[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 5321-5333]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                      NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I am going to begin my remarks. We had 
originally intended for Senator Cleland to begin this dialog. But I am 
going to go ahead since he has been detained. Then he can follow me. I 
do not think that is going to upset the order at all.
  I thank my good friend, the distinguished Senator from Georgia, for 
this continued initiative and for his leadership in continuing our 
bipartisan foreign policy dialog.
  As I said back in February during our first discussion, our objective 
is to try to achieve greater attention, focus, and mutual 
understanding--not to mention a healthy dose of responsibility--in this 
body in regard to America's global role and our vital national security 
interests. Our goal was to begin a process of building a bipartisan 
coalition, a consensus on what America's role should be in today's 
ever-changing, unsafe, and very unpredictable world.
  This is our second dialog. We will focus today on how we can better 
define our vital national interests.
  In doing our homework, both Senator Cleland and I have been doing a 
lot of reading and pouring over quite a few books and articles and 
commentaries and reports and legislation and speeches and position 
papers and the like. If it was printed, we read it.
  We have also been seeking the advice and counsel of everybody 
involved--in my case, the marine lance corporal about to deploy to 
Kosovo, to the very serious and hollow-faced old gentleman I visited at 
a Macedonian refugee camp, as well as foreign dignitaries and the 
military brass we admire and listen to as members of the Armed Services 
Committee, and all of the current and former advisors and experts and 
think tank dwellers and foreign policy gurus and intelligence experts. 
Needless to say, our foreign policy and national security homework 
universe is ever expanding and apparently without end. I hope I didn't 
leave anybody out.
  We both now have impressive bibliographies that we can wave around 
and put in the Record and we can recommend to our colleagues to prove 
that our bibliography tank, as it were, is pretty full. We have very 
little or no excuse if we are not informed.
  There was another book I wanted to bring to the attention of my 
colleagues. Its title is ``Going for the Max.'' It involves 12 
principles for living life to the fullest, written by our colleague and 
my dear friend, with a most appropriate and moving foreword from the 
Senate Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd

[[Page 5322]]

Ogilvie. This is a very easy and enjoyable read with a very 
inspirational message.
  Chapter 10 of Max's book states--and this is important--that success 
is a team effort, that coming together is a beginning, keeping together 
is progress, and working together is a success.
  That is a pretty good model for our efforts today and a recipe for us 
to keep in mind in this body as we try to better fulfill our national 
security obligations and to protect our individual freedoms.
  Thank you and well done, to my distinguished friend.
  Senator Cleland, in his remarks, will quote Owen Harries, editor of 
the publication, the National Interest. He will point out the need for 
restraint in regard to exercising our national power. Editor Harris 
warned--and this is what Senator Cleland will say--

       It is not what Americans think of the United States but 
     what others think of it that will decide the matter.

  When we are talking about ``matter,'' the ``matter'' in this case is 
stability and successful foreign and national security policy. I could 
not agree more. Senator Cleland will go on to quote numerous statements 
from foreign leaders and editorials from leading international 
publications and commentaries from respected observers around the 
globe, from our allies and from the fence sitters and our would-be 
adversaries.
  Sadly, I have to tell my colleagues that all were very critical of 
U.S. foreign policy. The basic thrust of the criticism, as described by 
Senator Cleland--and he will be saying this. Again, I apologize that I 
started first. In the order of things, we are sort of reversing this. I 
am giving him a promo, if that is okay. At any rate, Senator Cleland 
will state:

       The United States has made a conscious decision to use our 
     current position of predominance to pursue unilateralist 
     foreign and national security policies.

  Senator Cleland is right. Dean Joseph S. Nye of the Kennedy School of 
Government and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs warns about the CNN effect in the 
formulation and conduct of our foreign policy; the free flow of 
information and the shortened news cycles that have a huge impact on 
public opinion, and placing some items at the top of the public agenda 
that might otherwise warrant a lower priority; diverting attention from 
the A list of strategic issues of vital national security. What am I 
talking about? What does this criticism really suggest?
  We need to take the spin off. We need to take off our rose-colored, 
hegemonic glasses and take a hard look at the world and what the world 
thinks of us. I have a suggestion. It would only take Senators 10 
minutes a day. Every Member of the Senate can and should receive what 
are called ``Issue Focus Reports.'' These are reports on foreign media 
reaction to the world issues of the day. They are put out by the State 
Department. We at least should be aware of what others think of us and 
our foreign policy. Unfortunately and sadly, it is not flattering.
  For instance, the February 24 Issue Focus detailed foreign commentary 
from publications within our NATO allies, those who comprised Operation 
Allied Force in Kosovo, headlines of 39 reports from 10 countries. If 
my colleagues will bear with me a moment, these are some of the 
headlines. This is the Issue Focus I am talking about. It is a very 
short read. Senators could have that or could have this report at their 
disposal every week. Again, these are leading publications--some 
liberal, some conservative, some supportive of the United States and 
some not. Just as a catch-as-catch-can summary, listen to the 
headlines:

       Kosovo Unrest--A Domino Effect; Another War?; Wither 
     Kosovo?; Holding Back The Tide Of Ethnic Cleansing; Losing 
     The Peace; By The Waters of Mitrovica; West Won The War, But 
     Now Faces Losing The Peace; Holding Fast In The Kosovar Trap; 
     Speculation On U.S. Domination In The Balkans; Whoever 
     Believed In Multi-Ethnic Kosovo; Kosovo Calculations; The 
     U.S. Is Playing With Fire; The West Is Helpless In Kosovo; 
     Mitrovica, The Shadow Of The Wall Is Back; Military 
     Intervention Against Serbia A Mistake; U.S. and Europe Are 
     Also Clashing In Mitrovica; Kosovo Chaos Is A Trap For NATO; 
     A Failure That Burns; The Difficult Peace.

  It goes on and on.
  This kind of reading would help us a great deal in understanding how 
others really think of us. The March 24 Issue Focus, based on 49 
reports from leading newspapers and publications in 24 countries, 
assessed the U.S. and NATO policy 1 year after Operation Allied Force 
in the bombing of Kosovo. Summed up, the articles conclude it is time 
to ask some hard questions. Some unsettling headlines--again, this is a 
wide variety of publications from all ideologies and the whole 
political spectrum:

       A War With No Results; No End To The Kosovo Tragedy; 
     Europe's Leaders Warned Of A New Crisis; The West Fiasco In 
     Kosovo; Halfway Results; A Year Later: Where Do We Stand; A 
     Victory Gambled Away; No Sign Of Will For Peace; Making 
     Progress By Moving Backwards In The Balkans.

  Again, it goes on and on.
  I don't mean to suggest that we should base our foreign policy on 
foreign headlines or perceived perception with regard to criticism in 
foreign countries. If we take the spin off, I think a case can be made 
that we are seeing a world backlash against U.S. foreign policy no 
matter how well-intentioned.
  A timely article last month by Tyler Marshall and Jim Mann of the Los 
Angeles Times summarized it very well when they said:

       The nation's prominence as the world's sole superpower 
     leaves even allies very uneasy. They fear Washington--

  By the way, I certainly include the Congress--

       has lost its commitment to international order. America's 
     dominant shadow has long been welcomed in much of the world 
     as a shield from tyranny, a beacon of goodwill, an 
     inspiration of unique values. But, ten years after the 
     collapse of Communism left the United States to pursue its 
     interests without a world rival, that shadow is assuming a 
     darker character. In the State Department, it is called the 
     hegemony problem, a fancy way of describing the same 
     resentment that schoolchildren have for the biggest, 
     toughest, richest and smartest kid in school.

  The Marshall and Mann article goes on to say that America is 
suffering from a bad case of ``me first,'' that during the 
administration years we have seen a lot of focus and it has been on new 
objectives, pressing American commercial interests, the championing of 
democracy--certainly nothing wrong with that--and then the 
intervention, militarily, to protect human rights. They state the goals 
that concern the foreign leaders are less than the manner in which they 
have been pursued, a manner that appears inconsistent and sporadic and 
capricious. The article cites very serious backlash. Thirty-eight 
nations rallied to fight Iraq in 1991. Only Britain answers to the call 
today. Today, the French--our oldest ally--along with China, India, and 
Russia, have all discussed independently, or in consultation, ways to 
counter the balance of the enormity of American power.
  Japan is making plans to develop an independent military capability. 
In Europe, pro-Americanism is on the wane. European leaders cut their 
teeth on the protests of the 1960s, not the American aid packages of 
the 1950s. The situation in Russia is especially perilous with Russians 
seeing secondhand treatment--by their definition--with the U.S. in 
regard to their continued economic morass, NATO expansion, Kosovo, and 
the American condemnation of Moscow's war against Chechnya.
  Under the banner of the law of unintended effects, Washington Post 
columnist Charles Krauthammer opined the cost of our occupancy of 
Bosnia and Kosovo which has already cost tens of billions of dollars, 
drained our defense resources, and strained a hollow military which is 
charged with protecting vital American strategic interests in such 
crises areas as the Persian Gulf, the Taiwan Strait, and also the 
Korean peninsula. But he cited another cost, as he put it, more subtle 
and far heavier. He said that Russia has just moved from the 
democratically committed, if erratic, Boris Yeltsin to the dictatorship 
of the law, as promised by the new President, former KGB agent Vladimir 
Putin. I have his article. It is called ``The Path to Putin.'' I ask

[[Page 5323]]

unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                           The Path to Putin

                        (By Charles Krauthammer)

