[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 7]
[Senate]
[Pages 9296-9299]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                        NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise this morning to speak about an issue 
that is going to consume, over the next couple years, a fair amount of 
this body's time. If there were a contest to name a foreign policy 
issue that just won't go away, national missile defense would surely be 
a top contender.
  The United States has been researching, developing, and sometimes 
deploying ballistic missile defense systems for almost 40 years now. 
Throughout this period, the issues of whether to deploy such a system 
and what system to deploy have prompted intense and often partisan 
debate. That debate continues today.
  Two events this week argue strongly, however, for a pause in the 
partisan wrangling that so often accompanies this debate. The first 
event was Gov. George W. Bush's call on Tuesday for the President of 
the United States ``not to make a hasty decision, on a political 
timetable'' regarding amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
and deployment of a national missile defense.
  Anyone on this floor knows that we voted in the last year, assuming 
that funds are provided and consistent with a policy of continued 
strategic arms reductions, to deploy a limited national missile defense 
system ``as soon as technologically feasible,'' and the majority of the 
Senate voted for that. There has been a bit of a rush, to use the 
expression we use on the floor, to take steps by the end of this year 
to ``pour concrete in Alaska.'' That is a euphemism for saying we have 
to put certain radars up in Alaska in order to meet the timetable to 
erect by 2005 a limited national missile defense that will defend 
against, theoretically at least, weapons that may or are likely to be 
deployed by the North Koreans.
  Ninety-nine percent of the American people don't even know what we 
are talking about because we have not yet debated it, and it is going 
to cost $30 billion at the low end, probably a lot more. They have not 
heard that number before. What has happened is that we have been in a 
headlong rush to be in a position to be able to deploy that system in 
time to meet the looming threat from North Korea.
  Now Governor Bush comes along, the putative candidate for President 
of the United States in the Republican Party, and says: Don't make a 
hasty decision, Mr. President, on a political timetable.
  Well, really, we are on a political timetable. What is moving this 
national missile defense proposal forward as rapidly as it has are the 
likely events in North Korea over the next 5 to 7 years and a political 
timetable on the part of some of my Republican friends. Fortunately, 
Governor Bush has stepped in and said: Let's slow all this down; let's 
think about this. I think we should listen to him.
  A second event is Secretary of State Albright's journey to Florence, 
Italy, where she is making the case for national missile defense to our 
increasingly nervous allies, who oppose this notion of a limited 
national missile defense.
  What shall we make of Governor Bush's stance on national missile 
defense? He proposes a missile defense to defend not only the United 
States but also our allies. That is a different proposal from that 
which we have been legislating on for the past 2 years. He also 
proposes not only to defend against missiles from so-called rogue 
states, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq--which has been the 
rationale offered as to why we have to move so rapidly toward a 
national missile defense--but also to protect against accidental 
launches from anywhere in the world.
  If we are to defend our allies as well as ourselves, then we are 
going to have to build a much larger missile defense system than the 
one being proposed by the Pentagon and the one we have been debating in 
the Congress for the past year and a half. If we are to defend against 
accidental launches from any country rather than only attacks from a 
specific state, then we cannot rely upon the sort of land-based or sea-
based boost-phase system that I and others have been supporting as a 
means

[[Page 9297]]

