[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 6]
[House]
[Pages 7879-7884]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



 CLINTON ADMINISTRATION PROPOSING MASSIVE REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC FORCES

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ose). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) 
is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I will not take the full 
hour. But I do rise to discuss a matter of vital importance, following 
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), on issues relating to 
national security.
  There are some in both parties who are concerned that, perhaps, we 
are rushing to try to create a new legacy for this President on foreign 
policies relative to our policies with China and Russia.
  As someone who spends a great deal of time focusing on both of those 
countries as a senior member of the Committee on Armed Services and 
Chairman of the Committee on Military Research and Development and co-
chairman of the inter-parliamentary dialogue between Russia and the 
U.S., I am extremely concerned about not just our relationship with 
China, which I will have more to say later on this week and next week 
relative to the NTR vote, but specifically to our relationship with 
Russia.
  Mr. Speaker, we all know that the first week of June the President 
will take an historic trip to Moscow, where he has been asked to 
address the Duma, which is kind of an historic event, an American 
President being asked to speak before the lower house of the Russian 
Parliament.
  I applaud the President for going to Moscow. I am concerned, however, 
that the election of Putin as the new President of Russia saw him take 
his first trip not to Washington, not to the West. But his first trip, 
in fact, is to Beijing, where he is, in fact, engaged in a series of 
high-level meetings with the leadership of China.
  In fact, both China and Russia have talked about a new strategic 
partnership, one that would include China and Russia against the West 
and, in particular, against the U.S.
  Now, it is important that we reach out to this new leader in Russia. 
I did the day that he was sworn into office on January 11 in a three-
page letter that I wrote in Russian to him talking about the need for 
us to sit down and work together to build, once again, a solid 
relationship between our two countries.
  But I am extremely concerned, Mr. Speaker, about the President's 
upcoming trip in June; and I want to call my concerns to the attention 
of our colleagues and to the American people.
  Mr. Speaker, it is not that we do not want our President to go to 
Moscow. We do. And we do want him to discuss issues that are important 
between our two countries. And, obviously, reducing the threat of the 
massive buildup of arms that we both engaged in during the Cold War has 
got to be our top priority.
  But, Mr. Speaker, many of us on both sides of the aisle are equally 
concerned that this President not rush to a quick judgment in our 
relations with Russia or China that would cause America to, in the end, 
be more insecure and would cause more destabilizing relations between 
us and those two nations.
  Now, why do I raise these concerns today? Because, Mr. Speaker, last 
week it was brought to my attention by quiet conversations brought to 
me from both the Pentagon and the intelligence service that the 
President had ordered the Pentagon to look at a massive reduction in 
our strategic forces.
  In fact, one individual told me that the President himself had 
ordered a presidential nuclear initiative that would, in fact, cut our 
strategic forces by 50 percent and that this initiative would be 
announced as a part of the President's trip to Moscow.
  Now, why is that critically important? Mr. Speaker, as we both know, 
the strategic stability between us and Russia is based on an outdated 
theory called ``mutually assured destruction,'' where neither side 
dares challenge the other for fear of retaliation. We do not have a 
defensive system to defeat a Russian accidental launch. Although, the 
Russians do have a defense system around Moscow.
  So when we negotiate with the Russians in terms of reducing arms, it 
is critically important that our Pentagon, that our military leaders, 
that our strategic thinkers in our Government, not Republican or 
Democrat thinkers, but career thinkers who are paid to protect America, 
be consulted in terms of what the final outcome of negotiations should 
be.
  What I heard last week, Mr. Speaker, which was reported in at least 
three major newspapers in both Chicago, New York, and Washington on 
Thursday, was that the administration is, in fact, proposing massive 
reductions in our strategic forces in terms of our relations with 
Russia.
  Now, why am I concerned about that? I do want to see us reduce our 
strategic