       In late February, as the first anniversary of our 
     intervention in Kosovo approached, American peacekeepers 
     launched house-to-house raids in Mitrovica looking for 
     weapons. They encountered a rock-throwing mob and withdrew. 
     Such is our reward for our glorious little victory in the 
     Balkans: police work from which even Madeleine K. Albright, 
     architect of the war, admits there is no foreseeable escape. 
     (``The day may come,'' she wrote on Tuesday, ``when a Kosovo-
     scale operation can be managed without the help of the United 
     States, but it has not come yet.'')
       The price is high. Our occupations of Kosovo and Bosnia 
     have already cost tens of billions of dollars, draining our 
     defense resources and straining a military (already hollowed 
     out by huge defense cuts over the last decade) charged with 
     protecting vital American strategic interests in such crisis 
     areas as the Persian Gulf, the Taiwan Strait and the Korean 
     Peninsula.
       But there is another cost, more subtle and far heavier. 
     Russia has just moved from the democratically committed, if 
     erratic, Boris Yeltsin to the ``dictatorship of the law'' 
     promised by the new president, former KGB agent Vladimir 
     Putin. Putin might turn out to be a democrat, but the man who 
     won the presidency by crushing Chechnya will more likely 
     continue as the national security policeman of all the 
     Russias.
       What does that have to do with Kosovo? ``Without Kosovo, 
     Putin would not be Russian president today,'' says Dimitri 
     Simes, the Russia expert and president of the Nixon Center.
       The path from Kosovo to Putin is not that difficult to 
     trace. It goes through Chechnya. Americans may not see the 
     connection, but Russians do.
       Russians had long been suffering an ``Afghan-Chechen 
     syndrome'' under which they believed they could not prevail 
     in local conflicts purely by the use of force. Kosovo 
     demonstrated precisely the efficacy of raw force.
       Russians had also been operating under the assumption that 
     to be a good international citizen they could not engage in 
     the unilateral use of force without the general approval of 
     the international community. Kosovo cured them of that 
     illusion.
       And finally, Russia had acquiesced in the expansion of NATO 
     under the expectation and assurance that it would remain, as 
     always, a defensive alliance. Then, within 11 days of 
     incorporating Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, NATO 
     was launching its first extraterritorial war.
       The Russians were doubly humiliated because the Balkans had 
     long been in their sphere of influences with Serbia as their 
     traditional ally. The result was intense anti-American, anti-
     NATO feeling engendered in Russia. NATO expansion had 
     agitated Russian elites; Kosovo inflamed the Russian public.
       Kosovo created in Russia what Simes calls a ``national 
     security consensus:'' the demand for a strong leader to do 
     what it takes to restore Russia's standing and status. And it 
     made confrontation with the United States a badge of honor.
       The dash to Pristina airport by Russian troops under the 
     noses of the allies as they entered Kosovo was an unserious 
     way of issuing the challenge. But the support this little 
     adventure enjoyed at home showed Russian leaders the power of 
     the new nationalism.
       The first Russian beneficiary of Kosovo was then-Prime 
     Minister Yevgeny Primakov. But it was Prime Minister Putin 
     who understood how to fully exploit it. Applying the lessons 
     of Kosovo, he seized upon Chechen provocations into 
     neighboring Dagestan to launch his merciless war on Chechnya. 
     It earned him enormous popularity and ultimately the 
     presidency.
       One of Putin's first promises is to rebuild Russia's 
     military-industrial complex. We are now saddled with him for 
     four years, probably longer, much longer.
       The Clinton administration has a congenital inability to 
     distinguish forest from trees. It obsesses over paper 
     agreements, such as the chemical weapons treaty, which will 
     not advance to American interests one iota. It expends 
     enormous effort on Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, places 
     of (at best) the most peripheral interest to the United 
     States. And it lets the big ones slip away.
       Saddam Hussein is back building his weapons of mass 
     destruction. China's threats to Taiwan grow. The American 
     military is badly stretched by far-flung commitments in 
     places of insignificance. Most important of all, Russia, on 
     whose destiny and direction hinge the future of Eastern 
     Europe and the Caspian Basin, has come under the sway of a 
     cold-eyed cop, destroyer of Chechnya and heir to Yuri 
     Andropov, the last KGB graduate to rule Russia.
       Such is the price of the blinkered do-goodism of this 
     administration. We will be paying the price far into the 
     next.

  Mr. ROBERTS. Charles Krauthammer points out in the article--and I 
will read a little of it--that, basically, what the Russians thought 
was the path from Kosovo to Putin is not that difficult to trace. It 
goes through Chechnya.
  Americans may not see the connection, but the Russians do. The 
Russians have been operating under the assumption that to be a good 
international citizen, they could not engage in the unilateral use of 
force without the general approval of the international community. 
Well, Kosovo certainly cured them of that illusion. Finally, Russia 
acquiesced in the expansion of NATO under the expectation and assurance 
that it would remain always a defensive alliance. I am not arguing the 
pros and cons of that, but simply the reaction in Russia. Russians were 
doubly humiliated because the Balkans had long been in their sphere of 
influence, with Serbia as their traditional ally. The result was an 
intense anti-American, anti-NATO feeling engendered in Russia, and NATO 
expansion had really agitated the Russian elites, and Kosovo inflamed 
the Russian public.
  So Kosovo created what has been called a national security consensus. 
The demand for a strong leader to do what it takes to restore Russia's 
standing and status made the confrontation with the United States a 
badge of honor. I will tell you, in going to Moscow and talking with 
Russian leaders regarding the very important cooperative threat 
reduction programs that happened to come under the jurisdiction of my 
subcommittee, you get a lecture on Kosovo for a half hour even before 
you have a cup of coffee. So this article has some merit.
  In regard to Mr. Krauthammer's article:

       The first Russian beneficiary of Kosovo was then-Prime 
     Minister Primakov. But it was Prime Minister Putin who 
     understood how to fully exploit it. Applying the lessons of 
     Kosovo, he seized upon the Chechen provocations into 
     neighboring Dagestan to launch his merciless war on Chechnya. 
     It earned him enormous popularity and ultimately the 
     presidency.
       We are now saddled with him for four years, probably 
     longer, much longer.

  We hope the man without a face--which is how some describe Putin--we 
hope we can work with him and build a positive relationship. I think 
under the law of unintended effects, this is a good example.
  In China, obviously, the political wounds fester in the wake of the 
U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade; the Taiwan issue, 
charges of espionage, and the criticism of human rights; and continued 
controversy over whether or not Congress will approve a trading status 
that will result in the U.S. simply taking advantage of trade 
concessions that the Chinese have made to us.
  In Latin America, the lack of a so-called fast-track authority and 
U.S. trade policy is muddled. You can drive south into Central America 
and into trade relations with our competitors in the European Union. My 
friend from Nebraska, Senator Hagel, who will join us in about an hour, 
put it this way:

       It worries me, first, because most of us are not really 
     picking this up on our radar--this sense that we don't care 
     about what our trading partners or allies think. It is going 
     to come back and snap us in some ways. It will be very bad 
     for this country.

  Well, the criticism from the Marshall and Mann article becomes very 
harsh when they cite why the U.S. has become so aloof. I am quoting 
here:

       * * * a President who engages only episodically on 
     international issues and too often has failed to use either 
     the personal prestige or the power of his office to pursue 
     key foreign policy goals. * * * a Congress that cares little 
     about foreign affairs in the wake of the Cold War and seems 
     to understand even less. * * * a poisonous relationship 
     between the two branches of our Government putting 
     partisanship over national interests * * * an American public 
     inattentive to world affairs and confused by all of the 
     partisan backbiting now that the principal reference point--
     the evil of communism--has all but vanished as a major 
     threat.

  Indeed, that is a pretty harsh assessment. Aside from all the 
criticism and 20/20 hindsight--and it is easy to do that, trying to 
chart a well-defined foreign policy course is more complicated

[[Page 5324]]

and difficult today than ever before. Both Senator Cleland and I 
understand that. As chairman of the newly created Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, it 
seems as if we have a new emerging threat at our doorstep almost every 
day. I am talking about the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, rogue nations, ethnic wars, drugs, and terrorism.
  Concluding our second hearing on the subcommittee this session, and 
again asking the experts, ``What keeps you up at night?'' the answer 
came back: ``Cyber attacks and biological attacks'' from virtually any 
kind of source, and the bottom line was not if, but when.
  So it is not easy, but if we are worried about proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, we should also be worried about the 
proliferation of overall foreign policy roles, not to mention the role 
the U.S. should play in the world today.
  Some may say events of the day will determine our strategy on a case-
by-case basis. That seems to be the case. But I say that is a dangerous 
path, as evidenced by adversaries that did not or will not believe we 
have the will to respond.
  Former National Security Adviser, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, put it this 
way in a speech at the Brookings Institution National Forum, and he 
said this in response to some questions:

       The nature of our approach to foreign policy also changed 
     from, I would say, from foreign policy as a continuing focus 
     of the United States, which it had been for the 50 years of 
     the Cold War, to an episodic attention on the part of the 
     United States, and thus without much of a theme, and further 
     to that, a foreign policy whose decisions were heavily 
     influenced by polls, by what was popular back home or what 
     was assumed to be popular.

  General Scowcroft went on to say:

       So at a period when we should have been focusing on 
     structures to improve the possibility that we could actually 
     make some changes in the way the world operated, and some 
     improvements, we have frittered away the time. I think never 
     has history left us such a clean slate as we had in 1991. And 
     we have not taken advantage of it.
       One point on looking ahead from here. I think we have begun 
     engaging on a fundamental transformation of the international 
     system with insufficient thought.
       We, NATO, President Clinton, the U.N. Secretary General, 
     are moving to replace the Treaty of Westphalia, replacing the 
     notion of the sovereignty of the nation-state with what I 
     would call the sovereignty of the individual and 
     humanitarianism. That is a profound change in the way the 
     world operates. And we're doing it with very little analysis 
     of what it is we're about and how we want this to turn out.

  Evidenced by the Charles Krauthammer article.
  Again I quote from the general:

       In Kosovo, just for example, we conducted a devastating 
     bombing of a country in an attempt to protect a minority 
     within that country. And, as a result, we're now presiding 
     over reverse ethnic cleansing. What's the difference between 
     Kosovo and Chechnya?

  That is a question not many of us want to ponder.

       How many people must be placed in jeopardy to warrant an 
     invasion of sovereignty? Where? By whom? How does one set 
     priorities among these kind of crises?

  And, events of the day, again dominated by the so-called CNN effect, 
ignore the same kind of core questions posed by General Scowcroft and 
reflected again in an article by Doyle McManus the Washington Bureau 
Chief of the Los Angeles Times: When should the United States use 
military power?
  President Clinton has argued in the Clinton Doctrine that Americans 
should intervene wherever U.S. power can protect ethnic minorities from 
genocide. I would add a later UN speech seemed to indicate a backing 
off from that position.
  How will the United States deal with China and Russia, the two great 
potentially hostile powers?
  What is the biggest threat to our nation's security and how should 
the U.S. respond? Weapons of mass destruction head the list of course, 
but the President has added in terrorism, disease, poverty, disorder to 
the list.
  I know about the Strategic Concept of NATO, when that was passed 
during the 50-year anniversary last spring in Washington. Those of us 
who read the Strategic Concept and all of the missions that entailed--
moving away from a collective defense--we were concerned about that. We 
asked for a report as to whether that obligated the United States to 
all of these missions.
  Finally, we received a report from the administration of about three 
pages. The report said we are not obligated and not responsible. If we 
are not responsible for the Strategic Concept of NATO, what are we 
doing adopting it?
  When the U.S. acts, should it wait for the approval of the United 
Nations, seek the approval of our allies, or strike out on its own?
  However, my colleagues, the biggest question remains and it was 
defined well by retired Air Force Brigadier General David Herrelko who 
wrote in the Dayton Daily News recently:
  ``The United States needs to get a grip on what our national 
interests are, what we stand for and what we can reasonably do in the 
world before we can size our military forces and before we send them in 
harms way. We must hammer out, in a public forum, just what our 
national priorities are.'' He says, and I agree, we cannot continue 
adrift. Consider this retired military man's following points:

       More Americans have died in peacekeeping operations 
     (Lebanon, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia) than in military actions 
     (Iraq, Panama, Grenada and Yugoslavia).
       We have a president seeking United Nations approval for 
     military intervention but skipping the dialogue with 
     Congress.

