[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 5]
[Senate]
[Pages 6887-6889]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



              FOR CONTINUED U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN THE BALKANS

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, next week the Appropriations Committee is 
expected to mark up several bills that will incorporate the 
Administration's supplemental request for this fiscal year. Included in 
this request is two point six billion dollars for peacekeeping and 
reconstruction in Kosovo and the surrounding region.
  In that context, I rise to examine the rapidly changing conditions in 
the Balkans and to argue for continued vigorous American involvement in 
the region, including meeting the Administration's supplemental 
request.
  Mr. President, since the end of the Cold War few, if any other parts 
of the world have commanded as much of our attention as the Balkans, 
particularly the area of the former Yugoslavia. This is no accident. 
The Balkans were the crucible for the First World War, played a pivotal 
role in the outcome of the Second World War, and persist as the only 
remaining major area of instability in Europe.
  As every thoughtful political leader in London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, 
Madrid or other capitals will attest, if the movements in the countries 
of the Balkans toward political democracy, ethnic and religious 
coexistence, and free market capitalism do not succeed, the resulting 
turmoil will endanger the remarkable peace and prosperity laboriously 
created over the past half-century in the countries of the European 
Union and in other Western democracies.
  Moreover, Mr. President, for Americans warning of this possibility is 
not merely an academic exercise. In political, security, and economic 
terms, the United States is a European power. We are tied to the 
continent through a web of trade, investment, human contacts, and 
culture to a degree unequaled by relations with any other part of the 
world. Instability that spread to Western Europe would directly and 
adversely affect the United States of America in a major way.
  In other words, Mr. President, we do not have the luxury of being 
able to distance ourselves from the Balkans, no matter how emotionally 
appealing such a policy may appear at times.
  As someone who visits Southeastern Europe on a regular basis, I fully 
understand how frustrating dealing with Balkan issues can be. Much of 
this stunningly beautiful area, with its jumble of ancient peoples, has 
seemingly intractable problems. Americans accustomed to quick solutions 
naturally become frustrated, especially since we have built up a large 
presence on the ground in several Balkan countries in the last few 
years and, therefore, know first-hand the complexities involved.
  But the very diversity of the Balkans means that even if human 
history moved in a linear fashion--which it certainly does not--
progress toward democracy, human rights, and free markets in 
Southeastern Europe would necessarily be uneven, moving forward in some 
countries, stagnating in some, and even regressing in a few.
  Mr. President, this is precisely what has been happening; the region 
is experiencing ``ups and downs.'' Contrary to popular belief, 
undoubtedly influenced by the proclivity of the mass media to emphasize 
the negative, there have been several positive developments in the 
Balkans.
  Slovenia, the northernmost country of the Balkans, is the region's 
success story. It has already established a solid democracy, and its 
transition to a free-market economy has been so successful that its per 
capita gross domestic product now exceeds that of a few members of the 
European Union. Slovenia seems certain to be in the next round of NATO 
enlargement, and it is one of the strongest candidates for EU 
membership.
  Croatia, which suffered for a decade under the authoritarian rule of 
Franjo Tudjman, elected a new parliament this past January with a 
moderate, democratic coalition gaining a solid majority. The winner of 
the February presidential election, Mr. Mesic, is also a democratic 
reformer.
  Already there has been signs of positive movement from the new regime 
in Zagreb, both domestically and in foreign policy. For example, the 
government has begun investigating corruption from the Tudjman era in 
the banking and communications sectors. In the international realm, the 
Croatian government has signed an agreement on cooperation with the 
International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague. Moreover, the new 
government has closed down illegal television transmission towers in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,

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which had spread ultra-nationalist programming from Croatia.
  In fact, the hard-line obstructionist nationalist Croat leadership in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is running scared, knowing that it has lost its 
patron, the former HDZ regime, in Croatia. It appears that the new 
government in Zagreb has pledged itself to full Dayton implementation, 
including a commitment to the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
state.
