[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 20232-20252]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 654, S. 2507.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2507) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government, the Community 
     Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill 
which had been reported from the Select Committee on Intelligence with 
amendments to omit the parts in black brackets and insert the parts 
printed in italic.

                                S. 2507

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Prohibition on unauthorized disclosure of classified 
              information.
Sec. 304. POW/MIA analytic capability within the intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 305. Applicability to lawful United States intelligence activities 
              of Federal laws implementing international treaties and 
              agreements.
Sec. 306. Limitation on handling, retention, and storage of certain 
              classified materials by the Department of State.
Sec. 307. Clarification of standing of United States citizens to 
              challenge certain blocking of assets.
Sec. 308. Availability of certain funds for administrative costs of 
              Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Expansion of Inspector General actions requiring a report to 
              Congress.
Sec. 402. Subpoena authority of the Inspector General.
Sec. 403. Improvement and extension of central services program.
Sec. 404. Details of employees to the National Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 405. Transfers of funds to other agencies for acquisition of land.
Sec. 406. Eligibility of additional employees for reimbursement for 
              professional liability insurance.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

[Sec. 501. Two-year extension of authority to engage in commercial 
              activities as security for intelligence collection 
              activities.
[Sec. 502. Nuclear test monitoring equipment.
[Sec. 503. Experimental personnel management program for technical 
              personnel for certain elements of the intelligence 
              community.]
Sec. 501. Prohibition on transfer of imagery analysts from General 
              Defense Intelligence Program to National Imagery and 
              Mapping Agency Program.
Sec. 502. Prohibition on transfer of collection management personnel 
              from General Defense Intelligence Program to Community 
              Management Account.
Sec. 503. Authorized personnel ceiling for General Defense Intelligence 
              Program.
Sec. 504. Measurement and signature intelligence.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001.--
     Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2001 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (6) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
       (7) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations for Certain Elements 
     for Fiscal Years 2002 Through 2005.--Funds are hereby 
     authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2002 
     through 2005 for the conduct in each such fiscal year of the 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
     following elements of the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The National Security Agency.
       (4) The National Reconnaissance Office.

      SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2001, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill ____ 
     of the One Hundred Sixth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the Executive Branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     2001 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority 
     granted by this section.

     SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated for 
     the Community Management Account of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence for fiscal year 2001 the sum of $232,051,000.
       (2) Availability for advanced research and development 
     committee.--Within the amount authorized to be appropriated 
     in paragraph (1), amounts identified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to

[[Page 20233]]

     in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development 
     Committee shall remain available until September 30, 2002.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Community Management Account of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence are authorized a total of 618 full-time 
     personnel as of September 30, 2001. Personnel serving in such 
     elements may be permanent employees of the Community 
     Management Account element or personnel detailed from other 
     elements of the United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community 
     Management Account by subsection (a), there is also 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2001 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a).
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Community Management Account as of September 30, 2001, there 
     is hereby authorized such additional personnel for such 
     elements as of that date as is specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations.
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during 
     fiscal year 2001, any officer or employee of the United 
     States or member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the 
     staff of an element within the Community Management Account 
     from another element of the United States Government shall be 
     detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such 
     officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a 
     nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for 
     the performance of temporary functions as required by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated in subsection (a), $27,000,000 shall be 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within 
     such amount, funds provided for research, development, test, 
     and evaluation purposes shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2002, and funds provided for procurement 
     purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003.
       (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the 
     United States funds available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General 
     shall utilize funds so transferred for activities of the 
     National Drug Intelligence Center.
       (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the 
     provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
       (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
     operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2001 the sum of $216,000,000.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. PROHIBITION ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF 
                   CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 37 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) by redesignating section 798A as section 798B; and
       (2) by inserting after section 798 the following new 
     section 798A:

     ``Sec. 798A. Unauthorized disclosure of classified 
       information

       ``(a) Prohibition.--Whoever, being an officer or employee 
     of the United States, a former or retired officer or employee 
     of the United States, any other person with authorized access 
     to classified information, or any other person formerly with 
     authorized access to classified information, knowingly and 
     willfully discloses, or attempts to disclose, any classified 
     information to a person who is not both an officer or 
     employee of the United States and who is not authorized 
     access to the classified information shall be fined not more 
     than $10,000, imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both.
       ``(b) Construction of Prohibition.--Nothing in this section 
     shall be construed to establish criminal liability for 
     disclosure of classified information in accordance with 
     applicable law to the following:
       ``(1) Any justice or judge of a court of the United States 
     established pursuant to article III of the Constitution of 
     the United States.
       ``(2) The Senate or House of Representatives, or any 
     committee or subcommittee thereof, or joint committee 
     thereof, or any member of Congress.
       ``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `authorized', in the case of access to 
     classified information, means having authority or permission 
     to have access to the classified information pursuant to the 
     provisions of a statute, Executive Order, regulation, or 
     directive of the head of any department or agency who is 
     empowered to classify information, an order of any United 
     States court, or a provision of any Resolution of the Senate 
     or Rule of the House of Representatives which governs release 
     of classified information by the such House of Congress.
       ``(2) The term `classified information' means information 
     or material designated and clearly marked or represented, or 
     that the person knows or has reason to believe has been 
     determined by appropriate authorities, pursuant to the 
     provisions of a statute or Executive Order, as requiring 
     protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of 
     national security.
       ``(3) The term `officer or employee of the United States' 
     means the following:
       ``(A) An officer or employee (as those terms are defined in 
     sections 2104 and 2105 of title 5).
       ``(B) An officer or enlisted member of the Armed Forces (as 
     those terms are defined in section 101(b) of title 10).''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of that chapter is amended by striking the item 
     relating to section 798A and inserting the following new 
     items:

``798A. Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
``798B. Temporary extension of section 794.''.

     SEC. 304. POW/MIA ANALYTIC CAPABILITY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:


                     ``pow/mia analytic capability

       ``Sec. 115. (a) Requirement.--(1) The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Defense, establish and maintain in the intelligence community 
     an analytic capability with responsibility for intelligence 
     in support of the activities of the United States relating to 
     prisoners of war and missing persons (as that term is defined 
     in section 1513(1) of title 10, United States Code).
       ``(2) The analytic capability maintained under paragraph 
     (1) shall be known as the `POW/MIA analytic capability of the 
     intelligence community'.
       ``(b) Scope of Responsibility.--The responsibilities of the 
     analytic capability maintained under subsection (a) shall--
       ``(1) extend to any activities of the Federal Government 
     with respect to prisoners of war and missing persons after 
     December 31, 1990; and
       ``(2) include support for any department or agency of the 
     Federal Government engaged in such activities.''.

     SEC. 305. APPLICABILITY TO LAWFUL UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE 
                   ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL LAWS IMPLEMENTING 
                   INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS.

       The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:

                        ``TITLE X--MISCELLANEOUS


  ``applicability to united states intelligence activities of federal 
        laws implementing international treaties and agreements

       ``Sec. 1001. (a) In General.--No Federal law enacted on or 
     after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 that implements a 
     treaty or other international agreement shall be construed as 
     making unlawful an otherwise lawful and authorized 
     intelligence activity of the United States Government or its 
     employees, or any other person acting at their direction to 
     the extent such other person is carrying out such activity on 
     behalf of the United States, unless such Federal law 
     specifically addresses such intelligence activity.
       ``(b) Authorized Activities.--An activity shall be treated 
     as authorized for purposes of subsection (a) if the activity 
     is authorized by an appropriate official of the United States 
     Government, acting within the scope of the official duties of 
     that official and in compliance with Federal law and any 
     applicable Presidential directive.''.

     SEC. 306. LIMITATION ON HANDLING, RETENTION, AND STORAGE OF 
                   CERTAIN CLASSIFIED MATERIALS BY THE DEPARTMENT 
                   OF STATE.

       (a) Certification Regarding Full Compliance With 
     Requirements.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall 
     certify to the appropriate committees of Congress whether or

[[Page 20234]]

     not each covered element of the Department of State is in 
     full compliance with all applicable directives of the 
     Director of Central Intelligence, and all applicable 
     Executive Orders, relating to the handling, retention, or 
     storage of covered classified materials.
       (b) Limitation on Certification.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence may not certify a covered element of the 
     Department of State as being in full compliance with the 
     directives and Executive Orders referred to in subsection (a) 
     if the covered element is currently subject to a waiver of 
     compliance with respect to any such directive or Executive 
     Order.
       (c) Report on Noncompliance.--Whenever the Director of 
     Central Intelligence determines that a covered element of the 
     Department of State is not in full compliance with any 
     directive or Executive Order referred to in subsection (a), 
     the Director shall promptly notify the appropriate committees 
     of Congress of such determination.
       (d) Effects of Certification of Non-Full Compliance.--
     (1)(A) Effective as of January 1, 2001, no funds authorized 
     to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended 
     by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department 
     of State unless the Director of Central Intelligence has 
     certified under subsection (a) as of such date that each 
     covered element of the Department of State is in full 
     compliance with the directives and Executive Orders referred 
     to in subsection (a).
       (B) If the prohibition in subparagraph (A) takes effect in 
     accordance with that subparagraph, the prohibition shall 
     remain in effect until the date on which the Director 
     certifies under subsection (a) that each covered element of 
     the Department of State is in full compliance with the 
     directives and Executive Orders referred to in that 
     subsection.
       (2)(A) Subject to subsection (e), effective as of January 
     1, 2001, a covered element of the Department of State may not 
     retain or store covered classified information unless the 
     Director has certified under subsection (a) as of such date 
     that the covered element is in full compliance with the 
     directives and Executive Orders referred to in subsection 
     (a).
       (B) If the prohibition in subparagraph (A) takes effect in 
     accordance with that subparagraph, the prohibition shall 
     remain in effect until the date on which the Director 
     certifies under subsection (a) that the covered element 
     involved is in full compliance with the directives and 
     Executive Orders referred to in that subsection.
       (e) Presidential Waiver.--(1) The President may waive the 
     applicability of the prohibition in subsection (d)(2) to an 
     element of the Department of State otherwise covered by such 
     prohibition if the President determines that the waiver is in 
     the national security interests of the United States.
       (2) The President shall submit to appropriate committees of 
     Congress a report on each exercise of the waiver authority in 
     paragraph (1).
       (3) Each report under paragraph (2) with respect to the 
     exercise of authority under paragraph (1) shall set forth the 
     following:
       (A) The covered element of the Department of State 
     addressed by the waiver.
       (B) The reasons for the waiver.
       (C) The actions taken by the President to protect any 
     covered classified material to be handled, retained, or 
     stored by such element.
       (f) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means 
     the following:
       (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
       (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) The term ``covered classified material'' means any 
     material classified at the Sensitive Compartmented 
     Information (SCI) level.
       (3) The term ``covered element of the Department of State'' 
     means each element of the Department of State that handles, 
     retains, or stores covered classified material.
       (4) The term ``material'' means any data, regardless of 
     physical form or characteristic, including written or printed 
     matter, automated information systems storage media, maps, 
     charts, paintings, drawings, films, photographs, engravings, 
     sketches, working notes, papers, reproductions of any such 
     things by any means or process, and sound, voice, magnetic, 
     or electronic recordings.
       (5) The term ``Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) 
     level'', in the case of classified material, means a level of 
     classification for information in such material concerning or 
     derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical 
     processes that requires such information to be handled within 
     formal access control systems established by the Director of 
     Central Intelligence.

     SEC. 307. CLARIFICATION OF STANDING OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS 
                   TO CHALLENGE CERTAIN BLOCKING OF ASSETS.

       The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (title VIII 
     of Public Law 106-120; 113 Stat. 1626; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et 
     seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 811. STANDING OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS TO CHALLENGE 
                   BLOCKING OF ASSETS.

       ``No provision of this title shall be construed to prohibit 
     a United States citizen from raising any challenge otherwise 
     available to the United States citizen under subchapter II of 
     chapter 5 and chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code 
     (commonly referred to as the Administrative Procedure Act), 
     or any other provision of law, with respect to the blocking 
     of assets by the United States under this title.''.

     SEC. 308. AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN FUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
                   COSTS OF COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE 
                   SECRETARIAT.

       Notwithstanding section 1346 of title 31, United States 
     Code, or section 610 of the Treasury and General Government 
     Appropriations Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-58; 113 Stat. 467), 
     funds made available for fiscal year 2000 for any department 
     or agency of the Federal Government with authority to conduct 
     counterdrug intelligence activities, including counterdrug 
     law enforcement information-gathering activities, may be 
     available to finance an appropriate share of the 
     administrative costs incurred by the Department of Justice 
     for the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat 
     authorized by the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan of 
     February 12, 2000.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. EXPANSION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIONS REQUIRING A 
                   REPORT TO CONGRESS.

       Section 17(d)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)) is amended by striking all that 
     follows after subparagraph (A) and inserting the following:
       ``(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by 
     the Inspector General should focus on any current or former 
     Agency official who--
       ``(i) holds or held a position in the Agency that is 
     subject to appointment by the President, by and with the 
     advise and consent of the Senate, including such a position 
     held on an acting basis; or
       ``(ii) holds or held the position in the Agency, including 
     such a position held on an acting basis, of--
       ``(I) Executive Director;
       ``(II) Deputy Director for Operations;
       ``(III) Deputy Director for Intelligence;
       ``(IV) Deputy Director for Administration; or
       ``(V) Deputy Director for Science and Technology;
       ``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General 
     to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by 
     a current or former Agency official described or referred to 
     in subparagraph (B);
       ``(D) the Inspector General becomes aware of the possible 
     criminal conduct of a current or former Agency official 
     described or referred to in subparagraph (B) through a means 
     other than an investigation, inspection, or audit and such 
     conduct is not referred to the Department of Justice; or
       ``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible 
     alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary 
     information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or 
     audit,

     the Inspector General shall immediately submit a report on 
     such matter to the intelligence committees.''.

     SEC. 402. SUBPOENA AUTHORITY OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.

