[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 7725-7735]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



    DIALOG ON AMERICA'S GLOBAL ROLE III, MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS

  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I rise today, along with my distinguished 
colleague from Kansas, Senator Roberts, to continue our dialog on the 
global role of the United States. This is the third such dialog in what 
we have intended to be a year-long series. In February, we began by 
taking a broad look at the priorities and approaches of U.S. foreign 
policy in the post-cold-war period. A few weeks ago we narrowed the 
focus somewhat by trying to define and defend our national interest, 
which must be the first step in arriving at a coherent national 
security strategy.
  Today, as we start to go from general principles to concrete 
applications, Senator Roberts and I, along with several of our 
colleagues, will attempt to zero in on the U.S. role in multilateral 
organizations which strongly impact our national security, especially 
NATO and the U.N.
  I have just returned from a trip to Brussels and Italy where we were 
briefed on the air campaign from Aviano Air Base. In Brussels, I met 
with the Deputy Secretary General of NATO. As I said, Italy and then on 
to Macedonia, where we saw the regions where the refugees were kept 
during the war in Kosovo. Then, into Kosovo itself.
  I met with key military leaders and key political leaders from the 
United States, European nations, and NATO. These meetings only served 
to reinforce my strong belief that there is a pressing need to address 
the global role of the United States, both in our own national 
strategic planning and in NATO's planning. This conclusion is not a 
result of the recent actions taken in Serbia and Kosovo. Rather, these 
actions were merely symptomatic of, I think, the problem.
  A large portion of the military operation in Kosovo was supplied by 
the United States. I believe it is now time for the United States to 
lead in finding a political solution. Similarly, I believe the time has 
come to ``Europeanize'' the peace in Bosnia and Kosovo. While the 
soldiers I spoke with at Camp Bond steel certainly displayed high 
morale, reflected in the excellent job they actually have done, if we 
stay in the Balkans indefinitely with no clear way out, I believe we 
run an increasing risk of further overextending our military, thus 
exacerbating our recruitment and retention problems and lessening our 
capability to respond to more serious challenges to our vital national 
interests.
  From my perspective, the basic problem in the Balkans today is 
political, not military, and requires a political rather than military 
solution. Essentially, at this point in time, the various communities 
wish to live apart and exercise self-determination along ethnic lines. 
I would agree that such a development is unfortunate and not in keeping 
with our American view of the way the world should be. However, for any 
solution to the current situation to be acceptable to the parties 
directly involved--and, thus, durable--this inescapable fact must be 
taken into account.
  On June 30 of last year, the Senate accepted by voice vote my 
amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill which expressed 
``the sense of the Senate that the United States should call 
immediately for the convening of an international conference on the 
Balkans'' to develop a final political settlement of both the Kosovo 
and Bosnia conflicts.

[[Page 7726]]

  I ask unanimous consent that the text of my amendment be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  Amendment No. 1163 to S. 1234, Fiscal Year 2000 Foreign Operations 
  Appropriations Supporting an International Conference To Achieve a 
              Durable Political Settlement in the Balkans

          (Adopted by Senate by unanimous consent on 6/30/99)

     SEC. X. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING AN INTERNATIONAL 
                   CONFERENCE ON THE BALKANS.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) The United States and its allies in the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted large-scale military 
     operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
       (2) At the conclusion of 78 days of these hostilities, the 
     United States and its NATO allies suspended military 
     operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia based 
     upon credible assurances by the latter that it would fulfill 
     the following conditions as laid down by the so called Group 
     of Eight (G-8):
       (A) An immediate and verifiable end of violence and 
     repression in Kosovo.
       (B) Staged withdrawal of all Yugoslav military, police and 
     paramilitary forces from Kosovo.
       (C) Deployment in Kosovo of effective international and 
     security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United 
     Nations Security Council, and capable of guaranteeing the 
     achievement of the agreed objectives.
       (D) Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo, 
     to be decided by the United Nations Security Council which 
     will seek to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life 
     for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
       (E) Provision for the safe and free return of all refugees 
     and displaced persons from Kosovo and an unimpeded access to 
     Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
       (3) These objectives appear to have been fulfilled, or to 
     be in the process of being fulfilled, which has led the 
     United States and its NATO allies to terminate military 
     operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
       (4) The G-8 also called for a comprehensive approach to the 
     economic development and stabilization of the crisis region, 
     and the European Union has announced plans for $1,500,000,000 
     over the next 3 years for the reconstruction of Kosovo, for 
     the convening in July of an international donors' conference 
     for Kosovo aid, and for subsequent provision of 
     reconstruction aid to the other countries in the region 
     affected by the recent hostilities followed by reconstruction 
     aid directed at the Balkans region as a whole;
       (5) The United States and some of its NATO allies oppose 
     the provision of any aid, other than limited humanitarian 
     assistance, to Serbia until Yugoslav President Slobodan 
     Milosevic is out of office.
       (6) The policy of providing reconstruction aid to Kosovo 
     and other countries in the region affected by the recent 
     hostilities while withholding such aid for Serbia presents a 
     number of practical problems, including the absence in Kosovo 
     of financial and other institutions independent of 
     Yugoslavia, the difficulty in drawing clear and enforceable 
     distinctions between humanitarian and reconstruction 
     assistance, and the difficulty in reconstructing Montenegro 
     in the absence of similar efforts in Serbia.
       (7) In any case, the achievement of effective and durable 
     economic reconstruction and revitalization in the countries 
     of the Balkans is unlikely until a political settlement is 
     reached as to the final status of Kosovo and Yugoslavia.
       (8) The G-8 proposed a political process towards the 
     establishment of an interim political framework agreement for 
     a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking into full 
     account the final Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-
     Government in Kosovo, also known as the Rambouillet Accords, 
     and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity 
     of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries 
     of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK (Kosovo 
     Liberation Army).
       (9) The G-8 proposal contains no guidance as to a final 
     political settlement for Kosovo and Yugoslavia, while the 
     original position of the United States and the other 
     participants in the so-called Contact Group on this matter, 
     as reflected in the Rambouillet Accords, called for the 
     convening of an international conference, after three years, 
     to determine a mechanism for a final settlement of Kosovo 
     status based on the will of the people, opinions of relevant 
     authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the 
     implementation of the agreement and the provisions of the 
     Helsinki Final Act.
       (10) The current position of the United States and its NATO 
     allies as to the final status of Kosovo and Yugoslavia calls 
     for an autonomous, multiethnic, democratic Kosovo which would 
     remain as part of Serbia, and such an outcome is not 
     supported by any of the Parties directly involved, including 
     the governments of Yugoslavia and Serbia, representatives of 
     the Kosovar Albanians, and the people of Yugoslavia, Serbia 
     and Kosovo.
       (11) There has been no final political settlement in 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the armed forces of the United 
     States, its NATO allies, and other non-Balkan nations have 
     been enforcing an uneasy peace since 1996, at a cost to the 
     United States alone of over $10,000,000,000 with no clear end 
     in sight to such enforcement.
       (12) The trend throughout the Balkans since 1990 has been 
     in the direction of ethnically-based particularism, as 
     exemplified by the 1991 declarations of independence from 
     Yugoslavia by Slovenia and Croatia, and the country in the 
     Balkans which currently comes the closest to the goal of a 
     democratic government which respects the human rights of its 
     citizens is the nation of Slovenia, which was the first 
     portion of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to 
     secede and is also the nation in the region with the greatest 
     ethnic homogeneity, with a population which is 91 percent 
     Slovene.
       (13) The boundaries of the various national and sub-
     national divisions in the Balkans have been altered 
     repeatedly throughout history, and international conferences 
     have frequently played the decisive role in fixing such 
     boundaries in the modern era, including the Berlin Congress 
     of 1878, the London Conference of 1913, and the Paris Peace 
     Conference of 1919.
       (14) The development of an effective exit strategy for the 
     withdrawal from the Balkans of foreign military forces, 
     including the armed forces of the United States, its NATO 
     allies, Russia, and any other nation from outside the Balkans 
     which has such forces in the Balkans is in the best interests 
     of all such nations.
       (15) The ultimate withdrawal of foreign military forces, 
     accompanied by the establishment of durable and peaceful 
     relations among all of the nations and peoples of the Balkans 
     is in the best interests of those nations and peoples;
       (16) An effective exit strategy for the withdrawal from the 
     Balkans of foreign military forces is contingent upon the 
     achievement of a lasting political settlement for the region, 
     and only such a settlement, acceptable to all parties 
     involved, can ensure the fundamental goals of the United 
     States of peace, stability and human rights in the Balkans.
       (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (1) The United States should call immediately for the 
     convening of an international conference on the Balkans, 
     under the auspices of the United Nations, and based upon the 
     principles of the Rambouillet Accords for a final settlement 
     of Kosovo status, namely that such a settlement should be 
     based on the will of the people, opinions of relevant 
     authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the 
     implementation of the agreement and the provisions of the 
     Helsinki Final Act;
       (2) The international conference on the Balkans should also 
     be empowered to seek a final settlement for Bosnia-
     Herzegovina based on the same principles as specified for 
     Kosovo in the Rambouillet Accords; and
       (3) In order to produce a lasting political settlement in 
     the Balkans acceptable to all parties, which can lead to the 
     departure from the Balkans in timely fashion of all foreign 
     military forces, including those of the United States, the 
     international conference should have the authority to 
     consider any and all of the following: political boundaries; 
     humanitarian and reconstruction assistance for all nations in 
     the Balkans; stationing of UN peacekeeping forces along 
     international boundaries; security arrangements and 
     guarantees for all of the nations of the Balkans; and 
     tangible, enforceable and verifiable human rights guarantees 
     for the individuals and peoples of the Balkans.