[[Page 7880]]

forces and our reliance on them, but I want to do it in a logical and 
methodical manner. This administration, Mr. Speaker, unfortunately does 
not have a good track record in negotiating treaties that can get the 
bipartisan support of the Congress. This administration, in fact, has a 
terrible reputation in terms of our foreign policy in general.
  Many of our colleagues talk, for instance, frequently about the 
President's comments before he went into Kosovo and declared that we 
would see hundreds of thousands of mass graves from where Milosevic had 
buried the people he had murdered. Well, after that war was, in fact, 
wound down this year, we had the CIA before our committee and I asked 
the CIA how many mass graves did we find. They said well below 10,000; 
and some of those graves may have actually been wounds inflicted by the 
allied forces in their attempts to remove Milosevic from power.
  So while the President said one thing to get the support of the 
American people to go into Kosovo, which he promised us would last only 
a matter of weeks and which we would win, here we are a year later and 
Milosevic is still in power. We spent tons of money and, in fact, we 
have since learned that we probably killed more innocent people with 
allied bombs than what Milosevic did in his reign of terror. And 
Milosevic, the war criminal, is still in power and, many would argue, 
stronger than he was before America and Britain led the NATO allies in 
a massive deployment in the Kosovo theatre.
  Likewise, Mr. Speaker, many of our colleagues feel betrayed by this 
administration because of the failure of our arms control policies. In 
fact, in a floor speech 2 years ago, I documented 37 violations of arms 
control agreements by China and Russia since 1991, cases where we 
caught the Russians or the Chinese transferring technology illegally to 
states like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, as well as India and 
Pakistan.
  Mr. Speaker, in all of those 37 cases where we had evidence or 
inclinations that Russia and China had, in fact, violated arms control 
agreements, this administration imposed the requirement sanctions only 
two times. Once we caught the Chinese transferring ring magnets to 
Pakistan for their nuclear program, and once we caught the Chinese 
transferring M-11 missiles to Pakistan, both of which are violations of 
arms control agreements. Seventeen times we saw the Russians 
transferring technology, and 17 times we did nothing about it.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, as my colleagues know, the Congress became so 
disenchanted with this administration and so concerned about the 
flagrant ignorance of violations that were occurring by Russian 
entities that the Congress did something that many felt we would never 
do. We passed the Iran Missile Sanctions legislation.
  We passed that because Israel, just several years ago, I believe it 
was in 1998, told us that they had evidence that Russia was cooperating 
with Iran to build a new class of medium-range missiles, the Shahab 3 
and the Shahab 4. These missiles could target most of Europe and all of 
Israel.
  When the Congress heard that the Israelis had evidence, the question 
to our White House is, well, what are we doing to stop this transfer of 
technology? As we give Russia a billion dollars a year to assist them 
in stabilizing their economy, what are we doing to enforce the arms 
control agreements that require us to take actions against entities in 
any country that is illegally selling technology to rogue states?
  The fact is, Mr. Speaker, the response by the administration when we 
began to get information from the CIA that Israel was correct that we 
had evidence that Russia was, in fact, cooperating with Iran, the 
response of this administration was to make life unbearable for Dr. 
Gordon Ehlers.
  Dr. Gordon Ehlers was the Director of Nonproliferation for the CIA. 
Instead of being honest and candid with Members of Congress, as Dr. 
Ehlers was, the administration wanted to keep the evidence that we had 
of Russian cooperation with Iran quiet. So Dr. Ehlers was, basically, 
made so uncomfortable that he took early retirement from his job.
  The Congress then, in response, introduced bipartisan legislation, 
the Iran Missile Sanctions bill, endorsed by the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Gilman), a Republican, and Jane Harman of California. This 
bill would force the administration to impose the required sanctions on 
Russia. Immediately it got over 200 cosponsors because Members of 
Congress were livid that that administration was not enforcing arms 
control agreements that we and Russia were supposed to abide by.
  By November of that year, the House was getting ready to vote on the 
Iran Missile Sanctions bill. Vice President Gore called 12 of us down 
to the White House, Mr. Speaker. I was one of those 12 Members called 
down to the old Executive Office Building. Sitting in the old Executive 
Office Building with people like John McCain, Senator Bob Kerrey, 
Congressman Lee Hamilton, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), 
Congresswoman Jane Harman, and Senator Carl Levin, we listened to the 
Vice President tell us that if the Congress passed this legislation, it 
would be devastating to our relationship with Russia.
  When he finished talking to us for about an hour, the Members of 
Congress that were there from both parties from both Houses said, Mr. 
Vice President, we understand your concerns. But it is too late. The 
Congress has lost its confidence in this administration's ability to 
enforce arms control agreements that we are a party to.
  A week after the Vice President called us down, in spite of his 
objections and the President's objections, the bipartisan Iran Missile 
Sanctions bill passed the House with 392 votes.
  Mr. Speaker, as my colleagues know, we do not get those kinds of 
votes unless Members of Congress on both sides are absolutely upset and 
feel that this administration is not, in fact, living up to its 
requirements under our arms control treaties.
  Then, Mr. Speaker, we broke for the Christmas and holiday recess and 
came back in February. The Senate was about to take up the same bill, 
the Iran Missile Sanctions Act.
  The Vice President again called us back to the old Executive Office 
Building; and there again, the Vice President, with a member of the 
National Security Council, Jack Karavelli on one side, and the 
President's security adviser, Leon Furth on the other side, talked to 
us Democrats and Republicans, Senators and House Members, many of whom 
had been there for the earlier meeting, and said to the Senators, you 
cannot pass this bill. If you pass it, you will embarrass the President 
and you will cause us irreparable harm with the Russian leadership.
  Mr. Speaker, for a second time, in spite of the personal pleas of the 
Vice President and the President, the Senate passed the Iran Missile 
Sanctions bill with a vote that included 94 Senators voting in the 
affirmative.

