[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 20516-20526]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



GLOBAL ROLE V: ROLES OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE, AND THE MILITARY IN 
                               WAR-MAKING

  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, today, with my dear friend and wonderful 
colleague from Kansas, Senator Roberts, we come to the fifth and final 
in our series of floor discussions on the global role of the United 
States. We will begin with consideration of the key instruments of 
national security policy, and we will conclude this series with a 
presentation of what we have learned over the course of these dialogs.
  The inspiration for the first of today's topics comes from a source 
we have often cited in this series: The great 19th century military 
thinker, Karl von Clausewitz, who wrote in his seminal work on war 
these words:

       Its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical 
     trinity. The passions that are to be kindled in war must 
     already be inherent in the people. The scope which the play 
     of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability 
     and chance depends on the particular character of the 
     commander and the army; but the political aims are the 
     business of government alone.
       These three tendencies are like three different codes of 
     law, deep rooted in their subject and yet variable in their 
     relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of 
     them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them 
     would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this 
     reason alone, it would be totally useless.
       Our task, therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a 
     balance between these three tendencies, like an object 
     suspended between three magnets.

  Attempts to find the proper balance between the roles of the people, 
the military and the government when America goes to war have been a 
major feature of the last 35 years, from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 
to Operation Desert Storm, to Operation Allied Force. In my opinion, it 
is an effort which has not been overly successful. Certainly in the 
case of Vietnam, there was no real attempt to mobilize the American 
public in support of the war effort, nor for the Executive Branch to 
seek or the Congress to demand that the Constitutional role of the 
Congress to legitimize the conduct of hostilities be exercised. But I 
would also contend that much the same pattern is evident in more recent 
American interventions in the Balkans, and to an only somewhat lesser 
extent in the Gulf War.
  The fact that we have emerged from all of these military 
interventions without major harm--though the negative impact from 
Vietnam was far from negligible--is a tribute to the efforts of our 
servicemen and women, the capabilities of our weaponry, but also, I 
would suggest, the fact that our vital national interests were never 
threatened in these cases. Only the Cold War, which by and large was 
prosecuted effectively, both militarily and politically and on a 
bipartisan basis, and in which we achieved a decisive victory, posed 
such a threat in the last half century.
  We have spent much of the time in previous dialogues in discussing 
the proper ends of American national security policy in the post-Cold 
War era, but if we don't fix the problems in this ``holy trinity'' of 
means--the roles of the public, the military and the government--we are 
going to be continually frustrated in our achievement of whatever 
objectives we set.
  Let's start with the first of Clausewitz' trinity: the people.
  The post-Cold War world is not only producing changes abroad--changes 
which we have spoken of at some length in our previous global role 
discussions--but also a number of alterations here at home. Over the 
past decade or so, we have seen a democratization in terms of our 
foreign and defense policies in the sense that the American public is 
less and less disposed to leave these matters to the ``experts,'' and 
to trust the assurances of the ``Establishment'' with respect to the 
benefits of internationalism.
  While there is certainly nothing wrong with such skepticism, and 
indeed a demand for accountability is a healthy and appropriate 
attitude for the public to take, whether on national security or any 
other public policy, this democratization of national security policy 
has been marked by widespread public disengagement from the details of 
that policy:
  For example, a 1997 Wall Street Journal/NBC News survey found that 
foreign policy and defense ranked last, at 9 percent, among issues 
cited by the public as the most important matters facing the country.
  A 1997 Washington Post/Kaiser Foundation/Harvard poll discovered that 
64 percent of the American public thought that foreign aid was the 
largest component of the federal budget, when in fact it is one of the 
smallest at approximately 1 percent.
  A 1999 Penn and Schoen survey discovered that nearly half--48 
percent--of the American public felt that the U.S. was ``too engaged'' 
in international problems, while just 16 percent expressed the view 
that we are ``not engaged enough.''
  A 1999 poll for the Program on International Policy Attitudes found 
that only 28 percent of the American people wanted the U.S. government 
to promote further globalization while 34 percent wanted our government 
to try to slow or reverse it, and another 33 percent preferred that we 
simply allow it to continue at its own pace, as we are doing now.
  Related to these results, I personally believe that the end of the 
draft and the dramatic reductions in defense personnel levels in recent 
years--since FY85 the size of our armed forces decreased by 30 
percent--has produced a growing disconnect between the American public 
and the American military, with fewer and fewer people having relatives 
or friends in the military, or living in communities in which a 
military base is a dominant feature of the local economy. This growing 
separation between the military and civilian worlds has produced a 
profound impact on the perspectives and performance of the U.S. 
government when it comes to the use of force, and I will return to this 
point later.
  We can bemoan the public's skepticism and disengagement, and wish 
that it didn't exist, but it is a fact which impacts on all major 
foreign and defense policy issues facing the Congress. We saw it in the 
NAFTA debate, and in the debates on Iraq, NATO and the Balkans.
  Now, I believe that the critics of foreign trade and foreign 
engagement raise important and legitimate concerns which need to be 
addressed. I do not believe we can stand behind platitudes that 
``foreign trade is always good,'' or ``U.S. leadership is always 
essential.'' In my view, the burden is now on those who would urge 
engagement overseas, whether military, political or economic. As the 
just discussed public opinion data indicate, they have their work cut 
out for them, with widespread indifference, lack of knowledge and doubt 
about the value of such engagement. However, it is a debate worth 
having, and indeed is essential if we are to achieve the kind of 
national consensus we need in this post-Cold War era.
  The second of the war-making trinity of Clausewitz is the military 
itself. Lets talk about the military. The subject of military reform is 
a fascinating and important one in its own right, but is somewhat 
beyond the scope of our dialogues on the U.S. global role. However, I 
would like to touch on a few areas in which the specific needs of our 
Armed Forces, and the perspectives of and about the American military 
have

[[Page 20517]]

a direct bearing on our role as policy-makers.
  As perhaps the leading military analyst of the Vietnam War, Colonel 
Harry Summers, wrote in his excellent book On Strategy: The Vietnam War 
in Context:

       Prior to any future commitment of U.S. military forces our 
     military leaders must insist that the civilian leadership 
     provide tangible, obtainable political goals. The political 
     objective cannot merely be a platitude but must be stated in 
     concrete terms. While such objectives may very well change 
     during the course of the war, it is essential that we begin 
     with an understanding of where we intend to go. I couldn't 
     have said it better. As Clausewitz said, we should not ``take 
     the first step without considering the last . . .'' There is 
     an inherent contradiction between the military and its 
     civilian leaders on this issue. For both domestic and 
     international political purposes the civilian leaders want 
     maximum flexibility and maneuverability and are hesitant to 
     fix on firm objectives. The military on the other hand need 
     just such a firm objective as early as possible in order to 
     plan and conduct military operations. That is according to 
     Harry Summers.

  Mr. President, I know all too well the kind of price that is paid by 
our men and women in uniform when our political leaders fail to lay out 
clear and specific objectives. More than thirty years ago, in Vietnam 
we lacked clear and specific objectives. We attempted to use our 
military to impose our will in a region far from our shores and, in my 
view, far from our vital national interests, and without ever fully 
engaging the Congress or the American people in the process. The result 
was a conflict where the politicians failed to provide clear political 
objectives and where our policy was never fully understood or fully 
supported by the American people. From what I have seen since I came to 
this distinguished body in 1997, we have made very little progress on 
any of these fronts in the years since that time when it comes to 
America going to war.
  The trend discussed earlier of a growing disconnect between the 
military and civilians has been perhaps even more pronounced among 
national foreign and defense policy-makers. A groundbreaking recent 
study, organized by the North Carolina Triangle Institute for Security 
Studies and entitled ``Project on the Gap Between Military and Civilian 
Society,'' made a number of major findings relevant to our discussion 
today. Let me quote from the Project's Digest of Findings and Studies:

       Americans in the national political elite are increasingly 
     losing a personal connection to the military. For the first 
     75 years of the 20th Century, there was a significant 
     ``veteran's advantage'' in American politics: always a higher 
     percentage of veterans in Congress than in the comparable age 
     cohort in the general population. This veteran's advantage 
     has eroded over the past twenty-five years in both chambers 
     of Congress and across both parties. Beginning in the mid-
     1990s, there has been a lower percentage of veterans in the 
     Senate and the House of Representatives than in the 
     comparable cohort in the population at large . . . Compared 
     to historical trends, military veterans seem now to be under-
     represented in the national political elite.