       (a) Clarification Regarding Reports on Exercise of 
     Authority.--Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
     of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (d)(1), by striking subparagraph (E) and 
     inserting the following new subparagraph (E):
       ``(E) a description of the exercise of the subpoena 
     authority under subsection (e)(5) by the Inspector General 
     during the reporting period; and''; and
       (2) in subsection (e)(5), by striking subparagraph (E).
       (b) Scope of Authority.--Subsection (e)(5)(B) of that 
     section is amended by striking ``Government'' and inserting 
     ``Federal''.

     SEC. 403. IMPROVEMENT AND EXTENSION OF CENTRAL SERVICES 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Deposits in Central Services Working Capital Fund.--
     Subsection (c)(2) of section 21 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (H); 
     and
       (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new 
     subparagraphs:
       ``(F) Receipts from individuals in reimbursement for 
     utility services and meals provided under the program.
       ``(G) Receipts from individuals for the rental of property 
     and equipment under the program.''.
       (b) Clarification of Costs Recoverable Under Program.--
     Subsection (e)(1) of that section is amended in the second 
     sentence by inserting ``other than structures owned by the 
     Agency'' after ``depreciation of plant and equipment''.
       (c) Financial Statements of Program.--Subsection (g)(2) of 
     that section is amended in the first sentence by striking 
     ``annual audits under paragraph (1)'' and inserting the 
     following: ``financial statements to be prepared with respect 
     to the program. Office of Management and Budget guidance 
     shall also

[[Page 20235]]

     determine the procedures for conducting annual audits under 
     paragraph (1).''.
       (d) Extension of Program.--Subsection (h)(1) of that 
     section is amended by striking ``March 31, 2002'' and 
     inserting ``March 31, 2005''.

     SEC. 404. DETAILS OF EMPLOYEES TO THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 
                   OFFICE.

       The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:


                         ``details of employees

       ``Sec. 22. The Director may--
       ``(1) detail any personnel of the Agency on a reimbursable 
     basis indefinitely to the National Reconnaissance Office 
     without regard to any limitation under law on the duration of 
     details of Federal government personnel; and
       ``(2) hire personnel for the purpose of details under 
     paragraph (1).''.

     SEC. 405. TRANSFERS OF FUNDS TO OTHER AGENCIES FOR 
                   ACQUISITION OF LAND.

       (a) In General.--Section 8 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403j) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new subsection:
       ``(c) Transfers for Acquisition of Land.--(1) Sums 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to the Agency for 
     the acquisition of land that are transferred to another 
     department or agency for that purpose shall remain available 
     for 3 years.
       ``(2) The Director shall submit to the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives an annual 
     report on the transfers of sums described in paragraph 
     (1).''.
       (b) Conforming Stylistic Amendments.--That section is 
     further amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``In General.--'' after 
     ``(a)''; and
       (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``Scope of Authority 
     For Expenditure.--'' after ``(b)''.
       (c) Applicability.--Subsection (c) of section 8 of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as added by 
     subsection (a) of this section, shall apply with respect to 
     amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the 
     Central Intelligence Agency for fiscal years after fiscal 
     year 2000.

     SEC. 406. ELIGIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES FOR 
                   REIMBURSEMENT FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 
                   INSURANCE.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any provision of section 
     363 of the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government 
     Appropriations Act, 1997 (5 U.S.C. prec. 5941 note), the 
     Director of Central Intelligence may--
       (1) designate as qualified employees within the meaning of 
     subsection (b) of that section appropriate categories of 
     employees not otherwise covered by that subsection; and
       (2) use appropriated funds available to the Director to 
     reimburse employees within categories so designated for one-
     half of the costs incurred by such employees for professional 
     liability insurance in accordance with subsection (a) of that 
     section.
       (b) Reports.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall 
     submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
     and the Permanent Select Committee of Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives a report on each designation of a 
     category of employees under paragraph (1) of subsection (a), 
     including the approximate number of employees covered by such 
     designation and an estimate of the amount to be expended on 
     reimbursement of such employees under paragraph (2) of that 
     subsection.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     [SEC. 501. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN 
                   COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR 
                   INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.

       [Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended 
     in the second sentence by striking ``December 31, 2000'' and 
     inserting ``December 31, 2002''.

     [SEC. 502. NUCLEAR TEST MONITORING EQUIPMENT.

       [(a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 138 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     [``Sec. 2350l. Nuclear test monitoring equipment

       [``(a) Authority To Convey or Provide.--Subject to 
     subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense may, for purposes of 
     satisfying nuclear test explosion monitoring requirements 
     applicable to the United States--
       [``(1) convey or otherwise provide to a foreign government 
     monitoring and associated equipment for nuclear test 
     explosion monitoring purposes; and
       [``(2) install such equipment on foreign territory or in 
     international waters as part of such conveyance or provision.
       [``(b) Agreement Required.--Nuclear test explosion 
     monitoring equipment may be conveyed or otherwise provided 
     under the authority in subsection (a) only pursuant to the 
     terms of an agreement in which the foreign government 
     receiving such equipment agrees as follows:
       [``(1) To provide the Secretary of Defense timely access to 
     the data produced, collected, or generated by such equipment.
       [``(2) To permit the Secretary of Defense to take such 
     measures as the Secretary considers necessary to inspect, 
     test, maintain, repair, or replace such equipment, including 
     access for purposes of such measures.
       [``(c) Delegation of Responsibilities.--(1) The Secretary 
     of Defense may delegate any or all of the responsibilities of 
     that Secretary under subsection (b) to the Secretary of the 
     Air Force.
       [``(2) The Secretary of the Air Force may delegate any or 
     all of the responsibilities delegated to that Secretary under 
     paragraph (1).''.
       [(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of subchapter II of such chapter is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 2350k the 
     following new item:

[``2350l. Nuclear test monitoring equipment.''.

     [SEC. 503. EXPERIMENTAL PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR 
                   TECHNICAL PERSONNEL FOR CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       [(a) Program Authorized.--During the 5-year period 
     beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence may carry out a program of 
     experimental use of the special personnel management 
     authority provided in subsection (b) in order to facilitate 
     recruitment of eminent experts in science or engineering for 
     research and development projects administered by the 
     elements of the intelligence community specified in 
     subsection (c).
       [(b) Special Personnel Management Authority.--Under the 
     program, the Director of Central Intelligence may--
       [(1) within the limitations specified in subsection (c), 
     appoint scientists and engineers from outside the civil 
     service and uniformed services (as such terms are defined in 
     section 2101 of title 5, United States Code) to not more than 
     39 scientific and engineering positions in the elements of 
     the intelligence community specified in that subsection 
     without regard to any provision of title 5, United States 
     Code, governing the appointment of employees in the civil 
     service;
       [(2) prescribe the rates of basic pay for positions to 
     which employees are appointed under paragraph (1) at rates 
     not in excess of the maximum rate of basic pay authorized for 
     senior-level positions under section 5376 of title 5, United 
     States Code, notwithstanding any provision of such title 
     governing the rates of pay or classification of employees in 
     the executive branch; and
       [(3) pay any employee appointed under paragraph (1) 
     payments in addition to basic pay within the limit applicable 
     to the employee under subsection (e)(1).
       [(c) Specified Elements and Limitations.--The elements of 
     the intelligence community in which individuals may be 
     appointed under the program, and the maximum number of 
     positions for which individuals may be appointed in each such 
     element, are as follows:
       [(1) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), 15 
     positions.
       [(2) The National Security Agency (NSA), 12 positions.
       [(3) The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 6 positions.
       [(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 6 positions.
       [(d) Limitation on Term of Appointment.--(1) Except as 
     provided in paragraph (2), the service of an employee under 
     an appointment under subsection (b)(1) may not exceed 4 
     years.
       [(2) The Director of Central Intelligence may, in the case 
     of a particular employee, extend the period to which service 
     is limited under paragraph (1) by up to 2 years if the 
     Director determines that such action is necessary to promote 
     the efficiency of the element of the intelligence community 
     concerned.
       [(e) Limitations on Additional Payments.--(1) The total 
     amount of the additional payments paid to an employee under 
     subsection (b)(3) for any 12-month period may not exceed the 
     least of the following amounts:
       [(A) $25,000.
       [(B) The amount equal to 25 percent of the employee's 
     annual rate of basic pay.
       [(C) The amount of the limitation that is applicable for a 
     calendar year under section 5307(a)(1) of title 5, United 
     States Code.
       [(2) An employee appointed under subsection (b)(1) is not 
     eligible for any bonus, monetary award, or other monetary 
     incentive for service except for payments authorized under 
     subsection (b)(3).
       [(f) Period of Program.--(1) The program authorized under 
     this section shall terminate at the end of the 5-year period 
     referred to in subsection (a).
       [(2) After the termination of the program--
       [(A) no appointment may be made under paragraph (1) of 
     subsection (b);
       [(B) a rate of basic pay prescribed under paragraph (2) of 
     that subsection may not take effect for a position; and
       [(C) no period of service may be extended under subsection 
     (d)(2).
       [(g) Savings Provisions.--In the case of an employee who, 
     on the day before the termination of the program, is serving 
     in a position pursuant to an appointment under subsection 
     (b)(1)--
       [(1) the termination of the program does not terminate the 
     employee's employment in that position before the expiration 
     of the lesser of--

[[Page 20236]]

       [(A) the period for which the employee was appointed; or
       [(B) the period to which the employee's service is limited 
     under subsection (d), including any extension made under 
     paragraph (2) of that subsection before the termination of 
     the program; and
       [(2) the rate of basic pay prescribed for the position 
     under subsection (b)(2) may not be reduced for so long 
     (within the period applicable to the employee under paragraph 
     (1)) as the employee continues to serve in the position 
     without a break in service.
       [(h) Annual Report.--(1) Not later than October 15 of each 
     year, beginning in 2001 and ending in the year in which the 
     service of employees under the program concludes (including 
     service, if any, that concludes under subsection (g)), the 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall submit a report on the 
     program to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       [(2) The report submitted in a year shall cover the 12-
     month period ending on the day before the anniversary, in 
     that year, of the date of the enactment of this Act.
       [(3) The annual report shall contain, for the period 
     covered by the report, the following:
       [(A) A detailed discussion of the exercise of authority 
     under this section.
       [(B) The sources from which individuals appointed under 
     subsection (b)(1) were recruited.
       [(C) The methodology used for identifying and selecting 
     such individuals.
       [(D) Any additional information that the Director considers 
     helpful for assessing the utility of the authority under this 
     section.]

     SEC. 501. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF IMAGERY ANALYSTS FROM 
                   GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM TO 
                   NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY PROGRAM.

       (a) Prohibition on Use of Funds For Transfer.--No funds 
     authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be transferred 
     from the General Defense Intelligence Program to the National 
     Imagery and Mapping Agency Program for purposes of 
     transferring imagery analysis personnel from the General 
     Defense Intelligence Program to the National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency Program.
       (b) Role of Director of NIMA as Functional Manager for 
     Imagery and Geospacial Programs.--(1) The Secretary of 
     Defense shall, in consultation with the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, review options for strengthening the role of 
     the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as 
     the functional manager for United States imagery and 
     geospacial programs.
       (2) Not later than March 15, 2001, the Secretary shall 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on 
     the review required by subsection (b). The report shall 
     include any recommendations regarding modifications in the 
     role and duties of the Director of the National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency that the Secretary considers appropriate in 
     light of the review.
       (3) In this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees 
     of Congress'' means the following:
       (A) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (B) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 502. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF COLLECTION MANAGEMENT 
                   PERSONNEL FROM GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE 
                   PROGRAM TO COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be 
     transferred from the General Defense Intelligence Program to 
     the Community Management Account for purposes of transferring 
     intelligence collection management personnel.

     SEC. 503. AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL CEILING FOR GENERAL DEFENSE 
                   INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       The authorized personnel ceiling for the General Defense 
     Intelligence Program specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102 is hereby increased 
     by 2,152 positions.

     SEC. 504. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Study of Options.--The Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, conduct 
     a study of the utility and feasibility of various options for 
     improving the management and organization of measurement and 
     signature intelligence, including the option of establishing 
     a centralized tasking, processing, exploitation, and 
     dissemination facility for measurement and signature 
     intelligence.
       (b) Report.--Not later than April 1, 2001, the Director and 
     the Secretary shall jointly submit to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress a report on their findings as a result 
     of the study required by subsection (a). The report shall set 
     forth any recommendations that the Director and the Secretary 
     consider appropriate.
       (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means the following:
       (1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee 
amendments be agreed to.
  The committee amendments were agreed to.


               Amendments Nos. 4280 through 4285, En Bloc

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed en bloc to the following amendments which are at the desk: 
Warner amendment No. 4280, Specter amendment No. 4281, Feinstein 
amendment No. 4282, Moynihan amendment No. 4283, Kerrey amendment No. 
4284, and the Shelby-Bryan amendment No. 4285. I further ask unanimous 
consent that the amendments be agreed to and the motions to reconsider 
be laid upon the table en bloc.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments (Nos. 4280 through 4285) were agreed to, en bloc, as 
follows:


                           amendment no. 4280

 (Purpose: To modify the provisions relating to Department of Defense 
                        intelligence activities)

         On page 27, strike line 3 and all that follows through 
     page 37, line 3, and insert the following:

     TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 501. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN 
                   COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR 
                   INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.

       Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended 
     in the second sentence by striking ``December 31, 2000'' and 
     inserting ``December 31, 2002''.

     SEC. 502. ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN 
                   EXPERIMENTAL PERSONNEL PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN 
                   SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL.

       If the Director of Central Intelligence requests that the 
     Secretary of Defense exercise any authority available to the 
     Secretary under section 1101(b) of the Strom Thurmond 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 
     (Public Law 105-261; 5 U.S.C. 3104 note) to carry out a 
     program of special personnel management authority at the 
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the National Security 
     Agency in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent experts 
     in science and engineering at such agencies, the Secretary 
     shall respond to such request not later than 30 days after 
     the date of such request.