                              {time}  2000

  Mr. Speaker, you do not get 94 Senators to vote in unison to 
embarrass the President unless there are serious concerns about the 
policies of this administration. And those 94 Senators did exactly 
that. Mr. Speaker, the bill went to a conference. The President, as he 
said he would, vetoed the bill that year and we had the votes to 
override the veto because of a lack of confidence in this 
administration's policies. In fact, I was in all of those meetings 
where we discussed bringing the veto override up on the House floor 
with Speaker Gingrich one month before the Congressional elections that 
year in 1999.
  Mr. Speaker, it was Speaker Newt Gingrich who stopped the veto 
override from coming up for a vote in the House. It would have passed. 
We would have had overwhelming numbers of Members on both sides 
overturning the President's veto, but Republican Newt Gingrich did not 
want to bring that bill up a month before the Congressional elections. 
So in this new Congress, without Speaker Gingrich, without Members like 
Jane Harman, bipartisan Members again reintroduced the Iran missile 
sanctions bill, and this year,

[[Page 7881]]

Mr. Speaker, the Iran missile sanctions bill passed the House and the 
Senate unanimously. This year, Mr. Speaker, the President could not 
veto the bill because he knew he would be overridden. So what did he 
do? He did what Bill Clinton does so frequently. He changed his sides, 
came over in support of the legislation, and signed the bill into law, 
even though it was a direct slap at this administration and was a 
direct contradiction to their policies.
  Mr. Speaker, that was probably the most clear evidence of the lack of 
confidence of this Congress in the policies of this administration when 
it comes to arms control. My most glaring evidence, Mr. Speaker, was 
when I was in Moscow in 1996 in January, a month after the Washington 
Post had just reported a front page story that we had evidence that 
Iraq had received guidance systems from Russia illegally. While I was 
visiting with our ambassador, Ambassador Pickering in his office in 
Moscow, I said, ``Mr. Ambassador, what was the response from the 
Russians when you told them that we caught them illegally transferring 
guidance systems to Iraq?'' Now, the importance of these systems is 
that they make their missiles more accurate. As we all know, we lost 31 
young Americans in 1991 because of an Iraqi SCUD missile. Any 
technology that would make those missiles more accurate could endanger 
the lives of American troops and American allies. The Post reported 
that we had evidence that Russia had been helping Iraq with their 
guidance systems. So when I asked Ambassador Pickering what the 
response was from the Russian side, he said, ``Congressman, I haven't 
asked the Russians yet.'' I said, ``Why haven't you asked them, Mr. 
Ambassador?'' He said, ``Because that's got to come from the White 
House.''
  So I came back to Washington. At the end of January 1996 I wrote to 
President Clinton a letter saying, Dear Mr. President, we have evidence 
evidently, according to the Washington Post, that we have caught the 
Russians illegally transferring guidance systems to Iraq, in violation 
of the Missile Technology Control Regime, a key arms control agreement. 
That is a serious violation, Mr. President, and if it is so, what are 
you doing about it?''
  Mr. Speaker, the President wrote me back in April of that year. He 
said, ``Dear Congressman Weldon, you are right. If the Russians did 
what the Post said they did, that would be a terribly serious violation 
of an arms control agreement, and I assure you, if we can prove that 
the Russians transferred those devices, we will take aggressive action, 
and we will take the required actions mandated by that arms control 
treaty.''
  Mr. Speaker, little did I know that at that time, agencies of the 
U.S. Government had well over 100 sets of the Russian guidance systems 
that we caught being transferred from Russia to Iraq not on one 
occasion, not twice, but on three separate occasions. We caught the 
Russians transferring guidance systems to Iraq. In fact, I have a set 
of these devices that I carry around when I give speeches. Yet this 
administration did nothing to impose the required sanctions. In fact, 
Mr. Speaker, when asked by Members of Congress what action we had taken 
with Russia, the response by the administration was, ``Well, we got 
assurances from Russia that they'll never do it again.''
  Mr. Speaker, because of the continued policy of ignoring Russia's 
violations, the Congress lost total confidence in this administration 
on arms control agreements. Mr. Speaker, as an aside, I am convinced 
that the reason we did not call Russia on those violations was because 
