[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 7]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 10287-10289]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

                    DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF THE F-22


                         HON. PETER A. DeFAZIO

                               of oregon

                    in the house of representatives

                         Thursday, June 8, 2000

  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, during the debate on the fiscal year 2001 
Department of Defense appropriations bill, there was a rather rancorous 
debate about the future of the F-22. I submit for the record a 
devastating critique of the F-22 written by retired Colonel Everest 
Riccioni as well as a letter he wrote correcting misstatements made 
during the House floor debate.
  Colonel Riccioni is not just any critic of the F-22. His credentials 
are impeccable. He was one of three legendary ``Fighter Mafia'' 
mavericks who forced the Pentagon to produce the F-16 to improve U.S. 
air superiority. He served in the Air Force for 30 years, flew 55 
different types of military aircraft, and worked in the defense 
industry for 17 years managing aircraft programs, including the B-2 
  We should heed his warning that the F-22 will not work as advertised.

                                                     June 8, 2000.
     Representative Randy Cunningham,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Representative Cunningham: Your comments during 
     yesterday's floor debate require response. The comment about 
     the F-15 not keeping up with the F-22 does not establish the 
     existence of supercruise, and reflects your lack of insight 
     into supersonic cruise. Cruise means the ability to cover 

[[Page 10288]]

     and it is not a speed. Proof of supercruise is established by 
     a number, specifically the number of miles that can be 
     covered while at a supersonic Mach like 1.6. This number is 
     never forthcoming because few know the definition of 
     supercruise or are unwilling to reveal it.
       The fact that the F-16 flown by General Ryan could not keep 
     up with the F-22 is again an irrelevant speed statement on 
     the relative speed of the two aircraft. The requirements for 
     the F-16 specifically stated that there was no requirement 
     that it fly faster than Mach 1.6, a fact probably unknown to 
     the general. Had the general been flying a 40 year old F104A-
     19, he could have flown formation with the F-22.
       Pragmatic supersonic cruise is the ability to sustain 
     significant supersonic speeds (like 1. 6-1.8) for combat 
     relevant distances. For perspective, the original design 
     mission for the Advanced Tactical Fighter, cum F-22 was a 100 
     mile subsonic cruise-out to the Russian border, 400 NM 
     supersonic penetration at 1.6 Mach, consumption of the combat 
     fuel, a 400 nautical mile supersonic return to the border at 
     Mach 1.6, with a 100 NM return to land with normal reserves.
       A true measure of the super cruise potential of the F-22 
     is--the penetration supersonic distance that can be flown at 
     1.6 Mach out and back, with the same 100 nautical mile legs 
     and the same fuel reserved for combat and landing reserves. 
     The supersonic penetration distance is the validation of 
     supercruise. This number has not been established. The 
     supercruise potential of the F-22 remains unknown.
       If that number is 50 NM it is a fruitless achievement that 
     the F-104 can easily fulfill using its afterburner. A 100 NM 
     penetration can also be accomplished by the F-104A-19. A 200 
     NM penetration is not a great achievement; 300 NM means the 
     F-22 is a pragmatic supercruiser, 400 NM will remain a dream. 
     The distance number validates whether the F-22 has it, 
     nothing else.
       Retention of the wrong definition will forever retain 
                                            Col. Everest Riccioni,
                                          Rancho Palos Verdes, CA.

                 The F-22 Program--Fact Versus Fiction

               (By Everest E. Riccioni, Col. USAF, Ret.)

                               The Dream

       To provide the USAF Air Superiority for the period 
     following 2005.
       To Conduct--Offensive Counter Air Operation deep in 
     Russia--Its Primary Mission (300 Nautical Mile (NM) Combat 
     Mission--100 NM cruise to the point of penetration--200 NM 
     supersonic ingress and egress plus combat and fuel reserves).
       To provide a 750-800 Aircraft Fleet to replace the aging F-
     15 Fleet.
       To be designed to a Unit Flyaway Cost Limit in 1986 
     dollars--$35 Million.
       To control cost by conforming to a Weight Limit--50,000 lbs 
     (Cost and Weight comparable to the extant F-15--clearly the 
     imagined F-22 would have been a bargain).
       Dominant Characteristics: High Stealth; Effective 
     Supersonic Cruise; Ultra-High Performance and 
     Maneuverability; and Superior Avionics for Battle Awareness 
     and Effectiveness.
       Additional Aims: To Rejuvenate the Fleet (Reduce the 
     average age); Design for Low Maintenance (3 man-hours per 
     sortie); and Form a High-Low Mix with the Joint Strike 
     Fighter (JSF) fleet.

