[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 25428-25430]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                  EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on October 10, 2000, the Center for 
Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) hosted an important luncheon 
discussion on the European Union's evolving European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP). The guest speakers at that luncheon were 
Ambassador Christopher Meyer of Great Britain, Ambassador Juergen 
Chrobog of Germany, and Ambassador Francois Bujon de l'Estang of 
France. Senator Levin and I were privileged to sponsor this luncheon on 
Capitol Hill, in the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing room. 
Attendees at this luncheon included a prestigious group of former 
ambassadors and administration officials, representatives from 
industry, policy and research organizations, and senior congressional 
staff from both the House and Senate.
  Since December 1999, when the European Union (EU) Heads of State 
announced at a summit meeting in Helsinki their ``determination to 
develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a 
whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations 
in response to international crises,'' there has been a great deal of 
discussion and debate about the development of a common European 
defense identity. While I commend our European allies for their 
willingness to do more militarily, I have been concerned about the 
impact of an ESDP on the NATO Alliance.
  My views on the development of the European Security and Defense 
Policy start with the basic premise that NATO has been the most 
successful military alliance in history. NATO won the cold war; it is 
now plying an instrumental role in keeping the peace in Europe. 
Whatever is done in the context of an ESDP, it must not weaken NATO.
  There are a number of questions concerning the content of an ESDP--
questions I, Senator Levin, and others raised at the October 10 
luncheon. For example, Europeans are discussing increasing their 
military capabilities at a time of declining defense budgets, in a 
number of NATO partners. How is an added military capability possible 
with less money? Will ESDP developments--particularly the establishment 
of EU military structures--take valuable and scarce resources away from 
NATO military capabilities? How will the EU military force interact 
with NATO? Will NATO have the right of first refusal--or veto power--
over an EU-led military operation?
  These are important questions that should be answered. During the 
meeting on October 10, the Ambassadors provided valuable insight into 
the development of an ESDP. I commend their participation in today's 
forum. I ask unanimous consent that the opening statements of the three 
Ambassadors be printed in the Record.
  I will continue to monitor these developments and keep the Senate 
informed.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                 Speech by Ambassador Christopher Meyer


 european security and defense policy (esdp) and its implications for 
                       the United States and nato

       In October 1998 Tony Blair launched an initiative on 
     European defense in a speech at Portschach.
       He had been dismayed by the inadequacy of European 
     diplomatic and military performance in the Balkans. It 
     undermined the credibility of the EU's common foreign and 
     security policy. It corroded the Atlantic alliance by giving 
     comfort to those in the U.S. who argue that the Europeans 
     refuse to assume their share of the burden.
       He saw that the Europeans lack military transportation over 
     long distances; logistical support to sustain fighting forces 
     for long periods away from home; and enough capabilities such 
     as airborne surveillance, precision-guided munitions and 
     command, control and communications. The Kosovo campaign in 
     particular showed up these deficiencies.
       Blair's aim was, and remains, three-fold: To strengthen the 
     AEU's capacity to act internationally in a more effective 
     manner; to deliver a step-change in Europe's ability to 
     manage crises; and to strengthen the European Contribution to 
     the Atlantic alliance, in particular through more robust 
     European military capabilities.
       In the British view this is overwhelmingly in the interests 
     of the U.S., the alliance and of Europe.
       Since Blair's speech, he and president Chirac have been the 
     main drivers of this initiative. The British-French St. Malo 
     declaration was the first land-mark. But, of course, over the 
     last two years, the full memberships of the EU and NATO have 
     become increasingly involved, notably Germany.
       My colleagues will speak to you about the implications of 
     this initiative for the U.S. and NATO; about the current 
     state of play; and about next steps.
       I want to make only two observations.
       The first is that the initiative has made extraordinary 
     progress in less than 2 years:
       Last December, at Helsinki, the EU set itself a headline 
     goal: to be able by 2003 to deploy 60,000 troops at 60 days' 
     notice for operations lasting at least a year. By the end of 
     this year we should have identified who will need to do what 
     to make this goal reality; and we ought to have in place key 
     element of EU/NATO arrangements, as well as necessary 
     internal EU structures. My colleagues will say more about 
     this.
       My second observation is that behind the official 
     statements of welcome for this initiative, there has been 
     chronic suspicion and skepticism on this side of the 
     Atlantic, especially on Capitol Hill. Why?
       First, there is a long-standing schizophrenia at work. For 
     decades you have been telling the Europeans to get their act 
     together: one emergency phone number, please. But whenever we 
     show signs of doing what you ask, you become suspicious and 
     anxious that we are doing things behind your back. European 
     defense initiative has been much afflicted by this 
     schizophrenia. Damned if we do, damned if we don't.
       Second, some of you don't actually believe we will ever put 
     our money where our mouth is and increase European military 
     effectiveness. But, Britain and, I'm sure, France and