  This particular growing disconnection is having a major impact on the 
central topic of our global role dialogues. To quote again from the 
Triangle Institute report:

       The presence of veterans in the national political elite 
     has a profound effect on the use of force in American foreign 
     policy. At least since 1816, there has been a very durable 
     pattern in U.S. behavior: the more veterans in the national 
     political elite, the less likely the United States is to 
     initiate the use of force in the international arena. The 
     effect is statistically stronger than many other factors 
     known to influence the use of force . . . The trend of a 
     declining rate of veterans in the national political elite 
     may suggest a continued high rate of military involvement in 
     conflicts in the coming years.

  I find that statistic astounding.
  One part of the Triangle Institute study, titled ``The Civilian-
Military Gap and the American Use of Force 1816-1992,'' found:

     two broad clusters of opinion that track with military 
     experience, yielding what we call civilian hawks and military 
     doves.

  Specifically, this particular survey discovered that civilian leaders 
are more willing to use force but more likely to want to impose 
restrictions on the level of force to be used, and more supportive of 
human rights objectives, while military leaders are more reluctant to 
use force but prefer fewer restrictions on what level of force to 
employ, and tend to support more traditional ``Realpolitik'' objectives 
for U.S. foreign policy. Fascinating. Interestingly, civilian leaders 
with prior military experience were found to hold views closer to the 
military rather than civilian leadership.
  In other words, those who have seen the face of battle are more 
reticent about resorting to force than those who have not. This does 
not mean they--I should say we--are necessarily right in any particular 
case, but it should certainly give ``civilian hawks'' some pause in 
considering recourse to an instrument whose chief practitioners are 
wary of utilizing. Above all, as was the case with the government 
needing to engage the public far more effectively on questions of 
foreign policy, so must the military and the government--including the 
Congress --more effectively engage each other if we are ever going to 
achieve the kind of balance which Clausewitz wrote of.
  This leads me to the third and final piece of the Clausewitz trinity: 
the government. As I noted earlier, Colonel Summers emphasized that 
military leaders must insist that the civilian leadership provide 
tangible, obtainable political goals. In this country, that duty rests 
squarely on the shoulders of the President and Congress when it comes 
to the business of war, as outlined by our Founding Fathers when they 
drafted our Constitution.
  Under the Constitution, war powers are divided. Article I, Section 8, 
gives Congress the power to declare war and raise and support the armed 
forces, while Article II, Section 2 declares the President to be 
Commander in Chief. With this division of authority there has also been 
constant disagreement, not only between the executive and legislative 
branches, but between individual members of Congress as well, as we 
have seen in our most recent debates on authorizing the intervention in 
Kosovo and on the Byrd-Warner amendment concerning current funding of 
that very operation, dare I say war. Judging by the text of the 
Constitution and the debate that went into its drafting, however, 
members of Congress have a right, and I would say an obligation, to 
play a key role in the making of war and in determination of the proper 
use of our armed forces, which has brought Senator Pat Roberts and me 
to this floor, shoulder to shoulder, to see if we can't further 
articulate and work out a consensus on how do we commit American forces 
abroad.
  It is generally agreed that the Commander in Chief role gives the 
President power to repel attacks against the United States and makes 
him responsible for leading the armed forces. During the Korean and 
Vietnam conflicts, however, this country found itself involved for many 
years in undeclared wars. Many members of Congress became concerned 
with the erosion of congressional authority to decide when the United 
States should become involved in a war or should use our armed forces 
in situations that might lead to war.
  On November 7, 1973, the Congress passed the War Powers Resolution 
over the veto of President Nixon. As Dante Fascell, former Chairman of 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs noted:

       The importance of this law cannot be discounted. Simply 
     stated, the War Powers Resolution seeks to restore the 
     balance created in the Constitution between the President and 
     Congress on questions of peace and war. It stipulates the 
     constitutional directions that the President and Congress 
     should be partners in such vital questions--to act together, 
     not in separate ways.

  The War Powers Resolution has two key requirements. Section 4(a) 
requires the President to submit a report to Congress within forty-
eight hours whenever troops are introduced into hostilities or 
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly 
indicated by the circumstances. Section 5(b) then stipulates that if 
U.S. armed forces have been sent into situations of actual or imminent 
hostilities the President must remove the troops within sixty days--
ninety days if he requests a delay--unless Congress declares war or 
otherwise authorizes the use of force. The resolution also provides 
that Congress can compel the

[[Page 20518]]

President to withdraw the troops at any time by passing a joint 
resolution. It is important to note, however, that since the adoption 
of the War Powers Resolution, every President has taken the position 
that it is an unconstitutional infringement by the Congress on the 
President's authority as Commander-in-Chief, and the courts have not 
directly addressed this vital question.
  I would submit that although the Congress tried to reassert itself 
after the Vietnam War with the enactment of the War Powers Resolution, 
we have continued to be a timid, sometimes non-existent player in the 
government that Clausewitz emphasized must play a vital role in 
creating the balance necessary for an effective war-making effort. 
Since I came to the Senate, it has been my observation that the current 
system by which the Executive and Legislative Branches discharge their 
respective Constitutional duties in committing American servicemen and 
women into harm's way has become inadequate. Congress continually lacks 
sufficient and timely information as to policy objectives and means 
prior to the commitment of American forces. And then, in my opinion, 
Congress largely abdicates its responsibilities for declaring war and 
controlling the purse with inadequate and ill-timed consideration of 
operations.
  Perhaps this failure has been a long time in the making. My dear 
friend and colleague Senator Byrd so eloquently stated in an earlier 
address to this body on the history of the Senate,

       We remember December 7, 1941, as a day of infamy. We mourn 
     the hundreds of American servicemen who died at Pearl Harbor, 
     and the thousands who gave their lives in the war that 
     followed. We might also mourn the abrupt ending of the debate 
     over American foreign policy. While history proved President 
     Roosevelt and his followers more correct than their 
     isolationist opponents, it also buried for decades the 
     warnings of the isolationists that the United States should 
     not aspire to police the world, nor should it intervene at 
     will in the affairs of other nations in this hemisphere or 
     elsewhere.

  A very wise statement by Senator Byrd.
  Reasons for the failure of the War Powers Resolution and for our 
current difficulties abound. I believe that part of our problem stems 
from the disputed and uncertain role of the War Powers Resolution of 
1973 in governing the conduct of the President, as well as the 
Congress, with respect to the introduction of American forces into 
hostile situations. Once again, these disputes continue to resound 
between both the branches and individual members of the legislative 
branch.
  In all honesty, however, the realities of our government highlight 
the fact that while the legislature can urge, request, and demand that 
the President consult with members of Congress on decisions to use 
force, it cannot compel him to follow any of the advice that it might 
care to offer. With that in mind, as an institution, Congress can do no 
more than give or withhold its permission to use force. And while this 
``use it or lose it'' quality of congressional authorizations may make 
many members leery about acting on a crisis too soon, delays will 
virtually guarantee, as Senator Arthur Vandenberg once stated, that 
crises will ``never reach Congress until they have developed to a point 
where congressional discretion is pathetically restricted.''
  What a great quote. I felt that certainly as I tried to vote properly 
in this Chamber months ago in regard to Milosevic and his intervention 
in Kosovo.
  Mr. President, I believe that in view of our obligations to the 
national interest, to the Constitution and to the young American 
servicemen and women whose very lives are at stake whether it be a 
``contingency operation'' or a full-scale war, neither the executive or 
legislative branches should be satisfied with the current situation 
which results in uncertain signals to the American people, to overseas 
friends and foes, and to our armed forces personnel. In making our 
decision to authorize military action, Congress should work to elicit 
all advice and information from the President on down to the 
battlefield commanders, make a sound decision based on this 
information, and then leave battlefield management in the hands of 
those competent and qualified to carry out such a task. Only then will 
the proper roles and balance of the triad Clausewitz spoke of be 
obtained. And only then will our decisions to commit troops be based on 
the principles we spoke of in our earlier dialogs: (1) a vital national 
interest, (2) with clear national policy and objectives, and (3) with a 
well-defined exit strategy. As Senator Mansfield once stressed,

       In moments of crisis, at least, the President and the 
     Congress cannot be adversaries; they must be allies who 
     together, must delineate the path to guide the nation's 
     massive machinery of government in a fashion which serves the 
     interests of the people and is acceptable to the people.