  I might add, the Congress skips the dialog with the President.

       We commit our military forces before we clearly state our 
     objectives.
       We gradually escalate hostilities and we leave standing 
     forces behind.
       Some 7,000 now in Kosovo, and the peacekeepers. When there 
     was no peace, they became the target.

  General Herrelko ends his article with a plea: ``We are starved for 
meaningful dialogue between the White House and the Congress.''
  I agree Mr. President and would add we are starved for dialogue here 
in the Senate as well and that is why we are here.
  And, as Senator Cleland has pointed out, our goal is not to achieve 
unanimity on each and every issue but to at least contribute to an 
effort to focus attention on our challenges instead of reacting 
piecemeal as events of the day take place.
  And, goodness knows even if the foreign policy stadium is not full of 
interested spectators, we do have quite an array of players. LA Times 
Bureau Chief McManus has his own program:

       Humanitarian interventionists, mostly Democrats and 
     President Clinton with Kosovo being the prime example. 
     Nationalist interventionists, mostly Republicans who would 
     intervene in defense of democracy, trade and military 
     security.
       Realists, both Republicans and Democrats

  I think Senator Cleland would be in that category.

     skeptical about intervention but wanting the United States to 
     block any concert of hostile powers.
       Minimalists, those who think the United States should stay 
     out of foreign entanglements and quarrels and save its 
     strengths for major conflicts.

  Richard Haass, former foreign policy advisor in the Bush 
administration and now with the Brookings Institution, has defined the 
players in the foreign policy program much along the same lines as 
Senator Cleland did in his opening remarks during our first forum last 
month:

       Wilsonians who wish to assist other countries achieve 
     democracy;
       Economists, who wish to promote trade, prosperity and free 
     markets;
       Realists, who wish to preserve an orderly balance of power 
     without worrying too much what kind of states are doing the 
     balancing;
       Hegemonists who want to make sure the United States keeps 
     its status as the only superpower;
       Humanitarians, who wish to address oppression, poverty, 
     hunger and environmental damage;
       And, Minimalists, who wish to avoid spending time or tax 
     dollars on any of these matters.

  I'm not sure of any of my colleagues would want to be identified or 
characterized in any one of these categories but again the key question 
is whether or not the members of this foreign policy posse can ride in 
one direction and better define our vital national interests and from 
that definition establish

[[Page 5325]]

priorities and a national strategy to achieve them.
  Fortunately, as Senator Cleland has pointed out, some very 
distinguished and experienced national security and foreign policy 
leaders have already provided several road maps that make a great deal 
of sense. What does not make a great deal of sense is that few are 
paying attention.
  Lawrence Korb, Director of Studies of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, in a military analysis published in a publication called 
``Great Decisions'' has focused on the Powell Doctrine named after 
retired Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell, citing the dangers of 
military engagement and the need to limit commitments to absolutely 
vital national interests. On the other hand, the sweeping Clinton 
Doctrine emphasizes a global policing role for the United States.
  How do we reconcile these two approaches?
  I am not sure there is only one yellow brick foreign policy road but 
there are several good alternatives that have been suggested:
  First, I am going to refer to what I call the ``Old Testament'' on 
foreign policy in terms of vital national interests. This is the 
Commission on America's National Interests, 1996.
  Second, a national security strategy for a new century put out by the 
White House this past December. If you are being critical, or 
suggesting, or if you have a different approach than the current 
policy, as I have been during my remarks, you have an obligation to 
read this. The White House put this out as of December of 1999.
  Third, adapting U.S. Defense to Future Needs by Ashton Carter former 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security in the first 
Clinton administration and currently professor of science and 
international affairs at Harvard.
  We had him testify to this before the Emerging Threats Subcommittee 
just a month ago.
  Fourth, defining U.S. National Strategy by Kim Holmes and Jon Hillen 
of the Heritage Foundation, a detailed summary of threats confronting 
us today with appropriate commentary about their priorities.
  Fifth, transforming American Alliances by Andrew Krepinevvitch of the 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
  He has been of real help to us in regard to the Emerging Threats 
subcommittee, and also the full Committee on Armed Services.
  Sixth, a highly recommended article ``Back to Basics: U.S. Foreign 
Policy for the Coming Decade,'' by James E. Goodby, a senior fellow at 
the Brookings Institution and former Ambassador to Finland and Kenneth 
Wisebrode, Director of the International Security Program at the 
Atlantic Council of the United States.
  In this regard, Messrs. Goodby and Weisbrode have summarized the 
concerns of Senator Cleland and myself very well when they said:

       The most common error of policymakers is to fail to 
     distinguish among our levels of interest, leading to an over 
     commitment to higher level interests. In other words, 
     strategic or second tier interests, if mishandled, can 
     threaten vital interests. But, strategic interests, if well 
     understood and acted upon, can support vital interests.

  Goodby and Weisbrode do us a favor by following the example of others 
in prioritizing our vital national security interests:
  First and vital, homeland defense from threats to well being and way 
of life of the American people. I can't imagine anyone would have any 
quarrel with that.
  Second and strategic, I am talking about peace and stability in 
Europe and northeast Asia and open access to our energy supplies.
  Third, and of lesser interest, although it is of interest, stability 
in South Asia, Latin America, Africa, and open markets favorable to the 
United States and to world prosperity.
  The authors suggest how to accomplish these goals with what they call 
three essential pieces of foreign policy balance:
  First, stability and cohesion in Europe and between the European 
Union and the United States; second, mature and effective relations 
among China, Russia, and the West to include first among all others, a 
regular forum to oversee the reduction of the risk of nuclear weapons; 
and third, systematic patterns of consultation and policy coordination 
of the States benefiting from the global economy and positive relations 
between those States and the developing world.
  The authors also suggest the means to their ends by looking ahead and 
stressing the need for eventual NATO and Russian cooperation and 
stability, the need for a similar organization and effort between the 
United States and China, Japan, Russia, and Korea, and lastly, American 
support for the United Nations.
  In a self-acknowledged understatement, they state this is going to be 
a hard and tedious task. This is not easy. But it is absolutely 
necessary.
  Now, Mr. Goodby and Mr. Weisbrode are not critical per se, but they 
issue a warning and this is what we are trying to bring to the 
attention of the Senate. It is central to what Senator Cleland and I 
are trying to accomplish with these foreign policy and national 
security dialogs.

       The public perception and the private reality suggest 
     worrisome disorganization and a certain degree of impatience 
     with a foggy conceptual foreign policy framework. It is time 
     to return to the basic elements of the American role in the 
     world and to raise the public understanding of them.
       American strategic planners and policymakers cannot afford 
     to be arbitrarily selective about where and when to engage 
     U.S. power. This would make our foreign policy aimless and 
     lose the support of the American people.

  They continue:

       We should set out each of America's interests and how they 
     best may be achieved with the cooperation of other powers. 
     However, this cannot take place until the executive and 
     legislative branches of government resurrect the workable 
     partnership in foreign affairs that once existed but exists 
     no more.

  And Senator Cleland, my colleagues, that is why we are here today and 
that is why we are involved in this forum. In my personal view, we are 
starved for meaningful foreign policy and national security dialog 
between the White House and the Congress and within the Congress. The 
stakes are high.
  I recall well the meeting in Senator Cleland's office between Senator 
Cleland, myself, and Senator Snowe, worried about our involvement in 
the Balkans. I had an amendment, we had an amendment; we passed both 
amendments, setting out guidelines that the administration would 
respond, saying that before we spend money in regard to the defense 
appropriations or in the authorization bill, hopefully we can establish 
a better dialog, trying to figure out what our role was in regard to 
our constitutional responsibilities, I say to my good friend, without 
having to come to the floor with appropriations bills and have an 
amendment and say you can't spend the money for this until you explain 
this. That is no way to operate.
  It seems to me we can do a much better job. The stakes are high.
  As Carl Sandberg wrote of Americans: Always there arose enough 
reserves of strength, balances of sanity, portions of wisdom to carry 
the Nation through to a fresh start with ever renewing vitality.
  I hope this dialog and these discussions, all of the priority 
recommendations we have had from experts in the field, will help us 
begin that fresh start. We cannot afford to do otherwise.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a chart that 
outlines and prioritizes the vital national security interests of the 
United States as recommended by the many experts and organizations I 
have discussed earlier in my remarks. This chart was prepared by Maj. 
Scott Kindsvater, an outstanding pilot in the U.S. Air Force and a 
congressional fellow in my office.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

[[Page 5326]]



