[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 4]
[House]
[Pages 5221-5235]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



               CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE REFORM ACT OF 2000

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the 
Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 1658) to provide a more just and 
uniform procedure for Federal civil forfeitures, and for other 
purposes.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Senate amendment:
       Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Civil 
     Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Creation of general rules relating to civil forfeiture 
              proceedings.
Sec. 3. Compensation for damage to seized property.
Sec. 4. Attorney fees, costs, and interest.
Sec. 5. Seizure warrant requirement.
Sec. 6. Use of forfeited funds to pay restitution to crime victims.
Sec. 7. Civil forfeiture of real property.
Sec. 8. Stay of civil forfeiture case.
Sec. 9. Civil restraining orders.
Sec. 10. Cooperation among Federal prosecutors.
Sec. 11. Statute of limitations for civil forfeiture actions.
Sec. 12. Destruction or removal of property to prevent seizure.
Sec. 13. Fungible property in bank accounts.
Sec. 14. Fugitive disentitlement.
Sec. 15. Enforcement of foreign forfeiture judgment.
Sec. 16. Encouraging use of criminal forfeiture as an alternative to 
              civil forfeiture.
Sec. 17. Access to records in bank secrecy jurisdictions
Sec. 18. Application to alien smuggling offenses.
Sec. 19. Enhanced visibility of the asset forfeiture program.
Sec. 20. Proceeds.
Sec. 21. Effective date.

     SEC. 2. CREATION OF GENERAL RULES RELATING TO CIVIL 
                   FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 46 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 982 the 
     following:

     ``Sec. 983. General rules for civil forfeiture proceedings

       ``(a) Notice; Claim; Complaint.--
       ``(1)(A)(i) Except as provided in clauses (ii) through (v), 
     in any nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil 
     forfeiture statute, with respect to which the Government is 
     required to send written notice to interested parties, such 
     notice shall be sent in a manner to achieve proper notice as 
     soon as practicable, and in no case more than 60 days after 
     the date of the seizure.
       ``(ii) No notice is required if, before the 60-day period 
     expires, the Government files a civil judicial forfeiture 
     action against the property and provides notice of that 
     action as required by law.
       ``(iii) If, before the 60-day period expires, the 
     Government does not file a civil judicial forfeiture action, 
     but does obtain a criminal indictment containing an 
     allegation that the property is subject to forfeiture, the 
     government shall either--
       ``(I) send notice within the 60 days and continue the 
     nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under this section; 
     or
       ``(II) terminate the nonjudicial civil forfeiture 
     proceeding, and take the steps necessary to preserve its 
     right to maintain custody of the property as provided in the 
     applicable criminal forfeiture statute.
       ``(iv) In a case in which the property is seized by a State 
     or local law enforcement agency and turned over to a Federal 
     law enforcement agency for the purpose of forfeiture under 
     Federal law, notice shall be sent not more than 90 days after 
     the date of seizure by the State or local law enforcement 
     agency.
       ``(v) If the identity or interest of a party is not 
     determined until after the seizure or turnover but is 
     determined before a declaration of forfeiture is entered, 
     notice shall be sent to such interested party not later than 
     60 days after the determination by the Government of the 
     identity of the party or the party's interest.
       ``(B) A supervisory official in the headquarters office of 
     the seizing agency may extend the period for sending notice 
     under subparagraph (A) for a period not to exceed 30 days 
     (which period may not be further extended except by a court), 
     if the official determines that the conditions in 
     subparagraph (D) are present.
       ``(C) Upon motion by the Government, a court may extend the 
     period for sending notice under subparagraph (A) for a period 
     not to exceed 60 days, which period may be further extended 
     by the court for 60-day periods, as necessary, if the court 
     determines, based on a written certification of a supervisory 
     official in the headquarters office of the seizing agency, 
     that the conditions in subparagraph (D) are present.
       ``(D) The period for sending notice under this paragraph 
     may be extended only if there is reason to believe that 
     notice may have an adverse result, including--
       ``(i) endangering the life or physical safety of an 
     individual;
       ``(ii) flight from prosecution;
       ``(iii) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
       ``(iv) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
       ``(v) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or 
     unduly delaying a trial.
       ``(E) Each of the Federal seizing agencies conducting 
     nonjudicial forfeitures under this section shall report 
     periodically to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives and the Senate the number of occasions 
     when an extension of time is granted under subparagraph (B).
       ``(F) If the Government does not send notice of a seizure 
     of property in accordance with subparagraph (A) to the person 
     from whom the property was seized, and no extension of time 
     is granted, the Government shall return the property to that 
     person without prejudice to the right of the Government to 
     commence a forfeiture proceeding at a later time. The 
     Government shall not be required to return contraband or 
     other property that the person from whom the property was 
     seized may not legally possess.
       ``(2)(A) Any person claiming property seized in a 
     nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil 
     forfeiture statute may file a claim with the appropriate 
     official after the seizure.
       ``(B) A claim under subparagraph (A) may be filed not later 
     than the deadline set forth in a personal notice letter 
     (which deadline may be not earlier than 35 days after the 
     date the letter is mailed), except that if that letter is not 
     received, then a claim may be filed not later than

[[Page 5222]]

     30 days after the date of final publication of notice of 
     seizure.
       ``(C) A claim shall--
       ``(i) identify the specific property being claimed;
       ``(ii) state the claimant's interest in such property (and 
     provide customary documentary evidence of such interest if 
     available) and state that the claim is not frivolous; and
       ``(iii) be made under oath, subject to penalty of perjury.
       ``(D) A claim need not be made in any particular form. Each 
     Federal agency conducting nonjudicial forfeitures under this 
     section shall make claim forms generally available on 
     request, which forms shall be written in easily 
     understandable language.
       ``(E) Any person may make a claim under subparagraph (A) 
     without posting bond with respect to the property which is 
     the subject of the claim.
       ``(3)(A) Not later than 90 days after a claim has been 
     filed, the Government shall file a complaint for forfeiture 
     in the manner set forth in the Supplemental Rules for Certain 
     Admiralty and Maritime Claims or return the property pending 
     the filing of a complaint, except that a court in the 
     district in which the complaint will be filed may extend the 
     period for filing a complaint for good cause shown or upon 
     agreement of the parties.
       ``(B) If the Government does not--
       ``(i) file a complaint for forfeiture or return the 
     property, in accordance with subparagraph (A); or
       ``(ii) before the time for filing a complaint has expired--
       ``(I) obtain a criminal indictment containing an allegation 
     that the property is subject to forfeiture; and
       ``(II) take the steps necessary to preserve its right to 
     maintain custody of the property as provided in the 
     applicable criminal forfeiture statute,
     the Government shall promptly release the property pursuant 
     to regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, and may 
     not take any further action to effect the civil forfeiture of 
     such property in connection with the underlying offense.
       ``(C) In lieu of, or in addition to, filing a civil 
     forfeiture complaint, the Government may include a forfeiture 
     allegation in a criminal indictment. If criminal forfeiture 
     is the only forfeiture proceeding commenced by the 
     Government, the Government's right to continued possession of 
     the property shall be governed by the applicable criminal 
     forfeiture statute.
       ``(D) No complaint may be dismissed on the ground that the 
     Government did not have adequate evidence at the time the 
     complaint was filed to establish the forfeitability of the 
     property.
       ``(4)(A) In any case in which the Government files in the 
     appropriate United States district court a complaint for 
     forfeiture of property, any person claiming an interest in 
     the seized property may file a claim asserting such person's 
     interest in the property in the manner set forth in the 
     Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, 
     except that such claim may be filed not later than 30 days 
     after the date of service of the Government's complaint or, 
     as applicable, not later than 30 days after the date of final 
     publication of notice of the filing of the complaint.
       ``(B) A person asserting an interest in seized property, in 
     accordance with subparagraph (A), shall file an answer to the 
     Government's complaint for forfeiture not later than 20 days 
     after the date of the filing of the claim.
       ``(b) Representation.--
       ``(1)(A) If a person with standing to contest the 
     forfeiture of property in a judicial civil forfeiture 
     proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute is financially 
     unable to obtain representation by counsel, and the person is 
     represented by counsel appointed under section 3006A of this 
     title in connection with a related criminal case, the court 
     may authorize counsel to represent that person with respect 
     to the claim.
       ``(B) In determining whether to authorize counsel to 
     represent a person under subparagraph (A), the court shall 
     take into account such factors as--
       ``(i) the person's standing to contest the forfeiture; and
       ``(ii) whether the claim appears to be made in good faith.
       ``(2)(A) If a person with standing to contest the 
     forfeiture of property in a judicial civil forfeiture 
     proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute is financially 
     unable to obtain representation by counsel, and the property 
     subject to forfeiture is real property that is being used by 
     the person as a primary residence, the court, at the request 
     of the person, shall insure that the person is represented by 
     an attorney for the Legal Services Corporation with respect 
     to the claim.
       ``(B)(i) At appropriate times during a representation under 
     subparagraph (A), the Legal Services Corporation shall submit 
     a statement of reasonable attorney fees and costs to the 
     court.
       ``(ii) The court shall enter a judgment in favor of the 
     Legal Services Corporation for reasonable attorney fees and 
     costs submitted pursuant to clause (i) and treat such 
     judgment as payable under section 2465 of title 28, United 
     States Code, regardless of the outcome of the case.
       ``(3) The court shall set the compensation for 
     representation under this subsection, which shall be 
     equivalent to that provided for court-appointed 
     representation under section 3006A of this title.
       ``(c) Burden of Proof.--In a suit or action brought under 
     any civil forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any 
     property--
       ``(1) the burden of proof is on the Government to 
     establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
     property is subject to forfeiture;
       ``(2) the Government may use evidence gathered after the 
     filing of a complaint for forfeiture to establish, by a 
     preponderance of the evidence, that property is subject to 
     forfeiture; and
       ``(3) if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the 
     property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a 
     criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a 
     criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there 
     was a substantial connection between the property and the 
     offense.
       ``(d) Innocent Owner Defense.--
       ``(1) An innocent owner's interest in property shall not be 
     forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute. The claimant 
     shall have the burden of proving that the claimant is an 
     innocent owner by a preponderance of the evidence.
       ``(2)(A) With respect to a property interest in existence 
     at the time the illegal conduct giving rise to forfeiture 
     took place, the term `innocent owner' means an owner who--
       ``(i) did not know of the conduct giving rise to 
     forfeiture; or
       ``(ii) upon learning of the conduct giving rise to the 
     forfeiture, did all that reasonably could be expected under 
     the circumstances to terminate such use of the property.
       ``(B)(i) For the purposes of this paragraph, ways in which 
     a person may show that such person did all that reasonably 
     could be expected may include demonstrating that such person, 
     to the extent permitted by law--
       ``(I) gave timely notice to an appropriate law enforcement 
     agency of information that led the person to know the conduct 
     giving rise to a forfeiture would occur or has occurred; and
       ``(II) in a timely fashion revoked or made a good faith 
     attempt to revoke permission for those engaging in such 
     conduct to use the property or took reasonable actions in 
     consultation with a law enforcement agency to discourage or 
     prevent the illegal use of the property.
       ``(ii) A person is not required by this subparagraph to 
     take steps that the person reasonably believes would be 
     likely to subject any person (other than the person whose 
     conduct gave rise to the forfeiture) to physical danger.
       ``(3)(A) With respect to a property interest acquired after 
     the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture has taken place, 
     the term `innocent owner' means a person who, at the time 
     that person acquired the interest in the property--
       ``(i) was a bona fide purchaser or seller for value 
     (including a purchaser or seller of goods or services for 
     value); and
       ``(ii) did not know and was reasonably without cause to 
     believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.
       ``(B) An otherwise valid claim under subparagraph (A) shall 
     not be denied on the ground that the claimant gave nothing of 
     value in exchange for the property if--
       ``(i) the property is the primary residence of the 
     claimant;
       ``(ii) depriving the claimant of the property would deprive 
     the claimant of the means to maintain reasonable shelter in 
     the community for the claimant and all dependents residing 
     with the claimant;
       ``(iii) the property is not, and is not traceable to, the 
     proceeds of any criminal offense; and
       ``(iv) the claimant acquired his or her interest in the 
     property through marriage, divorce, or legal separation, or 
     the claimant was the spouse or legal dependent of a person 
     whose death resulted in the transfer of the property to the 
     claimant through inheritance or probate;
     except that the court shall limit the value of any real 
     property interest for which innocent ownership is recognized 
     under this subparagraph to the value necessary to maintain 
     reasonable shelter in the community for such claimant and all 
     dependents residing with the claimant.
       ``(4) Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection, no 
     person may assert an ownership interest under this subsection 
     in contraband or other property that it is illegal to 
     possess.
       ``(5) If the court determines, in accordance with this 
     section, that an innocent owner has a partial interest in 
     property otherwise subject to forfeiture, or a joint tenancy 
     or tenancy by the entirety in such property, the court may 
     enter an appropriate order--
       ``(A) severing the property;
       ``(B) transferring the property to the Government with a 
     provision that the Government compensate the innocent owner 
     to the extent of his or her ownership interest once a final 
     order of forfeiture has been entered and the property has 
     been reduced to liquid assets; or
       ``(C) permitting the innocent owner to retain the property 
     subject to a lien in favor of the Government to the extent of 
     the forfeitable interest in the property.
       ``(6) In this subsection, the term `owner'--
       ``(A) means a person with an ownership interest in the 
     specific property sought to be forfeited, including a 
     leasehold, lien, mortgage, recorded security interest, or 
     valid assignment of an ownership interest; and
       ``(B) does not include--
       ``(i) a person with only a general unsecured interest in, 
     or claim against, the property or estate of another;
       ``(ii) a bailee unless the bailor is identified and the 
     bailee shows a colorable legitimate interest in the property 
     seized; or
       ``(iii) a nominee who exercises no dominion or control over 
     the property.
       ``(e) Motion To Set Aside Forfeiture.--
       ``(1) Any person entitled to written notice in any 
     nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil 
     forfeiture statute who does not receive such notice may file 
     a motion to set aside