of reconciling defense with deterrence, which is different from the 
system proposed by the Pentagon.
  Governor Bush stated properly that ``deterrence remains the first 
line of defense against nuclear attack.'' I assume that means he 
believes the ABM Treaty is essential, as it is a vital building block 
in that first line of defense against nuclear attack.
  Governor Bush promised, properly, that if he were elected President, 
he would consult with our allies as he developed specific missile 
defense plans. I, too, have been suggesting, to my Senate colleagues 
and in high-level meetings, that we had better darn well understand 
what our allies think about this.
  My good friend, Senator Kyl, who is one of the brighter fellows here 
and who strongly supports national missile defense, said we should not 
let what our allies have to say affect what we do. I don't think it is 
that simple. Governor Bush now comes along and says he wants to make 
sure we consult with our allies. That is what he would do first after 
becoming President. This is clearly something we would want to have 
already done that before we decided to deploy any such system.
  The push to deploy a system, without working out something with our 
allies, has not come to fruition yet. But Governor Bush points out 
another flaw in the argument for proceeding rapidly. He also 
acknowledges the need to convince Russia that the United States' 
missile defenses would not be aimed at Russia.
  Governor Bush indicated a willingness to lower U.S. force levels--
although he confuses me. He says ``lower U.S. force levels below the 
START II levels.'' We have already basically agreed to that in the 
START III framework that was set in 1997. Is he talking about lowering 
U.S. nuclear force levels below the 2,000-to-2,500 figure proposed at 
Helsinki? Or is the suggestion that we lower them only to that level? 
He was a little unclear in how he stated that, and he leaves me a 
little unclear--indeed, totally unclear--as to what he means.
  Governor Bush also suggests that there is a need to move nuclear 
forces off the hair-trigger alert they are on. I agree. I think he is 
absolutely right about that. Indeed, Governor Bush stated that ``the 
United States should be willing to lead by example'' in this area.
  At the same time, however, Governor Bush spoke approvingly of ``laser 
technology'' and of ``a space-based system.'' Now, this will surely 
strike others as it did me--as an allusion to Reagan's support for the 
``Star Wars'' system of the 1980s, a notion that has been pretty 
soundly rejected up until now. It will raise legitimate fears, it seems 
to me, that a missile defense system deployed by the United States, 
whatever its size at first, would be enlarged to threaten the deterrent 
capacity of China, and eventually that of Russia.
  Would Governor Bush withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to ``fully 
explore these options?'' To fully explore the options of laser systems, 
of space-based systems--does that mean he is going to withdraw from the 
treaty he seems to imply is the building block upon which our 
deterrence rests? Or would he defer any decision on deployment until we 
were certain that the proposed system would successfully meet all of 
his criteria? His decision in that regard could determine whether his 
proposal prompted allied support or made them conclude that the United 
States was choosing missile defense foolishly or recklessly.
  Admittedly, this was just a press conference, and Governor Bush has 
not had a chance to flesh this out. But the bottom line is that he is 
saying: Whoa, slow up, there are a lot of things we haven't answered. 
We should not keep this on a political timetable.
  I wonder whether Governor Bush thought through all the implications 
of his missile defense proposals. How would he assure Russia that the 
United States would not seek to substitute defense for deterrence--an 
assurance he says is necessary? How would he avoid an arms race between 
Chinese missiles and American defenses? Or between China and India? Or 
then between India and Pakistan?
  My own view is that the risk of a nuclear arms race in Asia would be 
the most dangerous consequence of deploying a national missile defense 
that was not limited to defending against the missiles of specific 
target states. I fear that such an arms race would be terribly costly 
and would destabilize China's relations with its neighbors, and that 
the resulting instability would lead to Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea 
building nuclear weapons. They have the capacity to do that, and I 
truly believe they might, if an Asian arms race were to occur as a 
result of our missile defense deployment.
  Last week, the Los Angeles Times reported that a U.S. intelligence 
official warned ``that construction of a national missile defense could 
trigger a wave of destabilizing events around the world and possibly 
endanger relations with European allies.''
  Possible consequences reportedly include China fielding hundreds more 
missiles, putting MIRVed warheads on its missiles--which it does not 
have now--and adding countermeasures. We all know that they are 
measures added to a ballistic missile in order to fool any defensive 
system. The missile puts out a lot of little things--anything from 
balloons to what most people would think would be just like little 
pieces of metal. It is a lot more complicated than that, but the effect 
is to fool the defensive system as to which object has the nuclear 
warhead. That is what we mean by countermeasures. They are not hard to 
field. They haven't yet been fielded by China to any significant 
degree, to the best of our knowledge. But a U.S. intelligence official 
foresees China adding countermeasures to frustrate U.S. defenses and, 
in the words of that intelligence official, ``selling countermeasures 
for sure'' to countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq.
  This is precisely the sort of concern I have been raising for the 
last several months. I went to a defense conference in Germany with 
many of the people in the Senate, in the House, and in the Defense 
Department, as well as the defense establishments from all our allied 
nations--even some who are not members of NATO. I raised that very 
question there.
  No one had an answer, I might add, when I raised the question among 
all the defense experts. Everybody is prepared to give an estimate of 
what the North Koreans are likely to do in terms of building not only 
nuclear capability, but also the capability to have a missile with a 
third stage that could reach the continental United States, that could 
not only carry a nuclear warhead, but also be used in chemical or 
biological warfare.
  I asked: Can anybody give an estimate to the President as to what the 
Chinese would likely do if we deployed a national missile defense 
system? They now have fewer than two dozen intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. That seems to be a pretty good thing to me. I would not like 
to see China go to 200, or 400, or 800, or 1,000, which is fully within 
their capacity. I would not like them to do what the L.A. Times reports 
that a U.S. intelligence official raises as a possibility. I would not 
like to see them MIRV their warheads. I would not like to see them have 
more sophisticated nuclear weapons. I kind of like it where they are.
  Now, I also raised the question, Has anybody calculated or laid out 
for the President of the United States what the likely scenario is if 
China were to significantly increase their arsenal? What would happen 
in India? What would happen in Pakistan? Has anybody raised this 
possibility of that being of concern to the Japanese? Well, the truth 
is, no one had an answer.
  I even went to a high-level meeting in the Defense Department a 
couple of months ago, with the Secretary of Defense, other high 
officials, and those in charge of developing this system. I raised the 
same question again before the Foreign Relations Committee, on which 
the occupant of the Chair sits. I asked specifically--and he may have 
been there--the Director of the CIA if they had done such a study. 
Apparently, one is underway. Apparently, people are beginning to focus 
on the other side of this equation.

