[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 24785-24788]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



AMERICA'S BRAVE SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN AND VICE PRESIDENT GORE'S RECORD 
                           ON FOREIGN POLICY

  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today to address two issues that are 
related; first, to express support for one of the most lethal and 
effective foreign policy instruments we know; that is, our brave 
service men and women who are standing guard on distant shores. We were 
reminded of that recently by the terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 
Yemen. It was yet another reminder that our forces are on watch 24 
hours a day in farflung places many of us have never heard of. Their 
presence and service is a crucial component of foreign policy.
  The effort of the sailors aboard the U.S.S. Cole in saving the ship 
is a testimony to the honor, courage, and commitment the Navy expects 
from every sailor wearing the Navy uniform.
  Our thanks and our congratulations go to them; our sorrow, of course, 
for those who were lost; and our sympathies and prayers go with their 
families.
  But in light of the danger in which these fighting men and women of 
the United States are placed, it is important we assess our foreign 
policy, and that we take a look at the record of what has happened in 
the past.
  What have the two candidates done? Where would the Vice President 
lead us, based on his experience to date?
  When you talk about experience with respect to Vice President Gore's 
foreign policy, I am reminded of that old saw that ``experience is what 
you get when you expected to get something else.'' His record of 
experience has been a very bad one, and one that will put at risk other 
sailors and other U.S. military in the future. You don't need to look 
too far to share these concerns.
  First, let me call attention to a Wall Street Journal editorial page 
article,

[[Page 24786]]

``Gore's Hidden Weakness: Foreign Policy'' from Monday, October 23. 
There Robert Zoellick expresses concern over the supposed foreign 
policy experience that Vice President Gore would bring to the White 
House.
  In the article he said that in the Chernomyrdin agreement:

       . . . he blessed Russian exports to Iran of weapons that 
     could only be targeted against the U.S. Navy, which protects 
     the world's energy lifeline.

  He went on to say:

       . . . Russian technicians continued to help Iran develop 
     ``laser isotope separation technology'' used to enrich 
     uranium for nuclear weapons.

  This was to a country that the 
State Department called ``the most active state sponsor of terrorism.'' 
We would have hoped that our Vice President, in his agreements with Mr. 
Chernomyrdin, would have been trying to build a market economy based on 
the rule of law. He should have prodded them to close down the corrupt 
commissions. But what we seem to have seen, as a result, or what has 
followed on that agreement, was a Soviet-style bureaucracy that never 
made any progress.
  There was an admission that the IMF money went to foreigners and 
Russian speculators.
  Quoting the editorial further, the former chairman of Russia's 
security commission said:

       ``I cannot explain why the Western governments didn't pay 
     serious attention.'' And Anatoly Chubais, Mr. Chernomyrdin's 
     deputy, said pithily: ``We conned them out of $20 billion.''

  And the editorial writer, Mr. Zoellick, says:

       Mr. Gore's Russian record is more than a litany of costly 
     mistakes. The vice president was unable to either perceive 
     the true nature of Russia's transformation or to design 
     creative U.S. policy to match the circumstances.