[[Page 5223]]

     a declaration of forfeiture with respect to that person's 
     interest in the property, which motion shall be granted if--
       ``(A) the Government knew, or reasonably should have known, 
     of the moving party's interest and failed to take reasonable 
     steps to provide such party with notice; and
       ``(B) the moving party did not know or have reason to know 
     of the seizure within sufficient time to file a timely claim.
       ``(2)(A) Notwithstanding the expiration of any applicable 
     statute of limitations, if the court grants a motion under 
     paragraph (1), the court shall set aside the declaration of 
     forfeiture as to the interest of the moving party without 
     prejudice to the right of the Government to commence a 
     subsequent forfeiture proceeding as to the interest of the 
     moving party.
       ``(B) Any proceeding described in subparagraph (A) shall be 
     commenced--
       ``(i) if nonjudicial, within 60 days of the entry of the 
     order granting the motion; or
       ``(ii) if judicial, within 6 months of the entry of the 
     order granting the motion.
       ``(3) A motion under paragraph (1) may be filed not later 
     than 5 years after the date of final publication of notice of 
     seizure of the property.
       ``(4) If, at the time a motion made under paragraph (1) is 
     granted, the forfeited property has been disposed of by the 
     Government in accordance with law, the Government may 
     institute proceedings against a substitute sum of money equal 
     to the value of the moving party's interest in the property 
     at the time the property was disposed of.
       ``(5) A motion filed under this subsection shall be the 
     exclusive remedy for seeking to set aside a declaration of 
     forfeiture under a civil forfeiture statute.
       ``(f) Release Of Seized Property.--
       ``(1) A claimant under subsection (a) is entitled to 
     immediate release of seized property if--
       ``(A) the claimant has a possessory interest in the 
     property;
       ``(B) the claimant has sufficient ties to the community to 
     provide assurance that the property will be available at the 
     time of the trial;
       ``(C) the continued possession by the Government pending 
     the final disposition of forfeiture proceedings will cause 
     substantial hardship to the claimant, such as preventing the 
     functioning of a business, preventing an individual from 
     working, or leaving an individual homeless;
       ``(D) the claimant's likely hardship from the continued 
     possession by the Government of the seized property outweighs 
     the risk that the property will be destroyed, damaged, lost, 
     concealed, or transferred if it is returned to the claimant 
     during the pendency of the proceeding; and
       ``(E) none of the conditions set forth in paragraph (8) 
     applies.
       ``(2) A claimant seeking release of property under this 
     subsection must request possession of the property from the 
     appropriate official, and the request must set forth the 
     basis on which the requirements of paragraph (1) are met.
       ``(3)(A) If not later than 15 days after the date of a 
     request under paragraph (2) the property has not been 
     released, the claimant may file a petition in the district 
     court in which the complaint has been filed or, if no 
     complaint has been filed, in the district court in which the 
     seizure warrant was issued or in the district court for the 
     district in which the property was seized.
       ``(B) The petition described in subparagraph (A) shall set 
     forth--
       ``(i) the basis on which the requirements of paragraph (1) 
     are met; and
       ``(ii) the steps the claimant has taken to secure release 
     of the property from the appropriate official.
       ``(4) If the Government establishes that the claimant's 
     claim is frivolous, the court shall deny the petition. In 
     responding to a petition under this subsection on other 
     grounds, the Government may in appropriate cases submit 
     evidence ex parte in order to avoid disclosing any matter 
     that may adversely affect an ongoing criminal investigation 
     or pending criminal trial.
       ``(5) The court shall render a decision on a petition filed 
     under paragraph (3) not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the filing, unless such 30-day limitation is extended by 
     consent of the parties or by the court for good cause shown.
       ``(6) If--
       ``(A) a petition is filed under paragraph (3); and
       ``(B) the claimant demonstrates that the requirements of 
     paragraph (1) have been met;
     the district court shall order that the property be returned 
     to the claimant, pending completion of proceedings by the 
     Government to obtain forfeiture of the property.
       ``(7) If the court grants a petition under paragraph (3)--
       ``(A) the court may enter any order necessary to ensure 
     that the value of the property is maintained while the 
     forfeiture action is pending, including--
       ``(i) permitting the inspection, photographing, and 
     inventory of the property;
       ``(ii) fixing a bond in accordance with rule E(5) of the 
     Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims; 
     and
       ``(iii) requiring the claimant to obtain or maintain 
     insurance on the subject property; and
       ``(B) the Government may place a lien against the property 
     or file a lis pendens to ensure that the property is not 
     transferred to another person.
       ``(8) This subsection shall not apply if the seized 
     property--
       ``(A) is contraband, currency, or other monetary 
     instrument, or electronic funds unless such currency or other 
     monetary instrument or electronic funds constitutes the 
     assets of a legitimate business which has been seized;
       ``(B) is to be used as evidence of a violation of the law;
       ``(C) by reason of design or other characteristic, is 
     particularly suited for use in illegal activities; or
       ``(D) is likely to be used to commit additional criminal 
     acts if returned to the claimant.
       ``(g) Proportionality.--
       ``(1) The claimant under subsection (a)(4) may petition the 
     court to determine whether the forfeiture was 
     constitutionally excessive.
       ``(2) In making this determination, the court shall compare 
     the forfeiture to the gravity of the offense giving rise to 
     the forfeiture.
       ``(3) The claimant shall have the burden of establishing 
     that the forfeiture is grossly disproportional by a 
     preponderance of the evidence at a hearing conducted by the 
     court without a jury.
       ``(4) If the court finds that the forfeiture is grossly 
     disproportional to the offense it shall reduce or eliminate 
     the forfeiture as necessary to avoid a violation of the 
     Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the 
     Constitution.
       ``(h) Civil Fine.--
       ``(1) In any civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil 
     forfeiture statute in which the Government prevails, if the 
     court finds that the claimant's assertion of an interest in 
     the property was frivolous, the court may impose a civil fine 
     on the claimant of an amount equal to 10 percent of the value 
     of the forfeited property, but in no event shall the fine be 
     less than $250 or greater than $5,000.
       ``(2) Any civil fine imposed under this subsection shall 
     not preclude the court from imposing sanctions under rule 11 
     of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
       ``(3) In addition to the limitations of section 1915 of 
     title 28, United States Code, in no event shall a prisoner 
     file a claim under a civil forfeiture statute or appeal a 
     judgment in a civil action or proceeding based on a civil 
     forfeiture statute if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior 
     occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, 
     brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States 
     that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous or 
     malicious, unless the prisoner shows extraordinary and 
     exceptional circumstances.
       ``(i) Civil Forfeiture Statute Defined.--In this section, 
     the term `civil forfeiture statute'--
       ``(1) means any provision of Federal law providing for the 
     forfeiture of property other than as a sentence imposed upon 
     conviction of a criminal offense; and
       ``(2) does not include--
       ``(A) the Tariff Act of 1930 or any other provision of law 
     codified in title 19;
       ``(B) the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
       ``(C) the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 
     301 et seq.);
       ``(D) the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 1 et 
     seq.); or
       ``(E) section 1 of title VI of the Act of June 15, 1917 (40 
     Stat. 233; 22 U.S.C. 401).''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The analysis for 
     chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 982 the 
     following:

``983. General rules for civil forfeiture proceedings.''.

       (c) Striking Superseded Provisions.--
       (1) Civil forfeiture.--Section 981(a) of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Except as provided in 
     paragraph (2), the'' and inserting ``The''; and
       (B) by striking paragraph (2).
       (2) Drug forfeitures.--Paragraphs (4), (6) and (7) of 
     section 511(a) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 
     881(a) (4), (6) and (7)) are each amended by striking ``, 
     except that'' and all that follows before the period at the 
     end.
       (3) Automobiles.--Section 518 of the Controlled Substances 
     Act (21 U.S.C. 888) is repealed.
       (4) Forfeitures in connection with sexual exploitation of 
     children.--Paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 2254(a) of title 
     18, United States Code, are each amended by striking ``, 
     except that'' and all that follows before the period at the 
     end.
       (d) Legal Services Corporation Representation.--Section 
     1007(a) of the Legal Services Corporation Act (42 U.S.C. 
     2996f(a)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (9), by striking ``and'' after the 
     semicolon;
       (2) In paragraph (10), by striking the period and inserting 
     ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(11) ensure that an indigent individual whose primary 
     residence is subject to civil forfeiture is represented by an 
     attorney for the Corporation in such civil action.''

[[Page 5224]]



     SEC. 3. COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE TO SEIZED PROPERTY.

       (a) Tort Claims Act.--Section 2680(c) of title 28, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``any goods or merchandise'' and inserting 
     ``any goods, merchandise, or other property'';
       (2) by striking ``law-enforcement'' and inserting ``law 
     enforcement''; and
       (3) by inserting before the period at the end the 
     following: ``, except that the provisions of this chapter and 
     section 1346(b) of this title apply to any claim based on 
     injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property, 
     while in the possession of any officer of customs or excise 
     or any other law enforcement officer, if--
       ``(1) the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture 
     under any provision of Federal law providing for the 
     forfeiture of property other than as a sentence imposed upon 
     conviction of a criminal offense;
       ``(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited;
       ``(3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or 
     mitigated (if the property was subject to forfeiture); and
       ``(4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for which 
     the interest of the claimant in the property was subject to 
     forfeiture under a Federal criminal forfeiture law.''.
       (b) Department of Justice.--
       (1) In general.--With respect to a claim that cannot be 
     settled under chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, 
     the Attorney General may settle, for not more than $50,000 in 
     any case, a claim for damage to, or loss of, privately owned 
     property caused by an investigative or law enforcement 
     officer (as defined in section 2680(h) of title 28, United 
     States Code) who is employed by the Department of Justice 
     acting within the scope of his or her employment.
       (2) Limitations.--The Attorney General may not pay a claim 
     under paragraph (1) that--
       (A) is presented to the Attorney General more than 1 year 
     after it accrues; or
       (B) is presented by an officer or employee of the Federal 
     Government and arose within the scope of employment.

     SEC. 4. ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS, AND INTEREST.

       (a) In general.--Section 2465 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:

     ``Sec. 2465. Return of property to claimant; liability for 
       wrongful seizure; attorney fees, costs, and interest

       ``(a) Upon the entry of a judgment for the claimant in any 
     proceeding to condemn or forfeit property seized or arrested 
     under any provision of Federal law--
       ``(1) such property shall be returned forthwith to the 
     claimant or his agent; and
       ``(2) if it appears that there was reasonable cause for the 
     seizure or arrest, the court shall cause a proper certificate 
     thereof to be entered and, in such case, neither the person 
     who made the seizure or arrest nor the prosecutor shall be 
     liable to suit or judgment on account of such suit or 
     prosecution, nor shall the claimant be entitled to costs, 
     except as provided in subsection (b).
       ``(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any civil 
     proceeding to forfeit property under any provision of Federal 
     law in which the claimant substantially prevails, the United 
     States shall be liable for--
       ``(A) reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs 
     reasonably incurred by the claimant;
       ``(B) post-judgment interest, as set forth in section 1961 
     of this title; and
       ``(C) in cases involving currency, other negotiable 
     instruments, or the proceeds of an interlocutory sale--
       ``(i) interest actually paid to the United States from the 
     date of seizure or arrest of the property that resulted from 
     the investment of the property in an interest-bearing account 
     or instrument; and
       ``(ii) an imputed amount of interest that such currency, 
     instruments, or proceeds would have earned at the rate 
     applicable to the 30-day Treasury Bill, for any period during 
     which no interest was paid (not including any period when the 
     property reasonably was in use as evidence in an official 
     proceeding or in conducting scientific tests for the purpose 
     of collecting evidence), commencing 15 days after the 
     property was seized by a Federal law enforcement agency, or 
     was turned over to a Federal law enforcement agency by a 
     State or local law enforcement agency.
       ``(2)(A) The United States shall not be required to 
     disgorge the value of any intangible benefits nor make any 
     other payments to the claimant not specifically authorized by 
     this subsection.
       ``(B) The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply if 
     the claimant is convicted of a crime for which the interest 
     of the claimant in the property was subject to forfeiture 
     under a Federal criminal forfeiture law.
       ``(C) If there are multiple claims to the same property, 
     the United States shall not be liable for costs and attorneys 
     fees associated with any such claim if the United States--
       ``(i) promptly recognizes such claim;
       ``(ii) promptly returns the interest of the claimant in the 
     property to the claimant, if the property can be divided 
     without difficulty and there are no competing claims to that 
     portion of the property;
       ``(iii) does not cause the claimant to incur additional, 
     reasonable costs or fees; and
       ``(iv) prevails in obtaining forfeiture with respect to one 
     or more of the other claims.
       ``(D) If the court enters judgment in part for the claimant 
     and in part for the Government, the court shall reduce the 
     award of costs and attorney fees accordingly.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The analysis for 
     chapter 163 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking the item relating to section 2465 and inserting 
     following:

``2465. Return of property to claimant; liability for wrongful seizure; 
              attorney fees, costs, and interest.''.

     SEC. 5. SEIZURE WARRANT REQUIREMENT.