of our policy of a friendly relationship between Clinton and Yeltsin 
and therefore our policy in this country was to prevent anything from 
surfacing that would have embarrassed Boris Yeltsin. In fact, the year 
of those Iraqi violations was in fact the year that Yeltsin was running 
for reelection. In my opinion, that is why we never surfaced those 
clear violations of an arms control agreement.
  So, Mr. Speaker, the track record of this administration on arms 
control is abysmal. Many in this city, including arms control groups, 
maintain it is one of the worst in the history of this country in terms 
of letting countries get away with obvious violations of arms control 
treaties. That is why this administration could not get the votes for 
the nuclear test ban treaty. That is why this administration could not 
get the votes for any arms control treaty that it negotiates with any 
country. That is a sad state of affairs, when the confidence is so low 
that neither body will support arms control negotiations completed by 
this administration.
  Now, we had a similar occurrence occur, Mr. Speaker, 3 years ago. The 
administration, after the Senate ratified the START II treaty with 
Russia, a very important START II treaty, ratified by this country in 
1993, the year President Clinton came into office, because the Senate 
believed START II was important to reduce arms negotiated by former 
President Bush and before that, former President Reagan. So the Senate 
approved it. But then the administration did something that caused 
further erosion in the confidence of the Congress. The administration 
held negotiations with the Russians in Geneva to amend the ABM Treaty. 
These negotiations went on for months. They were centered around two 
specific issues: One was to make the ABM Treaty a multilateral treaty 
that would not just apply to Russia but would bring in Belarus, Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan. Now, I could not understand for the life of me why we 
would want to amend the ABM Treaty to broaden it. The second issue was 
demarcation, a complicated issue but one that would set up a 
distinction between a theater missile defense system and a national 
missile defense system. This distinction would be based on interceptor 
speed, a very highly scientific development that would differentiate 
between the two systems. I did not understand the negotiations. Unlike 
our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, I went to Geneva. I think I am the only 
Member of Congress from either body who went over there to sit in on 
the negotiations firsthand. I got the approval of the administration 
up-front. I sat down at the negotiating table with our chief negotiator 
Stanley Riveles on my side and I sat across from the chief Russian 
negotiator, General Koltunov. For 2\1/2\ hours I questioned the 
Russians through General Koltunov about the negotiations going on at 
Geneva. For instance, Mr. Speaker, I asked Koltunov, ``Why does Russia 
want to multinationalize or lateralize the ABM Treaty?'' I said, 
``General, you are the only country left of the former Soviet Union 
that has long range missiles. Why do you want to include Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan and Belarus? They don't have long range missiles. They have 
all been removed.''
  He looked at me and he said, ``Congressman, you're asking that 
question of the wrong person. We didn't propose multilateralizing the 
treaty. Your side did.'' Now, for the life of me, Mr. Speaker, I could 
not understand why we would want to multilateralize the ABM treaty 
unless there are those in the White House who wanted to make it more 
difficult to amend the treaty after they left office. If you bring 
Belarus in, with an unstable leader like Lukashenko, you could have 
Russia and America agree on an ABM change and have the Russians quietly 
tell Lukashenko, ``Don't support it,'' and have Belarus be the country 
that stopped the treaty from being changed. That became a very 
controversial item of negotiation that this administration agreed to.
  Then there was a second item, and that was demarcation. The 
administration agreed to a number difference between theater and 
national missile defense systems. I asked General Koltunov, ``Where do 
these numbers come from, General, how do you determine what is a 
theater versus a national missile defense system? Where is that line? 
How do you arrive at it? Is it some theory of physics?''
  He said, ``Congressman, these numbers were very carefully negotiated 
by our military and your military.''
  I said, ``Well, General, I don't understand but I think it's 
ridiculous that we would amend the ABM Treaty to broaden it to include 
theater missile defense systems when you, Russia, already have some of 
the world's most

