[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 6]
[House]
[Pages 7829-7832]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF NUCLEAR TRANSFERS TO NORTH KOREA ACT OF 2000

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 4251) to amend the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 
to enhance congressional oversight of nuclear transfers to North Korea, 
and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                               H.R. 4251

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Congressional Oversight of 
     Nuclear Transfers to North Korea Act of 2000''.

     SEC. 2. ENHANCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF NUCLEAR 
                   TRANSFERS TO NORTH KOREA.

       (a) Establishing Requirement for Congressional Action by 
     Joint Resolution.--The North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 
     1999 (subtitle B of title VIII of division A of H.R. 3427, as 
     enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113, 
     and as contained in appendix G to such Public Law) is amended 
     in section 822(a)--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (7) as 
     subparagraphs (A) through (G), respectively, and by indenting 
     each such subparagraph 2 ems to the right;
       (2) by striking ``until the President'' and inserting 
     ``until--
       ``(1) the President''; and
       (3) at the end of subparagraph (G) (as redesignated in 
     paragraph (1)) by striking the period and inserting ``; and
       ``(2) a joint resolution described in section 823 is 
     enacted into law pursuant to the provisions of such 
     section.''.
       (b) Description and Procedures for Joint Resolution.--The 
     North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 is amended--
       (1) by redesignating section 823 as section 824; and
       (2) by inserting after section 822 the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 823. JOINT RESOLUTION PURSUANT TO SECTION 822(A)(2).

       ``(a) Terms of Joint Resolution.--For purposes of section 
     822(a)(2), the term `joint resolution' means only a joint 
     resolution of the two Houses of Congress---
       ``(1) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as 
     follows: `That the Congress hereby concurs in the 
     determination and report of the President relating to 
     compliance by North Korea with certain international 
     obligations transmitted pursuant to section 822(a)(1) of the 
     North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999.';
       ``(2) which does not have a preamble; and
       ``(3) the title of which is as follows: `Joint Resolution 
     relating to compliance by North Korea with certain 
     international obligations pursuant to the North Korea Threat 
     Reduction Act of 1999.'.
       ``(b) Congressional Review Procedures.--
       ``(1) Rulemaking.--The provisions of this section are 
     enacted by the Congress--
       ``(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House 
     of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and, as 
     such, shall be considered as part of the rules of either 
     House and shall supersede other rules only to the extent they 
     are inconsistent therewith; and
       ``(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
     either House to change the rules so far as they relate to the 
     procedures of that House at any time, in the same manner, and 
     to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that 
     House.
       ``(2) Introduction and referral.--
       ``(A) Introduction.--A joint resolution described in 
     subsection (a)--
       ``(i) shall be introduced in the House of Representatives 
     by the majority leader or minority leader or by a Member of 
     the House of Representatives designated by the majority 
     leader or minority leader; and
       ``(ii) shall be introduced in the Senate by the majority 
     leader or minority leader or a Member of the Senate 
     designated by the majority leader or minority leader.
       ``(B) Referral.--The joint resolution shall be referred to 
     the Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate.
       ``(3) Discharge of committees.--If a committee to which a 
     joint resolution described in subsection (a) is referred has 
     not reported such joint resolution by the end of 30 days 
     beginning on the date of its introduction, such committee 
     shall be discharged from further consideration of such joint 
     resolution, and such joint resolution shall be placed on the 
     appropriate calendar of the House involved.
       ``(4) Floor consideration in the house of 
     representatives.--
       ``(A) In general.--On or after the third calendar day 
     (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays, except when 
     the House of Representatives is in session on such a day) 
     after the date on which the committee to which a joint 
     resolution described in subsection (a) is referred has 
     reported, or has been discharged from further consideration 
     of, such a joint resolution, it shall be in order for any 
     Member of the House to move to proceed to the consideration 
     of the joint resolution. A Member of the House may make the 
     motion only on the day after the calendar day on which the 
     Member announces to the House the Member's intention to do 
     so. Such motion is privileged and is not debatable. The 
     motion is not subject to amendment or to a motion to 
     postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion 
     is agreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to 
     the consideration of the joint resolution is agreed to, the 
     House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint 
     resolution which shall remain the unfinished business until 
     disposed of.
       ``(B) Debate.--Debate on a joint resolution described in 
     subsection (a), and on all debatable motions and appeals in 
     connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than two 
     hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring 
     and those opposing the joint resolution. An amendment to the 
     joint resolution is not in order. A motion further to limit 
     debate is in order and is not debatable. A motion to table, a 
     motion to postpone, or a motion to recommit the joint 
     resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote 
     by which the joint resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is 
     not in order.
       ``(C) Appeals.--Appeals from the decisions of the Chair to 
     the procedure relating to a joint resolution described in 
     subsection (a) shall be decided without debate.
       ``(5) Floor consideration in the senate.--Any joint 
     resolution described in subsection (a) shall be considered in 
     the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 
     601(b)(4) of the International Security Assistance and Arms 
     Export Control Act of 1976.
       ``(6) Consideration by the other house.--If, before the 
     passage by one House of a joint resolution of that House 
     described in subsection (a), that House receives from the 
     other House a joint resolution described in subsection (a), 
     then the following procedures shall apply:
       ``(A) The joint resolution of the other House shall not be 
     referred to a committee and may not be considered in the 
     House receiving it except in the case of final passage as 
     provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).
       ``(B) With respect to a joint resolution described in 
     subsection (a) of the House receiving the joint resolution--
       ``(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if 
     no joint resolution had been received from the other House; 
     but
       ``(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the joint 
     resolution of the other House.
       ``(C) Upon disposition of the joint resolution received 
     from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to 
     consider the joint resolution that originated in the 
     receiving House.
       ``(7) Computation of days.--In the computation of the 
     period of 30 days referred to in paragraph (3), there shall 
     be excluded the days on which either House of Congress is not 
     in session because of an adjournment of more than three days 
     to a day certain or because of an adjournment of the Congress 
     sine die.''.