       (a) In General.--Section 981(b) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(b)(1) Except as provided in section 985, any property 
     subject to forfeiture to the United States under subsection 
     (a) may be seized by the Attorney General and, in the case of 
     property involved in a violation investigated by the 
     Secretary of the Treasury or the United States Postal 
     Service, the property may also be seized by the Secretary of 
     the Treasury or the Postal Service, respectively.
       ``(2) Seizures pursuant to this section shall be made 
     pursuant to a warrant obtained in the same manner as provided 
     for a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
     Procedure, except that a seizure may be made without a 
     warrant if--
       ``(A) a complaint for forfeiture has been filed in the 
     United States district court and the court issued an arrest 
     warrant in rem pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain 
     Admiralty and Maritime Claims;
       ``(B) there is probable cause to believe that the property 
     is subject to forfeiture and--
       ``(i) the seizure is made pursuant to a lawful arrest or 
     search; or
       ``(ii) another exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
     requirement would apply; or
       ``(C) the property was lawfully seized by a State or local 
     law enforcement agency and transferred to a Federal agency.
       ``(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of rule 41(a) of the 
     Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a seizure warrant may be 
     issued pursuant to this subsection by a judicial officer in 
     any district in which a forfeiture action against the 
     property may be filed under section 1355(b) of title 28, and 
     may be executed in any district in which the property is 
     found, or transmitted to the central authority of any foreign 
     state for service in accordance with any treaty or other 
     international agreement. Any motion for the return of 
     property seized under this section shall be filed in the 
     district court in which the seizure warrant was issued or in 
     the district court for the district in which the property was 
     seized.
       ``(4)(A) If any person is arrested or charged in a foreign 
     country in connection with an offense that would give rise to 
     the forfeiture of property in the United States under this 
     section or under the Controlled Substances Act, the Attorney 
     General may apply to any Federal judge or magistrate judge in 
     the district in which the property is located for an ex parte 
     order restraining the property subject to forfeiture for not 
     more than 30 days, except that the time may be extended for 
     good cause shown at a hearing conducted in the manner 
     provided in rule 43(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
     Procedure.
       ``(B) The application for the restraining order shall set 
     forth the nature and circumstances of the foreign charges and 
     the basis for belief that the person arrested or charged has 
     property in the United States that would be subject to 
     forfeiture, and shall contain a statement that the 
     restraining order is needed to preserve the availability of 
     property for such time as is necessary to receive evidence 
     from the foreign country or elsewhere in support of probable 
     cause for the seizure of the property under this 
     subsection.''.
       (b) Drug Forfeitures.--Section 511(b) of the Controlled 
     Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 881(b)) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(b) Seizure Procedures.--Any property subject to 
     forfeiture to the United States under this section may be 
     seized by the Attorney General in the manner set forth in 
     section 981(b) of title 18, United States Code.''.

     SEC. 6. USE OF FORFEITED FUNDS TO PAY RESTITUTION TO CRIME 
                   VICTIMS.

       Section 981(e) of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following:
       ``(6) as restoration to any victim of the offense giving 
     rise to the forfeiture, including, in the case of a money 
     laundering offense, any offense constituting the underlying 
     specified unlawful activity; or''.

     SEC. 7. CIVIL FORFEITURE OF REAL PROPERTY.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 46 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 984 the 
     following:

     ``Sec. 985. Civil forfeiture of real property

       ``(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all civil 
     forfeitures of real property and interests in real property 
     shall proceed as judicial forfeitures.
       ``(b)(1) Except as provided in this section--
       ``(A) real property that is the subject of a civil 
     forfeiture action shall not be seized before entry of an 
     order of forfeiture; and
       ``(B) the owners or occupants of the real property shall 
     not be evicted from, or otherwise deprived of the use and 
     enjoyment of, real property that is the subject of a pending 
     forfeiture action.
       ``(2) The filing of a lis pendens and the execution of a 
     writ of entry for the purpose of conducting an inspection and 
     inventory of the property shall not be considered a seizure 
     under this subsection.
       ``(c)(1) The Government shall initiate a civil forfeiture 
     action against real property by--
       ``(A) filing a complaint for forfeiture;
       ``(B) posting a notice of the complaint on the property; 
     and

[[Page 5225]]

       ``(C) serving notice on the property owner, along with a 
     copy of the complaint.
       ``(2) If the property owner cannot be served with the 
     notice under paragraph (1) because the owner--
       ``(A) is a fugitive;
       ``(B) resides outside the United States and efforts at 
     service pursuant to rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
     Procedure are unavailing; or
       ``(C) cannot be located despite the exercise of due 
     diligence,
     constructive service may be made in accordance with the laws 
     of the State in which the property is located.
       ``(3) If real property has been posted in accordance with 
     this subsection, it shall not be necessary for the court to 
     issue an arrest warrant in rem, or to take any other action 
     to establish in rem jurisdiction over the property.
       ``(d)(1) Real property may be seized prior to the entry of 
     an order of forfeiture if--
       ``(A) the Government notifies the court that it intends to 
     seize the property before trial; and
       ``(B) the court--
       ``(i) issues a notice of application for warrant, causes 
     the notice to be served on the property owner and posted on 
     the property, and conducts a hearing in which the property 
     owner has a meaningful opportunity to be heard; or
       ``(ii) makes an ex parte determination that there is 
     probable cause for the forfeiture and that there are exigent 
     circumstances that permit the Government to seize the 
     property without prior notice and an opportunity for the 
     property owner to be heard.
       ``(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(B)(ii), to establish 
     exigent circumstances, the Government shall show that less 
     restrictive measures such as a lis pendens, restraining 
     order, or bond would not suffice to protect the Government's 
     interests in preventing the sale, destruction, or continued 
     unlawful use of the real property.
       ``(e) If the court authorizes a seizure of real property 
     under subsection (d)(1)(B)(ii), it shall conduct a prompt 
     post-seizure hearing during which the property owner shall 
     have an opportunity to contest the basis for the seizure.
       ``(f) This section--
       ``(1) applies only to civil forfeitures of real property 
     and interests in real property;
       ``(2) does not apply to forfeitures of the proceeds of the 
     sale of such property or interests, or of money or other 
     assets intended to be used to acquire such property or 
     interests; and
       ``(3) shall not affect the authority of the court to enter 
     a restraining order relating to real property.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The analysis for 
     chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 984 the 
     following:

``985. Civil forfeiture of real property.''.

     SEC. 8. STAY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE CASE.

       (a) In General.--Section 981(g) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(g)(1) Upon the motion of the United States, the court 
     shall stay the civil forfeiture proceeding if the court 
     determines that civil discovery will adversely affect the 
     ability of the Government to conduct a related criminal 
     investigation or the prosecution of a related criminal case.
       ``(2) Upon the motion of a claimant, the court shall stay 
     the civil forfeiture proceeding with respect to that claimant 
     if the court determines that--
       ``(A) the claimant is the subject of a related criminal 
     investigation or case;
       ``(B) the claimant has standing to assert a claim in the 
     civil forfeiture proceeding; and
       ``(C) continuation of the forfeiture proceeding will burden 
     the right of the claimant against self-incrimination in the 
     related investigation or case.
       ``(3) With respect to the impact of civil discovery 
     described in paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may determine 
     that a stay is unnecessary if a protective order limiting 
     discovery would protect the interest of 1 party without 
     unfairly limiting the ability of the opposing party to pursue 
     the civil case. In no case, however, shall the court impose a 
     protective order as an alternative to a stay if the effect of 
     such protective order would be to allow 1 party to pursue 
     discovery while the other party is substantially unable to do 
     so.
       ``(4) In this subsection, the terms `related criminal case' 
     and `related criminal investigation' mean an actual 
     prosecution or investigation in progress at the time at which 
     the request for the stay, or any subsequent motion to lift 
     the stay is made. In determining whether a criminal case or 
     investigation is `related' to a civil forfeiture proceeding, 
     the court shall consider the degree of similarity between the 
     parties, witnesses, facts, and circumstances involved in the 
     2 proceedings, without requiring an identity with respect to 
     any 1 or more factors.
       ``(5) In requesting a stay under paragraph (1), the 
     Government may, in appropriate cases, submit evidence ex 
     parte in order to avoid disclosing any matter that may 
     adversely affect an ongoing criminal investigation or pending 
     criminal trial.
       ``(6) Whenever a civil forfeiture proceeding is stayed 
     pursuant to this subsection, the court shall enter any order 
     necessary to preserve the value of the property or to protect 
     the rights of lienholders or other persons with an interest 
     in the property while the stay is in effect.
       ``(7) A determination by the court that the claimant has 
     standing to request a stay pursuant to paragraph (2) shall 
     apply only to this subsection and shall not preclude the 
     Government from objecting to the standing of the claimant by 
     dispositive motion or at the time of trial.''.
       (b) Drug Forfeitures.--Section 511(i) of the Controlled 
     Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 881(i)) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(i) The provisions of section 981(g) of title 18, United 
     States Code, regarding the stay of a civil forfeiture 
     proceeding shall apply to forfeitures under this section.''.

     SEC. 9. CIVIL RESTRAINING ORDERS.

       Section 983 of title 18, United States Code, as added by 
     this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(j) Restraining Orders; Protective Orders.--
       ``(1) Upon application of the United States, the court may 
     enter a restraining order or injunction, require the 
     execution of satisfactory performance bonds, create 
     receiverships, appoint conservators, custodians, appraisers, 
     accountants, or trustees, or take any other action to seize, 
     secure, maintain, or preserve the availability of property 
     subject to civil forfeiture--
       ``(A) upon the filing of a civil forfeiture complaint 
     alleging that the property with respect to which the order is 
     sought is subject to civil forfeiture; or
       ``(B) prior to the filing of such a complaint, if, after 
     notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the 
     property and opportunity for a hearing, the court determines 
     that--
       ``(i) there is a substantial probability that the United 
     States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that 
     failure to enter the order will result in the property being 
     destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or 
     otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and
       ``(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the 
     property through the entry of the requested order outweighs 
     the hardship on any party against whom the order is to be 
     entered.
       ``(2) An order entered pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) shall 
     be effective for not more than 90 days, unless extended by 
     the court for good cause shown, or unless a complaint 
     described in paragraph (1)(A) has been filed.
       ``(3) A temporary restraining order under this subsection 
     may be entered upon application of the United States without 
     notice or opportunity for a hearing when a complaint has not 
     yet been filed with respect to the property, if the United 
     States demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe 
     that the property with respect to which the order is sought 
     is subject to civil forfeiture and that provision of notice 
     will jeopardize the availability of the property for 
     forfeiture. Such a temporary order shall expire not more than 
     10 days after the date on which it is entered, unless 
     extended for good cause shown or unless the party against 
     whom it is entered consents to an extension for a longer 
     period. A hearing requested concerning an order entered under 
     this paragraph shall be held at the earliest possible time 
     and prior to the expiration of the temporary order.
       ``(4) The court may receive and consider, at a hearing held 
     pursuant to this subsection, evidence and information that 
     would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.''.

     SEC. 10. COOPERATION AMONG FEDERAL PROSECUTORS.

       Section 3322(a) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``civil forfeiture under section 981 of 
     title 18, United States Code, of property described in 
     section 981(a)(1)(C) of such title'' and inserting ``any 
     civil forfeiture provision of Federal law''; and
       (2) by striking ``concerning a banking law violation''.

     SEC. 11. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CIVIL FORFEITURE ACTIONS.

       Section 621 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1621) is 
     amended by inserting ``, or in the case of forfeiture, within 
     2 years after the time when the involvement of the property 
     in the alleged offense was discovered, whichever was later'' 
     after ``within five years after the time when the alleged 
     offense was discovered''.

     SEC. 12. DESTRUCTION OR REMOVAL OF PROPERTY TO PREVENT 
                   SEIZURE.

       Section 2232 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking subsections (a) and (b);
       (2) by inserting ``(e) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance.--
     '' before ``Whoever, having knowledge that a Federal 
     officer'';
       (3) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
       (4) by inserting before subsection (d), as redesignated, 
     the following:
       ``(a) Destruction or Removal of Property To Prevent 
     Seizure.--Whoever, before, during, or after any search for or 
     seizure of property by any person authorized to make such 
     search or seizure, knowingly destroys, damages, wastes, 
     disposes of, transfers, or otherwise takes any action, or 
     knowingly attempts to destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, 
     transfer, or otherwise take any action, for the purpose of 
     preventing or impairing the Government's lawful authority to 
     take such property into its custody or control or to continue 
     holding such property under its lawful custody and control, 
     shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 
     years, or both.
       ``(b) Impairment of In Rem Jurisdiction.--Whoever, knowing 
     that property is subject to the in rem jurisdiction of a 
     United States court for purposes of civil forfeiture under 
     Federal law, knowingly and without authority from that court, 
     destroys, damages, wastes, disposes of, transfers, or 
     otherwise takes any action, or knowingly attempts to destroy, 
     damage, waste, dispose of, transfer, or otherwise take any 
     action, for the purpose of impairing or defeating

[[Page 5226]]

     the court's continuing in rem jurisdiction over the property, 
     shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 
     years, or both.
       ``(c) Notice of Search or Execution of Seizure Warrant or 
     Warrant of Arrest In Rem.--Whoever, having knowledge that any 
     person authorized to make searches and seizures, or to 
     execute a seizure warrant or warrant of arrest in rem, in 
     order to prevent the authorized seizing or securing of any 
     person or property, gives notice or attempts to give notice 
     in advance of the search, seizure, or execution of a seizure 
     warrant or warrant of arrest in rem, to any person shall be 
     fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, 
     or both.''.

     SEC. 13. FUNGIBLE PROPERTY IN BANK ACCOUNTS.

       (a) In General.--Section 984 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (a) and redesignating 
     subsections (b), (c), and (d) as subsections (a), (b), and 
     (c), respectively;
       (2) in subsection (a), as redesignated--
       (A) by striking ``or other fungible property'' and 
     inserting ``or precious metals''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (c)'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (b)'';
       (3) in subsection (c), as redesignated--
       (A) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following: 
     ``(1) Subsection (a) does not apply to an action against 
     funds held by a financial institution in an interbank account 
     unless the account holder knowingly engaged in the offense 
     that is the basis for the forfeiture.''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``(2) As used in this 
     section, the term'' and inserting the following:
       ``(2) In this subsection--
       ``(A) the term `financial institution' includes a foreign 
     bank (as defined in section 1(b)(7) of the International 
     Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101(b)(7))); and
       ``(B) the term''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) Nothing in this section may be construed to limit the 
     ability of the Government to forfeit property under any 
     provision of law if the property involved in the offense 
     giving rise to the forfeiture or property traceable thereto 
     is available for forfeiture.''.

     SEC. 14. FUGITIVE DISENTITLEMENT.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 163 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 2466. Fugitive disentitlement

       ``A judicial officer may disallow a person from using the 
     resources of the courts of the United States in furtherance 
     of a claim in any related civil forfeiture action or a claim 
     in third party proceedings in any related criminal forfeiture 
     action upon a finding that such person--
       ``(1) after notice or knowledge of the fact that a warrant 
     or process has been issued for his apprehension, in order to 
     avoid criminal prosecution--
       ``(A) purposely leaves the jurisdiction of the United 
     States;
       ``(B) declines to enter or reenter the United States to 
     submit to its jurisdiction; or
       ``(C) otherwise evades the jurisdiction of the court in 
     which a criminal case is pending against the person; and
       ``(2) is not confined or held in custody in any other 
     jurisdiction for commission of criminal conduct in that 
     jurisdiction.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 163 of 
     title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:

``2466. Fugitive disentitlement.''.