  Beautifully said.
  In light of the problems and issues just discussed, I would like to 
take a moment to discuss S. 2851, a bill I recently introduced with 
Senators Roberts and Jeffords, which seeks to find a more workable 
system for Presidential and congressional interaction on the commitment 
of American forces into combat situations. It is a bill derived from 
the current system for Presidential approval and reporting to Congress 
on covert operations, a system which was established by Public Law 102-
88 in 1991. By most accounts, this system has been accepted by both 
branches and has worked very well with respect to covert operations, 
producing both better decisionmaking in the executive branch and 
improved congressional input and oversight with respect to these 
operations. Since overt troop deployments into hostilities almost 
certainly constitute a greater risk to American interests and to 
American lives, I believe such a system represents the very least we 
should do to improve the approval and oversight process with respect to 
overt military operations. It does not bind or limit the executive 
branch or military, but seeks to build upon the principles we have 
covered throughout our global roles dialog.
  Precisely because the United States is a democracy, it is important 
that policy decisions be made democratically. As Michael Walzer 
observes in his article ``Deterrence and Democracy'': ``The test of a 
democracy is not that the right side wins the political battle, but 
that there is a political battle.'' Policies that pass through public 
debate and inspection emerge all the stronger for it, because they 
enjoy greater respect both at home and abroad. Instead of seeing 
executive-legislative conflict over foreign policy as a cause for 
dismay, we should recognize that healthy democracies argue over the 
wisdom of policies. Debate is what, ultimately, produces better policy. 
And this is precisely the role of the government, both the President 
and Congress, in fulfilling our constitutional duties and achieving the 
proper balance of the Clausewitz trilogy.
  I believe the case has clearly been made that the public, the 
military, and the government--the three under-
pinnings of successful national security policy--are not now in proper 
``balance,'' to use Clausewitz' term. Each part of this trinity is 
skeptical and increasingly disengaged from the other two, with a number 
of significant and negative effects on our national interest which we 
have discussed today and in previous dialogs: a widening divide between 
the aspirations of American foreign policy-makers and the Congress' and 
the public's willingness to finance the necessary means is one such 
point; a military and civilian leadership which sees America's role in 
the world and the means appropriate to secure those ends in vastly 
different terms; a national government which is deeply divided along 
partisan lines and between the executive and legislative branches.
  I suggest the chief responsibility for fixing this dysfunctional 
system lies squarely with us in the government. As Clausewitz said, 
``the political aims are the business of government alone,'' and it is 
the political aims which drive, or at least should drive, both military 
requirements and the public's engagement, or disengagement, from 
American policy. We must find more and better ways of communicating 
with our constituents on the realities of our national interests and 
the real costs of

[[Page 20519]]

securing them. We must find more and better ways to increase the 
exchange of experiences and ideas between the government and the 
military. And we must find more and better ways of ensuring that both 
the executive and legislative branches properly fulfill their 
constitutional responsibilities in the arena of national security 
policy.
  Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University Eliot 
Cohen closed his paper on ``The Unequal Dialogue: The Civil-Military 
Gap and the Use of Force,'' which is a very interesting series of case 
studies on effective, and ineffective, civilian and military 
interaction during wartime, with these observations, which are 
extremely relevant to our discussion today:

       (The lessons of serious conflict) are, above all, that 
     political leaders must immerse themselves in the conduct of 
     war no less than they do in great projects of domestic 
     legislation; that they must master their military briefs as 
     thoroughly as they do their civilian ones; that they must 
     demand and expect from their military subordinates a candor 
     as bruising as it is necessary; that both groups must expect 
     a running conversation in which, although civilian opinion 
     will not dictate, it must dominate; that that conversation 
     will include not only ends and policies, but ways and means.

  In other words, we in Government, the constitutionally established 
political leaders, must step up to the plate and do our jobs when it 
comes to national security policy--especially when it comes to making 
war--with great humility as to our own limitations, with great care and 
forethought, but with diligence and determination.
  Mr. President, it is my honor and distinct personal privilege to 
yield to the distinguished Senator from Kansas, Mr. Roberts, for 
further remarks.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, before I begin, I would like to pay 
tribute and special thanks to Scott Kindsvater, who happens to come 
from my hometown of Dodge City, KS, who is a major in the U.S. Air 
Force and is a congressional fellow in my office. He is an F-15 pilot 
second to none. He is going to be assigned to the Pentagon. His tour of 
duty will end about the same time as the election. I thank him for all 
of his help, all of his homework, all of his study, and for gathering 
together the material that has been so helpful to me to take part in 
this foreign policy dialog.
  I thank my good friend and colleague, Senator Cleland. We again come 
to the floor of the Senate for what is our fifth dialog with regard to 
our Nation's role in global affairs and our vital national security 
interests. This effort has been prompted by our conviction, as the 
Senator has said, that such a dialog, such a process is absolutely 
necessary, if we are to arrive at a better bipartisan consensus on 
national security policy, a consensus our Nation deserves and needs but 
has been lacking since the end of the cold war.
  Both Senator Cleland and I have the privilege of serving together on 
the Senate Armed Services Committee. The distinguished Presiding 
Officer also serves on that committee and provides very valuable 
service. As a matter of fact, Senator Cleland and I sit directly 
opposite one another. During hearing after hearing on the leading 
national security issues of the past 4 years, it became obvious that 
while we did not agree on each and every issue, we shared many similar 
views and concerns. I call it ``the foreign policy and national 
security eyebrow syndrome''; that is to say, when Max and I hear 
testimony we think is off the mark, a little puzzling, or downright 
silly, our eyebrows go up, and that is usually followed by a great deal 
of head shaking and commiserating.
  The result has been a series of foreign policy dialogs: No. 1, what 
is the U.S. global role? No. 2, how do we define and defend U.S. vital 
national security interests? No. 3, what is the role of multilateral 
organizations in the world today and our role within them? No. 4, when 
and how should U.S. military forces be deployed?
  Today Senator Cleland has chosen a theme taken from the 19th century 
military strategist, Gen. Karl von Clausewitz, called ``The Trinity of 
War Making,'' or the role of government, the military, and the public 
in conducting and implementing our national security policy.
  Finally, in closing these dialogs for this session of Congress by 
Senator Cleland, I have prepared a summary of agreed upon principles 
which we suggest to this body that both he and I believe represent a 
suggested roadmap for the next administration and the Congress.
  With regard to two of the Clausewitz so-called trinities, the need 
for government to gain public support for national security policy, 
Senator Cleland already summarized our purpose very well when he said:

       We must find more and better ways of communicating with our 
     constituents on the realities of our national interests and 
     the costs in securing them.

  Senator Cleland went on to say:

       We must find more and better ways to increase the exchange 
     of experiences and ideas between our Government and our 
     military.

  Finally, Max said:

       We must find more and better ways of ensuring that both the 
     executive and our legislative branches properly fulfill their 
     constitutional responsibilities in the arena of national 
     security policy.

  In this regard, I will comment on the first of Senator Cleland's 
points, the fact that our political leadership must make sure that the 
public understands and supports the use of military force.
  Former Joint Chief of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell asserted our troops 
must go into battle with the support and understanding of the American 
people. General Powell contended back in 1993 that the key to using 
force is to first match the political expectations to military means in 
a wholly realistic way and, second, to attain very decisive results. He 
said a decision to use force must be made with clear purpose in mind 
and added that if the purpose is too murky--and, goodness knows, we 
have had a lot of that in recent years--our political leadership will 
eventually have to find clarity.
  As Senator Cleland has pointed out already, unfortunately, today it 
seems that national security and foreign policy issues represent little 
more than a blip on the public's radar screen. Obviously, the public 
this evening will be tuned to either the baseball playoffs or the 
debate. He quoted news surveys and polls showing foreign policy and 
defense ranking last among issues cited by the public as most important 
that face the country. That is amazing to me.
  A case in point: While we are all hopeful that the situation in the 
former Yugoslavia will result in the end of the Slobodan Milosevic 
regime and the possible transition to a more democratic government, 
U.S. and NATO military intervention and continued presence in the 
Balkans lacks a clearly defined policy goal or any realistic timetable 
for any conclusion. As a result, while most Americans may have really 
forgotten about or are not focused on Kosovo today, nevertheless, 6,000 
American troops still remain there and could remain there for another 
decade. That is a difficult sell with regard to public understanding.
  In that regard, as Senator Cleland has pointed out, Congress bears 
part of that responsibility. It is easy to criticize, but we bear part 
of that responsibility. Unclear political objectives do not allow our 
military leaders to create clear, concise, and effective military 
strategies to accomplish any specific goal. Unclear political goals 
lead to wars and involvement with no exit strategy.
  A brief examination of the chain of events leading up to the use of 
force in Kosovo certainly proves the point:
  On March 23 of 1999, the Senate conducted minimal debate regarding 
the use of force in Yugoslavia after troops had already been deployed. 
S. Con. Res. 21 passed, authorizing the President to conduct military 
air operations.
  On March 24, one day later, combat air operations did begin.
  On March 26, the President notified Congress, consistent with the War 
Powers Resolution, that operations began on March 24.
  On March 27, after the fact, the House considered the use of force 
and failed to pass S. Con. Res. 21 on March 28.
  On April 30, 18 Members of the House, having serious objection to 
that policy,

