[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 25190-25191]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                              NORTH KOREA

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, with the President contemplating a 
visit to North Korea, I think it is fair to question the logic of that 
kind of a decision at this time. This historic meeting, if it does take 
place between the two leaders, could have significant implications for 
North and South Korea. I will explain a little bit more.
  The leader of North Korea has hinted at plans to cease missile 
testing. He has indicated a proposed halt to the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and North Korea's hermit-like isolation. I 
have had the opportunity to visit North Korea. I was one of the first 
Members of this body about 5 years ago to fly in an Air Force plane to 
North Korea, the first Air Force plane to fly there since 1943. It was 
an extraordinary lesson in a country that is probably as backward as 
any nation on Earth.
  In any event, it is fair to say our Secretary of State, in completing 
a series of historic meetings with the North Korean leaders in 
Pyongyang, has set the stage pretty much for a Presidential visit.
  The concern I have associated with the development of a rapport 
between North and South Korea, I wonder just what the benefit of a U.S. 
intervention could be at this time. Still, while improving relations 
certainly is a cause for optimism, I do not think it is really time to 
celebrate.
  North Korea has a horrendous record. For over 50 years, it has been a 
living embodiment, if you will, of George Orwell's nightmarish visions. 
The original Big Brother, Kim Il-Song, has been replaced by his son. A 
legacy of terror and aggression pervades in that country. Recent 
efforts to recast North Korea's leader Kim Chong-il as a likable fellow 
strikes me as little out of character. Here is a man whose regime has 
for years been at the top of America's terrorist watch list. There is 
no question he assassinated South Korean officials in Burma several 
years ago. They fired missiles across Japanese territory not long ago 
and actively sought to develop nuclear capability. It has been a regime 
whose policy has resulted in mass starvation of its people, that 
diverts food and resources of the neediest to feed and house the few 
who live in splendor, and develop, obviously, their weapons capability.
  This is a man who utters an offhand remark suggesting that North 
Korea could be convinced to halt its missile program, and the 
administration seems to hail him as showing ``a willingness to 
undertake reform.'' I guess I am not quite ready to buy that yet. I 
think that is a naive approach. I am a little more skeptical.
  At every turn, North Korea's concessions have turned out to be false 
promises made strictly to blackmail U.S. and South Korea into giving 
direct economic assistance to the bankrupt North.
  I wonder why we are so eager to believe that North Korea's apparent 
concessions now are anything other than a pretext.
  Like my colleagues, I certainly applaud South Korea's President Kim 
Dae-jung's sunshine diplomacy efforts to reduce North-South tensions. 
His efforts have been admirable. I think the Koreans should be taking 
the lead themselves in rebuilding the trust between the two nations. 
Only through that direct effort by the two sides, free of outside 
interference, can tensions truly be resolved.
  As a consequence, I worry that the administration's bull-in-the-
China-shop-like interjection of itself into the dialog threatens to 
dictate, perhaps overwhelm, the delicate process of trust building.
  Already we have seen North Korea delay fulfillment of its commitments 
to South Korea because it ``was too busy'' preparing for Secretary 
Albright's visit. This suggests to me that the North might shift 
attention to relations with the U.S. and away from South Korea and have 
the effect of undermining attempts at a true accord between North and 
South.
  I understand President Clinton is anxious for a foreign policy 
accomplishment in light of the difficulties in the Mideast. He 
certainly worked toward resolution. It is unfortunate that has not 
happened. In any event, the question of peaceful and secure relations 
with North Korea would be a valuable legacy, but I question the direct 
involvement in the process and whether or not that shifting away from 
the South Korean dialog with the North to the intervention of the U.S. 
may be harmful at this time.

[[Page 25191]]

  Not only would efforts to reach a speedy agreement with North Korea 
be premature, in my opinion, it would seem to reward the North for 50 
years of aggression as thanks for 6 months of sunshine.
  Both the prospects for peace and the President's legacy would be best 
served if he were to stay, I believe, on the sidelines and allow the 
U.S.-North Korean relations to proceed as they have been, with caution 
and balance. I urge the President to put diplomacy ahead of legacy and 
not spend the final days of his administration interposing the U.S. 
between the two Koreas.

                          ____________________