     SEC. 503. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF IMAGERY ANALYSTS FROM 
                   GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM TO 
                   NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY PROGRAM.

       (a) Prohibition on Use of Funds For Transfer.--No funds 
     authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be transferred 
     from the General Defense Intelligence Program to the National 
     Imagery and Mapping Agency Program for purposes of 
     transferring imagery analysis personnel from the General 
     Defense Intelligence Program to the National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency Program.
       (b) Role of Director of NIMA as Functional Manager for 
     Imagery and Geospacial Programs.--(1) The Secretary of 
     Defense shall, in consultation with the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, review options for strengthening the role of 
     the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as 
     the functional manager for United States imagery and 
     geospacial programs.
       (2) Not later than March 15, 2001, the Secretary shall 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on 
     the review required by subsection (b). The report shall 
     include any recommendations regarding modifications in the 
     role and duties of the Director of the National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency that the Secretary considers appropriate in 
     light of the review.
       (3) In this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees 
     of Congress'' means the following:
       (A) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (B) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 504. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF COLLECTION MANAGEMENT 
                   PERSONNEL FROM GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE 
                   PROGRAM TO COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be 
     transferred from the General Defense Intelligence Program to 
     the Community Management Account for purposes of transferring 
     intelligence collection management personnel.

     SEC. 505. AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL CEILING FOR GENERAL DEFENSE 
                   INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       The authorized personnel ceiling for the General Defense 
     Intelligence Program specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102 is hereby increased 
     by 2,152 positions.

     SEC. 506. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Study of Options.--The Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall, in coordination

[[Page 20237]]

     with the Secretary of Defense, conduct a study of the utility 
     and feasibility of various options for improving the 
     management and organization of measurement and signature 
     intelligence, including--
       (1) the option of establishing a centralized tasking, 
     processing, exploitation, and dissemination facility for 
     measurement and signature intelligence;
       (2) options for recapitalizing and reconfiguring the 
     current systems for measurement and signature intelligence; 
     and
       (3) the operation and maintenance costs of the various 
     options.
       (b) Report.--Not later than April 1, 2001, the Director and 
     the Secretary shall jointly submit to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress a report on their findings as a result 
     of the study required by subsection (a). The report shall set 
     forth any recommendations that the Director and the Secretary 
     consider appropriate.
       (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means the following:
       (1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.
                                  ____



                           Amendment No. 4281

     (Purpose: To modify procedures under the Foreign Intelligence 
   Surveillance Act of 1978 relating to orders for surveillance and 
              searches for foreign intelligence purposes.)

  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under 
``Amendments Submitted.'')


                           amendment no. 4282

 (Purpose: To require disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 
regarding certain persons and records of the Japanese Imperial Army in 
    a manner that does not impair any investigation or prosecution 
conducted by the Department of Justice or certain intelligence matters)

       On page 37, after line 3, add the following:

     TITLE VI--DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON JAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY

     SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Japanese Imperial Army 
     Disclosure Act''.

     SEC. 602. ESTABLISHMENT OF JAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY RECORDS 
                   INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given such 
     term under section 551 of title 5, United States Code.
       (2) Interagency group.--The term ``Interagency Group'' 
     means the Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency Working 
     Group established under subsection (b).
       (3) Japanese imperial army records.--The term ``Japanese 
     Imperial Army records'' means classified records or portions 
     of records that pertain to any person with respect to whom 
     the United States Government, in its sole discretion, has 
     grounds to believe ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise 
     participated in the experimentation and persecution of any 
     person because of race, religion, national origin, or 
     political option, during the period beginning September 18, 
     1931, and ending on December 31, 1948, under the direction 
     of, or in association with--
       (A) the Japanese Imperial Army;
       (B) any government in any area occupied by the military 
     forces of the Japanese Imperial Army;
       (C) any government established with the assistance or 
     cooperation of the Japanese Imperial Army; or
       (D) any government which was an ally of the Imperial Army 
     of Japan.
       (4) Record.--The term ``record'' means a Japanese Imperial 
     Army record.
       (b) Establishment of Interagency Group.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish the 
     Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency Working Group, 
     which shall remain in existence for 3 years after the date 
     the Interagency Group is established.
       (2) Membership.--The President shall appoint to the 
     Interagency Group individuals whom the President determines 
     will most completely and effectively carry out the functions 
     of the Interagency Group within the time limitations provided 
     in this section, including the Historian of the Department of 
     State, the Archivist of the United States, the head of any 
     other agency the President considers appropriate, and no more 
     than 3 other persons. The head of an agency appointed by the 
     President may designate an appropriate officer to serve on 
     the Interagency Group in lieu of the head of such agency.
       (3) Initial meeting.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Interagency Group shall 
     hold an initial meeting and begin the functions required 
     under this section.
       (c) Functions.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Interagency Group shall, to the 
     greatest extent possible consistent with section 603--
       (1) locate, identify, inventory, recommend for 
     declassification, and make available to the public at the 
     National Archives and Records Administration, all classified 
     Japanese Imperial Army records of the United States;
       (2) coordinate with agencies and take such actions as 
     necessary to expedite the release of such records to the 
     public; and
       (3) submit a report to Congress, including the Committee on 
     Government Reform and Oversight of the House of 
     Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the Senate, describing all such records, the disposition 
     of such records, and the activities of the Interagency Group 
     and agencies under this section.
       (d) Funding.--There is authorized to be appropriated such 
     sum as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this 
     title.

     SEC. 603. REQUIREMENT OF DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS.

       (a) Release of Records.--Subject to subsections (b), (c), 
     and (d), the Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency 
     Working Group shall release in their entirety Japanese 
     Imperial Army records.
       (b) Exception for Privacy.--An agency head may exempt from 
     release under subsection (a) specific information, that 
     would--
       (1) constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
     privacy;
       (2) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or 
     reveal information about the application of an intelligence 
     source or method, or reveal the identity of a human 
     intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that 
     source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national 
     security interests of the United States;
       (3) reveal information that would assist in the development 
     or use of weapons of mass destruction;
       (4) reveal information that would impair United States 
     cryptologic systems or activities;
       (5) reveal information that would impair the application of 
     state-of-the-art technology within a United States weapon 
     system;
       (6) reveal actual United States military war plans that 
     remain in effect;
       (7) reveal information that would seriously and 
     demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a 
     foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine 
     ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;
       (8) reveal information that would clearly, and demonstrably 
     impair the current ability of United States Government 
     officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other 
     officials for whom protection services are authorized in the 
     interest of national security;
       (9) reveal information that would seriously and 
     demonstrably impair current national security emergency 
     preparedness plans; or
       (10) violate a treaty or other international agreement.
       (c) Applications of Exemptions.--
       (1) In general.--In applying the exemptions provided in 
     paragraphs (2) through (10) of subsection (b), there shall be 
     a presumption that the public interest will be served by 
     disclosure and release of the records of the Japanese 
     Imperial Army. The exemption may be asserted only when the 
     head of the agency that maintains the records determines that 
     disclosure and release would be harmful to a specific 
     interest identified in the exemption. An agency head who 
     makes such a determination shall promptly report it to the 
     committees of Congress with appropriate jurisdiction, 
     including the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Government Reform and Oversight and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Application of title 5.--A determination by an agency 
     head to apply an exemption provided in paragraphs (2) through 
     (9) of subsection (b) shall be subject to the same standard 
     of review that applies in the case of records withheld under 
     section 552(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code.
       (d) Limitation on Exemptions.--
       (1) In general.--The exemptions set forth in subsection (b) 
     shall constitute the only grounds pursuant to which an agency 
     head may exempt records otherwise subject to release under 
     subsection (a).
       (2) Records related to investigation or prosecutions.--This 
     section shall not apply to records--
       (A) related to or supporting any active or inactive 
     investigation, inquiry, or prosecution by the Office of 
     Special Investigations of the Department of Justice; or
       (B) solely in the possession, custody, or control of the 
     Office of Special Investigations.

     SEC. 604. EXPEDITED PROCESSING OF FOIA REQUESTS FOR JAPANESE 
                   IMPERIAL ARMY RECORDS.

       For purposes of expedited processing under section 
     552(a)(6)(E) of title 5, United States Code, any person who 
     was persecuted in the manner described in section 602(a)(3) 
     and who requests a Japanese Imperial Army record shall be 
     deemed to have a compelling need for such record.

[[Page 20238]]



     SEC. 605. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       The provisions of this title shall take effect on the date 
     that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                  ____



                           Amendment No. 4283

  (Purpose: To improve the identification, collection, and review for 
declassification of records and materials that are of archival value or 
   extraordinary public interest to the people of the United States)

  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under 
``Amendments Submitted.'')


                           amendment no. 4284

  (Purpose: To honor the outstanding contributions of Senator Daniel 
   Patrick Moynihan toward the redevelopment of Pennsylvania Avenue, 
                            Washington, DC)

       At the end of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 3__. DESIGNATION OF DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN PLACE.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) during the second half of the twentieth century, 
     Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan promoted the importance of 
     architecture and urban planning in the Nation's Capital, 
     particularly with respect to the portion of Pennsylvania 
     Avenue between the White House and the United States Capitol 
     (referred to in this subsection as the ``Avenue'');
       (2) Senator Moynihan has stressed the unique significance 
     of the Avenue as conceived by Pierre Charles L'Enfant to be 
     the ``grand axis'' of the Nation's Capital as well as a 
     symbolic representation of the separate yet unified branches 
     of the United States Government;
       (3) through his service to the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal 
     Office Space (1961-1962), as a member of the President's 
     Council on Pennsylvania Avenue (1962-1964), and as vice-
     chairman of the President's Temporary Commission on 
     Pennsylvania Avenue (1965-1969), and in his various 
     capacities in the executive and legislative branches, Senator 
     Moynihan has consistently and creatively sought to fulfill 
     President Kennedy's recommendation of June 1, 1962, that the 
     Avenue not become a ``solid phalanx of public and private 
     office buildings which close down completely at night and on 
     weekends,'' but that it be ``lively, friendly, and inviting, 
     as well as dignified and impressive'';
       (4)(A) Senator Moynihan helped draft a Federal 
     architectural policy, known as the ``Guiding Principles for 
     Federal Architecture,'' that recommends a choice of designs 
     that are ``efficient and economical'' and that provide 
     ``visual testimony to the dignity, enterprise, vigor, and 
     stability'' of the United States Government; and
       (B) the Guiding Principles for Federal Architecture further 
     state that the ``development of an official style must be 
     avoided. Design must flow from the architectural profession 
     to the Government, and not vice versa.'';
       (5) Senator Moynihan has encouraged--
       (A) the construction of new buildings along the Avenue, 
     such as the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade 
     Center; and
       (B) the establishment of an academic institution along the 
     Avenue, namely the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
     Scholars, a living memorial to President Wilson; and
       (6) as Senator Moynihan's service in the Senate concludes, 
     it is appropriate to commemorate his legacy of public service 
     and his commitment to thoughtful urban design in the Nation's 
     Capital.
       (b) Designation.--The parcel of land located in the 
     northwest quadrant of Washington, District of Columbia, and 
     described in subsection (c) shall be known and designated as 
     ``Daniel Patrick Moynihan Place''.
       (c) Boundaries.--The parcel of land described in this 
     subsection is the portion of Woodrow Wilson Plaza (as 
     designated by Public Law 103-284 (108 Stat. 1448)) that is 
     bounded--
       (1) on the west by the eastern facade of the Ronald Reagan 
     Building and International Trade Center;
       (2) on the east by the western facade of the Ariel Rios 
     Building;
       (3) on the north by the southern edge of the sidewalk 
     abutting Pennsylvania Avenue; and
       (4) on the south by the line that, bisecting the atrium of 
     the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, 
     continues east to bisect the western hemicycle of the Ariel 
     Rios Building.
       (d) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 
     document, paper, or other record of the United States to the 
     parcel of land described in subsection (c) shall be deemed to 
     be a reference to Daniel Patrick Moynihan Place.
                                  ____



