[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 15]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 21847-21848]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                          WRONG ON KAZAKHSTAN

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. DAN BURTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                        Friday, October 6, 2000

  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I would like to draw the 
attention of my colleagues to a very disturbing Op Ed article by 
Professor Amos Perlmutter (``More words than deeds on Kazakhstan?'' in 
the Washington Times of October 4, 2000), detailing how the Clinton-
Gore Administration has dropped the ball in promoting democracy and 
respect for human rights in Kazakhstan.
  Time after time, Kazakhstan's ruthless and corrupt President, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, has made promises to Vice President Gore and 
others in the Administration and has then failed to deliver on those 
promises. And so, as Professor Perlmutter puts it, the Nazarbayev 
regime continues its campaign of ``relentlessly destroying the 
opposition, closing the free press and involving itself in corrupt 
schemes.''
  It should have been possible for the United States, which has had the 
support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as 
well as numerous non-governmental human rights organizations, to insist 
that Nazarbayev fulfill the promises he made on human rights and free 
elections as a price for legitimacy in American eyes. Sadly, however, 
it seems clear that the Clinton-Gore Administration has pulled its 
punches, because it wants oil rich Kazakhstan's support for an oil 
pipeline that does not go through Russia. What is particularly 
troublesome in this regard is that the United States should not be 
turning a blind eye to repression and corruption in order to persuade 
Kazakhstan to do something that is in its interest in any event.
  Mr. Speaker, I submit Professor Perlmutter's article for the Record.

               [From the Washington Times, Oct. 4, 2000]

                  More Words Than Deeds on Kazakhstan?

                          (By Amos Perlmutter)

       The Clinton-Gore administration relationship with Nursultan 
     Nazarbayev's corrupt dictatorship in Kazakhstan is, once 
     again, making news. Not without reason.
       The case is that the administration failed to defend 
     political freedom and free enterprise in Kazakhstan. They 
     talked the talk without walking the walk when it came to 
     challenging the Nazarbayev dictatorship.
       Promises from Mr. Nazarbayev went unfulfilled. The 
     administration failed to support the claims of human rights 
     organizations, non-government organizations (NGOs), and the 
     OSCE that the Nazarbayev government is not only failing to 
     undergo democratic changes as a price for support from the 
     United States, but also is relentlessly destroying the 
     opposition, closing the free press and involving itself in 
     corrupt schemes.
       The effort to support this regime was conceived in 
     conformity with the American national interest. After all, 
     there are three reasons for U.S. strategic interest in 
     Kazakhstan: oil, nukes and independence. Kazakhstan has been 
     one of the Soviet Union's major oil reserves, and continues 
     to be a most significant oil reserve and also a Caspian 
     littoral state. Josef Stalin made Kazakhstan a Soviet nuclear 
     arsenal.
       Independence was the goal of both the Bush and Clinton 
     administrations, to

[[Page 21848]]

