[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 25422-25424]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                              AIDE MEMOIRE

  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I have great respect for my friend from 
Oregon. I know he knows I think he is dead wrong on this issue. For two 
reasons I think he is dead wrong: On the facts and I think he is dead 
wrong on the approach he has taken.
  The fact of the matter is, the administration at the time this aide 
memoire--a fancy phrase for saying this agreement--was signed by Gore 
and Chernomyrdin, a follow-on to a verbal agreement made by Clinton and 
by Yeltsin in 1994--that agreement was made known to the public; it was 
publicly stated, and that was actually offered. The House of 
Representatives was briefed at the time.
  Here we are less than 10 days before an election and it has become a 
cause celebre. I don't have the time, and I am sure my friend from 
Oregon doesn't have the inclination, to listen to why this is a 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. And this is not a 
binding obligation. There are distinctions between binding obligations 
and agreements. One requires disclosure; the other does not. The fact 
is, this was a good deal and it was disclosed and made available to be 
disclosed.
  Let me cut to the chase. The fact of the matter is we did have a 
closed meeting with members of the State Department. I was present, my 
friend from Oregon was present, our colleague from Kansas was present, 
Senator Brownback, and maybe someone else; I can't recall. I indicated 
at the time that although the White House and the State Department were 
not required to share these documents, in my view they were making a 
tactical political mistake not doing it.
  I am here to tell my friend from Oregon what I told Senator Lugar and 
what I told Senator Hagel, and I understand it is being communicated to 
the majority leader. The State Department is going to make available to 
the leadership of the House and the Senate--which is the way we do 
these things--the so-called annexes. If there is any violation of law--
which there is not, but if there is any--the only violation could flow 
from there being a weapons system that was transferred on the annex, 
that falls within the purview of the law, that covered certain weapons 
systems and destabilizing systems under the McCain-Gore legislation. So 
if there is nothing in that annex that was transferred, there can be no 
question there was no law broken here.
  This will be the test to know whether this is politics or not. This 
will be the test. If the administration makes that available to the 
majority leader, minority leader, Speaker of the House, and the 
minority leader of the House, the leadership of the House, then, in 
fact, we will find out. They will bring the document up, and they can 
see it.
  If they really want to know the answer, if they really believe a law 
was broken, then it is really clear; they can sit down and look at it 
and find out. But if the offer is made and it is refused--I will say 
and challenge anyone to give me a good reason why I am wrong--that is 
pure politics.
  I really mean this; I have an inordinately high regard for my friend 
from Oregon. That probably hurts him back home, but I like him a lot. 
The fact of the matter is, we have worked closely together on a whole 
number of items. I have never misled him and he has never misled me. I 
got off the phone with Strobe Talbott. The Secretary of State is 
intending to call the majority leader, going to make the offer tomorrow 
to come up and show the documents.
  It is interesting that the letter requesting documents says they 
basically want these annexes. I know we need more time to explain this 
to someone listening because this is kind of confusing. My friend from 
Oregon knows what I am talking about because he knows the area well. 
The annex lists all those weapons systems that would be sanctionable if 
transferred by the Russians to the Iranians, if that were to occur.
  We will find out whether anything was transferred. By the way, unlike 
in any other administration, it has been pointed out that 10 times as 
many weapons were transferred to the Iranians when Bush was President 
than since Clinton has been President. But we will find out whether 
anything was violated.
  I want to make it clear, the offer will be made. If the offer is 
rejected, I want everyone to know--and the press who may be listening--
that a big neon light should go on, ``Politics, politics, politics.'' 
If the offer is accepted, then, in fact--and my colleagues look at it, 
the majority leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, if they look at it and they say this looks like a 
duck, to use my friend's phrase, that is a different story. That is 
debatable; that is something that warrants concern.
  To reiterate:
  The Senators' letter says that ``the Vice President pledges to `avoid 
any penalties to Russia that might otherwise arise under domestic law.' 
''
  The letter omits the words immediately preceding that quote from the 
leaked understanding: ``take appropriate steps'' to avoid penalties. 
That meant that the United States would not circumvent U.S. law. 
Rather, if necessary, we would sanction Russia, but waive the 
penalties, pursuant to the law.
  But in fact, there was no need to waive penalties at all, because 
Russia was not proposing any conventional arms transfers that would 
trigger sanctions under U.S. law--and the Vice President was assured of 
this by the Department of Defense before he signed the understanding.
  One relevant law was the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 
1992, the so-called ``McCain-Gore Act.'' That law requires sanctions 
against governments that transfer ``destabilizing numbers and types'' 
of ``advanced conventional weapons'' to Iran or Iraq. Thus, you must 
find both the sale of advanced conventional weapons to Iran, and that 
these are a number and type so as to tip the balance of power in the 
region.
  We have been assured--by experienced, career officials--that the 
Annex listing planned Russian arms transfers to Iran contains nothing 
that would meet all those tests.
  But we don't have to trust the Government on this. Anthony Cordesman, 
who was John McCain's national security assistant in 1992, working on 
the McCain-Gore bill, wrote recently: ``Iran . . . has not . . . 
received destabilizing transfers of advanced conventional weapons.''
  The third Kilo-class submarine to be sent to Iran was specifically 
considered by the Pentagon, which decided that it would not be 
destabilizing.
  In any case, submarines are not listed in the 1992 law's definition 
of advanced conventional weapons; and even

