[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 6]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 8670-8674]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



FLOYD D. SPENCE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                           HON. MARCY KAPTUR

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                         Thursday, May 18, 2000

       The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of 
     the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4205) to 
     authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for military 
     activities of the Department of Defense and for military 
     construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for 
     fiscal year 2001, and for other purposes:

  Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, I include the following GAO report for the 
Record.

   United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional 
                               Requesters

Occupational Safety and Health.--Government Responses to Beryllium Uses 
                               and Risks

                              May 19, 2000

                        Congressional Requesters

       Over the last 50 years, federal policymakers and scientists 
     have attempted to both capitalize on the advantages of 
     beryllium and address health and environmental risks. 
     Beryllium is a strong and lightweight metal that generates 
     and reflects neutrons, resists corrosion, is transparent to X 
     rays, and conducts electricity. It is also a hazardous 
     substance.
       Among the organizations that have played key roles in 
     responding to the risks associated with beryllium are the 
     Departments of Defense, Energy, and Labor. The Departments of 
     Defense and Energy are the federal agencies that have most 
     commonly used beryllium. Defense procures components 
     containing beryllium for a variety of weapon systems from 
     private contractors. Energy operates federal facilities 
     (including nuclear weapons production facilities) that use 
     beryllium, and it has responsibility for protecting federal 
     and contract workers at these facilities. Energy has 
     identified at least 17 facilities that use or have used 
     beryllium, and it estimates that about 20,000 current and 
     former workers at these facilities were exposed or 
     potentially exposed to beryllium from the 1940s to the 
     present. The Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and 
     Health Administration has overall responsibility for 
     protecting the health and safety of workers in most 
     workplaces throughout the United States, including those that 
     use beryllium.
       This report responds to your request for information on 
     beryllium as a hazardous material and on the health and 
     safety controls over its use. As agreed with your offices, 
     this report (1) provides information on beryllium's uses and 
     risks and (2) describes selected key events that illustrate 
     the evolution of the federal government's response to risks 
     posed by beryllium. To respond to the second question, we 
     identified and summarized key events from the 1960s through 
     the 1990s involving actions by the Departments of Defense and 
     Energy and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 
     Appendix I describes the objectives, scope, and methodology 
     for this review.


                            results in brief

       Lightness, strength, and other attributes have made 
     beryllium useful in a wide array of products, such as 
     aircraft, spacecraft, X-ray equipment, and nuclear weapons. 
     However, beryllium is considered hazardous. Health effects 
     from high exposure to beryllium particles were first noted in 
     the early 20th century. Beginning in the 1940s, scientists 
     linked exposure
       From the 1960s to the 1990s, Defense, Energy, and the 
     Occupational Safety and Health Administration took a number 
     of actions to assess and to respond to risks associated with 
     exposure to beryllium. In reviewing selected key events, we 
     noted that the agencies took the following steps to reduce 
     risks from exposure to beryllium: discontinued testing of 
     rocket propellant containing beryllium, assessed beryllium 
     exposure standards, limited worker exposure to beryllium, 
     established health surveillance measures, and proposed 
     compensation for workers who have chronic beryllium disease. 
     The key events are as follows:
       Defense discontinued testing beryllium in rocket fuel by 
     1970, due in part to concerns about meeting air quality 
     requirements.
       The Occupational Safety and Health Administration proposed 
     a more stringent worker exposure standard for beryllium in 
     1975 based on evidence that it was carcinogenic in laboratory 
     animals. The proposal generated concerns about the technical 
     feasibility of the proposal, impact on national security, and 
     the scientific evidence supporting the proposed change. 
     According to Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
     officials, the agency discontinued its work on the proposal 
     in the early 1980s in response to other regulatory priorities 
     such as lead, electrical hazards, and occupational noise. In 
     1998, the agency announced that it would develop a 
     comprehensive standard for beryllium by 2001
       Energy improved working conditions at its facilities and 
     implemented medical testing for its current and former 
     workers during the 1980s and 1990s after new cases of chronic 
     beryllium disease were identified during the 1980s. From 1984 
     through 1999, 149 Energy workers have been diagnosed with 
     definite or possible chronic beryllium disease.
       In 1999, Energy issued a rule that established new worker 
     safety controls, such as increased use of respirators and 
     assessing hazards associated with work tasks, for its 
     facilities that use beryllium. Energy also proposed a 
     compensation program for Energy workers affected by chronic 
     beryllium disease, which has been introduced as legislation 
     in the Congress.
       The Departments of Defense, Energy, and Labor provided 
     written or oral comments on our report and generally 
     concurred with the information presented. They suggested 
     technical changes, and Labor officials also emphasized that 
     the hazard information bulletin on beryllium cited in the 
     body of this report was a significant effort to protect 
     worker health.