  Mr. CLELAND. I truly believe that such an approach is the best, if 
not the only, way to resolve the difficulties in Bosnia and Kosovo--
allowing our troops eventually to come home but avoiding an 
unacceptable security vacuum in southeast Europe--and is definitely in 
the best interest of the United States and Europe.
  Two years ago this week, the Senate was debating the expansion of 
NATO, and I should add that I found that discussion to be perhaps the 
finest deliberation on national security issues that I have witnessed 
in the time I have served in the U.S. Senate. The debate raised serious 
questions regarding both the makeup and purpose of NATO, but, in the 
end, I, and a large majority of the Senate, concluded that extension of 
NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary was in our, 
and NATO's, best interest because NATO was the only entity ready and 
able to fill the security void in northeastern Europe.
  Much has changed in the time since that vote, including the launching 
of the first offensive military operations in the history of the 
alliance last year in Kosovo and Serbia, an action which also 
represented the first time NATO

[[Page 7727]]

asserted the right to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign 
nation. Both of these were significant departures from the Senate's 
understanding of NATO as expressed during that debate as well as the 
representations we made to other nations, most notably Russia, about 
the goals and the intentions of NATO in the aftermath its eastward 
expansion. Specifically, section 3 of the Senate Resolution of 
Ratification affirmed that the ``core mission'' of NATO remains 
``collective self-defense,'' and we sought to calm Russian anxieties by 
pointing to the 50-year record of NATO in never launching offensive 
operations, and never violating the sovereignty of states except in 
pursuit of collective self-defense.
  Since we voted for NATO expansion we have also witnessed the issuance 
of a new Strategic Concept for NATO, in April of 1999, and here again, 
the results were not exactly as anticipated at the time of the Senate's 
ratification vote on NATO expansion 2 years ago. For a particularly 
insightful and detailed treatment of this subject, I would commend to 
all Senators a May 24, 1999 floor statement by my distinguished 
colleague from Kansas, Mr. Roberts, which dissected in some detail the 
numerous departures from the Senate's 1998 Resolution of Ratification 
in the April 1999 NATO Strategic Concept.
  For purposes of today's discussion on how multilateral organizations 
impact on the U.S. global role, I would like to highlight just two of 
the issues identified by Senator Roberts: the central issue of NATO's 
purpose, or ``core mission,'' and the matter of how European nations 
should provide for their own defense, the so-called European Security 
and Defense Identity.
  For its first 50 years, which culminated in its victory in the Cold 
War without ever having to fight a battle, the core purpose of NATO, 
recognized by friend and foe alike, was set forth in article 5 of the 
North Atlantic treaty of April 4, 1949:

       The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more 
     of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an 
     attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if 
     such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 
     right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by 
     Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
     the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
     individually and in concert with other Parties, such action 
     as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
     restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

  In contrast, the new NATO Strategic Concept goes well beyond the 
traditional collective security role in its aspirations for NATO. Item 
24 in the April 24, 1999 text states that:

       Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from 
     whatever direction, would be covered by Article 5 and 6 of 
     the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also 
     take account of the global context. Alliance security 
     interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, 
     including acts of terrorism, sabotage, and organized crime, 
     and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources.

  I wonder if NATO is designed to track terrorism around the world, 
sabotage around the world, and organized crime around the world.
  I continue to quote:

       The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, 
     particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also 
     pose problems for security and stability affecting the 
     Alliance.

  Item 10 in that document includes as ``fundamental security tasks'' 
for NATO the traditional objectives of security, consultation, and 
deterrence and defense, as well as ``crisis management,'' within which 
allies are ``to stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in 
conformity of Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to 
effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis 
management, including crisis response operations.''
  I wonder if NATO has become not a self-defense organization but a 
crisis management and crisis intervention organization. I wonder.
  I point out that Article 7 of the NATO Treaty says that:

       This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted 
     as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the 
     Charter of the Parties which are members of the United 
     Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security 
     Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
     security.

  While some Western observers, especially in the United States, 
maintain that the 1999 Strategic Concept does not represent a 
significant change in NATO's policy, I believe that the Norwegian 
newspaper, Oslo Aftenposten, was much closer to the mark when it wrote 
last April that:

       In its new ``strategic concept'' NATO has approved a 
     radical expansion of the alliance's tasks, both 
     geographically and with regard to content. From now on it 
     will be the alliance's task to promote ``security and 
     stability in the Euro-Atlantic area'' by ``becoming actively 
     involved in dealing with crises, including operations in 
     response to crises.'' We see the first example in Kosovo.

  It is my view that the members of the NATO alliance, and especially 
the United States, need to think much more carefully about the expanded 
aspirations of their new strategic concept, and the costs--economic, 
political, and human resource--they are willing and able to pay in 
pursuit of these aspirations. Specifically, at the very least I believe 
both Houses of Congress, especially this House, the Senate, need to 
undertake a thorough series of hearings on the strategic concept and 
the future of NATO.
  As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I could not urge this 
set of hearings more strongly.
  The Norwegian paper goes on to say that:

       It is also new and important that the alliance said ``yes'' 
     at the summit meeting to the desire of the EU countries to 
     play a more independent role and thus acquire greater 
     political weight in the NATO cooperation. Behind this also 
     lies a desire for a cautious counterweight to a United States 
     that is perhaps more strongly dominant now, militarily and 
     politically, than ever before in NATO's history.

  Distinguished colleagues, this leads to my other major concern about 
the United States and NATO: the question of a ``more independent role'' 
for the European Union countries. John Keegan, one of the world's 
leading military historians, summed up the current debate in an article 
last December. He said:

       Though it has long been American policy to encourage 
     European political and economic integration on the model of 
     its own federal structure, the United States is far less 
     ready to welcome moves by the Europeans to go their own 
     strategic way. There are two reasons for that. The first is 
     that the United States sees its own security as inextricably 
     bound up within the alliance system in which it is a partner. 
     The second is that it doubts the ability of the Europeans to 
     construct parallel systems which will deliver military value. 
     . . . The Americans are right to regard all current European 
     attempts, either through the European Union, or the belatedly 
     revived Western European Union or through ad hoc arrangements 
     such as the newly announced Anglo-French force, to bypass 
     NATO as damaging to the security structure that already 
     exists.

  Despite its advances in economic integration, the European community 
still lags far behind in developing a common national security 
structure. As we witnessed in Bosnia, and most recently Kosovo, Europe 
lacks either the will or the means, or both, to conduct independent 
military operations even in its own backyard. And whatever the end 
result of the recent European Security and Defense Initiative, or 
Identity it will be many years before the Europeans can develop a 
military capable of significant action independent of the United 
States. When one adds the additional questions of national sovereignty, 
domestic pressures to cut defense spending, and, of course, the need 
for consensus on how and when to take military action, the challenges 
facing the Europeans are daunting indeed.
  Until Europe can surmount these challenges, which, most likely, will 
be many years from now, American involvement and leadership via NATO 
will still be seen, by Europeans at least, as essential. On my recent 
trip, I was discussing the role of the United States in Europe with the 
Deputy Secretary of NATO, Sergio Balanzio, when he told me that the 
United States is, ``a European power whether you like it or not --
obviously, indicating we are a European power, whether we like it or 
not, in Europe and in the Balkans. I responded that it is one thing to 
be on the point of the spear and to bear the heavy load in certain 
cases, as the U.S.