       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to any case pending on or after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 15. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN FORFEITURE JUDGMENT.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 163 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 2467. Enforcement of foreign judgment

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) the term `foreign nation' means a country that has 
     become a party to the United Nations Convention Against 
     Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
     (referred to in this section as the `United Nations 
     Convention') or a foreign jurisdiction with which the United 
     States has a treaty or other formal international agreement 
     in effect providing for mutual forfeiture assistance; and
       ``(2) the term `forfeiture or confiscation judgment' means 
     a final order of a foreign nation compelling a person or 
     entity--
       ``(A) to pay a sum of money representing the proceeds of an 
     offense described in Article 3, Paragraph 1, of the United 
     Nations Convention, or any foreign offense described in 
     section 1956(c)(7)(B) of title 18, or property the value of 
     which corresponds to such proceeds; or
       ``(B) to forfeit property involved in or traceable to the 
     commission of such offense.
       ``(b) Review by Attorney General.--
       ``(1) In general.--A foreign nation seeking to have a 
     forfeiture or confiscation judgment registered and enforced 
     by a district court of the United States under this section 
     shall first submit a request to the Attorney General or the 
     designee of the Attorney General, which request shall 
     include--
       ``(A) a summary of the facts of the case and a description 
     of the proceedings that resulted in the forfeiture or 
     confiscation judgment;
       ``(B) certified copy of the forfeiture or confiscation 
     judgment;
       ``(C) an affidavit or sworn declaration establishing that 
     the defendant received notice of the proceedings in 
     sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend against the 
     charges and that the judgment rendered is in force and is not 
     subject to appeal; and
       ``(D) such additional information and evidence as may be 
     required by the Attorney General or the designee of the 
     Attorney General.
       ``(2) Certification of request.--The Attorney General or 
     the designee of the Attorney General shall determine whether, 
     in the interest of justice, to certify the request, and such 
     decision shall be final and not subject to either judicial 
     review or review under subchapter II of chapter 5, or chapter 
     7, of title 5 (commonly known as the `Administrative 
     Procedure Act').
       ``(c) Jurisdiction and Venue.--
       ``(1) In general.--If the Attorney General or the designee 
     of the Attorney General certifies a request under subsection 
     (b), the United States may file an application on behalf of a 
     foreign nation in district court of the United States seeking 
     to enforce the foreign forfeiture or confiscation judgment as 
     if the judgment had been entered by a court in the United 
     States.
       ``(2) Proceedings.--In a proceeding filed under paragraph 
     (1)--
       ``(A) the United States shall be the applicant and the 
     defendant or another person or entity affected by the 
     forfeiture or confiscation judgment shall be the respondent;
       ``(B) venue shall lie in the district court for the 
     District of Columbia or in any other district in which the 
     defendant or the property that may be the basis for 
     satisfaction of a judgment under this section may be found; 
     and
       ``(C) the district court shall have personal jurisdiction 
     over a defendant residing outside of the United States if the 
     defendant is served with process in accordance with rule 4 of 
     the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
       ``(d) Entry and Enforcement of Judgment.--
       ``(1) In general.--The district court shall enter such 
     orders as may be necessary to enforce the judgment on behalf 
     of the foreign nation unless the court finds that--
       ``(A) the judgment was rendered under a system that 
     provides tribunals or procedures incompatible with the 
     requirements of due process of law;
       ``(B) the foreign court lacked personal jurisdiction over 
     the defendant;
       ``(C) the foreign court lacked jurisdiction over the 
     subject matter;
       ``(D) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court 
     did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time 
     to enable him or her to defend; or
       ``(E) the judgment was obtained by fraud.
       ``(2) Process.--Process to enforce a judgment under this 
     section shall be in accordance with rule 69(a) of the Federal 
     Rules of Civil Procedure.
       ``(e) Finality of Foreign Findings.--In entering orders to 
     enforce the judgment, the court shall be bound by the 
     findings of fact to the extent that they are stated in the 
     foreign forfeiture or confiscation judgment.
       ``(f) Currency Conversion.--The rate of exchange in effect 
     at the time the suit to enforce is filed by the foreign 
     nation shall be used in calculating the amount stated in any 
     forfeiture or confiscation judgment requiring the payment of 
     a sum of money submitted for registration.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 163 of 
     title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:

``2467. Enforcement of foreign judgment.''.

     SEC. 16. ENCOURAGING USE OF CRIMINAL FORFEITURE AS AN 
                   ALTERNATIVE TO CIVIL FORFEITURE.

       Section 2461 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(c) If a forfeiture of property is authorized in 
     connection with a violation of an Act of Congress, and any 
     person is charged in an indictment or information with such 
     violation but no specific statutory provision is made for 
     criminal forfeiture upon conviction, the Government may 
     include the forfeiture in the indictment or information in 
     accordance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
     upon conviction, the court shall order the forfeiture of the 
     property in accordance with the procedures set forth in 
     section 413 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853), 
     other than subsection (d) of that section.''.

     SEC. 17. ACCESS TO RECORDS IN BANK SECRECY JURISDICTIONS.

       Section 986 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) Access to Records in Bank Secrecy Jurisdictions.--
       ``(1) In general.--In any civil forfeiture case, or in any 
     ancillary proceeding in any criminal forfeiture case governed 
     by section 413(n) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 
     853(n)), in which--
       ``(A) financial records located in a foreign country may be 
     material--
       ``(i) to any claim or to the ability of the Government to 
     respond to such claim; or
       ``(ii) in a civil forfeiture case, to the ability of the 
     Government to establish the forfeitability of the property; 
     and
       ``(B) it is within the capacity of the claimant to waive 
     the claimant's rights under applicable financial secrecy 
     laws, or to obtain the records so that such records can be 
     made available notwithstanding such secrecy laws;
     the refusal of the claimant to provide the records in 
     response to a discovery request or to take the action 
     necessary otherwise to make the records available shall be 
     grounds for judicial sanctions, up to and including dismissal 
     of the claim with prejudice.

[[Page 5227]]

       ``(2) Privilege.--This subsection shall not affect the 
     right of the claimant to refuse production on the basis of 
     any privilege guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
     States or any other provision of Federal law.''.

     SEC. 18. APPLICATION TO ALIEN SMUGGLING OFFENSES.

       (a) Amendment of the Immigration and Nationality Act.--
     Section 274(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1324(b)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(b) Seizure and Forfeiture.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any conveyance, including any vessel, 
     vehicle, or aircraft, that has been or is being used in the 
     commission of a violation of subsection (a), the gross 
     proceeds of such violation, and any property traceable to 
     such conveyance or proceeds, shall be seized and subject to 
     forfeiture.
       ``(2) Applicable procedures.--Seizures and forfeitures 
     under this subsection shall be governed by the provisions of 
     chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code, relating to civil 
     forfeitures, including section 981(d) of such title, except 
     that such duties as are imposed upon the Secretary of the 
     Treasury under the customs laws described in that section 
     shall be performed by such officers, agents, and other 
     persons as may be designated for that purpose by the Attorney 
     General.
       ``(3) Prima facie evidence in determinations of 
     violations.--In determining whether a violation of subsection 
     (a) has occurred, any of the following shall be prima facie 
     evidence that an alien involved in the alleged violation had 
     not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, 
     or reside in the United States or that such alien had come 
     to, entered, or remained in the United States in violation of 
     law:
       ``(A) Records of any judicial or administrative proceeding 
     in which that alien's status was an issue and in which it was 
     determined that the alien had not received prior official 
     authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United 
     States or that such alien had come to, entered, or remained 
     in the United States in violation of law.
       ``(B) Official records of the Service or of the Department 
     of State showing that the alien had not received prior 
     official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the 
     United States or that such alien had come to, entered, or 
     remained in the United States in violation of law.
       ``(C) Testimony, by an immigration officer having personal 
     knowledge of the facts concerning that alien's status, that 
     the alien had not received prior official authorization to 
     come to, enter, or reside in the United States or that such 
     alien had come to, entered, or remained in the United States 
     in violation of law.''.
       (b) Technical Corrections to Existing Criminal Forfeiture 
     Authority.--Section 982(a)(6) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)--
       (A) by inserting ``section 274(a), 274A(a)(1), or 
     274A(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act or'' before 
     ``section 1425'' the first place it appears;
       (B) in clause (i), by striking ``a violation of, or a 
     conspiracy to violate, subsection (a)'' and inserting ``the 
     offense of which the person is convicted''; and
       (C) in subclauses (I) and (II) of clause (ii), by striking 
     ``a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, subsection 
     (a)'' and all that follows through ``of this title'' each 
     place it appears and inserting ``the offense of which the 
     person is convicted'';
       (2) by striking subparagraph (B); and
       (3) in the second sentence--
       (A) by striking ``The court, in imposing sentence on such 
     person'' and inserting the following:
       ``(B) The court, in imposing sentence on a person described 
     in subparagraph (A)''; and
       (B) by striking ``this subparagraph'' and inserting ``that 
     subparagraph''.

     SEC. 19. ENHANCED VISIBILITY OF THE ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM.

       Section 524(c)(6) of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(6)(A) The Attorney General shall transmit to Congress 
     and make available to the public, not later than 4 months 
     after the end of each fiscal year, detailed reports for the 
     prior fiscal year as follows:
       ``(i) A report on total deposits to the Fund by State of 
     deposit.
       ``(ii) A report on total expenses paid from the Fund, by 
     category of expense and recipient agency, including equitable 
     sharing payments.
       ``(iii) A report describing the number, value, and types of 
     properties placed into official use by Federal agencies, by 
     recipient agency.
       ``(iv) A report describing the number, value, and types of 
     properties transferred to State and local law enforcement 
     agencies, by recipient agency.
       ``(v) A report, by type of disposition, describing the 
     number, value, and types of forfeited property disposed of 
     during the year.
       ``(vi) A report on the year-end inventory of property under 
     seizure, but not yet forfeited, that reflects the type of 
     property, its estimated value, and the estimated value of 
     liens and mortgages outstanding on the property.
       ``(vii) A report listing each property in the year-end 
     inventory, not yet forfeited, with an outstanding equity of 
     not less than $1,000,000.
       ``(B) The Attorney General shall transmit to Congress and 
     make available to the public, not later than 2 months after 
     final issuance, the audited financial statements for each 
     fiscal year for the Fund.
       ``(C) Reports under subparagraph (A) shall include 
     information with respect to all forfeitures under any law 
     enforced or administered by the Department of Justice.
       ``(D) The transmittal and publication requirements in 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B) may be satisfied by--
       ``(i) posting the reports on an Internet website maintained 
     by the Department of Justice for a period of not less than 2 
     years; and
       ``(ii) notifying the Committees on the Judiciary of the 
     House of Representatives and the Senate when the reports are 
     available electronically.''.

     SEC. 20. PROCEEDS.

       (a) Forfeiture of Proceeds.--Section 981(a)(1)(C) of title 
     18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``or a 
     violation of section 1341'' and all that follows and 
     inserting ``or any offense constituting `specified unlawful 
     activity' (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of this title), 
     or a conspiracy to commit such offense.''.
       (b) Definition of Proceeds.--Section 981(a) of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term `proceeds' is 
     defined as follows:
       ``(A) In cases involving illegal goods, illegal services, 
     unlawful activities, and telemarketing and health care fraud 
     schemes, the term `proceeds' means property of any kind 
     obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of the 
     commission of the offense giving rise to forfeiture, and any 
     property traceable thereto, and is not limited to the net 
     gain or profit realized from the offense.
       ``(B) In cases involving lawful goods or lawful services 
     that are sold or provided in an illegal manner, the term 
     `proceeds' means the amount of money acquired through the 
     illegal transactions resulting in the forfeiture, less the 
     direct costs incurred in providing the goods or services. The 
     claimant shall have the burden of proof with respect to the 
     issue of direct costs. The direct costs shall not include any 
     part of the overhead expenses of the entity providing the 
     goods or services, or any part of the income taxes paid by 
     the entity.
       ``(C) In cases involving fraud in the process of obtaining 
     a loan or extension of credit, the court shall allow the 
     claimant a deduction from the forfeiture to the extent that 
     the loan was repaid, or the debt was satisfied, without any 
     financial loss to the victim.''.

     SEC. 21. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Except as provided in section 14(c), this Act and the 
     amendments made by this Act shall apply to any forfeiture 
     proceeding commenced on or after the date that is 120 days 
     after the date of enactment of this Act.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde).


