[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 14]
[House]
[Pages 20618-20622]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                    TRUTH IN REGULATING ACT OF 2000

  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and 
pass the Senate bill (S. 1198) to establish a 3-year pilot project for 
the General Accounting Office to report to Congress on economically 
significant rules of Federal agencies, and for other purposes.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                                S. 1198

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Truth in Regulating Act of 
     2000''.

     SEC. 2. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this Act are to--
       (1) increase the transparency of important regulatory 
     decisions;
       (2) promote effective congressional oversight to ensure 
     that agency rules fulfill statutory requirements in an 
     efficient, effective, and fair manner; and
       (3) increase the accountability of Congress and the 
     agencies to the people they serve.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act, the term--
       (1) ``agency'' has the meaning given such term under 
     section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code;
       (2) ``economically significant rule'' means any proposed or 
     final rule, including an interim or direct final rule, that 
     may have an annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or 
     more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a 
     sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the 
     environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or 
     tribal governments or communities; and
       (3) ``independent evaluation'' means a substantive 
     evaluation of the agency's data, methodology, and assumptions 
     used in developing the economically significant rule, 
     including--
       (A) an explanation of how any strengths or weaknesses in 
     those data, methodology, and assumptions support or detract 
     from conclusions reached by the agency; and
       (B) the implications, if any, of those strengths or 
     weaknesses for the rulemaking.

     SEC. 4. PILOT PROJECT FOR REPORT ON RULES.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Request for review.--When an agency publishes an 
     economically significant rule, a chairman or ranking member 
     of a committee of jurisdiction of either House of Congress 
     may request the Comptroller General of the United States to 
     review the rule.
       (2) Report.--The Comptroller General shall submit a report 
     on each economically significant rule selected under 
     paragraph (4) to the committees of jurisdiction in each House 
     of Congress not later than 180 calendar days after a 
     committee request is received. The report shall include an 
     independent evaluation of the economically significant rule 
     by the Comptroller General.
       (3) Independent evaluation.--The independent evaluation of 
     the economically significant rule by the Comptroller General 
     under paragraph (2) shall include--
       (A) an evaluation of the agency's analysis of the potential 
     benefits of the rule, including any beneficial effects that 
     cannot be quantified in monetary terms and the identification 
     of the persons or entities likely to receive the benefits;
       (B) an evaluation of the agency's analysis of the potential 
     costs of the rule, including any adverse effects that cannot 
     be quantified in monetary terms and the identification of the 
     persons or entities likely to bear the costs;
       (C) an evaluation of the agency's analysis of alternative 
     approaches set forth in the notice of proposed rulemaking and 
     in the rulemaking record, as well as of any regulatory impact 
     analysis, federalism assessment, or other analysis or 
     assessment prepared by the agency or required for the 
     economically significant rule; and
       (D) a summary of the results of the evaluation of the 
     Comptroller General and the implications of those results.
       (4) Procedures for priorities of requests.--The Comptroller 
     General shall have discretion to develop procedures for 
     determining the priority and number of requests for review 
     under paragraph (1) for which a report will be submitted 
     under paragraph (2).
       (b) Authority of Comptroller General.--Each agency shall 
     promptly cooperate with the Comptroller General in carrying 
     out this Act. Nothing in this Act is intended to expand or 
     limit the authority of the General Accounting Office.

     SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated to the General 
     Accounting Office to carry out this Act $5,200,000 for each 
     of fiscal years 2000 through 2002.

     SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE AND DURATION OF PILOT PROJECT.

       (a) Effective Date.--This Act and the amendments made by 
     this Act shall take effect 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.
       (b) Duration of Pilot Project.--The pilot project under 
     this Act shall continue for a period of 3 years, if in each 
     fiscal year, or portion thereof included in that period, a 
     specific annual appropriation not less than $5,200,000 or the 
     pro-rated equivalent thereof shall have been made for the 
     pilot project.
       (c) Report.--Before the conclusion of the 3-year period, 
     the Comptroller General shall submit to Congress a report 
     reviewing the effectiveness of the pilot project and 
     recommending whether or not Congress should permanently 
     authorize the pilot project.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) each 
will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan).


