[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 16]
[Senate]
[Pages 22741-22745]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



               PRESIDENTIAL THREAT PROTECTION ACT OF 2000

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed to Calendar No. 775, H.R. 3048.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 3048) to amend section 879 of title 18, United 
     States Code, to provide clearer coverage over threats against 
     former Presidents and members of their families, and for 
     other purposes.

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.


                           Amendment No. 4319

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, Senator Hatch has an amendment at the desk, 
and I ask for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott], for Mr. Hatch, for 
     himself, Mr. Leahy, and Mr. Thurmond, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4319.

  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 3, strike lines 19 through 24 and insert the 
     following:
       ``(e)(1) When directed by the President, the United States 
     Secret Service is authorized to participate, under the 
     direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, in the planning, 
     coordination, and implementation of security operations at 
     special events of national significance, as determined by the 
     President.
       ``(2) At the end of each fiscal year, the President through 
     such agency or office as the President may designate, shall 
     report to the Congress--
       ``(A) what events, if any, were designated special events 
     of national significance for security purposes under 
     paragraph (1); and
       ``(B) the criteria and information used in making each 
     designation.''.
       On page 7, line 6, after ``offense'' insert ``or 
     apprehension of a fugitive''.
       On page 8, strike lines 17 through 19.
       On page 9, strike line 14 and insert the following:
     issuance.
       ``(11) With respect to subpoenas issued under paragraph 
     (1)(A)(i)(III), the Attorney General shall issue guidelines 
     governing the issuance of administrative subpoenas pursuant 
     to that paragraph. The guidelines required by this paragraph 
     shall mandate that administrative subpoenas may be issued 
     only after review and approval of senior supervisory 
     personnel within the respective investigative agency or 
     component of the Department of Justice and of the United 
     States Attorney for the judicial district in which the 
     administrative subpoena shall be served.''.
       At the end of the bill, insert the following:

     SEC. 6. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS TO APPREHEND FUGITIVES.

       (a) Authority of Attorney General.--Section 3486(a)(1) of 
     title 18, United States Code, as amended by section 5 of this 
     Act is further amended in subparagraph (A)(i)--
       (1) by striking ``offense or'' and inserting ``offense,''; 
     and
       (2) by inserting ``or (III) with respect to the 
     apprehension of a fugitive,'' after ``children,''.
       (b) Additional Basis for Nondisclosure Order.--Section 
     3486(a)(6) of title 18, United States Code, as amended by 
     section 5 of this Act, is further amended in subparagraph 
     (B)--
       (1) by striking ``or'' and the end of clause (iii);
       (2) by striking the period at the end of clause (iv) and 
     inserting ``; or''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(v) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or 
     undue delay of a trial.''.
       (c) Definitions.--Section 3486 of title 18, as amended by 
     section 5 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the 
     end the following:
       ``(g) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) the term `fugitive' means a person who--
       ``(A) having been accused by complaint, information, or 
     indictment under Federal law of a serious violent felony or 
     serious drug offense, or having been convicted under Federal 
     law of committing a serious violent felony or serious drug 
     offense, flees or attempts to flee from, or evades or 
     attempts to evade the jurisdiction of the court with 
     jurisdiction over the felony;
       ``(B) having been accused by complaint, information, or 
     indictment under State law of a serious violent felony or 
     serious drug offense, or having been convicted under State 
     law of committing a serious violent felony or serious drug 
     offense, flees or attempts to flee from, or evades or 
     attempts to evade, the jurisdiction of the court with 
     jurisdiction over the felony;
       ``(C) escapes from lawful Federal or State custody after 
     having been accused by complaint, information, or indictment 
     of a serious violent felony or serious drug offense or having 
     been convicted of committing a serious violent felony or 
     serious drug offense; or
       ``(D) is in violation of subparagraph (2) or (3) of the 
     first undesignated paragraph of section 1073;
       ``(2) the terms `serious violent felony' and `serious drug 
     offense' shall have the meanings given those terms in section 
     3559(c)(2) of this title; and
       ``(3) the term `investigation' means, with respect to a 
     State fugitive described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of 
     paragraph (1), an investigation in which there is reason to 
     believe that the fugitive fled from or evaded, or attempted 
     to flee from or evade, the jurisdiction of the court, or 
     escaped from custody, in or affecting, or using any facility 
     of, interstate or foreign commerce, or as to whom an 
     appropriate law enforcement officer or official of a State or 
     political subdivision has requested the Attorney General to 
     assist in the investigation, and the Attorney General finds 
     that the particular circumstances of the request give rise to 
     a Federal interest sufficient for the exercise of Federal 
     jurisdiction pursuant to section 1075.''.