                             General Leave

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on H.R. 1658.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill represents the culmination of a 7-year effort 
to reform our Nation's civil asset forfeiture laws. We would not be 
here today without the momentum generated by the House's passage of 
H.R. 1658 last June by the overwhelming vote of 375-48. That vote was 
made possible by the tireless support of my colleagues, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the ranking member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary; the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr); and the gentleman 
from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) and their staffs.
  House passage was also made possible by the support of a multitude of 
organizations who put aside their differences to work toward a common 
goal: the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Americans 
for Tax Reform, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Rifle 
Association, the American Bar Association, the National Association of 
Realtors, the Credit Union National Association, the American Bankers 
Association, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, the National 
Association of Home Builders, the Boat Owners Association of the United 
States, United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Apartment 
Association, the American Hotel and Motel Association, and the Law 
Enforcement Alliance of America.
  H.R. 1658 only got us through the House. Forfeiture reform would not 
have become a reality had the cause not been adopted by Orrin Hatch, 
the

[[Page 5228]]

chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary; and Pat Leahy, the 
committee's ranking member. I owe a debt of gratitude to the Senators 
and their staffs for succeeding in crafting a bill that could get 
through the Senate and yet retain all the necessary elements of reform.
  I must thank Senators Sessions and Schumer and their staffs for 
negotiating in the utmost good faith in helping craft a bill that both 
reforms our forfeiture laws and yet leaves civil forfeitures as an 
important crime-fighting tool for Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement.
  Similar thanks must go to Attorney General Reno and Assistant 
Attorney General Robert Raben. They can all be proud of what they 
helped to accomplish.
  I also must thank our former colleague Bob Bauman and Brenda 
Grantland of Forfeiture Endangers American Rights for their long and 
dedicated work on behalf of forfeiture reform, and Chicago Tribune 
columnist Stephen Chapman for first alerting me to the great abuses of 
forfeiture laws.
  And I must thank David Smith, who has been there since the beginning. 
David helped me draft my first forfeiture reform bill, the Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Reform Act of 1993, and helped draft Senators Leahy's and 
Hatch's reform bill and helped draft the Senate-passed bill we are 
considering today. This bill is truly his accomplishment.
  And finally, George Fishman of our Committee on the Judiciary staff 
has been tireless in helping shepherd this legislation through the 
House and Senate.
  Let me briefly outline the main points of H.R. 1658 as passed by the 
Senate. The bill makes eight fundamental reforms:
  (1) The bill requires the Government to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture. Currently, 
when a property owner goes to Federal court to challenge a seizure of 
property, all the Government needs to do is make an initial showing of 
probable cause that the property is subject to civil forfeiture. The 
owner then must establish that the property is innocent.
  (2) The bill provides that if the Government's theory of forfeiture 
is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of 
a crime or was involved in the commission of a crime, the Government 
must show that there was a substantial connection between the property 
and the crime.
  (3) The bill provides that property can be released by a Federal 
court pending final disposition of a civil forfeiture case if continued 
possession by the Government would cause the property owner substantial 
hardship, such as preventing the functioning of a business or leaving 
an individual homeless, and the likely hardship outweighs the risks 
that the property will be destroyed, damaged, lost, concealed or 
transferred if returned to the owner.
  (4) The bill provides that property owners who substantially prevail 
in court proceedings challenging the seizure of their property will 
receive reasonable attorney's fees. In addition, the bill allows a 
court to provide counsel for indigents if they are represented by 
appointed counsel in related criminal cases. Currently, property owners 
who successfully challenge the seizure of their property almost never 
are awarded attorney's fees. In addition, indigents have no right to 
appointed counsel in civil forfeiture cases.
  (5) The bill eliminates the cost bond requirement, under which a 
property owner must now post a bond of the lesser of $5,000 or 10 
percent of the value of the property seized merely for the right to 
contest a civil forfeiture in Federal court. The bill provides that if 
a court finds that a claimant's assertion of an interest in property 
was frivolous, the court may impose a civil fine.
  (6) The bill creates a uniform innocent owner defense for all Federal 
civil forfeiture statutes. Importantly, the defense protects property 
owners who have given timely notice to the police of the illegal use of 
their property and have in a timely fashion revoked or made a good 
faith attempt to revoke permission to use the property from those 
engaging in the illegal conduct.
  (7) The bill allows property owners to sue the Federal Government for 
compensation for damage to their property when they prevail in civil 
forfeiture actions. Currently, the Federal Government is exempt from 
liability for damage caused during the handling or storage of property 
being detained by law enforcement officers.
  (8) The bill provides a uniform definition of the forfeitable 
proceeds of criminal acts. In cases involving illegal goods or 
services, unlawful activities and telemarketing and health care fraud 
schemes, proceeds are properties obtained directly or indirectly as a 
result of the commission of the offenses giving rise to forfeiture, and 
any properties traceable thereto, and are not limited to the net gain 
or profit realized from the offenses. In cases involving lawful goods 
or services that are sold or provided in an illegal manner, proceeds 
are money acquired through the illegal transactions less the direct 
costs incurred in providing the goods or services.
  H.R. 1658 also contains a number of provisions addressing the needs 
of the Justice Department and State and local law enforcement.

                              {time}  1345

  These include increasing the availability of criminal forfeiture and 
the civil forfeiture of the proceeds of crimes, relaxing the statute of 
limitations governing civil forfeiture actions, allowing Federal courts 
discretionary use of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, allowing 
Federal courts to enhance forfeiture judgments of foreign nations, 
allowing Federal courts to impose sanctions up to and including 
dismissal of an owner's claim if property owners who have filed claims 
in civil forfeiture cases refuse to provide the government with access 
to potentially material financial records in foreign countries, and 
allowing Federal courts to issue civil restraining orders against 
property where there is a substantial probability the government will 
prevail in civil forfeiture actions.
  This bill is one we can all be proud of. It returns civil asset 
forfeiture to the ranks of respected law enforcement tools that can be 
used without risk to the civil liberties and property rights of 
American citizens. We are all better off that this is so.
  Mr. Speaker, I insert into the Record at this point a Congressional 
Budget Office letter on this matter. I urge my colleagues to support 
this bill today.

                                                    U.S. Congress,


                                  Congressional Budget Office,

                                    Washington, DC, April 5, 2000.
     Hon. Orrin G. Hatch,
     Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
     prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1658, the Civil 
     Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000.
       If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
     pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Lanette 
     J. Keith (for federal costs), who can be reached at 226-2860, 
     and Shelley Finlayson (for the state and local impact), who 
     can be reached at 225-3220.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Barry B. Anderson
                                   (For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
       Enclosure.


               congressional budget office cost estimate

     H.R. 1658--Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000
       Summary: H.R. 1658 would make many changes to federal asset 
     forfeiture laws that would affect the processing of about 
     60,000 civil seizures conducted each year by the Department 
     of justice (DOJ) and the Department of the Treasury. (The 
     Treasury Department makes an additional 50,000 seizures 
     annually that would not be affected by this act.) Assuming 
     appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO estimates that 
     implementing H.R. 1658 would cost $9 million over the 2001-
     2005 period to pay for additional costs of court-appointed 
     counsel that would be authorized by this legislation. In 
     addition, enacting the legislation would affect direct 
     spending and receipts; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures 
     would apply.
       Because CBO expects that enacting H.R. 1658 would result in 
     fewer civil seizures by DOJ and the Treasury Department, we 
     estimate that governmental receipts (i.e., revenues) 
     deposited into the Assets Forfeiture Fund and the Treasury 
     Forfeiture Fund would decrease by about $115 million each 
     year beginning in fiscal year 2001. Under current law, both 
     forfeiture funds are authorized to collect revenue and spend 
     the balance without further appropriation. Thus, the 
     corresponding direct spending from the two

[[Page 5229]]

     funds would also decline, but with some lag. CBO estimates 
     that enacting this provision would decrease projected 
     surpluses by a total of $46 million over the fiscal years 
     2001 and 2002 (the difference between lower revenues and 
     lower direct spending over those years), but that by fiscal 
     year 2003 the changes in receipts and spending would be 
     equal, resulting in no net budgetary impact thereafter.
       H.R. 1658 also would require the Legal Services Corporation 
     (LSC) to represent certain claimants in civil forfeiture 
     cases and would require the federal government to reimburse 
     the LSC for its costs. CBO estimates that this provision 
     would increase direct spending by $5 million over the 2001-
     2005 period.
       In addition, H.R. 1658 would make the federal government 
     liable for any property damage, attorney fees, and pre-
     judgment and post-judgment interested payments on certain 
     assets to prevailing parties in civil forfeiture proceedings. 
     CBO cannot estimate either the likelihood or the magnitude of 
     such awards because there is no basis for predicting either 
     the outcome of possible litigation or the amount of 
     compensation.
       H.R. 1658 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
     mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
     (UMRA), but CBO expects that enacting this legislation would 
     lead to a reduction in payments to state and local 
     governments from the Assets Forfeiture Fund and the Treasury 
     Forfeiture Fund.
       Description of the Act's major provisions: H.R. 1658 would 
     make various changes to federal laws relating to the 
     forfeiture of civil assets. In particular, the act would:
       Establish a short statutory time limit for the federal 
     government to notify interested parties of a seizure and to 
     file a complaint;
       Eliminate the cost bond requirement, whereby claimants have 
     to post bond in an amount of the lesser of $5,000 or 10 
     percent of the value of the seized property (but not less 
     than $250) to preserve the right to contest a forfeiture;
       Permit federal courts to appoint counsel for certain 
     indigent claimants;
       Increase the federal government's burden of proof to a 
     preponderance of the evidence;
       Require the federal government to compensate prevailing 
     claimants for property damage;
       Establish the federal government's liability for payment of 
     attorney fees and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; 
     and
       Authorize the use of forfeited funds to pay restitution to 
     crime victims.
       Estimated cost to the Federal Government: As shown in the 
     following table, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 1658 
     would increase discretionary spending for court-appointed 
     counsel by $9 million over the 2001-2005 period, assuming 
     appropriation of the necessary funds. (For the purposes of 
     this estimate. CBO assumes that spending for this purpose 
     would be funded with appropriated amounts from the Defender 
     Services account.) In addition, we estimate that over the 
     2001-2005 period, the reductions in direct spending of funds 
     from forfeited assets would be smaller than the reductions in 
     revenues estimated to occur as a result of enacting H.R. 
     1658, resulting in a net cost of $46 over the five-year 
     period. Finally, CBO estimates that additional payments to 
     the Legal Services Corporation would be about $1 million each 
     year. The costs of this legislation fall within budget 
     function 750 (administration of justice).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   By fiscal year, in millions of dollars
                                                           -----------------------------------------------------
                                                              2000     2001     2002     2003     2004     2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
                                        Spending subject to appropriation
 
Spending Under Current Law Defender Services:
    Estimated Authorization Level \1\.....................      375      387      397      408      419      429
    Estimated Outlays.....................................      373      389      398      408      419      429
Proposed Changes:
    Estimated Authorization Level.........................        0        1        2        2        2        2
    Estimated Outlays.....................................        0        1        2        2        2        2
Spending Under H.R. 1658 for Defender Services:
    Estimated Authorization Level \1\.....................      375      388      399      410      421      431
    Estimated Outlays.....................................      373      390      399      410      421      431
 
                                     Changes in revenues and direct spending
 
Changes in Forfeiture Receipts:
    Estimated Revenues....................................        0     -115     -115     -115     -115     -115
Spending of Forfeiture Receipts:
    Estimated Budget Authority............................        0     -115     -115     -115     -115     -115
    Estimated Outlays.....................................        0      -76     -108     -115     -115     -115
Payments to the Legal Services Corporation:
    Estimated Budget Authority............................        0        1        1        1        1        1
    Estimated Outlays.....................................        0        1        1        1        1       1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 2000 level is the amount appropriated for that year. The estimated authorization levels for 2001 through
  2005 reflect CBO baseline estimates, assuming adjustments for anticipated inflation.

       Basis of estimate: For purposes of this estimate, CBO 
     assumes that H.R. 1658 will be enacted by the end of fiscal 
     year 2000 and that the necessary amounts will be appropriated 
     for each fiscal year. We also assume that outlays for 
     defender services and the use of forfeiture receipts will 
     continue to follow historical patterns.
     Spending subject to appropriation
       H.R. 1658 would allow for court-appointed counsel for 
     certain parties contesting a forfeiture who already have been 
     appointed counsel in a related criminal case. The act also 
     would eliminate the requirement that claimants post bond 
     before the case is tried in federal court. Consequently, CBO 
     anticipates that enacting H.R. 1658 would make it easier for 
     people whose assets have been seized to challenge the 
     forfeiture of such assets. Based on information from DOJ, we 
     estimate that the percentage of seizures that would result in 
     contested civil cases would increase from 5 percent annually 
     to at least 20 percent in fiscal year 2001. As the defense 
     bar becomes increasingly aware of and more familiar with the 
     provisions of H.R. 1658, CBO expects that the percentage of 
     contested civil cases would increase to about 30 percent each 
     year.
       While the decision to appoint counsel would be at the 
     discretion of the judge assigned to each case, CBO expects 
     that judges would not want to encourage litigation in many 
     cases. Moreover, CBO expects that many of the contested cases 
     would involve larger assets, and such cases usually do not 
     involve indigent claimants who would need court-appointed 
     counsel. Based on information from DOJ, CBO estimates that a 
     small number of indigent claimants in civil forfeiture cases 
     would also have a criminal case pending. Specifically, we 
     estimate that court-appointed counsel would be provided in 
     about 5 percent of contested civil cases. In addition, 
     because forfeiture cases involve property, the courts might 
     have to appoint more than one attorney to represent multiple 
     claimants in the same case. Historical data suggest an 
     average of 1.5 claims per case.
       While H.R. 1658 does not specify a level of compensation 
     paid to court-appointed counsel for a civil forfeiture case, 
     CBO expects such payment would be equivalent to amounts paid 
     in criminal cases. Based on information from the 
     Administrative Office of the United States Courts, CBO 
     estimates that court-appointed counsel would be paid about 
     $3,000 per claimant per case. In total, we estimate that 
     additional defender services related to civil asset 
     forfeiture proceedings would cost about $9 million over the 
     next five years.
       In addition, other discretionary spending could be affected 
     by this act. On the one hand, the federal court system could 
     require additional resources in the future if additional 
     cases are brought to trial and the amount of time spent on 
     each case increases. On the other hand, some savings in law 
     enforcement resources could be realized if fewer seizures and 
     conducted each year. While CBO cannot predict the amount of 
     any such costs or savings, we expect that, on balance, 
     implementing the act would result in no significant 
     additional discretionary spending other than the increases 
     for court-appointed counsel.
     Revenues and direct spending
       Based on information from DOJ and the Treasury Department, 
     CBO estimates that about 23,000 seizures that would otherwise 
     occur each year under current law would be eliminated under 
     H.R. 1658. (Such seizures primarily involve assets whose 
     value is less than $25,000.) The various changes to civil 
     forfeiture laws under this act would make proving cases more 
     difficult and more time-consuming for the federal government. 
     In many instances, law enforcement agencies, including the 
     state and local agencies that work on investigations jointly 
     with the federal government and then receive a portion of the 
     receipts generated from the forfeitures, many determine that 
     certain cases, especially those with a value less than 
     $25,000, may no longer be cost-effective to pursue. While the 
     federal government and other law enforcement agencies would 
     take a few years following enactment of the legislation to 
     realize the full effects of its provisions on the forfeiture 
     and claims process, CBO expects