[[Page 8671]]




                        Beryllium Uses and Risks

       In the 1920s and 1930s, beryllium was used for a variety of 
     purposes, including as an additive for alloying with copper 
     and other metals in manufacturing, as an ingredient in 
     fluorescent lamps, and for other purposes. Today, beryllium 
     is used in nuclear reactor and weapons parts; aircraft, 
     spacecraft, and missile structures and parts; military 
     vehicle structures and parts; electronics; auto parts; 
     lasers; X-ray equipment; dental prosthetics; and other 
     consumer products. In some of these products, substitutes for 
     beryllium can be used (e.g., titanium, stainless steel, and 
     some forms of bronze and aluminum). However, Energy and 
     Defense officials state there is no substitute for beryllium 
     in key nuclear components or in weapons for which lightweight 
     and strength are critical.
       According to U.S. Public Health Service reports, people are 
     exposed to extremely low levels of naturally occurring 
     beryllium in the air, in many foods, in water, and in soil. 
     The highest exposures to beryllium tend to occur in the 
     workplace. Occupational exposure to beryllium occurs when it 
     is extracted from ore; when the ore is processed into 
     beryllium metal; and when this metal is made into parts 
     (e.g., machined, welded, cut, or ground). Today, beryllium is 
     used in many applications outside of the Defense and Energy 
     industries.
       Health effects from high exposure to beryllium particles 
     were first noted in the early 20th century. Beginning in the 
     1940s, scientists linked exposure to beryllium with an 
     inflammatory lung condition now called chronic beryllium 
     disease, which is often debilitating and, in some cases, 
     fatal.
       Research on the biomedical and environmental aspects of 
     beryllium is extensive.\3\ According to the National Jewish 
     Medical and Research Center (a nonprofit institution devoted 
     to respiratory, allergic, and immune system diseases), 
     beryllium primarily affects the lungs. The disease occurs 
     when people inhale beryllium dust, and it can develop even 
     after workers have been out of the beryllium industry for 
     many years. There are three main types of adverse health 
     effects associated with beryllium exposure:
       Chronic beryllium disease is caused by an allergic-like 
     reaction to beryllium. Even brief exposure to very low levels 
     can lead to this disease, which often has a slow onset and 
     involves changes to lung tissue that reduce lung function. 
     The first evidence of what was to be called chronic beryllium 
     disease was identified in 1946. More recent studies indicate 
     that reaction to beryllium depends on the type of beryllium 
     and the work task.\4\ According to the National Jewish 
     Medical and Research Center, the disease occurs in 1 to 16 
     percent of exposed people, with the level of exposure that 
     poses risk and the precise mechanisms of disease not yet well 
     characterized.
       Acute beryllium disease (symptoms lasting less than 1 year) 
     results from relatively high exposure to soluble beryllium 
     compounds (i.e., compounds that can be at least partially 
     dissolved). This disease usually has a quick onset and 
     resembles pneumonia
       National and international organizations have identified 
     beryllium metal and compounds as carcinogenic to humans. 
     Studies involving workers in plants with high exposure during 
     the 1940s showed subsequent increases in mortality. The 
     magnitude of the risk from current occupational exposure 
     levels is not known, but may be minimal.