[[Page 7728]]

did in Bosnia and Kosovo, but quite another to always be called upon to 
ride to the rescue, even in Europe itself.
  Going back to 1949, when NATO was formed, one of the quotes that 
rings in my ears is a quote from Lord Ismay, the first Secretary 
General of NATO. When he was asked the purpose of NATO, Lord Ismay 
said: The purpose of NATO is to keep the Americans in, the Russians 
out, and the Germans down.
  I have serious reservations about that particular mission statement 
now. There is no need to keep the Russians out. As a matter of fact, we 
are wrapping our arms around the big bear in every way in every trade 
agreement, every cooperative agreement we can possibly put together. 
Secondly, there is no need to keep the Germans down. They are an 
emerging strong force on the European continent.
  I wonder, though, having just come back from dealing with my NATO 
friends and our NATO allies, and having gone to Kosovo, whether the 
real ultimate purpose of NATO for the Europeans now is to keep the 
Americans in.
  Personally, I do not mind sharing power. I do mind always being the 
lead dog that is called upon to bear the burden. I think more and more 
Americans are feeling that way themselves.
  For me, however, the bottom line is that, despite all of the 
difficulties, despite the possibility that there may well be some 
short-term disadvantages for the United States, I believe the United 
States must, I repeat must, be unequivocally supportive of the 
development of a strong, independent European military capability to 
accompany Europe's growing economic and political integration. There is 
at present, and for the foreseeable future, no overwhelming threat to 
European security such as that posed by the Soviet Union and Warsaw 
Pact. Europe should be able to attend to its own defenses in the post-
Cold War world. The fact that it has not done so is certainly 
attributable to many factors, especially its divided and conflict-
ridden history, but if it does not act now--when the threat is so low--
then when will it?
  Developing the necessary support structures, both political and 
military, to produce an effective European security identity will be 
neither quick, nor easy, nor cheap. But they have to start sometime, 
and while the United States must avoid precipitous actions--such as 
threatening a unilateral troop pull-out--I believe we must clearly 
signal that we fully understand and support moves toward greater 
European self-defense capabilities. Such moves may well produce some 
short-term redundancies and inefficiencies in NATO, but I believe that 
unless we encourage the Europeans to develop their own capabilities for 
their own defense, we will not see the kind of increased defense 
efforts that Europe ought to undertake. Certainly American taxpayers 
have done their share, throughout most of the 20th Century, to 
contribute to European security.
  I think British Prime Minister Tony Blair said it best in a November 
22, 1999 speech in London. He said:

       We must shape European Defence policy in a way designed to 
     strengthen (the) transatlantic bond by making NATO a more 
     balanced partnership, and by giving Europeans the capacity to 
     act whenever the United States, for its own reasons, decides 
     not to be involved. Only then will Europe pull its weight in 
     world security and share more of the burden with the United 
     States.

  I could not have said it better.
  Mr. President, I now yield the floor to the distinguished Senator 
from Kansas, my friend and colleague in these dialogs on the U.S. 
global role in the world, Mr. Roberts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, let me again thank my good friend and a 
distinguished American hero and statesman, the Senator from Georgia, 
for setting in motion our bipartisan foreign policy dialog. His common 
sense approach and his insightfulness to our country's national 
security obligations, I think, have been most helpful and most 
educational.
  I say to the Senator, I believe and I hope that our endeavor is 
accomplishing the original goals we outlined in our first dialog. Our 
dialog has attracted attention from the media, and some academics. We 
have been invited to participate in various academic panel discussions 
and foreign policy dialogs.
  I hope both our colleagues and the American public have been paying 
attention in our effort to come to grips with America's role in an 
environment so different that we cannot even name it, other than 
calling it the post-Cold War period.
  When I have the opportunity to go back to Kansas and address the 
issue of what our vital national security interests are; I realize 
foreign policy is not a very bright return on the public radar screen 
which is unfortunate.
  Robert Kagan recently stated that the campaign for the Presidency 
should focus more on foreign policy. I certainly think that is the 
case. He asked a simple question, ``Is the world a safer place than it 
was 8 years ago?'' His article took us on a world tour of 
uncertainties, specifically identifying Iraq, the Balkans, China, 
Taiwan, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, Haiti, Colombia 
and Russia.
  A realistic evaluation of emerging patterns in the world lead us to 
the fact that the world is dangerously close to coming apart at the 
seams. It is time for a serious debate about foreign policy, and this 
dialog we have started is a small step in that direction.
  In our last dialog Senator Cleland and I discussed the importance of 
identifying and establishing levels of priority to our U.S. vital 
national interests. Many other think tanks and foreign policy 
organizations have recommended a similar priority ranking. I noticed 
the other day in an article that Vice President Gore has recently 
articulated, a new kind of foreign policy suggestion--a new agenda--
adding the destruction of the natural environment and the AIDS pandemic 
overseas as ``a threat to U.S. national security interests.'' These 
unique and unprecedented issues are important issues, however, they 
have never made the cut in any other U.S. national interest lists. They 
definitely did not make the cut in the last bipartisan dialog that I 
had with my friend and colleague from Georgia. Nonetheless, it is a 
healthy debate, and I think it is a very proper debate for our country 
and the Presidential candidates.
  What did make the cut is the fact that the United States does not 
want a hostile regional hegemon to develop in Europe or Asia. And then, 
in the meantime, what happened in the Balkans post-Bosnia and post-
Kosovo is the fact that we have a paradox of enormous irony. The irony 
is the United States continues in the role of being a world hegemon, or 
superpower--the only one. Some critics say we have developed into a 
humanitarian world global cop and our actions and means are viewed by 
them as contrary to their own national interests.
  Mr. President, the consequence of the U.S. role is the rest of the 
world is responding as any sovereign nation would respond to a hegemon.
  Former Ambassador Bob Ellsworth, a former Member of the House of 
Representatives, and Dr. Michael May, wrote in the Los Angeles Times 
that U.S. military forces are so large, so advanced technologically, 
and so active all over the world, that a climate of ``hegemony envy'' 
has developed in key strategic areas in Asia, Europe, and the Middle 
East.
  Ambassador Ellsworth explains, the U.S. post-Cold War, change in 
posture from defense and deterrence to enlargement and offense, and the 
Clinton doctrine proclaiming and executing intervention around the 
world in regard to a rather questionable definition of U.S. vital 
national interests is creating antihegemonic coalitions against the 
United States.
  This current trend of both allies and nonallies asserting themselves 
against the U.S. is a very troubling digression.
  The Nobel Prize novelist and diplomat, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, 
observed that ``President Clinton has found the political legacy he 
wants to leave behind: The Imperial American Model.'' Obviously, that 
depiction of American foreign policy is counter to the goal of 
multilateral cooperation in the world today.
  As Senator Cleland stated, our third dialog today will focus on the 
role of

[[Page 7729]]

multilateral organizations in foreign policy.
  What are we talking about? Well, currently the United States is a 
member of a staggering 90 multilateral organizations and numerous other 
bilateral agreements. It took a great deal of effort by staff and by 
research specialists to determine the number of multilateral 
organizations where the U.S. is obligated. I venture to guess, I say to 
my colleague, that the State Department, the Department of Defense, the 
Congress, and most foreign policy experts really don't have any idea 
individually or collectively of the responsibilities, commitments, or 
obligations or the money that these organizations require of the U.S. 
all throughout the world.
  Richard Haass of the Brookings Institution tried to tackle the issue 
of how much the U.S. should try to do, largely or entirely on its own--
unilaterally--depending on the policy priorities or the level of U.S. 
national interests versus how much the U.S. should do in cooperation 
with others. He articulated that the choice is very complicated, as the 
multilateral options subsume multiple approaches of multiple 
organizations, including using the U.N. and other international 
institutions, alliances, and other regional organizations, and 
coalitions of those able and willing to act.
  The fact is, the U.S. almost never acts unilaterally, and it probably 
should not. The U.S. has fought five major wars during the 20th 
century, and in each of these conflicts the U.S. operated as part of an 
alliance or a coalition. The recent U.S. actions all were conducted in 
conjunction with forces from other nations, even as our military 
superiority has reached a level unmatched in history.
  Therefore, if the U.S. is going to operate within the constraints of 
multilateral organizations--and that appears to be the case--the U.S. 
must structure alliances in such a way that promotes our national 
interests and ensures that U.S. power is not undermined.
  The following list of multilateral organizations associated with 
countries that the U.S. has current, ongoing operations is staggering: 
Iraq, 23; East Timor, 5; Korea, 42; Kosovo, 6; Yugoslavia, 30; 
Colombia, 15.
  We don't have enough time in the rest of the session of Congress to 
examine all of the multilateral organizations where the U.S. has 
obligations. Obviously, that is going to be an effort that should take 
place as we change administrations, whether it be the Vice President or 
whether it be the Governor from Texas. Today, like my colleague, I want 
to focus on NATO a bit and offer some possible suggestions for the 
future of America's alliances.
  During the Cold War, containment of Soviet power provided a simple 
and easily definable job of deterrence from Warsaw Pact aggression. The 
new Strategic Concept that was adopted over a year ago during the 50th 
anniversary of NATO is a far different concept from the collective 
defense organization originally developed from the ashes of World War 
II.
  If you read the Strategic Concept, you will find that the new 
commitments outlined have evolved, as I have indicated, NATO from a 
collective security organization concerned with self-defense to an 
international crisis management and humanitarian relief operation and 
organization.
  Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North 
Atlantic Council, recently said:

       Unbeknownst to many is the fact that the Strategic 
     Concept's most important function is to instruct Alliance 
     military authorities how to configure NATO defense forces so 
     that they are equipped for the full range of Alliance 
     missions, from collective defense to peacekeeping.

