[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 5902-5905]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IN COUNTERING PROLIFERATION 
                           OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, this week the sixth Nonproliferation Treaty 
Review Conference opened in New York.
  At the last conference five years ago countries agreed to extend 
indefinitely the treaty. I recently introduced, along with Senators 
Baucus, Kerry, Roth, Bingaman, Kerrey, Kohl, and Schumer, Senate 
Concurrent Resolution 107, expressing support for another successful 
review conference. A similar bipartisan resolution will be introduced 
in the House. I hope my colleagues on the

[[Page 5903]]

Foreign Relations Committee will consider this resolution as quickly as 
possible.
  Some delegates to the conference have suggested that the United 
States is not as strongly committed as it once was to arms control, 
citing as examples the Senate failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Administration negotiations with the Russians to 
modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. I wish, as do many of my 
distinguished colleagues, that the CTBT had been ratified. I hope that 
it will be. Nevertheless, I believe all my colleagues, regardless of 
their position on this issue, share a strong and abiding interest in 
pursuing arms control agreements and making the world more secure from 
threats from weapons of mass destruction.
  As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright observed in her address to 
the delegations to the conference ``the United States is part of the 
international consensus on nuclear disarmament.'' We have taken 
considerable steps with our allies to reduce our nuclear weapons 
arsenal and have made a commitment to further reductions with the 
Russians.
  I share the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's concern--
expressed at the Review Conference--that ``nuclear conflict remains a 
very real and very terrifying possibility at the beginning of the 21st 
century.'' The nuclear weapons testing by India and Pakistan in 1998 
are added reasons to be worried.
  Equally disturbing are reports that Iran is still pursuing secretly a 
nuclear weapon and long range missile program. While we develop a 
national missile defense program to protect us against limited attacks, 
we must strengthen those arms control regimes which help to contain the 
spread of weapons systems to states who may wish to harm us.
  One of the steps that the United States and other states can take is 
to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) made the IAEA safeguards system the 
verification arm of the NPT. While the IAEA does provide some technical 
assistance to countries for the peaceful use of nuclear technology, it 
also inspects the nuclear inventories of non-nuclear weapon members of 
the NPT to ensure there are no diversions to weapons use.
  The Gulf War disclosed for the first time an Iraq nuclear weapons 
program which was being carried out despite IAEA inspections. This 
disclosure provided new impetus to strengthening the IAEA inspection 
system. The IAEA has developed a strengthened safeguards program which 
consists of more intrusive and aggressive inspections. The agency also 
proposes a new inspection protocol giving its inspectors more authority 
to collect information. Some 46 countries have signed the protocol 
which the United States helped develop.
  But the increase in membership in the IAEA and the strengthened 
inspection system has meant more demands on IAEA inspectors and 
facilities. I asked the Congressional Research Service to prepare a 
brief on the IAEA to explain its new functions. Zachary Davis, CRS's 
Specialist in International Nuclear Policy, is to be commended for his 
work on this subject. I urge my colleagues to read his analysis--
``Nuclear Weapons: Strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency 
Inspections.'' I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record 
in full, following my remarks. The IAEA deserves our full support and 
the NPT Review Conference deserves our full attention. Again, I urge my 
colleagues to express their support by co-sponsoring S. Con. Res. 107.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

   Nuclear Weapons: Strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency 
                              Inspections

    (By Zachary S. Davis, Specialist, International Nuclear Policy 
               Resources, Science and Industry Division)


                                summary

       The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an 
     international organization established to achieve two goals. 
     First, it operates an international inspection system to 
     provide assurances that nuclear materials and technology in 
     use for civilian purposes are not diverted to make nuclear 
     weapons. Second, the IAEA provides assistance in civilian 
     applications of nuclear technology for energy, agriculture, 
     medicine and science. The IAEA is strengthening its 
     inspection system to cope with countries such as Iraq and 
     North Korea that established covert nuclear weapons programs 
     and refused to cooperate with inspections, despite their 
     membership in the Nonproliferation Treaty.
       The strengthened safeguards system provides IAEA inspectors 
     with greater access to a wider range of nuclear activities. 
     New technologies will improve inspectors' ability to detect 
     undeclared nuclear activities. A new protocol to the standard 
     IAEA inspection agreement gives inspectors more information 
     and access. However, these improvements will require 
     additional resources from member states. This report outlines 
     the IAEA mission and describes efforts to improve it. It will 
     be updated as events merit.