[[Page 5230]]

     that the total number of seizures would decrease by nearly 40 
     percent. CBO estimates that such a reduction in seizures 
     would reduce total forfeiture receipts by about $115 million 
     in fiscal year 2001 and by $575 million over the 2001-2005 
     period.
       The receipts deposited into the Assets Forfeiture Fund and 
     the Treasury Forfeiture fund are used to pay for all costs 
     associated with the operation of the forfeiture program, the 
     payment of equitable shares of proceeds to foreign, state, 
     and local law enforcement agencies, and other expenses not 
     directly associated with a forfeiture case, such as payment 
     of awards to informants. In recent years about 67 percent of 
     total asset forfeiture receipts collected in a given year are 
     spent in the same year in which they are collected; 
     therefore, we estimate that enacting H.R. 1658 would result 
     in a decrease in federal spending of $76 million in fiscal 
     year 2001, $108 million in 2001, and $115 million annually in 
     subsequent years.
       In addition, H.R. 1658 would require the Legal Service 
     Corporation to represent claimants in financial need and 
     whose claim involves an asset that is the claimant's primary 
     residence. Under H.R. 1658, the court must enter a judgment 
     in favor of the LSC for the cost of legal representation. 
     Based on historical data, CBO estimates that such judgments 
     would increase direct spending by about $1 million a year.
     Additional potential budgetary impacts
       In addition, this act would make the federal government 
     liable for any property damage, attorney fees, and pre-
     judgment and post-judgment interest payments on certain 
     assets to prevailing parties in civil forfeiture proceedings. 
     However, CBO cannot estimate either the likelihood or the 
     magnitude of such awards because there is no basis for 
     predicting either the outcome of possible litigation or the 
     amount of compensation. Compensation payments could come from 
     appropriated funds or occur without further appropriation 
     from the Judgment Fund, or from both sources.
       Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go 
     procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or 
     receipts. The following table summarizes the estimated pay-
     as-you-go effects of H.R. 1658. For the purposes of enforcing 
     pay-as-you-go procedures, only the effects in the current 
     year, the budget year, and the succeeding four years are 
     counted.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                     By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars
                                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         200      201      202      203      204      205      206      207      208      209      2010
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes in outlays...................................        0      -75     -107     -114     -114     -114     -114     -114     -114     -114     -114
Changes in receipts..................................        0     -115     -115     -115     -115     -115     -115     -115     -115     -115     -115
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

       Estimated impact on state, local, and tribal governments: 
     H.R. 1658 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined 
     in UMRA. However, because CBO expects that the seizure of 
     assets would decline under the act, CBO estimates that 
     payments to state and local law enforcement agencies from the 
     Assets Forfeiture Fund and the Treasury Forfeiture Fund would 
     decline by about $230 million over the 2001-2005 period. 
     State and local law enforcement agencies receive, on average, 
     about 40 percent of the receipts in these forfeiture funds 
     either because they participate in joint investigations that 
     result in the seizure of assets, or because they turn over 
     assets seized in their own investigations to the federal 
     government, which conducts the civil asset forfeiture case. 
     In both cases the receipts from a seizure are accumulated in 
     the funds and a portion is distributed to state and local 
     agencies according to their involvement.
       Estimated impact on the private sector: This act would 
     impose no new private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA.
       Previous CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 1658 as 
     reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary on June 18, 
     1999. While the two versions of the legislation are similar, 
     we estimate they would have different costs. CBO estimates 
     the House version would result in a greater loss of 
     forfeiture receipts, by $25 million annually, than the 
     version approved by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
     because the House version would place the burden of proof in 
     assets forfeiture cases more heavily on the federal 
     government.
       In addition, the House version of H.R. 1658 would not 
     require payments to the Legal Services Corporation for 
     representation of certain claimants whose principal residence 
     has been seized. Finally, CBO estimates that the Senate 
     version of the legislation would authorize less spending than 
     the House version for the legal representation of indigent 
     claimants because it restricts the eligibility requirements 
     for this service more than the House legislation. We estimate 
     this representation would cost about $2 million annually 
     under the Senate version and about $13 million annually under 
     the House version.
       Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Lanette J. Keith. 
     Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Shelley 
     Finlayson. Impact on the Private Sector: John Harris.
       Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant 
     Director for Budget Analysis.
  Mr. Speaker, since no Committee Report was filed for H.R. 1658 by the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, the House Judiciary Committee Report 
remains the best legislative history as to the bill. See H.R. Rep. No. 
106-192 (1999). However, since new provisions were added to the bill in 
the Senate and other provisions were modified from their original House 
form, it will be useful for me to make a number of clarifying points.


     standard of proof (section 2--creating 18 U.S.C. sec. 983(c))

  H.R. 1658, as amended by the Senate, reduced the standard of proof 
the government has to meet in civil asset forfeiture cases from clear 
and convincing evidence to a preponderance of the evidence. While this 
is obviously a lower standard, Congress remains extremely dubious as to 
the probative value of certain types of evidence in meeting this 
standard.
  First, as noted in the Committee Report to H.R. 1658, Congress is 
very skeptical that a person's carrying of ``unreasonably large'' 
quantities of cash is indicative of involvement in the drug trade. See 
H.R. Rep. No. 106-192 at 8. Many federal courts have ruled that a 
person's carrying of large amounts of cash does not even meet the 
current government burden of probable cause. The Seventh Circuit so 
ruled in U.S. v. $506,231 in U.S. Currency, 125 F. 3d 442 (7th Cir. 
1997). The court found that ``[a]s far as we can tell, no court in the 
nation has yet held that, standing alone, the mere existence of 
currency, even a lot of it, is illegal. We are certainly not willing to 
be the first to so hold.'' Id. at 452. The court also found it 
necessary to remind a U.S. Attorney that ``the government may not seize 
money, even half a million dollars, based on its bare assumption that 
most people do not have huge sums of money lying about, and if they do, 
they must be involved in narcotics trafficking or some other sinister 
activity.'' Id. at 454 (emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit found 
similarly. See U.S. v. $191,910 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1072 
(9th Cir. 1994) (``[A]ny amount of money, standing alone, would 
probably be insufficient to establish probable cause for 
forfeiture.''); See also U.S. v. One Lot of U.S. Currency ($36,634), 
103 F.3d 1048, 1055 n.9 (1st Cir. 1997); U.S. v. $121,100, 999 F.2d 
1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1993). Congress disagrees with those courts that 
have suggested otherwise. See U.S. v. $37,780 in U.S. Currency, 920 
F.2d 159, 162 (2nd Cir. 1990). Clearly, if large amounts of cash do not 
meet the probable cause standard, they do not meet the higher standard 
of preponderance of the evidence.
  The government can rely on large amounts of cash in conjunction with 
other evidence in attempting to meet its standard of proof. For 
instance, large amounts of cash found in proximity to drugs are often 
relied upon. However, the probative value of this evidence is much 
lower when the amount of drugs found is consistent with personal use. 
See U.S. v. Real Property Located at 110 Collier Dr., 793 F. Supp. 
1048, 1052 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (``The simultaneous presence of $8,861 in 
mildewed currency and a small amount of drugs for personal use . . . 
does not establish probable cause that the currency was intended to be 
used for the exchange of drugs.'')
  In any event, the relative evidentiary contribution of cash in 
meeting a standard of proof, especially one raised above mere probable 
cause, should rarely be significant. Why? As the court found in U.S. v. 
One Lot of U.S. Currency Totalling $14,665, 33 F. Supp.2d 47 (D. Mass. 
1998), reliance on cash can involve invidious assumptions: ``[m]any 
immigrants and Americans with limited means--hard working and law 
abiding--prefer to use cash in lieu of bank accounts and credit cards. 
* * * Indeed, the whole notion that carrying cash is indicative of 
illegal conduct reflects class and cultural biases that are profoundly 
troubling.'' Id. at 53-54.
  Of especially little probative value is the method by which cash is 
carried. As the court found in One Lot of U.S. Currency Totalling 
$14,665:

       I do not doubt that drug couriers and dealers use rubber 
     bands to bundle their illgotten gains. However, drug dealers 
     also presumably use belts to hold up their trousers; under 
     the government's analysis, if [the claimant] was wearing a 
     belt at the time of the seizure, it would suggest his 
     involvement

[[Page 5231]]

     with illegal activity. Although many courts appear to 
     disagree, I find that the government's `rubber band' 
     hypothesis doesn't stretch quite that far.
     Id. at 54 (footnotes omitted). See also $506,231 in U.S. 
     Currency, 125 F.3d at 452.

  The second type of evidence whose probative value is questioned by 
Congress is the fact that airline tickets are purchased with cash. See 
H.R. Rep. No. 106-192 at 8. See also One Lot of U.S. Currency 
($36,634), 103 F.3d at 1055 n. 9. U.S. v. $40,000 in U.S. Currency, 999 
F. Supp. 234, 238 (D.P.R. 1998); U.S. v. Funds in the Amount of $9,800, 
952 F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (N.D. III. 1996).
  The third type of disfavored evidence is narcotic dog alerts on 
currency. As one commentator has noted:

       It has been estimated that one out of every three 
     circulating bills has been involved in a cocaine transaction. 
     Cocaine and other drugs attach to the oily surface of 
     currency in a variety of ways. Each contaminated bill 
     contaminates others as they pass through cash registers, cash 
     drawers, wallets, and counting machines. If, in fact, a 
     substantial part of the currency in this country will cause a 
     trained dog to alert, then the alert obviously has no 
     evidentiary value.

  Smith, 1 Prosecution and Defense of Forfeiture Cases sec. 4.03, p. 4-
82.3 (footnotes omitted). The author cites experts finding that 70-97% 
of all currency is contaminated with cocaine. Id. at sec. 4.03, p. 4-
82.1-4-82.2.
  Many federal courts have agreed as to the low probative value of dog 
alerts. See, e.g., $506,231 in U.S. Currency, 125 F.3d at 453; Muhammed 
v. Drug Enforcement Agency, 92 F.3d 648, 653 (8th Cir. 1996)(``The fact 
of contamination, alone, is virtually meaningless and gives no hint of 
when or how the cash became so contaminated.''); U.S. v. $5,000 in U.S. 
Currency, 40 F.3d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 1994) (``[T]he evidentiary value 
of narcotics dog's alert [is] minimal.'') (footnote omitted); U.S. v. 
U.S. Currency, $30,060, 39 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1994) (`` `[T]he 
continued reliance of courts and law enforcement officers on [drug dog 
alerts] to separate `legitimate' currency from `drug-connected' 
currency is logically indefensible.' '' Id. at 1043, quoting Jones v. 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 819 F. Supp. 698, 721 (M.D. Tenn. 
1993) (footnote omitted)); U.S. v. $53,082 in U.S. Currency, 985 F.2d 
245 (6th Cir. 1993) (``[A] court should `seriously question the value 
of a dog's alert without other persuasive evidence. . . .' '' Id. at 
250-51 n.5, quoting U.S. v. $80,760 in U.S. Currency, 781 F. Supp. 462, 
476 (N.D. Tex. 1991), aff'd, 978 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1992); One Lot of 
U.S. Currency Totalling $14,665, 33 F. Supp.2d at 58. See also U.S. v. 
$639,558 in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 714 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Dog 
alerts of little value in meeting a standard of probable cause, and are 
of even less value in meeting a standard of preponderance of the 
evidence.
  Adding the above factors together, ``[t]he government must come 
forward with more than a `drug-courier profile' and a positive dog 
sniff [to meet the standard of probable cause].'' Funds in the Amount 
of $9,800, 952 F. Supp. at 1261.'' As the court ruled in $80,760 in 
U.S. Currency, 781 F. Supp. at 475, ``[p]rofile characteristics are of 
little value in the forfeiture context without other persuasive 
evidence establishing the requisite substantial connection.'' See also 
Jones, 819 F. Supp. at 719 (``The mere fact that a traveler matches 
some elements of a drug courier profile does not amount to even 
articulable suspicion, much less probable cause.''). The same holds 
true, to an even greater extent, when the standard is preponderance of 
the evidence.
  Lastly, ``[a]n owner does not have to prove where he obtained money 
until the government demonstrates that it has [met its burden] to 
believe the money is forfeitable.'' $506,231 in U.S. Currency, 125 F.3d 
at 454.
  I should also note that while hearsay may be used to establish 
probable cause for seizure, see U.S. v. One 56 Foot Motor Yacht Named 
Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1983), it is not admissible to 
establish the forfeitability of property by a preponderance of the 
evidence. And, while the government may use evidence obtained after the 
forfeiture complaint is filed to establish the forfeitability of the 
property by a preponderance of the evidence, the government must still 
have had enough evidence to establish probable cause at the time of 
filing (or seizure, if earlier). The bill is not intended to limit the 
right of either party to bring a motion for summary judgment after the 
filing of the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) or 56(b).


   facilitating property (section 2--creating 18 U.S.C. sec. 983(c))