[[Page 20520]]

filed suit against the President for conducting military activities 
without any authorization.
  Then on May 20, 1999, the emergency supplemental appropriations bill 
for fiscal year 1999 finally passed, and it provided funding for the 
ongoing U.S. Kosovo operations.
  On May 25, the 60-day deadline passed following Presidential 
notification of military operations, and the President didn't seek a 
30-day extension, noting instead that the War Powers Resolution is 
constitutionally defective.
  Then on February 18, 2000, a Federal appeals court affirmed the 
district court decision that the House of Representatives Members 
lacked standing to sue the President relative to the April 30 suit of 
the previous year.
  I might add at this juncture that Senators Cleland and Snowe, I, and 
others had all previously successfully amended various appropriations 
measures mandating the administration report to the Congress specific 
policy goals and military strategy objectives prior to the involvement 
of any U.S. troops.
  Most, if not all, of those reports were late, were not specific or 
pertinent to the fast changing situation in the Balkans. We at least 
tried.
  And, Mr. President, I remember well the briefing by members of the 
Administration with regard to why the ongoing military operation in 
Kosovo was in our vital national interest. I still have my notebook and 
the list:
  The Balkans represent a strategic bridge to Europe and the Middle 
East.
  The current conflict could spin into Albania and include Macedonia, 
Greece and Turkey. After all World War I started in the same region.
  We should act to prevent a humanitarian disaster and massacre of 
thousands of refugees.
  If we do not act, it will endanger our progress in Bosnia.
  The leadership and credibility of NATO into the next century is at 
stake.
  We must oppose Serb aggression.
  With all due respect Mr. President, these arguments did not match the 
fast-changing conditions in the Balkans. 20-20 hindsight now tells us 
the incremental bombing campaign and publicly ruling out the use of 
ground troops exacerbated the refugee tragedy.
  The present Presiding Officer serves with me on the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, and we had a hearing after part of these 
problems developed. Somehow intelligence reports predicting the law of 
unintended effects went unheeded or were ignored.
  And, in the end, U.S. stated goals changed when the original goals 
fell short. We were assured we were fighting, not for our national 
interest but selflessly to save lives and promote democracy, fighting 
in behalf of humanity. Mr. President, in my view, neither the Senate, 
the House or the administration can square these goals with what has 
actually taken place and is taking place in the Balkans. I don't 
question the intent.
  The most optimistic lien today is that Kosovo is liberated after the 
mighty efforts of the U.S. led NATO coalition. Well, as described by 
James Warren of the Chicago Tribune, it is a liberated total mess.
  He quotes British academic and international relations analyst 
Timothy Garton Ash, a professor at St. Antony's College, Oxford, who 
reviewed six books on the conflict with unbiased perspective.
  According to Warren, most Americans have forgotten about the war by 
now, so they don't care much about the fact the so called winners are 
totally unprepared for dealing with peace. Violence and chaos reign in 
Kosovo. The victims and the ``good guys,'' the Kosovars have conducted 
reverse ethnic cleansing under the noses of U.S. and NATO troops.
  We have, in fact, created a new Kosovo apartheid. Having failed to 
stop the killing, we are proving unable to win the peace or prevent 
revenge inspired reverse ethnic cleansing.
  Moreover, since the Balkan war, badly fought and with no clear end 
game, other nations have increasingly been united in criticizing U.S. 
clout as we wield unparalleled power on the world stage and have 
reacted with what some refer to as a new arms race.
  Since we can be sure there will be other calls for intervention in 
the world, it is incumbent on us to ask whether a more effective 
approach exists.
  President Clinton has, in fact, proclaimed to the world, that if a 
state sought to wipe out large numbers of innocent civilians based on 
their race or religion, the United States should intervene in their 
behalf. Stated such, a public support can be garnered for such a 
policy.
  But, as Kosovo has demonstrated, things are not that simple. As Adam 
Wolfson pointed out in his article within Commentary magazine;
  Certainly the vast majority of Kosovars were subjected to harassment 
and much worse and their crisis was as President Clinton described, a 
humanitarian one. But, the Kosovars also had their political objectives 
and ambitions; an independent Kosovo ruled by themselves; a goal they 
press for today by political intimidation and violence.
  The United States has, on the other hand, continued to oppose 
independence and has supported a multicultural society for Kosovo. Vice 
President Gore has said that in Kosovo there must be a genuine 
recognition and respect for difference and the creation of a tolerant 
and open society where everyone's rights are respected, regardless of 
ethnic or religious background and where all groups can participate in 
government, business, the arts and education.
  These are fine and noble goals but they are ``ours'' not those of the 
Kosovars. We have two choices. First, we can accept the political 
ambitions for a mono-cultural and independent state purged of non 
Albanians or second, we can attempt to stay in Kosovo until we can 
somehow transform entrenched and long standing political and ethnic 
culture and teach the values of diversity and religious toleration. 
This is on small task and in my view, It may not sustainable over the 
long term both in terms of cost, benefit and public opinion.
  Will the American people respond? Do they even care? In their book, 
``Misreading the Public, the Myth of a New Isolationism,'' Steven Kull 
and I.M. Destler of the Brookings Institution, make the case that the 
notion that public attitudes are typified today by new isolationism, 
greater parochialism and declining interest in the world is simply not 
true.
  They argue most Americans do not believe we should disengage from the 
world and support international engagement and for the United States to 
remain involved but with greater emphasis on cooperative and 
multilateral involvement. They also argue that when presented with 
facts, reasonable goals and alternatives, that public support can be 
gained.
  That is the point, Mr. President. We have to do a better job. Member 
of the Senate need to participate in the daily grind of overseeing 
Administration policies, passing judgment, and behaving as a co-equal 
branch. When a majority, if a majority can be found, feels a President 
oversteps constitutional barriers or threatens to do so, we should 
respond with statutory checks, not floor speeches and sense-of-the-
Senate resolutions.
  In this regard Senator Cleland has done us a favor with his proposal 
derived from the current system for Presidential approval and reporting 
to Congress on covert operations. Senator Cleland has candidly pointed 
out his bill does not represent a consensus view and his introduction 
of the legislation is to stimulate further discussion. Let the 
discussion begin.
  Mr. President, having spoken to the role of government and the public 
with the specific example of Kosovo, let me turn to the third topic of 
the ``Clausewitz Trinity'', the military.
  Mr. President, I am sure that no General throughout history, be he 
Clausewitz or Eisenhower would condone sending troops that are not 
ready into battle. In the not-mincing-any-words department, I am 
concerned and frustrated that our United States Military today is 
stressed, strained, and in too many cases hollow.
  I often say in Kansas that our first obligation as Members of 
Congress is to