  I think we ought to be alarmed. We ought to be alarmed at the record 
that Vice President Gore has written as he takes credit for our foreign 
policy with Russia.
  Is it really credit, when we find that the Russians continue to 
export arms to Iran? Would it alarm Americans that Iran, which relies 
on Russian arms sales to maintain its own military, sends arms also to 
Hezbollah's guerrillas in Lebanon, which uses those same arms against 
Israeli soldiers in settlements?
  Yesterday, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations began hearings 
to probe the recent press reports that Vice President Al Gore and the 
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin made a secret agreement 5 
years ago promising the Clinton White House would not enforce the law 
requiring sanctions for Russian sales to Iran.
  Is this what we can expect, secret deals with Russia that have not 
stopped the sales of dangerous weapons to Iran? We are still seeking 
disclosure to the appropriate committees of Congress of the details of 
the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement.
  They have not come forward even to give the committees of 
jurisdiction the details on that agreement. What is going on? Why is it 
being hidden?
  I think we all ought to be very much concerned about what appears to 
be a series of deadly mistakes covered up--covered up--and kept out of 
the view of the congressional committees.
  Now, portions of the 12-page agreement between Vice President Gore 
and Mr. Chernomyrdin appeared in the October 17 edition of the 
Washington Times. In there, it appeared that the U.S. Vice President 
committed our country to ``avoid any penalties to Russia that might 
otherwise arise under domestic law.'' The final document reads: ``This 
aide memoire, as well as the attached annexes, will remain strictly 
confidential.''
  This secret Gore-Chernomyrdin agre-
ement, and the Clinton-Gore administration's promise not to implement 
U.S. laws requiring sanctions for Russian weapons proliferation to 
Iran, was first reported in the New York Times on October 13 of this 
year. It said there that:

       In exchange for the Russian promises, the United States 
     pledged not to seek penalties against Russia under a 1992 law 
     that requires sanctions against countries that sell advanced 
     weaponry to countries the State Department classifies as 
     state sponsors of terrorism. Iran is on that list.

  The law they are referring to, of course, is the 1992 Iran-Iraq Non-
Proliferation Act. That was sponsored by the Senator from Tennessee, 
Mr. Al Gore, along with Senator McCain.
  Let's be clear. This law requires the President impose sanctions on 
countries that sell advanced weaponry or assist in nuclear weapons 
programs in countries sponsoring terrorism. Russian cooperation with 
Iran's nuclear program was a major concern behind enactment of that 
legislation. How do you get around that?
  The White House has attempted to downplay the impact of Vice 
President Gore's deal by arguing the weaponry transferred was 
``antiquated.''
  I see nothing antiquated about laser isotope separation technology, 
which was described in the Wall Street Journal article, being used to 
enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.
  It is my understanding that some of the weapons sold to Iran by 
Russia included the Kilo-class submarine, which is difficult to detect 
and track in the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf because they 
generate very little noise while operating on battery power. In the 
event of a crisis, these submarines would present a credible threat to 
U.S. forces, allied vessels, and merchant marine traffic. They also aid 
wake-homing torpedoes and antiship mines. If these weapons pose a 
significant threat to U.S. ships and forces in the region, then these 
transfers appear to me to meet the threshold for sanctions under the 
Gore-McCain Act.
  Make no mistake, were tensions to escalate between the United States 
and countries in the Middle East, these weapons could have a 
catastrophic effect on our sailors and other military personnel on 
ships in the region. We just saw what a small simple boat loaded with 
explosives could do. What other reminders do we need.
  The Vice President defends his actions claiming that none of the 
weapons included met the standard for triggering sanctions. Yet the 
Washington Times uncovered a letter sent last January to the Russian 
Foreign Minister by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright admitting:

       Without the aid memoire, Russia's conventional arms sales 
     to Iran would have been subject to sanctions based on various 
     provisions of our laws.

  In classified documents obtained 
by the Washington Times, a 1995 letter, apparently written by Mr. 
Chernomyrdin to Vice President Gore, said:

       The information we are passing on to you is not to be 
     conveyed to third parties, including the U.S. Congress. Open 
     information concerning our cooperation with Iran is obviously 
     a different matter, and we do not object to the constructive 
     use of such information. I am counting on your understanding.