  He also said:

       The U.S. believes that the most important new elements of 
     the revised Strategic Concept is the recognition that the 
     fundamental tasks of the Alliance is to carry out so-called 
     ``non-article 5'' missions--operations in response to crises 
     that go beyond the defense of a Allied territory.

  I am concerned that the most important and successful alliance in the 
history of our country has been so dramatically restructured that the 
future of the alliance is uncertain. Our force structure cannot stand 
another swampy intervention with unclear and unsound objectives with no 
exit strategy in sight.
  The new Strategic Concept, as tested in Kosovo, in my personal 
opinion, is drying out the Cold War glue which holds the alliance 
together. Targeting by committee and escalation warfare has stressed 
the system and turned a 3-day war into a 78-day war of limited 
escalation. As indicated by the debate on this floor just about an hour 
or two ago, an amendment introduced by both Senator Byrd and Senator 
Warner will cause considerable and useful debate on Monday and Tuesday 
ending in a critical vote about the future of the Kosovo operation.
  Gen. Brent Scowcroft expressed his concern last November stating:

       The revised Strategic Concept of NATO and the U.N. 
     Secretary General separately have taken on the task of 
     advocating the support of persecuted minorities inside state 
     boundaries; that is, humanitarian operations such as those in 
     Kosovo. In Yugoslavia, we heavily bombed a country in an 
     attempt to protect a minority within that country. Now we are 
     in Kosovo presiding over reverse ethnic cleansing--surely a 
     case of unintended consequences.

  Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Dean of the Kennedy School of Government, 
recently posed several thought-provoking questions:

       After the collapse of the Soviet Union, what should be the 
     limits of NATO's mission? With the Kosovo crisis, NATO fired 
     its first shot in anger in a region outside the alliance's 
     treaty area, on declared humanitarian grounds. What criteria 
     might NATO draw on to guide a policy on the threat, or use, 
     of its force in a new strategic environment of the 21st 
     century?

  Some experts predict, and I hope they are not right, that due to the 
ugliness of Kosovo, NATO may never again mount another military 
offensive. I fear that Kosovo or future Kosovo-type interventions will 
also undermine U.N. Security Council credibility. By the way, that 
credibility is being questioned with the U.N. mission in Africa.
  Mr. President, if knowing what we know now about the new Strategic 
Concept and NATO with respect to a Kosovo or a Chechnya or Rwanda, 
would Senators still support the changes?
  Again, I maintain that most Senators are not aware of all the 
obligations listed in the Strategic Concept. I said it at the time, I 
said it 6 months ago, I said it during the first dialog, and I say it 
again today. How many people need to be placed in jeopardy before we 
act? What criteria do we set for humanitarian or C-list interventions? 
Does the United States intervene with or without NATO allies or U.N. 
Security Council approval on humanitarian grounds? Can we possibly 
justify intervention in some areas of the world and not others when 
none reach the threshold of vital or important national interests?
  Our country cannot support militarily a future which pursues U.S. and 
allied interests more widely around the world. The new Strategic 
Concept that our country is currently operating under effectively 
enrolls the United States and NATO as a world policeman.
  Some say that is not all bad. Some say that is what we must do as the 
world's only superpower.
  In this regard, as the distinguished Senator from Georgia pointed 
out, Europe is not standing still. They are proceeding with a Defense 
Capability Initiative and the development of the European Security and 
Defense Identity (ESDI) within the alliance.
  I believe it is in U.S. interests for the European alliance to 
develop their defense capabilities, to strengthen their collective 
will, and to make a greater contribution to security and defense in 
Europe. However, my Dodge City gut feeling says, sure, go ahead and 
provide for your own defense, and bring our American men and women 
home. The Balkans are in your ball park. You decide the players.
  However, history and military experience, and the experience and 
expertise of others, rightly point out that challenges with force 
structure, allocation, balance, interoperability, and the growing gap 
in tactics and capability between our countries underlying the auspices 
of NATO are counterproductive to peace.
  In Kosovo, the U.S. aircraft flew two-thirds of the strike missions. 
Nearly

[[Page 7730]]

every precision-guided munition was launched from an American aircraft, 
and U.S. intelligence identified almost all the targets. With the 
current European shrinking defense budgets and a reluctance to support 
the current mission, the road to ESDI may be a rocky one filled with 
potholes indeed.
  Even members of NATO who do not belong to the European Union are 
worried that plans for yet another new E.U. military force could weaken 
the collective defense.
  Another concern of hierarchy and command structure with respect to 
ESDI, E.U. corps, and NATO still retaining the rights of first refusal 
and how the U.N. Security Council structure fits among the 
organizations is also a very troubling problem to overcome.
  The number one concern should be to preserve NATO as the overarching 
framework and avoid duplication of effort or any political divisiveness 
from establishing separate capabilities. The Kosovo crisis raises 
questions that must be answered about the alliance's capability to 
reshape itself for new conflicts of the 21st century and at the same 
time accommodate the E.U.'s ambition to play a greater role in the 
continent's security.
  Mr. President, I also want to address the issue of NATO expansion.
  I realize the NATO membership is an affair of the heart for many 
nations who aspire to become members. However, as Senator Lugar has 
alluded to we need to step back a little bit and keep the door open but 
put the future enlargement on hold.
  We had a lunch hosted yesterday by the distinguished Senator from 
Indiana and Gen. Wesley Clark. Gen. Clark emphasized the fact that 
nations in Europe who aspire to become either members of the European 
Union, Partnership for Peace, or NATO without recognizing the 
tremendous fervor and the tremendous emotion involved in regard to 
their self-determination and what they think will be the bulwark for 
them and their individual liberty.
  First and foremost, NATO, I think, must rebuild Russian relations, 
which were strained over the Kosovo conflict. I know that belief is 
shared by Senator Levin. We have been working together on a cooperative 
threat reduction program within the jurisdiction of the Armed Services 
Committee which we believe will make some meaningful threat reduction 
progress and at the same time help rebuild stressed relations.
  The London Times diplomatic editor, Christopher Lockwood, reflects 
that NATO's possible new members at the current time cannot contribute 
militarily with force structure, compatible doctrine, or political and 
economic stability.
  I have been a strong supporter of NATO. I will remain a strong 
supporter of NATO. But I think we have to rethink the current NATO 
flightpath and answer the hard questions that require our attention.
  Mr. President, I now want to offer what I think are extremely 
insightful approaches to the future of multilateral organizations.
  Richard Haass expressed:

       Alliances, such as NATO, are one manifestation, although 
     such groupings are rare and likely to become even less common 
     in a world of few fixed adversaries. Much more common are 
     informal coalitions of parties able and willing to work 
     together on behalf of a common purpose--be it to rescue the 
     Mexican economy, contain Sadam Hussein, or enter East Timor. 
     Such groupings are not ideal--they are invariably ad hoc and 
     reactive and lack the legitimacy of more formal regional or 
     UN undertakings--but they are consistent with a world where 
     the willingness of governments to cooperate varies from 
     crisis to crisis and situation to situation, where great 
     power consensus in unreliable, and where U.S. resources, 
     however great, are still limited.