     SEC. 3. EXPANSION OF RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH 
                   NORTH KOREA.

       Section 822(a) of the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 
     1999 is amended by striking ``such agreement,'' both places 
     it appears and inserting in both places ``such agreement (or 
     that are controlled under the Export Trigger List of the 
     Nuclear Suppliers Group),''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee) each 
will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).


                             General Leave

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on H.R. 4251.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as may I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that the distinguished gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) has joined with

[[Page 7830]]

me to offer bipartisan legislation regarding U.S. nuclear cooperation 
with North Korea pursuant to the 1994 Agreed Framework between our 
Nation and North Korea. Our bill is designed to make certain that no 
transfers of U.S. nuclear equipment or technology to North Korea takes 
place pursuant to that agreement without careful review by the Congress 
and without the full support of the Congress.
  Along with other distinguished cosponsors, including the gentleman 
from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), chairman of our Subcommittee on Asia and 
the Pacific, and the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), chairman of 
our Republican Policy Committee, as well as the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Kucinich), our former colleague on the Committee on International 
Relations, we introduced H.R. 4251, entitled the Congressional 
Oversight of Nuclear Transfers to North Korea Act of 2000. We 
introduced that on April 12.
  But this proposal is not a new one. For all practical purposes, this 
bill already has passed the House of Representatives. On July 21 of 
last year, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) and I offered 
an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act requiring the 
President to certify to the Congress that North Korea has fulfilled all 
of its obligations under the Agreed Framework before a nuclear 
cooperation agreement between our Nation and North Korea can enter into 
effect.
  Without such a nuclear cooperation agreement, key nuclear components 
could not be transferred to North Korea from the United States as 
contemplated by the Agreed Framework. The Gilman-Markey amendment 
further required that Congress enact a joint resolution concurring in 
the President's certification before such a nuclear cooperation can 
enter into effect. Our amendment was approved by a wide margin with 
strong support on both sides of the aisle.
  We later negotiated with the administration over our amendment in the 
conference committee on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, and we 
reached an agreement with the administration over the language of the 
certification. Our certification requirement was enacted into law late 
last year as the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 2000.
  We were less successful, however, with regard to our proposed 
requirement that the Congress enact a joint resolution concurring in 
the President's certification. The administration resisted our idea 
that Congress should have a role with the President in evaluating North 
Korea's compliance with the Agreed Framework. They noted in particular 
that the language of our amendment last year did not include expedited 
procedures that would ensure that such a joint resolution would 
actually be considered on the floor of both Houses of the Congress. 
Without such expedited procedures, they argued such a resolution could 
be filibustered in the Senate or bottled up in the committee in the 
House.
  It has never been our intention, Mr. Speaker, to allow procedural 
maneuvers in either House to block implementation of the Agreed 
Framework. What we want is to make certain that the issue of North 
Korea's compliance with its obligations will be fully considered in 
both Houses, and that both Chambers will be able to express themselves 
on the subject by majority vote.
  Because expedited procedures can help ensure that the majority of 
each chamber will be heard, we have always favored including them in 
our legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4251 amends the North Korea Threat Reduction Act to 
require that Congress concur in any certification submitted by the 
President pursuant to that Act before a nuclear cooperation agreement 
between our Nation and North Korea can enter into effect. To meet the 
concerns expressed last year, our bill includes expedited procedures 
for consideration in both the House and Senate of a joint resolution 
concurring in the President's certification.
  We worked with the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), our 
distinguished Ranking Democratic Member on the Committee on 
International Relations, to refine the expedited procedures while this 
bill was before our committee. After it was approved by our committee, 
we received the very able assistance from the Committee on Rules in 
further perfecting the expedited procedures. The amendment that we have 
before us today reflects that very helpful contribution.
  I want to thank not only the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. 
Gejdenson), but also the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), 
chairman of the Committee on Rules, and the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley), Ranking Democratic Member for their 
support in developing this very fine product that we have before us 
today.
  The text before us, Mr. Speaker, has been developed with bipartisan 
input from two very important committees. The only possible reason that 
any Member could have for objecting to it is the belief that Congress 
is incapable of fairly evaluating whether North Korea has complied with 