                           amendment no. 4285

       On page 10, strike line 11 and all that follows through 
     page 12, line 2, and insert the following:
       ``(a) Prohibition.--Whoever, being an officer or employee 
     of the United States, a former or retired officer or employee 
     of the United States, any other person with authorized access 
     to classified information, or any other person formerly with 
     authorized access to classified information, knowingly and 
     willfully discloses, or attempts to disclose, any classified 
     information acquired as a result of such person's authorized 
     access to classified information to a person (other than an 
     officer or employee of the United States) who is not 
     authorized access to such classified information, knowing 
     that the person is not authorized access to such classified 
     information, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not 
     more than 3 years, or both.
       ``(b) Construction of Prohibition.--Nothing in this section 
     shall be construed to establish criminal liability for 
     disclosure of classified information in accordance with 
     applicable law to the following:
       ``(1) Any justice or judge of a court of the United States 
     established pursuant to article III of the Constitution of 
     the United States.
       ``(2) The Senate or House of Representatives, or any 
     committee or subcommittee thereof, or joint committee 
     thereof, or any member of Congress.
       ``(3) A person or persons acting on behalf of a foreign 
     power (including an international organization) if the 
     disclosure--
       ``(A) is made by an officer or employee of the United 
     States who has been authorized to make the disclosure; and
       ``(B) is within the scope of such officer's or employee's 
     duties.
       ``(4) Any other person authorized to receive the classified 
     information.
       ``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `authorized', in the case of access to 
     classified information, means having authority or permission 
     to have access to the classified information pursuant to the 
     provisions of a statute, Executive Order, regulation, or 
     directive of the head of any department or agency who is 
     empowered to classify information, an order of any United 
     States court, or a provision of any Resolution of the Senate 
     or Rule of the House of Representatives which governs release 
     of classified information by such House of Congress.
       ``(2) The term `classified information' means information 
     or material properly classified and clearly marked or 
     represented, or that the person knows or has reason to 
     believe has been properly classified by appropriate 
     authorities, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or 
     Executive Order, as requiring protection against unauthorized 
     disclosure for reasons of national security.
       On page 12, strike line 21 and all that follows through 
     page 13, line 16, and insert the following:
       ``Sec. 115. (a) Requirement.--(1) The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Defense, establish and maintain in the intelligence community 
     an analytic capability with responsibility for intelligence 
     in support of the activities of the United States relating to 
     unaccounted for United States personnel.
       ``(2) The analytic capability maintained under paragraph 
     (1) shall be known as the `POW/MIA analytic capability of the 
     intelligence community'.
       ``(b) Scope of Responsibility.--The responsibilities of the 
     analytic capability maintained under subsection (a) shall--
       ``(1) extend to any activities of the Federal Government 
     with respect to unaccounted for United States personnel after 
     December 31, 1999; and
       ``(2) include support for any department or agency of the 
     Federal Government engaged in such activities.
       ``(c) Unaccounted for United States Personnel Defined.--In 
     this section, the term `unaccounted for United States 
     personnel' means the following:
       ``(1) Any missing person (as that term is defined in 
     section 1513(1) of title 10, United States Code).
       ``(2) Any United States national who was killed while 
     engaged in activities on behalf of the United States 
     Government and whose remains have not been repatriated to the 
     United States.''.
       On page 14, beginning on line 11, strike ``acting at their 
     direction''.
       On page 14, line 13, insert ``, and at the direction of,'' 
     after ``on behalf of''.
       On page 14, line 16, strike ``Authorized Activities.--An 
     activity'' and insert ``Authorized Intelligence Activities.--
     An intelligence activity''.
       On page 14, line 18, insert ``intelligence'' before 
     ``activity''.
       On page 15, beginning on line 9, strike ``, and all 
     applicable Executive Orders,''.
       On page 15, line 11, strike ``materials'' and insert 
     ``material''.
       On page 15, line 15, strike ``and Executive Orders''.
       On page 15, line 18, strike ``or Executive Order''.
       On page 15, line 22, strike ``or Executive Order''.
       On page 15, strike line 25 and all that follows through 
     page 16, line 16, and insert the following:
       (d) Effects of Certification of Non-Full Compliance.--(1) 
     Subject to subsection (e), effective as of January 1, 2001, a 
     covered element of the Department of State
       On page 16, line 20, strike ``and Executive Orders''.
       On page 16, strike lines 22 and 23 and insert the 
     following:
       (2) If the prohibition in paragraph (1) takes effect in 
     accordance with that paragraph, the prohibition

[[Page 20239]]

       On page 17, beginning on line 1, strike ``and Executive 
     Orders''.
       On page 17, strike line 3 and insert the following:
       (e) Waiver by Director of Central Intelligence.--(1) The 
     Director of Central Intelligence may
       On page 17, beginning on line 4, strike ``subsection 
     (d)(2)'' and insert ``subsection (d)''.
       On page 17, line 6, strike ``the President'' and insert 
     ``the Director''.
       On page 17, line 9, strike ``The President'' and insert 
     ``The Director''.
       On page 17, between lines 17 and 18, insert the following:
       (C) The actions, if any, that will be taken to bring such 
     element into full compliance with the directives referred to 
     in subsection (a), including a schedule for completion of 
     such actions.
       On page 17, line 18, strike ``(C) The actions taken by the 
     President'' and insert ``(D) The actions taken by the 
     Director''.
       On page 17, line 20, insert before the period the 
     following: ``pending achievement of full compliance of such 
     element with such directives''.

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be 
read the third time and the Senate proceed to the consideration of H.R. 
4392. Further, I ask unanimous consent that all after the enacting 
clause be stricken and the text of S. 2507, as amended, be inserted in 
lieu thereof, the bill be read the third time and passed, the Senate 
insist on its amendment, request a conference with the House, and the 
Chair be authorized to appoint conferees on the part of the Senate. 
Finally, I ask unanimous consent that S. 2507 be placed back on the 
calendar.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The bill (S. 2507), as amended, was read the third time.
  The bill (H.R. 4392), as amended, was read the third time and passed, 
as follows:

       Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives 
     (H.R. 4392) entitled ``An Act to authorize appropriations for 
     fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government, the Community 
     Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.'', 
     do pass with the following amendment:
       Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Prohibition on unauthorized disclosure of classified 
              information.
Sec. 304. POW/MIA analytic capability within the intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 305. Applicability to lawful United States intelligence activities 
              of Federal laws implementing international treaties and 
              agreements.
Sec. 306. Limitation on handling, retention, and storage of certain 
              classified materials by the Department of State.
Sec. 307. Clarification of standing of United States citizens to 
              challenge certain blocking of assets.
Sec. 308. Availability of certain funds for administrative costs of 
              Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat.
Sec. 309. Designation of Daniel Patrick Moynihan Place.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Expansion of Inspector General actions requiring a report to 
              Congress.
Sec. 402. Subpoena authority of the Inspector General.
Sec. 403. Improvement and extension of central services program.
Sec. 404. Details of employees to the National Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 405. Transfers of funds to other agencies for acquisition of land.
Sec. 406. Eligibility of additional employees for reimbursement for 
              professional liability insurance.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 501. Two-year extension of authority to engage in commercial 
              activities as security for intelligence collection 
              activities.
Sec. 502. Role of Director of Central Intelligence in experimental 
              personnel program for certain scientific and technical 
              personnel.
Sec. 503. Prohibition on transfer of imagery analysts from General 
              Defense Intelligence Program to National Imagery and 
              Mapping Agency Program.
Sec. 504. Prohibition on transfer of collection management personnel 
              from General Defense Intelligence Program to Community 
              Management Account.
Sec. 505. Authorized personnel ceiling for General Defense Intelligence 
              Program.
Sec. 506. Measurement and signature intelligence.

                 TITLE VI--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Sec. 601. Short title.
Sec. 602. Orders for electronic surveillance under the Foreign 
              Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 603. Orders for physical searches under the Foreign Intelligence 
              Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 604. Disclosure of information acquired under the Foreign 
              Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for law enforcement 
              purposes.
Sec. 605. Coordination of counterintelligence with the Federal Bureau 
              of Investigation.
Sec. 606. Enhancing protection of national security at the Department 
              of Justice.
Sec. 607. Coordination requirements relating to the prosecution of 
              cases involving classified information.
Sec. 608. Severability.

     TITLE VII--DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON JAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY

Sec. 701. Short title.
Sec. 702. Establishment of Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency 
              Working Group.
Sec. 703. Requirement of disclosure of records.
Sec. 704. Expedited processing of FOIA requests for Japanese Imperial 
              Army records.
Sec. 705. Effective date.

              TITLE VIII--DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION

Sec. 801. Short title.
Sec. 802. Findings.
Sec. 803. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 804. Identification, collection, and review for declassification 
              of information of archival value or extraordinary public 
              interest.
Sec. 805. Protection of national security information and other 
              information.
Sec. 806. Standards and procedures.
Sec. 807. Judicial review.
Sec. 808. Funding.
Sec. 809. Definitions.
Sec. 810. Sunset.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001.--
     Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2001 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (6) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
       (7) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations for Certain Elements 
     for Fiscal Years 2002 Through 2005.--Funds are hereby 
     authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2002 
     through 2005 for the conduct in each such fiscal year of the 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
     following elements of the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The National Security Agency.
       (4) The National Reconnaissance Office.

      SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2001, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill ____ 
     of the One Hundred Sixth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the Executive Branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian

[[Page 20240]]

     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     2001 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority 
     granted by this section.

     SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated for 
     the Community Management Account of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence for fiscal year 2001 the sum of $232,051,000.
       (2) Availability for advanced research and development 
     committee.--Within the amount authorized to be appropriated 
     in paragraph (1), amounts identified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for 
     the Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain 
     available until September 30, 2002.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Community Management Account of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence are authorized a total of 618 full-time 
     personnel as of September 30, 2001. Personnel serving in such 
     elements may be permanent employees of the Community 
     Management Account element or personnel detailed from other 
     elements of the United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community 
     Management Account by subsection (a), there is also 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2001 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a).
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Community Management Account as of September 30, 2001, there 
     is hereby authorized such additional personnel for such 
     elements as of that date as is specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations.
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during 
     fiscal year 2001, any officer or employee of the United 
     States or member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the 
     staff of an element within the Community Management Account 
     from another element of the United States Government shall be 
     detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such 
     officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a 
     nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for 
     the performance of temporary functions as required by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated in subsection (a), $27,000,000 shall be 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within 
     such amount, funds provided for research, development, test, 
     and evaluation purposes shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2002, and funds provided for procurement 
     purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003.
       (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the 
     United States funds available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General 
     shall utilize funds so transferred for activities of the 
     National Drug Intelligence Center.
       (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the 
     provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
       (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
     operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2001 the sum of $216,000,000.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. PROHIBITION ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF 
                   CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 37 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) by redesignating section 798A as section 798B; and
       (2) by inserting after section 798 the following new 
     section 798A:

     ``Sec. 798A. Unauthorized disclosure of classified 
       information

       ``(a) Prohibition.--Whoever, being an officer or employee 
     of the United States, a former or retired officer or employee 
     of the United States, any other person with authorized access 
     to classified information, or any other person formerly with 
     authorized access to classified information, knowingly and 
     willfully discloses, or attempts to disclose, any classified 
     information acquired as a result of such person's authorized 
     access to classified information to a person (other than an 
     officer or employee of the United States) who is not 
     authorized access to such classified information, knowing 
     that the person is not authorized access to such classified 
     information, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not 
     more than 3 years, or both.
       ``(b) Construction of Prohibition.--Nothing in this section 
     shall be construed to establish criminal liability for 
     disclosure of classified information in accordance with 
     applicable law to the following:
       ``(1) Any justice or judge of a court of the United States 
     established pursuant to article III of the Constitution of 
     the United States.
       ``(2) The Senate or House of Representatives, or any 
     committee or subcommittee thereof, or joint committee 
     thereof, or any member of Congress.
       ``(3) A person or persons acting on behalf of a foreign 
     power (including an international organization) if the 
     disclosure--
       ``(A) is made by an officer or employee of the United 
     States who has been authorized to make the disclosure; and
       ``(B) is within the scope of such officer's or employee's 
     duties.
       ``(4) Any other person authorized to receive the classified 
     information.
       ``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `authorized', in the case of access to 
     classified information, means having authority or permission 
     to have access to the classified information pursuant to the 
     provisions of a statute, Executive Order, regulation, or 
     directive of the head of any department or agency who is 
     empowered to classify information, an order of any United 
     States court, or a provision of any Resolution of the Senate 
     or Rule of the House of Representatives which governs release 
     of classified information by such House of Congress.
       ``(2) The term `classified information' means information 
     or material properly classified and clearly marked or 
     represented, or that the person knows or has reason to 
     believe has been properly classified by appropriate 
     authorities, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or 
     Executive Order, as requiring protection against unauthorized 
     disclosure for reasons of national security.
       ``(3) The term `officer or employee of the United States' 
     means the following:
       ``(A) An officer or employee (as those terms are defined in 
     sections 2104 and 2105 of title 5).
       ``(B) An officer or enlisted member of the Armed Forces (as 
     those terms are defined in section 101(b) of title 10).''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of that chapter is amended by striking the item 
     relating to section 798A and inserting the following new 
     items:

``798A. Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
``798B. Temporary extension of section 794.''.

     SEC. 304. POW/MIA ANALYTIC CAPABILITY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:


                     ``pow/mia analytic capability

       ``Sec. 115. (a) Requirement.--(1) The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Defense, establish and maintain in the intelligence community 
     an analytic capability with responsibility for intelligence 
     in support of the activities of the United States relating to 
     unaccounted for United States personnel.
       ``(2) The analytic capability maintained under paragraph 
     (1) shall be known as the `POW/MIA analytic capability of the 
     intelligence community'.
       ``(b) Scope of Responsibility.--The responsibilities of the 
     analytic capability maintained under subsection (a) shall--
       ``(1) extend to any activities of the Federal Government 
     with respect to unaccounted for United States personnel after 
     December 31, 1999; and
       ``(2) include support for any department or agency of the 
     Federal Government engaged in such activities.
       ``(c) Unaccounted for United States Personnel Defined.--In 
     this section, the term `unaccounted for United States 
     personnel' means the following:
       ``(1) Any missing person (as that term is defined in 
     section 1513(1) of title 10, United States Code).
       ``(2) Any United States national who was killed while 
     engaged in activities on behalf of the United States 
     Government and whose remains have not been repatriated to the 
     United States.''.

[[Page 20241]]



     SEC. 305. APPLICABILITY TO LAWFUL UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE 
                   ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL LAWS IMPLEMENTING 
                   INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS.

       The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:

                        ``TITLE X--MISCELLANEOUS


  ``applicability to united states intelligence activities of federal 
        laws implementing international treaties and agreements

       ``Sec. 1001. (a) In General.--No Federal law enacted on or 
     after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 that implements a 
     treaty or other international agreement shall be construed as 
     making unlawful an otherwise lawful and authorized 
     intelligence activity of the United States Government or its 
     employees, or any other person to the extent such other 
     person is carrying out such activity on behalf of, and at the 
     direction of, the United States, unless such Federal law 
     specifically addresses such intelligence activity.
       ``(b) Authorized Intelligence Activities.--An intelligence 
     activity shall be treated as authorized for purposes of 
     subsection (a) if the intelligence activity is authorized by 
     an appropriate official of the United States Government, 
     acting within the scope of the official duties of that 
     official and in compliance with Federal law and any 
     applicable Presidential directive.''.

     SEC. 306. LIMITATION ON HANDLING, RETENTION, AND STORAGE OF 
                   CERTAIN CLASSIFIED MATERIALS BY THE DEPARTMENT 
                   OF STATE.