     strengthen Central Asia non-Russian Muslim states, and to 
     move them in the direction of democracy and free enterprise. 
     There was a tacit strategic purpose in separating Kazakhstan 
     from Russia's historical imperial linkages (an exercise in 
     futility). Kazakhstan is the most Russified Central Asian 
     state, with close to 30 percent of its population Russians 
     who serve as the main scientific, industrial and business 
     elite.
       However, the Clinton administration sank into the pool of 
     oil that inadvertently led to the most serious corruption of 
     the Nazarbayev dictatorship by failing to resist the 
     dictatorship. One of the administration's major foreign 
     policy goals was humanitarian intervention to help bring an 
     end to former communist dictatorships in the former Soviet 
     Union and the Balkans.
       In fact, the administration conducted a ``humanitarian 
     war'' in Kosovo. The idea of a humanitarian and exemplary 
     intervention, i.e. support of opposition groups in 
     Kazakhstan, free press, and democracy was sacrificed, 
     unfortunately, to the pool of oil.
       The administration was not directly involved in support of 
     the dictatorship. But it failed to vigorously resist the 
     Nazarbayev violation of human rights, dissolution of the 
     Kazakh parliament on two occasions and above all closing the 
     only two opposition papers and the rigging of the 1999 
     elections.
       In defense of the administration you could say diplomatic 
     gobbleygook and securing unfulfilled promises from Mr. 
     Nazarbayev was unfortunately subordinated to oil and nuclear 
     strategic policies. The embassy in Kazakhstan continuously 
     reported to the U.S. State Department on Mr. Nazarbayev's 
     violations of human rights.
       In fact, the OSCE, human rights groups, non-government 
     organizations (NGOs), and other groups have warned the 
     administration and continuously protested Mr. Nazarbayev's 
     dictatorship and suppression of freedom in Kazakhstan. Leon 
     Fuerth, Vice President Al Gore's national security adviser, 
     and his assistant, Richard Brody, met on Sept. 15, 1999, at 
     the Old Executive Office Building to discuss the upcoming 
     visit of President Nazarbayev to the United States. Attending 
     were several people from the State Department, regional and 
     human rights bureaus, as well as the Human Rights Foundation, 
     and the Kazakhstan 21st Century Foundation.
       Mr. Fuerth was on the defensive throughout the meeting, as 
     the various representatives pressed hard the argument that 
     the meeting was a mistake at that time, since Mr. Nazarbayev 
     would interpret it as an endorsement of his behavior. 
     According to one of the participants, Mr. Fuerth was 
     unpersuasive and ineffective in defending the purpose for the 
     visit of Mr. Nazarbayev to the United States.
       The issue at stake was Kazakhstan's MiG sales to North 
     Korea and the failure of democracy. When Mr. Nazarbayev 
     promised Mr. Gore the next election ``would be better,'' the 
     OSCE report on the 1999 elections in Kazakhstan were still 
     pending. Mr. Fuerth said at the meeting, ``We will adopt its 
     [OSCE's] findings as leverage on Nazarbayev.'' Mr. Fuerth 
     continued, ``Our government has been saying repeatedly, and 
     the vice president personally, pay attention to what the 
     monitors are saying about your, i.e. Nazarbayev's, 
     elections.'' Mr. Fuerth said Mr. Nazarbayev is ``not your 
     poster boy'' for democracy and freedom. Mr. Fuerth said, 
     ``Gore sees his personal relationship as essential to 
     prodding Nazarbayev toward democracy.''
       America's goals include, says Mr. Fuerth, ``carrying 
     Kazakhstan to a modern self-sustaining state at every level 
     of societal concern. . .  . We are into their affairs at a 
     fantastic level of detail, and that is only possible with the 
     political support of Nazarbayev and this [Gore-Nazarbayev] 
     commission and the commitment of the United States to a face-
     to-face meeting with the vice president.
       Mr. Fuerth continued to say the United States must persuade 
     them to ``more and more perfect democracy,'' and he is 
     ``perfectly aware of the imperfections.'' According to Mr. 
     Feurth, Mr. Gore's message is ``Democracy is on the agenda. 
     Democracy is not our idiosyncrasy.'' He describes Mr. Gore's 
     agenda as follows: ``Democracy and elections are essential 
     parts of the relationship Nazarbayev wants with the U.S. Gore 
     will explain why a valid election is indispensable if he [Mr. 
     Nazarbayev] wants the relationship he seeks.''
       After meeting with the president, Mr. Nazarbayev went back 
     home and continued in his oil-mired practices, human-rights 
     violations and the creation of his position as president for 
     life.
       Since Mr. Gore was given the portfolio on Russia and the 
     independent states of the former Soviet Union, the essential 
     difference between what the Cox Report finds in the case of 
     Russia and the administration policy toward Kazakhstan is 
     that in the case of Russia it was mired with good intentions 
     for reform that turned sour because of support for Boris 
     Yeltsin's corrupt, undemocratic government. You cannot tell 
     Russia, a major power, what to do, while the situation in 
     Kazakhstan was totally different.
       Not only was the United States in the position to help 
     implement the recommendations for democracy and freedom in 
     Kazakhstan, it coddled the dictator and made no impact 
     whatsoever or follow up on the promises made by Mr. 
     Nazarbayev to Mr. Gore to advance the democracy in 
     Kazakhstan.
       In the case of Kazakhstan, the United States was in a 
     stronger position than in Russia, with the support of OSCE, 
     multiple human rights organizations and NGOs, to impose upon 
     the dictatorship to implement their promises made on human 
     rights and free elections as a price for legitimacy in 
     American eyes.
       They did not do it. The administration tacitly accepted Mr. 
     Nazarbayev's defense that there is an emergent democracy in 
     Kazakhstan and it is a question of ``time.''
       It seems the Clinton-Gore administration did not try very 
     hard to institutionalize and implement their commitments to 
     democracy, free elections, and an open press in the case of 
     Kazakhstan.

     

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