         KEY EVENTS IN THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO BERYLLIUM RISKS

       The following illustrative key events involving Defense, 
     Energy, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
     (OSHA) document concerns and actions taken regarding 
     beryllium exposure risks. The events include (1) Defense's 
     decision to discontinue testing beryllium in rocket fuel by 
     1970, (2) OSHA's efforts in the 1970s and since 1998 to lower 
     the exposure limits, (3) Energy's steps to improve working 
     conditions and medical screening in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
     (4) Energy's 1999 rule on beryllium worker safety.
     Defense discontinued testing of beryllium rocket propellant
       Defense discontinued testing of rocket propellant 
     containing beryllium by 1970 due to the potential risk of 
     public exposure to hazardous levels of beryllium particles 
     released in rocket exhaust. According to an August 1969 Air 
     Force report, the Air Force and Advanced Research Projects 
     Agency began development of beryllium rocket propellant in 
     1959. Experiments in the 1960s showed that rocket payloads 
     could be increased 10 to 30 percent by using beryllium powder 
     in propellant. Research and development efforts later 
     expanded to include other Defense agencies and the National 
     Aeronautics and Space Administration.
       As military and civilian agencies experimented with 
     beryllium in rocket fuel, they also pursued concerns about 
     beryllium's potential risks. For example, an August 1962 
     manufacturer's internal memorandum stated that officials 
     planned a visit from the Navy propellant plant at Indian 
     Head, Maryland, to discuss health and safety concerns in 
     handling beryllium powders at a test facility for solids fuel 
     propellants. When testing began to involve firing large 
     rocket motors that would release potentially hazardous levels 
     of beryllium particles into the air, concerns expanded to 
     include the general population in the vicinity of test 
     facilities.
       In 1966, the U.S. Public Health Service requested the 
     National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council to 
     study the toxicity and hazards of beryllium propellant and 
     its compounds and to recommend air quality criteria. The 
     resulting March 1966 council report recommended a range of 
     less stringent limits for atmospheric contamination. The U.S. 
     Public Health Service concluded that release of any form of 
     beryllium above 75 micrograms per cubic meter of air could be 
     hazardous, and it did not adopt the council's recommendation 
     to change the release limit.
       According to a 1985 Air Force report, as a result of the 
     U.S. Public Health Service decision, all beryllium propellant 
     and motor testing has been discontinued since 1970. Following 
     the U.S. Public Health Service decision, Defense issued a 
     directive in 1967 that in effect curtailed open-air firing of 
     beryllium-fueled rocket motors. The directive required that 
     the release of beryllium in all open-air firings fall within 
     the 75 microgram contamination limit, that exhaust from 
     rocket motors be filtered to meet the 75 microgram limit, or 
     that firings be conducted outside the continental limits of 
     the United States. According to the August 1969 Air Force 
     report, this directive severely limited development of 
     beryllium-fueled rocket motors. The report also indicated 
     that the 75 microgram contamination limit could not be met, 
     the equipment needed to filter exhaust to meet the 75 
     microgram limit was not available, and firing at remote 
     locations was expensive. The Environmental Protection Agency, 
     which is today responsible for air quality standards, 
     continues to limit such releases to the 75 microgram level.