        background: iaea inspections and the ``nuclear bargain''

       The IAEA was established in 1957 as part of President 
     Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program to provide independent 
     assurances that the spread of civilian nuclear technology did 
     not also promote the spread of nuclear weapons. Exporters of 
     nuclear technology such as the United States asked the IAEA 
     to apply safeguards on nuclear technologies, such as 
     reactors, and materials, such as nuclear fuel, to make sure 
     that the purchasers did not use them to make nuclear weapons. 
     The IAEA gained new responsibilities in 1970 when the 
     Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) designated the IAEA safeguards 
     system as the global verification mechanism for the NPT. The 
     Agency also provides technical assistance for countries to 
     use nuclear technology for energy, medicine, agriculture, and 
     scientific research. The balance between technical assistance 
     and nuclear safeguards is often referred to as the ``nuclear 
     bargain:'' in return for receiving civilian nuclear 
     technology, recipient nations agreed to international 
     safeguards.
       Organization. The Director General of the IAEA is Mohomed 
     ElBaradei, a U.S.-trained, Egyptian diplomat who served many 
     years as head of the IAEA legal department. The main policy-
     making body is the Board of Governors, which has 35 members, 
     including states with advanced nuclear programs. The General 
     Conference of all 131 members meets annually to debate Agency 
     positions, programs and priorities.
       Inspections Based on Inventories, Not Risk of Diversion. 
     All non-nuclear weapon members of the Nonproliferation Treaty 
     agree to allow the IAEA to inspect their nuclear inventories. 
     Each country provides an initial declaration and regular 
     reports on its inventory, which the IAEA then inspects on a 
     regular basis. The amount of inspection efforts is determined 
     by how much nuclear material a country has. Under this 
     formula, countries with large civil nuclear programs such as 
     Japan, Germany, South Korea, and Canada receive the most 
     attention, while countries possessing much smaller amounts of 
     nuclear material such as Iran and Iraq receive much less 
     attention.
       The Agency's members and its founding statutes do not allow 
     it to shift inspection resources from currently trusted 
     countries that possess large amounts of nuclear material, 
     such as Japan, to focus on countries with small but growing 
     nuclear programs that are considered to be proliferation 
     risks, such as Iran. One way to address this problem is 
     through across-the-board increases in the Agency's global 
     inspection system, although IAEA members have insisted for 
     many years on maintaining a zero-growth budget.
       Weapons States and Non-NPT Members. The five legally 
     recognized nuclear weapon states (Britain, France, China, 
     Russia, United States) are not obligated to accept 
     inspections, but in practice do allow some access to some 
     facilities on a voluntary basis. Nearly all non-weapon states 
     that possess nuclear capabilities accept comprehensive 
     safeguards. Only a few countries (India, Israel, Pakistan, 
     Cuba) have not joined the NPT, but even these are members of 
     the IAEA and accept safeguards at selected facilities.
       Numbers of inspections. The IAEA conducts thousands of 
     inspections annually. In 1998 the Agency performed 2,507 
     safeguards inspections at 897 facilities and other locations 
     worldwide. At the end of 1998, 222 safeguards agreements were 
     in force in 138 states (and Taiwan). This includes safeguards 
     agreements with 126 states pursuant to the NPT. (The NPT has 
     187 member states, but many of these are developing countries 
     that do not posses nuclear material or facilities that need 
     to be inspected.) The quantities of nuclear materials and 
     numbers of facilities under IAEA safeguards are growing 
     steadily. As a result of growing stocks of nuclear materials, 
     IAEA resources are being stretched thinner and may not keep 
     pace with this growing demand.