[[Page 9298]]

  The fundamental rationale for our strategic doctrine is to guard 
Americans from harm, as best we can, to guarantee the security of those 
young Senate pages sitting up there and their children and 
grandchildren. Are we better off with a missile defense system as 
contemplated and an arms race in Asia, if that were to occur?
  Or are we better off with the risk that might come from North Korea, 
if they developed a third stage that could reach the United States and 
we relied instead upon deterrence? I have not made that final judgment 
in my own mind. But I know one thing. We don't have enough information 
now to make a final judgment.
  All this leads me to conclude that the risks inherent in doing 
without a national missile defense at this moment might be less than 
the risk we would accept in building either the Pentagon's proposed 
missile defense or the sort of defenses that Gov. George Bush has 
proposed.
  Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser in the Ford and 
Bush administrations, is also allegedly concerned. The Los Angeles 
Times reported that he called the scenario of an Asian nuclear arms 
race ``plausible'' and warned: ``We ought to think whether we want the 
Chinese to change their very minimalist strategy.''
  I know I don't want China to change their minimalist strategy. I 
believe anybody who thinks we can affect that outcome would not want 
China to change its minimalist strategy. I say this--speaking for 
myself, and clearly not for Brent Scowcroft--not merely because of the 
added threat that it would pose to the United States of America, but 
also because of what that would most assuredly cause to happen in 
India, and what that almost assuredly would cause to happen in 
Pakistan, and elsewhere.
  Can anyone in this Chamber suggest to me that if China were to change 
in a robust fashion their nuclear strategy, that officials are going to 
sit in Tokyo, and say: You know, let's not worry about this; this is 
not a problem; we have the American nuclear umbrella? As much as I love 
our Japanese friends and allies, the last thing I want to see come out 
of this debate that we are going to have in the next weeks and months, 
and hopefully next year or so, is a nuclear Japan.
  I hope General Scowcroft, who is a senior adviser to Governor Bush, 
will encourage his very important pupil to think carefully about this.
  Just as I have concerns regarding Gov. Bush's position on national 
missile defense, so do I have concerns regarding the Pentagon's 
proposed system and the hurried pace at which a deployment decision is 
being forced upon the President.
  Some of my concerns are those of a supporter of arms control, but 
others relate to the apparent shortcomings of the system the Pentagon 
proposes.
  Renowned scientists and former defense officials have said that a 
land-based missile defense aimed at incoming warheads cannot do the 
job.
  The current National Intelligence Estimate on the foreign missile 
threat to the United States warns:

       We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles 
     would also develop various responses to US theater and 
     national defenses. Russia and China each have developed 
     numerous countermeasures and probably are willing to sell the 
     requisite technologies.
       Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq 
     probably would rely initially on readily available 
     technology--including separating RVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV 
     reorientation, radar absorbing material . . ., booster 
     fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) 
     decoys--to develop penetration aids and countermeasures. 
     These countries could develop countermeasures based on these 
     technologies by the time they flight test their missiles.

  Decades ago, when missile defense research began during the Cold War, 
the goal was not a perfect defense.
  Rather, the idea was that by limiting our casualties--both in human 
lives and in retaliatory forces--a missile defense would buttress our 
ability to fight and win a nuclear war.
  Missile defense supporters saw such an imperfect national missile 
defense as a contributor to deterrence, even though the Nixon 
administration eventually concluded that it was better to bar such 
defenses than to engage in an arms race involving both offensive and 
defensive weapons.
  Modern proposals for a limited national missile defense are very 
different, however. They are aimed at deterring countries that would 
have no hope of defeating the United States in a nuclear war, but would 
seek to deter or to punish us by building a capability to destroy one 
or more American cities.
  To defend against those threats, one's defense must be perfect. 
Merely limiting the destruction will not suffice.
  I wonder whether the operational effectiveness of the Pentagon's 
proposed missile defense will really be sufficient.
  If a system can kill each warhead 95 percent of the time, then the 
odds are 1 in 3 that an 8-warhead attack will get at least one warhead 
through and destroy a U.S. city. If the system can kill each warhead 98 
percent of the time, there will still be a 1-in-3 chance that an attack 
with 21 warheads will get at least one bomb through.
  In the days when the Presiding Officer and I were younger men, there 
used to be a bumper sticker that people would put on their car: ``One 
nuclear bomb can ruin your day''--one warhead getting through. If the 
objective is to deter against any of these rogue states, a missile 
defense must be perfect.
  Missile defense supporters cite the need to avoid being blackmailed 
by North Korea or Iraq. But I find it hard to see how a national 
missile defense will give us freedom of action in Korea or the Middle 
East, if there is still one chance in 3, or even one chance in 5, that 
a modest attack will wipe out a whole American city.
  In light of that reality, it is equally hard to understand the 
Pentagon's commitment to the proposed system, except as the product of 
bureaucratic inertia and political pressure to deploy the first system 
it could find.
  When the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on missile defense 
last year, I asked all our witnesses--both supporters and opponents of 
national missile defense--whether they would support a system limited 
to that which the Pentagon proposes. Not one of them, proponent or 
opponent, was prepared to do so.
  Two commissions chaired by Gen. Larry Welch, former Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force, have criticized the testing program for the Pentagon's 
national missile defense system. The term ``rush to failure'' has 
become part of our everyday vocabulary. We should be equally attentive 
to Gen. Welch's warning that we are unprepared to determine the 
``deployment readiness'' of national missile defense, despite the name 
of the Defense Department's forthcoming review.
  The Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation has voiced 
similar concerns regarding the limits of our national missile defense 
testing program.
  His concerns were seconded last month by the American Physical 
Society, which warned:

       A decision on whether or not to deploy the NMD is scheduled 
     for the next few months. The tests that have been conducted 
     or are planned for the period fall far short of those 
     required to provide confidence in the ``technical 
     feasibility'' called for in last year's NMD deployment 
     legislation.