  These secret agreements between the Vice President and Mr. 
Chernomyrdin took place in the context of a Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Commission, which began in 1993 and was conducted in twice yearly 
meetings until Mr. Chernomyrdin was removed from his position in 1998. 
These secret agreements contradict administration and Vice President 
Gore's concerns regarding the spread of dangerous missiles in the 
Middle East and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to a 
country such as Iran who exports terrorism.
  Former Secretaries of State and Defense, Directors of Central 
Intelligence, National Security Advisers, have put out a strong letter, 
dated October 24, saying in part:

       This is why we are deeply disturbed by the agreement made 
     by Vice President Gore and then Russian Premier Chernomyrdin 
     in which America acquiesced in the sale by Russia to Iran of 
     highly threatening military equipment such as modern 
     submarines, fighter planes, and wake-homing torpedoes.
       We also find incomprehensible that this agreement was not 
     fully disclosed even to those committees of Congress charged 
     with receiving highly classified briefings--apparently at the 
     request of the Russian Premier. But agreement to his request 
     is even more disturbing since the Russian sales could have 
     brought about sanctions against Russia in accordance with a 
     1992 U.S. law sponsored by Senator John McCain and then 
     Senator Al Gore.


[[Page 24787]]


  This letter was signed by George Schultz, Jim Baker, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Henry Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld, James 
Schlesinger, Brent Scowcroft, Caspar Weinberger, and James Woolsey. I 
think their concerns ought to be concerns of all of us.
  This foreign policy effort is part and parcel with Vice President 
Gore's approach to the people. Who does the Vice President trust. 
Apparently not the people, not the U.S. Congress.
  The reason we are here discussing this issue is because exactly 13 
days ago the New York Times revealed that Vice President Gore signed 
this secret agreement I have been discussing. This Gore-Chernomyrdin 
deal has broad foreign policy ramifications. The decision to allow 
Russia to escape the consequences of providing Iran with conventional 
weapons is one which affects the security of our allies and more 
importantly the security of our troops such as those who routinely 
patrol the waters of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. This is not 
the type of agreement which should have been kept from the American 
people.
  In closing, I find it unconscionable that the Vice President of the 
United States could willingly withhold information from the Congress 
regarding the sale of arms from Russia to Iran; to a state described by 
his own administration as ``the most active state sponsor of 
terrorism.'' I find it highly disturbing knowing the difficulties we 
have faced in this region over the years that the Vice President would 
willingly hide from the people a deal that puts in the hands of the 
Iranian government weapons that could do real harm to our forces in the 
region who routinely patrol the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Our 
forces put their lives at risk any time they enter this region of the 
world because tensions are so high. Is it unrealistic to ask that the 
Government that sends our military forces into harm's way would work at 
decreasing the availability of arms in the region that could 
potentially be used against them?
  Is it unrealistic to expect from our President and Vice President 
sufficient trust in the people and our form of government to convey 
information to the Congress critical to our national security, critical 
to the security of our allies and critical to the stability of a region 
of the world that is wrought with tension and hatred for our allies 
such as Israel? I think not. I urge my fellow citizens to not simply 
accept the spin by supporters of Vice President Gore that his foreign 
policy experience is necessarily good for America and the troops we 
send in harm's way to enforce it.
  I urge this body to take action to get copies of that agreement from 
the administration. We should demand it. We should subpoena it. I hope 
my colleagues will joint me in seeking that resolution.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article from the Wall 
Street Journal and the statement by former Secretaries of State be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the materials were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

            [From the Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2000]

                 Gore's Hidden Weakness: Foreign Policy

                         By Robert B. Zoellick

       Events around the world have thrust foreign policy into the 
     presidential campaign and political commentators are making 
     routine references to Al Gore's ``experience.'' Yet the vice 
     president's international seasoning reminds me of the hapless 
     Hapsburgs: The Austro-Hungarians had a long record of 
     battles, but kept retreating and losing . . . wars, 
     territories, and eventually their country! If experience is 
     bad, it is a defect, not a credential. Here are four of Mr. 
     Gore's major defects.