                         Successes and Failures

       A few NPT member states have violated their obligations and 
     diverted civilian nuclear technology and materials to covert 
     weapons programs.

[[Page 5904]]

       Iraq. Iraq was a party to the NPT for many years, but used 
     its civil nuclear program to disguise an extensive nuclear 
     weapons program. IAEA inspectors did not learn the full 
     nature and extent of Iraq's nuclear weapons program until the 
     Gulf War, when Allied forces attacked many undeclared nuclear 
     installations. After the war, the United Nations Security 
     Council created the Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) to 
     account for and eliminate Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and 
     biological weapons and missiles. The IAEA headed the nuclear 
     inspections. Iraq quit cooperating with UNSCOM in 1999; 
     efforts to reestablish inspections in Iraq have been blocked 
     by Russia and France in the Security Council, although IAEA 
     inspectors were allowed to inspect nuclear material remaining 
     in Iraq in January 2000.
       North Korea. North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985, but 
     refused to accept safeguards until 1992. When North Korea 
     finally allowed safeguards inspections, it provided 
     incomplete and contradictory information and then blocked 
     IAEA access to key sites. The IAEA quickly discovered the 
     discrepancies and reported Pyongyang's noncompliance to the 
     United Nations Security Council, which urged North Korea to 
     comply, but took no further action. North Korea refused 
     access and threatened to quit the NPT. Nevertheless, North 
     Korea remains obligated under the NPT to allow IAEA 
     inspections, despite its noncompliance. The IAEA has 
     repeatedly called upon North Korea to comply with its NPT 
     safeguards obligations. Under the 1994 Agreed Framework 
     between the United States and North Korea, the IAEA monitors 
     the shut-down of North Korea's declared nuclear facilities, 
     but is not able to apply full safeguards. However, North 
     Korea must fully comply and allow the IAEA to resolve all 
     outstanding inspection questions before the Agreed Framework 
     can be fully implemented.
       Inspections in Iraq and North Korea provide many lessons 
     for strengthening the IAEA safeguards system. Inspections in 
     South Africa after that country declared in 1991 that it had 
     dismantled its 6 nuclear weapons and joined the NPT also 
     helped the Agency learn how to improve its ability to detect 
     hidden nuclear activities and account for undeclared 
     activities such as those possessed by South Africa. Many 
     analysts expect the IAEA to be tested next in Iran, which has 
     a growing nuclear program but denies any interest in 
     acquiring nuclear weapons.


                          How Safeguards Work

       Each non-weapons member of the NPT signs an agreement with 
     the IAEA authorizing the Agency to keep track of the nuclear 
     materials in the country and provides the IAEA with an 
     inventory of its nuclear materials. IAEA inspectors verify 
     the declared inventories and make periodic visits to make 
     sure all the material can be accounted for. Agency inspectors 
     check records and take samples at reactors, fuel storage 
     facilities, and other nuclear installations to verify the 
     accuracy and completeness of each country's declared 
     inventory. Inspectors take a variety of measurements of 
     nuclear materials to verify their content (see below). The 
     Agency has a laboratory near its headquarters in Vienna, 
     Austria, where samples are analyzed. It also sends samples to 
     approved laboratories in several countries, including the 
     United States, for expert analysis. Inspectors attach seals 
     and tags to critical equipment to detect unauthorized access. 
     The Agency also installs video cameras to monitor activities 
     at nuclear facilities throughout the world.
       When questions arise about a country's nuclear inventory, 
     the Agency can request additional information and/or more 
     access to facilities. Normally, additional information can 
     resolve questions. However, in the past, inspectors have not 
     always pressed member states to resolve outstanding issues, 
     and states like Iraq and North Korea have attempted to take 
     advantage of the Agency's disinclination to confront member 
     states about incomplete or incorrect information. Recent 
     improvements in IAEA safeguards, however, are intended to 
     fill gaps and correct past deficiencies.