  Samuel Huntington, in this book ``The Clash of Civilizations'' 
explain: ``In the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the 
greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on 
civilizations is the surest safeguard against war.'' And, since the 
Cold War the question of ``Which side are you on?'' has been replaced 
by the much more fundamental one, ``Who are you?'' Every state has to 
have an answer. That answer, its cultural identify, defines the state's 
place in world politics, its friends, and its enemies.
  Mr. Huntington further explains that we must nurture other Western 
cultures that identify with the U.S. and accept our civilization as 
unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against 
challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of 
civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to 
maintain the multi civilizational character of global politics.
  Roberts translation: Why not concentrate in areas of the world where 
Western values, Western democracy, have been cherished, nurtured, and 
appreciated? At the same time the U.S. needs to stop trying to impose 
Western values in areas where they are not and will not take root?
  Andrew Krepinevich from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments recently finished a thought-provoking future vision titled 
``Transforming America's Alliances.'' He believes that America's 
alliances are in need of transformation due to the following reasons: 
Relative decline in U.S. global power, the rise and recovery of great 
regional power, with an increased focus on Asia, the eroding of current 
ally durability and reliability, the current military revolution will 
make power projection more difficult, and finally the growing need to 
provide for homeland defense.
  Mr. President, I feel Mr. Krepinevich's assessment undertakes bold 
steps toward the future in his following statement:

       If the U.S. is to preserve the current favorable military 
     balance in regions around the globe in the future, it will 
     find itself increasingly dependent upon allies for support. 
     This may require a somewhat different set of alliances than 
     exist today. Restructuring alliance relationships to meet 
     requirements will take years, perhaps decades. Yet the 
     geopolitical and military revolutions that will likely stress 
     the U.S. alliance relationships should be undertaken now.
  Mr. President, that is what we are trying to do. That is what Senator 
Cleland and I are trying to accomplish with our foreign policy dialog. 
America cannot afford to miss this opportunity to shape the future.
  I thank my colleague for initiating the third dialog. I especially 
thank my colleagues who have been very patient listening to my remarks. 
Senator Lugar, Senator Levin, and I welcome their input.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith of Oregon). The Senator from 
Indiana.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator from Indiana yield for 2 minutes?
  Mr. LUGAR. I am happy to yield to the Senator.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent, after the Senator from Indiana is 
finished with his remarks, I be recognized to participate in the dialog 
which is going on between Senator Roberts and Senator Cleland.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia controls the time.
  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 9\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. CLELAND. I yield the time necessary to the distinguished Senator 
from Michigan.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I ask the Presiding Officer how much time I have 
remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senators from Kansas and Georgia are 
sharing the time.
  Mr. ROBERTS. So the time remaining in regard to both Senators is now 
9 minutes?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. ROBERTS. That does not give enough time for the distinguished 
Senator from Michigan or the distinguished Senator from Indiana. I ask 
unanimous consent we be granted an additional 30 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent, after the Senator from Indiana 
has completed his statement, I be recognized with whatever time is 
available.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, at this time I ask unanimous consent to 
have printed in the Record a letter from me

[[Page 7731]]

along with one I received today from Gen. Wesley Clark, who, until last 
week, was NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and the senior 
military commander of the NATO-led operation at Kosovo. It relates to 
his views on the Byrd-Warner amendment, as it is called, which is part 
of the military construction appropriations bill.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                       U.S. Senate


                                   Committee on Armed Services

                                     Washington, DC, May 10, 2000.
     General Wesley K. Clark, USA,
     Department of Defense, Washington, DC.
       Dear General Clark: Following up on our conversation today, 
     I am enclosing a copy of an amendment adopted by the 
     Appropriations Committee yesterday that, among other things, 
     would terminate funding for deployment of U.S. ground combat 
     troops in Kosovo after July 1, 2001, unless the President 
     requests and Congress enacts a joint resolution specifically 
     authorizing their continued deployment.
       I would very much like to have your personal views on this 
     amendment, particularly your views on the impact this 
     amendment could have on U.S. troops currently on the ground 
     in Kosovo and whether or not this amendment would increase 
     the risk to those troops; the impact of this amendment on 
     U.S. interests in the region; and the impact of this 
     amendment on our relationship with our NATO allies.
       Thank you for your consideration of this important matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Carl Levin,
     Ranking Minority Member.
                                  ____

                                                     May 11, 2000.
       Dear Senator Levin: Thank you for your letter of 10 May and 
     the opportunity to provide my personal views on the amendment 
     adopted by the Senate Appropriations Committee governing the 
     future of U.S. troops in Kosovo.
       While I support efforts of the Congress and the 
     Administration to encourage our allies to fulfill their 
     commitments to the United Nations mission in Kosovo, I am 
     opposed to the specific measures called for in the amendment. 
     These measures, if adopted, would be seen as a de facto pull-
     out decision by the United States. They are unlikely to 
     encourage European allies to do more. In fact, these measures 
     would invalidate the policies, commitments and trust of our 
     Allies in NATO, undercut US leadership worldwide, and 
     encourage renewed ethnic tension, fighting and instability in 
     the Balkans. Furthermore, they would, if enacted, invalidate 
     the dedication and commitment of our Soldiers, Sailors, 
     Airmen, and Marines, disregarding the sacrifices they and 
     their families have made to help bring peace to the Balkans.
       Regional stability and peace in the Balkans are very 
     important interests of the United States. Our allies are 
     already providing over 85 percent of the military forces and 
     the funding for reconstruction efforts. US leadership in 
     Kosovo exercised through the Supreme Allied Commander, 
     Europe, as well as our diplomatic offices, is a bargain. It 
     is an effective 6:1 ratio of diplomatic throw-weight to our 
     investment. We cannot do significantly less. Our allies would 
     see this as a unilateral, adverse move that splits fifty 
     years of shared burdens, shared risks, and shared benefits in 
     NATO.
       This action will also undermine specific plans and 
     commitments made within the Alliance. At the time that US 
     military and diplomatic personnel are pressing other nations 
     to fulfill and expand their commitment of forces, 
     capabilities and resources, an apparent congressionally 
     mandated pullout would undercut their leadership and all 
     parallel diplomatic efforts.
       All over Europe, nations are looking to the United States. 
     We are their inspiration, their model, and their hope for the 
     future. Small nations, weary of oppression, ravaged by a 
     century of war, looking to the future, look to us. The 
     promise of NATO enlargement, led by the United States, is the 
     promise of the expansion of the sphere of peace and stability 
     from Western Europe eastward. This powerful, stabilizing 
     force would be undercut by this legislation, which would be 
     perceived to significantly curtail US commitment and 
     influence in Europe.
       Setting a specific deadline for US pull-out would signal to 
     the Albanians the limits of the international security 
     guarantees providing for their protection. This, in turn, 
     would give them cause to rearm and prepare to protect 
     themselves from what they would view as an inevitable Serbian 
     reentry. The more radical elements of the Albanian population 
     in Kosovo would be encouraged to increase the level of 
     violence directed against the Serb minority, thereby 
     increasing instability as well as placing US forces on the 
     ground at increased risk. Mr. Milosevic, in anticipation of 
     the pullout and ultimate breakup of KFOR, would likely 
     encourage civil disturbances and authorize the increased 
     infiltration of para-military forces to raise the level of 
     violence. He would also take other actions aimed at preparing 
     the way for Serbian military and police reoccupation of the 
     province.
       Our servicemen and women, and their families, have made 
     great sacrifices in bringing peace and stability to the 
     Balkans. This amendment introduces uncertainty in the 
     planning and funding of the Kosovo mission. This uncertainly 
     will be undermine our service members' confidence in our 
     resolve and may call into question the sacrifices we have 
     asked of them and their families. A US withdrawal could give 
     Mr. Milosevic the victory he could not achieve on the 
     battlefield.
       In all of our activities in NATO, the appropriate 
     distribution of burdens and risk remains a longstanding and 
     legitimate issue among the nations. Increased European burden 
     sharing is an imperative in Europe as well as the United 
     States. European nations are endeavoring to meet this 
     challenge in Kosovo, and in the whole KFOR and UNMIK 
     constitute a burdensharing success story, even as we 
     encourage Europeans to do even more. The United States must 
     continue to act in our own best interests. This legislation, 
     if enacted, would see its worthy intent generating 
     consequences adverse to some of our most fundamental security 
     interests.
       Thank you again for your support of our servicemen and 
     women.
           Very respectfully,
                                                  Wesley K. Clark,
                                               General, U.S. Army.