[[Page 20521]]

make sure our national security capability is equal to our vital 
national security responsibilities. How do we do this?
  One way is to do exactly what Senator Cleland and I try to do and 
that is to personally visit our men and women in uniform stationed here 
at home and throughout the world. We, along with a majority of members 
of the Armed Services Committee, visit with and seek advice from the 
ranks; our enlisted, our non-commissioned officers, officers and 
commanders.
  Mr. President, when doing that and when making remarks and 
observations before many military groups; active duty, reserve and 
guard units, I always acknowledge those in the military must operate 
and perform their duties within the chain of command. But, I also ask 
them for their candor and honesty.
  And they have provide me and others that with spades.
  Those in the Navy tell me the Navy cannot or soon will not be able to 
perform assigned duties with current force structure. The bottom line 
is there are not enough ships or submarines in the fleet and training 
and weapons inventories are inadequate.
  Those in the Army tell me the training and doctrine command is almost 
broken and peacekeeping operations are taking their toll on combat 
readiness.
  Those in the Air Force repeat what is common knowledge--pilot 
retention problems are legion. The Air Force is short about 1,200 
pilots today. Strategic lift in both air and sea is inadequate.
  The Marines tell this former marine they have significant problems in 
the operation and maintenance of their Harrier and helicopter fleet. 
They tell me they are meeting their recruiting and retention challenges 
but they are working harder and harder to achieve that goal.
  Overall, those in command tell us--and the figures are plain to see--
that operation and maintenance accounts have been robbed for eight 
years to pay for ever increasing peace keeping and now peace 
enforcement missions.
  Spare parts are hard to come by, we are short of weapons both for 
practice and combat. Mission capable rates are consistently down. 
Recent press reports state 12 of 20 major Army training centers are 
rated C-4, the lowest readiness rating. A Navy Inspector General Report 
says Navy fliers are leaving port at a lower stage of readiness. The 
Air Force reports that its readiness rates for warplane squadrons 
continues to decline.
  Many units are on frequent temporary duty assignments or are deployed 
most of the year on missions that many believe are of questionable 
value. When the troops come home, their training is shortchanged based 
on the lack of time available for training and lack of resources. 
Maintenance required for old equipment takes significant time away from 
other missions, from family and it is very costly.
  There is another related problem and challenge, that of morale. There 
is a growing uneasiness with military men and women that their 
leadership either does not care or is out of touch with their problems. 
By leadership, I am including the Congress of the United States. 
Soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines tell me they are stressed out and 
dissatisfied and leaving.
  This has been an anecdotal outpouring from military commanders in the 
field simply fed up with current quality of life and readiness stress. 
Pick up any service, military or defense publication or read any story 
in the press and what we have is equal opportunity frustration.
  A February study by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies warns us about ``stress on personnel and families, problems 
with recruiting and retention, and for some, declining trust and 
confidence in the military institution and its leaders.''
  Half of the respondents in the survey said their unit did not have 
high morale and two thirds said stress was a problem. A recent Army 
study at Fort Leavenworth, the intellectual center of the Army, located 
in my homes state of Kansas, warned the number of lieutenants and 
captains leaving the Army is now over 60% compared to 48% a decade ago.
  In a survey taken at Fort Benning, outgoing captains complained they 
were disillusioned with the Army mission and lifestyle, struggling to 
maintain a functional family life. The American soldier has gone from a 
homeland protector of vital national interests to nomadic peace keeper. 
His weapons, on the cutting edge, some complain are beginning to rust.
  During this time there has been quite a transition period Mr. 
President. Stretching from the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton 
administrations, military personnel levels declined by 40 percent, 
spending dropped 35 percent and meanwhile the number of U.S. forces 
stationed abroad increased and remains high.
  Under Secretary for Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Jacques 
Gansler recently stated:

       We are trapped in a death spiral. The requirement to 
     maintain our aging equipment is costing us more each year in 
     repair costs, down time and maintenance tempo. But, we must 
     keep this equipment in repair to maintain readiness. It 
     drains our resources--resources we should apply to 
     modernization of the traditional systems and development of 
     new systems.
       So we stretch out our replacement schedules to ridiculous 
     lengths and reduce the quantities of new equipment we 
     purchase, raising the cost and still durther delaying 
     modernization.

  I am very concerned if what I have described is even close to 
factual--and I am afraid it is based upon my own conversations with the 
men and women of our military, that we are headed in a very dangerous 
direction.
  I realize the readiness of our military has become an issue in the 
current presidential campaign. And, it is not my intent to take sides 
in that debate during this policy forum. I might add I think in some 
ways this debate is long overdue.
  Another way to determine our military readiness is to ask those in 
charge. And, Senator Cleland and I, along with members of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee did just that last week. The joint chiefs of 
staff came before the committee. Not without some not so subtle advice 
from on high.
  Prior to the joint chiefs testimony, Administration spokesman Kenneth 
Bacon said Defense Secretary Cohen told the Chiefs he expected them to 
play straight on the readiness issue, to give the facts, not to ``beat 
the drum with a tin cup'' but to talk honestly about the pressures they 
face from the operations their forces are undergoing.
  Well, Mr. Bacon need not have worried. The Chiefs testified and shot 
pretty straight. On an annual basis the Marines said they needed 
approximately $1.5 billion to be the fully modernized 911 force in 
readiness we expect of them. The Air Force told us they needed $20 to 
$30 billion, the Navy some $17 billion and the Army $10 billion. That 
totaled up to somewhere between $48 to $60 billion more the Chiefs feel 
each service needs to perform its mission.
  Those figures, by the way, compare with a recent estimate by the 
Congressional Budget Office regarding the cost the CBO deems necessary 
to enable the services to meet their mission obligations.
  Lord knows what the Chiefs would have requested if they had beat the 
drum with a tin cup. And, I must admit I am disappointed by the 
suggestion in Mr. Bacon's warning that the chiefs would ever provide 
anything but their honest testimony before the Congress, after all each 
of the Chiefs swore to provide their honest, candid assessment during 
their nomination hearings.
  I always assume they do just that.
  With all of the pressures of the current political season, perhaps 
Mr. Bacon's concern was understandable, after all he is a spokesman.
  I brought a tin cup to the hearings last week. The distinguished 
acting Presiding Officer looked with some shock and amazement as I had 
a tin cup and poured water into it. I described all the missions that 
the military had. Then I described what they had to work with. I said: 
Keep pouring the water and some water might come out. In other words, 
the services can't

[[Page 20522]]