     SEC. 7. FUGITIVE APPREHENSION TASK FORCES.

       (a) In General.--The Attorney General shall, upon 
     consultation with appropriate Department of Justice and 
     Department of the Treasury law enforcement components, 
     establish permanent Fugitive Apprehension Task Forces 
     consisting of Federal, State, and local law enforcement 
     authorities in designated regions of the United States, to be 
     directed and coordinated by the United States Marshals 
     Service, for the purpose of locating and apprehending 
     fugitives.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Attorney General for the United 
     States Marshals Service to carry out the provisions of this 
     section $30,000,000 for the fiscal year 2001, $5,000,000 for 
     fiscal year 2002, and $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2003.
       (c) Other Existing Applicable Law.--Nothing in this section 
     shall be construed to

[[Page 22742]]

     limit any existing authority under any other provision of 
     Federal or State law for law enforcement agencies to locate 
     or apprehend fugitives through task forces or any other 
     means.

     SEC. 8. STUDY AND REPORTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS.

       (a) Study on Use of Administrative Subpoenas.--Not later 
     than December 31, 2001, the Attorney General, in consultation 
     with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall complete a study on 
     the use of administrative subpoena power by executive branch 
     agencies or entities and shall report the findings to the 
     Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives. Such report shall include--
       (1) a description of the sources of administrative subpoena 
     power and the scope of such subpoena power within executive 
     branch agencies;
       (2) a description of applicable subpoena enforcement 
     mechanisms;
       (3) a description of any notification provisions and any 
     other provisions relating to safeguarding privacy interests;
       (4) a description of the standards governing the issuance 
     of administrative subpoenas; and
       (5) recommendations from the Attorney General regarding 
     necessary steps to ensure that administrative subpoena power 
     is used and enforced consistently and fairly by executive 
     branch agencies.
       (b) Report on Frequency of Use of Administrative 
     Subpoenas.--
       (1) In general.--The Attorney General and the Secretary of 
     the Treasury shall report in January of each year to the 
     Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives on the number of administrative subpoenas 
     issued by them under this section, whether each matter 
     involved a fugitive from Federal or State charges, and the 
     identity of the agency or component of the Department of 
     Justice or the Department of the Treasury issuing the 
     subpoena and imposing the charges.
       (2) Expiration.--The reporting requirement of this 
     subsection shall terminate in 3 years after the date of 
     enactment of this section.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the Presidential Threat Protection Act, 
H.R. 3048, is a high priority for the Secret Service and the Service's 
respected Director, Brian Stafford, and I am pleased that this 
legislation is passing the Senate today, along with legislation that 
Senators Thurmond, Hatch and I have crafted to assist the U.S. Marshals 
Service in apprehending fugitives.
  The Presidential Threat Protection Act, H.R. 3048, would expand or 
clarify the Secret Service's authority in four ways. First, the bill 
would amend current law to make clear it is a federal crime, which the 
Secret Service is authorized to investigate, to threaten any current or 
former President or their immediate family, even if the person is not 
currently receiving Secret Service protection and including those 
people who have declined continued protection, such as former 
Presidents, or have not yet received protection, such as major 
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates and their families.
  Second, the bill would incorporate in statute certain authority, 
which is currently embodied in a classified Executive Order, PDD 62, 
clarifying that the Secret Service is authorized to coordinate, design, 
and implement security operations for events deemed of national 
importance by the President ``or the President's designee.''
  Third, the bill would establish a ``National Threat Assessment 
Center'' within the Secret Service to provide training to State, local 
and other Federal law enforcement agencies on threat assessments and 
public safety responsibilities.
  Finally, the bill authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to issue 
administrative subpoenas for investigations of ``imminent'' threats 
made against an individual whom the service is authorized to protect. 
The Secret Service has requested that the Congress grant this 
administrative subpoena authority to expedite investigation procedures 
particularly in situations where an individual has made threats against 
the President and is en route to exercise those threats.
  ``Administrative subpoena'' is the term generally used to refer to a 
demand for documents or testimony by an investigative entity or 
regulatory agency that is empowered to issue the subpoena independently 
and without the approval of any grand jury, court or other judicial 
entity. I am generally skeptical of administrative subpoena power. 
Administrative subpoenas avoid the strict grant jury secrecy rules and 
the documents provided in response to such subpoenas are, therefore, 
subject to broader dissemination. Moreover, since investigative agents 
issue such subpoenas directly, without review by a judicial officer or 
even a prosecutor, fewer ``checks'' are in place to ensure the subpoena 
is issued with good cause and not merely as a fishing expedition.
  H.R. 3048 addresses these general concerns with the following 
procedural safeguards, some of which would apply not only to the new 
administrative subpoena authority of the Secret Service but also to 
current administrative subpoena authority granted to the FBI to issue 
administrative subpoenas in cases involving child abuse, child sexual 
exploitation, and Federal health care offenses.
  The new administrative subpoena authority in threat cases may only be 
exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury upon determination of the 
Director of the Secret Service that the threat is imminent, and the 
Secret Service must notify the Attorney General of the issuance of each 
subpoena. I should note that this requirement will help ensure that 
administrative subpoenas will be used in only the most significant 
investigations since obtaining the authorization for such a subpoena 
from senior Treasury and Secret Service personnel may take longer than 
simply going to the local U.S. Attorney's office to get a grand jury 
subpoena.
  The bill would limit the scope of both current and new administrative 
subpoena authority of the FBI for obtaining records in child sex abuse 
and exploitation cases from Internet Service Providers to the name, 
address, local and long distance telephone billing records, telephone 
number or services used by a subscriber.
  The bill would also expressly allow a person whose records are 
demanded pursuant to an administrative subpoena to contest the 
administrative subpoena by petitioning a federal judge to modify or set 
aside the subpoena.
  The bill would authorize a court to order non-disclosure of the 
administrative subpoena for up to 90 days (and up to a 90 day 
extension) upon a showing that disclosure would adversely affect the 
investigation in an enumerated way.
  Upon written demand, the agency must return the subpoenaed records or 
things if no case or proceedings arise from the production of records 
``within a reasonable time.''
  The administrative subpoena may not require production in less than 
24 hours after service so agencies may have to wait for at least a day 
before demanding production.
  The Senate amendment to H.R. 3048 would modify the House-passed 
version, which provides that violation of the administrative subpoena 
is punishable by fine or up to five years' imprisonment. This penalty 
provision in the House version of the bill is both unnecessary and 
excessive since current law already provides that failure to comply 
with the subpoena may be punished as a contempt of court--which is 
either civil or criminal. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3486(c). Under current 
law, the general term of imprisonment for some forms of criminal 
contempt is up to six months. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Sec. 402. The Senate 
amendment would strike that provision in the House bill.
  Secret Service protective function Privilege. While passage of this 
legislation will assist the Secret Service in fulfilling its critical 
mission, this Congress is unfortunately coming to a close without 
addressing another significant challenge to the Secret Service's 
ability to fulfill its vital mission of protecting the life and safety 
of the President and other important persons. I refer to the misguided 
and unfortunately successful litigation of Special Counsel Kenneth 
Starr to compel Secret Service agents to answer questions about what 
they may have observed or overheard while protecting the life of the 
President.
  As a result of Mr. Starr's zealous efforts, the courts refused to 
recognize a protective function privilege and required that at least 
seven Secret Service officers appear before a federal grand jury to 
respond to questions regarding President Clinton, and others.