     OSHA actions to revise exposure standards
       In 1971, OSHA adopted a beryllium standard developed by the 
     American National Standards Institute to control exposure to 
     beryllium in the workplace. OSHA subsequently began efforts 
     to determine whether this standard should be revised.
       In a 1975 Federal Register notice outlining its proposal, 
     OSHA cited several issues raised by the revised standard, 
     including OSHA's decision to treat beryllium as a substance 
     that posed a carcinogenic risk to humans based on laboratory 
     animal data, the technical feasibility of achieving the 
     proposed exposure limits, and the methods of monitoring 
     airborne concentrations of beryllium. It solicited comments 
     from the public and received about 150 written comments and 
     40 requests for a public hearing. As a result, from August 
     through September 1977, OSHA held an informal rulemaking 
     hearing and heard testimony from 46 individuals representing 
     business, government, labor, and academia. Some commenters 
     questioned whether there was sufficient scientific evidence 
     to support a revision, whether employers (particularly 
     beryllium producers) could comply with lower exposure limits 
     with existing technology, and whether the cost of complying 
     with the proposed standard was excessive.
       In 1978, while government panels were considering the 
     sufficiency of scientific evidence, the Secretaries of Energy 
     and Defense questioned the impact of the proposed standard on 
     the continued production of beryllium, which was important 
     for national defense. August 30, 1978, letters from the 
     Secretary of Energy to the Secretary of Labor and the 
     Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare noted that the 
     proposed standard would place a heavy burden on the two 
     primary beryllium producers in the United States, who might 
     stop producing beryllium. Specifically, the letter stated 
     that ``Clearly, cessation of beryllium metal and/or beryllium 
     oxide production is unacceptable and would significantly 
     degrade our national defense effort.'' The Secretary agreed 
     that workers' health was paramount, but believed that the 
     scientific questions warranted an independent peer review. 
     The Secretary of Defense--in November 1978 letters to the 
     Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Health, Education, 
     and Welfare--echoed the Energy Secretary's concerns about 
     national security and the scientific evidence.
       The first government panel reviewed human cancer studies, 
     but documents did not show whether or how the panel's review 
     was concluded. The Secretary of Health, Education, and 
     Welfare formed a second panel in 1978 to address three 
     questions. The questions were as follows: (1) Are the animal 
     studies credible in showing beryllium carcinogenicity
       The second panel's consultants generally agreed that (1) 
     beryllium was an animal carcinogen, (2) no good information 
     existed on cancer involving beryllium-copper alloy, and (3) 
     epidemiological evidence was suggestive of an association 
     between beryllium exposure in the workplace and human lung 
     cancer (however, the data were only suggestive because of 
     alternative explanations for this association). In a 1978 
     report to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
     the U.S. Surgeon General and the Assistant Surgeon General, 
     who oversaw the panel and reviewed the scientific evidence, 
     stated that the conclusion that beryllium was an animal 
     carcinogen required the Department of Health, Education, and 
     Welfare to recommend standard setting and that more 
     definitive answers were needed regarding the last two 
     questions.
       Representatives from Defense, Energy, and OSHA met to 
     discuss the proposed OSHA