carry all the water they were intended to carry. Of course, what I 
didn't say was that I had drilled a hole in the cup. Of course, some of 
the water was coming out. But it made a good audiovisual tool.
  I thank the distinguished Senator for his help. I didn't bring one 
here tonight. Don't worry. We are not going to get anybody wet.
  To be fair, Mr. Bacon stated he believes our forces are well 
equipped, trained and led. I will acknowledge the ``led'' part. The 
point is too much attention has been placed on the tip of the spear of 
U.S. military might.
  Mr. Bacon is correct, the Secretary of Defense is correct, and others 
are correct. I think we all agree that the tip of the spear is ready. 
It is tough and it is lethal.
  But, just as important but not often discussed is the shaft of the 
spear. Range, sustainability, lethality, accuracy and the deterrence 
capacity of the spear as a weapon is greatly reduced if the shaft is 
weak or damaged.
  What comprises the shaft of our military readiness spear?
  Let us try the adequacy of critical air and sea lift to sustain the 
force or get the force to the fight in a timely manner.
  Let us try the adequacy of the reserve of key repair parts and 
weapons inventory to sustain the battle.
  Let us talk about the effectiveness and adequacy of training time and 
funding.
  We should mention the impact of quality of life from pay to health 
care to housing on the warrior's willingness--and they are warriors--to 
commit to a career in the military.
  We should mention the impact of the significant operational tempo of 
the military and the impact that has on the total military spear.
  We should also mention the effect of mission quality and duration on 
readiness to fight and win the nation's wars; and
  The services' preparation for the future, joint battlefield in an 
environment where asymmetric warfare will be the norm and the 
battlefield may be in an urban environment.
  I do not mean to pick on Mr. Bacon, notwithstanding his comments, the 
primary purpose of our military as defined from Clausewitz to Colin 
Powell is the readiness of the force to carry out the National 
Strategy. I have grave concerns that if we look behind the tip of the 
spear of U.S. military readiness, our forces are not ready. And, if 
that is banging on our readiness capability with a tin cup, so be it.
  The point is that we in the Congress have the obligation and 
responsibility to provide the resources our Armed Forces need to 
protect our vital national interests.
  There is the real debate that should take place. Our former NATO 
allied commander, Wes Clark recently asked the real pertinent question. 
How should the armed services be used? If readiness is a priority, what 
is it we should be ready for? General Clark said it's high time we had 
this debate and settled the issue.
  While I am not sure we will ever settle the issue, it is time for the 
debate and I have a suggestion, I even have a road map.
  The Senator from Georgia has during our past dialogues referred to 
the Commission on America's National Interests and the Commission's 
valuable 1996 report. As a matter of fact, we have both referred to 
this report and we found it most helpful.
  The good news is that the commission has updated its findings for the 
year 2000. I have it in my hand. It has set forth a clear and easy-to-
understand list of recommendations that at least in part can answer the 
question posed by General Clark and many others: ``Ready for what?''
  Senator Cleland referred to this challenge during his testimony with 
the Joint Chiefs last week. He pointed out, as I have tried to do in 
some respects, America is adrift, spending a great deal of time in what 
may be important interests we all agree with but ignoring matters of 
vital national interest.
  The authors have summarized the national interest by saying that we 
have vital national interests: We have extremely important, we have 
important, and less important or secondary interests.
  My dear friend knows we are spending an awful lot of time on 
important issues and less important or secondary issues--as far as I am 
concerned, not enough time with extremely important and vital.
  I commend this report to the attention of my colleagues and all 
interested parties. The commission has identified six cardinal 
challenges for our next President and the next Congress more along the 
lines of the principles that we have agreed to and we will recommended 
in just a moment.
  I ask unanimous consent the executive summary from the report by the 
Commission on America's National Interests, which is much shorter than 
the book, be printed in the Record following the conclusion of our 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. ROBERTS. I yield to my distinguished friend.
  Mr. CLELAND. I thank Senator Roberts for that wonderful presentation.
  We have reached several conclusions in this year-long dialog 
regarding America's global role. Before I get to some of the 
conclusions, may I say a special thank-you to my key staff members. Mr. 
Bill Johnstone, who has been the absolute force behind my remarks and 
has helped my thought process for a number of years as we have 
discussed American foreign policy issues, a special thanks goes to him. 
A special thanks also to Tricia Heller of my staff, and Andy 
Vanlandingham; they have been invaluable in helping me form some of my 
conclusions about America's global role in the world.
  I thank very much my dear friend from Kansas. It is an honor to be 
with him, continuing our dialog on America's role in the world in the 
21st century, particularly in terms of military commitments, our 
footprint around the world, so to speak, and its rationale. It is a 
pleasure to stand shoulder to shoulder with him in a bipartisan way, to 
see if we can't find a consensus that might lead us well into the 21st 
century in terms of our foreign policy.
  Mr. President, when Senator Roberts and I embarked on this series of 
Global Role Dialogues back in February, we set as our goal the 
initiation of a serious debate in this great institution of the United 
States Senate on the proper role of our country in the post-cold war 
world. We both believed--and continue to believe--that such a process 
is absolutely necessary if we are to arrive at the bipartisan consensus 
on national security policy which our Nation so badly needs, but has 
been lacking since the fall of the Soviet Union. While the vagaries of 
Senators' schedules have unfortunately limited somewhat our ability to 
involve more Senators in this process, I want to thank Senators 
Hutchison, Hagel, Lugar and Levin who all made important contributions 
to these discussions. Senator Roberts and I will be exploring ways in 
which we can broaden this dialogue in the next Congress.
  When we began our discussions we also indicated that we had far more 
questions than definitive answers. And while we cannot claim to have 
found any magic solutions or panaceas for the challenges facing the 
United States on the global scene as we approach the end of the 
Twentieth Century, I believe I can speak for Senator Roberts when I say 
that we believe we have learned much from the writings and statements 
of many, many others, in this country and abroad, who have thoughtfully 
considered these questions we have been examining.
  We have drawn heavily on the work of such entities as the Commission 
on America's National Interests--on which Senator Roberts serves with 
distinction--, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 
and the ODC's America's National Interests in Multilateral Engagement: 
A Bipartisan Dialogue. We have consulted the work of a large number of 
academics, and governmental, military and opinion leaders from around 
the world. And, for myself, I have certainly learned a great deal from 
my friend

[[Page 20523]]

and colleague, the distinguished Senator from Kansas.
  While what we are about to say is far from complete and very much a 
work in progress, we believe it is only fair to provide the Senate--
which has indulged us with many hours of floor time to pursue this 
project--and to those who have followed our efforts with interest and 
encouragement to lay out the lessons we have learned and some general 
principles which we believe should guide our national security policies 
in the years ahead.
  At this point, I yield again to my partner in these dialogues, 
Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, but first I want to thank him for all of 
his help in this undertaking. His experience, his good humor and his 
wisdom have made our dialogues both instructive and extremely 
enjoyable. I yield to Senator Roberts.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, with all those accolades, the Senator 
missed one--I had one other line in there.
  I commend my good friend for his commonsense approach to our 
country's future. I thank him. I applaud him for his leadership. He has 
begun what I think is a trail-blazing initiative. This has been, as he 
has indicated, a year-long bipartisan foreign policy dialog endeavor. 
We thank staff and various folks on the floor for their patience. I 
learned a great deal from the distinguished Senator from Georgia. He 
said he learned from me. I learned from him.
  As the Senator mentioned, we would now like to present our lessons 
learned from our year-long dialogs, these dialogs that we began because 
we both felt our foreign policy agenda had run aground. We wanted to 
start a series of these dialogs, these debates or colloquys, in order 
to arrive at a consensus concerning the future of our Nation's foreign 
and defense policies.
  We condensed our five dialogs into seven foreign policy principles. 
These principles are not only a compilation of our dialogs, but also a 
summary of the lessons learned from the various discussions with 
colleagues, as the Senator has indicated, foreign policy elites, from 
academia and the government, and from several consultations with many 
military leaders. These seven foreign policy principles are simple. 
They are realistic. They are sustainable. We believe they would support 
and secure our national interests. We strongly believe the following 
principles are a step in the right direction.
  We urge the next administration of Congress and all of our colleagues 
in the Congress to begin the process of trying to articulate a coherent 
national security strategy.
  I again yield to the Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, these are not the ``seven deadly sins,'' 
but I think in many ways it is a sin if we violate these basic 
fundamental lessons that we have learned.
  First and foremost, we believe as a nation--including government, 
media, academia, personalities, and other leaders--we need to engage in 
a serious and sustained national dialog to do several things: First, 
define our national interests and differentiate the level of interest 
involved, spell out what we should be prepared to do in defense of 
those interests; second, build a bipartisan consensus in support of the 
resulting set of interests and policies.
  As a starting point, within the Senate, we would encourage the 
Foreign Relations Committee and our own Armed Services Committee upon 
which we both sit to hold hearings on the finished products of the 
Commission on America's National Interests, the U.S. Commission on 
National Security/21st Century and other relevant considerations of 
these critical topics.
  I yield to the Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Here is principle No. 2 that the distinguished Senator 
and I have agreed upon.
  The President and the Congress need to, first, find more and better 
ways to increase communications with the American public. We both have 
talked about this at length in our previous discussion with the 
American public on the realities of our international interests and the 
costs of securing them.
  I could go into a long speech on how I tried to convince the Kansas 
wheat farmer that first he must have security, then he must have 
stability, then he must have an economic future, then he may get $4 
wheat at the country elevator, but it all starts with security.
  Second, it finds more and better ways to increase the exchange of 
ideas and experiences between government and the military to avoid the 
broadening lack of military experience in the political elite. We must 
find more and better ways of ensuring that both the executive and 
legislative branches fulfill their constitutional responsibilities in 
national security policy concerning military operations other than 
declared war.
  And, as a result of our second principle, Senator Cleland sponsored 
the bill of which I was proud to cosponsor, S. 2851, requiring the 
President to report on certain information before deployments of armed 
forces. This bill basically requires the President to report 
information of overt operations very similar to the law requiring the 
President to report certain information prior to covert operations. It 
makes sense to me. I yield to the Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CLELAND. Third, the President and the Congress need to urgently 
address the mismatch between our foreign policy ends and means, and 
between commitments and forces by:
  Determining the most appropriate instrument--diplomatic, military, or 
other--for securing policy objectives;
  Reviewing carefully current American commitments--especially those 
involving troop deployments--including the clarity of objectives, and 
the presence of an exit strategy; and
  Increasing the relatively small amount of resources devoted to the 
key instruments for securing our national interests--all of which can 
be supported by the American public, as detailed in ``The Foreign 
Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public'' from the University 
of Maryland's Center for International and Security Studies.
  These include:
  Armed Forces--which need to be reformed to meet the requirements of 
the 21st Century;
  Diplomatic Forces;
  Foreign Assistance;
  United Nations Peacekeeping Operations--which also need to be 
reformed to become much more effective;
  Key Regional Organizations--including NATO, the Organization of 
American States, the Organization for African Unity and the Association 
of South East Asian Nations.
  I again yield to Senator Roberts.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Let's try principle No. 4. We are the only global 
superpower, and in order to avoid stimulating the creation of a hostile 
coalition of other nations, the United States should, and can afford 
to, forego unilateralist actions, except where our vital national 
interests are involved.
  The U.S. should pay international debt.
  The U.S. must continue to respect and honor international commitments 
and not abdicate our global role leadership.
  Finally, the U.S. must avoid unilateral economic and trade sanctions. 
Unilateral sanctions simply don't work as a foreign policy tool. They 
put American businesses, workers, and farmers at a huge competitive 
disadvantage. The U.S. needs to take a harder look at alternatives, 
such as multilateral pressure and more effective U.S. diplomacy.
  I yield to the distinguished Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CLELAND. Fifth, with respect to multilateral organizations, the 
United States should:
  More carefully consider NATO's new Strategic Concept, and the future 
direction of this, our most important international commitment; Press 
for reform of the UN's and Security Council's peacekeeping operations 
and decisionmaking processes; Fully support efforts to strengthen the 
capabilities of regional organizations including the European Union, 
the Organization of American States, the Organization for African 
Unity, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations--to deal with 
threats to regional security; and
  Promote a thorough debate, at the UN and elsewhere, on proposed 
standards for interventions within sovereign states.