                            the realization


                           Unrealized Dreams

       The dreams for Stealth, Supercruise, Ultra-High Climb, 
     Acceleration, and Maneuvering Performance have not been 
     realized. The Outstanding Avionics will not be properly 
     tested before purchase and possibly not even before combat.

                         High Cost, Low Numbers

       The number of F-22s purchased will not provide a critical 
     mass of fighters.
       The ``Dream'' of 800 fighters for $70 Billion fell to 648 
     for $64.2B (after a 1992 Selected Acquisition Report), to 442 
     for $64.2B (after the Bottom-Up Review of defense strategy), 
     and to 339 for $64.2B (after a Quadrennial Defense 
     Review).\2\ Study groups and the Congressional Budget Office 
     seeking responsible funding are considering options of 175 
     and even 100 F-22s. This is a total program cost of more than 
     $200M per aircraft--one-third the cost of the B-1! This cost 
     (predicted in 1976) is worse than obscene.\3\
       Despite high funding levels--the future size of the Air 
     Combat Command will soon be greatly reduced.
       The low number of F-22s will not rejuvenate an aging F-15, 
     F-16 fleet. (Algebraic averaging)
       A mix of F-22s and JSFs cannot be a High-Low Mix. It will 
     be An Ultra-High--High Mix. There is no low element. The 
     complementary F-15 and F-16 do both the air superiority and 
     air-to-surface missions. The F-22 mainly does air superiority 
     missions. Both have deserted our US Army.
       The few F-22s possessing quasi-F-15 performance will 
     degrade the air superiority capability of the Air Combat 
     Command, composed of 1600 fighters.
       Our decision-makers have (again) opted for unilateral 
     disarmament in the face of their perceived threats.\4\



       The F-22 is not a Stealthy Aircraft.
       Stealth means the proper suppression of all its important 
     ``signatures''--Visual Signature, Radar Signature, Infrared 
     Signature, Electromagnetic Emissions, and Sound.
       Visually--The F-22, one of the world's largest, most 
     identifiable fighters, cannot hide in daylight. Its role is 
     in daylight. Stealth operations are night operations. 
     Unfortunately stealth against radar invariably increases the 
     size of a fighter making it more visible.
       The radar signature is utterly inadequately reported. Only 
     a single data number is provided to congressional committees 
     and the GAO--the average radar signature in the level forward 
     direction within 20 degrees of the nose, presumably to enemy 
     fighter radars. In the B-1B reporting fiasco, the 100/1 
     signature advantage over the B-52 became a real 1.8/1. One 
     cannot design an aircraft to simultaneously hide from low and 
     medium frequency ground radars and from high frequency 
     airborne fighter radars. Properly, all the data should be 
     portrayed and reported--for all azimuths, for all 
     ``latitudes,'' and for all radar frequencies. Single data 
     points constitute lying by omission and gross incompleteness.
       The temperature increases of supersonic cruising flights 
     make the F-22s beacons in the sky to infrared sensors.
       Fighters, with radar to search for and find the enemy 
     autonomously, at long ranges, cannot hide their high powered 
     electric emissions to modern, sophisticated, Russian 
     equipment. The Russians excel at this art and export their 
     equipment to many nations. Further, F-22 detection of enemies 
     by radar is an inverse fourth power phenomenon, while 
     detection of the F-22's radar is an inverse square 
     phenomenon, giving the advantage to the enemy. In other 
     words, the F-22's radar will be detected by an enemy plane 
     before the F-22 detects the enemy.
       It appears that designing air superiority aircraft 
     primarily for radar stealth is an error.