                             General Leave

  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend 
their remarks on S. 1198.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Wisconsin?
  There was no objection.

                              {time}  1915

  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, S. 1198 is Truth in Regulating Act of 2000. It is a 
bipartisan good government bill. It establishes a regulatory analysis 
function with the General Accounting Office. This function is intended 
to enhance congressional responsibility for regulatory decisions 
developed under the laws Congress enacts. It is the product of the 
leadership over the past few years of the gentlewoman from New York 
(Mrs. Kelly), the chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform 
and Paperwork Reduction, who will be joining us here in a few minutes.
  The most basic reason for supporting this bill is constitutional, as 
Congress needs a Congressional Budget Office to check and balance the 
executive branch in the budget office, so too does it need an analytic 
capability to check and balance the executive branch in the regulatory 
process. GAO is a logical location since it already has some regulatory 
review responsibilities under the Congressional Review Act.
  Mr. Speaker, article 1, section 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests all 
legislative powers in the U.S. Congress. While Congress may not 
delegate its legislative functions, it routinely authorizes executive 
branch agencies to issue rules that implement laws passed by Congress. 
Congress has become increasingly concerned about its responsibility to 
oversee agency rulemaking, especially due to the extensive costs and 
impacts of Federal Rules.
  During the 105th Congress, the House Government Reform Subcommittee 
on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs 
chaired by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. McIntosh) held a hearing on 
the earlier Kelly regulatory analysis bill, H.R. 1704. This bill sought 
to establish a new, freestanding congressional agency. The subcommittee 
then marked up and reported her bill, H.R. 1704, and called for the 
establishment of a new legislative branch, Congressional Office of 
Regulatory Analysis commonly referred to as CORA, to analyze all major 
rules and report to Congress on potential costs, benefits, and 
alternative approaches that could achieve the same regulatory goals at 
lower costs.
  This agency was intended to aid Congress in analyzing Federal 
regulations. The committee report stated Congress needs the expertise 
that CORA would provide to carry out its duty under the CRA. Currently 
Congress does not have the information it needs to carefully evaluate 
regulations. The only analyses it has to rely on are those provided by 
the agencies which promulgate the rules.
  There is no official, third-party analysis of new regulations. 
Unfortunately,

[[Page 20619]]