[[Page 7882]]

capable theater missile defense systems and you're selling them all 
over the place.''
  I came back to Washington not satisfied with what I heard. The 
administration concluded their negotiations in Geneva, and those two 
items became known as the protocols. I found out a year later what I 
think is the reason that these numbers were reached for the demarcation 
between these systems, Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I simply want 
to compliment him on his fine work and to say that the bill which will 
be coming forward tomorrow on military construction should I think go a 
long way towards addressing some of the concerns that my friend has 
raised.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank my colleague. I thank him for his 
chairmanship of the Committee on Rules and look forward to his new 
rule, hopefully tomorrow, on the defense authorization bill for 2001.
  Mr. DREIER. We are going to work on that right now.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I read an article in the Tel 
Aviv newspaper that documented that Russia was trying to sell Israel a 
brand new defense system called the Antei 2500. I had never heard of 
this system. I know most of Russia's systems. So I called the CIA. They 
were not quite sure of it either but they sent an expert over about a 
month later who was a missile expert for the CIA. He brought in some 
documents with him. I said, ``Have you ever heard of this new Russian 
system called the Antei 2500? It is supposed to be fantastic.'' He 
said, ``Congressman, I know the system.'' He said, ``In fact the 
Russians have printed documents, marketing brochures,'' and he gave me 
one. He said, ``This is what they were showing at the Abu Dhabi air 
show this year.'' I picked it up and looked at it. There were 
photographs of this new missile defense system that Russia was in fact 
trying to sell. I found out they were not just trying to sell it to 
Israel, they were also offering it to Greece. I read through the 
brochure. The agent and I, the CIA agent and I had a discussion about 
the capability. He said, ``It is a very capable system, almost as 
capable as our PAC-3.'' On the back page of that document, Mr. Speaker, 
was a summary sheet of all the capabilities of that system. To my 
amazement, the interceptor speed of that Antei 2500 was right below the 
threshold of the demarcation that our government got sucked into by the 
Russians in Geneva. So in effect, Mr. Speaker, that is where the 
demarcation number came from. In our haste to enter into an agreement 
with the Russians, we agreed to an artificial number between theater 
and national missile defense that would let the Russians a year later 
market a brand new system right below that threshold but would prohibit 
us from making our systems go beyond that capability.
  Mr. Speaker, that is why there is no confidence in this 
administration's ability to negotiate arms control agreements. It is 
because this administration has a terrible track record. In fact, Mr. 
Speaker, today the Iranians are developing the Shahab 4 system which 
they got help from the Russians on which has a defined capability of at 
least 2500 kilometers.