                        strengthened safeguards

       Since the early 1990s, the IAEA has been upgrading its 
     safeguards system to prevent a repeat of problems encountered 
     in Iraq and elsewhere. Most importantly, the Agency is taking 
     steps to detect undeclared nuclear activities such as found 
     in Iraq. Strengthened Safeguards, formerly referred to as the 
     93+2 Program, consists of legal, technical, and political 
     measures which are outlined below.
       Information. Inspectors rely on information provided by the 
     states themselves, on information collected by the Agency 
     from the states and from open source information, and 
     information provided to the Agency by member states. Prior to 
     the Gulf War, member states had not provided intelligence 
     information to the IAEA. However, the Agency has increasingly 
     received and used intelligence provided by member states, as 
     well as expanding its use of open source information from a 
     variety of sources. Those types of information were critical 
     in detecting discrepancies in North Korea's initial 
     declaration of its inventory of nuclear material and in 
     uncovering the full extent of Iraq's nuclear program. 
     Recently the Agency has begun to use commercial satellite 
     imagery to augment its information data bases.
       Access. One problem highlighted by the Agency's failure to 
     detect Iraq's extensive covert nuclear weapon program was the 
     limitations that member states put on its access to 
     facilities. In the past, the IAEA focused almost exclusively 
     on accounting for nuclear material, and did not pay much 
     attention to related equipment and installations. The IAEA 
     has reasserted its authority to gain access to all facilities 
     housing nuclear activities. However, additional authority is 
     needed and would be authorized by the new protocol inspection 
     agreement (see below).
       Technology. The Agency is upgrading its inspection 
     equipment with the help of the United States and other member 
     states. Upgrades include new cameras and remote monitoring 
     equipment, more accurate measuring tools, and new methods of 
     detecting minute quantities of nuclear material in soil, 
     water, plants and air that can be collected from numerous 
     locations. The IAEA is also beginning to use commercial 
     satellite imagery to monitor developments at nuclear 
     installations.
       Political and Financial Support. The IAEA depends on 
     support from member states to be effective. Contributions to 
     the regular budget are apportioned on the United Nations 
     scale of assessments. Most of the technology and equipment it 
     uses is contributed by members. Its budget is limited and 
     divided among several missions that are popular with certain 
     members, such as nuclear safety and technical assistance. 
     Given its budget constraints, the Agency depends on special 
     voluntary contributions to support programs of particular 
     interest to certain members, including advanced safeguards 
     and arms control.
       Enforcement. Even when the IAEA discovers noncompliance, it 
     can only report to the United Nations Security Council. 
     Enforcement is a political decision of the Security Council 
     and its members.


                     additional safeguards protocol

       An important part of the Strengthened Safeguards effort is 
     a new inspection protocol that gives Agency inspectors more 
     authority to collect more information about a wider range of 
     nuclear activities (uranium mining, imports, exports, etc.), 
     to use more intrusive inspection methods, and to expand their 
     access to undeclared activities. The additional information 
     and access is required to reduce the risk of undeclared 
     nuclear activities going undetected, as they did in Iraq.
       The United States, which played a primary role in 
     formulating the new inspection protocol, agreed to accept 
     some of the new measures on selected U.S. activities to 
     persuade others to sign it. The four other nuclear weapon 
     states also agreed to sign the protocol and implement it. The 
     United States, as a nuclear weapons state under the NPT, is 
     not obligated to open its facilities for inspection and can 
     exclude any sites it chooses from IAEA inspection. By early 
     2000, 46 countries had signed the Additional Protocol. The 
     U.S. version of the Protocol will be submitted to the Senate 
     for its consent to ratification before taking effect in the 
     United States.


new inspection missions: excess weapons materials and fissile material 
                             cutoff treaty