[[Page 8672]]

     standard in 1979. Concerns included national security, 
     technical feasibility, and the scientific evidence. OSHA 
     continued its efforts to finalize the standard and prepare a 
     draft rule at least through July 1980. According to OSHA 
     officials, work was discontinued in the early 1980s because 
     of other regulatory priorities such as lead, electrical 
     hazards, and occupational noise.
       In 1998, OSHA announced that it was developing a 
     comprehensive standard on occupational exposure to beryllium. 
     In its announcement, the agency cited evidence of chronic 
     beryllium disease associated with beryllium exposure below 
     the 2 microgram limit, a new beryllium sensitivity test, and 
     conclusions that beryllium is a human carcinogen. Officials 
     from OSHA expect to propose a standard in 2001.
       To develop information for this standard, OSHA contracted 
     with a private firm and has obtained preliminary data on 
     industries that use beryllium. It also issued a hazard 
     information bulletin on beryllium exposure in September 1999 
     to alert employers and employees about the potential hazards 
     of beryllium and to provide guidance on work practices needed 
     to control exposure.
     Energy improved working conditions and medical screening 
         following new disease cases in the 1980s
       Two Energy facilities that have large numbers of beryllium-
     related workers are Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site 
     in Golden, Colorado, and the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant in Oak 
     Ridge, Tennessee. Rocky Flats produced beryllium metal parts 
     for nuclear weapons from 1958 through 1998, but no longer has 
     any production role and is expected to be closed. Some 
     workers at Rocky Flats may encounter beryllium during the 
     environmental cleanup process at the facility. The Y-12 Plant 
     produces nuclear weapons parts from beryllium powder and has 
     other roles in the nuclear weapons program that may expose 
     workers to beryllium. Overall, as of March 2000, Energy had 
     identified at least 17 facilities that use or have used 
     beryllium. Energy's preliminary estimate is that
       According to Energy documents, from the 1970s through 1984, 
     the incidence of chronic beryllium disease appeared to 
     significantly decline at Energy facilities. This apparent 
     reduction, along with the long latency period for the 
     disease, led Energy to assume that chronic beryllium disease 
     was occurring only among workers who had been exposed to high 
     levels of beryllium decades earlier, such as in the 1940s. 
     However, in 1984 a new case of chronic beryllium disease was 
     diagnosed in a worker employed in 1970 at Energy's Rocky 
     Flats facility. Several additional cases were diagnosed among 
     Rocky Flats workers in the following years, raising questions 
     about the adequacy of worker protection measures. In 
     response, Energy investigated the working conditions at Rocky 
     Flats and made improvements to ventilation in 1986 and also 
     improved working practices. Energy also instituted medical 
     screening programs for beryllium workers at risk of 
     developing chronic beryllium disease, making use of new 
     medical advances such as a new blood test. In addition, 
     Energy improved its practices for monitoring worker exposure.
     Energy's Actions at Rocky Flats
       After the new case of chronic beryllium disease was 
     diagnosed in June 1984, Energy's Albuquerque Operations 
     Office, which oversaw Rocky Flats, conducted an investigation 
     of working conditions at the plant's beryllium machine shop 
     to identify factors contributing to the disease case. The 
     investigation, reported in October 1984, identified 
     ventilation problems in the beryllium machine shop and 
     hazards from performing certain operations outside of 
     ventilation hoods, which are designed to collect and filter 
     out airborne beryllium particles. The investigation also 
     found that the affected worker had repeatedly been exposed to 
     beryllium at levels greater than the permissible exposure 
     limit of 2 micrograms per cubic meter of air (averaged over 
     an 8-hour period).
       During the 1984 investigation, the Rocky Flats facility 
     began taking air samples from workers' ``breathing zones'' 
     for the first time, using sampling devices placed on workers' 
     shirts or lapels. Previously, the facility had used ``area 
     monitoring,'' in which sampling devices were placed on 
     beryllium machines or other fixed locations in the work area. 
     Exposed levels measured by personal breathing zone sampling 
     were generally found to be higher than those measured by area 
     samplers. Several reasons could account for the differing 
     monitoring results, according to a 1996 research study and 
     Energy officials. Fixed area monitors were not always well-
     placed to represent breathing zones.\18\ Also, fixed area 
     monitors placed on or near machines may not capture exposures 
     resulting from the use of hand-held tools or poor practices, 
     such as shaking out cloths used to clean machines.
       Following the investigation, Rocky Flats remodeled the 
     ventilation system, eliminated most operations outside 
     ventilation hoods, imposed procedures for cleaning tools and
       A second evaluation at Rocky Flats was conducted by the 
     National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, at the 
     request of a union's local chapter. This evaluation, which 
     was completed in May 1986 before the ventilation remodeling 