       (a) Certification Regarding Full Compliance With 
     Requirements.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall 
     certify to the appropriate committees of Congress whether or 
     not each covered element of the Department of State is in 
     full compliance with all applicable directives of the 
     Director of Central Intelligence relating to the handling, 
     retention, or storage of covered classified material.
       (b) Limitation on Certification.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence may not certify a covered element of the 
     Department of State as being in full compliance with the 
     directives referred to in subsection (a) if the covered 
     element is currently subject to a waiver of compliance with 
     respect to any such directive.
       (c) Report on Noncompliance.--Whenever the Director of 
     Central Intelligence determines that a covered element of the 
     Department of State is not in full compliance with any 
     directive referred to in subsection (a), the Director shall 
     promptly notify the appropriate committees of Congress of 
     such determination.
       (d) Effects of Certification of Non-Full Compliance.--(1) 
     Subject to subsection (e), effective as of January 1, 2001, a 
     covered element of the Department of State may not retain or 
     store covered classified information unless the Director has 
     certified under subsection (a) as of such date that the 
     covered element is in full compliance with the directives 
     referred to in subsection (a).
       (2) If the prohibition in paragraph (1) takes effect in 
     accordance with that paragraph, the prohibition shall remain 
     in effect until the date on which the Director certifies 
     under subsection (a) that the covered element involved is in 
     full compliance with the directives referred to in that 
     subsection.
       (e) Waiver by Director of Central Intelligence.--(1) The 
     Director of Central Intelligence may waive the applicability 
     of the prohibition in subsection (d) to an element of the 
     Department of State otherwise covered by such prohibition if 
     the Director determines that the waiver is in the national 
     security interests of the United States.
       (2) The Director shall submit to appropriate committees of 
     Congress a report on each exercise of the waiver authority in 
     paragraph (1).
       (3) Each report under paragraph (2) with respect to the 
     exercise of authority under paragraph (1) shall set forth the 
     following:
       (A) The covered element of the Department of State 
     addressed by the waiver.
       (B) The reasons for the waiver.
       (C) The actions, if any, that will be taken to bring such 
     element into full compliance with the directives referred to 
     in subsection (a), including a schedule for completion of 
     such actions.
       (D) The actions taken by the Director to protect any 
     covered classified material to be handled, retained, or 
     stored by such element pending achievement of full compliance 
     of such element with such directives.
       (f) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means 
     the following:
       (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
       (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) The term ``covered classified material'' means any 
     material classified at the Sensitive Compartmented 
     Information (SCI) level.
       (3) The term ``covered element of the Department of State'' 
     means each element of the Department of State that handles, 
     retains, or stores covered classified material.
       (4) The term ``material'' means any data, regardless of 
     physical form or characteristic, including written or printed 
     matter, automated information systems storage media, maps, 
     charts, paintings, drawings, films, photographs, engravings, 
     sketches, working notes, papers, reproductions of any such 
     things by any means or process, and sound, voice, magnetic, 
     or electronic recordings.
       (5) The term ``Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) 
     level'', in the case of classified material, means a level of 
     classification for information in such material concerning or 
     derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical 
     processes that requires such information to be handled within 
     formal access control systems established by the Director of 
     Central Intelligence.

     SEC. 307. CLARIFICATION OF STANDING OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS 
                   TO CHALLENGE CERTAIN BLOCKING OF ASSETS.

       The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (title VIII 
     of Public Law 106-120; 113 Stat. 1626; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et 
     seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 811. STANDING OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS TO CHALLENGE 
                   BLOCKING OF ASSETS.

       ``No provision of this title shall be construed to prohibit 
     a United States citizen from raising any challenge otherwise 
     available to the United States citizen under subchapter II of 
     chapter 5 and chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code 
     (commonly referred to as the Administrative Procedure Act), 
     or any other provision of law, with respect to the blocking 
     of assets by the United States under this title.''.

     SEC. 308. AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN FUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
                   COSTS OF COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE 
                   SECRETARIAT.

       Notwithstanding section 1346 of title 31, United States 
     Code, or section 610 of the Treasury and General Government 
     Appropriations Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-58; 113 Stat. 467), 
     funds made available for fiscal year 2000 for any department 
     or agency of the Federal Government with authority to conduct 
     counterdrug intelligence activities, including counterdrug 
     law enforcement information-gathering activities, may be 
     available to finance an appropriate share of the 
     administrative costs incurred by the Department of Justice 
     for the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat 
     authorized by the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan of 
     February 12, 2000.

     SEC. 309. DESIGNATION OF DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN PLACE.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) during the second half of the twentieth century, 
     Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan promoted the importance of 
     architecture and urban planning in the Nation's Capital, 
     particularly with respect to the portion of Pennsylvania 
     Avenue between the White House and the United States Capitol 
     (referred to in this subsection as the ``Avenue'');
       (2) Senator Moynihan has stressed the unique significance 
     of the Avenue as conceived by Pierre Charles L'Enfant to be 
     the ``grand axis'' of the Nation's Capital as well as a 
     symbolic representation of the separate yet unified branches 
     of the United States Government;
       (3) through his service to the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal 
     Office Space (1961-1962), as a member of the President's 
     Council on Pennsylvania Avenue (1962-1964), and as vice-
     chairman of the President's Temporary Commission on 
     Pennsylvania Avenue (1965-1969), and in his various 
     capacities in the executive and legislative branches, Senator 
     Moynihan has consistently and creatively sought to fulfill 
     President Kennedy's recommendation of June 1, 1962, that the 
     Avenue not become a ``solid phalanx of public and private 
     office buildings which close down completely at night and on 
     weekends,'' but that it be ``lively, friendly, and inviting, 
     as well as dignified and impressive'';
       (4)(A) Senator Moynihan helped draft a Federal 
     architectural policy, known as the ``Guiding Principles for 
     Federal Architecture,'' that recommends a choice of designs 
     that are ``efficient and economical'' and that provide 
     ``visual testimony to the dignity, enterprise, vigor, and 
     stability'' of the United States Government; and
       (B) the Guiding Principles for Federal Architecture further 
     state that the ``development of an official style must be 
     avoided. Design must flow from the architectural profession 
     to the Government, and not vice versa.'';
       (5) Senator Moynihan has encouraged--
       (A) the construction of new buildings along the Avenue, 
     such as the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade 
     Center; and
       (B) the establishment of an academic institution along the 
     Avenue, namely the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
     Scholars, a living memorial to President Wilson; and
       (6) as Senator Moynihan's service in the Senate concludes, 
     it is appropriate to commemorate his legacy of public service 
     and his commitment to thoughtful urban design in the Nation's 
     Capital.
       (b) Designation.--The parcel of land located in the 
     northwest quadrant of Washington, District of Columbia, and 
     described in subsection (c) shall be known and designated as 
     ``Daniel Patrick Moynihan Place''.
       (c) Boundaries.--The parcel of land described in this 
     subsection is the portion of Woodrow Wilson Plaza (as 
     designated by Public Law 103-284 (108 Stat. 1448)) that is 
     bounded--
       (1) on the west by the eastern facade of the Ronald Reagan 
     Building and International Trade Center;
       (2) on the east by the western facade of the Ariel Rios 
     Building;
       (3) on the north by the southern edge of the sidewalk 
     abutting Pennsylvania Avenue; and
       (4) on the south by the line that, bisecting the atrium of 
     the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, 
     continues east to bisect the western hemicycle of the Ariel 
     Rios Building.
       (d) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 
     document, paper, or other

[[Page 20242]]

     record of the United States to the parcel of land described 
     in subsection (c) shall be deemed to be a reference to Daniel 
     Patrick Moynihan Place.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. EXPANSION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIONS REQUIRING A 
                   REPORT TO CONGRESS.

       Section 17(d)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)) is amended by striking all that 
     follows after subparagraph (A) and inserting the following:
       ``(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by 
     the Inspector General should focus on any current or former 
     Agency official who--
       ``(i) holds or held a position in the Agency that is 
     subject to appointment by the President, by and with the 
     advise and consent of the Senate, including such a position 
     held on an acting basis; or
       ``(ii) holds or held the position in the Agency, including 
     such a position held on an acting basis, of--
       ``(I) Executive Director;
       ``(II) Deputy Director for Operations;
       ``(III) Deputy Director for Intelligence;
       ``(IV) Deputy Director for Administration; or
       ``(V) Deputy Director for Science and Technology;
       ``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General 
     to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by 
     a current or former Agency official described or referred to 
     in subparagraph (B);
       ``(D) the Inspector General becomes aware of the possible 
     criminal conduct of a current or former Agency official 
     described or referred to in subparagraph (B) through a means 
     other than an investigation, inspection, or audit and such 
     conduct is not referred to the Department of Justice; or
       ``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible 
     alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary 
     information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or 
     audit,

     the Inspector General shall immediately submit a report on 
     such matter to the intelligence committees.''.

     SEC. 402. SUBPOENA AUTHORITY OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.

       (a) Clarification Regarding Reports on Exercise of 
     Authority.--Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
     of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (d)(1), by striking subparagraph (E) and 
     inserting the following new subparagraph (E):
       ``(E) a description of the exercise of the subpoena 
     authority under subsection (e)(5) by the Inspector General 
     during the reporting period; and''; and
       (2) in subsection (e)(5), by striking subparagraph (E).
       (b) Scope of Authority.--Subsection (e)(5)(B) of that 
     section is amended by striking ``Government'' and inserting 
     ``Federal''.

     SEC. 403. IMPROVEMENT AND EXTENSION OF CENTRAL SERVICES 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Deposits in Central Services Working Capital Fund.--
     Subsection (c)(2) of section 21 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (H); 
     and
       (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new 
     subparagraphs:
       ``(F) Receipts from individuals in reimbursement for 
     utility services and meals provided under the program.
       ``(G) Receipts from individuals for the rental of property 
     and equipment under the program.''.
       (b) Clarification of Costs Recoverable Under Program.--
     Subsection (e)(1) of that section is amended in the second 
     sentence by inserting ``other than structures owned by the 
     Agency'' after ``depreciation of plant and equipment''.
       (c) Financial Statements of Program.--Subsection (g)(2) of 
     that section is amended in the first sentence by striking 
     ``annual audits under paragraph (1)'' and inserting the 
     following: ``financial statements to be prepared with respect 
     to the program. Office of Management and Budget guidance 
     shall also determine the procedures for conducting annual 
     audits under paragraph (1).''.
       (d) Extension of Program.--Subsection (h)(1) of that 
     section is amended by striking ``March 31, 2002'' and 
     inserting ``March 31, 2005''.

     SEC. 404. DETAILS OF EMPLOYEES TO THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 
                   OFFICE.

       The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:


                         ``details of employees

       ``Sec. 22. The Director may--
       ``(1) detail any personnel of the Agency on a reimbursable 
     basis indefinitely to the National Reconnaissance Office 
     without regard to any limitation under law on the duration of 
     details of Federal government personnel; and
       ``(2) hire personnel for the purpose of details under 
     paragraph (1).''.

     SEC. 405. TRANSFERS OF FUNDS TO OTHER AGENCIES FOR 
                   ACQUISITION OF LAND.

       (a) In General.--Section 8 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403j) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new subsection:
       ``(c) Transfers for Acquisition of Land.--(1) Sums 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to the Agency for 
     the acquisition of land that are transferred to another 
     department or agency for that purpose shall remain available 
     for 3 years.
       ``(2) The Director shall submit to the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives an annual 
     report on the transfers of sums described in paragraph 
     (1).''.
       (b) Conforming Stylistic Amendments.--That section is 
     further amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``In General.--'' after 
     ``(a)''; and
       (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``Scope of Authority 
     For Expenditure.--'' after ``(b)''.
       (c) Applicability.--Subsection (c) of section 8 of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as added by 
     subsection (a) of this section, shall apply with respect to 
     amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the 
     Central Intelligence Agency for fiscal years after fiscal 
     year 2000.

     SEC. 406. ELIGIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES FOR 
                   REIMBURSEMENT FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 
                   INSURANCE.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any provision of section 
     363 of the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government 
     Appropriations Act, 1997 (5 U.S.C. prec. 5941 note), the 
     Director of Central Intelligence may--
       (1) designate as qualified employees within the meaning of 
     subsection (b) of that section appropriate categories of 
     employees not otherwise covered by that subsection; and
       (2) use appropriated funds available to the Director to 
     reimburse employees within categories so designated for one-
     half of the costs incurred by such employees for professional 
     liability insurance in accordance with subsection (a) of that 
     section.
       (b) Reports.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall 
     submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
     and the Permanent Select Committee of Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives a report on each designation of a 
     category of employees under paragraph (1) of subsection (a), 
     including the approximate number of employees covered by such 
     designation and an estimate of the amount to be expended on 
     reimbursement of such employees under paragraph (2) of that 
     subsection.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 501. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN 
                   COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR 
                   INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.

       Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended 
     in the second sentence by striking ``December 31, 2000'' and 
     inserting ``December 31, 2002''.

     SEC. 502. ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN 
                   EXPERIMENTAL PERSONNEL PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN 
                   SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL.

       If the Director of Central Intelligence requests that the 
     Secretary of Defense exercise any authority available to the 
     Secretary under section 1101(b) of the Strom Thurmond 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 
     (Public Law 105-261; 5 U.S.C. 3104 note) to carry out a 
     program of special personnel management authority at the 
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the National Security 
     Agency in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent experts 
     in science and engineering at such agencies, the Secretary 
     shall respond to such request not later than 30 days after 
     the date of such request.

     SEC. 503. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF IMAGERY ANALYSTS FROM 
                   GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM TO 
                   NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY PROGRAM.

       (a) Prohibition on Use of Funds For Transfer.--No funds 
     authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be transferred 
     from the General Defense Intelligence Program to the National 
     Imagery and Mapping Agency Program for purposes of 
     transferring imagery analysis personnel from the General 
     Defense Intelligence Program to the National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency Program.
       (b) Role of Director of NIMA as Functional Manager for 
     Imagery and Geospacial Programs.--(1) The Secretary of 
     Defense shall, in consultation with the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, review options for strengthening the role of 
     the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as 
     the functional manager for United States imagery and 
     geospacial programs.
       (2) Not later than March 15, 2001, the Secretary shall 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on 
     the review required by subsection (b). The report shall 
     include any recommendations regarding modifications in the 
     role and duties of the Director of the National Imagery and 
     Mapping Agency that the Secretary considers appropriate in 
     light of the review.
       (3) In this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees 
     of Congress'' means the following:
       (A) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (B) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 504. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF COLLECTION MANAGEMENT 
                   PERSONNEL FROM GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE 
                   PROGRAM TO COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be 
     transferred from the General Defense Intelligence Program to 
     the Community Management Account for purposes of transferring 
     intelligence collection management personnel.

