[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 2]
[Senate]
[Pages 2052-2053]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                                  IRAQ

  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I want to call to the attention of my 
colleagues an issue that is not being raised in the otherwise 
informative presidential primary campaigns. It is not a theoretical 
issue, nor is it an issue concerning budgetary decisions.
  Rather, it is an issue which sends American pilots on combat missions 
almost daily. It is an issue which throughout the last decade has cost 
the lives of hundreds of American and thousands of soldiers and 
civilians of other nationalities. It is an issue which threatens the 
peace and security of some of our closest allies, and which, if not 
solved, could threaten the United States with weapons of mass 
destruction. It is an issue which starves and hold captive twenty-two 
million people

[[Page 2053]]

in conditions of unparalleled terror of their government. It is an 
issue which we have failed to deal with decisively, and that failure 
calls into question our dedication to the freedom we prize so highly 
for ourselves.
  The issue is the continuing rule of Saddam Hussein. Nine years after 
the United States led a coalition to eject Iraqi forces and liberate 
Kuwait, Saddam continues to brutalize his people, threaten his 
neighbors, and develop weapons of mass destruction--earlier versions of 
which he used on neighboring states, on Israel, and on his own people. 
The good news is that sanctions have weakened his military, and his 
political support base has shrunk to his immediate family. All of 
mountainous northern Iraq and large swathes of southern Iraq are free 
of his control. Nonetheless, he continues to rule the central part of 
the country and, as Jim Hoagland pointed out in today's Washington 
Post, Saddam is likely to outlast yet another American President.
  The Administration will no doubt point to the restraining effect UN 
sanctions have had on Saddam's ability to threaten his neighbors. In 
truth, his regime would have been far more aggressive if sanctions and 
the no-fly zones guaranteed by U.S. and British airpower had not been 
in effect. But in choosing policy options against an outlaw like 
Saddam, restraint is a minimal objective.
  For example, we and our allies in the former Yugoslavia are not 
seeking to restrain those accused of war crimes during the ethnic war 
there; we seek to catch them, lock them up, and get them to The Hague 
for trial. Saddam has killed far more than any of the wanted Yugoslavs, 
and he keeps on killing today. Our rhetoric, including mine today, 
calls for the same response to Saddam.
  But our real policy is merely to restrain him. The fact that the 
restraint has endured nine years is what the Administration shows as 
evidence of its success. But adhering to the policy of restraint is 
actually taking us farther from our stated goals. Support for the 
sanctions policy is eroding at the UN. This, along with rising oil 
prices and Iraq's rising oil production, have made Saddam a key global 
energy player once again. In addition, Saddam has had thirteen months 
to develop weapons of mass destruction without the inhibition imposed 
by outside inspections. Now, a new inspection regime has been voted by 
the Security Council. If Iraq eventually accepts it, I presume Dr. Blix 
and his new inspectors will do their best. Yet, they will never be as 
intrusive, and therefore as effective, as UNSCOM. In sum, the 
restraints which we have kept on Saddam for nine years are loosening. 
He is very close to being free of the handcuffs in which both we and 
his people have invested so much.
  Restraining Saddam was always a minimal objective. It was a way to 
avoid the strategic risk many see in the bolder objective of acting in 
support of the Iraqi opposition to remove Saddam from power and achieve 
democracy. It is ironic that the minimal objective requires the 
continual application of U.S. military force, not just for a decade, 
but presumably forever. The bolder objective, once achieved, would 
bring U.S. military operations and basing in the Gulf countries to an 
end. I believe Congress has recognized the need for bold action. In 
passing the Iraq Liberation Act in October 1998, Congress expressed its 
frustration with the status quo and provided resources with which the 
Administration could support the Iraqi opposition in their efforts to 
remove Saddam from power.
  In signing the Iraq Liberation Act, President Clinton affirmed that 
U.S. policy was not merely to restrain Saddam but to see him replaced. 
Unfortunately, the President's policy pronouncement has not been 
followed by action. The President and Vice President have encouraging 
words for Iraqis seeking to free their country, but their words are 
belied by the inaction of their Administration. Despite unprecedented 
unity, the Administration has provided only a small proportion of 
available resources to the Iraqi opposition, and this only on 
superficialities which will have no effect on opinion inside Iraq. The 
countries in the region all agree the U.S. is not serious about 
supporting Saddam's removal. If you don't believe me, call the 
ambassador of any Middle Eastern country and ask him or her if our 
actions and rhetoric match.
  If the Administration actively sought Saddam's replacement, our 
allies in the region would know it and they would cooperate with us. 
But the Administration has not asked because the truth is, beneath the 
rhetoric, we are clinging to the old policy of restraining Saddam. 
There are now signs that the consensus for even that is fraying. I 
would hate to think that the boldest hope of our national security 
establishment is that our policy will hold until noon on January 20 of 
2001.
  I admit to coming late to an understanding of the evil of the Iraqi 
regime and the imperative of fighting it. After Saddam's invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990, I voted against the Gulf War resolution. My distrust of 
the Bush Administration's statements regarding the need for the use of 
force in Iraq were colored by my own experiences in Vietnam. But Iraq 
is not Vietnam. And I have come to understand the brutality of Saddam 
Hussein's regime and the overwhelming requirement to support the 
efforts of Iraqis to replace it. I understand the threat the regime 
poses to his people, to his neighbors, and to the rest of the world. 
Most of all, this is about our commitment to freedom.
  The long night of the Iraqi people will not be ended through a policy 
of merely retraining the Iraqi regime. Instead, we must work to match 
our words and our deeds to actively support the Iraqi opposition in 
their effort to remove Saddam Hussein and establish a democratic Iraq. 
When the people of Iraq obtain their freedom, it will transform the 
Middle East. It will create a new region in which brutality, poverty, 
and unnecessary armaments will be supplanted by security, prosperity, 
and creative diversity.
  Mr. President, this goal is within our reach. But the difference 
between success and failure in this endeavor will be measured by our 
willingness to act in support of the people of Iraq.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.

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