[[Page 25429]]

     Germany are determined to make a reality of this initiative. 
     Britain has just increased its military budget accordingly. 
     The capabilities commitment conference will be held precisely 
     to pin member-states down to concrete commitments. The UK has 
     already made clear that it will offer a pool of land forces 
     adding up to about 20,000, of whom a maximum of 12,000 would 
     be deployed in any one scenario. The pool would allow 
     deployment of one a group of armored, mechanized or air 
     assault brigades, with probably two additional brigades in 
     support (e.g. Artillery, air defense, attack helicopters, HA 
     and signals).
       The UK defense budget is rising in real terms. Procurement 
     plans announced this year include four C-17 strategic lift 
     aircraft with more to follow; maverick precision guided 
     munitions and new air-to-air missiles for the Eurofighter; 
     two new aircraft carriers and six new type-45 destroyers; new 
     command, control and intelligence systems.
       Third, you sometimes exaggerate the share of the burden the 
     U.S. have to assume. Its true you flew most of the sorties in 
     the Kosovo campaign. That is something we Europeans have to 
     rectify. But don't forget that today in Kosovo, 85% of the 
     NATO-led force comes from Europe. So does most of the civil 
     aid. That's how it should be.
       Fourth, the question is asked why it is necessary to 
     introduce the EU into the equation, when there is already a 
     security body called NATO, of which 13 out of 15 members are 
     European. Isn't, the skeptics ask, the European defense 
     initiative really about replacing NATO as the basis for 
     collective European defense and cutting transatlantic 
     security ties? This is perhaps the most deep-seated of U.S. 
     concerns.
       The answer to this last question is an emphatic ``no'', as 
     my colleagues will confirm. NATO will remain the bedrock of 
     our defense and that of European allies. This initiative is 
     not about replacing NATO or undermining its role in 
     collective defence and other demanding crisis management 
     missions. No-one in Europe is suggesting an EU role in 
     collective defence. European allies have made perfectly 
     clear, in actions as well as in declarations, our preference 
     to act alongside the U.S. wherever possible, particularly in 
     high intensity operations.
       Instead, this initiative is about other cases, where the 
     U.S. does not want to be involved, ``putting out fires in our 
     backyard'', as French defence minister Alain Richard has put 
     it. With the U.S. where you want to be present, otherwise on 
     our own. ``Separable, but not separate''.
       Bear in mind that we are not writing on a blank piece of 
     paper. Rather than creating a new security body, we are 
     replacing an existing body that has not proven effective 
     enough--the western European union--by one with far greater 
     political, financial and organizational muscle--the European 
     union. We are trading up for a more useful instrument. But 
     our aims have not changed: a more effective European defence, 
     organically linked to NATO and its structures.
       Submerging Western European Union (WEU) functions into the 
     European Union (EU), we simplify not multiply European 
     security structures. We end an artificial separation between 
     hard defence in NATO and WEU, from foreign and security 
     policy in the EU. EU policies should become less declaratory, 
     more hard-headed. That will be good for us all.
       Finally, let me underline one point that Tony Blair has 
     made clear, repeatedly, right back to his first speech in 
     October 1998: this initiative should be judged, and we 
     ourselves will measure its success, by whether there is a 
     real improvement in military capabilities. We are under no 
     illusions about the difficulty. But it has been and remains 
     the central aim of the initiative.
                                  ____


                  Speech by Ambassador Jurgen Chrobog


 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and its implications for 
                       the United States and NATO