                              {time}  2015

  If we were to accept the administration's demarcation protocol, we 
could not improve our systems to defeat the Iranian Shahab-4 system 
which Russia helped Iran build. That is why this Congress, Mr. Speaker, 
has no confidence, and that is why I have no confidence in this 
administration in arms control negotiations.
  Now, to add further insult to injury, when the administration 
finished their negotiations in Geneva and these two protocols were 
signed by the White House and by the Russian leadership, by law and by 
the Constitution, the President is required to submit those changes to 
the treaty to the Senate, because constitutionally the Senate has the 
role of advise and consent.
  Mr. Speaker, that was 3 years ago. For 3 years Senate leadership has 
been asking the administration to send those two protocols up so the 
Senate could debate them, and for 3 years the White House has refused 
to send those two items up. Why? Because they know they could not get 
them passed, because no Member of the Senate would have confidence in 
those two items that we negotiated based on the outline I have just 
provided to our colleagues, so for 3 years the Senate held those 
protocols back.
  Quietly, in getting the Russians to approve START II, the 
administration gave a wink and a nod to Russia and said, look, instead 
of us bringing those demarcation items up and those protocols up 
separately, attach those to START II. So when the Russian Duma ratified 
the START II treaty three weeks ago, they did not just pass the START 
II treaty that our Senate ratified in 1993, they added those two 
protocols on to the START II ratification.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, this President knows that this Senate will never 
approve START II with those two protocols included, so now we have a 
case where the START II treaty is in jeopardy, and it is in jeopardy 
again because of the underhanded and deceitful way in which the 
protocols were not brought before to the Senate or to the House, but 
rather, forced on the Russian side as a part of the START II final 
passage.
  The President also knows that we have a law on the books that says 
the President cannot go below a certain threshold of strategic weapons 
unless START II is fully ratified. START II is not fully ratified, Mr. 
Speaker, and this President cannot get START II fully ratified under 
the terms agreed to by the Russians. So if we cannot get START II 
ratified as agreed to by the Russian side, then how are we ever going 
to reach below that to a START III level? In fact, Mr. Speaker, in last 
year's defense bill, we also put a provision in that said, in Section 
1201, that not later than September 1, 2000, the Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services in the Senate and the 
House, in consultation with the CIA, an assessment of the strategic 
balance between Russia and the U.S. based on decreasing numbers of 
strategic weapons.
  Mr. Speaker, we have been informed by the Pentagon they have not even 
completed the assessment for this report. They have not even completed 
the assessment for the further reductions that would come under START 
III, and here is President Clinton telling the Pentagon, ``Tell me how 
I can cut our strategic forces in one-half.''
  Mr. Speaker, that is why there is no confidence. There is no 
confidence because last week when I heard the administration was 
proposing these changes, I went to see Majority Leader Trent Lott. I 
said, ``Mr. Majority Leader, have you had any consultation with the 
White House on what is going to be discussed in Moscow in June?'' He 
said ``none.''
  I went to the Speaker, I went to the Majority Leader, I went to the 
Majority Whip. I went to the Chairman of the Committee on Armed 
Services, I went to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense 
Appropriations. I said to all of them, ``Have you been briefed by this 
administration on what they are going to offer and negotiate with 
Russia at the summit in June?'' They all said no.
  So here we have an administration that has lost the confidence of 
this Congress on arms control agreements for all the reasons I 
documented, plus many more, now proposing a major announcement of a 
reduction with the Russians in Moscow in June. It is not that we do not 
want to work with the Russians to reduce arms. I want that, Mr. 
Speaker, and I work at that every day. But, Mr. Speaker, I want those 
negotiations based on candor, I want them based on fact, I want them 
based on what the Pentagon feels is within our best security 
limitations.
  I do not want the President going off to Moscow to reverse the legacy 
of 7\1/2\ years of helping to cause Russia to become a failure, a 
basket case, where in 1992 young Russians were parading in Moscow 
streets waving American flags, and Boris Yeltsin's first speech was 
declaring a new strategic relationship between the U.S. and Russia, 
and, 7 years later, in 1999, having 5,000 Russians stand in front of 
the American embassy

[[Page 7883]]