its international obligations. I would be surprised if any Member of 
this body had such a concern.
  Most presidents, of course, would prefer for Congress to abdicate to 
them all responsibilities relating to foreign affairs. But, Mr. 
Speaker, we were elected by our constituents to represent them, and we 
cannot do that by ceding our constitutional responsibilities to the 
Executive Branch.
  This legislation is designed to help us, in this body, to exercise 
responsibilities we were elected to carry out. We hope and expect that 
it will once again receive strong bipartisan support.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and 
I rise in strong support of this bill.
  In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed 
Framework under which North Korea was obligated to freeze its 
activities at several nuclear related sites subject to international 
on-site inspection.
  These sites included an operating nuclear reactor that the North 
Koreans had built themselves, a nuclear reprocessing plant suitable for 
producing plutonium for nuclear weapons from this reactor's fuel, and 
two larger nuclear reactors under construction.
  In exchange for North Korea's freeze, the United States was obligated 
to provide low-grade heating oil and create an international consortium 
to construct two civil power reactors to replace the two reactors that 
North Korea had been building.
  International inspectors continue to verify that activity at these 
North Korean nuclear cites remain frozen. The Agreed Framework has 
successfully ensured that they cannot contribute to a North Korean 
nuclear weapon program so long as the Agreed Framework is in force.
  However, I am concerned that the United States and its allies cannot 
be assured at this point that North Korea is not surreptitiously 
seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
  We must be vigilant that North Korea fully and completely meets all 
of its nonproliferation obligations under the Agreed Framework, the 
Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and its obligations to 
allow inspections of its activities by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency.
  This bill will require congressional review and approval of any 
nuclear cooperation with North Korea. Such cooperation will be 
necessary to complete the two civil nuclear power reactors now being 
built in fulfillment of the Agreed Framework agreement between the 
United States and North Korea.
  This bill is a significant improvement over last year's version. 
Under the previous Gilman-Markey amendment, one committee chair or 
Chamber leader could have prevented consideration of the joint 
resolution approving the President's certification that North Korea is 
living up to its nonproliferation obligations. The version before the 
House today contains expedited procedures ensuring that there will be a 
vote on the joint resolution in both Houses.

[[Page 7831]]

  Mr. Speaker, the Agreed Framework is clearly in our national security 
interest of the United States and our allies in the region. A nuclear-
armed North Korea would be a serious threat to all of us. So long as 
North Korea is meeting its obligations under the Agreed Framework, and 
those nuclear facilities are shut down, it is strongly in the United 
States' national interest to live up to our side of the bargain and 
support the construction of these two reactors.
  This bill today places a serious responsibility on the shoulders of a 
future Congress. When the time comes for a decision on whether to move 
forward with the provision of two nuclear reactors to North Korea, 
Members of Congress must deliberate coolly, objectively, and without 
partisan rancor. If the Agreed Framework ultimately comes apart with 
all the potential devastating consequences for peace and stability in 
the region, then it must happen because the North Koreans did not live 
up to their obligations, not because the United States walked away from 
the agreement.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), chairman of our 
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York 
(Chairman Gilman) for yielding me this time.
  I rise in strong support of H.R. 4251, which was offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Chairman Gilman). Essentially and importantly, 
H.R. 4251 addresses concerns raised when the North Korean nuclear issue 
was debated during last year's consideration of the Embassy Security 
Act of 1999. At that time, language was overwhelmingly approved that 
required Presidential certification and a positive vote on this body 
and by the other body before a nuclear cooperation agreement with North 
Korea could go into effect. Without such a Presidential certification 
and positive congressional vote, key nuclear technology could not be 
sold or transferred to North Korea.
  When this measure was debated in July of last year, it was approved 
by a vote of 305 to 120. At that time, the gentleman from Connecticut 
(Mr. Gejdenson) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Ackerman) raised a 
concern that either legislative body might stall the process by 
refusing to schedule a vote.
  H.R. 4251, as the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee) has 
mentioned, seeks to, and I think does adequately, address this concern 
by establishing an expedited procedure for consideration of a joint 
resolution concurring in the President's certification. This is an 
attempt to alleviate the legitimate concerns raised when this matter 
was last debated.
  Mr. Speaker, former Secretary of Defense William Perry was tasked by 
the President with devising a strategy for responding to the North 
Korean threat. Few individuals have garnered greater respect than 
Secretary Perry as he served as the Secretary of Defense. He is an 
outstanding public servant and has made a major contribution to U.S. 
national security in so many ways, including what he has done with 
respect to the North Korean threat.