     was completed, concluded that a health hazard existed from 
     over-exposure to beryllium in the beryllium machine shop. The 
     Institute recommended that Rocky Flats routinely use personal 
     breathing zone sampling, conduct all beryllium machining 
     under exhaust ventilation, and conduct medical monitoring of 
     beryllium-exposed workers.
     Improved Medical Testing
       During the late 1980s, medical advances allowed for earlier 
     and easier detection of chronic beryllium disease and 
     sensitivity to beryllium. Beryllium sensitivity is an immune 
     system reaction, similar to an allergic reaction, which can 
     occur in some persons exposed to beryllium and that indicates 
     an increased risk of developing chronic beryllium disease. A 
     blood test for sensitivity, known as the beryllium lymphocyte 
     proliferation test, was refined during the late 1980s. 
     Another new diagnostic device, the flexible bronchoscope (a 
     tubular lighted device), provided a less invasive means for 
     examining the lungs for signs of chronic beryllium disease.
       Energy and the National Jewish Medical and Research Center 
     first began using the newly-developed blood test on a trial 
     basis to identify workers sensitivity to beryllium at rocky 
     flats in 1987. Beginning in 1991, Energy established medical 
     screening programs for many additional current and former 
     Energy employees, using this blood text. For those identified 
     as having sensitivity to beryllium, Energy offered follow-up 
     medical exams to determine whether chronic beryllium disease 
     was present. Medical testing was provided in phases, due to 
     the funding levels available, according to an official in 
     Energy's Office of Occupational Medicine and Medical 
     Surveillance. Specifically, blood testing for current and 
     former Rocky Flats workers began on a routine basis in 1991, 
     for current Oak Ridge workers in 1991, for former Oak Ridge 
     workers in 1993, and for former workers at several other 
     facilities where workers could have been exposed to beryllium 
     in 1996 and 1997.
       From 1984 through December 31, 1999, a total of 13,770 
     current and former workers (or about 69 percent of the 
     estimated 20,000 workers who may have been exposed to 
     beryllium) had been screened for definite or possible chronic 
     beryllium disease. Through this testing, 149 Energy workers 
     have been diagnosed with chronic beryllium disease. The 
     Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health 
     states that of the 149 workers, 89 have been diagnosed with 
     chronic beryllium disease and another 60 have
     Improved exposure monitoring
       During the 1990s, Energy also expanded the use of personal 
     breathing zone monitoring at its facilities. For instance, 
     the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge took only 148 personal breathing 
     zone samples prior to 1990, but took 1,448 personal breathing 
     zone samples from 1990 through 1996. According to plant 
     officials, beginning in January 1998 and continuing through 
     fiscal year 1999, the Y-12 Plant sampled every beryllium 
     worker on every shift and reported the results back to the 
     workers the following day. More than 7,900 personal breathing 
     zone samples were collected during this period, according to 
     the plant's Industrial Hygiene Manager. The purposes of this 
     monitoring effort were to make workers more aware of safety 
     practices through immediate feedback, to identify any 
     practices needing improvement, and to address the monitoring 
     requirements states in a 1997 Energy notice on chronic 
     beryllium disease prevention (described below). The 
     Industrial Hygiene Manager for the Y-12 Plant told us that 
     the plant plans to continue using personal breathing zone 
     sampling routinely, sampling every worker in some locations 
     and using a statistically based sampling approach in 
     locations where more extensive data have already been 
     gathered.
     Energy established a rule on beryllium worker safety in 1999 
         and proposed a beryllium worker compensation program
       Energy issued a rule in December 1999 establishing 
     regulations to reduce beryllium exposure levels among its 
     workforce, to reduce the number of workers exposed to 
     beryllium, and to provide medical testing for exposed and 
     potentially exposed workers. This rule on chronic beryllium 
     disease prevention applied to federal, contractor, and 
     subcontractor employees at Energy facilities where there is 
     actual or potential exposure to beryllium. Energy has 
     identified 17 facilities affected by the rule. These 
     facilities have a total of about 8,100 workers who currently 
     are associated with beryllium activities. According to 
     officials in Energy's Office of Environment, Safety, and 
     Health, each Energy facility is currently evaluating how it 
     is affected by the new requirements in the rule. This review 
     may result in identifying additional facilities that are 
     affected by the rule. Several actions by Energy, such as a 
     survey of its facilities to identify those with beryllium 
     uses, preceded development of the final rule. In addition, in 
     November 1999, the Secretary of Energy announced a 
     legislative proposal to provide compensation for Energy 
     workers who have contracted chronic beryllium disease or 
     beryllium sensitivity.
     Steps preceding issuance of DOE's rule
       In 1996, Energy surveyed the contractors that manage and 
     operate its facilities concerning the extent of beryllium 
     usage and