in Moscow throwing bricks and cans of paint at our embassy, and one of 
Boris Yeltsin's final speeches declaring a new strategic relationship 
between Russia and China with the U.S. as the enemy.
  Now, we cannot blame all of that turnaround on Bill Clinton, but, Mr. 
Speaker, I can tell you that we have not done well with Russia over the 
last 8 years, and the level of confidence from both Russia and China is 
at an all time low. Our concern is that this President, in his rush to 
repair his tainted foreign policy image, may try to come out with some 
grandiose scheme that does two things: It puts a new face on the 
foreign policy legacy of Bill Clinton; and, secondary, it gives Al 
Gore, who has been trailing in the polls by about 8 or 9 points to 
Governor Bush, a political issue to run on through the November 
election.
  Mr. Speaker, arms control negotiations with the Russians cannot be 
based on what is best for a presidential campaign, and they cannot be 
based on trying to recreate a legacy that does not exist when it comes 
to foreign policy issues.
  Here is my greatest fear, Mr. Speaker; that the President, in a rush 
to accept the advice of some of his political advisers to have some 
newly negotiated level of reduction in arms with the Russians, may end 
up reaching an agreement that the Senate will never ratify, and, 
therefore, again we will let Russia down, and again the Russians will 
lose confidence, and they will think that we did it deliberately, that 
the President went over to Moscow to negotiate something, announced 
something was potent in front of the entire Duma and the entire 
country, and then America did not follow through. Why? Not because of 
any disagreement necessarily with Russia, but because this Congress has 
no confidence in this administration's arms control track record. In 
fact, it was not until last year that the administration began to 
finally impose some limited sanctions on Russian entities that we, in 
fact, knew were in violation of arms control agreements.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, I want Russia to succeed, and I work at it every 
day. I want them to be a stable friend of ours. Calling violations of 
arms control agreements into question when Russian entities do things 
that are wrong is no different than when we accuse a company like Loral 
or Hughes or some other American firm of illegally selling technology 
in violation of those same agreements or our own laws. And what we did 
for 8 years was ignore the violations of Russian entities. We did it 
because I think we had a failed foreign policy of not wanting to 
embarrass Russia's leaders. Now we are paying the price for that.
  We cannot let in the matter of the last 6 months of this 
administration a President who, in my opinion, is desperately trying to 
reverse what will be his legacy of a failed foreign policy, to announce 
some grandiose plan that is not based on substance and does not have 
bipartisan support.
  Mr. Speaker, one month ago, Secretary Cohen called six of us from the 
House over to the Pentagon for a luncheon meeting, three Democrats, 
three Republicans, and the Secretary had all of his senior staff there, 
and we talked about where we should go with Russia.
  I told the Secretary then our policy with Russia has got to be a 
bipartisan policy. This administration has lost the confidence of the 
Congress, and the only way this administration can have any hope of a 
successful new relationship is to bring in leaders of both parties.
  I suggested to Secretary Cohen that he lead a bipartisan delegation 
to Moscow to meet with Putin's people, with Republicans and Democrats 
sitting together, to discuss a new relationship. What do we have a 
month later? This President, without any consultation with the Speaker, 
without any consultation with the Majority Leader, without any 
consultation with any Member of Congress, secretly proposing a new 
deal, one that he could stand up before the cameras, before the Duma, 
bite his lip and talk about a new relationship in America's and 
Russia's relations, when he knows full well this Congress just does not 
trust his ability to negotiate successful treaties that are in 
America's best interests.
  If this President does not take those steps, then it is wrong for him 
to go to Moscow and lay out a scenario to the Russians that he knows 
full well this Congress will not support. He may try to give Al Gore a 
political campaign theme, but that is not going to work, Mr. Speaker, 
because we caught onto this act in advance.
  That is why last week the White House was in a skirmish, because the 
cat got out of the bag. Members of Congress were aware that there were 
secret discussions taking place that were leading up to a major 
announcement by the President in Moscow that would shake America and 
shake Russia.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, thank goodness our leadership has responded. Only 
Friday Majority Leader Trent Lott and Speaker Denny Hastert announced 
that they are forming a bipartisan coalition that will begin to assess 
our defense posture, but specifically what increased threats might come 
about by unilateral discussions in our strategic forces.
  I called former CIA director, Jim Woolsey, on the phone last Thursday 
and said, ``Director Woolsey, would you be willing to serve on such a 
panel?'' He said ``Absolutely.'' People of the caliber of Jim Woolsey 
and Don Rumsfeld are the kind of people that this Congress has 
confidence in. When Don Rumsfeld and Jim Woolsey and the other seven 
Members of the Rumsfeld Commission came back to this Congress two years 
ago with a report that said the CIA was wrong, the administration was 
wrong, the threat to our security from countries like Iran and Iraq and 
China were closer than what they were originally stated to be, the 
Congress responded with overwhelming bipartisan support.
  We now need those same bipartisan people, who are recognized experts 
on defense and strategic issues, to analyze what would happen if we, in 
fact, agreed in Moscow to lower the number of strategic weapons and 
what the onus would be on our side in terms of security risk, because 
there are many in this country who have argued that to go too low with 
strategic forces coequally be destabilizing.
  So, Mr. Speaker, tonight I am asking our colleagues to begin to ask 
the questions before President Clinton goes to Moscow. The first 
question is, Mr. President, why have you not involved the Congress? If 
you want to succeed, Mr. President, do what we suggested to Secretary 
Cohen 5 weeks ago; bring a bipartisan delegation together, a delegation 
that you have called upon when you want support for your initiatives.
  I can recall in each of the past 5 years, former administration 
official Howard Smith calling me each year to deliver Republican votes 
for the administration's cooperative threat reduction program, and each 
year we did that. The administration has had a policy of calling us 
when they want our support for their priorities, but ignoring us when 
they tread on such delicate issues as arms control treaties and 
relations.
  Nothing could be more devastating to our relationship with Russia 
than to have a President of the United States go to Moscow, make a 
grand appearance before the Duma and announce some grand strategy, only 
to have the Senate say, ``We don't agree, Mr. President. You went too 
far.''

