[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 2]
[Senate]
[Pages 1503-1505]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                      CONFRONTING NUCLEAR THREATS

  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, a few weeks ago, former Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger joined what has become a chorus of distinguished 
citizens and representatives who are suggesting the decision to deploy 
the national missile defense system be postponed until after the 
November 7 Presidential election. Although it may be that a delay is 
necessitated for other reasons, I hope we do not allow the approach of 
a Presidential election to prevent us from making important foreign 
policy decisions.
  Not only do I believe this to be a precedent which would hamper 
future Presidential decisionmaking, but it also ignores the fact that 
this is a tough decision for any President to make anytime, regardless 
of the circumstances. It also ignores that it takes time for a new 
Commander in Chief at the helm of the ship to get his or her foreign 
policy sea legs. Such a delay could jeopardize our capacity to deploy 
NMD in a timely fashion.
  In his argument, Secretary Kissinger referred to ``congressionally 
imposed deadline.'' This is a commonly made mistake about what Congress 
did last year. All we called for was deployment of national missile 
defense ``as soon as it is technologically possible.'' The 
administration has said this decision could be made as early as June 
and has recently indicated this could slip to late summer.
  Of the four criteria that will be used by President Clinton to make 
his decision, the most difficult to quantify is the impact on other 
arms control agreements. Specifically, the impact most feared is that 
deployment of this missile defense system would be regarded by the 
Russians as a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
  While I can make a very strong argument that deployment of NMD is 
permitted under the terms of this treaty, this argument will diminish 
in importance if the Russian Government abrogates other treaties by 
modifying their strategic nuclear weapons. This includes the very real 
and destabilizing prospect of re-MIRVing their missiles or converting 
single-warhead missiles to multiwarhead missiles. This is why the 
United States is attempting, and thus far without success, to persuade 
Russia to allow a modification of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty in order to build NMD and avoid potentially serious conflict 
between the United States and the Russian Government. We have met 
considerable resistance, not only from the Russians but also from 
allies who regard our analysis of the ballistic missile threat to be 
flawed.
  To be clear, the new threat is real. We cannot afford to ignore the 
real threat that an accidental or rogue nation launch of ballistic 
missiles carrying nuclear weapons poses to the survival of our Nation. 
The need to build this defensive system, which is still being tested 
for feasibility and reliability, derives from the national intelligence 
estimate and an external panel headed by Donald Rumsfeld. Both have 
concluded that the threat of rogue nation or unauthorized launch of a 
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon at the United States of America 
is real.
  As a consequence, we have begun testing a system which would protect 
Americans against this threat. A test schedule for May will be 
critically important to demonstrate feasibility and reliability, one of 
the four Presidential conditions needed for deployment. Given the risk/
reward ratio of defending against nuclear weapons, the current cost 
estimates over 10 years of an amount that is less than 1 percent of our 
national defense budget and the unlikely reassessment of this threat, 
all that would stand in the way of a Presidential decision to deploy 
would be the potential adverse impact on other agreements.
  The President will face this question: Will a decision to deploy NMD 
result in other nations, especially Russia, reacting in a manner that 
would produce a net increase in proliferation activity and thus 
increase the potential for rogue or unauthorized launch of nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapons?
  We are more likely to resolve this potential conflict in a way that 
increases the safety and security of Americans if President Clinton 
does not delay the decision until after the November 7 election. This 
is a decision that should be made on the basis of the current facts and 
the four criteria for deployment previously outlined by the 
administration.
  To be successful, we should also consider an alternative negotiating 
strategy that would pose a win-win for both the United States and 
Russia. It would reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. It 
would improve the relations between the United States and Russia. And 
it would enable the United States to redirect money from maintaining 
our current nuclear weapons stockpile to our conventional forces, where 
a real strain can be seen in recruitment, readiness, and capability.

[[Page 1504]]