  Mr. LEVIN. I will take 30 seconds to read two paragraphs about the 
language in the letter from Wesley Clark:

       These measures, if adopted, would be seen as a de facto 
     pull-out decision by the United States. They are unlikely to 
     encourage European allies to do more. In fact, these measures 
     would invalidate the policies, commitments and trust of our 
     Allies in NATO, undercut U.S. leadership worldwide, and 
     encourage renewed ethnic tension, fighting and instability in 
     the Balkans. Furthermore, they would, if enacted, invalidate 
     the dedication and commitment of our Soldiers, Sailors, 
     Airmen, and Marines, disregarding the sacrifices they and 
     their families have made to help bring peace to the Balkans.
       Setting a specific deadline for U.S. pull-out would signal 
     to the Albanians the limits of the international security 
     guarantees providing for their protection. This, in turn, 
     would give them cause to rearm and prepare to protect 
     themselves from what they would view as an inevitable Serbian 
     reentry. The more radical elements of the Albanian population 
     in Kosovo would be encouraged to increase the level of 
     violence directed against the Serb minority, thereby 
     increasing instability as well as placing U.S. forces on the 
     ground at increased risk.

  Mr. Milosevic, in anticipation of the pullout and ultimate breakup of 
KFOR, would likely encourage civil disturbances and authorize the 
increased infiltration of para-military forces to raise the level of 
violence. He would also take other actions aimed at preparing the way 
for Serbian military police reoccupation of the province.
  I know this subject will be a matter of some debate on Monday and 
Tuesday. I intend to participate in that debate on the appropriations 
bill containing the Byrd-Warner provision. But at this time, because of 
the interest in the letter of General Clark, I thought I would ask that 
be printed in the Record.
  Again, I thank my friend from Indiana for yielding.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senators from 
Georgia and Kansas. It is a privilege to follow on some of the thoughts 
of the distinguished Senator from Kansas, as he has discussed 
multilateral organizations and focused especially on NATO which, in the 
judgment of many of us, is the most important and successful of these 
organizations in which the United States is a member.
  It is axiomatic, at least for many in foreign policy, that Europe 
counts for the United States. By that I mean simply this: that although 
throughout our history many have argued that we could get along by 
ourselves on this continent and that entanglement in the affairs of 
Europe was often described as nefarious skullduggery statesmanship 
without scruple, that eventually we come back to the fact that in the 
small world in which we live now, what happens on that continent 
matters a great deal to our security and to our prosperity.
  It is for this reason that the United States stayed in Europe after 
World War II. To state it very simply, as German Foreign Minister 
Fischer stated when he visited with our Foreign Relations Committee 
this week: The United States presence, the decision to stay, made all 
the difference in the last half century. It made a difference in terms

[[Page 7732]]

of peace on the Europe continent, which had not had such an era of 
peace in a whole millennium.
  It made a very great difference for us, the United States, leaving 
aside NATO and the security it provided, because of the collective 
defense of NATO members against the perceived menace of the former 
Soviet Union and its allies. The fact is that through the Marshall 
Plan, and through many other economic associations, the European 
countries grew substantially and so did our markets and so did our 
prosperity. We tend to take this all for granted, but only in the last 
50 years has this been a fact.
  We came to a point after the breakup of the former Soviet Union in 
which many argued, and I was not the one who originated the term, but I 
adopted it in a tour I took of Europe in 1993, that either NATO would 
go ``out of area or out of business.'' By that I meant simply that the 
idea of collective defense against the former Soviet Union, which had 
broken up, made much less sense than it had made before. Some would 
have said the Soviet Union might revive suddenly and attack hapless 
European nations, but this became less and less likely. In fact, we 
found in the Desert Storm war, that our problem was that NATO was not 
equipped to deal with conflicts out of area. It was a pickup game in 
which we enlisted various nations.
  This out of area action had been contemplated at the time of the 
United Nations Charter in Article 4, which Senator Roberts has cited. 
John Foster Dulles spoke openly and eloquently on that point. It was 
anticipated that NATO members from time to time would act out of area 
in their collective efforts and for collective security. So we did that 
in Desert Storm and the idea was always, from the time of the United 
Nations Charter and the NATO Charter onward, that nations could freely 
decide to join in such actions. In the case of Desert Storm they did 
so.
  Now that a whole new set of facts began to come forward, in which 
there were countries--Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and others--
but mainly the first three--in which the point was made: We are a 
democracy. We are searching for freedom. We are searching for relevance 
and association with others who want freedom as we do.
  Some argued the evolution of Europe might have come entirely through 
the European Union, through the economic union of the members. But most 
of us noted that was going very slowly. It still goes slowly. Poland is 
not a member of the European Union as we speak, and it is not 
contemplated that it will be for several years. This is now a very 
large country with a functioning economy and a democracy.
  The point was that collective security meant making certain that the 
gains, the victories of the cold war, were ensured and were solidified. 
That was the debate that we had a short time ago with regard to 
expansion of NATO. Some argued: Why expand if there is no particular 
threat? Why not wait and see how the threat shapes up? You can always 
take on new members in the event things are troubled.
  But many argued, and I was one, that the integration of forces, the 
building of institutions, takes time. Even in the successful war we 
fought in the desert, the weapons systems that were employed took 25 
years to evolve. It is very probable that the strengths we are now 
building with new members in Europe, in NATO, will make a difference in 
terms of their collective security, and I believe in ours. With the 
crisis over, many persons in the United States and maybe in this body, 
tend to ask: Why are we involved in Europe? In fact, why can't 
Europeans run their own affairs? They say it is a troublesome situation 
to have our forces involved there, meddling and in harm's way.
  We went through this in a very practical way with regard to the war 
in Bosnia. As you may recall, in the latter stages of the Bush 
administration, there was anxiety on the part of President Bush as to 
what was happening in the former Yugoslavia. He was strongly advised by 
European leaders that they knew better what was happening there, that 
our involvement was really not particularly welcomed. President Bush 
may have welcomed that advice, for all I know. But in any event, his 
determination was to leave that problem alone, so the conflict 
continued to progress badly in terms of the loss of life and 
displacement of persons and refugees and so forth.
  President Clinton attacked former President Bush in the 1992 campaign 
for failing to have a plan for Bosnia. But when President Clinton came 
into office in 1993 he found out how difficult that situation was.
  I know from my own experience, traveling with Senator Nunn in 1993, 
talking on the phone with President Clinton over long distance as he 
asked what we were finding out and how things were going? He was 
attempting to evolve a policy.
  He sent Secretary Christopher to Europe about that time, a trip which 
was very unsuccessful. The Secretary talked with the British and then 
the French and gave our views and asked their views. They had all sorts 
of views, all of them contradictory, and none of them helpful with 
regard to anything we had in mind.
  As a result, things drifted. Some may say that was simply too bad. 
Here are people with intractable views, demagogs. Whatever was 
happening in Yugoslavia was miserable and unfortunate for those people, 
and especially for their neighbors, our European allies. But that was 
their problem--and perhaps it was. But late in the game, Europeans came 
to us and said: We cannot solve it. It is insoluble without the United 
States.
  We might have said, ``Tough luck. You are on your own. This is what 
you wanted. You made your bed, now sleep in it.''
  We could have said that. We could have watched the unraveling of 
various parts of Europe as refugees and economic difficulties and 
aggression proceeded. But we took a different view--I think the correct 
view--namely, we are the leaders in NATO. NATO was relevant to that 
situation.
  That was a big step but not all Senators agreed. The point being made 
in the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from West 
Virginia and the distinguished Senator from Virginia is that we have 
not gone to war very often. We have declared war even less. It is time 
to stop these informal arrangements in which we get involved in 
operations without having an up-or-down vote or authorization to spend 
money or send the troops.
  That is a good point. I can remember arguing before the Desert Storm 
war that we ought to do that, and there was great anxiety in the White 
House about any such vote for fear it might come out badly that Saddam 
Hussein, therefore, would have a free ride. Ultimately, the vote was 
very close.
  I understand the constitutional point very well. It could very well 
be that historians will argue we misplayed our hand at Rambouillet, 
that our diplomacy was not as swift as it should have been, that we 
made threats when we did not understand the military power that would 
be necessary to make those threats good, and that even having made the 
threats, we did not have a very good plan once we were tested. I make 
no apologies for any of what proceeded, but the point is, we finally 
come back to the fact we are in Europe because it is our security--our 
security--that is at stake. It could be argued, too, that for the 
moment the Europeans are not sharing the burden, although they would 
argue, by this time, that they are shouldering their burden--but that 
is another debate all by itself. Or they might argue we should not be 
involved without having up-or-down votes in the Congress on these 
things in any event, or that many Americans believe we are in Kosovo or 
in Bosnia purely for humanitarian purposes, not for gut strategic 
purposes of the United States, but because of ethnic cleansing or 
refugees or displaced persons.
  The case will be made that this is not a real war, this is a policing 
action; it is a structural problem, like that faced by a mayor of a 
city or police or other situations analogous that can be handled by 
police, and European policemen rather than American policemen.
  We keep coming back to this haunting question that President George

[[Page 7733]]