CORA supporters in the 105th Congress could not overcome the resistance 
of the defenders of the regulatory status quo. Opponents argued that 
creating a new congressional agency would be fiscally irresponsible. 
But by this logic, Congress ought to abolish CBO, as an even more 
heroic demonstration of fiscal conservatism in action. Of course, most 
of us recognize that disbanding the CBO, however, penny-wise would be 
pound foolish.
  In this Congress, 106th Congress, the chairman of the Subcommittee on 
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, the 
gentleman from Indiana (Chairman McIntosh), and myself, as vice 
chairman, and the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Kelly), chairwoman of 
Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform and Paperwork Reduction, seeking to 
accommodate the prejudice against a freestanding agency, introduced 
separate bills, H.R. 3021 and H.R. 3669 respectively, to establish a 
CORA function within the GAO, which is an existing legislative branch 
agency capable of performing such functions.
  The MacIntosh and Kelly bills were introduced in January and 
February. On May 9, the Senate passed its own regulatory analysis 
legislation, S. 1198, which we are now considering by unanimous 
consent, I might add.
  Like the McIntosh and Kelly bills, the Senate legislation would also 
establish a regulatory analysis function within the GAO.
  During the 106th Congress, the Committee on Government Reform did not 
hold a hearing specifically on one of the CORA bills. However, the 
subcommittee did hold a June 14 hearing entitled, does Congress 
delegate too much power to agencies and what should be done about it?
  Witnesses testified that Congress needs its own, in-house, regulatory 
analysis capability so that Members could especially provide timely 
comment on proposed rules, while there is still an opportunity to 
influence the costs, the scope, and the content of final agency action.
  On June 26, the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Kelly) and the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. McIntosh) introduced H.R. 4744, which 
included several needed improvements to S. 1198, along the lines 
suggested by the witnesses at this June 14th hearing. For example, 
whereas S. 1198 merely permits GAO to assist Congress in submitting 
timely comments on proposed regulations during the public comment 
period. H.R. 4744 would require GAO to provide such assistance. This is 
a critical improvement, because it is only by commenting on proposed 
rules during the public comment period that Congress has any real 
opportunity to influence the costs, the scope and the content of 
regulation.
  In addition, unlike S. 1198, H.R. 4744 would require GAO to review 
not only the agency's data but also the public's data to assure a more 
balanced evaluation, analyze not only rules costing $100 million or 
more, but also rules with a significant impact on small businesses, and 
examine whether alternatives not considered by the agencies might 
achieve the same goal in a more cost-effective manner or with greater 
net benefits.
  On June 29, the Committee on Government Reform favorably reported 
H.R. 4744 with a very thorough discussion of issues in its accompanying 
report, but on June 24, the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Kelly) and 
the gentleman from Indiana (Chairman McIntosh), along with the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Condit) and the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Turner) introduced H.R. 4924.
  This bill included only a few of H.R. 4744's improvements to S. 1198, 
the inclusion within the scope of GAO's purview of agency rules with a 
significant impact on small businesses, a directive to GAO to submit 
its independent evaluation of proposed rules within the public comment 
period, albeit only when doing so is practicable. House Report 106-772 
explains the basis for these improvements.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4924 was, in my judgment, inferior to H.R. 4744, 
which in itself is a watered-down version of the complete reform that 