                              {time}  1600

  Dr. Perry proposed a blueprint for two alternative paths of U.S.-
North Korea relations. If North Korea chooses the path of peace, the 
United States would be willing to provide improved political and 
economic relations, including, presumably, the technology for two 
light-water reactors. But, if North Korea chooses the path of 
confrontation under the Perry initiative, the United States and our 
allies must be prepared to meet force with force and deny Pyongyang any 
political or military advantage.
  It certainly is not yet clear which path North Korea has taken. The 
DPRK's missile development program, its history of a covert program for 
nuclear weapons development, and its extraordinarily blatant terrorist 
activities are among the many reasons for suspicion, caution, and 
maximum verification. If North Korea does choose the path of 
confrontation, this body should be prepared to abandon the nuclear 
cooperation agreement, and the Congress needs to reduce any ambiguity 
about that point.
  Mr. Speaker, in closing, H.R. 4251 ensures that this body will have a 
voice in that determination. It is a responsible measure, and I urge 
support for the resolution offered by the distinguished chairman.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), whose work has been very sustained and 
consistent on this issue.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Lee) for generously yielding me this time, and I stand here proudly as 
the lead Democratic cosponsor with the distinguished chairman of the 
Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Gilman).
  I, of course, would also like to thank the ranking Democrat on the 
committee, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), for his 
sustained interest in and support for this legislation.
  The reason that we are here today is that North Korea's record on 
nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation is nothing short of 
abysmal. This secretive, Stalinist, rogue regime has, over the last 
decade, refused to carry out its obligations under the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty and other accords it has signed. In fact, in 
1993, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT and stopped 
international inspections of its nuclear weapons programs. It has 
constructed nuclear reactors and a plutonium reprocessing plant at a 
site called Yongbyon. As a result of these activities, U.S. and foreign 
intelligence assessments have reportedly concluded that North Korea 
probably has acquired enough weapons-grade plutonium to manufacture 
from one to three nuclear bombs. At the same time, North Korea has been 
testing and developing ballistic missiles that may soon be capable of 
reaching as far away as the western United States. In addition, North 
Korea is believed to be a major exporter of ballistic missile 
technology and components to countries like Iran and Pakistan, 
increasing the security risk in those regions of the world.
  In an effort to halt North Korea's progress towards a full-blown 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capacity, the Clinton 
administration negotiated an agreed framework with North Korea in 1994, 
which provided a package of benefits in return for a freeze on North 
Korea's nuclear program and acceptance of nonproliferation requirement. 
One key component of this benefits package was a United States promise 
to facilitate the delivery of two light-water nuclear reactors to North 
Korea, which were intended to replace two nuclear weapons production 
reactors then under construction in North Korea.
  H.R. 4251 would require an affirmative vote of approval before any 
nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and North Korea 
that allows the sale of these reactors to go forward.
  This amendment builds on an effort begun last year by the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Gilman) and myself. Last July 21, the House voted 
305 to 120 to pass the Gilman-Markey amendment to the State Department 
authorization bill, which required the President to make certain 
nonproliferation certifications regarding North Korea's compliance with 
various international agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation; 
that is, the NPT and the 1994 Agreed Framework; and the Congress to 
pass a joint resolution approving an agreement for cooperation with 
North Korea before U.S. nuclear facilities technologies or materials 
can be exported to North Korea.
  The specific certifications required under the Gilman-Markey 
amendment were drawn from the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework. All 
our amendment required is for the President to certify that the North 
Koreans have actually complied with the specific nuclear 
nonproliferation commitments

