantly--the lives of our young Americans on the line.

  As we approach Memorial Day, where we pay tribute and honor to those 
young Americans who have given their lives in the past, we must think 
carefully and judiciously how we commit young Americans in the future 
in terms of American military intervention in the world.
  Americans who serve today on the front lines in the service of this 
great Nation in Korea, Kosovo, Bosnia, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere 
around the globe, are very special Americans. They have volunteered to 
do this duty for the rest of us.
  When we return from the Memorial Day break, Senator Roberts and I 
will resume these dialogs with a discussion of Clausewitz's trinity of 
warmaking. He said, successfully war is prosecuted if you have three 
things together: the people, the government, and the military. Marching 
forward arm in arm is what we are all about. That will be the subject 
of our next discussion.
  I yield to the distinguished Senator from Kansas, my partner, my dear 
friend, Mr. Pat Roberts.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I thank my colleague for his contribution. I yield the 
floor for that purpose.

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