is needed to implement Congress' Constitutional responsibility for 
regulatory oversight, but it was a step in the right direction.
  On June 29, the House passed H.R. 4924. Unfortunately, the Senate has 
not yet considered H.R. 4924. Since we are at the close of the 106th 
Congress, we now, however, urge the House's favorable consideration of 
S. 1198.
  Mr. Speaker, S. 1198 does not require or expect GAO to conduct any 
new regulatory impact analyses or cost benefit analyses, or other 
impact analyses. However, GAO's independent evaluation should lead the 
agencies to prepare any missing cost/benefit analysis, small business 
impact, federalism impact, or any other missing analysis. For example, 
after the MacIntosh subcommittee insisted that the Department of Labor 
prepare a missing RIA for its ``Baby UI'' rule, Labor finally prepared 
one.
  Here is basically in a nutshell, Mr. Speaker, how S. 1198 works. A 
chairman or a ranking member of a committee of jurisdiction may request 
that GAO submit an independent evaluation to the committee of a major 
proposed or final rule within 180 days. GAO's analysis shall include an 
evaluation of the potential benefits of the rule, potential costs of 
the rule, alternative approaches in the rulemaking record, and various 
impact analyses.
  Congress currently has two opportunities to review agency regulatory 
actions. Under the Administrative Procedures Act, Congress can comment 
on an agency proposed and interim rules during the public comment 
period. The APA's fairness provisions require that all members of the 
public, including Congress, be given an equal opportunity to comment. 
Late congressional comments cannot be considered by an agency unless 
all other late comments are equally considered. Agencies can ignore 
comments filed by Congress after the end of the public comment period, 
as the Department of Labor did during its Baby UI period in its rule. 
Therefore, since GAO cannot be given more time than other members of 
the public to comment, GAO should complete its review of agency 
regulatory proposals during the public comment period.
  Under the CRA, Congress can disapprove an agency final rule after it 
is promulgated but before it is effective. Unfortunately, Congress has 
been unable to carry out its responsibility under the CRA because it 
neither has had all of the information it needs to carefully evaluate 
agency regulatory proposals nor sufficient staff for this function.
  In fact, since the March 1996 enactment of the CRA, there has been no 
completed congressional resolutions of disapproval. To assume oversight 
responsibility for Federal regulations, Congress needs to be armed with 
an independent evaluation, that is why we are doing this.
  What is needed is an analysis of legislative history to see if there 
is a nondelegation problem, such as in the Food and Drug 
Administration's proposed rule to regulate tobacco products, which was 
struck by the Supreme Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, or backdoor 
legislating, such as in the Department of Labor's Baby UI rule, which 
provides paid family leave to small business employees, even though 
Congress in the Family and Medical Leave Act said no to paid family 
leave and any coverage of small businesses.
  Sometimes the quickest or the only way to find that an agency has 
ignored a congressional intent or failed to consider less costly or 
nonregulatory alternatives, is to examine nonagency or public data and 
analysis. It is for that reason that, under H.R. 4744, GAO would be 
required to consult the public's data in the course of evaluating 
agency's rules. Although S.1198 does not require GAO to review public 
data, it does not forbid it. And I bring this up, because some hope 
that S.1198 implicitly contains a gag order, forbidding GAO to consult 
any analyses of data except those supplied by the agency. That is an 
incorrect reading, however, and the purpose and hope of this bill is to 
enable Congress to comment knowledgeably about agency rules from the 
standpoint of a truly independent evaluation of those rules, including 
the consumption and evaluation of public outside data.