[[Page 20243]]



     SEC. 505. AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL CEILING FOR GENERAL DEFENSE 
                   INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       The authorized personnel ceiling for the General Defense 
     Intelligence Program specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102 is hereby increased 
     by 2,152 positions.

     SEC. 506. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Study of Options.--The Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, conduct 
     a study of the utility and feasibility of various options for 
     improving the management and organization of measurement and 
     signature intelligence, including--
       (1) the option of establishing a centralized tasking, 
     processing, exploitation, and dissemination facility for 
     measurement and signature intelligence;
       (2) options for recapitalizing and reconfiguring the 
     current systems for measurement and signature intelligence; 
     and
       (3) the operation and maintenance costs of the various 
     options.
       (b) Report.--Not later than April 1, 2001, the Director and 
     the Secretary shall jointly submit to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress a report on their findings as a result 
     of the study required by subsection (a). The report shall set 
     forth any recommendations that the Director and the Secretary 
     consider appropriate.
       (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means the following:
       (1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.

                 TITLE VI--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

     SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Counterintelligence Reform 
     Act of 2000''.

     SEC. 602. ORDERS FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNDER THE 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       (a) Requirements Regarding Certain Applications.--Section 
     104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1804) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subsection:
       ``(e)(1)(A) Upon written request of the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Defense, 
     the Secretary of State, or the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, the Attorney General shall personally review 
     under subsection (a) an application under that subsection for 
     a target described in section 101(b)(2).
       ``(B) Except when disabled or otherwise unavailable to make 
     a request referred to in subparagraph (A), an official 
     referred to in that subparagraph may not delegate the 
     authority to make a request referred to in that subparagraph.
       ``(C) Each official referred to in subparagraph (A) with 
     authority to make a request under that subparagraph shall 
     take appropriate actions in advance to ensure that delegation 
     of such authority is clearly established in the event such 
     official is disabled or otherwise unavailable to make such 
     request.
       ``(2)(A) If as a result of a request under paragraph (1) 
     the Attorney General determines not to approve an application 
     under the second sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of 
     making the application under this section, the Attorney 
     General shall provide written notice of the determination to 
     the official making the request for the review of the 
     application under that paragraph. Except when disabled or 
     otherwise unavailable to make a determination under the 
     preceding sentence, the Attorney General may not delegate the 
     responsibility to make a determination under that sentence. 
     The Attorney General shall take appropriate actions in 
     advance to ensure that delegation of such responsibility is 
     clearly established in the event the Attorney General is 
     disabled or otherwise unavailable to make such determination.
       ``(B) Notice with respect to an application under 
     subparagraph (A) shall set forth the modifications, if any, 
     of the application that are necessary in order for the 
     Attorney General to approve the application under the second 
     sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of making the 
     application under this section.
       ``(C) Upon review of any modifications of an application 
     set forth under subparagraph (B), the official notified of 
     the modifications under this paragraph shall modify the 
     application if such official determines that such 
     modification is warranted. Such official shall supervise the 
     making of any modification under this subparagraph. Except 
     when disabled or otherwise unavailable to supervise the 
     making of any modification under the preceding sentence, such 
     official may not delegate the responsibility to supervise the 
     making of any modification under that preceding sentence. 
     Each such official shall take appropriate actions in advance 
     to ensure that delegation of such responsibility is clearly 
     established in the event such official is disabled or 
     otherwise unavailable to supervise the making of such 
     modification.''.
       (b) Probable Cause.--Section 105 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1805) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), 
     and (g) as subsections (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), 
     respectively;
       (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
     subsection (b):
       ``(b) In determining whether or not probable cause exists 
     for purposes of an order under subsection (a)(3), a judge may 
     consider past activities of the target, as well as facts and 
     circumstances relating to current or future activities of the 
     target.''; and
       (3) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (1), by 
     striking ``subsection (b)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection 
     (c)(1)''.

     SEC. 603. ORDERS FOR PHYSICAL SEARCHES UNDER THE FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       (a) Requirements Regarding Certain Applications.--Section 
     303 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1823) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subsection:
       ``(d)(1)(A) Upon written request of the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Defense, 
     the Secretary of State, or the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, the Attorney General shall personally review 
     under subsection (a) an application under that subsection for 
     a target described in section 101(b)(2).
       ``(B) Except when disabled or otherwise unavailable to make 
     a request referred to in subparagraph (A), an official 
     referred to in that subparagraph may not delegate the 
     authority to make a request referred to in that subparagraph.
       ``(C) Each official referred to in subparagraph (A) with 
     authority to make a request under that subparagraph shall 
     take appropriate actions in advance to ensure that delegation 
     of such authority is clearly established in the event such 
     official is disabled or otherwise unavailable to make such 
     request.
       ``(2)(A) If as a result of a request under paragraph (1) 
     the Attorney General determines not to approve an application 
     under the second sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of 
     making the application under this section, the Attorney 
     General shall provide written notice of the determination to 
     the official making the request for the review of the 
     application under that paragraph. Except when disabled or 
     otherwise unavailable to make a determination under the 
     preceding sentence, the Attorney General may not delegate the 
     responsibility to make a determination under that sentence. 
     The Attorney General shall take appropriate actions in 
     advance to ensure that delegation of such responsibility is 
     clearly established in the event the Attorney General is 
     disabled or otherwise unavailable to make such determination.
       ``(B) Notice with respect to an application under 
     subparagraph (A) shall set forth the modifications, if any, 
     of the application that are necessary in order for the 
     Attorney General to approve the application under the second 
     sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of making the 
     application under this section.
       ``(C) Upon review of any modifications of an application 
     set forth under subparagraph (B), the official notified of 
     the modifications under this paragraph shall modify the 
     application if such official determines that such 
     modification is warranted. Such official shall supervise the 
     making of any modification under this subparagraph. Except 
     when disabled or otherwise unavailable to supervise the 
     making of any modification under the preceding sentence, such 
     official may not delegate the responsibility to supervise the 
     making of any modification under that preceding sentence. 
     Each such official shall take appropriate actions in advance 
     to ensure that delegation of such responsibility is clearly 
     established in the event such official is disabled or 
     otherwise unavailable to supervise the making of such 
     modification.''.
       (b) Probable Cause.--Section 304 of that Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1824) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) as 
     subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
     subsection (b):
       ``(b) In determining whether or not probable cause exists 
     for purposes of an order under subsection (a)(3), a judge may 
     consider past activities of the target, as well as facts and 
     circumstances relating to current or future activities of the 
     target.''.

     SEC. 604. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED UNDER THE 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 
                   FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES.

       (a) Inclusion of Information on Disclosure in Semiannual 
     Oversight Report.--Section 108(a) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1808(a)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) Each report under the first sentence of paragraph (1) 
     shall include a description of--
       ``(A) each criminal case in which information acquired 
     under this Act has been passed for law enforcement purposes 
     during the period covered by such report; and
       ``(B) each criminal case in which information acquired 
     under this Act has been authorized for use at trial during 
     such reporting period.''.
       (b) Report on Mechanisms for Determinations of Disclosure 
     of Information for Law Enforcement Purposes.--(1) The 
     Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress a report on the authorities and procedures 
     utilized by the Department of Justice for determining whether 
     or not to disclose information acquired under the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) for law enforcement purposes.
       (2) In this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees 
     of Congress'' means the following:

[[Page 20244]]

       (A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the Senate.
       (B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 605. COORDINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WITH THE 
                   FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

       (a) Treatment of Certain Subjects of Investigation.--
     Subsection (c) of section 811 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. 402a) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraphs (1) and (2), by striking ``paragraph 
     (3)'' and inserting ``paragraph (5)'';
       (2) by redesignating paragraphs (3), (4), (5), and (6) as 
     paragraphs (5), (6), (7), and (8), respectively;
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new 
     paragraph (3):
       ``(3)(A) The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall submit to the head of the department or 
     agency concerned a written assessment of the potential impact 
     of the actions of the department or agency on a 
     counterintelligence investigation.
       ``(B) The head of the department or agency concerned 
     shall--
       ``(i) use an assessment under subparagraph (A) as an aid in 
     determining whether, and under what circumstances, the 
     subject of an investigation under paragraph (1) should be 
     left in place for investigative purposes; and
       ``(ii) notify in writing the Director of the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation of such determination.
       ``(C) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     and the head of the department or agency concerned shall 
     continue to consult, as appropriate, to review the status of 
     an investigation covered by this paragraph and to reassess, 
     as appropriate, a determination of the head of the department 
     or agency concerned to leave a subject in place for 
     investigative purposes.''; and
       (4) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by striking 
     ``paragraph (1) or (2)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1), (2), 
     or (3)''.
       (b) Timely Provision of Information and Consultation on 
     Espionage Investigations.--Paragraph (2) of that subsection 
     is further amended--
       (1) by inserting ``in a timely manner'' after ``through 
     appropriate channels''; and
       (2) by inserting ``in a timely manner'' after ``are 
     consulted''.
       (c) Interference With Full Field Espionage 
     Investigations.--That subsection is further amended by 
     inserting after paragraph (3), as amended by subsection (a) 
     of this section, the following new paragraph (4):
       ``(4)(A) The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify 
     appropriate officials within the executive branch, including 
     the head of the department or agency concerned, of the 
     commencement of a full field espionage investigation with 
     respect to an employee within the executive branch.
       ``(B)(i) A department or agency may not conduct a polygraph 
     examination, interrogate, or otherwise take any action that 
     is likely to alert an employee covered by a notice under 
     subparagraph (A) of an investigation described in that 
     subparagraph without prior coordination with the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation.
       ``(ii) Any examination, interrogation, or other action 
     taken under clause (i) shall be taken in consultation with 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation.''.

     SEC. 606. ENHANCING PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY AT THE 
                   DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

       (a) Authorization for Increased Resources To Fulfill 
     National Security Mission of the Department of Justice.--
     There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of 
     Justice for the activities of the Office of Intelligence 
     Policy and Review to help meet the increased personnel 
     demands to combat terrorism, process applications to the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, participate 
     effectively in counter-espionage investigations, provide 
     policy analysis on national security issues, and enhance 
     secure computer and telecommunications facilities--
       (1) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2001;
       (2) $7,500,000 for fiscal year 2002; and
       (3) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 2003.
       (b) Availability of Funds.--(1) No funds authorized to be 
     appropriated by subsection (a) for the Office of Intelligence 
     Policy and Review may be obligated or expended until the 
     later of the dates on which the Attorney General submits the 
     reports required by paragraphs (2) and (3).
       (2)(A) The Attorney General shall submit to the committees 
     of Congress specified in subparagraph (B) a report on the 
     manner in which the funds authorized to be appropriated by 
     subsection (a) for the Office of Intelligence Policy and 
     Review will be used by that Office--
       (i) to improve and strengthen its oversight of Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation field offices in the implementation 
     of orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.); and
       (ii) to streamline and increase the efficiency of the 
     application process under that Act.
       (B) The committees of Congress referred to in this 
     subparagraph are the following:
       (i) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the Senate.
       (ii) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
       (3) In addition to the report required by paragraph (2), 
     the Attorney General shall also submit to the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives a report that addresses the issues identified 
     in the semiannual report of the Attorney General to such 
     committees under section 108(a) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1808(a)) that was 
     submitted in April 2000, including any corrective actions 
     with regard to such issues. The report under this paragraph 
     shall be submitted in classified form.
       (4) Funds made available pursuant to subsection (a), in any 
     fiscal year, shall remain available until expended.
       (c) Report on Coordinating National Security and 
     Intelligence Functions Within the Department of Justice.--The 
     Attorney General shall report to the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
     within 120 days on actions that have been or will be taken by 
     the Department to--
       (1) promote quick and efficient responses to national 
     security issues;
       (2) centralize a point-of-contact within the Department on 
     national security matters for external entities and agencies; 
     and
       (3) coordinate the dissemination of intelligence 
     information within the appropriate components of the 
     Department and the formulation of policy on national security 
     issues.

     SEC. 607. COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO THE 
                   PROSECUTION OF CASES INVOLVING CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       The Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.) 
     is amended by inserting after section 9 the following new 
     section:


   ``coordination requirements relating to the prosecution of cases 
                    involving classified information

       ``Sec. 9A. (a) Briefings Required.--The Assistant Attorney 
     General for the Criminal Division and the appropriate United 
     States Attorney, or the designees of such officials, shall 
     provide briefings to the senior agency official, or the 
     designee of such official, with respect to any case involving 
     classified information that originated in the agency of such 
     senior agency official.
       ``(b) Timing of Briefings.--Briefings under subsection (a) 
     with respect to a case shall occur--
       ``(1) as soon as practicable after the Department of 
     Justice and the United States Attorney concerned determine 
     that a prosecution or potential prosecution could result; and
       ``(2) at such other times thereafter as are necessary to 
     keep the senior agency official concerned fully and currently 
     informed of the status of the prosecution.
       ``(c) Senior Agency Official Defined.--In this section, the 
     term `senior agency official' has the meaning given that term 
     in section 1.1 of Executive Order No. 12958.''.

     SEC. 608. SEVERABILITY.

       If any provision of this title (including an amendment made 
     by this title), or the application thereof, to any person or 
     circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this title 
     (including the amendments made by this title), and the 
     application thereof, to other persons or circumstances shall 
     not be affected thereby.

     TITLE VII--DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON JAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY

     SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Japanese Imperial Army 
     Disclosure Act''.