  To spur constructive action, we must force ourselves to remember this 
grim truth: The only thing capable of killing every man, woman, and 
child in the United States of America is the Russian nuclear stockpile. 
We must remember the threat no longer comes from a deliberate attack. 
Instead, these weapons now present two new and very dangerous threats.
  The first is the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch 
of a Russian nuclear weapon. During the cold war, we worried about the 
military might of the Soviet Union, but today we worry about the 
military weakness of Russia and her ever-decreasing ability to control 
the over 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads in her arsenal. There are 
numerous stories that have emerged out of Russia over the past few 
years highlighting the vulnerability of these weapons. There are 
stories of major security breaches at sensitive nuclear facilities. 
There are stories of unpaid Russian soldiers attempting to sell 
nuclear-related material in order to feed their families. And there are 
stories of the continuing decay of the command and control 
infrastructure needed to maintain the nuclear arsenal of Russia. Each 
of these demonstrates the vulnerability of the Russian arsenal to an 
accidental launch based on a technical error or miscalculation or the 
unauthorized use of a weapon by a rogue group or disgruntled 
individual.
  The second threat posed by the nuclear legacy of the cold war is the 
danger of the proliferation of material, technology, or expertise. 
Consider just the case of North Korea. Last summer, North Korea held 
the world's attention as a result of indications that they were 
preparing to test a long-range Taepo Dong ballistic missile. Through 
skillful diplomacy, the United States was able to convince the North 
Koreans to halt their missile testing program.
  However, the stability of the entire east Asian region was in 
jeopardy as a result of the possibility of such a test. North Korea is 
one of the most backward countries in the world. It is a country where 
millions of its own citizens have starved to death. Yet this country 
was able to affect the actions of the United States, Japan, and China 
as a result of their ability to modify what is, in truth, outdated 
Soviet missile technology. As has been indicated publicly, the Taepo 
Dong is little more than a longer range version of the 1950s Soviet 
Scud missile. One can only imagine the consequences to our security if 
North Korea had a nuclear capability and the means to deliver it. But 
this illustrates the threat posed by proliferation. Without real 
management of these materials and technology--much of it Russian in 
origin--it will become easier for third and fourth rate powers to 
drastically affect our own security decisions.
  Both of these threats--accidental or unauthorized launch and 
proliferation of these weapons to rogue nations--present a new 
challenge to the United States. It is a challenge very different from 
the cold war standoff of two nuclear superpowers. Classic deterrence, 
better known as mutual assured destruction, was the bedrock of our 
policy to confront nuclear threats during the cold war. Mutual assured 
destruction was based on the premise that our enemies would not dare to 
attack the United States as long as they knew that such an attack would 
be met with an overwhelming, deadly response by the United States. This 
theory, however, provides no safety from an accidental launch caused by 
the failure of outdated technology. It provides no safety net from the 
use of these weapons by a terrorist state whose only objective is the 
death of as many Americans as possible.
  We need to develop a completely new and comprehensive approach to 
confront these threats. National missile defense will not add to our 
security if it is built as a stand alone venture. As part of a 
comprehensive approach it most assuredly can. To succeed, we should 
work with Russia to develop a new strategic partnership. We need a 
partnership based on cooperation, not confrontation--a partnership that 
builds on the many areas of mutual concern, not those that divide--a 
partnership that recognizes the nuclear legacy of the cold war 
threatens all of us, and that only by working together can we truly 
reduce this threat.
  The possibility of a new approach where our interests intersect with 
those of Russia can be seen in a proposal made by Russia to our arms 
control negotiators in Geneva. The Russians offered to reduce the 
number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,500 on each side. We rejected 
the offer based on an assessment of minimum deterrence levels that are 
500 to 1,000 strategic warheads higher. But this assessment has been 
overtaken by events in Russia which now make it likely the Russians 
will be unable to safely maintain more than a few hundred of their own 
nuclear weapons.
  As the Russian capability to maintain their stockpile dwindles, it is 
natural to assume our threshold for deterrence will also significantly 
decrease. Thus, by keeping more weapons than we need to defend our 
national interests, we are encouraging the Russians to maintain more 
weapons than they are able to control. The net effect is to increase 
the danger of the proliferation or accidental use of these deadly 
weapons which decreases the effectiveness of national missile defense.
  So, here is the outline of a win-win proposal to the Russians. We 
jointly agree to make dramatic reductions in the U.S. and Russian 
nuclear arsenal. We jointly agree that national missile defense is an 
essential part of a strategy to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. 
And, we jointly agree that parallel reductions in our nuclear forces 
must include arrangements--and a Congressional commitment to provide 
funding--to secure and manage the resultant nuclear material.
  We are fortunate that we will not begin from scratch on this problem. 
We can build upon one of the greatest acts of post-cold war 
statesmanship: the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. To 
facilitate these dramatic reductions, we must look for ways to expand 
upon the success of this program, to enlist new international partners, 
and to work with the Russians to find new solutions to the problems of 
securing nuclear material. Additionally, we should continue our lab-to-
lab efforts that are assisting the transition of Russian nuclear 
facilities and workers from military to civilian purposes. These are 
the practical, on the ground programs that will help us reduce the 
chance of the proliferation of nuclear materials and know-how.
  In exchange for deep nuclear reductions and technical assistance, the 
Russians would agree to changes in the ABM Treaty. With this 
alternative, the President would not have to choose between national 
missile defense and future cooperation with Russia. Instead, by working 
in cooperation with Russia on a comprehensive basis, we will be able to 
deploy a limited NMD system designed to protect the United States from 
accidental or rogue state ballistic missile launches.
  We can reach such an agreement with Russia because the Russian people 
now know they are not immune from the threats of extremism. Their 
security is also endangered by the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction to terrorists and rogue states. This now presents us with 
an opportunity to begin to work with Russia diplomatically to confront 
this emerging threat from countries like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. 
Former Secretary of Defense William Perry's success in halting North 
Korea's missile testing program highlights the potential power of 
diplomacy to reduce these threats. But by developing a strategic 
partnership with Russia, and working cooperatively to bring change in 
North Korea, to end Saddam Hussein's brutal regime, or to foster real 
reform in Iran, we will reduce nuclear dangers and create a safer 
world.
  So as President Clinton considers his decision about NMD, I hope he 
considers an alternative strategy that embraces a comprehensive 
approach to the threats we face in today's world. Now is the time to 
reach out to Russia and to create a partnership that will build the 
basis for securing the post-cold war peace for our children.
  Mr. President, in the aftermath of the administration's rejection of 
the offer to substantially reduce strategic

[[Page 1505]]

weapons, the issue of a previous analysis of the minimum deterrence 
done by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Shalikashvili, was raised. I say to my colleagues, I intend to read 
carefully that report and revisit the floor with an opportunity to 
discuss what I believe is a rational minimum deterrence level necessary 
to protect the people of the United States of America. Obviously, that 
must be a concern of ours as well.
  But I believe there is a historic opportunity. It will be difficult 
for us to seize that opportunity if Republicans and Democrats do not 
agree that still the most important thing for all of us to do is to 
make certain the safety and security of the American people are secured 
through not only our policies but our active efforts.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Iowa is 
recognized.

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