[[Page 8673]]

     the estimated numbers of workers exposed to beryllium. 
     Following the survey, in July 1997, Energy issued a notice to 
     its offices
     Energy's rule on chronic beryllium disease prevention
       Energy's December 1999 rule on chronic beryllium disease 
     prevention includes a number of provisions designed to reduce 
     beryllium exposure among its workers. First, the rule adopts 
     OSHA's permissible exposure limit (currently 2 micrograms per 
     cubic meter averaged over an 8-hour period) or a more 
     stringent limit that may be promulgated by OSHA in the 
     future. Second, the rule establishes an action level that is 
     one-tenth of the permissible exposure limit, at which level 
     certain controls must be implemented. Controls required when 
     exposure reaches the action level include using respirators 
     and protective clothing, periodically monitoring beryllium 
     levels, setting annual goals for exposure reduction, and 
     limiting work area access to authorized personnel. The rule 
     requires that periodic monitoring occur at least quarterly 
     and that facilities use personal breathing zone monitoring. 
     In addition, some controls are required for any beryllium 
     work, regardless of the exposure level. These include 
     assessing hazards before beginning work tasks involving 
     beryllium, providing safety training to workers, and 
     providing respirators to any beryllium worker who requests 
     one.
       Energy's rule includes two other types of beryllium limits. 
     First, the rule establishes limits for beryllium particles on 
     surfaces such as floors, tables, and the exterior of 
     machinery. Surface sampling must be conducted routinely, and 
     specified housekeeping methods must be used to keep beryllium 
     dust below the limits. Second, the rule sets limits called 
     release criteria for beryllium-contaminated equipment or 
     items. One limit is set for releasing equipment and items to 
     other facilities that perform beryllium work. A second, more 
     stringent level is set for releasing equipment and items for 
     re-use outside of Energy facilities or in non-beryllium areas 
     of Energy facilities.
       Energy's rule requires that medical surveillance be 
     provided, on a voluntary basis, to all current workers with 
     known or potential exposure to beryllium. Beryllium workers' 
     annual health evaluations are to include blood tests for 
     beryllium sensitivity and a physical examination emphasizing 
     the respiratory system. These health evaluations are to be 
     provided at no cost to workers. If medical opinions so 
     indicate, employers at Energy facilities must offer to remove 
     workers from beryllium work and exposure. Individuals removed 
     from beryllium work must be provided the opportunity to 
     transfer to other work for which they are qualified or can be 
     trained in a short period. If a position is not available, 
     employers must provide such workers with their normal 
     earnings, benefits, and seniority for up to 2 years.
     Worker compensation proposal
       In November 1999, the Administration transmitted a 
     legislative proposal to the Congress to provide compensation 
     for current and former Energy workers with chronic beryllium 
     disease. The proposal covers employees of Energy and its 
     predecessor agencies, Energy contractors and subcontractors, 
     and beryllium vendors who sold beryllium to Energy. According 
     to Energy officials who helped develop the proposal, 
     employees of beryllium vendors were included because (1) 
     Energy's contracts with vendors through the early 1960s 
     generally required them to apply the same worker safety 
     provisions that Energy used in its own facilities and (2) the 
     vendors manufactured beryllium parts to government 
     specifications and for the sole use of the government. 
     Affected workers would be eligible to receive reimbursement 
     for medical costs, assistance for impairment or vocational 
     rehabilitation, and compensation for lost wages. Workers with 
     sensitivity to beryllium could also be reimbursed for medical 
     costs involved in tracking their condition. In an 
     announcement regarding this proposal, the Secretary of Energy 
     noted that the proposal would reverse Energy's past practice 
     of opposing and litigating most worker health compensation 
     claims. The Administration's proposed legislation was 
     introduced in the House and the Senate in November 1999. Two 
     other bills concerning compensation for beryllium workers 
     have also been introduced in the House and are pending.
     Agency comments and our evaluation
       We provided the Departments of Energy, Labor, and Defense 
     with a draft of this report for their review and comment. 
     They generally agreed with the information in the report and 
     provided technical changes, which we incorporated as 
     appropriate. Energy's written comments are in appendix II. An 
     official of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 
     Defense for Environmental Security orally concurred with the 
     information in our report and suggested changes to clarify 
     data on air monitoring and medical testing. An official of 
     Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration orally 
     concurred with the information in our report and suggested 
     changes to clarify terminology and to expand data on 
     beryllium as a human carcinogen.
       We will provide copies of this report to the Honorable 
     William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Bill 
     Richardson, the Secretary of Energy; the Honorable Alexis 
     Herman, the Secretary of Labor; and other interested parties.
       If you have any questions about this report, please call 
     the contacts listed in appendix III.
       David R. Warren, Director, Defense Management Issues.

                                  ____
                                  

                           List of Requesters

       The Honorable Robert F. Bennett.
       The Honorable Mike DeWine.
       The Honorable John McCain.
       United States Senate.
       The Honorable Christopher Shays, Chairman, Subcommittee on 
     National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International 
     Relations.
       Committee on Government Reform..
       The Honorable Tim Holden
       The Honorable Paul E. Kanjorski.
       The Honorable Marcy Kaptur.
       The Honorable Jim Kolbe.
       House of Representatives.