The American Physical Society is the premier professional group for 
physicists in this country. They take no stand on national missile 
defense itself. They deserve our bi-partisan attention.
  In recent weeks, former senior officials have counseled delay. Listen 
to President Reagan's former National Security Advisor, Robert 
McFarlane: ``Still more work is needed before a decision on deployment 
is made.''
  Listen to President Carter's former National Security Advisor, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski:

       The bottom line is that at this stage there is no urgent 
     strategic need for a largely domestically driven decision 
     regarding the deployment of the national missile defense.
       The issue should be left to the next president--to be 
     resolved after consensus is reached with our allies both in 
     Europe and in the Far East, after more credible evidence 
     becomes available regarding the technical feasibility and 
     probable costs of the national

[[Page 9299]]

     missile defense, and after compelling intelligence estimates 
     are aired regarding the origin, scale and timing of likely 
     new threats to the United States and its allies.

  In a forthcoming article, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
writes: ``deployment of the present NMD system should be deferred.'' He 
is joined in that recommendation by two former Deputy Secretaries of 
Defense, John Deutch and John White.
  Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger says: ``In the light of 
recent ambiguous test results and imminent electoral preoccupations, it 
would be desirable to delay a final technical judgment until a new 
administration is in place.''
  As we all know, the motivations behind these bi-partisan 
recommendations are often very divergent.
  Many Republicans fear that President Clinton will purposely strike a 
deal with Russia to limit U.S. missile defenses to an ineffective 
system, hoping that such a deal will make it politically untenable for 
a Republican president, were one to be elected, to go beyond it.
  I do not share those fears. The Administration has made clear to 
Russians and Republicans alike that its proposed ABM Treaty protocol 
would be only a first step.
  My fear is rather that the President will be sandwiched: between 
Russia, which doubts both our intent to deploy a missile defense system 
and our willingness to limit it; and Republicans, who have tried to 
make this a partisan campaign issue and have even urged Russian 
officials not to negotiate with the President of the United States of 
America.
  My fear is that the President--in order to show Russia that he is 
serious, and under pressure from Republicans accusing the 
Administration of being ``soft'' on the issue--will order the Defense 
Department to proceed with the deployment of a system that all of us 
know is the wrong one to build.
  The time has come to set our fears aside. The fact is that, whatever 
our views on the wisdom of putting our trust in a national missile 
defense, many of us oppose the system proposed by the Pentagon.
  Whatever our views on the larger issues, many of us would be content 
if the President were to defer both a deployment decision and the 
choice of a missile defense architecture, and let his successor grapple 
with those issues.
  It is also a fact, however, that the President has been under 
political pressure to proceed with deployment, despite the technical 
and strategic concerns that many of us share.
  If missile defense supporters maintain that pressure, they increase 
the risk that a poor system will be deployed, rather than one that 
meets our country's needs by any rational measure.
  I therefore call on the two major presidential campaigns--that of 
Gov. Bush and that of Vice President Gore--to agree not to seek 
partisan advantage if the President defers a missile defense deployment 
decision.
  I call on all of us in the Congress to give the President the freedom 
of action to make his decision without political sniping.
  I also call on both campaigns to agree that negotiations for a path-
breaking START III agreement should continue. Gov. Bush stated that he 
would:

       . . . ask the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment 
     of our nuclear force posture and determine how best to meet 
     our security needs . . . [and] pursue the lowest possible 
     number consistent with our national security.

  He added that ``the United States should remove as many weapons as 
possible from high alert, high-trigger status, another unnecessary 
vestige of Cold War confrontation.''
  There is no reason to defer these two ideas until next year.
  The Joint Chiefs of Staff has said that it cannot go below the 
Helsinki target of 2,000 to 2,500 warheads for a START III agreement 
unless the President changes the nuclear targeting guidance.
  Gov. Bush has implied that he would seek the Pentagon's advice on 
alternatives to that guidance, however, and President Clinton should do 
the same.
  In summary, the longest-lasting foreign policy debate is not likely 
to be settled any time soon. There is widespread agreement, however, 
that we should not let this debate lead us into unwise decisions.
  With goodwill on both sides, we have an opportunity to suspend the 
partisan wrangling and let our current and future leaders make their 
decisions in a rational way. Let us all work together to achieve that 
shared objective.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bunning). The Senator from Wyoming.

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