                   Supersonic Cruise--``Supercruise''

       The F-22 has not yet demonstrated effective supersonic 
       The USAF has never appreciated that speed without 
     persistence is meaningless. Proof--Six USAF aircraft capable 
     of Mach 2.2 never exceeded 1.4 Mach in combat over North 
     Vietnam in 10 years of war, in hundreds of thousands of 
     sorties. The F-15 has never demonstrated its performance 
     guarantee of Mach 2.5 flight in a combat configuration on a 
     realistic combat mission profile.
       The USAF has the wrong definition of supercruise--
     (supersonic flight in turbojet thrust, i.e. without using an 
     afterburner.) Cruise means covering distance efficiently. 
     Fighters with wings properly sized for subsonic maneuver 
     achieve efficient supersonic flight at altitudes of 60,000 
     feet requiring partial afterburning thrust. This may be 
     unknown to the testers since the test program limits testing 
     to below 50,000. The proper cruise condition may remain 
     unknown. All supercruisers cruise at very high altitudes 
     using some afterburning (i.e. ramjet) thrust--MiG-31, SR-71, 
     as did the many designs that I have studied, generated, or 
     supervised. (Detailed aerodynamic-thermodynamic analysis is 
     available upon request.)
       The GAO report that the F-22 has demonstrated supercruise 
     is specious and misleading. The reports have merely stated 
     that the F-22 has demonstrated 1.6 Mach flight speeds in pure 
     turbojet (dry) thrust. No report of distance traveled or 
     persistence at those speeds was made. Supersonic speeds in 
     dry thrust bode well, but this capability is not sufficient 
     to achieve supercruise. Proper data are global radius of 
     action and global persistence plots as functions of speed and 
     altitude, for rational missions.
       These data must be then compared to those of the F-15 and 
     the ancient F-104-19 to establish progress. For example--the 
     40 year old F-104A-19 has twice the supersonic radius of the 
     20 year old F-15C at 1.7 Mach, and out-accelerates it at Mach 
     2.2. Compare! In comparison lies the proof of progress.
       The Fuel Fraction of the F-22 is insufficient for pragmatic 
     supersonic cruise missions. Fuel Fraction, the weight of the 
     fuel divided by the weight of the aircraft at take-off, 
     impacts cruise-range, be it super- or subsonic. At today's 
     state of the art, fuel fractions of 29 percent and below 
     yield subcruisers; 33 percent provides a quasi-supercruiser; 
     and 35 percent and above provides useful missions. The F-22's 
     fuel fraction is 29 percent, equal to those of the 
     subcruising F-4s, F-15s and the Russian MiG29 Flanker. The 
     Russian medium range supersonic interceptor, the MiG-31 
     Foxhound, has a fuel fraction of over 45 percent. Supersonic 
     cruise fighters require higher fuel fractions since they must 
     have excessive wing for supersonic cruise. Breguet's range 
     equation establishes the dependence of aircraft radius on 
     speed, lifi-to-drag ratio, specific fuel consumption and the 
     part of the total fuel fraction available for cruise.
       The ``dream'' design mission was continually redefined and 
     degraded to--a) conform

[[Page 10289]]

     to physical reality, and--b) to reduce the uncontrolled cost 
     and weight. (Flexible (rubber) Requirements.)

                         Ultra-High Performance

       The F-22 does not provide a Great Leap Forward in 
     performance relative to the F-15C or MiG-29. At 65,000 lbs, 
     with 18,500-18,750 lbs of fuel, with two nominal 35,000 lb 
     thrust engines--it has the thrust to weight ratio of the F-
     15C, the fuel fraction of the F-15C, and a wing loading that 
     is only slightly inferior to that of the F-15C, so it will 
     accelerate, climb, and maneuver much like the F-15C for 
     reasons of basic physics.
       There are two differences from the F-15--thrust vectoring 
     and supersonic speeds in dry thrust. Thrust vectoring allows 
     the F-22 to maneuver controllably at sub-stall speeds, which 
     other aircraft cannot. This, in the helicopter speed domain, 
     is in seeming contradiction to an aircraft designed for 
     supersonic engagement with slashing attacks using its beyond 
     visual range missiles.
       The flight test program to validate maneuverability is 
     utterly inadequate. Using a single number--the maximum 
     steady-state G at 30,000 ft at 0.9 Mach--on an aircraft that 
     operates from 40 knots to beyond Mach 2, from sea level to 
     above 60,000 ft is a throwback to the Dark Ages of aircraft 
     evaluation. Proper presentations are global, all-altitude 
     all-speed plots at the two major power settings. They must be 
     compared to friendly and enemy aircraft. Comparison reveals 
     progress, the whole truth, and even allows the formulation of 
     battle tactics.