     SEC. 702. ESTABLISHMENT OF JAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY RECORDS 
                   INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given such 
     term under section 551 of title 5, United States Code.
       (2) Interagency group.--The term ``Interagency Group'' 
     means the Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency Working 
     Group established under subsection (b).
       (3) Japanese imperial army records.--The term ``Japanese 
     Imperial Army records'' means classified records or portions 
     of records that pertain to any person with respect to whom 
     the United States Government, in its sole discretion, has 
     grounds to believe ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise 
     participated in the experimentation and persecution of any 
     person because of race, religion, national origin, or 
     political option, during the period beginning September 18, 
     1931, and ending on December 31, 1948, under the direction 
     of, or in association with--
       (A) the Japanese Imperial Army;
       (B) any government in any area occupied by the military 
     forces of the Japanese Imperial Army;
       (C) any government established with the assistance or 
     cooperation of the Japanese Imperial Army; or
       (D) any government which was an ally of the Imperial Army 
     of Japan.
       (4) Record.--The term ``record'' means a Japanese Imperial 
     Army record.
       (b) Establishment of Interagency Group.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish the 
     Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency Working Group, 
     which shall remain in existence for 3 years after the date 
     the Interagency Group is established.
       (2) Membership.--The President shall appoint to the 
     Interagency Group individuals whom the

[[Page 20245]]

     President determines will most completely and effectively 
     carry out the functions of the Interagency Group within the 
     time limitations provided in this section, including the 
     Historian of the Department of State, the Archivist of the 
     United States, the head of any other agency the President 
     considers appropriate, and no more than 3 other persons. The 
     head of an agency appointed by the President may designate an 
     appropriate officer to serve on the Interagency Group in lieu 
     of the head of such agency.
       (3) Initial meeting.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Interagency Group shall 
     hold an initial meeting and begin the functions required 
     under this section.
       (c) Functions.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Interagency Group shall, to the 
     greatest extent possible consistent with section 703--
       (1) locate, identify, inventory, recommend for 
     declassification, and make available to the public at the 
     National Archives and Records Administration, all classified 
     Japanese Imperial Army records of the United States;
       (2) coordinate with agencies and take such actions as 
     necessary to expedite the release of such records to the 
     public; and
       (3) submit a report to Congress, including the Committee on 
     Government Reform and Oversight of the House of 
     Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the Senate, describing all such records, the disposition 
     of such records, and the activities of the Interagency Group 
     and agencies under this section.
       (d) Funding.--There is authorized to be appropriated such 
     sum as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this 
     title.

     SEC. 703. REQUIREMENT OF DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS.

       (a) Release of Records.--Subject to subsections (b), (c), 
     and (d), the Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency 
     Working Group shall release in their entirety Japanese 
     Imperial Army records.
       (b) Exception for Privacy.--An agency head may exempt from 
     release under subsection (a) specific information, that 
     would--
       (1) constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
     privacy;
       (2) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or 
     reveal information about the application of an intelligence 
     source or method, or reveal the identity of a human 
     intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that 
     source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national 
     security interests of the United States;
       (3) reveal information that would assist in the development 
     or use of weapons of mass destruction;
       (4) reveal information that would impair United States 
     cryptologic systems or activities;
       (5) reveal information that would impair the application of 
     state-of-the-art technology within a United States weapon 
     system;
       (6) reveal actual United States military war plans that 
     remain in effect;
       (7) reveal information that would seriously and 
     demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a 
     foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine 
     ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;
       (8) reveal information that would clearly, and demonstrably 
     impair the current ability of United States Government 
     officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other 
     officials for whom protection services are authorized in the 
     interest of national security;
       (9) reveal information that would seriously and 
     demonstrably impair current national security emergency 
     preparedness plans; or
       (10) violate a treaty or other international agreement.
       (c) Applications of Exemptions.--
       (1) In general.--In applying the exemptions provided in 
     paragraphs (2) through (10) of subsection (b), there shall be 
     a presumption that the public interest will be served by 
     disclosure and release of the records of the Japanese 
     Imperial Army. The exemption may be asserted only when the 
     head of the agency that maintains the records determines that 
     disclosure and release would be harmful to a specific 
     interest identified in the exemption. An agency head who 
     makes such a determination shall promptly report it to the 
     committees of Congress with appropriate jurisdiction, 
     including the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Government Reform and Oversight and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
       (2) Application of title 5.--A determination by an agency 
     head to apply an exemption provided in paragraphs (2) through 
     (9) of subsection (b) shall be subject to the same standard 
     of review that applies in the case of records withheld under 
     section 552(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code.
       (d) Limitation on Exemptions.--
       (1) In general.--The exemptions set forth in subsection (b) 
     shall constitute the only grounds pursuant to which an agency 
     head may exempt records otherwise subject to release under 
     subsection (a).
       (2) Records related to investigation or prosecutions.--This 
     section shall not apply to records--
       (A) related to or supporting any active or inactive 
     investigation, inquiry, or prosecution by the Office of 
     Special Investigations of the Department of Justice; or
       (B) solely in the possession, custody, or control of the 
     Office of Special Investigations.

     SEC. 704. EXPEDITED PROCESSING OF FOIA REQUESTS FOR JAPANESE 
                   IMPERIAL ARMY RECORDS.

       For purposes of expedited processing under section 
     552(a)(6)(E) of title 5, United States Code, any person who 
     was persecuted in the manner described in section 702(a)(3) 
     and who requests a Japanese Imperial Army record shall be 
     deemed to have a compelling need for such record.

     SEC. 705. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       The provisions of this title shall take effect on the date 
     that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

              TITLE VIII--DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION

     SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Public Interest 
     Declassification Act of 2000''.

     SEC. 802. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) It is in the national interest to establish an 
     effective, coordinated, and cost-effective means by which 
     records on specific subjects of extraordinary public interest 
     that do not undermine the national security interests of the 
     United States may be collected, retained, reviewed, and 
     disseminated to Congress, policymakers in the executive 
     branch, and the public.
       (2) Ensuring, through such measures, public access to 
     information that does not require continued protection to 
     maintain the national security interests of the United States 
     is a key to striking the balance between secrecy essential to 
     national security and the openness that is central to the 
     proper functioning of the political institutions of the 
     United States.

     SEC. 803. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.

       (a) Establishment.--There is established within the 
     executive branch of the United States a board to be known as 
     the ``Public Interest Declassification Board'' (in this title 
     referred to as the ``Board'').
       (b) Purposes.--The purposes of the Board are as follows:
       (1) To advise the President, the Assistant to the President 
     for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget, and such other executive branch 
     officials as the Board considers appropriate on the 
     systematic, thorough, coordinated, and comprehensive 
     identification, collection, review for declassification, and 
     release to Congress, interested agencies, and the public of 
     declassified records and materials (including donated 
     historical materials) that are of archival value, including 
     records and materials of extraordinary public interest.
       (2) To promote the fullest possible public access to a 
     thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of 
     significant United States national security decisions and 
     significant United States national security activities in 
     order to--
       (A) support the oversight and legislative functions of 
     Congress;
       (B) support the policymaking role of the executive branch;
       (C) respond to the interest of the public in national 
     security matters; and
       (D) promote reliable historical analysis and new avenues of 
     historical study in national security matters.
       (3) To provide recommendations to the President for the 
     identification, collection, and review for declassification 
     of information of extraordinary public interest that does not 
     undermine the national security of the United States, to be 
     undertaken in accordance with a declassification program that 
     has been established or may be established by the President 
     by Executive Order.
       (4) To advise the President, the Assistant to the President 
     for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget, and such other executive branch 
     officials as the Board considers appropriate on policies 
     deriving from the issuance by the President of Executive 
     Orders regarding the classification and declassification of 
     national security information.
       (c) Membership.--(1) The Board shall be composed of nine 
     individuals appointed from among citizens of the United 
     States who are preeminent in the fields of history, national 
     security, foreign policy, intelligence policy, social 
     science, law, or archives, including individuals who have 
     served in Congress or otherwise in the Federal Government or 
     have otherwise engaged in research, scholarship, or 
     publication in such fields on matters relating to the 
     national security of the United States, of whom--
       (A) five shall be appointed by the President;
       (B) one shall be appointed by the Majority Leader of the 
     Senate;
       (C) one shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the 
     Senate;
       (D) one shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (E) one shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (2)(A) Of the members initially appointed to the Board, 
     three shall be appointed for a term of four years, three 
     shall be appointed for a term of three years, and three shall 
     be appointed for a term of two years.
       (B) Any subsequent appointment to the Board shall be for a 
     term of three years.
       (3) A vacancy in the Board shall be filled in the same 
     manner as the original appointment. A member of the Board 
     appointed to fill a vacancy before the expiration of a term 
     shall serve for the remainder of the term.
       (4) A member of the Board may be appointed to a new term on 
     the Board upon the expiration

[[Page 20246]]

     of the member's term on the Board, except that no member may 
     serve more than three full terms on the Board.
       (d) Chairperson; Executive Secretary.--(1)(A) The President 
     shall designate one of the members of the Board as the 
     Chairperson of the Board.
       (B) The term of service as Chairperson of the Board shall 
     be two years.
       (C) A member serving as Chairperson of the Board may be re-
     designated as Chairperson of the Board upon the expiration of 
     the member's term as Chairperson of the Board, except that no 
     member shall serve as Chairperson of the Board for more than 
     six years.
       (2) The Director of the Information Security Oversight 
     Office shall serve as the Executive Secretary of the Board.
       (e) Meetings.--The Board shall meet as needed to accomplish 
     its mission, consistent with the availability of funds. A 
     majority of the members of the Board shall constitute a 
     quorum.
       (f) Staff.--Any employee of the Federal Government may be 
     detailed to the Board, with the agreement of and without 
     reimbursement to the detailing agency, and such detail shall 
     be without interruption or loss of civil, military, or 
     foreign service status or privilege.
       (g) Security.--(1) The members and staff of the Board 
     shall, as a condition of appointment to or employment with 
     the Board, hold appropriate security clearances for access to 
     the classified records and materials to be reviewed by the 
     Board or its staff, and shall follow the guidance and 
     practices on security under applicable Executive Orders and 
     agency directives.
       (2) The head of an agency shall, as a condition of granting 
     access to a member of the Board, the Executive Secretary of 
     the Board, or a member of the staff of the Board to 
     classified records or materials of the agency under this 
     title, require the member, the Executive Secretary, or the 
     member of the staff, as the case may be, to--
       (A) execute an agreement regarding the security of such 
     records or materials that is approved by the head of the 
     agency; and
       (B) hold an appropriate security clearance granted or 
     recognized under the standard procedures and eligibility 
     criteria of the agency, including any special access approval 
     required for access to such records or materials.
       (3) The members of the Board, the Executive Secretary of 
     the Board, and the members of the staff of the Board may not 
     use any information acquired in the course of their official 
     activities on the Board for nonofficial purposes.
       (4) For purposes of any law or regulation governing access 
     to classified information that pertains to the national 
     security of the United States, and subject to any limitations 
     on access arising under section 806(b), and to facilitate the 
     advisory functions of the Board under this title, a member of 
     the Board seeking access to a record or material under this 
     title shall be deemed for purposes of this subsection to have 
     a need to know the contents of the record or material.
       (h) Compensation.--(1) Each member of the Board shall 
     receive compensation at a rate not to exceed the daily 
     equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay payable for 
     positions at ES-1 of the Senior Executive Service under 
     section 5382 of title 5, United States Code, for each day 
     such member is engaged in the actual performance of duties of 
     the Board.
       (2) Members of the Board shall be allowed travel expenses, 
     including per diem in lieu of subsistence at rates authorized 
     for employees of agencies under subchapter of chapter 57 of 
     title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or 
     regular places of business in the performance of the duties 
     of the Board.
       (i) Guidance; Annual Budget.--(1) On behalf of the 
     President, the Assistant to the President for National 
     Security Affairs shall provide guidance on policy to the 
     Board.
       (2) The Executive Secretary of the Board, under the 
     direction of the Chairperson of the Board and the Board, and 
     acting in consultation with the Archivist of the United 
     States, the Assistant to the President for National Security 
     Affairs, and the Director of the Office of Management and 
     Budget, shall prepare the annual budget of the Board.
       (j) Support.--The Information Security Oversight Office may 
     support the activities of the Board under this title. Such 
     support shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.
       (k) Public Availability of Records and Reports.--(1) The 
     Board shall make available for public inspection records of 
     its proceedings and reports prepared in the course of its 
     activities under this title to the extent such records and 
     reports are not classified and would not be exempt from 
     release under the provisions of section 552 of title 5, 
     United States Code.
       (2) In making records and reports available under paragraph 
     (1), the Board shall coordinate the release of such records 
     and reports with appropriate officials from agencies with 
     expertise in classified information in order to ensure that 
     such records and reports do not inadvertently contain 
     classified information.
       (l) Applicability of Certain Administrative Laws.--The 
     provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. 
     App.) shall not apply to the activities of the Board under 
     this title. However, the records of the Board shall be 
     governed by the provisions of the Federal Records Act of 
     1950.

     SEC. 804. IDENTIFICATION, COLLECTION, AND REVIEW FOR 
                   DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION OF ARCHIVAL 
                   VALUE OR EXTRAORDINARY PUBLIC INTEREST.