  It is debatable whether the ``good example'' set by Zagreb will soon 
influence the situation in Serbia; but it is already clear that the 
change of government in Zagreb is causing Bosnian Croat leaders to re-
think their strategy.
  The local elections in Bosnia last month provided mixed results. In 
the Republika Srpska, Prime Minister Dodik's coalition lost ground, but 
there is still hope that the new government being formed will 
accelerate the pace of implementation of the Dayton Accords.
  In the Federation, reformist Bosnian Croats did not have sufficient 
time to organize strong opposition to the entrenched HDZ nationalists. 
As the withdrawal of subsidies from Zagreb to the Bosnian Croat HDZ 
takes effect, however, the moderate Bosnian Croats may be able to 
increase their strength in the upcoming national elections.
  The most heartening developments concern the Bosnian Muslims, the 
largest of the three major communities in the country. The Muslims have 
demonstrated an accelerating move away from the nationalist SDA party 
to non-nationalist alternatives, as demonstrated by their electoral 
victories in several of Bosnia's largest cities.
  Mr. President, the southern Balkans also show several positive 
trends, some of them quite remarkable. At the Helsinki Summit of the 
European Union in December 1999, Turkey for the first time was granted 
the status of candidate for membership. To be sure, any realistic 
analysis of Turkey's chances would make them long-term, but the 
development in Helsinki is nonetheless a real breakthrough and is being 
received as such by the majority of Turkey's population.
  Moreover, the devastating earthquakes that rocked both Turkey and 
Greece last summer elicited mutual expressions of popular sympathy from 
both peoples and have led to a significant warming of relations between 
these two long-time rivals.
  Both Bulgaria and Romania are governed by Western-looking, democratic 
free-marketeers. The closing of the Danube by the NATO bombing in the 
air war last year has had an extremely damaging effect on their already 
shaky economies. Both countries, though, have embarked upon painful, 
but necessary reforms. The reformers will be sorely tested in upcoming 
national elections.
  Macedonia, perhaps the most fragile country in the region, has 
survived the trauma of the Kosovo war, with its massive influx of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees, without the violent destabilization 
expected by many observers, and certainly intended by Milosevic. A 
newly elected conservative government includes an ethnic Albanian 
party, but the raw material for an ethnic conflagration persists.
  The ``downs'' in the Balkan picture, which have been getting the 
lion's share of the publicity, are Serbia proper, Montenegro, and 
Kosovo.
  Certainly the principal negative fact of life in the region is the 
continuing presence in power in Serbia of Slobodan Milosevic. My 
colleagues know well my feelings about this man. In 1993, six years 
before the Hague Tribunal made public its indictment, I called 
Milosevic a war criminal to his face at a meeting in his office in 
Belgrade.
  Milosevic, quite simply, has been a disaster for the Serbian people. 
He has destroyed Serbia's economy, eviscerated its body politic, and 
debased its reputation internationally. It is not easy to start--and 
lose--four wars in eight years, but Milosevic has managed to do it. He 
is a man of only one ideological conviction: that he must hold onto 
power in Serbia. To retain power he is ready to use any means, 
including ruining the lives of the people he theoretically represents.
  Unfortunately, Milosevic clings to power through a combination of 
ruthlessness, tactical cunning, and the inability until now of the 
Serbian opposition to forge a permanent anti-Milosevic coalition that 
could be compelling for the Serbian electorate. There is some basis for 
cautious optimism that the political opposition in Serbia may be 
unifying in its opposition to Milosevic. Last month the opposition was 
able to bring out to the streets of Belgrade a massive crowd of more 
than two hundred thousand demonstrators against Milosevic.