  While H.R. 1658 as it was introduced and originally passed in the 
House contained no provision reforming the standards regarding 
``facilitation'' forfeiture, this is an issue about which I have been 
long concerned. See Hyde, Forfeiting Our Property Rights: Is Your 
Property Safe From Seizure? 61 (1995) I am gratified that it is 
addressed in the Senate amendment to H.R. 1658.
  There are many facilitation-type civil forfeiture provisions in the 
U.S. Code. Most importantly, the federal drug laws make subject to 
civil forfeiture ``[a]ll conveyances . . . which are used, or intended 
for use . . . in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, 
receipt, possession, or concealment of [controlled substances] . . . 
.'' 21 U.S.C. sec. 881(a)(4). They also make subject to forfeiture 
``[a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended 
to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter . . . .'', 21 
U.S.C. sec. 881(a)(6), and ``[a]ll real property . . . which is used, 
or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to . . . facilitate the 
commission of a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than 
one year's imprisonment . . . [,]'' 21 U.S.C. sec. 881(a)(7). Also, 
federal law make subject to civil forfeiture ``[a]ny property, real or 
personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in 
violation of [certain money laundering laws] . . . .'' 18 U.S.C. sec. 
981(a)(1)(A).
  How strong need the connection be between the ``facilitating'' 
property and the underlying crime? As to 881(a)(6), courts have 
interpreted its legislative history as requiring there to be a 
``substantial connection'' between the property and the crime. See 
Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Joint Explanatory Statements of 
Titles II and III, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin News 9518, 9522.
  As to 881(a)(7), many courts require there to be a substantial 
connection. See, e.g., U.S. v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery 
St., 914 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1990); U.S. v. 26.075 Acres, Located in 
Swift Creek Township, 687 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd sub nom. 
U.S. v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1542 (4th Cir. 1989); U.S. v. 
Forfeiture, Stop Six Center, 781 F. Supp. 1200, 1205-06 (N.D. Tex. 
1991). Others do not. The Seventh Circuit has ruled that the 
facilitating property need only have ``more than an incidental or 
fortuitous connection to criminal activity . . . .'' U.S. v. Real 
Estate Known as 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied sub nom. Born v. U.S. 498 U.S. 1126 (1991). See also U.S. 
v. Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1269 (2nd Cir. 1989) 
(test is ``sufficient nexus'').
  How significant is the difference? The Seventh Circuit in 916 Douglas 
Ave. has found that ``[t]he difference between th[e substantial 
connection] approach and our own appears largely to be semantic rather 
than practical.'' 903 F.2d at 494. This might be the case--the Fourth 
Circuit has ruled that under the substantial connection test, ``[a]t 
minimum, the property must have more than an incidental or fortuitous 
connection to criminal activity[!]'' U.S. v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 
990 (4th Cir. 1990). Some courts don't even feel the need to choose 
between the tests, ruling that facilitation has been shown in 
particular cases under either test. See U.S. v. Rd 1, Box 1, 
Thompsontown, 952 F.2d 53, 57 (3rd Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Real Property 
and Residence at 3097 S.W. 111th Ave., 921 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1090 (1991).
  As to 881(a)(4), some courts have applied the substantial connection 
test. See U.S. v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft, 777 F.2d 947, 953 (4th Cir. 
1985); U.S. v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424, 1426 (11th Cir. 
1983). Others have not. See U.S. v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 
F.2d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
  H.R. 1658 provides that the substantial connection test should be 
used whenever facilitating property is subject to civil forfeiture 
under the U.S. Code. And the test is intended to mean something, it is 
intended to require that facilitating property have a connection to the 
underlying crime significantly greater than just ``incidental or 
fortuitous.''
  In one area in particular, courts have been much too liberal in 
finding facilitation. An especially high standard should have to be met 
before we dispossess a person or family of their home. A primary 
residence should be accorded far greater protection than mere personal 
property. See U.S. v. Certain Lots in Virginia Beach, 657 F. Supp. 
1062, 1065 (E.D. Va. 1987). But, courts have not always felt this way 
in applying section 881(a)(7). In U.S. v. Premises and Real Property at 
250 Kreag Rd., 739 F. Supp. 120, 124 (W.D.N.Y. 1990), the court found a 
home forfeitable because the owner grew 17 stalks of marijuana in his 
backyard of home for personal use (standard used was unclear). See also 
U.S. v. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 205 (1st Cir. 1992). 
The court in 916 Douglas Ave. found a home forfeitable on the basis of 
three phone calls made to or from it regarding the sale of

[[Page 5232]]

two ounces of cocaine. ``The loss of one's home for the sale of a small 
amount of cocaine is undoubtedly a harsh penalty'', but that is what 
Congress intended. 903 F.2d at 494 (no substantial connection needed). 
In U.S. v. Plescia, 48 F.3d 1452, 1462 (7th Cir. 1995), one phone call 
to set up a large drug deal resulted in the forfeiture of a home (no 
substantial connection needed). See also U.S. v. Zuniga, 835 F. Supp. 
622 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (Under a ``substantial connection'' or lesser 
test, ten calls involving drug offenses resulted in the forfeiture of a 
house (under a criminal forfeiture statute with an ``identical'' burden 
as 881(a)(7)).). None of these cases would meet the substantial 
connection test provided in H.R. 1658.
  Under the substantial connection test, should an entire bank account 
be forfeitable because some of its assets were involved in money 
laundering? In U.S. v. All Monies ($477,048.62 in account #90-3617-3, 
754 F. Supp. 1467 (D.Haw. 1991), the court ruled that under sec. 
881(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. sec. 981(a)(1)(A), the government showed 
probable cause that an entire bank account worth approximately $477,000 
was forfeitable for being involved in/facilitated drug and money 
laundering offenses, not just the approximately $242,000 in the account 
representing the proceeds of a drug crime. The court found that ``both 
the legitimate and tainted money in the account aided [the laundering 
of drug proceeds]. The account provided a repository for the drug 
proceeds in which the legitimate money could provide a `cover' for 
those proceeds, thus making it more difficult to trace the proceeds.'' 
Id. at 1475-76 (substantial connection required).
  Such a doctrine can quickly lead to unfair and disproportionate 
results. The 10th Circuit presents the proper limitation:

       [T]he mere pooling or commingling of tainted and untainted 
     funds in an account does not, without more, render the entire 
     contents of the account subject to forfeiture. . . . 
     [F]orfeiture of legitimate and illegitimate funds commingled 
     in an account is proper as long as the government 
     demonstrates that the . . . [owner] pooled the funds to 
     facilitate, i.e., disguise the nature and source of, his 
     scheme. * * *

  U.S. v. Bornfield, 145 F.3d 1123, 1135 (10th Cir. 1998) (criminal 
forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. sec. 982(a)(1)) (citations omitted) 
(standard used was unclear). See also U.S. v. Contents of Account, 847 
F. Supp. 329, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (``The facilitation theory is 
appropriate in the present case where [the owner] established and 
controlled the [accounts], and commingled legitimate and illegitimate 
funds in these accounts, for the purpose of disguising the nature and 
source of the proceeds of [the] scheme.'') (forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 
sec. 981(a)(1)(A)) (standard used was unclear).
  Under H.R. 1658's substantial connection test, in order for an entire 
bank account composed of both tainted and untainted funds to be 
forfeitable, a primary purpose of its establishment or maintenance must 
be to disguise a money laundering scheme. This rule should also apply 
when the government seeks to forfeit an entire business because tainted 
funds were laundered in a firm bank account. For the business to be 
forfeitable, a primary purpose for the establishment or maintenance of 
the entire business must be to disguise a money laundering scheme. See 
U.S. v. Any and All Assets of Shane Co., 816 F. Supp. 389, 401 
(M.D.N.C. 1991) (Business that was a front for money laundering was 
forfeitable.) (forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. sec. 981(a)(1)(A) 
(substantial connection required).


      proportionality (section 2--creating 18 U.S.C. sec. 983(g))

  This provision is designed to codify U.S. v. Bajakajian 524 U.S. 321 
(1998).


                  Statute of Limitations (section 11)

  This provision amends 19 U.S.C. sec. 1621, enlarging the time in 
which the government may commence a civil forfeiture action by allowing 
the government to commence an action within five years after the time 
the alleged offense was discovered, or two years after the time when 
the involvement of the property in an offense is discovered, whichever 
is later. 19 U.S.C. sec. 1621 has been construed as requiring the 
government to exercise reasonable care and diligence in seeking to 
learn the facts disclosing the alleged wrong. Thus, the courts have 
held under sec. 1621 that the time begins to run as soon as the 
government is aware of facts that should trigger an investigation 
leading to discovery of the offense. See Smith, 1 Prosecution and 
Defense of Forfeiture Cases sec. 12.02. This construction will require 
the government to exercise reasonable diligence in seeking discovery of 
assets involved in an offense once the offense is discovered.
  The provision should not be read as extending the statute of 
limitations in cases that are already time-barred as of the date of 
enactment of the bill.


              uniform definition of proceeds (section 20)

  S. 1931's uniform definition of proceeds is self-explanatory. 
However, it is important to note Congress' disapproval of the ``ink 
drop'' test for proceeds forfeiture developed by the Eleventh Circuit. 
In U.S. v. One Single Family Residence, 933 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir. 
1991) (proceeds forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. sec. 881(a)(6)), the court 
ruled that ``[a]s to a wrongdoer, any amount of the invested proceeds 
traceable to drug activities forfeits the entire property. We have 
never held that as to a wrongdoer only the funds traceable to illegal 
activities may be forfeited.'' To the contrary, only that portion of a 
piece of property purchased with tainted funds is forfeitable.


            destruction or removal of property (section 12)

  18 U.S.C. sec. 2232 is amended to expand the scope of conduct which 
constitutes an offense for damaging or removing property which is 
subject to a lawful search or seizure. Subsection (a), which makes it a 
crime to damage or remove property which has not yet been seized, 
should be interpreted in a commonsense fashion to apply to a person or 
persons who had knowledge that a law enforcement agency is attempting, 
has attempted, or was about to attempt to seize the property. 
Subsection (b), which has been added to this section, makes it an 
offense to remove or destroy property which is already the subject of 
the in rem jurisdiction of a United States District Court.


                      effective date (section 21)

  For purposes of the effective date provision, the date on which a 
forfeiture proceeding is commenced is the date on which the first 
administrative notice of forfeiture relating to the seized property is 
sent. The purpose of this provision is to give the Justice Department 
and the U.S. courts four months from the date of enactment of the bill 
to educate their employees as to the bill's changes in forfeiture law.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, this legislation has been long in coming. I know on 
behalf of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), we want to thank 
the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) because this is legislation that 
the gentleman from Illinois has worked on extensively and without rest. 
The gentleman from Illinois has worked in a bipartisan manner. He has 
those of us who have had disagreements sometimes rally around this 
legislation because in every single one of our districts we found 
someone's mother, someone's wife, someone's sister, some innocent 
person who has been law abiding but because we are part of a great 
family, have found some family member outside of the law who has 
brought down the heavy hand of the law on hardworking people who have 
retained, if you will, or worked hard for the properties that they 
have.
  I want to pay tribute to the gentleman; and I know the gentleman from 
Michigan would because, as I just heard a few moments ago, this is 
truly a bipartisan bill. I want to distinguish the fact that this is on 
the suspension calendar because we have had some vigorous debates here 
just earlier this morning about the process of suspensions bypassing 
committee, and I would not want this legislation to be defined 
accordingly.
  This bill has been worked and worked and worked and your staff, 
George, we thank you, we know you have been on the battle line working 
hard to make sure that this comes together. I want to acknowledge Perry 
Apelbaum and Cori Flam likewise and say that we rise in support of this 
legislation, a bipartisan bill that is a result of extensive 
negotiations and deliberations with our colleagues in the Senate, 
Senators Hatch, Leahy, Sessions and Schumer as well as the Department 
of Justice. I might do a slight editorial note and say that out of the 
bipartisan effort, the bill from the House may not be the exact same 
and I might have wanted the bill from the House maybe because I am a 
House Member but we are gratified that we finally resolved it and it 
has come back for a vote.
  Mr. Speaker, the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act makes common sense 
changes to our civil asset forfeiture laws to make these procedures 
fair and more equitable. H.R. 1658 strikes the right balance between 
the

[[Page 5233]]

needs of law enforcement and the right of individuals to not have their 
property forfeited without proper safeguards. I recall that we actually 
had hearings on this, and I recall some of the really horrific stories 
of individuals losing their only house, their only source of income 
because of this law.
  Would you believe that under current law, the government can 
confiscate an individual's private property on the mere showing of 
probable cause? That is under current law. Then even though that person 
has never been arrested, much less convicted of a crime, the government 
requires a person to file action in a Federal court to prove that the 
property is not subject to forfeiture just to get the property back. 
Well, that is true.
  We can imagine that the gentleman from Michigan enthusiastically 
embraced and worked with the gentleman from Illinois on this 
legislation. There is no question that forfeiture laws can, as Congress 
intended, serve legitimate law enforcement purposes. My own police 
department, a simple and small example, promotes and utilizes or has 
utilized civil forfeiture laws as relates to drug intervention and drug 
crimes. But they are currently susceptible to abuse. That is why the 
bill makes reforms to the current civil forfeiture regimen.
  To highlight a few examples, the bill places the burden of proof 
where it belongs, with the government agency that performed the 
seizure, and it protects individuals from the difficult task of proving 
a negative, in other words, proving that their property was not subject 
to forfeiture. H.R. 1658 also permits the awarding of attorney's fees 
if the claimant substantially prevails, creates an innocent owner 
defense and permits a court to provisionally return property to a 
claimant on a showing of substantial hardship where, for example, the 
forfeiture crippled the functioning of a business, prevented an 
individual from working or left an individual homeless. Is that not 
justice for Americans? These reforms simply balance the scales so that 
innocent people have a level playing field on which to challenge 
improper seizures.
  H.R. 1658 also makes certain changes to help law enforcement crack 
down on criminal activities. For example, the bill permits courts to 
enter restraining orders to secure the availability of the property 
subject to civil forfeiture, and it clarifies that the law prohibiting 
the removal or destruction of property to avoid prosecution applies to 
seizures as well as forfeitures.
  As I see the ranking member on the floor of the House, I know that he 
will have much to say about this bipartisan effort. But I am hoping 
that this bill, although it appears on the suspension calendar, will 
evidence the hard work that we have done collectively on the Committee 
on the Judiciary on this very issue. I thank both the chairman and the 
ranking member for their efforts. I am very proud to support this bill 
today personally and to ask my colleagues to join us in supporting this 
important legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I am in support of this bill which calls for civil asset 
forfeiture reform. This is a good bipartisan bill which now shifts the 
burden of proof to the government to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence when seizing property and permits the appointment of counsel 
for indigent claimants while protecting innocent owners.
  Unlike criminal forfeiture, civil forfeiture requires no due process 
before a property owner is required to surrender their property.
  Studies suggest that minorities are acutely affected by civil asset 
forfeitures. As we are well aware by now, racial profiling by the 
police has alarmingly increased the number of cases of minorities 
involved in traffic stops, airport searches and drug arrests. These 
cases afford the government, sometimes justifiably, with the 
opportunity to seize property. Since 1985, the justice department's 
asset forfeiture fund increased from $27 million to $338 million.
  Since a deprivation of liberty is not implicated in a civil 
forfeiture, the government is not bound by the constitutional 
safeguards of criminal prosecution. The government needs only show 
probable cause that the property is subject to forfeiture. The burden 
shifts to property owner to prove that the property is not subject to 
forfeiture.
  The property owner may exhaust his or her financial assets in 
attorney's fees to fight for the return of property. If the financial 
burden of attorney's fees is not rushing enough, the owner has to post 
a bond worth 10 percent of the value of the property, before contesting 
the forfeiture. Independent owners are not entitled to legal counsel.
  Interestingly enough, persons charged in criminal cases are entitled 
to a hearing in court and the assistance of counsel. The government 
need not charge a property owner with a crime when seizing property 
under civil laws. The result is that an innocent person, or a person 
not charged with a crime, has fewer rights than the accused criminal. 
This anomaly must end.
  Reform of civil asset forfeiture laws is long overdue. I urge you to 
support this bill to ensure that innocent owners are provided some 
measure of due process before their property is seized.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr).
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman 
of the Committee on the Judiciary for yielding me this time. I would 
like to commend the gentleman from Illinois for his tremendous work 
over many years' time on reforming Federal asset forfeiture laws which, 
as we all know, are an important tool for Federal law enforcement and 
indirectly for local law enforcement which frequently because of their 
participation in cases resulting in seized assets participate in the 
disposition of those seized assets once they are forfeited.
  Many of us, including myself as a former United States attorney, 
while having tremendous regard and respect for our civil asset 
forfeiture laws and what an important tool they are for law enforcement 
also recognize they are subject to abuse and have been abused. This 
legislation on which the gentleman from Illinois has been working for 
many years and which will be one of the most important hallmarks of his 
tenure as both chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary and his long 
and distinguished service as a Member of the House of Representatives 
will go a long way towards bringing back into balance a system that has 
become sorely out of balance. I commend the gentleman for his work, and 
I commend both sides of the aisle for bringing this forward in a 
bipartisan manner. I urge its adoption.
  Mr. Speaker, I also rise today with the chairman of the Committee on 
the Judiciary to discuss the intent of section 983(a)(2)(C)(ii) which 
states, ``A claim shall state the claimant's interest in such property 
and provide customary documentary evidence of such interest if 
available and state that the claim is not frivolous.''
  Mr. Speaker, I interpret this language to require only prima facie 
evidence to establish such an interest. I assume the gentleman from 
Illinois concurs with my representation but would like for the record 
to clarify what type of documentation would be necessary to establish 
this interest in the seized property, sufficient to make a claim under 
this legislation.
  This documentary evidence should be fairly easy to obtain while still 
establishing the claimant has a legitimate, nonfrivolous interest in 
such property. This interest can be established by documents including 
but not limited to a copy of an automobile title, a loan statement for 
a home, or a note from a bank for a monetary account. For property such 
as cash in which no documentary evidence is normally available, this 
provision would be loosely applied and there would be an assumption of 
the claimant's interest in such property by simply making a claim and 
asserting its nonfrivolous nature.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I thank the 
gentleman from Georgia for bringing this issue to the attention of the 
House. The gentleman's explanation is accurate and reflects the intent 
of the legislation. There was a need for such an explanation and I 
appreciate the gentleman from Georgia's clarification of this issue.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. I thank the gentleman for engaging in the 
colloquy.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds. I want to thank the