       Now that Sir Christopher has outlined how ESDP came into 
     being and what it is all about, I would like to concentrate 
     on the controbution ESDP will make to NATO and the 
     transatlantic partnership. In doing so, I'll try to address 
     some of the questions that have been raised in this country 
     about ESDP. I'll certainly be happy to discuss them in more 
     detail later on. Christopher Meyer's remarks have pointed out 
     why EDSP is vital to further European integration. With ESDP, 
     the European Union has committed itself to making essential 
     progress towards a political union which is underpinned by 
     credible political and military action. But ESDP is of equal 
     importance to NATO, the U.S., and the transatlantic 
     relationship--and not just because a strong Europe is very 
     much in the interest of the United States.
       To underpin this, I would like to make four brief points:
       First: ESDP will enable Europeans to engage in crisis 
     management, principally on the European continent. ESDP is an 
     historic step towards strengthening the military capabilities 
     of the Europe NATO partners. In this respect, it is a product 
     of the lessons learned from Bosina and Kosovo. ESDP enhances 
     the ability of the EU to make decisions in crisis management. 
     With ESDP, Europe will be able to perform a broad spectrum of 
     missions ranging from civilian conflict prevention to 
     military crisis management. These include humanitarian 
     assistance, evacuation measures during crisis situations in 
     third countries, and military peacekeeping and peace-
     enforcing--all of which we refer to as the ``Petersberg 
     Task.'' I would like to mention here the efforts to enhance 
     European capabilities predates the St. Malo agreement of 1998 
     by a few years. In June 1992, on German initiative, a WEU 
     Ministerial meeting near Bonn first outlined the ``Petersberg 
     tasks'' which later became the basis for ESDP objectives. 
     Within the framework of ESDP, the EU will develop tools for 
     civilian crisis management, including a task force of police 
     officers ready to deploy on short notice. This will make the 
     EU the only multilateral organization that can offer the full 
     range of conflict management measures.
       Second: By developing European capabilities in key military 
     areas, ESDP will make a substantial contribution to 
     transatlantic burden-sharing. These new capabilities include 
     command and control, strategic intelligence, and strategic 
     airlift--just to name the most important ones. These 
     priorities will also play an important role in the reform of 
     the German armed forces which has recently begun. This reform 
     will triple the number of troops that Germany will be able to 
     rapidly deploy from 50,000 to 150,000. This increase in the 
     readiness forces will enable the Bundeswehr to participate in 
     one major operation with up to 50,000 soldiers for a period 
     of up to one year or two medium sized operations, each with 
     up to 10,000 soldiers for several years, a significant 
     improvement over current capabilities as demonstrated by the 
     7,500 men presently deployed in the Balkans. Germany will 
     thus be in a better position to meets its responsibilities 
     within NATO and the European framework. Germany's defense 
     budget will increase by 3.2% in 2001. As you know, a German-
     French initiative is already underway on establishing a 
     European air transport command--a way to combine financial 
     resources to achieve the required capability quality and 
     quantity. The modernization of European forces will be 
     harmonized with NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative and 
     thus simultaneously contribute to both the European and NATO 
     force goals. Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska said it very 
     plainly in his recent article for ``Defense News'' 
     (3.7.2000), and I quote ``Greater European military 
     capabilities will make the alliance stronger, lift some of 
     the burden the United States now carries in having to act in 
     every crisis, and make the U.S.-European relationship a more 
     equal one.'' End of quote. I could not agree more. A strong 
     Europe is good for the United States. For this very good 
     reason, not only Senator Hagel but also a whole generation of 
     American politicians before him have been calling for exactly 
     the same steps which we are now taking with ESDP.
       Third: Within NATO, ESDP will strengthen the transatlantic 
     link. The European Union will use its crisis management 
     capability to complement and reinforce NATO. There may be 
     occasions when the U.S. is not inclined or, for other 
     reasons, is unable to dispatch American troops to deal with a 
     conflict in Europe which needs to be addressed. This is 
     precisely the type of scenario in which ESDP can play a role. 
     Let me be clear: The EU is not competing with NATO. The 
     Europeans will take care of business ``where NATO as a whole 
     is not engaged'' (European Council Helsinki, Dec. 1998). 
     There will be no separate European army. There will be no 
     unnecessary duplication of assets or capabilities between 
     NATO and the European Union. In fact, the EU might require 
     NATO assets to conduct EU-led military operations. ESDP 
     reflects the EU's willingness to shoulder more of the burden 
     of safeguarding peace and democracy. As the New Strategic 
     Concept of the Alliance, which was endorsed at NATO's 
     Washington summit in April 1999, states: ``The increase in 
     the responsibilities and capacities of the European allies 
     with respect to security and defense enhances the security 
     environment of the alliance.''
       And finally, my forth point. The EU will include other 
     European countries in ESDP. Procedures are being put in place 
     to allow the six European NATO members which are not EU 
     member states and possibly other contributing states to fully 
     participate in European-led operations. That includes the 
     Eastern and Southeastern countries that are candidates for EU 
     membership. ESDP thus reinforces and broadens the security 
     umbrella of NATO.
       To sum up: EU and NATO have very different backgrounds, 
     histories and structures. They will not detract from each 
     other, but grow closer in values, convictions, and actions. 
     For the European Union, and Germany in particular, the 
     transatlantic partnership and the U.S. political and military 
     presence in Europe remain the key to peace and security on 
     the European continent. And one thing is absolutely certain: 
     NATO remains responsible for the collective defense of 
     Europe. NATO will not lose any of its importance, and ESDP 
     will strengthen the European Union and NATO.