[[Page 22743]]

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 W.L. 272884 (May 22, 1998 D.C.), 
affirmed 1998 WL 370584 (July 7, 1998 D.C. Cir) (per curiam). These 
recent court decisions, which refused to recognize a protective 
function privilege, could have a devastating impact upon the Secret 
Service's ability to provide effective protection. The Special Counsel 
and the courts ignored the voices of experience--former Presidents, 
Secret Service Directors, and others--who warned of the potentially 
deadly consequences. The courts disregarded the lessons of history. We 
cannot afford to be so cavalier; the stakes are just too high.
  In order to address this problem, I introduced the Secret Service 
Protective Privilege Act, S. 1360, on July 13, 1999, to establish a 
Secret Service protective function privilege so Secret Service agents 
will not be put in the position of revealing private information about 
protected officials as Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr compelled the 
Secret Service to do with respect to President Clinton. Unfortunately, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee took no action on this legislation in 
this Congress.
  Few national interests are more compelling than protecting the life 
of the President of the United States. The Supreme Court has said that 
the nation has ``an overwhelming interest in protecting the safety of 
its Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without 
interference from threats of physical violence.'' Watts v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). What is at stake is not merely the 
safety of one person: it is the ability of the Executive Branch to 
function in an effective and orderly fashion, and the capacity of the 
United States to respond to threats and crises. Think of the shock 
waves that rocked the world in November 1963 when President Kennedy was 
assassinated. The assassination of a President has international 
repercussions and threatens the security and future of the entire 
nation.
  The threat to our national security and to our democracy extends 
beyond the life of the President to those in direct line of the Office 
of the President--the Vice President, the President-elect, and the Vice 
President elect. By Act of Congress, these officials are required to 
accept the protection of the Secret Service--they may not turn it down. 
This statutory mandate reflects the critical importance that Congress 
has attached to the physical safety of these officials.
  Congress has also charged the Secret Service with responsibility for 
protecting visiting heads of foreign states and foreign governments. 
The assassination of a foreign head of state on American soil could be 
catastrophic from a foreign relations standpoint and could seriously 
threaten national security.
  The bill I introduced, S. 1360, would enhance the Secret Service's 
ability to protect these officials, and the nation, from the risk of 
assassination. It would do this by facilitating the relationship of 
trust between these officials and their Secret Service protectors that 
is essential to the Secret Service's protective strategy. Agents and 
officers surround the protectee with an all-encompassing zone of 
protection on a 24-hour-a-day basis. In the face of danger, they will 
shield the protectee's body with their own bodies and move him to a 
secure location.
  That is how the Secret Service averted a national tragedy on March 
30, 1981, when John Hinckley attempted to assassinate President Reagan. 
Within seconds of the first shot being fired, Secret Service personnel 
had shielded the President's body and maneuvered him into the waiting 
limousine. One agent in particular, Agent Tim McCarthy, positioned his 
body to intercept a bullet intended for the President. If Agent 
McCarthy had been even a few feet farther from the President, history 
might have gone very differently.
  For the Secret Service to maintain this sort of close, unremitting 
proximity to the President and other protectees, it must have their 
complete, unhesitating trust and confidence. Secret Service personnel 
must be able to remain at the President's side even during confidential 
and sensitive conversations, when they may overhear military secrets, 
diplomatic exchanges, and family and private matters. If our Presidents 
do not have complete trust in the Secret Service personnel who protect 
them, they could try to push away the Secret Service's ``protective 
envelope'' or undermine it to the point where it could no longer be 
fully effective.
  This is more than a theoretical possibility. Consider what former 
President Bush wrote in April, 1998, after hearing of the independent 
counsel's efforts to compel Secret Service testimony:

       The bottom line is I hope that [Secret Service] agents will 
     be exempted from testifying before the Grand Jury. What's at 
     stake here is the protection of the life of the President and 
     his family and the confidence and trust that a President must 
     have in the [Secret Service]. If a President feels that 
     Secret Service agents can be called to testify about what 
     they might have seen or heard then it is likely that the 
     President will be uncomfortable having the agents nearby. I 
     allowed the agents to have proximity first because they had 
     my full confidence and secondly because I knew them to be 
     totally discreet and honorable. . . . I can assure you that 
     had I felt they would be compelled to testify as to what they 
     had seen or heard, no matter what the subject, I would not 
     have felt comfortable having them close in. . . . I feel very 
     strongly that the [Secret Service] agents should not be made 
     to appear in court to discuss that which they might or might 
     not have seen or heard. What's at stake here is the 
     confidence of the President in the discretion of the [Secret 
     Service]. If that confidence evaporates the agents, denied 
     proximity, cannot properly protect the President.