                                                             DEFINING U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Source                          Vital Interests                        Important Interests                        Other Interests
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
``A National Security Strategy  1. Physical security of our territory    1. Regions where we have sizable         1. Responding to natural and manmade
 for a New Century''; The        and that of our allies. 2. Safety of     economic stake or commitments to         disasters. 2. Promoting human rights
 White House; 1/5/2000.          our citizens. 3. Economic well-being     allies. 2. Protecting global             and seeking to halt gross violations
                                 of our society. 4. Protection of         environment from severe harm. 3.         of those rights. 3. Supporting
                                 critical infrastructures from            Crises with a potential to generate      democratization, adherence to the
                                 paralyzing attack (energy, banking and   substantial and highly destabilizing     rule of law and civilian control of
                                 finance, telecommunications,             refugee flows.                           the military. 4. Promoting
                                 transportation, water systems, and                                                sustainable development and
                                 emergency services).                                                              environmental protection.
``Americans and the World: A    American public's foreign policy         .......................................  ......................................
 Survey at Century's End,''      priorities--1.--Prevent the spread of
 Foreign Policy, Spring 1999.    nuclear weapons. 2. Stop the influx of
                                 illegal drugs into U.S. 3. Protect
                                 American jobs. 4. Combat international
                                 terrorism. 5. Secure adequate energy
                                 supplies.--(American foreign policy
                                 leadership priorities)--1. Prevent the
                                 spread of nuclear weapons. 2. Combat
                                 international terrorism. 3. Defend the
                                 security of U.S. allies. 4. Maintain
                                 superior military power worldwide. 5.
                                 Fight world hunger.
``America's National            1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the        (Extremely Important)--1. Prevent,       Just Important--1. Discourage massive
 Interests,'' Commission on      threat of nuclear, biological, and       deter, and reduce the threat of the      human rights violations in foreign
 America's National Interests;   chemical (NBC) weapons attacks on the    use of nuclear or biological weapons     countries as a matter of official
 7/1996.                         United States. 2. Prevent the            anywhere. 2. Prevent the regional        government policy. 2. Promote
                                 emergence of a hostile hegemon in        proliferation of NBC weapons and         pluralism, freedom, and democracy in
                                 Europe or Asia. 3. Prevent the           delivery systems. 3. Promote the         strategically important states as
                                 emergence of a hostile major power on    acceptance of international rules of     much as feasible without
                                 U.S. borders or in control of the        law and mechanisms for resolving         destabilization. 3. Prevent and, if
                                 seas. 4. Prevent the catastrophic        disputes peacefully. 4. Prevent the      possible at low cost, end conflicts
                                 collapse of major global systems:        emergence of a regional hegemon in       in strategically insignificant
                                 trade, financial markets, supplies of    important regions, such as the Persian   geographic regions. 4. Protect the
                                 energy, and environmental. 5. Ensure     Gulf. 5. Protect U.S. friends and        lives and well-being of American
                                 the survival of US allies.               allies from significant external         citizens who are targeted or taken
                                                                          aggression. 6. Prevent the emergence     hostage by terrorist organizations.
                                                                          of a reflexively adversarial major       5. Boost the domestic output of key
                                                                          power in Europe or Asia. 7. Prevent      strategic industries and sectors
                                                                          and, if possible at reasonable cost,     (where market imperfections may make
                                                                          end major conflicts in important         a deliberate industrial policy
                                                                          geographic regions. 8. Maintain a lead   rational). 6. Prevent the
                                                                          in key military-related and other        nationalization of U.S.-owned assets
                                                                          strategic technologies (including        abroad. 7. Maintain an edge in the
                                                                          information and computers). 9. Prevent   international distribution of
                                                                          massive, uncontrolled immigration        information to ensure that American
                                                                          across U.S. borders. 10. Suppress,       values continue to positively
                                                                          contain, and combat terrorism,           influence the cultures of foreign
                                                                          transnational crime, and drugs. 11       nations. 9. Reduce the U.S. illegal
                                                                          Prevent genocide.                        alien and drug problems. 10. Maximize
                                                                                                                   U.S. GNP growth from international
                                                                                                                   trade and investment.
``Adapting to U.S. Defence to   A-List: Potential future problems that   B-List: Actual threat to vital U.S.      C-List Important problems that do not
 Future Needs,'' Ashton B.       could threaten U.S. survival, way of     interests; deterrable through ready      threaten vital U.S. interests--1.
 Carter, Survival, Winter 1999-  life and position in the world;          forces--1. Major-Theater War in NE       Kosovo. 2. Bosnia. 3. East Timor. 3.
 2000.                           possibly preventable--1. Danger that     Asia. 2. Major Theater War in            Rwanda. 4. Somalia. 5. Haiti.
                                 Russia might descend into chaos,         Southwest Asia.
                                 isolation and aggression. 2. Danger
                                 that Russia and the other Soviet
                                 successor states might lose control of
                                 the nuclear, chemical and biological
                                 weapons legacy of the former Soviet
                                 Union. 3. Danger that, as China
                                 emerges, it could spawn hostility
                                 rather than becoming cooperatively
                                 engaged in the international system.
                                 4. Danger that weapons of mass
                                 destruction (WMD) will proliferate and
                                 present a direct military threat to
                                 U.S. forces and territory.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hutchinson). The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I cannot express strongly enough what an 
honor it is to be on the floor of the Senate and listen to my 
distinguished colleague talk about the need for a meaningful dialog on 
a subject that often gets put down at the bottom of the list when it 
comes to public issues. I am reminded of a line from one of 
Wellington's troops after the battle at Waterloo, after the battle was 
won, that in time of war, and not before, God of the soldier, men 
adore; but in time of peace, with all things righted, God is forgotten 
and the soldier slighted.
  Unfortunately, I think my dear colleague, Senator Pat Roberts, and I 
have sensed that the vital interests of the United States, the 
interests that cause us to go to war, the interests that compel us to 
fight for our vital national interests, these basic fundamental 
principles have been lost in the shuffle. Somehow they have been 
slighted and somehow the issue of foreign policy and defense has been 
shoved to the background. We have lost sight of the basis of who we are 
and what we are about as we go into the 21st century, which is why we 
have tried through this dialog to call attention to this issue.
  We have some wonderful colleagues joining in our dialog, including my 
fellow Vietnam veteran, Senator Kerrey, and Senator Hagel, as well as 
Senator Hutchinson and Senator Kyl.
  For a few weeks, I wondered whether I was a little bit out of touch 
and wondered whether or not this dialog on American foreign policy and 
global reach was something that was out of touch with what was going on 
in the world. I went back home the last few days and in my own hometown 
paper in Atlanta I came across an article, a New York Times piece, 
Anti-Americanism Growing Across Europe.
  Hello. Good morning. I realized that what I was seeing in a daily 
newspaper was what I was attempting to engage here in terms of a 
perspective on our global reach, a sense that we were overcommitted in 
the world and yet underfunded, a sense of mismatch between our ends and 
our means to achieve those ends. I realized we really were on target.
  In my State, we say that even a blind hog can root up an acorn every 
now and then. I think my distinguished colleague and I from Kansas have 
rooted up an acorn.
  We are on to something. That is a reason why I am strengthened in 
pursuing this dialog, and I am delighted we will have additional 
Senators entering into this dialog because unless we ourselves begin to 
define who we are as a nation, what we want out of our role as a 
nation, and where we want to go and how we exercise our power, unless 
we decide it, it will occur by happenstance. We will move from crisis 
to crisis. We will not have a plan and we will end up in places in the 
world where we know not of what we speak.
  One of the quotes I have come across, one of the lines that continues 
to reinforce my view of my own concern and caution about America's 
expanded role in the world, is from our first dialog back in February 
when Owen Harries, editor of the National Interests, summed up his 
views on the appropriate approach for the United States in today's 
world with the following comments: I advocate restraint because every 
dominant power in the last four centuries that has not practiced it, 
that has been excessively intrusive and demanding, has ultimately been 
confronted by a hostile coalition of other powers. Americans may 
believe that their country, being exceptional, need have no worries in 
this respect. I do not agree. It is not what Americans think of the 
United States but what others think of it that will decide the matter. 
Anti-Americanism is growing across Europe. The distinguished Senator 
from Kansas has accumulated, in a shocking way, some headlines from 40 
or 50 newspapers among our allies and our friends, questioning our 
role, particularly in the Balkans, but questioning our exercise of 
power, as it were.
  The foreign perspective is not one to which we generally devote much 
attention in the Congress, certainly after the cold war is over, but 
our attention to foreign affairs has been slight. We do not really 
devote much attention to foreign affairs and consideration of our 
foreign policy options unless we are threatened.
  I am delighted Senator Roberts is sitting as the chairman of the 
Emerging Threats Subcommittee in the Armed Services Committee. He has 
his eye on the ball, certainly an emerging ball in terms of threats to 
our country. I think the overall threat is that we do not realize one 
could occur now that the cold war is over.
  I think, also, one of the emerging threats, from my point of view, is 
that

[[Page 5327]]

we will overcommit and overexpand and overreact and, instead of being 
only a superpower working with others and sharing power, we will wind 
up imposing--by default, almost, in the power vacuums around the 
world--a pax Americana that cannot be sustained by the will of the 
people in this country--again, a mismatch between means and ends.
  But it is important, as Mr. Harries suggests, to focus on this issue.
  I have spent some time, over recent months, as has the distinguished 
Senator from Kansas, reviewing what foreign opinion makers and leaders 
are saying about the United States. While we may think, as I do, that 
our country has not made a clear choice about our global role, the view 
from abroad is very different. Many people think we have chosen the 
path we are now on.
  A Ukrainian commentator, in the Kiev newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli, wrote 
in April of last year:

       Currently, two opinions are possible in the world-- the 
     U.S. opinion and the wrong opinion. . . .

  He said the U.S.

       . . . has announced its readiness to act as it thinks best, 
     should U.S. interests require this, despite the United 
     Nations. And let those whose interests are violated think 
     about it and draw conclusions. This is the current world 
     order or world disorder.

  That, from Kiev.
  The influential Times of India editorialized in July of last year:

       New Delhi should not lose sight of the kind of global order 
     the U.S. is fashioning. NATO's policies towards Yugoslavia 
     and the U.S.-led military alliance's new Strategic Concept 
     are based on the degradation of international law and a more 
     muscular approach to intervention. Such a trend is certainly 
     not in India's interest.

  So India has concluded: Why don't we go it alone? Why don't we 
develop ourselves as a nuclear power?
  The President of Brazil was quoted on April 22 of last year in an 
interview with a Sao Paulo newspaper as to his views about the United 
States: While President Cardoso was generally sympathetic to the United 
States and supportive of good bilateral relations between our two 
countries, the President of Brazil nonetheless expressed certain 
misgivings about our approach to international relations.
  He said:

       The United States currently constitutes the only large 
     center of political, economic, technologic, and even cultural 
     power. This country has everything to exert its domain on the 
     rest of the world, but it must share it. There must be rules, 
     even for the stronger ones. When the strongest one makes 
     decisions without listening, everything becomes a bit more 
     difficult. In this European war, NATO made the decision, but 
     who legalized it? That's the main problem. I am convinced 
     more than ever that we need a new political order in the 
     world.

  I think I am correct that Jack Kennedy once indicated we would seek a 
world where the strong are just and the weak preserved. Because we are 
strong now, I think we have to have an inordinate sense of being just. 
But these are all voices from countries that have not traditionally 
been close to the United States. Let's look, then, at some of our NATO 
allies, nations with whom we presumably share the closest relationships 
and common interests.
  In a commentary from February of last year in Berlin's Die 
Tageszeitung, a German writer observes:

       There is a growing number of people with more and more 
     prominent protagonists who are at odds with American 
     supremacy and who are inclined to see the action of the State 
     Department as a policy of interests. And Washington is 
     offering no reason to deny the justification of these 
     reservations. As unilateral as possible and as multilateral 
     as necessary--that's the explicit maxim under which U.S. 
     President Bill Clinton has pursued his foreign and defense 
     policies in the last 2 years.