                              Major Flaws

       First: Mr. Gore proclaims that he led U.S. policy toward 
     Russia. We have learned from the New York Times, however, 
     that he blessed Russian exports to Iran of weapons that could 
     only be targeted against the U.S. Navy, which protects the 
     world's energy lifeline. After Mr. Gore signed a secret 
     agreement approving these arms sales in 1995, the prime 
     ministers of Russia and Iran jointly described the U.S. 
     presence in the Gulf as ``totally unacceptable.'' Instead of 
     making the Russians pay a price for subverting U.S. 
     interests, Mr. Gore promised Russia that America would help 
     Moscow find more customers for its arms and make its military 
     industry eligible for technical assistance.
       Mr. Gore also stopped sanctions against Russia, required by 
     a law that he had cosponsored in 1992. In return, the 
     Russians promised to stop those arms sales by the end of 1999 
     but, responding to U.S. weakness, reneged on the deal and 
     sold additional weapons to Iran. Meanwhile, according to the 
     administration's own testimony, Russian technicians continued 
     to help Iran develop ``laser isotope separation technology'' 
     used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. And the State 
     Department recently called Iran ``the most active state 
     sponsor of terrorism.''
       This example is part of a pattern: Mr. Gore's diplomatic 
     myopia, a function of his concentration on near-term tasks, 
     leaves him blind to the wider, strategic implications of his 
     actions. Consider Mr. Gore's dealings with Russia's economy. 
     Energetically pursuing his penchant for bureaucratic detail, 
     he embraced a commission with Viktor Chernomyrdin, the 
     Russian prime minister, that approached economics with 
     faculty ``Gosplan'' logic.
       The old Soviet approach to economic relations was to 
     establish joint ventures blessed by high-level officials 
     (who, like Mr. Chernomyrdin, received preferential 
     treatment). To build a market economy based on the rule of 
     law, Mr. Gore should have prodded Russia to close down 
     corrupt commissions and open avenues for private 
     entrepreneurs. Yet as the head of the political section in 
     the U.S. Embassy in Moscow reported, the Gore-Chernomyrdin 
     commisison resembled a Soviet-style bureaucracy with any 
     information that contradicted success filed away forever.
       Admitting that the IMF's money went to ``foreigners and 
     Russian speculators,'' the former chairman of Russia's 
     Securities Commission said: ``I cannot explain why the 
     Western governments didn't pay serious attention.'' And 
     Anatoly Chubais, Chernomyrdin's deputy, said pithily: ``We 
     conned them out of $20 billion.''
       Mr. Gore's Russia record is more than a litany of costly 
     mistakes. The vice president was unable either to perceive 
     the true nature of Russia's transformation or to design 
     creative U.S. policy to match the circumstances. Mr. Gore was 
     committed to process over substantive results. Unwilling to 
     face unpleasant truths, he did not hold Russians accountable 
     for lies and other actions that harmed U.S. interests. 
     Second: Commentators generally assume that Mr. Gore supports 
     free trade, but his track record suggests that his 
     ``leadership'' on trade would be tepid at best, and 
     counterproductive at worst.
       After the 1994 elections, Mr. Gore would not defend the 
     North American Free Trade Agreement, much less make the 
     larger case for free trade. The administration set distant 
     goals for trade, but was unwilling to back words with 
     actions. By the time Messrs. Clinton and Gore stirred 
     themselves to try to recover fast-track trade negotiating 
     authority in 1997, protectionists had made it impossible. As 
     a result, the administration retreated when it could only get 
     the support of about 40 out of over 200 Democrats in the 
     House.
       Mr. Gore's record provides additional evidence that he is 
     unwilling to expend political capital to promote trade. He 
     did not lift a finger to prevent the World Trade Organization 
     fiasco in Seattle; but he did applaud Mr. Clinton's 
     destructive announcement that any new trade agreement must 
     include labor provisions backed by sanctions, which the 
     administration's own negotiators had resisted.
       When Mr. Clinton and George W. Bush worked this year to win 
     votes for normal trade relations with Beijing--so that China 
     could enter the WTO--Mr. Gore again dodged responsibility. In 
     fact, he told union protectionists behind closed doors that 
     if Mr. Clinton failed with the China vote, he--Al Gore--would 
     insist on labor provisions in any new agreement.
       Third: Mr. Gore's experience with the environment should be 
     of concern to Americans, regardless of their views on climate 
     change. He locked our climate change policy into a 
     bureaucratic, restrictive, and impractical Kyoto treaty. The 
     Senate, Democrats and Republicans alike, voted 97 to 0 in 
     protest against this agreement. The treaty has many flaws, 
     not the least of which is a failure to include greenhouse gas 
     requirements for China, India and other countries whose 
     growing emissions could dwarf America's own reductions.
       Even some environmentalists are concerned privately that 
     this impractical agreement--like other in Mr. Gore's 
     international file--impedes realistic goals based on 
     scientific evidence and practical plans to deal with 
     greenhouse gases. Indeed, Joe Lieberman, who recognized that 
     the Kyoto treaty had created stalemate instead of progress, 
     tried to fashion legislation that bypassed the Kyoto 
     strictures.