[[Page 20620]]

  Instructed by GAO's independent evaluations, Congress then will be 
better equipped to review final agency rules under the CRA. More 
importantly, Congress will be better equipped to submit timely and 
knowledgeable comments on proposed rules during the public period. Some 
CORA foes hope that all GAO analyses of proposed rules will be untimely 
and, therefore, have no effect on the substance of rules, which I am 
confident that GAO will want to please, rather than annoy its 
customers, those of us serving in Congress and will help submit timely 
regulatory analysis.
  Thus, even though this bill is a far cry from the original Kelly idea 
of a CORA legislation, this legislation, S.1198, will increase the 
transparency of important regulatory decisions. It will promote 
effective congressional oversight, and it will increase the 
accountability of Congress.
  The best government is a government that is accountable to the 
people. For America to have an accountable regulatory system, the 
peoples elected representatives must participate in and take 
responsibility for the rules promulgated under the laws Congress passes 
and by the executive branch agencies, that is why I urge my colleagues 
to support this meaningful step.
  Mr. Speaker, I went through this exhaustive legislative history on 
this bill because I think it is important that those who are 
researching and realizing the debate here in Congress know the intent 
as we pass this bill.
  S. 1198, the ``Truth in Regulating Act of 2000,'' is a bi-partisan, 
good government bill. It establishes a regulatory analysis function 
within the General Accounting Office (GAO). This function is intended 
to enhance Congressional responsibility for regulatory decisions 
developed under the laws Congress enacts. It is the product of the 
leadership over the last few years of Small Business Subcommittee 
Chairwoman on Regulatory Reform and Paperwork Reduction, Sue Kelly.
  The most basic reason for supporting this bill is Constitutional: 
Just as Congress needs a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to check and 
balance the Executive Branch in the budget process, so it needs an 
analytic capability to check and balance the Executive Branch in the 
regulatory process. GAO is a logical location since it already has some 
regulatory review responsibilities under the Congressional Review Act 
(CRA).
  Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests all legislative 
powers in the U.S. Congress. While Congress may not delegate its 
legislative functions, it routinely authorizes Executive Branch 
agencies to issue rules that implement laws pass by Congress. Congress 
has become increasingly concerned about its responsibility to oversee 
agency rulemaking, especially due to the extensive costs and impacts of 
Federal rules.
  During the 105th Congress, the House Government Reform Subcommittee 
on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, 
chaired by David McIntosh, held a hearing on Mrs. Kelly's earlier 
regulatory analysis bill (H.R. 1704), which would sought to establish a 
new, freestanding Congressional agency. The Subcommittee then marked up 
and reported her bill (H. Rept. 105-441, Part 2). H.R. 1704 called for 
the establishment of a new Legislative Branch Congressional Office of 
Regulatory Analysis (CORA) to analyze all major rules and report to 
Congress on potential costs, benefits, and alternative approaches that 
could achieve the same regulatory goals at lower costs. This agency was 
intended to aid Congress in analyzing Federal regulations. The 
Committee Report stated, ``Congress needs the expertise that CORA would 
provide to carry out its duty under the CRA. Currently, Congress does 
not have the information it needs to carefully evaluate regulations. 
The only analyses it has to rely on are those provided by the agencies 
which promulgate the rules. There is no official, third-party analysis 
of new regulations'' (p. 5).
  Unfortunately, CORA supporters in the 105th Congress could not 
overcome the resistance of the defenders of the regulatory status quo. 
Opponents argued that creating a new Congressional agency would be 
fiscally irresponsible. By this logic, Congress ought to abolish CBO, 
as an even more heroic demonstration of fiscal conservatism in action. 
Of course, most of us recognize that dismantling CBO, however penny 
wise, would be pound foolish.
  In the 106th Congress, Government Reform Subcommittee Chairman David 
McIntosh and Small Business Subcommittee Chairwoman Sue Kelly, seeking 
to accommodate the prejudice against a freestanding agency, introduced 
bills (H.R. 3521 and H.R. 3669, respectively) to establish a CORA 