       In addition to the growing number of civil nuclear 
     facilities and growing stockpiles of materials under IAEA 
     safeguards, the IAEA is being assigned new missions to 
     support arms control agreements.
       Excess Weapon Materials: The Trilateral Initiative. The 
     United States and Russia each have many tons of excess 
     nuclear weapons materials--highly enriched uranium and 
     plutonium. The stockpiles of excess materials are growing as 
     more nuclear weapons are dismantled under the terms of arms 
     control agreements. The United States and Russia each 
     declared hundreds of tons of weapons materials as excess and 
     asked the IAEA to verify that this material is not reused to 
     make nuclear weapons. The IAEA agreed to work with Russian 
     and U.S. experts to develop a special verification 
     arrangement to allow the Agency to verify the materials 
     without revealing sensitive weapons-related information. The 
     arrangement, called the Trilateral Initiative, is funded by 
     the Departments of Energy and State. The Trilateral 
     Initiative can support arms control agreements such as START 
     II and a proposed START III by providing independent 
     verification that weapons materials are removed from military 
     stockpiles and are not reused for nuclear explosives.
       Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). The Clinton 
     Administration proposed negotiating a multilateral treaty to 
     stop further production of highly enriched uranium or 
     plutonium for use in nuclear explosives. Such a treaty would 
     cap the amount of weapons materials, and therefore limit the 
     number of weapons that could be made from existing stocks. 
     The IAEA is widely viewed as the most likely inspection 
     agency for such a treaty. Although an FMCT has broad 
     international support, negotiations are stalled at the 
     Conference on Disarmament, a branch of the United Nations 
     located in Geneva, Switzerland. New funding would be 
     required.


                    iaea budget and budget problems

       The IAEA annual budget is about $226 million. The budget is 
     divided among several major programs including safeguards, 
     safety,

[[Page 5905]]

     and technical assistance. Member states' contributions are 
     determined by the United Nations scale of contributions and 
     are combined in the Agency's annual budget. The Agency also 
     receives voluntary contributions from member states targeted 
     to support specific programs or projects.
       U.S. Contribution. The United States provides about 25% of 
     the IAEA regular budget. In 1999 the U.S. assessed 
     contribution was $49 million. The United States also provided 
     a voluntary contribution of $40 million, mainly to support 
     activities related to the Strengthened Safeguards System. The 
     United States also provided less than $1 million from the 
     Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to upgrade IAEA 
     inspection equipment. U.S. contributions to the IAEA are 
     funded through the State Department's 050 account.
       Stretching the Resources. While the members of the IAEA are 
     tasking it with additional responsibilities, many resist 
     providing additional funds to pay for Strengthened 
     Safeguards, expanding inspections, improving nuclear safety, 
     and for new arms control missions such as the Trilateral 
     Initiative. The U.S. practice of paying its dues at the end 
     of the U.S. fiscal year (instead of by calendar year, as 
     requested by the IAEA) puts further strain on the Agency. 
     With stocks of nuclear material growing in many countries, 
     some of which pose proliferation concerns, at some point the 
     IAEA's resources may be stretched so far that the Agency can 
     not fulfill all of its functions. Declining credibility of 
     IAEA safeguards could weaken their deterrent and detection 
     functions and possibly undermine nuclear nonproliferation 
     efforts.


                              legislation

       Congress has consistently supported the IAEA and has 
     authorized and appropriated funds for the Agency since its 
     inception in 1956. In recent years Congress has continued 
     support for strengthening the safeguards system and through 
     voluntary contributions. However, legislation has also been 
     proposed to withhold portions of the voluntary U.S. 
     contribution to the IAEA to signal displeasure with IAEA 
     programs that benefit particular member states such as Iran 
     and Cuba.


                         for additional reading

       IAEA documents are available on their web site: http://
www.iaea.org/worldatom.
       International Atomic Energy Agency, ``Safeguards and 
     Nonproliferation,'' IAEA Bulletin, volume 41, number 4, 1999.
       Zachary Davis, International Atomic Energy Agency: 
     Strengthen Verification Authority? CRS Report 97-571, May 
     1997.

                          ____________________