                           Superior Avionics

       The expectations for the avionics are to provide great 
     battle awareness and effective weapons management. The F-22 
     is to autonomously identify (ID) the enemy from friend, from 
     neutral, regardless of the country that produced the 
       But, testing will not be fully completed before going into 
     production! The pressure is on to meet production schedules 
     and to do incomplete testing to save time and money. 
     Incomplete testing is fatal and extremely wasteful. B-1 
     avionics, similarly treated, still do not function in the 
     aircraft after two decades, despite large transfusions of 
       Such refined identification capability has never been 
     achieved though frequently promised. Given failure and 
     dependence on visual identification, the F-22 will be at the 
     level of the F-15 and F-16. The requirement for visual ID 
     made the AIM-7D/E, the Talos, the complex long-range Phoenix 
     missile and the Aegis missile cruiser relatively worthless. 
     The avionics are to be treated as ``guilty'' until tested and 
     proven to be innocent.
       The software is more extensive and complex than that of the 
     Aegis missile cruiser. Dependence on the integrated, complex 
     system belies the dream of a low maintenance requirement.
       Most likely result--The F-22 will be declared combat ready 
     much before it is.

                      Relevance of Air Superiority

       The relevance of air superiority in the modern world is 
     vastly overstated. The USAF has faced no air superiority 
     force since the Korean War. Nor have our ground troops faced 
     an enemy air-to-surface threat.
       US air superiority fighters are aimed at enemy fighters--
     the irrelevant half (of the problem. Our foreseeable enemies 
     achieve air superiority with competent, relatively 
     affordable, highly mobile Russian vehicles carrying surface-
     to-air missiles (IR radar, and optically guided), and two 
     30mm cannon (the Tangkuska). These are armed with SA-6, SA-8 
     and SA-10 missiles. The F-22 only counters non-existent enemy 
     fighters. Hence air-to-surface F-16s, A-10s, and F-15s become 
     the de facto air superiority aircraft. Attempts to equip the 
     F-22 to suppress enemy defenses are easily defeated by enemy 
     tactics used in Vietnam and Serbia.
       The USAF is already over-equipped to handle any imaginable 
     air superiority problem. Today, Air Combat Command is capable 
     of handling any coalition of air superiority threats. Air 
     Combat Command has the most important factor--competent 
     pilots, the second most important factor--large numbers 
     (1,600-2,400 fighters), and the least important advantage--
     the best aircraft. In Germany during World War II US numbers, 
     not quality, reigned supreme. \5\ The USAF has always had and 
     has always depended upon superior numbers to win. Numbers 
     guarantee victory. Numbers develop intensity and allow 
     multiple attacks.
       The US has no realistic future air superiority problem 
     facing it. A sane US will not war with India, China, or 
     Russia. Nor will we war with France, England, Japan, and 
     Germany. None of these nations will attack the US. Other 
     countries are not threats. Nor will we war with our friends 
     to whom we sold US aircraft. \6\ The US must minimize its 
     enemies, not create them artificially to sustain the arms 
     industry. Even Canada has been listed as a possible threat! 
     Yet, the US continues to seek foreign sales before our modern 
     aircraft see service in the USAF and US Navy. (Examples--the 
     US Navy's F-14, F-18E, and the F-22.)
       The conjured need to cope with our weapons places our 
     country in a self-perpetuating arms race with itself.


       Money expended on the program will weaken Air Combat 
     Command and the USAF in two ways--
       By getting involved with an aircraft that has no function, 
     and no relevance to modern wars.
       By denying themselves funds they really need--for training 
     and for new aircraft to support a US Army, completely shipped 
     of supporting airpower.
       Approximately 90 percent of the program funding can still 
     be saved, and reprogrammed to relevant Air Force programs.