[[Page 5234]]

gentlewoman from Texas for her very cordial remarks. I want to 
particularly thank the gentleman from Michigan and his staff and make a 
point. This Committee on the Judiciary in this House of Representatives 
can work together in a bipartisan fashion to turn out good legislation. 
This is one example. There are many others. This bill had its genesis 
in a newspaper article written by Steve Chapman of the Chicago Tribune 
several years ago. When I read what was going on under civil asset 
forfeiture, I thought it was more appropriate for the Soviet Union than 
the United States, and it has taken 7 years but we are there today and 
it is a great moment.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Sweeney).
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time. I want to say, a year ago I rose on this floor with my colleagues 
the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hutchinson) and the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Weiner) in opposition to this bill. I come today in support 
of this particular provision. I rose in opposition a year ago because I 
was concerned about the effects on criminal justice and specifically 
the effects on law enforcement, but I have to point out that the 
chairman and the Committee on the Judiciary, as has been noted, in a 
bipartisan manner has done a tremendous job to ease those concerns.
  They have provided us great improvements on the bill. The compromise 
provides important procedural protections to law-abiding property 
owners without compromising law enforcement's ability to shut down 
criminal enterprises. Specifically the bill shifts the burden of proof 
in forfeiture cases from property owners to the government with the 
appropriate threshold of a preponderance of the evidence.
  The compromise also limits the appointment of court-appointed lawyers 
to indigent claimants whose primary residence is subject to forfeiture. 
I want to say that there is one concern that I have and I think a 
couple of my colleagues have as well as it relates to this legislation, 
and, that is, that we have a continuing reservation that the removal of 
the cost bond requirement could impair the asset forfeiture program in 
the future.
  We know that the Justice Department is already overwhelmed with 
challenges to asset seizures, and I am fearful that the removal of the 
cost bond could further paralyze that effort. But let me say this, I 
hope to and I know my colleagues who stood with me a year ago hope to 
work with the chairman and the committee to oversee the implementation 
of cost bond provisions requiring up-front certification and 
posthearing penalties and ensure that my fears do not become a reality 
for law enforcement. But overall, Mr. Speaker, this is a victory for 
the American people. I want to salute the Committee on the Judiciary 
and its great chairman. I urge support for this bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pease). Without objection, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) will control the time previously granted to 
the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  I would like to begin by pointing out that the chairman of this 
committee and I have worked together on this measure for at least a 
couple of Congresses. I have been working on it, also, unbeknownst to 
the gentleman from Illinois in the Committee on Government Reform. I 
think we have come quite a long way. The bill retains the core of some 
of the main reforms that was in Hyde-Conyers.
  We have adopted the Senate version. But the shifting of the burden of 
proof is very important. The appointment of counsel is a critical 
improvement. The return of property in case of substantial hardship is 
very important. And the innocent owner defense is now strong in the 
bill. The claim for property damages while in the government's custody 
is a valid concern. And an award of interest. The bill allows 
prejudgment interest to be awarded when cash is improperly seized by 
the government. And we eliminate the cost of bond which would be a part 
of the current requirement that a claimant challenging a civil asset 
forfeiture file a cost of bond.
  Who would have believed that under our current law, the government 
can confiscate an individual's private property on a mere showing of 
probable cause? Then even though a person has never been arrested, not 
to mention convicted, of a crime, the government requires the person to 
file an action to prove that the property is not subject to forfeiture 
to get the property back.

                              {time}  1400

  It is important that we have asset forfeiture, but this puts it under 
controls that have not existed before.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Weiner), a distinguished member of the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. WEINER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Senate amendments 
to H.R. 1658, and I want to commend the gentleman from Illinois 
(Chairman Hyde), our chairman, for his year-long effort to reform our 
asset forfeiture laws. The gentleman quite literally wrote the book on 
the subject. When the history is written of his prodigious work in this 
House, this certainly warrants mention.
  Last year, a somewhat divided House considered H.R. 1658. While it 
garnered the support of the majority of our colleagues, it was 
adamantly opposed by the administration, as well as by every major law 
enforcement group. Because of this opposition, I offered, along with 
the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hutchinson) and the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Sweeney), a substitute version of H.R. 1658 on the floor of 
the House.
  The substitute would have made needed reforms by placing the burden 
of proof on the Government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that property seized was used in an illegal activity. It would have 
allowed for counsel to be appointed in those proceedings. It would have 
protected innocent owners, and it would have allowed property to be 
returned to claimants in instances of hardship.
  It was, I thought, a balanced approach that had the support of all 
major law enforcement organizations, as well as 155 of my colleagues. 
That amendment failed, although it had some support, and many of us 
voted against the base bill for that reason.
  Mr. Speaker, today's amendment, today's bill I am pleased to vote in 
favor of. It puts the burden of proof where it should be, on the 
Government; and it rightfully protects the owners and spouses and 
children, if they can show they were not involved in illegal activity.
  Perhaps, most importantly, today's bill has the approval of the men 
and women of law enforcement. Like our substitute, today's bill allows 
civil asset forfeiture to continue to be used as a tool by police and 
prosecutors across the country to shut down crack houses and seize 
drug-running speedboats.
  Mr. Speaker, I applaud the authors of this compromise and my 
colleagues who voted in favor of reform originally.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, 
merely to point out in the colloquy between the gentleman from Georgia 
and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the distinguished chairman 
of the committee, that I stand in agreement about the interpretation 
given by the chairman of section 983A(2)(c)(2), which dealt with the 
claimant's interests in such property and provide customary documentary 
evidence of such evidence, if available, and state that the claim is 
not frivolous.
  Mr. Speaker, I just wanted to join in a clarification of the intent 
that, for example, a person should not be barred from challenging an 
improper forfeiture if he or she has misplaced a receipt or if the 
person does not have the evidence on hand. I think that response is 
consistent with the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and the 
gentleman from Georgia, and I just wanted to weigh in on that.

[[Page 5235]]

  This has taken quite awhile, but it is an important measure, and my 
compliments are out to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the 
chairman of the committee, and to all of the Members who have gone 
through a rethinking process to bring the bill to the kind of support 
that I believe it is enjoying on the floor this afternoon.
  Mr. Speaker, I began looking at this matter from the old Government 
Operations Committee, and I was very pleased to learn that the 
gentleman from Illinois had, indeed, studied the matter, had put 
together his thoughts in a book on the matter, and it led us to 
bringing forth a bill jointly that now has the imprimatur, I believe, 
of most of the Members in both bodies.
  It is in that spirit that we will want to make sure that it is 
implemented fairly and that it adds to the good body of law that comes 
out of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. Speaker, with those remarks, I reserve the balance of our time.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I wish to express my gratitude again to the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and his staff and everyone who worked on 
this bill. We did not mention Jon Dudas and Rick Filkins. I just want 
to say, George Fishman who is sitting here, he was the single most 
indispensable element of this bill, and I am grateful to him.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank Mr. Hyde for 
working so rigorously to come to a reasonable agreement with the Senate 
on civil asset forfeiture reform. The compromise is fair and will 
restore fairness to this process.
  Civil asset forfeiture is a mechanism allowing law enforcement 
authorities to seize assets such as homes, property, cash, and cars 
that are used in furtherance of criminal activity. However, in recent 
years, the laws have been used overly broadly, and have been cited by 
civil libertarians as excessive and open to abuse.
  One of the most important challenges Congress faces is balancing 
individual liberties against the need for effective law enforcement. 
Generally, our laws do this fairly well. However, our civil asset 
forfeiture laws are tilted too far in one direction. Current civil 
asset forfeiture laws allow police to seize a person's assets, 
regardless of whether the person has been, or ever is, convicted of a 
crime, if police have nothing more than probable cause to believe the 
property was used for criminal purposes. You are presumed guilty until 
you can prove yourself innocent.
  In effect, our current asset forfeiture system targets both criminals 
and law-abiding citizens, takes their cars, cash, homes, and property 
away, and then forces them to prove they are innocent in order to get 
their assets back. The goal of this reform legislation is to change a 
system that sometimes violates the rights of the law-abiding, while 
retaining those provisions that allow law enforcement to target 
criminals, and hit them where it hurts--in their pocket books.
  As I know from my service as a federal prosecutor, the majority of 
jurisdictions in America use asset forfeiture laws sensibly and fairly. 
Unfortunately, in some cases, law enforcement officers intentionally 
target citizens and seize their assets, because they know proving 
innocence under the constraints of the current law is extremely 
difficult if not impossible. The burden of proof for the government is 
minimal, the person may have less than 2 weeks to file a defense, and 
they have to post a bond even though the government has seized their 
assets.
  H.R. 1658 was introduced to address this matter of allowing law 
enforcement to use this important tool of asset forfeiture, while still 
requiring them to be more mindful of due process and individual rights.
  This legislation enjoys wide bi-partisan support, and passed the 
House on June 24, 1999 by a vote of 375-48. Additionally, the 65,000 
member Law Enforcement Alliance of America supports it, as do many 
other line officers and retired police chiefs from across America. It 
returns balance and fairness to an area of law that has been abused to 
violate the rights of innocent citizens for too long.
  This reform legislation does not deny law enforcement the ability to 
seize and forfeit assets that truly are used for criminal endeavors. It 
does, however, more properly balance those powers against civil 
liberties.
  Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this measure. 
Passage of this bill is long overdue, and I urge all Members to join me 
in voting to send it to the President for signing into law.
  Since the House passed this bill last year, it has been the subject 
of intensive negotiations that have involved the administration and law 
enforcement organizations as well as Members of both the House and 
Senate. Those negotiations have resulted in the revised version of the 
bill now before the House. I am sure that it is not everything that 
some might want, but it is acceptable to all concerned, and I think it 
deserves approval.
  Enactment of this bill will correct serious imbalances in the law 
regarding civil forfeitures--cases in which the government seizes 
property allegedly connected to a violation of law. Under current law, 
seized property won't be returned unless the person whose property was 
seized can prove either that the property was not connected to the 
alleged crime or that the owner did not know about or consent to the 
allegedly illegal use of the property.
  This bill shifts the burden of proof to the government, where it 
belongs, so that it would be up to the government to show by 
preponderance of the evidence that an asset was sufficiently connected 
to a crime to be subject to civil forfeiture. While this is a somewhat 
less stringent requirement than in the bill as originally passed by the 
House, it is a great improvement over the current law.
  The bill also makes a number of other important improvements over the 
current law. It will require that seizures be made pursuant to a 
warrant. It will eliminate the need for people to post a bond in order 
to contest a civil-forfeiture case. It will create a uniform ``innocent 
owner'' defense for all civil-forfeiture cases. It will allow property 
to be released from government custody before final disposition of a 
case where continued custody would be a hardship to the owner 
outweighing any risk to the government. And it will allow people to 
seek to recover from the government if seized property is damaged while 
in custody.
  I congratulate all those whose hard work has made it possible for the 
bill to be on the floor today, and I urge its approval.
  Mr. Speaker, with great pleasure, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ose). The question is on the motion 
offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) that the House 
suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill, H.R. 
1658.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor 
thereof) the rules were suspended and the Senate amendment was 
concurred in.
  The motion to reconsider is laid on the table.

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