[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 18]
[Senate]
[Pages 26505-26506]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      Mr. DOMENICI (for himself and Mr. Lugar):
  S. 3275. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Energy to guarantee 
loans to facilitate nuclear nonproliferation programs and activities of 
the Government of the Russian Federation, and for other purposes; to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations.


                  FISSILE MATERIAL LOAN GUARANTEE ACT

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Fissile Material 
Loan Guarantee Act. This Act is intended to increase the arsenal of 
programs that reduce proliferation threats from the Russian nuclear 
weapons complex.
  This Act presents an unusual option, which I've been discussing with 
the leadership of some of the world's largest private banks and lending 
institutions and with senior officials of the Russian Federation's 
Ministry for Atomic Energy. I also am aware that discussions between 
Western lending institutions and the Russian Federation are progressing 
well and that discussions with the International Atomic Energy 
Authority or IAEA have helped to clarify their responsibilities.
  This Act would enable the imposition of international protective 
safeguards on new, large stocks of Russian weapons-ready materials in a 
way that enables the Russian Federation to gain near-term financial 
resources from the same materials. The Act requires that these 
resources be used in support of non-proliferation or energy programs 
within Russia. It also requires that the materials used to 
collateralize these loans must remain under international IAEA 
safeguards forevermore.
  This Act does not replace programs that currently are in place to 
ensure that weapons-grade materials can never be used in weapons in the 
future. The Highly Enriched Uranium or HEU Agreement is moving toward 
elimination of 500 tons of Russian weapons-grade uranium. The Plutonium 
Disposition Agreement is similarly working on elimination of 34 tons of 
Russian weapons-grade plutonium.
  The HEU agreement removes material usable in 20,000 nuclear weapons, 
while the plutonium disposition agreement similarly removes material 
for more than 4,000 nuclear weapons. Both of these agreements enable 
the transition of Russian materials into commercial reactor fuel, 
which, after use in a reactor, destroys its ``weapons-grade'' 
attributes. There should be no question that both these agreements 
remain of vital importance to both nations.
  But estimates are that the Russian Federation has vast stocks of 
weapons-

[[Page 26506]]

grade materials in addition to the amounts they've already declared as 
surplus to their weapons needs in these earlier agreements. If we can 
provide additional incentives to Russia to encourage transition of more 
of these materials into configurations where it is not available for 
diversion or re-use in weapons, we've made another significant step 
toward global stability.
  By introducing this Act now, Mr. President, I'm hoping that this 
concept will be carefully reviewed by all interested parties--by the 
new Administration, by lending institutions, and by the Russian 
Federation. My hope is that in the next Congress, these interests can 
come together to enable this new approach to still further reduce the 
proliferation threats from surplus weapons materials in the Russian 
nuclear weapons complex.

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