  As President Bush's letter makes plain, requiring Secret Service 
agents to betray the confidence of the people whose lives they protect 
could seriously jeopardize the ability of the Service to perform its 
crucial national security function.
  The possibility that Secret Service personnel might be compelled to 
testify about their protectees could have a particularly devastating 
affect on the Service's ability to protect foreign dignitaries. The 
mere fact that this issue has surfaced is likely to make foreign 
governments less willing to accommodate Secret Service both with 
respect to the protection of the President and Vice President on 
foreign trips, and the protection of foreign heads of state traveling 
in the United States.
  The security of our chief executive officers and visiting foreign 
heads of state should be a matter that transcends all partisan politics 
and I regret that this legislation does not do more to help the Secret 
Service by providing a protective function privilege.
  The Fugitive Apprehension Act. The Senate amendment to H.R. 3048 
incorporates into the bill the substance of the Thurmond-Biden-Leahy 
substitute amendment to S. 2516, the Fugitive Apprehension Act, which 
passed the Senate unanimously on July 26, 2000. That substitute 
amendment reconciled the significant differences between S. 2516, as 
introduced, and S. 2761, ``The Capturing Criminals Act,'' which I 
introduced with Senator Kohl on June 21, 2000. The Senate amendment to 
H.R. 3048 makes certain changes to S. 2516 to ensure that the authority 
granted is consistent with privacy and other appropriate safeguards.
  As a former prosecutor, I am well aware that fugitives from justice 
are an important problem and that their capture is an essential 
function of law enforcement. According to the FBI, nearly 550,000 
people are currently fugitives from justice on federal, state, and 
local felony charges combined. This means that there are almost as many 
fugitive felons as there are citizens residing in my home state of 
Vermont.
  The fact that we have more than one half million fugitives from 
justice, a significant portion of whom are convicted felons in 
violation of probation or parole, who have been able to flaunt court 
order and avoid arrest, breeds disrespect for our laws and poses 
undeniable risks to the safety of our citizens.
  Our Federal law enforcement agencies should be commended for the job 
they have been doing to date on capturing federal fugitives and helping 
the states and local communities bring their fugitives to justice. The 
U.S. Marshals Service, our oldest law enforcement agency, has arrested 
over 120,000 federal, state and local fugitives in the past four years, 
including more federal fugitives than all the other federal agencies 
combined. In prior years,

[[Page 22744]]