function within GAO, which is an existing Legislative Branch agency. 
McIntosh and Kelly introduced their bills in January and February 2000. 
On May 9th, the Senate passed its own regulatory analysis legislation, 
S. 1198, by unanimous consent. Like the McIntosh and Kelly bills, the 
Senate legislation would also establish a regulatory analysis function 
within GAO.
  During the 106th Congress, the Government Reform Committee did not 
hold a hearing specifically on one of the CORA bills. However, the 
Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and 
Regulatory Affairs did hold a June 14th hearing, entitled ``Does 
Congress Delegate Too Much Power to Agencies and What Should be Done 
About It?'' Witnesses at the hearing included Senator Sam Brownback, 
Representative J.D. Hayworth, former Administrator of the Office of 
Management and Budget's (OMB's) Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs Dr. Wendy Lee Gramm, former OMB General Counsel Alan Raul, and 
New York Law School Professor David Schoenbrod.
  Witnesses stressed that Congress needs its own, in-house, regulatory 
analysis capability so that Members could especially provide timely 
comment on proposed rules, while there is still an opportunity to 
influence the cost, scope and content of the final agency action. 
Witnesses stated that a regulatory analysis function should: (a) take 
into account Congressional legislative intent; (b) examine other, less 
costly regulatory and nonregulatory alternative approaches besides 
those in an agency proposal; and (c) identify additional, non-agency 
sources of data on benefits, costs, and impacts of an agency's 
proposal.
  Dr. Gramm testified that, ``there's clearly a need for more and 
better analysis that is independent of the agency writing the 
regulation . . . In my view, Congress cannot carry out its 
responsibilities effectively without such analysis.'' She continued by 
recommending, ``a shadow OIRA . . . to perform independent, high-
quality analysis of agency regulations at the proposal stage . . . 
whether or not the agency has considered the different alternatives, 
what might be other alternatives . . . I would suggest that all this 
analysis be done at the proposal stage so that this information can be 
put into the rulemaking record.''
  On June 26th, Chairwoman Kelly and Chairman McIntosh introduced H.R. 
4744, which included several needed improvements to S. 1198, along the 
lines suggested by the witnesses at the June 14th hearing. For example, 
whereas S. 1198 merely permits GAO to assist Congress in submitting 
timely comments on proposed regulations during the public comment 
period, H.R. 4744 would require GAO to provide such assistance. This 
was a critical improvement, because it is only by commenting on 
proposed rules during the public comment period that Congress has any 
real opportunity to influence the cost, scope, and content of 
regulation. In addition, unlike S. 1198, H.R. 4744 would require GAO to 
review not only the agency's data but also the public's data to assure 
a more balanced evaluation, analyze not only rules costing $100 million 
or more but also rules with a significant impact on small businesses, 
and examine whether alternatives not considered by the agencies might 
achieve the same goal in a more cost-effective manner or with greater 
net benefits.
  On June 29th, the Government Reform Committee favorably reported H.R. 
4744, with a thorough discussion of issues in its accompanying report 
(H. Rept. 106-772).
  On July 24th, Chairmen Kelly and McIntosh with Messrs. Condit and 
Turner introduced H.R. 4924. This bill included only a few of H.R. 
4744's improvements to S. 1198: (a) inclusion, within the scope of 
GAO's purview, of agency rules with a significant impact on small 
businesses; and (b) a directive to GAO to submit its independent 
evaluation of proposed rules within the public comment period, albeit 
only when doing so is ``practicable.'' House Report 106-772 explains 
the basis for these improvements. H.R. 4924 was, in my judgment, 
inferior to H.R. 4744, which was itself a watered down version of the 
complete reform needed to implement Congress' Constitutional 
responsibility for regulatory oversight. But, it was a step in the 
right direction.
  On July 29th, the House passed H.R. 4924. Unfortunately, the Senate 
has not yet considered H.R. 4924. Since we are at the close of the 
106th Congress, we now urge the House's favorable consideration of S. 
1198.
  S. 1198 does not require or expect GAO to conduct any new Regulatory 
Impact Analyses (RIAs), cost-benefit analyses, or other impact 
analyses. However, GAO's independent evaluation should lead the 
agencies to prepare