  From Italy, an Italian general expressed the following view in the 
December 1999 edition of the Italian geopolitical quarterly LiMes:

       The condition all the NATO countries as a whole find 
     themselves in is closer to the condition of vassalage with 
     respect to the United States than it is to the condition of 
     alliance. NATO is not able to influence the policy of the 
     United States because its existence in effect depends on it. 
     No member countries are able to resist the American pressures 
     because their own resources are officially at the disposal of 
     everybody and not just the United States.

  What evidence do our foreign friends cite for such concerns? The 
influential left-of-center Dutch daily NRC Handelsblad wrote last 
October:

       The U.S. Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
     Treaty does not just represent a heavy defeat for President 
     Clinton. Far more important are the consequences for world 
     order of treaties designed to stop the proliferation of 
     weapons of mass destruction and hence boost world security. . 
     . .

  According to this newspaper in the Netherlands:

       Unfortunately, the decision fits in with a growing tendency 
     on the part of U.S. foreign policy to place greater emphasis 
     on the United States' own room for maneuver and less on 
     international cooperation and traditional idealism.

  In a similar vein, the Times of London carried a commentary last 
November. It said:

       The real fear is of an American retreat, not to 
     isolationism, but to unilateralism, exacerbated at present by 
     the post-impeachment weakness of President Clinton and his 
     standoff with the Republican Congress. That's shown by the 
     Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the 
     stalling of free trade initiatives, and the refusal to pay 
     arrears to the United Nations. The U.S. is seen as wayward 
     and inward-looking.

  While there are some exceptions, the majority of statements I looked 
at expressed the view the United States has indeed made the conscious 
decision to use our current position of predominance to pursue 
unilateralist foreign and national security policy.
  When I first came to Washington 30-some-odd years ago as a young 
intern, I found out there could not be a conspiracy here. We are not 
that well organized. There cannot be a unilateralist conspiracy in the 
world by the United States--we are not that well organized. What has 
evolved is a sense in which we have moved from crisis to crisis and 
looked at power vacuums and said, ``We need to be there.''
  I like the notion that General Shelton has about the use of American 
military power. He says:

       We've got a great hammer, but not every problem in the 
     world is a nail.

  I do like President Kennedy's insight, too, that there is not 
necessarily an American solution for every problem in the world.
  Yet we act as if there is. If one looks at the outcomes of recent 
American foreign policy debates, it is easy to see how those viewing us 
from a distance might come to such a conclusion. Since I have come to 
the Senate, the U.S. Government through the combined efforts of the 
executive and the legislative branches--what are, relatively speaking, 
nondiscussions, I might add--has made the following decisions: Withheld 
support from the international landmines treaty; rejected jurisdiction 
by the new international criminal court; been slow to pay off long 
overdue arrears to the United Nations; rejected the current 
applicability of international emissions standards set at Kyoto; 
rejected fast-track international trade negotiating authority for the 
President; rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, apparently 
committed to a national missile defense system which will violate the 
ABM Treaty; and established a principle of ``humanitarian 
intervention'' where national sovereignty can be violated without 
United Nations sanction under certain circumstances.
  My purpose here is not to argue for or against any of these 
individual positions; for, indeed, I have supported some of them as, 
indeed, have virtually every Member of the Congress and the 
administration. But, as far as I know, not one of us has supported them 
all.
  If the Republican congressional majority has been largely responsible 
for the actions rejecting multilateral commitments and entanglements in 
the national security sphere, it is my party, the Democrats, who has 
taken the lead in opposing international trade obligations, and the 
Democratic administration which has espoused the cause of humanitarian 
interventions in violation of national sovereignty. In short, the sum 
total of our actions has been far more unilateral than any of us would 
have intended or carved out for ourselves.
  This is relatively incoherent, and I can see why other nations might 
view us as more organized than we are.
  It is also very damaging to our national interest and is one of the 
major

[[Page 5328]]

motives for our efforts to promote this development of a bipartisan 
consensus through these floor debates. We have to get back to some 
basic understanding of who we are and what we are doing in the world.
  As was discussed in our first dialog, there are certainly some 
leading voices among America's foreign policy thinkers who do, indeed, 
advocate a unilateralist course for America in the post-cold-war era, 
but not even that group actually believes we have actually embarked 
upon that course. Very few believe we are willing to invest sufficient 
resources today to even pursue the somewhat less demanding 
multilateralist approach which seems to have more support among our 
foreign policy establishment.
  The direct danger to America from this mismatch between means and 
ends, between our commitments and our forces, between our aspirations 
and our willingness to pay to achieve them is one of the central 
concerns for our discussion today and one I will turn to later. 
However, I want to conclude these opening remarks with an observation 
about indirect consequences of this situation with respect to the 
credibility of American foreign policy abroad.
  The chief of the research department of the Japanese Defense Agency's 
National Institute for Defense Studies wrote in March of last year:

       (O)pinion surveys in the United States show that people are 
     inclined to think that the United States should bear as 
     little burdens as possible even though the country should 
     remain the leader in the world. This thinking that the United 
     States should be the world's leader but should not bear too 
     much financial burden may be contradictory in context, but is 
     popular among Americans. This serves as a warning to the 
     international community that the United States might get at 
     first involved in some international operations but run away 
     later in the middle of the operations, leaving things 
     unfinished.

  Because we do not have a comprehensive strategy, because we do not 
talk to each other enough, because we do not have a proper dialog, 
particularly in this body, and because we move from crisis to crisis in 
our foreign policy and come up with different solutions for different 
situations without a clear understanding of who we are and where we are 
going, we are sending a mixed message to even our best friends.
  To me, the case is clear: If we are to avoid misunderstandings at 
home and abroad, if we are to prevent unwanted and unintended 
conclusions and consequences, as the distinguished Senator from Kansas 
mentioned, about our objectives, we have to pull together and forge a 
coherent, bipartisan consensus to guide our country in the uncertain 
waters of the 21st century. Those who came before us and built this 
country into the grand land it is today, and those who will inherit it 
from us in the years ahead deserve no less.
  I am honored to yield to the distinguished Senator from Kansas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Parliamentary inquiry: I believe I have 1 hour reserved 
in morning business and that the distinguished Senator from Georgia has 
1 hour; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 hours under the control of both 
Senators.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I inform my colleagues that Senator Hutchison of Texas 
and Senator Hagel will be taking part, and I think perhaps Senator 
Kerrey will be coming to the floor. Senator Hagel will be arriving in 
about 9 minutes. If my distinguished colleague wants to summarize any 
other comments or perhaps go over the Commission on America's National 
Interests, I think now is the time to do so, if he is prepared to do 
that.
  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I want to add some additional comments, 
if that is all right with my distinguished colleague.
  Earlier, I spoke about the mismatch between the goals of American 
foreign policy and the means we employ in achieving them. Whether one 
espouses a unilateralist or multilateralist approach, or something in 
between, most of those with a strong interest in American foreign 
policy have major goals for that policy, whether in preventing the 
emergence of global rivals or in promoting the spread of democracy, 
whether in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction or in 
protecting human rights. Yet today we devote a little over 1 percent of 
the Federal budget for international affairs, compared to over 5 
percent in 1962 in the middle of the cold war.
  Of particular concern to me as a member of the Armed Services 
Committee, since the 1980s we have gone from providing roughly 25 
percent of the budget for national defense to 18 percent today. We have 
reduced the active-duty armed forces by over one-third but have 
increased overseas deployments by more than 300 percent. I have often 
said we have, as a country, both feet firmly planted on a banana peel. 
We are going in opposite directions. That cannot last. We have a 
mismatch between our commitments and our willingness to live up to 
those commitments. We are sending a mixed message abroad.
  What is the result of all of this? Newspapers reported that last 
November, for the first time in a number of years, the U.S. Army rated 
2 of its 10 divisions as unprepared for war. Why were they unprepared 
for war? Because they were bogged down in the Balkans. That was never 
part of the deal going into the Balkans, that an entire U.S. Army 
division would be there for an indefinite period of time. No wonder 
these other two divisions were unprepared for war because they had 
elements in the Balkans doing something else--not fighting a war, but 
peacekeeping missions.
  The services continue to struggle in meeting both retention and 
recruiting goals, and the service members and their families with whom 
I meet and who are on the front lines in carrying out the policies 
decided in Washington are showing the visible strains of this mismatch 
between our commitments and our resources. They deserve better from us.
  I hope other Senators had an opportunity to watch Senator Roberts' 
discussion of our national interests during our February 24 dialog. If 
not, I commend my colleagues' attention to those remarks as printed in 
the Congressional Record of that date.
  In brief, he stated the opinion, which I share, that in the post-
cold-war world, our country has had a hard time in prioritizing our 
national interests, leading to confusion and inconsistency. He went on 
to cite the July 1996 report by the Commission on America's National 
Interests, of which he was a member, along with our colleagues Senators 
John McCain and Bob Graham and my distinguished predecessor, Sam Nunn.
  Of particular relevance to our topic today of defining and defending 
our national interests, the Commission found:

       For the decades ahead, the only sound foundation for a 
     coherent, sustainable American foreign policy is a clear 
     public sense of American national interests. Only a national-
     interest-based foreign policy will provide priorities for 
     American engagement in the world. Only a foreign policy 
     grounded in American national interests will allow America's 
     leaders to explain persuasively how and why specific 
     expenditures of American treasure or blood deserve support 
     from America's citizens.

  As my colleagues will note from the charts I have, the Commission 
went on to divide our national interests into four categories. They 
defined ``vital interests'' as those:

       Strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance the well-being 
     of Americans in a free and secure nation.

  And as Senator Roberts has discussed, and you can see on the chart, 
they found only five items which reached that high standard.
  In addition to attempting to identify our national interests, the 
commission also addressed the key issue of what we should be prepared 
to do to defend those interests:

       For ``vital'' national interests, the United States should 
     be prepared to commit itself to fight, even if it has to do 
     so unilaterally and without the assistance of allies.

  But there is a lower priority than that.
  Next in priority come ``extremely important interests''--these are 
not vital; but they are extremely important--defined as those which:

       . . . would severely prejudice but not strictly imperil the 
     ability of the U.S. Government to safeguard and enhance the 
     well-

[[Page 5329]]

     being of Americans in a free and secure nation--

  And for which:

     the United States should be prepared to commit forces to meet 
     threats and to lead a coalition of forces, but only in 
     conjunction with a coalition or allies whose vital interests 
     are threatened.

  Next, third, we have another set of interests. These are called 
``just important interests.'' They are not vital, not necessary. These 
are important, which would have major negative consequences:

       The United States should be prepared to participate 
     militarily, on a case-by-case basis, but only if the costs 
     are low or others carry the lion's share of the burden.

  Finally, last, comes the most numerous but lowest priority category 
of ``less important or secondary interests,'' which:

       Are intrinsically desirable but that have no major effect 
     on the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and 
     enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure 
     nation.