the Marshals Service spearheaded special fugitive apprehension task 
forces, called FIST Operations, that targeted fugitives in particular 
areas and was singularly successful in arresting over 34,000 fugitive 
felons.
  Similarly, the FBI has established twenty-four Safe Streets Task 
Forces exclusively focused on apprehending fugitives in cities around 
the country. Over the period of 1995 to 1999, the FBI's efforts have 
resulted in the arrest of a total of 65,359 state fugitives.
  Nevertheless, the number of outstanding fugitives is too large. The 
Senate amendment to H.R. 3028 will help make a difference by providing 
new but limited administrative subpoena authority to the Department of 
Justice to obtain documentary evidence helpful in tracking down 
fugitives and by authorizing the Attorney General to establish fugitive 
task forces.
  Unlike initial criminal inquiries, fugitive investigations present 
unique difficulties. Law enforcement may not use grand jury subpoenas 
since, by the time a person is a fugitive, the grand jury phase of an 
investigation is usually over. Use of grand jury subpoenas to obtain 
phone or bank records to track down a fugitive would be an abuse of the 
grand jury. Trial subpoenas may also not be used, either because the 
fugitive is already convicted or no trial may take place without the 
fugitive.
  This inability to use trial and grand jury subpoenas for fugitive 
investigations creates a gap in law enforcement procedures. Law 
enforcement partially fills this gap by using the All Writs Act, 28 
U.S.C. Sec. 1651(a), which authorizes federal courts to ``issue all 
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions 
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.'' The procedures, 
however, for obtaining orders under the Act, and the scope and non-
disclosure terms of such orders, vary between jurisdictions. 
Authorizing administrative subpoena power will help bridge the gap in 
fugitive investigations by providing a uniform mechanism for federal 
law enforcement agencies to obtain records useful for tracking a 
fugitive's whereabouts.
  The Thurmond-Biden-Leahy substitute amendment, which previously 
passed the Senate, incorporated a number of provisions from the Leahy-
Kohl ``Capturing Criminals Act'' and made significant and positive 
modifications to the original version of S. 2516. These improvements 
are largely incorporated into the current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond 
amendments to H.R. 3048, which the Senate considers today. First, as 
introduced, S. 2516 would have limited use of an administrative 
subpoena to those fugitives who have been ``indicted,'' and failed to 
address the fact that fugitives flee after arrest on the basis of a 
``complaint'' and may flee after the prosecutor has filed an 
``information'' in lieu of an amendment. The prior substitute amendment 
and the current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to H.R. 3048, by 
contrast, would allow use of such subpoenas to track fugitives who have 
been accused in a ``complaint, information or indictment.''
  Second, S. 2516, as introduced, would have required the U.S. Marshals 
Service to report quarterly to the Attorney General (who must transmit 
the report to Congress) on use of the administrative subpoenas. While a 
reporting requirement is useful, the requirement as described in the 
original S. 2516 was overly burdensome and insufficiently specific. The 
prior substitute amendment and the current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond 
amendment to H.R. 3048 would require, as set forth in the Capturing 
Criminals Act, that the Attorney General report for the next three 
years to the Judiciary Committees of both the House and Senate on the 
following information about the use of administrative subpoenas in 
fugitive investigations: the number issued, by which agency, 
identification of the charges on which the fugitive was wanted and 
whether the fugitive was wanted on federal or state charges.
  Third, although the original S. 2516 outlined the procedures for 
enforcement of an administrative subpoena, it was silent on the 
mechanisms for contesting the subpoena by the recipient. The procedures 
outlined in H.R. 3048 address this issue in a manner fully consistent 
with those I originally outlined in the Capturing Criminals Act by 
allowing a person, who is served with an administrative subpoena, to 
petition a court to modify or set aside the subpoena.
  Fourth, the original S. 2516 set forth no procedure for the 
government to command a custodian of records to avoid disclosure or 
delay notice to a customer about the existence of the subpoena. This is 
particularly critical in fugitive investigations when law enforcement 
does not want to alert a fugitive that the police are on the person's 
trail. Both the prior substitute amendment to S. 2516, which passed the 