                              {time}  2030

  Right now, that is the way the Senate feels about START II, Mr. 
Speaker. In the words of senators like Jon Kyl and Jim Inhofe, Senators 
on both sides of the aisle have questioned the two protocols that were 
added to the START II treaty by the Russian side. This administration 
needs to clear up those two protocols before it attempts to negotiate 
further reductions in the START III process.
  Mr. Speaker, in the end I want us to reach historic new levels in our 
relationship with the Russians, as Ronald Reagan and George Bush did; 
but Ronald Reagan and George Bush negotiated with Russia with three 
basic conditions in mind: Strength, consistency and candor.
  For the last 7\1/2\ years, Mr. Speaker, we have not seen any of those 
three positions used in our negotiations with

[[Page 7884]]

Russia. We have wavered. We have ignored reality. We have pretended 
things are not what they are and we have allowed Russian entities to 
get away with deliberate violations of arms control treaties that have 
undermined the confidence of the Congress in terms of a new treaty we 
would enter into, and that is a real sorrowful situation.
  So I would hope, Mr. Speaker, that this administration and the 
President and his team would reach out in the last 3 weeks before the 
Moscow trip to the Congress to bring in Republican and Democrat 
leaders, to have a full and open debate and dialogue about where we are 
going with Russia; not to do something in secret, not to have some 
grand announcement, where he attempts to capture the imagination of the 
American people to restore a failed foreign policy legacy and not to 
boost Al Gore's campaign and give him an edge on defense issues.
  If the President does not do that, Mr. Speaker, then this Congress 
will not support anything that the President negotiates and, 
unfortunately, we will again create more of a lack of confidence on the 
Russian side as to what our intentions are in our relationship.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, I have encouraged the President to move away 
from the whole theory of mutually assured deterrence where we basically 
dare each other to attack and build up these large missiles to attack 
each other and move toward what I call asymmetric deterrence, where we 
continue to negotiate with the Russians decreases in our offensive 
weapons but begin to allow in those negotiations strategic defensive 
systems as well, so that we focus on defending our people as opposed to 
threatening to attack the other side.
  Mr. Speaker, if this President wants to change the legacy that he has 
made for himself, the best thing he could do would be to go to Moscow 
with a bipartisan approach. In fact, I would go even one step further, 
Mr. Speaker. I would implore the President in this, an election year, 
to invite Governor George Bush and Vice President Al Gore in to let 
each of them share in any negotiation that takes place in Moscow, 
because President Clinton is not going to get anything ratified that he 
does in Moscow, number one, because of the legacy of the failed arms 
control practices of the past 7\1/2\ years but, two, just because of 
the time involved.
  The President will go in June. We will be in session the rest of June 
and July. We will break in August, come back in September. No arms 
control agreement has ever been ratified that quickly by a Senate, and 
the President knows that. So he will not have to get the support of the 
Congress in the next session. It will be either Al Gore or George W. 
Bush.
  So my advice to the President would be, bring in Republicans and 
Democrats, Mr. Speaker; have an honest discussion with us about our 
approach with the Russians; clear up the START II treaty; get rid of 
those two protocols that were never a part of the START II treaty that 
the Senate ratified in 1993 and bring in George W. Bush along with Al 
Gore and involve both of them in any discussions with the Russians, 
because if the President does not, Mr. Speaker, if he does not do that 
then we could only read his intent as being purely political; purely 
political because the President knows that his only attempt would be 
to, one, change his own legacy and, two, bolster Al Gore's campaign and 
not to a sincere effort to get this country's legislative bodies to 
ratify a substantive agreement with Russia, because if that were the 
case the President would involve this Congress and he would involve 
George W. Bush in this process before he goes to Moscow.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask my colleagues to convey their 
concerns, as I will be doing.

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