Bush had to face and then President Bill Clinton when the Europeans 
said: We cannot make it by ourselves. Ultimately, Europeans might say: 
We can; we are different now; we have new institutions--whether they be 
security or economic--and you Americans can go home; we can get along 
without you; it's been nice to have you around.
  That is not what they are saying. As a matter of fact, every European 
statesman who comes to Washington--and the Chair presides over these 
coffees in our Foreign Relations Committee--we hear every single 
foreign minister and defense minister vowing how important it is the 
United States is there, stays there, stays there big, how we must take 
the lead and help organize the situation. We may say in our impatience: 
Will they never be able to pull it together? Perhaps not in our 
lifetime.
  What are the consequences if we leave? The consequence is the same 
one the German foreign minister told us this week. We left after the 
First World War. As a matter of fact, throughout the 1930s, we were not 
only isolationists, we were glad we were not close to the action, and 
we suffered for that. We lost a lot of lives. We had a war around the 
world that was touch and go for some time because we were not prepared 
to do the difficult work, the tedious work, the actual intervention day 
by day, the grimy, grubby work of diplomacy country by country, case by 
case. That is the problem.
  Duty in Kosovo, duty in Bosnia is not a popular assignment for 
anybody and never will be. I can think of various other places in 
Europe in which it is not going to be very pleasant. Yet to keep the 
peace for over 50 years, to have prosperity for them and for us, to 
make a difference in terms of stability of the world, that counts for 
something.
  On the cheap, we can say, by and large, we did not vote for it, we 
are tired of paying too much for it. Europeans understand that a little 
bit, and I give credit to the distinguished Senator from Virginia for 
trying to urge them to step up to the plate, and they have now 
demonstrated they are paying more than 85 percent--the lion's share--
whether it is the policing side or the economic side, and that we are 
paying 15 percent, and that is about what we agreed to do.
  They said, in essence: You fought most of the war, we will pick up 
five-sixths of the cost. That may or may not be a good agreement, but 
that is roughly where we have come to in Kosovo. We could say we are 
tired of paying the 15 percent and, as a matter of fact, our 5,000 or 
6,000 troops are tired of being there and, as a Senate, we are tired of 
debating the issue. We would just like to get a vote on this and get 
rid of it cleanly. Tell the President, whoever he is, where to go in 
this situation. It makes no difference whether we have a Secretary of 
State negotiating over there or not, we know better because we 
represent the people and we have the power of the purse and we can jerk 
this thing out immediately.
  Some will argue whether or not to do that as a matter of fact. The 
vote would not come for a year. General Clark has testified to this in 
the letter the distinguished Senator from Michigan just read, that 
other countries will make their own calculations. We, frankly, do not 
know what the foreign policy of President Putin of Russia will be. We 
suspect, as a matter of fact, as we have heard from the Russian 
Ambassador and from others that the Russians want a zone in Kosovo, 
maybe ours. Let's say we withdraw and the Russians say: It would be 
fine, as a matter of fact, if we were there because we could help 
integrate the Serbs as they want to come back to their homes, or help 
with a little bridge there; that would be a good thing in terms of 
integration of Europe as we see it; and we are here as Russians; the 
Americans have gone home; they were tired of this, tired of the 
policing action and all the burdens, all the difficulties. That is one 
possibility.
  President Milosevic might say: Let's be at ease for a year, wait it 
out. Kosovo was sort of a contretemps, a bad nightmare. A good many 
bombs were dropped around the country, there was some difficulties with 
the power stations and difficulties in terms of deprivation, but, by 
and large, that is in the past, and in a year's time, we can be home 
free. We can begin to operate business as usual.
  The Albanians noting the situation likewise say: We have a year to 
prepare for the war to take on the Serbs who are back with perhaps the 
help of Russian friends and others who come in to fill this vacuum.
  European allies will be accused frequently of withdrawing people from 
the country. They will say, by and large, the Americans are a strange 
leader; they are gone. This is the only war NATO ever fought and some 
may feel the only one it ever will fight because there was not very 
much leadership here, not much standing to talk to us about whether we 
have an independent force, whether it is with NATO or anybody else.
  We have a very fateful vote coming up, and it comes right to the 
point we are discussing today: multinational organizations and 
particularly NATO, the most important security alliance, because Europe 
counts.
  I suggest we do reaffirm NATO.
  As a matter of fact, as the distinguished Senator from Kansas pointed 
out, I suggested last year at the NATO celebration that we consider 
carefully new members. There were nine applicants. I say it is 
imperative that we keep hope alive for all nine. That is the incentive 
for their reform and for the courage to continue on.
  As a matter of fact, I hope we will move to adopt new members. I hope 
we will offer leadership to fill out much more substantially those who 
have fought for freedom, those who have a lot at stake in the kind of 
Europe we think would be more secure for them and for us.
  I think we ought to be devoting more resources to NATO rather than 
less. It seems to me we have a golden opportunity. Historically, we 
have been established there for a long time. To abandon or weaken NATO 
at this point, or to give hints we are going to abandon it, or to give 
hints that it can be taken for granted, would be an unfortunate policy.
  By the same token, this debate gives us an opportunity to finally 
establish, once and for all the question: Does Europe count? Do we 
care? Can Europe make it without us? I believe it counts. I do not 
think they can make it without us. I think we have to be there. And if 
we are going to be there, we ought to lead, and we ought to have the 
resources that make it count. We ought to expand the operation, as a 
matter of fact. We ought to be assertive and bold as opposed to timidly 
pulling back into our tent.
  I believe that is what the debate ought to be about. It ought to be 
about the strength of the very best multinational organization we have, 
about the reasons our allies are important to us, and what we intend to 
do about it.
  I thank the Chair for the opportunity to give this address.
  I thank the distinguished Senators from Georgia and Kansas, again, 
for inviting me to be a part of the colloquy.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CLELAND. How much time is left on our time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 15 minutes remaining.
  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I would like to conclude my remarks with 
some additional thoughts and comments.
  I thank Senator Lugar, a distinguished student and practitioner of 
foreign policy in this body for many years, and the distinguished 
Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, and thank him for his wonderful 
letter from General Clark, who is a man with whom I have shared a meal 
recently and discussed Kosovo and many other matters. He is a 
distinguished American. I respect him highly.
  I thank my distinguished colleague from Kansas. One of the things 
that impressed me was the point the Senator from Kansas mentioned, that 
this country is committed and obligated in some form or fashion to 90 
different treaties or organizations, and that is indeed quite an 
astounding number.

[[Page 7734]]

  I have two basic fears about America's global role. One is that, like 
Gulliver, we will get wrapped up in many lilliputian events and 
treaties and entanglements and not be free to move to crises in the 
world where we need to have a maximum impact; secondly, that we get 
drawn into power vacuums around the world, particularly in the wake of 
the fall of the Soviet Union, and institute a pax Americana.
  I was recently in Macedonia. As the helicopter took off, headed 
toward Kosovo, an Army colonel pointed out that if you looked out of 
the helicopter to your left, you could see a Roman aqueduct. I had 
never really been in that part of the world. It was amazing to actually 
see a Roman aqueduct put together by the Roman armies there in 
Macedonia over 2,000 years ago and it still be intact.
  I began to think the very ground over which I was flying had been 
occupied by not only Alexander the Great but his father Philip, and 
that Greek and Roman armies had gone over this very terrain. Later, 
after the Dark Ages, for some 600 years the Turks and the Ottoman 
Empire occupied this particular land. Now we, the Americans, were 
there.
  It was a sobering moment for me. I wondered exactly how effective we 
could really be in that part of the world with those conflicts which 
seem to be eternal. I wondered exactly what we could do there, what we 
could contribute, especially with our military force.
  Those are some thoughts I have.
  I would like to address one other issue in terms of our multilateral 
and multinational relations, and that is our relationship with the 
United Nations.
  In large part because of American support, the UN was founded in 1945 
with the purpose, according to its Charter:

       To maintain international peace and security, and to that 
     end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention 
     and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression 
     of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to 
     bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
     principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
     settlement of international disputes or situations which 
     might lead to a breach of the peace.

  Furthermore, under Article 34 of the U.N. Charter, U.N. ``members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in 
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council 
acts on their behalf.'' And Article 52 provides that:

       Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of 
     regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such 
     matters relating to the maintenance of international peace 
     and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided 
     that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are 
     consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
     Nations.