[[Page 20621]]

any missing cost/benefit, small business impact, federalism impact, or 
any other missing analysis. For example, after the McIntosh 
Subcommittee insisted that the Department of Labor prepare a missing 
RIA for its Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation (``Baby UI'') 
proposed rule, Labor finally prepared one.
  Here's how S. 1198 works. The Chairman or Ranking Member of a 
Committee of jurisdiction may request that GAO submit an independent 
evaluation to the Committee of a major proposed or final rule within 
180 days. GAO's analysis shall include an evaluation of the potential 
benefits of the rule, the potential costs of the rule, alternative 
approaches in the rulemaking record, and the various impact analyses.
  Congress currently has two opportunities to review agency regulatory 
actions. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Congress can 
comment on agency proposed and interim rules during the public comment 
period. The APA's fairness provisions require that all members of the 
public, including Congress, be given an equal opportunity to comment. 
Late Congressional comments cannot be considered by the agency unless 
all other late public comments are equally considered. Agencies can 
ignore comments filed by Congress after the end of the public comment 
period, as the Department of Labor did after its proposed ``Baby UI'' 
rule. Therefore, since GAO cannot be given more time than other members 
of the public to comment, GAO should complete its review of agency 
regulatory proposals during the public comment period.
  Under the CRA, Congress can disapprove an agency final rule after it 
is promulgated but before it is effective. Unfortunately, Congress has 
been unable to fully carry out its responsibility under the CRA because 
it has neither all of the information it needs to carefully evaluate 
agency regulatory proposals nor sufficient staff for this function. In 
fact, since the March 1996 enactment of the CRA, there has been no 
completed Congressional resolutions of disapproval.
  In recent years, various statutes (such as the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995 and the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996) and executive orders (such as President Reagan's 
1981 Executive Order 12291, ``Federal Regulation,'' and President 
Clinton's 1993 Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and 
Review'') have mandated that Executive Branch agencies conduct 
extensive regulatory analyses, especially for economically significant 
rules having a $100 million-or-more effect on the economy or a 
significant impact on small businesses. Congress, however, does not 
have the analytical capability to independently and fairly evaluate 
these analyses.
  To assume oversight responsibility for Federal regulations, Congress 
needs to be armed with an independent evaluation. What is needed is an 
analysis of legislative history to see if there is a non-delegation 
problem, such as in Food and Drug Administration's proposed rule to 
regulate tobacco products, which was struck down by the Supreme Court 
in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, or backdoor legislating, such as in the 
Department of Labor's ``Baby UI'' rule, which provides paid family 
leave to small business employees, even though Congress in the Family 
and Medical Leave Act said no to paid family leave and any coverage of 
small businesses.
  Sometimes the quickest (or only) way to find out that an agency has 
ignored Congressional intent or failed to consider less costly or non-
regularly alternatives, is to examine non-agency (i.e., ``public'') 
data and analyses. It is for that reason that, under H.R. 4744, GAO 
would be required to consult the public's data in the course of 
evaluating agency rules. Although S. 1198 does not require GAO to 
review public data, neither does it forbid or preclude GAO from doing 
so. I bring this up, because some hope that S. 1198 implicitly contains 
a gag order, forbidding GAO to consult any analyses or data except 
those supplied by the agency to be reviewed. This reading of S. 1198 
would defeat a key purpose of the bill, which is to enable Congress to 
comment knowledgeably about agency rules from the standpoint of a truly 
independent evaluation of those rules.
  Instructed by GAO's independent evaluations, Congress will be better 
equipped to review final agency rules under the CRA. More importantly, 
Congress will be better equipped to submit timely and knowledgeable 
comments on proposed rules during the public comment period. Some CORA 
foes hope that all GAO analyses of proposed rules will be untimely and, 
therefore, have no effect on the substance of rules. I am confident 
that GAO will want to please rather than annoy its customers, and will 
not fail to help Members of Congress submit timely comments on 
regulatory proposals.
  Thus, even though a far cry from the original idea of an independent 
CORA agency, and although inferior to the Kelly-McIntosh bill reported 
by the Government Reform Committee, S. 1198 will increase the 
transparency of important regulatory decision, promote effective 
Congressional oversight, and increase the accountability of Congress. 
The best government is a government accountable to the people. For 
America to have an accountable regulatory system, the people's elected 
representatives must participate in, and take responsibility for, the 
rules promulgated under the laws Congress passes. S. 1198 is a 
meaningful step towards Congress' meeting its regulatory oversight 
responsibility.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) 
for taking the time to review the legislative history and also thank 
the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Kelly) for the work that she has 
done on this issue over the years, and to thank the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. McIntosh) for his efforts.
  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak in support of S.1198. S.1198 was 
passed by unanimous consent in the Senate on May 9, 2000 without 
opposition from the Government Accounting Office, public interest 
groups or industry representatives. The gentleman from California (Mr. 
Condit) introduced the text of S.1198 in the House as H.R. 4763.
  However, the House Committee on Government Reform did not consider 
H.R. 4763. Instead, it considered its own version of the bill, H.R. 
4744. Unfortunately, H.R. 4744 did not enjoy the same support that 
S.1198 did.
  The GAO expressed serious concerns about the scope of the analyses, 
the timing provided for conducting the reviews and the certainty of 
funding; also public interest groups expressed concerns and opposed 
passage. Therefore, the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) and I 
offered the text of the Senate bill, S. 1198, which addressed these 
concerns, as an amendment to H.R. 4744.
  Our amendment, unfortunately, was rejected by the committee on a 
party-line vote. I am pleased to see that we worked all of these things 
out, and the House now has the opportunity to vote on this proposal. It 
is nice to be able to come here before the Congress and show how at 
long last we have an opportunity to work together on something.
  Furthermore, on July 25, 2000, the House passed H.R. 4924 under 
suspension of the rules, that bill was substantially similar to S.1198. 
Now, S.1198 creates a 3-year pilot project in which, at the request of 
a committee of jurisdiction, GAO, the General Accounting Office, would 
analyze economically significant proposed and final rules.