[[Page 25430]]

     
                                  ____
            Speech by Ambassador Francois Bujon de l'Estang


 european security and defense policy (esdp) and its implications for 
                       the united states and nato

       I would like to thank Dr. Hamre and Simon Serfaty for this 
     excellent initiative taken by the CSIS.
       From St. Malo to today, some apprehension has been 
     expressed on Capitol Hill regarding European security and 
     defense policy. This apprehension has been largely due, I 
     believe, to misconceptions and lack of understanding of our 
     intentions and our objectives. Perhaps terminology has not 
     helped either, with the European predilection for ominous 
     acronyms
       After the excellent presentations of my British and German 
     colleagues, there is little left to add. However, there is 
     only one thing worse than a European conspiracy: a French-
     inspired European conspiracy. According to a rather popular 
     theory in Washington, ESDP is a dark and dangerous plot 
     organized by France to finally break up the Atlantic Alliance 
     with the unknowing complicity of its blind European partners. 
     Therefore, people are undoubtedly paying close attention to 
     the current French Presidency of the EU. Let me spend a few 
     minutes to shed some light on our plans until December 31, 
     and briefly go over the goals--and achievements--of our 
     current presidency in order to dispel and doubt that might 
     still be lingering in your minds.
       1. To quote Lord Robertson, ESDP is about three things: 
     capabilities, capabilities and capabilities. I wholeheardly 
     subscribe to this assertion, for at least two reasons: first 
     of all, France has always prided itself, on a national level, 
     with a strong commitment to robust defense capabilities, and 
     our present forces are there to show it--it is only natural 
     that we attempt to pursue our European endeavor with the same 
     priority. Second, because capabilities are the key to the 
     success of ESDP, in terms of political credibility of course 
     but also in terms of our military objectives.
       Let me tell you what our projects are in terms of 
     capabilities:
       As you all know by now, at Helsinki, last December, the 
     fifteen heads of State or Government set themselves two 
     series of targets in terms of military capabilities.
       On the one hand, the quantitative so called ``head-line 
     goals'' (60,000 troops rapidly deployable, self-sufficient 
     for a whole year with the necessary air and naval support);
       On the other hand, qualitative targets regarding collective 
     capabilities in areas such as command and control, 
     intelligence and strategic transport. What we are doing today 
     is to transform these political objectives into concrete 
     goals, in a very detailed manner. In political objectives 
     into concrete goals, in a very detailed manner. In other 
     words, the dozen or so lines in the Helsinki conclusions on 
     capabilities have, thanks to an alchemy performed by EU 
     military planners with input from their NATO colleagues, 
     turned into some 50 pages of specific requirements.
       This allows us to match up what we need to what we 
     currently have, and of course measure the gaps, which we will 
     aim to close at the Capabilities Commitment Conference, to be 
     held in Brussels next November 20 by Defense Ministers of the 
     15. This event will allow each member State to make pledges 
     toward meeting these requirements. We also aim to decide, 
     before the end of our Presidency, on a European review 
     mechanism that will allow us to continue narrowing the gap 
     until 2003, and more generally to review the nature and 
     composition of European military forces.
       Just to give you a flavor of this work, which suddenly 
     makes all of these debates very real: the Defense Ministers 
     of the 15 agreed, two weeks ago, that in order to fulfill the 
     Helsinki objectives the EU needed: 80,000 troops in order to 
     allow for a simultaneous contingency and still be able to 
     project 60,000 as agreed (allowing for rotations, this means 
     of course 200,000 to 230,000 troops); 300 to 350 fighter 
     planes; some 80 combat ships . . . these are just some of the 