  In recent years, the United States has worked with, and sometimes 
without, the cooperation of the U.N. Security Council when seeking to 
accomplish its objectives. Despite all the difficulties associated with 
it, the Security Council remains the only widely accepted, 
multinational, legitimizing force for conducting military operations 
against a sovereign nation. In the 1995 book, ``Beyond Westphalia,'' 
editors Gene Lyons, Michael Mustanduno and their colleagues tackled the 
difficult question of ``state sovereignty and international 
intervention.'' The authors write that:

       A historical transition was marked by the settlement of 
     Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War and 
     opened the quest-- which goes on to this day-- to find a way 
     for independent states, each enjoying sovereignty over a 
     given territory, to pursue their interests without destroying 
     each other or the international system of which each is a 
     part.

  One of the recurring themes which has been highlighted in these floor 
dialogues organized by Senator Roberts and myself about the global role 
of the United States in the post-Cold War world is on this very 
question of sovereignty. More specifically, under what conditions is it 
permissible and appropriate for a nation or coalition of nations to 
intervene in the internal affairs of another sovereign state?
  In an April 1999 speech in Chicago, British Prime Minister Blair 
posed the question in a way which is representative of the concerns of 
many of those--especially in the Western democracies--who believe that, 
under certain egregious circumstances, there must be limits on national 
sovereignty in today's world. Prime Minister Blair said:

       The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to 
     identify the circumstances in which we should get actively 
     involved in other people's conflicts. Non-interference has 
     long been considered an important principle of international 
     order. And it is not one we would want to jettison too 
     readily. One state should not feel it has the right to change 
     the political system of another or foment subversion or seize 
     pieces of territory to which it feels it should have some 
     claim. But the principle of non-interference must be 
     qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can never 
     be a purely internal matter. When oppression produces massive 
     flows of refugees which unsettle neighboring countries then 
     they can properly be described as ``threats to international 
     peace and security.''

  It is interesting that on that same day in 1999, Brazilian President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso offered some related observations, with his 
views on the Kosovo War, which he and his country supported. President 
Cardoso's views reflect the concerns of many of those in the developing 
world who worry about the consequences of a loss of sovereignty in 
reducing their ability to control their own destiny.
  We heard Senator Roberts talk about the fear of the United States and 
its growing hegemony or being a great hegemony in various portions of 
the world, or being the ``big dog.''
  President Cardoso said this:

       Who has the authority and approval of the international 
     community to drop bombs? Such attacks are not endorsed by an 
     international organization that legalized such actions. The 
     United Nations was left aside . . . The United States 
     currently constitutes the only large center of political, 
     economic, technologic, and even cultural power. This country 
     has everything to exert its domain on the rest of the world, 
     but it must share it. There must be rules, even for the 
     stronger ones. When the strongest one makes decisions without 
     listening, everything becomes a bit more difficult. In this 
     European war, NATO made the decision, but who legalized it? 
     That is the main problem. I am convinced more than ever that 
     we need a new political order in the world.

  How do we reconcile these different and sometimes conflicting, yet 
both legitimate, concerns: the need on the one hand to protect 
powerless individuals from the depredations of their own governments, 
and on the other to protect less powerful nations from unilateral or 
even multilateral decisions by the stronger powers?
  Mr. President, in the last dialog, I tried to quote President 
Kennedy. I think I got the quote wrong. I think he said that ``we must 
dream of a world in which the strong are just, the weak secure, and the 
peace preserved.'' I think that is what President Cardoso was after.
  The editors of Beyond Westphalia draw four principal conclusions 
which bear on this matter. The first two offer encouragement to those 
who see a clear need for constraints on unfettered sovereignty, 
especially in cases of massive human rights violations:

       First, constraints on state sovereignty not only have a 
     long history but have been increasing significantly in recent 
     years as a consequence of both growing interdependence and 
     the end of the cold war . . . (Second), while constraints on 
     state sovereignty traditionally were largely constraints on 
     states' behavior with regard to other states, in recent 
     decades constraints on sovereignty have increasingly involved 
     the internal affairs of states, or how governments relate to 
     their own citizens, economies, and territories.

  However, the current limits on international interventions are 
captured in the final two observations:

       (Third), the international community has developed a 
     formidable institutional presence, yet clearly lacks the 
     resources and organizational capacity to serve as a viable 
     alternative to the society of sovereign states . . . 
     (Fourth), the legitimacy of the international community will 
     continue to be questionable as long as there are fundamental 
     differences between North and South with regard to whose 
     values and interests the international community represents . 
     . . If the major powers claim to be acting, through the 
     exercise of their international decisionmaking authority, as 
     the guardians of the common good, less powerful states

[[Page 7735]]

     seem to want to know, who is guarding the guardians?

  Lyons and Mastanduno conclude that we are likely to experience an 
ongoing ``chipping away'' at the sovereign autonomy of nations. 
However, they end with the following cautionary note:

       The idea of state sovereignty is alive and well among both 
     the more powerful and less powerful members of contemporary 
     international society. Even if states increasingly share 
     authority with intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
     organizations, the state system endures.

  So where does that leave us? For the isolationists and the 
unilateralists, the question of international intervention is, of 
course, not important for they believe that the United States should 
not, or need not, rely on other nations or the international community 
in advancing our security interests. However, as I have said in the 
first two of these dialogues, I do not believe the people of our 
country are prepared now, or in the foreseeable future, to pay the 
substantial--albeit quite different--costs arising out of either the 
isolationists' or the unilateralists' agendas.
  For everyone else, including balance of power realists, Wilsonian 
idealists and everyone in between, they have to face the dilemma of 
balancing the reality of the continuing dominance of the nation state 
as the key player in international security affairs with the increasing 
transnational communications, economic forces, and values which are 
circumscribing national sovereignty.
  In my opinion, we have no choice but to try to improve the 
international machinery for legitimating and, in some circumstances 
conducting, interventions in extreme cases where a nation's actions 
within its own borders necessitate such a response. To do otherwise 
would be to ignore the trends noted by Lyons and Mastanduno in 1995 and 
which have certainly considered apace since then. And whatever its 
shortcomings, and they are many, it is clear that the international 
machinery of choice, for the United States as well as for most of the 
world, and recognized in solemn commitments--for example including 
NATO's own charter--is the United Nations and more particularly its 
Security Council.
  But it is equally clear that the UN's machinery is not now capable of 
fulfilling this role assigned to it by the international community. The 
sad current events in Sierra Leone, and previously in Bosnia, in 
Rwanda, in Angola, and in Somalia demonstrate convincingly that the UN 
cannot enforce the will of the international community unless all local 
parties accept its intervention. In other words, it can enforce an 
existing peace but cannot make peace.
  And in the absence of an effective United Nations, I say to the 
advocates of humanitarian intervention, we have to proceed with great 
caution. Furthermore, while various Western leaders and theorists have 
proposed standards to determine when and how national sovereignty 
should be overridden, such standards are neither comprehensive, nor 
clear, nor widely accepted.
  Though I do not oppose the notion of international intervention in 
principle--because as I said before various global trends are moving us 
in that direction--in my opinion much will have to be done before we 
can or should stake important national interests on it. Among the steps 
which must be undertaken are:
  Reforming the peacekeeping operations and decision-making processes 
within the UN and the Security Council.
  Strengthening the capabilities of regional organizations, like the 
Organization for African Unity, the Organization of American States, 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations--and as I suggested earlier 
the European Union-- to deal with regional threats to international 
order.
  Thoroughly debating--including in this body--the proposed frameworks 
for intervention put forward by the Clinton Administration, the British 
government, and others.
  None of these steps will be easy. For example, reforming the 
decision-making processes of the Security Council in a way that 
improves its ability to act would presumably involve curtailing the 
veto power of the permanent members. However, while such a change would 
eliminate or reduce the ability of China or Russia to block what we 
view as appropriate interventions, it would also similarly constrain 
our own capacity to prevent what we view as undesirable actions by the 
UN. Strengthening the capabilities of regional entities raises resource 
questions, and, as already discussed, developing a serious European 
defense capability raises a number of additional concerns. And 
developing any sort of meaningful consensus about the principles for 
international interventions even among NATO members--let alone among 
both developed and developing countries--will be an extremely long and 
difficult process. But for anyone who can conceive of circumstances 
where an international response will be in our national interest, it is 
the type of effort we will have to undertake.
  Mr. President, that concludes my remarks in this, our third session 
on the US Global Role. Our next discussion will hopefully take place 
during the week of May 22, and in many ways is at the heart of the 
concerns which motivated both me and Senator Roberts to initiate these 
dialogs: the central question of when and how to employ American 
military forces abroad. I look forward to that debate--which will 
appropriately occur just before the Memorial Day break-- and I hope 
other Senators will participate.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Is there any time left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time has expired.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent to speak for 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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