[[Page 20524]]

  I yield to the distinguished Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Principle No. 6: In the post-cold-war world, the U.S. 
should adopt a policy of realistic restraint with respect to the use of 
U.S. military force in situations other than those involving the 
defense of vital national interests. In all other situations, we must: 
Insist on well-defined political objectives; determine whether non-
military means will be effective, and if so, try them prior to any 
recourse to military force. We should remember the quote from General 
Shelton:

       The military is the hammer in our foreign policy toolbox 
     but not every problem is a nail.

  We should ascertain whether military means can achieve the political 
objectives.
  We should determine whether the benefits outweigh the costs 
(political, financial, military), and that we are prepared to bear 
those costs.
  We should determine the ``last step'' we are prepared to take if 
necessary to achieve the objectives.
  I wonder what that last step would be. It is one thing to have a 
cause to fight for. It is another thing to have a cause that you are 
willing to die for. In too many cases today, it doesn't seem to me that 
we have the willingness to enter into a cause in which we are ready to 
die but it seems to me we are sure willing to risk the lives of others 
in regards to limited policy objectives. That's not part of the 
principle. That's just an observation in regard to the last step 
recommendation.
  We should insist that we have a clear, concise exit strategy, 
including sufficient consideration of the subsequent role of the United 
States, regional parties, international organizations and other 
entities in securing the long-term success of the mission--Kosovo is a 
great example.
  Finally, insist on Congressional approval of all deployments other 
than those involving responses to emergency situations.
  The Senator referred to the amendment introduced by the distinguished 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, and that of 
Senator Byrd. I voted for that. I do not think it was an abdication of 
our responsibilities.
  Again, those of us in Congress, the majority, should approve all 
deployments other than those involving responses to emergency 
situations.
  I yield to the Senator.
  Mr. CLELAND. Beautifully said. I could not have said it better, nor 
concur more.
  Finally, the United States can, and must, continue to exercise 
international leadership, while following a policy of realistic 
restraint in the use of military forces in particular, by:
  Pursuing policies that promote a strong and growing economy, which is 
the essential underpinning of any nation's strength; maintaining 
superior, ready and mobile armed forces, capable of rapidly responding 
to threats to our national interests; strengthening the non-military 
tools discussed above for securing our national interests; and making a 
long-term commitment to promoting democracy abroad via a comprehensive, 
sustained program which makes a realistic assessment of the 
capabilities of such a program as described by Thomas Carothers in his 
excellent primer on ``Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve''.
  I hope it is very clear that Senator Roberts and I are not advocating 
a retreat from America's global leadership role, and are not advocating 
a new form of isolationism. We both believe our country has substantial 
and inescapable self-interests which necessitate our leadership. 
However, when it comes to the way we exercise that leadership, 
especially when it involves military force, we do believe that our 
national interests sometimes require that we use restraint. The 
alternatives--whether a unilateralism which imposes direct resource 
costs far beyond what the Congress or the American people have shown a 
willingness to finance or an isolationism which would fail to secure 
our national interests in this increasingly interconnected world--are, 
in our judgment, unacceptable.
  Over the course of these dialogues, Senator Roberts and I have both 
turned to the following words from the editor of the publication 
National Interest, Owen Harries:

       I advocate restraint because every dominant power in the 
     last four centuries that has not practiced it--that has been 
     excessively intrusive and demanding--has ultimately been 
     confronted by a hostile coalition of other powers. Americans 
     may believe that their country, being exceptional, need have 
     no worries in this respect. I do not agree. It is not what 
     Americans think of the United States but what others think of 
     it that will decide the matter.

  On his desk at the Pentagon when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Colin Powell kept a quote from the great Athenian historian 
Thucydides:

       Of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men 
     most.

  With great thanks to my distinguished colleague, Senator Roberts, and 
to the Senate, I conclude these dialogs on the global role of the 
United States. I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

     Commission on America's National Interests--Executive Summary

       This report of the Commission on America's National 
     Interests focuses on one core issue: what are U.S. national 
     interests today? The U.S. enters a new century as the world's 
     most powerful nation, but too often seems uncertain of its 
     direction. We hope to encourage serious debate about what 
     must become an essential foundation for a successful American 
     foreign policy: America's interests. We have sought to 
     identify the central questions about American interests. 
     Presuming no monopoly of wisdom, we nevertheless state our 
     own best answers to these questions as clearly and precisely 
     as we can--not abstractly or diplomatically. Clear assertions 
     that some interests are more important than others will 
     unavoidably give offense. We persist--with apologies--since 
     our aim is to catalyze debate about the most important U.S. 
     national interests. Our six principal conclusions are these:
       America advantaged.--Today the U.S. has greater power and 
     fewer adversaries than ever before in American history. 
     Relative to any potential competitor, the U.S. is more 
     powerful, more wealthy, and more influential than any nation 
     since the Roman empire. With these extraordinary advantages, 
     America today is uniquely positioned to shape the 
     international system to promote international peace and 
     prosperity for decades or even generations to come.
       America adrift.--Great power implies great responsibility. 
     But in the wake of the Cold War, the U.S. has lost focus. 
     After four decades of unprecedented single-mindedness in 
     containing Soviet Communist expansion, the United States has 
     seen a decade of ad hoc fits and starts. A defining feature 
     of American engagement in recent years has been confusion. 
     The reasons why are not difficult to identify. From 1945 to 
     1989, containment of expansionist Soviet communism provided 
     the fixed point for the compass of American engagement in the 
     world. It concentrated minds in a deadly competition with the 
     Soviet Union in every region of the world; motivated and 
     sustained the build-up of large, standing military forces and 
     nuclear arsenals with tens of thousands of weapons; and 
     precluded the development of truly global systems and the 
     possibility of cooperation to address global challenges from 
     trade to environmental degradation. In 1989 the Cold War 
     ended in a stunning, almost unimaginable victory that erased 
     this fixed point from the globe. Most of the coordinates by 
     which Americans gained their bearings in the world have now 
     been consigned to history's dustbin: the Berlin Wall, a 
     divided Germany, the Iron Curtain, captive nations of the 
     Warsaw Pact, communism on the march, and, finally, the Soviet 
     Union. Absent a compelling cause and understandable 
     coordinates, America remains a superpower adrift.
       Opportunities missed and threats emerging.--Because of the 
     absence of coherent, consistent, purposive U.S. leadership in 
     the years since the Cold War, the U.S. is missing one-time-
     only opportunities to advance American interests and values. 
     Fitful engagement actually invites the emergence of new 
     threats, from nuclear weapons-usable material unaccounted for 
     in Russia and assertive Chinese risk-taking, to the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the 
     unexpectedly rapid emergence of ballistic missile threats.
       The foundation for sustainable American foreign policy.--
     The only sound foundation for a sustainable American foreign 
     policy is a clear sense of America's national interests. Only 
     a foreign policy grounded in America's national interests can 
     identify priorities for American engagement in the world. 
     Only such a policy will allow America's leaders to explain 
     persuasively how and why American citizens should support 
     expenditures of American treasure or blood.
       The hierarchy of American national interests.--Clarity 
     about American national interests demands that the current 
     generation of American leaders think harder about