[[Page 25423]]

President Bush made no move to add them to the list, even though the 
law permits such additions.
  The Senators' letter quotes Secretary Albright's letter to Russian 
Foreign Minister Ivanov, in which she says we ``upheld our commitment 
not to impose sanctions'' and that ``without the Aide Memoire, Russia's 
conventional arms sales to Iran would have been subject to sanctions 
based on various provisions of our laws.'' As you said yesterday:
  One reasonable interpretation is that Secretary Albright is saying, 
``if you hadn't obeyed the Aide Memoire, you would have gotten in 
trouble.'' And that's true. If Russia had signed new deals to sell 
``lethal military equipment'' to Iran, or if it had sold lots of 
``advanced conventional weapons'' to Iran, it would have forced us to 
invoke sanctions under our law. But they basically did obey the Aide 
Memoire, and stayed out of trouble in this regard.
  Another reasonable interpretation is that the Secretary was 
overstating her case, using U.S. law as a club with which to beat the 
Russians. If so, more power to her.
  A third reasonable interpretation is that Secretary Albright was 
thinking of those sanctions, based on other U.S. laws, that do not 
require any trigger other than a Presidential determination that the 
national security warrants them.
  The Albright letter does not show any violation or circumvention of 
the 1992 Iran-Iraq law, and there is no evidence of any such action.
  The Senators' letter rejects Vice President Gore's point that 
Russia's arms transfers were pursuant to previously-signed contracts, 
because the McCain-Gore law does not exempt such transfers.
  That misses the point. There are other laws that would require 
sanctions for any transfer of ``lethal military equipment'' to Iran. 
Those laws exempt transfers under pre-1996 contracts.
  The administration never claimed that it was cutting off all Russian 
arms transfers to Iran. But it did put a cap on those transfers, 
limiting them essentially to ones contracted for during the Bush 
administration.
  The Senators' letter says that the Congress must review all the 
relevant documents, renews a demand for all the previously requested 
documents, and threatens a subpoena if these are not produced by noon 
Monday.
  The fact is, however, that only the Annex to the Aide Memoire is 
cited as a really necessary document.
  I think the executive branch ought to find a way to let appropriate 
senators review the Annex and the Secretary's letter to the Russian 
Foreign Minister, while maintaining the confidentiality of those 
documents.
  Once that is done, I believe that there will be no good reason to 
seek further documents.
  Tony Cordesman, the expert in Middle Eastern military affairs who was 
Senator McCain's national security assistant, summed up this case 
admirably a couple of weeks ago:

       Political campaigns are a poor time to debate complex 
     military issues, particularly when the debate is based on 
     press reports that are skewed to stress the importance of the 
     story at the expense of objective perspective and the facts.