  The gangland quality of life in contemporary Serbia is demonstrated 
by the recent public machine-gun slayings of ``Arkan,'' the Yugoslav 
defense minister, and other ultra-nationalist figures. Most recently 
independent journalists in Serbia have been given implicit death 
threats--from no less a personage than Mr. Seselj, the deputy prime 
minister! These moves, however, bespeak the increasing weakness and 
fear of the Milosevic regime, not any strength.
  I should add that another reason that Milosevic has been able to 
survive this cold winter is assistance from like-minded dictators. Over 
the past few months, China made a gift of three hundred million 
dollars, and Iraq contributed much needed oil. It is also extremely 
likely that Russia and Belarus have funneled assistance to Milosevic.
  The United States Government is actively supporting the creation of a 
civil society in Serbia through targeted grants to a variety of 
independent media, citizens' groups, independent trade unions, and 
towns controlled by the democratic opposition.
  Despite Milosevic's malevolent and unscrupulous behavior, I remain 
convinced that ultimately the pressure from below--and from within his 
government, party, and armed forces--will result in his fall from 
power. What is key is that we not lose our patience or our nerve. I 
will not put a date on Milosevic's fall, but fall he will, and the 
long-suffering Serbian people will begin to regain their dignity.
  Montenegro, the junior partner in the Yugoslav Federation, is 
governed by a multi-ethnic, democratic coalition led by President Milo 
Djukanovic. The reformist government of this little republic of less 
than seven hundred thousand citizens is struggling to avoid being 
overthrown by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, who is currently 
scheming about how to undermine Montenegro's democratically elected 
government. His tools are the Yugoslav army and shadowy paramilitary 
forces loyal to him, plus economic pressures applied to its vastly 
smaller neighbor.
  We have seen Milosevic starring in this movie before--- in Slovenia, 
in Croatia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Kosovo. Milosevic lost 
each time, in the process sacrificing hundreds of thousands of lives 
and causing untold material damage. I can only hope that he has learned 
his lesson.
  Kosovo is another ongoing challenge for American policy and 
fortitude. Eleven months after the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops, 
Serbian police, and paramilitaries, the province is still struggling to 
regain a semblance of normalcy. The task is enormous: by the estimate 
of the U.N., some eight hundred ten thousand residents who fled during 
last year's war have returned to a province in which approximately two-
thirds of the housing stock was destroyed or damaged beyond repair. Not 
an appealing base on which to rebuild a traumatized society.
  In that context, the herculean efforts of the international civilian 
and military authorities have had a good measure of success. Despite 
the understandable headlines detailing revenge killings of Serbs and 
Roma by ethnic Albanians, and of Kosovar Albanians by other Kosovar 
Albanians, the fact is that the incidence of homicide has dropped 
dramatically over the last several months.
  The serious upsurge in ethnic violence in the town of Mitrovica 
earlier this year shows that universal security in the province has yet 
to be achieved. The response of KFOR to Mitrovica was to send in 
additional troops, from

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different sectors. Also a special prosecutor was appointed by the 
United Nations to handle Mitrovica. Things boiled over there; now the 
flame has been doused and the lid is back on. We will have to keep an 
eye on Mitrovica and northern Kosovo.
  Similarly, the Presevo Valley in southeastern corner of Serbia 
proper, which has a strong ethnic Albanian majority population, is a 
potential flashpoint. Radical elements have been training in the 
demilitarized zone between Kosovo and Serbia proper, occasionally 
staging hit-and-run raids on Serbian police. Their motive is clearly to 
provoke a larger conflict, and then to appeal to KFOR to bail them out. 
We should not fall for this trap. I am pleased that the Administration 
has made clear to the radicals that they are on their own, and has 
enlisted the help of responsible Kosovar Albanians to rein them in.
  With respect to security in Kosovo, however, the overall trend is in 
the right direction. The drop in the murder rate is due largely to the 
excellent work of the forty-two thousand, five hundred KFOR troops in 
Kosovo, and increasingly to the more than three thousand, one hundred 
international police deployed by the U.N. Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo--known as UNMIK. Eventually four thousand, four 
hundred UNMIK police are to be deployed.