[[Page 20525]]

     international affairs than they have ever been required to 
     do. During the Cold War we had clearer, simpler answers to 
     questions about American national interests. Today we must 
     confront again the central questions: Which regions and 
     issues should Americans care about--for example, Bosnia, 
     Rwanda, Russia, Mexico, Africa, East Asia, or the Persian 
     Gulf? Which issues matter most--for example, opening markets 
     for trade, investment opportunities, weapons of mass 
     destruction (WMD), international crime and drugs, the 
     environment, or human rights? Why should Americans care? How 
     much should citizens be prepared to pay to address these 
     threats or seize these opportunities?
       The Commission has identified a hierarchy of U.S. national 
     interests: ``vital interests,'' ``extremely important 
     interests,'' ``important interests,'' and ``less important or 
     secondary interests.'' This Report states our own best 
     judgment about which specific American national interests are 
     vital, which are extremely important, and which are just 
     important. Readers will note a sharp contrast between the 
     expansive, vague assertions about vital interests in most 
     discussion today, and the Commission's sparse list. While 
     others have claimed that America has vital interests from the 
     Balkans and the Baltics to pandemics and Taiwan, the 
     Commission identifies only five vital U.S. national interests 
     today. These are (1) to prevent, deter, and reduce the threat 
     of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the 
     United States or its military forces abroad; (2) to ensure 
     U.S. allies' survival and their active cooperation with the 
     U.S. in shaping an international system in which we can 
     thrive; (3) to prevent the emergence of hostile major powers 
     or failed states on U.S. borders; (4) to ensure the viability 
     and stability of major global systems (trade, financial 
     markets, supplies of energy, and the environment); and (5) to 
     establish productive relations, consistent with American 
     national interests, with nations that could become strategic 
     adversaries, China and Russia.
       Challenges for the decade ahead.--Developments around the 
     world pose threats to U.S. interests and present 
     opportunities for advancing Americans' well-being. Because 
     the United States is so predominant in the economic, 
     technical, and military realms, many politicians and pundits 
     fall victim to a rhetoric of illusion. They imagine that as 
     the sole superpower, the U.S. can simply instruct other 
     nations to do this or stop that and expect them to do it. But 
     consider how many American presidents have come and gone 
     since President Kennedy consigned Fidel Castro to the dustbin 
     of history. Students of history will recognize a story-line 
     in which a powerful state emerges (even if accidentally), 
     engenders resentment (even when it acts benevolently), 
     succumbs to the arrogance of power, and thus provokes new 
     threats, from individual acts of terrorism to hostile 
     coalitions of states. Because America's resources are 
     limited, U.S. foreign policy must be selective in choosing 
     which issues to address seriously. The proper basis for 
     making such judgments is a lean, hierarchical conception of 
     what American national interests are and what they are not. 
     Media attention to foreign affairs reflects access to vivid, 
     compelling images on a screen, without much consideration of 
     the importance of the U.S. interest threatened. Graphic 
     international problems like Bosnia or Kosovo make consuming 
     claims on American foreign policy to the neglect of issues of 
     greater importance, like the rise of Chinese power, the 
     unprecedented risks of nuclear proliferation, the opportunity 
     to increase the openness of the international trading and 
     financial systems, or the future of Mexico.
       Based on its assessment of specific threats to and 
     opportunities for U.S. national interests in the final years 
     of the century, the Commission has identified six cardinal 
     challenges for the next U.S. president:
       Strengthen strategic partnerships with Japan and the 
     European allies despite the absence of an overwhelming, 
     immediate threat;
       Facilitate China's entry onto the world stage without 
     disruption;
       Prevent loss of control of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
     weapons-usable materials, and contain the proliferation of 
     biological and chemical weapons;
       Prevent Russia's reversion to authoritarianism or 
     disintegration into chaos;
       Maintain the United States' singular leadership, military, 
     and intelligence capabilities, and its international 
     credibility; and
       Marshal unprecedented economic, technological, military, 
     and political advantages to shape a twenty-first century 
     global system that promotes freedom, peace, and prosperity 
     for Americans, our allies, and the world.
       For each of these challenges, and others, our stated 
     hierarchy of U.S. national interests provides coordinates by 
     which to navigate the uncertain, fast-changing international 
     terrain in the decade ahead.


                   summary of u.s. national interests

     Vital
       Vital national interests are conditions that are strictly 
     necessary to safeguard and enhance Americans' survival and 
     well-being in a free and secure nation.
       Vital U.S. national interests are to:
       1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, 
     biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States 
     or its military forces abroad;
       2. Ensure U.S. allies' survival and their active 
     cooperation with the U.S. in shaping an international system 
     in which we can thrive;
       3. Prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed 
     states on U.S. borders;
       4. Ensure the viability and stability of major global 
     systems (trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and 
     the environment); and
       5. Establish productive relations, consistent with American 
     national interests, with nations that could become strategic 
     adversaries, China and Russia.
       Instrumentally, these vital interests will be enhanced and 
     protected by promoting singular U.S. leadership, military and 
     intelligence capabilities, credibility (including a 
     reputation for adherence to clear U.S. commitments and even-
     handedness in dealing with other states), and strengthening 
     critical international institutions--particularly the U.S. 
     alliance system around the world.
     Extremely Important
       Extremely important national interests are conditions that, 
     if compromised, would severely prejudice but not strictly 
     imperil the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and 
     enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure 
     nation.
       Extremely important U.S. national interests are to:
       1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of the use of 
     nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons anywhere;
       2. Prevent the regional proliferation of WMD and delivery 
     systems;
       3. Promote the acceptance of international rules of law and 
     mechanisms for resolving or managing disputes peacefully;
       4. Prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon in important 
     regions, especially the Persian Gulf;
       5. Promote the well-being of U.S. allies and friends and 
     protect them from external aggression;
       6. Promote democracy, prosperity, and stability in the 
     Western Hemisphere;
       7. Prevent, manage, and, if possible at reasonable cost, 
     end major conflicts in important geographic regions;
       8. Maintain a lead in key military-related and other 
     strategic technologies, particularly information systems;
       9. Prevent massive, uncontrolled immigration across U.S. 
     borders;
       10. Suppress terrorism (especially state-sponsored 
     terrorism), transnational crime, and drug trafficking; and
       11. Prevent genocide.
     Important
       Important national interests are conditions that, if 
     compromised, would have major negative consequences for the 
     ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and enhance the 
     well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.
       Important U.S. national interests are to:
       1. Discourage massive human rights violations in foreign 
     countries;
       2. Promote pluralism, freedom, and democracy in 
     strategically important states as much as is feasible without 
     destabilization;
       3. Prevent and, if possible at low cost, end conflicts in 
     strategically less significant geographic regions;
       4. Protect the lives and well-being of American citizens 
     who are targeted or taken hostage by terrorist organizations;
       5. Reduce the economic gap between rich and poor nations;
       6. Prevent the nationalization of U.S.-owned assets abroad;
       7. Boost the domestic output of key strategic industries 
     and sectors;
       8. Maintain an edge in the international distribution of 
     information to ensure that American values continue to 
     positively influence the cultures of foreign nations;
       9. Promote international environmental policies consistent 
     with long-term ecological requirements; and
       10. Maximize U.S.-GNP growth from international trade and 
     investment.
       Instrumentally, the important U.S. national interests are 
     to maintain a strong UN and other regional and functional 
     cooperative mechanisms.
     Less Important or Secondary
       Less important or secondary national interests are not 
     unimportant. They are important and desirable conditions, but 
     ones that have little direct impact on the ability of the 
     U.S. government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of 
     Americans in a free and secure nation.
       Less important or secondary U.S. national interests 
     include:
       1. Balancing bilateral trade deficits;
       2. Enlarging democracy everywhere for its own sake;
       3. Preserving the territorial integrity or particular 
     political constitution of other states everywhere; and
       4. Enhancing exports of specific economic sectors.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Alabama is 
recognized.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I have been fascinated and informed by 
the

[[Page 20526]]

colloquy that has been ongoing between the Senator from Kansas and the 
Senator from Georgia. I have been honored to serve on the Armed 
Services Committee with the two of them. I know they take these issues 
seriously, and it is, indeed, appropriate we begin to think through 
clearly what the role of the United States is and what the role of 
Congress is in establishing U.S. policy.
  I thank them for those observations. They are very valuable. I agree 
with them that we need to involve the American people in this. The 
great American experiment that has guided us so far has allowed the 
people to rule. We do not need to do it under the table without full 
and open debate.
  I strongly believe we must not as a nation abdicate our ability to 
act unilaterally when our national interest is at stake, or else why 
have we invested so greatly to establish this magnificent military? We 
cannot rely on a majority vote of the U.N. We cannot rely on the fact 
that we may override or avoid a veto in the Security Council. We have 
to be prepared to take care of our own interests. I thank my colleagues 
for the dialog.

                          ____________________