                              {time}  1930

  GAO would evaluate the agency's analyses of costs, benefits, 
alternatives, regulatory impact, federalism impact, and any other 
analysis prepared by the agency or required to be prepared by the 
agency. All of this analysis would be completed within 180 days of the 
committee's request.
  Under this bill, GAO would retain its traditional role as auditor and 
evaluate only the agencies' work. It would not be required to conduct 
its own independent analyses. Furthermore, it would not require the 
agency to conduct any new analysis. It only requires GAO review of 
agency analyses that are required by separate statute or executive 
order.
  In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I support S. 1198 because it sheds light 
on the adequacy and usefulness of the agencies' analyses. Yet, it 
ensures that the GAO has adequate time and resources to fulfill its new 
responsibilities, and it preserves GAO's traditional role as auditor.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may 
consume to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Kelly), the champion of 
small business, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform 
and Paperwork Reduction, and the champion of CORA.
  Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, the Truth in Regulating Act represents the 
culmination of nearly 4 years of hard

[[Page 20622]]

work and an effort that will provide Congress with a new resource for 
reviewing new government regulations before they take effect.
  I first introduced this legislation during the 105th Congress, Mr. 
Speaker, with the goal of giving Congress the tools it needs to oversee 
the steady stream of new and often costly regulations coming from the 
Federal government.
  Government regulations have an impact on every American. We see an 
average of close to 4,000 new regulations promulgated every year.
  In most cases, regulations speak to a noble purpose, and can often be 
viewed as a measure of the value that we place in protecting such 
things as human health, workplace safety, or the environment. Yet, too 
often the government oversteps its bounds in its attempt to achieve 
these goals, and we all pay the price as a consequence.
  The price of regulations poses a particularly heavy burden on small 
businesses and manufacturers. They drive our economy forward. They need 
our help.
  Estimates vary on the annual cost of government regulations from a 
range of $300 billion a year to $700 billion every year. Congress has a 
special entity, the Congressional Budget Office, or CBO, to help it 
grapple with our enormous Federal budget. There is growing sentiment 
that a similar office is needed within the legislative branch to review 
and analyze the numerous government regulations that are developed and 
issued every year.
  To address this need, in 1997 I first introduced legislation to 
create the Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis, or CORA. 
Today's legislation is the culmination of that effort.
  As the vice chairman of the Committee on Small Business and the 
Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform and Paperwork 
Reduction, and as a small businesswoman myself, I know that small 
business owners are very familiar with the burdens that Federal 
regulations place on them.
  Some studies have shown that for small employers, the cost of 
complying with Federal regulations is more than double what it cost 
their larger counterparts. Mr. Speaker, we do not need any study to 
reach that conclusion. Common sense says that if a regulation costs a 
company with a $5 billion revenue stream the same as it does a company 
with a $5 million revenue stream, the overall impact on the smaller 
company will be significantly more on a per unit basis.
  S. 1198 creates an office within GAO that would focus solely on 
conducting independent regulatory evaluations of regulations to help 
determine whether the agencies have complied with the law and executive 
orders. The fact is, Congress cannot obtain unbiased information from 
the participants in the rulemaking because each participant, including 
the Federal agency, has a particular viewpoint and bias.
  This legislation will fill the information gap and assist Members in 
Congress in determining whether action is warranted. The purpose of the 
bill is to ensure Congress exercises its legislative powers in the most 
informed manner possible. Ultimately, this will lead to better and more 
finely tuned legislation, as well as more effective agency regulations.
  The office will provide Congress with reliable, non-partisan 
information, levelling the playing field with the executive branch and 
improving Congress' ability to understand the burdens that are placed 
on small businesses and the economy by excessive regulation.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
Ryan) for his work on this issue, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
McIntosh) for his strong support, as well as the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Barcia) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Condit) 
for their longstanding support for this legislation.
  I would also like to thank the ranking member of the Committee on 
Government Reform, the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman), as well 
as the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), for their support in moving 
this legislation forward.
  Finally, I would like to thank especially the gentleman from Indiana 
(Mr. Burton) for moving this legislation quickly to the floor today, 
and for his leadership on this issue. I strongly urge my colleagues to 
join me in supporting this effort.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to echo the gentlewoman's remarks with respect to 
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Waxman).
  Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I also just want to thank everybody who put a lot of 
hard work into this bill. I think we have a good bipartisan compromise.
  Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ose). The question is on the motion 
offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) that the House 
suspend the rules and pass the Senate bill, S. 1198.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor 
thereof) the rules were suspended and the Senate bill was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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