  My colleagues in the Senate, this is exactly the kind of exercise--of 
defining and differentiating our national interests, and of gauging the 
proper kind and level of response for protecting such interests--that 
we need to be engaging in if we are to bring coherence and 
effectiveness to our post-cold war foreign and national security 
policy. Everything is not the most important thing to do. Everything is 
not necessarily in America's vital interest to do. It is, in my 
judgment, what we must do in considering our policies, particularly 
toward the Balkans and now with a plan in Colombia to involve ourselves 
in a war against narcotraffickers in Colombia. We need to do several 
things. We need to ask ourselves: How vital are our interests in those 
areas? And what are we willing to pay to protect those interests?
  What about the role of other countries, who, for reasons of history 
and geography, may have even greater national interests at stake?
  Senator Roberts pointed out back in February the similarities between 
the Commission on America's National Interests list of ``vital'' 
interests and related compilations by other groups and individuals. I 
believe, for example, that the commission's definitions of ``vital'' 
and ``extremely important'' national interests are quite compatible 
with the relevant portions of the January 2000 White House ``National 
Security Strategy for a New Century.'' The conflicts will lie in 
applying these general principles to specific cases. That is what 
Senator Roberts and I intend to do with the remaining sessions of these 
global role dialogs, including such applications as the role of our 
alliances and the decision on when and how to intervene militarily.
  However, from my perspective, though we may have some implicit common 
ground as to our most important national interests and what we should 
be prepared to do in defending them, in the real world where actions 
must count for more than words and where capabilities will inevitably 
be given greater weight than intentions, the picture we too often give 
to the world--of unilateralist means and narrowly self-interested 
ends--and to our own citizens--of seemingly limitless aspirations but 
quite limited resources we are willing to expend in achieving them--is 
surely not what we should be doing.
  Samuel P. Huntington writes in the March/April edition of Foreign 
Affairs:

       Neither the Clinton administration nor Congress nor the 
     public is willing to pay the costs and accept the risks of 
     unilateral global leadership. Some advocates of American 
     global leadership argue for increasing defense expenditures 
     by 50 percent, but that is a nonstarter. The American public 
     clearly sees no need to expend effort and resources to 
     achieve American hegemony. In one 1997 poll, only 13 percent 
     said they preferred a preeminent role for the United States 
     in world affairs, while 74 percent said they wanted the 
     United States to share power with other countries. Other 
     polls have produced similar results. Public disinterest in 
     international affairs is pervasive, abetted by the 
     drastically shrinking media coverage of foreign events. 
     Majorities of 55 to 66 percent of the public say that what 
     happens in western Europe, Asia, Mexico, and Canada has 
     little or no impact on their lives. However much foreign 
     policy elites may ignore or deplore it, the United States 
     lacks the domestic political base to create a unipolar world. 
     American leaders repeatedly make threats, promise action, and 
     fail to deliver. The result is a foreign policy of ``rhetoric 
     and retreat'' and a growing reputation as a ``hollow 
     hegemon.''

  One of my favorite authors on war and theorists on war, Clausewitz, 
put it this way:

       Since in war too small an effort can result not just in 
     failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo 
     the other, which sets up an interaction. Such an interaction 
     could lead to a maximum effort if a maximum effort could be 
     defined. But in that case, all proportion between action and 
     political demands would be lost: means would cease to be 
     commensurate with ends, and in most cases a policy of maximum 
     exertion would fail because of the domestic problems it would 
     raise.

  I think we are maximally committed around the world. I think we have 
to review these commitments because I am not quite sure we have the 
domestic will to follow through on them or the budgets to take care of 
them. We do not want to risk failure.
  Once again, I thank all of the Senators who have joined in today's 
discussion. I have benefitted from their comments, and encourage all of 
our colleagues of whatever party and of whatever views on the proper 
U.S. global role to join in this effort to bring greater clarity and 
greater consensus to our national security policies through these 
dialogs. Our next session will be on the role of multilateral 
organizations, including NATO and the United Nations, and is scheduled 
to occur just after the Easter break.
  During the Easter break I intend to go visit our allies and friends 
in NATO, in Belgium, to go to Aviano to get a background briefing on 
how the air war in the Balkans was conducted, to go on to Macedonia and 
into Kosovo itself to see our forces there. That would be over the 
Easter break. I will go back through London to get a briefing from our 
closest ally, our British friends.
  I hope to come back to the Senate in a few weeks with a more 
insightful view of what we should do, particularly in that part of the 
world, regarding our responsibilities.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. First, again, I thank my good friend, the distinguished 
Senator from Georgia, for this continued initiative and his leadership 
in what we think is a bipartisan foreign policy dialog. I hope it is 
successful.
  We said back in February during our first discussion that our 
objective was to try to achieve greater attention, focus, and mutual 
understanding--not to mention a healthy dose of responsibility--in this 
body in regard to our global role.
  I repeat again, in chapter 10 of the Senator's book that he has 
provided to every Senator, with a marvelous introduction by our 
Chaplain, the Senator stated that success is a team effort, that coming 
together is a beginning, keeping together is progress, and working 
together is success. That is a pretty good motto for our efforts today, 
as well as a recipe for our foreign policy goals.
  I am very privileged to yield 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator 
from Nebraska, Mr. Hagel. He is a recognized expert in the field of 
international affairs, and more especially, a strong backer of free 
trade. I seek his advice and counsel often on the very matters that we 
are talking about.
  I am delighted he has joined us. I yield 15 minutes to the 
distinguished Senator and my friend.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, first, let me acknowledge the leadership of 
my colleagues from Georgia and Kansas for bringing attention and focus 
to an area that does not often get appropriate focus. It is about 
international affairs--the connecting rods to our lives in a world now 
that is, in fact, globally connected.
  That global community is underpinned by a global economy. There is 
not a dynamic of the world today, not an action taken nor a consequence 
of that action, that does not affect America, that does not affect our 
future. I am grateful that Senators Cleland and Roberts have taken the 
time and the

[[Page 5330]]

leadership to focus on an area of such importance to our country.
  I point out an op-ed piece that appeared in Monday's Washington Post, 
written by Robert Kagan, and I ask unanimous consent that the article 
be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Apr. 10, 2000]

                       A World of Problems . . .

                           (By Robert Kagan)

       Call me crazy, but I think it actually would serve the 
     national interest if George W. Bush spent more time talking 
     about foreign policy in this campaign. Not to slight the 
     importance of his statements on the environment and the 
     census. But perhaps Bush and his advisers can find time to 
     pose a simple, Reaganesque question: Is the world a safer 
     place than it was eight years ago?
       A hundred bucks says even James Carville can't answer that 
     question in the affirmative--at least not with a straight 
     face. A brief tour d'horizon shows why.


                                  iraq

       As the administration enters its final months, Saddam 
     Hussein is alive and well and Baghdad, pursuing his quest for 
     weapons of mass destruction, free from outside inspection and 
     getting wealthier by the day through oil sales while the 
     sanctions regime against him crumbles. The next president may 
     see his term dominated by the specter of Saddam Redux.


                              the balkans

       You can debate whether things are getting better in Bosnia, 
     or whether Kosovo is on its way to recovery or to disaster. 
     And Clinton deserves credit for intervening in both crises. 
     But Slobodan Milosevic is still in power in Belgrade, still 
     stirring the pot in Kosovo and is on the verge of starting 
     his fifth Balkan war in Montenegro. Milosevic was George Bush 
     Sr.'s gift to Bill Clinton; he will be Clinton's gift to Al 
     Gore or George Jr.


                              china-taiwan

       Even Sinologists sympathetic to the Clinton 
     administration's policies think the odds of military conflict 
     across the Taiwan Strait have increased dramatically. 
     Meanwhile, the administration's own State Department 
     acknowledges the steady deterioration of Beijing's human 
     rights record. Good luck to Al Gore if he tries to call China 
     policy a success.


                         weapons proliferation

       Two years after India and Pakistan exploded nuclear 
     devices, their struggle over Kashmir remains the likeliest 
     spark for the 21st century's first nuclear confrontation. If 
     this is the signal failure of the Clinton administration's 
     nonproliferation policies, North Korea's and Iran's weapons 
     programs come in a close second and third. Even the 
     administration's intelligence experts admit that the threat 
     to the United States has grown much faster than Clinton and 
     Gore anticipated. And where is the missile defense system to 
     protect Americans in this frightening new era?


                           haiti and colombia

       After nobly intervening in Haiti to restore a 
     democratically elected president in 1994, the administration 
     has frittered away the past 5\1/2\ years. Political 
     assassinations in Haiti are rife. Prospects for stability are 
     bleak. Meanwhile, the war in Colombia rages, and even a 
     billion-dollar aid program may not prevent a victory by 
     narco-guerrillas. When the next president has to send troops 
     to fight in Colombia or to restore order in Haiti, again, 
     he'll know whom to thank.


                                 russia

       Even optimists don't deny that the election of Vladimir 
     Putin could be an ominous development. The devastation in 
     Chechnya has revealed the new regime's penchant for 
     brutality.
       Add to all this the decline of the armed forces--even the 
     Joint Chiefs complain that the defense budget is tens of 
     billions of dollars short--and you come up with a story of 
     failure and neglect. Sure, there have been some successes: 
     NATO expansion and, maybe, a peace deal in Northern Ireland. 
     Before November, Clinton could pull a rabbit out of the hat 
     in the Middle East. But Jimmy Carter had successes, too. They 
     did not save him from being painted as an ineffectual world 
     leader in the 1980 campaign.
       Bush maybe gun-shy about playing up foreign policy after 
     tussling with John McCain in the primaries. But Gore is no 
     McCain. He is nimble on health care and education, but he is 
     clumsy on foreign policy. Bush may not be a foreign policy 
     maven, but he's got some facts on his side, as well as some 
     heavy hitters. Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, Goerge Shultz and 
     Richard Lugar, instead of whispering in W.'s ear, could get 
     out in public and help build the case. John McCain could 
     pitch in, too.
       The offensive can't start soon enough. The administration 
     has been adept at keeping the American people in a complacent 
     torpor: Raising the national consciousness about the sorry 
     state of the world will take time. And if Bush simply waits 
     for the next crisis before speaking out, he will look like a 
     drive-by shooter. Bush also would do himself, his party and 
     the country a favor if he stopped talking about pulling U.S. 
     troops out of the Balkans and elsewhere. Aside from such talk 
     being music to Milosevic's ears, Republicans in Congress have 
     been singing that neo-isolationist tune for years, and the 
     only result has been to make Clinton and Gore look like Harry 
     Truman and Dean Acheson.
       Some may say it's inappropriate to ``politicize'' foreign 
     policy. Please. Americans haven't witnessed a serious 
     presidential debate about foreign policy since the end of the 
     Cold War. Bush would do everyone a service by starting such a 
     debate now. He might even do himself some good. Foreign 
     policy won't be the biggest issue in the campaign, but in a 
     tight race, if someone bothers to wake the people up to the 
     world's growing dangers, they might actually decide that they 
     care.