Senate last July, and H.R. 3048, which the Senate considers today, 
provide express authority for law enforcement to apply for a court 
order directing the custodian of records to delay notice to subscribers 
of the existence of the subpoena on the same terms applicable in 
current law to other subpoenas issued, for example, to telephone 
companies and financial institutions. This procedure is consistent with 
provisions I originally proposed in the Capturing Criminals Act.
  Fifth, S. 2516, as introduced, would have authorized use of an 
administrative subpoena in fugitive investigations upon a finding by 
the Attorney General that the documents are ``relevant and material,'' 
which is further defined to mean that ``there are articulable facts 
that show the fugitive's whereabouts may be discerned from the records 
sought.'' In my view, changing the standard for issuance of a subpoena 
from ``relevancy'' to a hybrid of ``relevant and material'' would set a 
confusing precedent. Accordingly, the current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond 
amendment to H.R. 3048 amendment would authorize issuance of an 
administrative subpoena in fugitive investigations based on the same 
standard as for other administrative subpoenas, i.e., that the 
documents may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry.
  Sixth, the original S. 2516 authorized the Attorney General to issue 
guidelines delegating authority for issuance of administrative 
subpoenas in fugitive investigations only to the Director of the U.S. 
Marshals Service, despite the fact that the FBI, and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration also want this authority to find fugitives 
on charges over which they have investigative authority. The substitute 
amendment to S. 2516, which previously passed the Senate, and the 
current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to H.R. 3048, which we consider 
today, would authorize the Attorney General to issue guidelines 
delegating authority for issuance of administrative subpoenas to 
supervisory personnel within components of the Department. In addition, 
the current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to H.R. 3048 would require 
that the Attorney General's guidelines require that administrative 
subpoenas in fugitive investigations be issued only upon the review and 
approval of senior supervisory personnel within the respective 
investigating agency and of the U.S. Attorney in the judicial district 
in which the subpoena would be served.
  Seventh, the original S. 2516 did not address the issue that a 
variety of administrative subpoena authorities exist in multiple forms 
in every agency. The substitute amendment to S. 2516, which previously 
passed the Senate, and the Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to H.R. 3048, 
which we consider today, incorporates from the Capturing Criminals Act 
a requirement that the Attorney General provide a report on this issue.
  Eighth, the current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to H.R. 3048 would 
limit the use of administrative subpoenas in fugitive investigations to 
those fugitives who have been accused or convicted of serious violent 
felony or serious drug offenses.
  Finally, as introduced, S. 2516 authorized the U.S. Marshal Service 
to establish permanent Fugitive Apprehension Task Forces. By contrast, 
the substitute amendment to S. 2516, which previously passed the 
Senate, and the Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to

[[Page 22745]]

H.R. 3048, which we consider today, would authorize $40,000,000 over 
three years for the Attorney General to establish multi-agency task 
forces (which will be coordinated by the Director of the Marshals 
Service) in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
States, so that the Secret Service, BATF, the FBI and the States are 
able to participate in the Task Forces to find their fugitives.
  The Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to H.R. 3048 will help law 
enforcement--with increased resources for regional fugitive 
apprehension task forces and administrative subpoena authority--to 
bring to justice both federal and state fugitives who, by their 
conduct, have demonstrated a lack of respect for our nation's criminal 
justice system.
  I urge that the Senate pass H.R. 3048 with the Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond 
amendment without delay.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment 
be agreed to, the bill, as amended, be read the third time and passed, 
the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and any statements 
relating to the bill be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 4319) was agreed to.
  The bill (H.R. 3048), as amended, was read the third time and passed.

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