                                  ____
                                  

                               Appendix I

                   Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

       Our objectives were (1) to provide information on beryllium 
     uses and risks and (2) to describe selected key events that 
     illustrate the evolution of federal government responses to 
     risks. More specifically, we were asked to examine key events 
     at the Departments of Energy and Defense and at Labor's 
     Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
       To obtain information on beryllium uses and risks, we 
     reviewed documentation such as agency studies and reports and 
     interviewed officials at Energy, Defense, Labor, and the 
     Occupational Safety and Health Administration headquarters. 
     We reviewed current and archived data and reports from the 
     U.S. Public Health Service; the National Jewish Medical and 
     Research Center, Denver, Colorado; Brush Wellman, Inc. (one 
     of two producers of beryllium in the United States) 
     headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio; and the Lovelace 
     Respiratory Research Institute, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
       We selected key events during the 1960s through 1990s 
     involving Energy, Defense, and Labor to illustrate agency 
     responses to beryllium uses and risks. For each event, we 
     screened current and archived records for documentation such 
     as agency hearing records, studies, correspondence, and 
     reports; we interviewed agency officials to identify agency 
     positions; and we followed up on agency officials' interviews 
     with other parties, to ensure the accuracy of our report.
       For Energy, we contacted headquarters staff in the Offices 
     of Environment, Safety and Health; the General Counsel; 
     Defense Programs; Science; and Nuclear Energy, Science and 
     Technology; and field staff from Defense facilities, 
     including Rocky Flats, Colorado; Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, 
     Tennessee; Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico; and 
     Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California. We 
     obtained data on exposure sampling; working conditions; 
     medical screening efforts; workplace controls; policy, 
     practices, and procedures; and the rule, proposed 
     legislation, and associated history.
       For Defense overview information, we contacted staff from 
     the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental 
     Security; the military service headquarters; the U.S. Army 
     Center for health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, Aberdeen 
     Proving Ground, Maryland; the Navy Environmental Health 
     Center, Norfolk, Virginia; the Air Force Institute for 
     Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health Risk Analysis, 
     Brooks Air Force Base, Texas; and selected subordinate 
     commands. Regarding beryllium rocket fuel, we also visited 
     the Air Force Research Laboratory, Edwards Air Force Base, 
     California. We obtained background information from the 
     headquarters of the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration, its Langley Research Center, and the Chemical 
     Propulsion Information Agency, Columbia, Maryland.
       For Labor, we interviewed current and former staff from the 
     Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and health 
     Administration and the Department of Health and Human 
     Services' National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
     Health. We obtained and examined the complete transcript of 
     the August-September 1977 informal hearing on beryllium, as 
     well as key documents available from hearing records and 
     related archive files.
       This report was reviewed for classification by an 
     authorized derivative classifier at Energy and was determined 
     to be unclassified. We conducted our review from June 1999 
     through April 2000 in accordance with generally accepted 
     government auditing standards.

[[Page 8674]]

     
                                  ____
                              Appendix II

                 Comments from The Department of Energy

                                              Department of Energy
                                   Washington, DC, April 27, 2000.
     David R. Warren,
     Director, Defense Management Issues, National Security and 
         International Affairs Division, United States General 
         Accounting Office, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Warren: In response to your April 7, 2000, request 
     to the Secretary of Energy, the Office of Environment, Safety 
     and Health has reviewed the draft General Accounting Office 
     report, RCED-HEHS-00-92, ``OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH: 
     Government Responses to Beryllium Uses and Risks'' (GAO Code 
     709457.) The Office of Environment, Safety and Health has no 
     essential comments requiring a reply from the General 
     Accounting Office prior to the publication of the report. We 
     found the report to be accurate. However, we are enclosing 
     suggested comments for your considerations.
       If you have any questions, please contact Ms. Lesley 
     Gasperow, Director, Office of Budget and Administration, on 
     301-903-5577.
           Sincerely,
                                        David Michaels, Ph.D, MPH,
                             Assistant Secretary, Environment,    
     Safety and Health.
                                  ____


                              Appendix III

                 GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

     GAO Contacts
       Charles Patton, Jr., (202) 512-8412.
       Uldis Adamsons, (202) 512-4289.
     Acknowledgments
       In addition to those named above, Bruce Brown, Rachel 
     Hesselink, Arturo Holguin, Robert Kigerl, Lori Rectanus, 
     Ronni Schwartz, George Shelton, and Glen Trochelman made key 
     contributions to this report.