  Mr. HAGEL. Mr. Kagan is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace. He echoes what Senators Roberts and Cleland 
have talked about; that is, the vital interests of our country in world 
affairs. He suggests that America's two Presidential candidates this 
year, Governor Bush and Vice President Gore, focus attention in the 
remaining months of this Presidential campaign on international issues. 
He lays out a number of areas in the world that are of vital 
consequence and concern to not only those particular regions but to the 
United States.
  The point is, others are coming to the same conclusions and 
realizations as our friends from Georgia and Kansas: that international 
relations is the completeness of all of our policies--trade, national 
security, economy, geopolitics. It is, in fact, a complete policy.
  We are living in a most unique time in history, a time when 
everything is possible. We live in a time when we can do more good for 
mankind than ever in the history of the world. Why is that? It deserves 
some perspective and some review.
  Over the last 50 years, it has been the multilateral organizations of 
the world, beginning with the visionary and foresighted leadership of 
Harry Truman after World War II and a Republican Congress, working 
jointly to develop and implement multilateral policies and 
organizations such as the United Nations, such as what was born at 
Breton Woods, the IMF, the World Bank, trade organizations, 
multilateral peace, financial organizations--all are imperfect, all are 
flawed. But in the real world, as most of us understand, the choice is 
seldom between all good, the easy choice, and all bad. Normally our 
foreign policy and every dynamic of that foreign policy, be it foreign 
aid, be it national security interests, be it geopolitical interests, 
falls somewhere between all good and all bad. It is a difficult 
position to have to work our way through.
  With this weekend's upcoming annual meetings for the IMF and the 
World Bank and the number of guests who will be coming to Washington--I 
suspect not exactly to celebrate the IMF and the World Bank and the 
World Trade Organization and other multilateral organizations--it is 
important that we bring some perspective to the question that fits very 
well into the larger question Senators Roberts and Cleland have asked; 
that is, is the world better off with a World Trade Organization, with 
a world trade regime, its focus being to open up markets, break down 
barriers, allow all nations to prosper? And how do they prosper? They 
prosper through free trade. Underpinning the free trade is individual 
liberty, individual freedom, emerging democracies, emerging markets.
  We could scrap the World Trade Organization, 135 nations, and go back 
to a time, pre-World War II, that essentially resulted in two world 
wars, where there would be no trading regime. Those countries that are 
now locked in poverty have to go it on their own. That is too bad. We 
can scrap the World Trade Organization. While we are at it, have the 
IMF and the World Bank added to any prosperity in the world? Have they 
made mistakes? Yes.
  Let's examine some of the underlying and most critical and realistic 
dynamics of instability in the world. We do know that when there is 
instability, there is no prosperity and there is no peace. What causes 
instability?

[[Page 5331]]

  Let's examine what it is that causes instability. When you have 
nations trapped in the cycle of hopelessness and the perpetuation of 
that cycle because of no hope, no future, poverty, hunger, pestilence, 
what do we think is going to happen? History is rather complete in 
instructing us on this point: conflict and war. When there is conflict 
and war, is there an opportunity to advance the causes of mankind? No. 
Why is that? Let's start with no trading. There are no markets. Do we 
really believe we can influence the behavior of nations with no 
contact, no engagement, no trade? I don't think so.
  As many of our guests who are arriving now in Washington, who will 
parade up and down the streets, burning the effigies of our President 
and the Congress and the World Trade Organization and the IMF and the 
World Bank--and I believe sincerely their motives are pure; that they 
wish to pull up out of abject poverty the more than 1.5 billion people 
in the world today, which is a worthy, noble cause--I think the record 
over the last 50 years is rather complete in how that has been done to 
help other nations over the last 50 years do that a little differently 
than tearing down the multilateral institutions that have added to 
prosperity and a better life and a hope for mankind.
  I will share with this body a couple of facts from the 1999 Freedom 
House survey. Most of us know of the organization called Freedom House. 
It issued its first report in 1978. This is what Freedom House issued 
on December 21, 1999: 85 countries out of 192 nations today are 
considered free. That represents 44 percent of the countries in the 
world today. That is the second largest number of free countries in the 
history of man. That represents 2.34 billion people living in free 
countries with individual liberties, 40 percent of all the people in 
the world. Fifty-nine countries are partly free, 31 percent of the 
countries. That represents 1.5 billion people living in partly free 
countries, 25 percent of the world's population.
  What are the real numbers? Seventy-five percent of the countries, 
largest in the history of mankind, are living in either free or partly 
free countries. Forty-eight countries not free. That represents 25 
percent of the population of the world.
  What does that mean? Let's go back and examine about 100 years ago 
where the world was. At the turn of the century, no country on Earth, 
including the United States, had universal suffrage. Less than 100 
years ago, the United States did not allow women to vote, and there 
were other human rights violations we accepted in this country. My 
point is, the United States must be rather careful not to moralize and 
preach to the rest of the world. Yes, we anchor who we are on the 
foundation of our democracy and equal rights, but it even took America 
250 years to get as far as we have come.
  So we should, if nothing else, at least be mindful of that as we 
dictate to other countries. Now, as we examine a number of the points 
that have been made this morning and will be made throughout the next 
few months about foreign policy, it is important for us to have some 
appreciation and lend some perspective to not only the tremendous 
progress that has been made in the world today, and the hope we have 
for tomorrow, and the ability and the opportunities we have to make the 
world better--and it is fundamentally about productive capacity, 
individual freedoms, trade, free markets, private investment, rule of 
law, rights, contract law, all that America represents, all that three-
fourths of the world countries and population represent. It is 
solutions, creative solutions, for which we are looking.
  Creative solutions will come as a result of imaginative and bold 
leadership. As I have said often when I have been challenged about 
America's role in the world and is America burdening itself with too 
much of a role--incidentally, what should our role be? That is a 
legitimate debate. But I have said this: America has made its mistakes. 
But think of it in this context. If America decides that its burden is 
too heavy, whether that be in the area of contributions to the United 
Nations, to NATO, wherever we are around the world, as an investment, 
we believe in markets, in freedom, in opportunity, in less war, less 
conflict, a future for our children, for whatever reason, if we believe 
we are too far extended--and that is a legitimate question--and we will 
have an ongoing dynamic debate on the issue and we should remind 
ourselves of this--the next great nation on earth--and there will be a 
next great nation if America chooses to recede back into the cold, gray 
darkness of mediocrity--that next great, powerful nation may not be 
quite as judicious and benevolent with its power as America has been 
with our power. That is not the world that I wish my 7-year-old and 9-
year-old children to inherit.
  If there is an additional burden--and there is--for America to carry 
on to be the world's leader, for me, it is not only worthy of the 
objective to continue to help all nations and raise all nations' 
opportunities, but realistically, geopolitically, it is the only answer 
for the kind of world that we want not just for our children but for 
all children of the world.
  So rather than tear down organizations and tear down trade regimes 
and tear down organizations that are focused on making the world 
better, we should ask our friends who are coming to Washington this 
week to give us creative solutions and be part of those creative 
solutions.
  Mr. President, I am grateful for an opportunity to share some 
thoughts and hopefully make a contribution to what my friend from 
Georgia and my friend from Kansas have been about today and earlier in 
our session. This will continue throughout this year because through 
this education and this information and this exchange of thoughts and 
ideas we will fundamentally broaden and deepen the foundation of who we 
are as a free nation and not be afraid of this debate in front of the 
world. It is the debate, the borderless challenges of our time--
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the scourge of our time, 
illegal drugs--that must be confronted and dealt with as a body of all 
nations, all peoples. Understanding and dealing with these fundamental 
challenges and issues are in the common denominator, mutual self-
interest of all peoples.
  Again, I am grateful for their leadership. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. L. Chafee). The Senator from Kansas is 
recognized.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for his 
very valuable contribution and for taking part.
  How much time does the Senator from Texas need? We have approximately 
25 minutes still remaining under morning business.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Up to 15 minutes, or if someone else is scheduled in, 
let me know.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I will soon yield to the Senator from 
Texas. She has been a champion on behalf of our men and women in 
uniform. She is a former member of the Armed Services Committee, now a 
very valued and influential member of the Appropriations Committee. 
These are the folks who have the obligation and responsibility to pay 
for a military that I believe today is stressed, strained, and somewhat 
hollow, unfortunately.
  I think Senator Hutchison, probably more than any other Senator, has 
been very diligent expressing concern and alerting the Senate and the 
Congress and the American people as to our commitments abroad, what is 
in our vital national security interests, and the problems we have 
talked about regarding an overcommitment.
  The Senator has come to me on repeated occasions when proposing 
amendments. Sometimes she has withdrawn them, and other times she has 
proceeded but always prompting a debate on the Senate floor where there 
literally has been none in regard to our military policy and when we 
commit the use of force. She has pointed out, I think in excellent 
fashion, the paradox of the enormous irony that we have in Bosnia where 
we are supporting a partitioned kind of society among three ethnic 
groups, or nationalities; whereas, just to the south, in Kosovo, our