  I ask unanimous consent the pertinent letters be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                 Washington, DC, October 26, 2000.
     Hon. Madeleine Albright,
     Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Albright: We were extremely disappointed 
     that the Department of State continues to refuse to give the 
     Committee access to critical documents relating to the Gore-
     Chernomyrdin agreement.
       Madame Secretary, this is simply unacceptable. All of the 
     evidence in the public domain leads us to the conclusion that 
     Vice President Gore signed a secret deal with Russian Premier 
     Viktor Chernomyrdin, in which he agreed to ignore U.S. non-
     proliferation laws governing weapons transfers to Iran.
       The text of the agreement signed by Mr. Gore and Mr. 
     Chernomyrdin (as published in the New York Times), the Vice 
     President pledges to ``avoid any penalties to Russia that 
     might otherwise arise under domestic law.''
       And, in your letter to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov 
     earlier this year (published in the Washington Times), you 
     state: ``We have also upheld our commitment not to impose 
     sanctions for these transfers disclosed in the Annex to the 
     Aide Memoire, Russia's conventional arms sales to Iran would 
     have been subject to sanctions based on various provisions of 
     our laws. This possibility still exists in the event of 
     continued Russian transfers after the December 31 termination 
     date.''
       The administration's defense--repeated by the Vice 
     President this morning on ``Good Morning America''--that the 
     Russian transfers to Iran he agreed to were under ``pre-
     existing contracts'' simply does not wash. The date the 
     contracts were signed is irrelevant. The Gore-McCain law 
     covers the transfer of weapons after 1992. There is no 
     ``contract sanctity'' exception in the law--it does not 
     matter whether the transfers took place under new or pre-
     existing contracts. What matters, under law, is when the 
     transfer took place.
       The Administration's other defense--that the weapons 
     transferred are not covered by the Gore-McCain law--is belied 
     by the Administration stubborn refusal to share with the 
     Committee the Annex that lists the weapons.
       In essence, you are saying to Congress and the American 
     people: ``Trust us.'' Considering the fact that almost 
     everything we have learned about this secret deal has come 
     from the news media and not the Administration, we 
     respectfully decline.
       Congress has a right and responsibility to review all the 
     relevant documents, and to judge for itself whether the 
     transfers the Vice President signed off on were covered by 
     U.S. non-proliferation laws.
       We expect the Administration to share all of the requested 
     documents with the Committee no later than noon on Monday, 
     October 20.
       If the Administration continues to stonewall, and withhold 
     these documents from Congress, then the Foreign relations 
     Committee will have no choice but to issue a subpoena to 
     obtain them.
           Sincerely,
         Gordon Smith, John McCain, Jesse Helms, Trent Lott, John 
           Warner, Sam Brownback, Don Nickles, Fred Thompson, 
           Richard Shelby, Richard G. Lugar.
                                  ____



                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                  Washington, DC, October 25, 2000
     Hon. George P. Schultz,
     Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow, Hoover 
         Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: I read with interest your election-eve 
     condemnation of an understanding that Vice President Gore and 
     Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin reached some five years 
     ago. I was surprised--and saddened--to see that you and other 
     men who have served our nation with dignity and distinction 
     would sign a letter that was promptly used in an effort to 
     exploit a national security issue for partisan gain.
       It is time to set the record straight. First, the June 1995 
     U.S.-Russia understanding prevented new Russian arms sales to 
     Iran and thus enhanced the security of the United States and 
     its allies. Second, the understanding did not circumvent, 
     violate or undermine any U.S. law. Indeed, it appears to have 
     led Russia to stay within the bounds of U.S. law regarding 
     conventional arms transfers to Iran. Third, although the 
     executive branch was under no legal obligation to submit the 
     June 1995 understanding to the Congress as an international 
     agreement, it did make public the broad outlines of the 
     understanding and provide classified oral briefings at least 
     to one committee.
       One highly respected expert in this field is Mr. Anthony H. 
     Cordesman, who was national security assistant to Senator 
     John McCain when his employer and then-Senator Al Gore wrote 
     the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992. Mr. 
     Cordesman now holds the Arleigh Burke Chair at the Center for 
     Strategic and International Studies. Earlier this month, he 
     wrote an analysis of Russia's conventional arms transfer to 
     Iran. The opening of that study strikes me as especially 
     worthy of your consideration: ``Political campaigns are a 
     poor time to debate complex military issues, particularly 
     when the debate is based on press reports that are skewed to 
     stress the importance of the story at the expense of 
     objective perspective and the facts. Iran does represent a 
     potential threat to US interests, but it has not had a major 
     conventional arms build-up or received destabilizing 
     transfers of advanced conventional weapons.''
       If you remain uncertain regarding any of the points I have 
     made, I invite you to consult such sources as Mr. Cordesman's 
     CSIS study, Iranian Arms Transfers: The Facts, the public 
     testimony this morning of Deputy Assistant Secretaries of 
     State John P. Barker and Joseph M. DeThomas before the Senate 
     Committee on Foreign Relations, and even my own opening 
     statement at this morning's hearing.
           Sincerely,
                                             Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
                                                     U.S. Senator.

  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I don't know a lot about matters over 
which I

[[Page 25424]]

don't have jurisdiction as a Senator. So I don't expect all Senators to 
know as much about sanctions as the Senator from Oregon and I because 
we spend probably 20 percent of our time working on that in the Foreign 
Relations Committee. My friend from Massachusetts forgot more about 
HCFA than I will ever know. It took me a while to know what HCFA was. 
They set the rates for everything, and it affects the American people a 
heck of a lot more than sanctions policy.
  There are discretionary sanctions available to the President of the 
United States. I emphasize ``discretionary.'' The comment made by the 
Secretary of State refers to those discretionary policies.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator has utilized the 8 
minutes he requested.
  The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.

                          ____________________