                             poor judgment

       Finally, Mr. Gore's experience flashes warning signs about 
     his approach to being commander-in-chief. Mr. Gore reminds us 
     that he voted in support of the Gulf War resolution. He does 
     not admit, however, that in

[[Page 24788]]

     critical Senate testimony only about six weeks before the war 
     began, he harshly criticized President Bush's decision to 
     send the military reinforcements to the Gulf that were 
     necessary to launch a successful attack. Instead, Mr. Gore 
     wanted to rely on economic sanctions.
       It was also discouraging that Mr. Gore told a national TV 
     audience that he would impose social policy ``litmus tests'' 
     on appointments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After learning 
     that this idea would have politicized the military--and 
     precluded the service of Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf and 
     others who differ with him on gays in the military--the 
     ``experienced'' vice president reversed himself.
       Mr. Gore's spinners are now programmed to blurt out that he 
     has 20-odd years of foreign policy exposure. There is more 
     than a touch of truthful irony in that claim. This is part of 
     a pattern of the vice president relying on references to 
     resumes, committees and agreements--instead of outlining 
     strategies to use U.S. power for sound ends. Mr. Gore does 
     indeed have foreign policy experience. Unfortunately for him, 
     it is bad experience.
                                  ____


Statement by Former Secretaries of State, Defense, Directors of Central 
  Intelligence and National Security Advisors on the Sale of Russian 
                   Weapons to Iran, October 24, 2000

       The following individuals, who include supporters of both 
     Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Gore, believe 
     strongly that:
       ``The President's most important job is safeguarding our 
     nation's security and our ability to protect our interests, 
     our citizens and our allies and friends. The military balance 
     in regions of vital interest to America and her allies--
     including the Persian Gulf, which is a critical source of the 
     world's energy supplies--is the essential underpinning for a 
     strong foreign policy.
       ``This is why we are deeply disturbed by the agreement made 
     between Vice President Gore and then Russian Premier 
     Chernomyrdin in which America acquiesced in the sale by 
     Russia to Iran of highly threatening military equipment such 
     as modern submarines, fighter planes, and wake-homing 
     torpedoes.
       ``We also find incomprehensible that this agreement was not 
     fully disclosed even to those committees of Congress charged 
     with receiving highly classified briefings--apparently at the 
     request of the Russian Premier. But agreement to this request 
     is even more disturbing since the Russian sales could have 
     brought about sanctions against Russia in accordance with a 
     1992 U.S. law sponsored by Senator John McCain and then 
     Senator Al Gore.''
       George P. Shultz, former Secretary of State.
       James A. Baker, III, former Secretary of State.
       Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Assistant to the President for 
     National Security Affairs.
       Frank C. Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense and former 
     Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
       Lawrence S. Eagleburger, former Secretary of State.
       Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary of State and former 
     Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
       Donald H. Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense.
       James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and 
     former Director of Central Intelligence.
       Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for 
     National Security Affairs.
       Caspar W. Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense.
       R. James Woolsey, Attorney and former Director of Central 
     Intelligence.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I commend my colleague from Missouri 
for bringing up a very important issue.

                          ____________________