[[Page 5332]]

goal is to somehow promote a multiethnic society where the divisions 
are at least equal to that in Bosnia.
  Senator Hutchison not only comes to the floor and expresses her 
opinion, but her opinion is based on facts and on actually being 
present in the area with which we are concerned. She has been a repeat 
visitor to Bosnia, Kosovo, and every troubled spot I can imagine, 
including Brussels and Russia. She does more than talk to officials. 
Senator Hutchison, when she goes on a co-del, not only talks to the 
briefing folks, but she actually goes out to the people involved and 
talks about their daily lives, their individual freedoms, their 
pocketbooks. She talks to these folks individually and gives us a 
healthy dose of common sense and reality when she is reporting on it. 
We are glad to welcome her to this debate. I yield the Senator 15 
minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the Senators for taking time 
on the Senate floor to discuss an issue which is not before us this 
very minute, but it is something that requires much more thought, much 
more long-term debate in the Senate.
  I commend the leadership of these two distinguished members of the 
Armed Services Committee on a bipartisan basis. Certainly, both have 
served in our military quite honorably, and especially Senator Cleland, 
who has given so much for our country. I say thank you for setting 
aside this time. I look forward to participating on future occasions 
that you are setting aside for discussion of the big picture items.
  I think one of the problems we face today is we haven't truly come to 
grips with what America's role in the world is in the post-cold-war 
era. The issues you are bringing forth are exactly what we should be 
setting out in order to have a policy in the post-cold-war era that 
allows the United States to take its rightful place and do the very 
best job we can for America and for our allies around the world.
  It is an understatement to say that the United States is the world's 
only superpower. In pure military terms, we are a colossus. Our troops 
are in Japan, Korea, throughout Europe, and in the Middle East. We 
guard countless other nations. We keep tyrants in check from Baghdad to 
Pyongyang to Belgrade. No other nation has ever wielded such military 
power.
  Leadership on this scale requires discretion, the confidence to know 
the right course, and the will to pursue it--the confidence to know 
when not to engage but to encourage others to do so.
  True leadership is striking out on a right course of action grounded 
in a central philosophy of advancing the American national interests. 
Simply put, both our allies and our enemies must know what to expect 
from the United States of America. We must always be strong. We must 
rely upon diplomacy to maintain much of our leadership. But when 
diplomacy fails, global leadership may require the use of military 
force.
  When and how should the United States use our military power?
  There was a time when the answer was clear. During the cold war, we 
determined we should only use military force when our vital national 
interests were clearly threatened. In the cold war, there was a clear 
military focus on a threat we could easily identify. We knew that if we 
acted, the Soviets would react. There was a clarity.
  Today, however, because we are the only superpower, we are often 
called upon to act when there is a crisis anywhere in the world. 
Leadership in this instance requires much more discipline than in the 
past.
  In our political system, that discipline comes from the checks and 
balances that have been built into it.
  The only clear authority our Constitution grants to the President in 
committing our forces to conflict is in the role of Commander in Chief 
to deploy troops. But equally clear in the Constitution, Congress alone 
has the power to declare war, to raise and support an Army, and to 
provide for the Navy.
  Our framers couldn't have been more clear on this issue. They did not 
break with the monarchy in England to establish another monarchy in 
America. They feared placing in the hands of the President the sole 
power to commit to war and also implement that war. Yet, especially in 
the last 50 years, Presidents have sent our troops into conflict 
without formal declaration of war that would be required by Congress, 
and not only for emergencies such as repelling sudden attacks that were 
envisioned by our founders.
  Congress is being gradually excluded in its constitutional role in 
foreign policy. The consultation process is broken, and it must be 
fixed.
  In a representative democracy such as ours, elected officials must 
stand up and be counted when the fundamental decisions of war and peace 
are made.
  I believe it is important for Congress to reclaim its deliberate role 
intended by the Constitution. I have proposed limits on the duration 
and size of a force that can be deployed without congressional 
approval. I have proposed that the President be required to identify 
the specific objectives of a mission prior to its approval by Congress.
  Too often operations such as those we have seen in Bosnia, and now 
Kosovo, become open ended with no milestone to measure success, no 
milestone to measure failure, and no exit strategy.
  It is the hallmark of this administration for the United States to go 
into regional crises and displace friendly, local powers who share our 
goal and could act effectively on their own. In Kosovo, we fought and 
sustained an unsustainable government. We are trying to prevent the 
realignment of a region where the great powers have tried and failed 
many times to impose their will on ancient hatred and atrocities.
  In fact, I am interested in working with others to see if we can 
address this issue. We must condition future peacekeeping funds on the 
requirement that the administration reconvene the parties to the Dayton 
peace accords that ended in the Bosnia conflict, and those involved in 
the Rambouillet talks that resulted in Kosovo, and other regional 
interests.
  We must review the progress we have made and begin developing a long-
term settlement based on greater self-determination by the governed and 
less wishful thinking by outside powers. This will probably involve 
tailoring the current borders to fit the facts on the ground. But this 
will create the condition for a genuine stability and reconstruction. 
When we take up further funding of Bosnia and Kosovo, I am not going to 
try to determine the outcome of these talks, but it is essential that 
we reconvene the parties to see where we are. For Heaven's sake, that 
is a modest proposal from the world's only superpower.
  Years ago, President Nixon laid out principles on how our military 
forces should be used overseas. Based upon his principles, I offer the 
following outline for a rational superpower to try to bridge the 
ethical question:
  First, we should acknowledge that bold leadership means war is the 
last resort--not the first. We cannot let our allies and our enemies 
suck us into regional quicksand. This is what happened in Bosnia and 
Kosovo. Our allies refused to act on their own, insisting they could 
not take military action without a commitment of U.S. troops. That was 
not the case. Our European allies have sophisticated military forces. 
We should have been ready with backup assistance with heavy air and sea 
support, intelligence monitoring, supplies, and logistical 
coordination, but they did not need our combat leadership for a 
regional conflict that could be contained by their own superb ground 
forces.
  Second, we should not get involved in civil conflicts that make us a 
party to the conflict. We learned this with tragic consequences in 
Somalia when we got in between warring forces trying to capture one 
warlord. Yes, Serbia has a terrible leader. And it was tempting to 
punish him with our military force. But look who pays the price with 
many innocent civilians in Serbia as well. Often these types of 
missions are ones in which our allies can do a better job because 
oftentimes it takes more money and it is less efficient for American 
troops to do peacekeeping missions.
  When we commit 10,000 troops, it is not 10,000 troops. It is 10,000 
troops on

[[Page 5333]]

the ground and 25,000 troops in the surrounding perimeter to protect 
them. This is because American troops are always the target wherever 
they are, as they were in Somalia and as they have been in Kosovo. You 
are never going to hear me say we should not have the protection force. 
Of course, we are going to have the protection force if our troops are 
involved.
  I have heard it said by many in our military who come home from 
overseas that if there is an incident, it is going to be against us.
  I have heard our military people say if they are walking with other 
groups of military on parade, that people who are wishing to protest 
will let the Turks go by, the French go by, and the Brits go by. They 
wait for the Americans to hurl the epitaphs. We have to have a 
protection force. But that is not the case for many of our allies.
  Third, why not help those who are willing to fight for their own 
freedom? The administration seems to see no option between doing 
nothing and bombing someone into the stone age. There are, too often, 
other options. These options that we ignore, and sometimes even oppose, 
include local forces willing to fight for their own freedom.
  In Bosnia, for example, since 1991, we have maintained an arms 
embargo on the Muslim forces who wanted, and begged, to be able to 
fight for themselves. I met with them many times. I have been to Bosnia 
and that region seven times. I am going again next week. I am going to 
have Easter services with the great 49th Division, the reserve unit 
that is in control of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. Congress 
voted to lift the arms embargo and allow the Muslims to have arms to 
defend themselves, but the administration opposed it. For 3 years the 
Muslims and Croats were routed because they could not fight. They 
didn't have the arms. But the Croats got the arms, they ignored the 
arms embargo, and they fought back. When they did, President Milosevic 
cut a deal.
  I think we need to look at the option of helping people who are 
willing to help themselves rather than keep a fight artificially 
unfair.
  Fourth, we should not even threaten the use of troops except under 
clear policies. One clear policy should be if the security of the 
United States is at risk. When should we deploy our troops? We need a 
higher standard than we have seen in the last 6 years. Look at the war 
in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. security interests were at stake. A 
madman, with suspected nuclear and biological weapons, invaded a 
neighboring country and threatened the whole Middle East. It could have 
realigned the region in a way that would have a profound impact on the 
United States and our allies and subjected the entire territory to 
chemical, biological, and perhaps nuclear weapons.
  We, of course, should always honor our commitments to our allies. If 
North Korea invades the south, we are committed to helping our allies. 
We also have a responsibility toward a democratic Taiwan, which has 
been under constant intimidation from Communist China. We have the 
world's greatest military alliance, NATO, where we are committed to 
defend any one of those countries that might be under attack from a 
foreign power.
  It is in the U.S. interest that we protect ourselves and our allies 
with a nuclear umbrella. Yes, we would use troops to try to make sure a 
despot didn't have nuclear capabilities.
  These are clear areas of U.S. security interests. However, the United 
States does not have to commit troops on the ground to be a good ally. 
If our allies believe they must militarily engage in a regional 
conflict, that should not have to be our fight.
  The United States does not have to commit troops to be a good ally. 
If our allies believe they must militarily engage in a regional 
conflict, that should not have to be our fight. We could even support 
them in the interest of alliance unity. We could offer intelligence 
support, ``airlift,'' or protection of noncombatants. We do not have to 
get directly involved with troops in every regional conflict to be good 
allies.
  When violence erupted last year in Indonesia, we got it about right. 
We stepped aside and let our good ally Australia take lead. We helped 
with supplies and intelligence, but it wasn't American ground troops 
facing armed militants.
  Instead, we should focus our resources where the United States is 
uniquely capable; in parts of the world where our interests may be 
greater or where air power is necessary.
  It is not in the long-term interest of our European allies for U.S. 
forces to be tied down on a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia or Kosovo 
while in some parts of the world there is a danger of someone getting a 
long-range missile tipped with a germ warhead provided by Saddam 
Hussein and paid for by Osama Bin Laden.
  A reasonable division of labor--based on each ally's strategic 
interests and unique strengths--would be more efficient and more 
logical.
  What has been the result of our unfocused foreign relations? 
Qualified personnel are leaving the services in droves. In the past 2 
years, half of Air Force pilots eligible for continued service opted to 
leave when offered a $60,000 bonus.
  The Army fell 6,000 short of the congressionally authorized troop 
strength last year. We used up a large part of our weapons inventory in 
Kosovo. We were down to fewer than 200 cruise missiles worldwide. That 
may sound like a lot, but it's just a couple of days worth in Desert 
Storm.
  So let's be clear that if we do not discriminate about the use of our 
forces it will weaken our core capabilities. If we had to send our 
forces into combat, it would be irresponsible to send them without the 
arms they need, the troop strength they need, and the up-to-date 
training they must have. It takes 9 months to retrain a unit after a 
peacekeeping mission into warlike readiness.
  As a superpower, the United States must draw distinctions between the 
essential and the important. Otherwise, we could dissipate our 
resources and be unable to handle either. To maximize our strength, we 
should focus our efforts where they can best be applied. That is 
clearly air power and technology. This will be the American 
responsibility, but troops on the ground where those operations fall 
short of a full combat necessity can be done much better by allies with 
our backup rather than us taking the lead every time.
  Any sophisticated military power can patrol the Balkans, or East 
Timor, or Somalia. But only the United States can defend NATO, maintain 
the balance of power in Asia, and keep the Persian Gulf open to 
international commerce.
  I thank the distinguished Senators Roberts and Cleland for allowing 
Members to discuss these issues in a way that will, hopefully, help to 
solve them in the long term.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Senator Cleland and I thank the distinguished Senator 
from Texas for her contribution.

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