     elements in this catalogue of forces that have been agreed. I 
     could also mention strategic lift, UAVs, amphibious landing
     ships . . .
       I would like to mention in passing that, as you can see, we 
     are not just aiming at operations on the low end of the 
     peace-keeping spectrum as I have sometimes heard. Does this 
     mean that we would be able, in 2003, to carry out an 
     operation such as ``Allied Force'' entirely by ourselves? Of 
     course not--and it would be dangerous to create such 
     expectations. But the imbalance between U.S. and European 
     forces which we witnessed last year would be substantially 
     reduced--and 2003 will be an important stepping stone on the 
     path to such a capability, which we need to keep as a longer-
     term goal in order to be prepared for all non-article 5 
     contingencies.
       3. I often hear people complaining about the fact that the 
     EU is not working to improve its capabilities, but just 
     creating new institutions. This is inaccurate on both counts: 
     as I have just pointed out, we are actively working on 
     reinforcing our capabilities. As for institutions, I would 
     agree with Sir Christopher that we are re-organizing, not 
     multiplying European institutions. As we have reiterated at 
     the last European Councils, our goal is to develop an 
     autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a 
     whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military 
     operations in response to international crises''. The 
     capacity to take decisions and to conduct EU-led military 
     operations requires the adequate political-military decision-
     making structures, procedures and expertise. During our 
     Presidency, we are working hard in order to allow these new 
     EU structures (the Political and Security Committee, the 
     Military Committee and the Military Staff) to get up and 
     running in their permanent configuration, taking over from 
     their interim one. These bodies are analogous to those that 
     existed in the past in the WEU, and which will be disbanded.
       I might add that those new institutions that are being 
     created are those which fulfill the objective of allowing 
     consultation and cooperation with NATO and with non-EU 
     countries, two goals that I know are very dear to many of 
     those here today, as they are indeed to us. Under our 
     Presidency, we have already held a joint meeting between the 
     North Atlantic Council and the Interim Political and Security 
     Committee (and there will be more to come), as well as 
     several meetings of the newly set up joint working groups 
     between the EU and NATO. These are needed to address, in a 
     pragmatic and solution-oriented way, the issues that the two 
     organizations need to work out together (access to NATO 
     assets, information security, etc.) and to work out the 
     elements of the long-term EU-NATO relationship. We have also 
     set up an inclusive forum for the 15 European non-EU partners 
     and, within this forum, for the 6 non-EU NATO allies. Several 
     meetings have also already been held in the two months that 
     have gone by since we took up our presidency. These countries 
     will, of course, be closely associated to the November 
     Capabilities Commitment Conference.
       One final word: after having gone into such detail into our 
     current projects, just to give you a taste of how complex 
     this whole endeavor is and how seriously we are taking our 
     task, I wouldn't want the trees to hide the forest.
       The crucial element to bear in mind is that we are at a 
     turning point in the history of the European Union, of the 
     Atlantic Alliance and of transatlantic relations. There is 
     much at stake, both for the future of the EU's foreign and 
     security policy, and therefore for our ability as Europeans 
     to play our role on the world stage, and for the 
     transatlantic link as well. We have taken the full measure of 
     what is at stake and are pleased to see that quarreling and 
     suspicion have given largely given way, on this side of the 
     Atlantic, to a better understanding of our common interests 
     and our shared objective.

                          ____________________