  Our government must be sure to make its pledged payments to UNMIK on 
time and to pressure other donor countries to do the same. Cooperation 
between UNMIK's chief, Dr. Bernard Kouchner, and KFOR's commander has 
been superb. If Dr. Kouchner is given all the tools the way KFOR has 
been, then I believe he will be able to do his job successfully.
  Incidentally, Mr. President, KFOR's commanders have been, in order, 
an Englishman, a German, and now a Spaniard--all under NATO's Supreme 
Commander in Europe, an American.
  While profound mistrust of KFOR and UNMIK exists among much of the 
Serbian community in Kosovo, a hopeful sign is that observers from the 
Serb community recently joined the power-sharing system UNMIK has set 
up with a broad spectrum of Kosovar Albanian leaders.
  Much of the Serbs' mistrust--and of widespread unease among the 
Kosovar Albanians--stems from the fact that although the homicide rate 
in the province has dropped, other forms of criminality are increasing. 
Particularly worrisome is the influx of organized crime elements from 
Albania across the porous, mountainous border into Kosovo.
  We must not allow Kosovo to descend into gang-infested semi-anarchy. 
This is the principal reason that the promised international funding 
for UNMIK simply must be delivered promptly. I cannot stress this 
requirement enough. Our government must pressure the Europeans--who 
have assumed the primary responsibility for KFOR, UNMIK, and the 
Stability Pact for Southeast Europe--immediately to live up to their 
pledges.
  Because of excellent work by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and other national and international organizations, there 
are high expectations all over Kosovo that this spring and summer there 
will be reconstruction on a mass scale all over the province. We must 
be certain that the international funding is delivered in time, so as 
not to deflate the Kosovars' and the Kosovo Serbs' hopes and damage our 
credibility and that of our allies and other cooperating nations.
  Mr. President, the more I delve into the details of the American and 
other international efforts to rebuild the Balkans--in Kosovo, in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Albania, and elsewhere--the more respect I 
have for our outstanding men and women serving in often difficult and 
dangerous circumstances in our diplomatic service, our armed forces, 
and our aid missions. They are bright, they are dedicated, and they are 
getting tangible results. This is a side of the story that the American 
public should hear more about.
  It is also important that the American public understands that the 
overwhelming majority of KFOR troops, the overwhelming majority of 
UNMIK personnel, and the overwhelming majority of development 
assistance are all being provided by our European allies and other 
friendly governments. Mr. President, one bright spot of the Kosovo 
story is that it shows that burdensharing not only can work, but is 
working.
  In Kosovo, perhaps more than anywhere else in the Balkans, however, 
even as we analyze serious current problems, we must never lose sight 
of what the situation would be if we had not acted militarily last 
year. Milosevic would have gotten away with vile ethnic cleansing on a 
scale unprecedented in Europe for decades, causing untold human misery, 
destabilizing Macedonia and Albania, irreparably harming the 
credibility of NATO, and possibly even fracturing the alliance.
  No, the situation in Kosovo is far from good, but it is incalculably 
better than it would have been, had NATO, under President Clinton's 
leadership, not intervened.
  In early February, at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, the 
U.S. Congressional delegation had breakfast with Lord Robertson, the 
Secretary General of NATO. As he so aptly put it, ``no one should 
expect a Balkan Switzerland to be created in a few short years.'' But 
that should not blind us, either to the significant progress already 
achieved, or to the continuing importance to the United States and to 
the rest of Europe of the struggle for lasting security in the Balkans.
  We must keep our eye on the prize and redouble our efforts to rebuild 
and stabilize Southeastern Europe. So, once again, I urge my colleagues 
on the Appropriations Committee to fully fund, without conditions, the 
Administration's supplemental request for peacekeeping and 
reconstruction in Kosovo. The stakes are simply too high to do 
otherwise.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

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