[[Page 7832]]

they made under the Agreed Framework and other international agreements 
they have signed to terminate their efforts to enrich uranium, 
reprocess spent fuel, or otherwise acquire, test or deploy nuclear 
weapons.
  Now, there was one part of the Gilman-Markey amendment as it passed 
the House that the Senate was not willing to accept. That was the 
requirement for an affirmative vote of approval by the Congress before 
a nuclear cooperation agreement could become effective for North Korea. 
Under current law, nuclear cooperation agreements take effect within 90 
days of their formal submission by the President unless Congress has, 
within that time period, passed a joint resolution of disapproval. 
While this process theoretically provides an opportunity to review and 
block a nuclear cooperation agreement, in practice the Congress has 
never, in its history, passed a joint resolution disapproving a nuclear 
cooperation agreement. That is never, my colleagues. Never. Indeed, 
most of the time, Congress never even votes on these agreements, as the 
State Department, the U.S. nuclear industry and their supporters can 
usually run out the clock and thereby allow an agreement to take effect 
without any congressional vote, even though there are nonproliferation 
considerations that should have been debated on the floor of Congress.
  H.R. 4251 assures that Congress will have a strong voice in ensuring 
that any future U.S.-North Korea nuclear cooperation agreement is fully 
consistent with our national security and nuclear nonproliferation 
interests. It does so by requiring a joint resolution of approval to be 
adopted by the Congress before any such agreement goes into effect.
  I am pleased that the bill also included expedited procedures to 
assure timely Congressional action on any approval resolution brought 
forth in the future with respect to North Korea. The gentlewoman from 
Connecticut had raised the issue of possible delaying tactics, 
particularly in the Senate, during last year's debate over this 
provision. By providing expedited procedures for consideration of an 
approval resolution, we should help assure that a vote actually occurs 
on any North Korea nuclear cooperation agreement.
  I think this is a good bill. I think the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Gilman) has provided enormously important national leadership on this 
question. Without question it has now arisen to the top of our national 
security concerns of our Nation, and I hope this resolution receives 
unanimous support here today.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I just want to thank the chairman, the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), and the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) for working in a bipartisan fashion in 
bringing this resolution to the floor.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my opposition 
to H.R. 4251. This bill sounds good on its face, and it might make us 
feel like we're striking a blow against North Korea, but I believe its 
passage today is a mistake.
  First, if this bill becomes law, it will make it virtually impossible 
for the United States to keep the commitments we made in the 1994 
Agreed Framework. That was the deal designed to end North Korea's 
nuclear program. Slowly but surely, and despite its critics' dire 
warnings, it is succeeding.
  This bill would block delivery of key components to the light-water 
reactors now under construction by a South Korean firm. Those 
components are not the core reactors, whose installation will come only 
when the United States, South Korea and Japan are confident that North 
Korea no longer poses a nuclear threat. Instead, the affected items are 
more basic components that would be denied much sooner, and at a 
critical moment in this process of eliminating North Korea's nuclear 
capabilities.
  My second objection is that our timing is terrible. For the first 
time since the Korean nation was split in two, a summit has been 
scheduled between the leaders of the North and South. Hopes are high 
that President Kim Dae Jung and General Kim Jong II will make progress 
toward peace, or at least a more permanent end to the tense stand-off 
that has blighted Korea's history for 50 years.
  In less than a month, South Korea's elected president--a national 
hero known for his courage in pressing for human rights--will meet with 
North Korea's new leader--a man who has broken his predecessors' 
tradition of isolation and hostility by reaching out to the United 
States and other nations.
  The North-South summit is an historic initiative that tour country 
should support. Instead, by this vote we risk signaling to Koreans in 
both nations that they cannot trust the United States to keep our 
solemn commitments. With 37,000 Americans stationed along one of the 
world's most dangerous borders, ending the Korean War--or even 
lessening the hostile situation--should be our country's highest 
priority. This bill will take us further from that goal.
  Mr. Speaker, our allies in South Korea have grave concerns about this 
bill. Few of us expect it to win Senate passage or, if it does, the 
President's approval. Passage of this bill today puts a successful 
strategy in jeopardy, and does so at what may well be a turning point 
in history. I urge my colleagues to vote no on the bill.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I too want to thank the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) for his supportive remarks and his diligent 
work on this matter.
  Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pease). The question is on the motion 
offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) that the House 
suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 4251, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the 
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be 
postponed.

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