       (a) Briefings on Agency Declassification Programs.--(1) As 
     requested by the Board, or by the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the head of 
     any agency with the authority under an Executive Order to 
     classify information shall provide to the Board, the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, or the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives, on an annual basis, a summary briefing and 
     report on such agency's progress and plans in the 
     declassification of national security information. Such 
     briefing shall cover the declassification goals set by 
     statute, regulation, or policy, the agency's progress with 
     respect to such goals, and the agency's planned goals and 
     priorities for its declassification activities over the next 
     two fiscal years. Agency briefings and reports shall give 
     particular attention to progress on the declassification of 
     records and materials that are of archival value or 
     extraordinary public interest to the people of the United 
     States.
       (2)(A) The annual briefing and report under paragraph (1) 
     for agencies within the Department of Defense, including the 
     military departments, and the elements of the intelligence 
     community shall be provided on a consolidated basis.
       (B) In this paragraph, the term ``elements of the 
     intelligence community'' means the elements of the 
     intelligence community specified or designated under section 
     3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401a(4)).
       (b) Recommendations on Agency Declassification Programs.--
     (1) Upon reviewing and discussing declassification plans and 
     progress with an agency, the Board shall provide to the head 
     of the agency the written recommendations of the Board as to 
     how the agency's declassification program could be improved. 
     A copy of each recommendation shall also be submitted to the 
     Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and 
     the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
       (2) Consistent with the provisions of section 803(k), the 
     Board's recommendations to the head of an agency under 
     paragraph (1) shall become public 60 days after such 
     recommendations are sent to the head of the agency under that 
     paragraph.
       (c) Recommendations on Special Searches for Records of 
     Extraordinary Public Interest.--(1) The Board shall also make 
     recommendations to the President regarding proposed 
     initiatives to identify, collect, and review for 
     declassification classified records and materials of 
     extraordinary public interest.
       (2) In making recommendations under paragraph (1), the 
     Board shall consider the following:
       (A) The opinions and requests of Members of Congress, 
     including opinions and requests expressed or embodied in 
     letters or legislative proposals.
       (B) The opinions and requests of the National Security 
     Council, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads 
     of other agencies.
       (C) The opinions of United States citizens.
       (D) The opinions of members of the Board.
       (E) The impact of special searches on systematic and all 
     other on-going declassification programs.
       (F) The costs (including budgetary costs) and the impact 
     that complying with the recommendations would have on agency 
     budgets, programs, and operations.
       (G) The benefits of the recommendations.
       (H) The impact of compliance with the recommendations on 
     the national security of the United States.
       (d) President's Declassification Priorities.--(1) 
     Concurrent with the submission to Congress of the budget of 
     the President each fiscal year under section 1105 of title 
     31, United States Code, the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget shall publish a description of the 
     President's declassification program and priorities, together 
     with a listing of the funds requested to implement that 
     program.
       (2) Nothing in this title shall be construed to substitute 
     or supersede, or establish a funding process for, any 
     declassification program that has been established or may be 
     established by the President by Executive Order.

     SEC. 805. PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND 
                   OTHER INFORMATION.

       (a) In General.--Nothing in this title shall be construed 
     to limit the authority of the head of an agency to classify 
     information or to continue the classification of information 
     previously classified by an agency.
       (b) Special Access Programs.--Nothing in this title shall 
     be construed to limit the authority of the head of an agency 
     to grant or deny access to a special access program.
       (c) Authorities of Director of Central Intelligence.--
     Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit the 
     authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence as the 
     head of the intelligence community, including the Director's 
     responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods 
     from unauthorized disclosure as required by section 103(c)(6) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6)).
       (d) Exemptions to Release of Information.--Nothing in this 
     title shall be construed to limit any exemption or exception 
     to the release to the public under this title of information 
     that is protected under section 552(b) of title 5, United 
     States Code (commonly referred to as the ``Freedom of 
     Information Act''), or section 552a of title 5, United States 
     Code (commonly referred to as the ``Privacy Act'').
       (e) Withholding Information From Congress.--Nothing in this 
     title shall be construed to authorize the withholding of 
     information from Congress.

[[Page 20247]]



     SEC. 806. STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES.

       (a) Liaison.--(1) The head of each agency with the 
     authority under an Executive Order to classify information 
     and the head of each Federal Presidential library shall 
     designate an employee of such agency or library, as the case 
     may be, to act as liaison to the Board for purposes of this 
     title.
       (2) The Board may establish liaison and otherwise consult 
     with such other historical and advisory committees as the 
     Board considers appropriate for purposes of this title.
       (b) Limitations on Access.--(1)(A) Except as provided in 
     paragraph (2), if the head of an agency or the head of a 
     Federal Presidential library determines it necessary to deny 
     or restrict access of the Board, or of the agency or library 
     liaison to the Board, to information contained in a record or 
     material, in whole or in part, the head of the agency or the 
     head of the library, as the case may be, shall promptly 
     notify the Board in writing of such determination.
       (B) Each notice to the Board under subparagraph (A) shall 
     include a description of the nature of the records or 
     materials, and a justification for the determination, covered 
     by such notice.
       (2) In the case of a determination referred to in paragraph 
     (1) with respect to a special access program created by the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, 
     or the head of any other agency, the notification of denial 
     of access under paragraph (1), including a description of the 
     nature of the Board's request for access, shall be submitted 
     to the Assistant to the President for National Security 
     Affairs rather than to the Board.
       (c) Discretion to Disclose.--At the conclusion of a 
     declassification review, the head of an agency may, in the 
     discretion of the head of the agency, determine that the 
     public's interest in the disclosure of records or materials 
     of the agency covered by such review, and still properly 
     classified, outweighs the Government's need to protect such 
     records or materials, and may release such records or 
     materials in accordance with the provisions of Executive 
     Order 12958 or any successor order to such Executive Order.
       (d) Discretion To Protect.--At the conclusion of a 
     declassification review, the head of an agency may, in the 
     discretion of the head of the agency, determine that the 
     interest of the agency in the protection of records or 
     materials of the agency covered by such review, and still 
     properly classified, outweigh's the public's need for access 
     to such records or materials, and may deny release of such 
     records or materials in accordance with the provisions of 
     Executive Order 12958 or any successor order to such 
     Executive Order.
       (e) Reports.--(1)(A) Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     the Board shall annually submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report on the activities of the 
     Board under this title, including summary information 
     regarding any denials by the head of an agency or the head of 
     a Federal Presidential library of access of the Board to 
     records or materials under this title.
       (B) In this paragraph, the term ``appropriate congressional 
     committees'' means the Select Committee on Intelligence and 
     the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on Government Reform and Oversight of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), notice that the Board 
     has been denied access to records and materials, and a 
     justification for the determination in support of the denial, 
     shall be submitted by the agency denying the access as 
     follows:
       (A) In the case of the denial of access to a special access 
     program created by the Secretary of Defense, to the 
     Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate 
     and to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of 
     the House of Representatives.
       (B) In the case of the denial of access to a special access 
     program created by the Director of Central Intelligence, or 
     by the head of any other agency (including the Department of 
     Defense) if the special access program pertains to 
     intelligence activities, or of access to any information and 
     materials relating to intelligence sources and methods, to 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (C) In the case of the denial of access to a special access 
     program created by the Secretary of Energy or the 
     Administrator for Nuclear Security, to the Committees on 
     Armed Services and Appropriations and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and to the Committees on Armed 
     Services and Appropriations and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 807. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

       Nothing in this title limits the protection afforded to any 
     information under any other provision of law. This title is 
     not intended and may not be construed to create any right or 
     benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law 
     against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or its 
     employees. This title does not modify in any way the 
     substantive criteria or procedures for the classification of 
     information, nor does this title create any right or benefit 
     subject to judicial review.

     SEC. 808. FUNDING.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is hereby 
     authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provisions of 
     this title amounts as follows:
       (1) For fiscal year 2001, $650,000.
       (2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2001, such sums 
     as may be necessary for such fiscal year.
       (b) Funding Requests.--The President shall include in the 
     budget submitted to Congress for each fiscal year under 
     section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, a request for 
     amounts for the activities of the Board under this title 
     during such fiscal year.

     SEC. 809. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Agency.--(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     the term ``agency'' means the following:
       (i) An executive agency, as that term is defined in section 
     105 of title 5, United States Code.
       (ii) A military department, as that term is defined in 
     section 102 of such title.
       (iii) Any other entity in the executive branch that comes 
     into the possession of classified information.
       (B) The term does not include the Board.
       (2) Classified material or record.--The terms ``classified 
     material'' and ``classified record'' include any 
     correspondence, memorandum, book, plan, map, drawing, 
     diagram, pictorial or graphic work, photograph, film, 
     microfilm, sound recording, videotape, machine readable 
     records, and other documentary material, regardless of 
     physical form or characteristics, that has been determined 
     pursuant to Executive Order to require protection against 
     unauthorized disclosure in the interests of the national 
     security of the United States.
       (3) Declassification.--The term ``declassification'' means 
     the process by which records or materials that have been 
     classified are determined no longer to require protection 
     from unauthorized disclosure to protect the national security 
     of the United States.
       (4) Donated historical material.--The term ``donated 
     historical material'' means collections of personal papers 
     donated or given to a Federal Presidential library or other 
     archival repository under a deed of gift or otherwise.
       (5) Federal presidential library.--The term ``Federal 
     Presidential library'' means a library operated and 
     maintained by the United States Government through the 
     National Archives and Records Administration under the 
     applicable provisions of chapter 21 of title 44, United 
     States Code.
       (6) National security.--The term ``national security'' 
     means the national defense or foreign relations of the United 
     States.
       (7) Records or materials of extraordinary public 
     interest.--The term ``records or materials of extraordinary 
     public interest'' means records or materials that--
       (A) demonstrate and record the national security policies, 
     actions, and decisions of the United States, including--
       (i) policies, events, actions, and decisions which led to 
     significant national security outcomes; and
       (ii) the development and evolution of significant United 
     States national security policies, actions, and decisions;
       (B) will provide a significantly different perspective in 
     general from records and materials publicly available in 
     other historical sources; and
       (C) would need to be addressed through ad hoc record 
     searches outside any systematic declassification program 
     established under Executive Order.
       (8) Records of archival value.--The term ``records of 
     archival value'' means records that have been determined by 
     the Archivist of the United States to have sufficient 
     historical or other value to warrant their continued 
     preservation by the Federal Government.

     SEC. 810. SUNSET.

       The provisions of this title shall expire four years after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, unless reauthorized by 
     statute.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Fitzgerald) appointed Mr. Shelby, Mr. 
Lugar, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Allard, Mr. 
Mack, Mr. Warner, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Graham, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Baucus, Mr. 
Robb, Mr. Lautenberg, and Mr. Levin conferees on the part of the 
Senate.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I yield to Senator Bryan.
  Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I thank the leader. I specifically thank 
the chairman, Senator Shelby. We have worked to put this authorization 
bill together. It could not have happened but for his cooperation and 
the cooperation of a number of others of our colleagues on the 
Intelligence Committee. I thank them for their cooperation, the 
chairman in particular. I thank the majority leader and Senator Daschle 
as well. Again, I acknowledge the leadership of my chairman. He has 
been most helpful in working through this bill. I thank him, the 
majority leader, and our colleagues.
  My remarks will echo many of the points made by the distinguished 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Shelby. Those who are 
not familiar with the workings of the Intelligence Committee may find 
it odd that members from different parties have such agreement on the 
substance

[[Page 20248]]

of this legislation. Most of my colleagues, however, know that the 
committee has a long tradition of bipartisanship and I am proud to say 
that under Senator Shelby's leadership we have upheld that tradition. 
We have confronted difficult policy issues and budget choices, and the 
chairman has gone out of his way to ensure that the committee addressed 
these in a fair and nonpartisan way. I appreciate the courtesies he has 
shown me as vice chairman. I think we have produced a good bill that 
focuses on several critical areas of intelligence policy.
  This important legislation authorizes the activities of the U.S. 
intelligence community and seeks to ensure that this critical function 
will continue to serve our national security interests into the 21st 
century. The community faces momentous challenges from both the 
proliferation of threats facing America and from the rapid pace of 
technological change occurring throughout society. How we respond to 
these challenges today will affect our ability to protect American 
interests in the years ahead.
  Some have argued that the end of the cold war should have 
significantly reduced our need for a robust intelligence collection 
capability. In fact, the opposite is true. The bipolar world of the 
Soviet-United States confrontation provided a certain stability with a 
clear threat and a single principal adversary on which to focus. We now 
face a world with growing transnational threats of weapons 
proliferation, terrorism, and international crime and narcotics 
trafficking, and multiple regional conflicts which create instability 
and threaten U.S. interests. While we, of course, must continue to 
closely monitor Russia, which still possesses the singular capability 
to destroy our country, these emerging threats demand increasing 
attention and resources.
  A decade after the collapse of Soviet communism, the intelligence 
community continues its difficult transition, from an organization 
which confronted one threat to one which now must focus on a variety of 
threats, each unique in its potential to harm the United States. At the 
same time, the community has been buffeted by the information 
revolution, which provides tremendous opportunity for intelligence 
collection, but threatens to overwhelm our ability to process and 
disseminate information. These twin challenges--new and qualitatively 
different threats, coupled with an information and technological 
explosion--threaten the community's ability to serve as an early 
warning system for our country and a force multiplier for our armed 
services.
  Unfortunately, the intelligence community has often been too slow to 
confront these challenge and to adapt to these new realities. To make 
this transition will require the following:
  First, the intelligence community must get its budget in order. 
Although I believe the community probably needs additional resources, 
the Congress first must be convinced that existing resources are being 
used effectively.
  Second, the various intelligence agencies must begin to function ore 
corporately--as a community, rather than as separate entities, all with 
different and often conflicting priorities. This has been a topic of 
debate for some time. And yet, the passage of time does not seem to 
have brought us much closer to this objective.
  Third, the intelligence community must do a better job of setting 
priorities. That means making hard decisions about what it will not do. 
Resources are stretched thin, often because community leadership has 
been unable to say no. The result is that agencies like the National 
Security Agency are starved for recapitalization funds necessary to 
keep pace with technological changes.
  Fourth, the community must streamline its bureaucracy, eliminating 
unnecessary layers of management, particularly those that separate the 
collector of intelligence from the analyzer of that intelligence.
  Finally, the community must revamp its information technology 
backbone so that agencies can easily and effectively communicate with 
one another.
  These steps will not be easy but are essential if the intelligence 
community is to stay relevant in today's world. Good intelligence is 
more important than ever. As we deal with calls for military 
intervention in far flung locales, intelligence becomes a force 
multiplier. We rely on the intelligence community to keep us informed 
of developing crises, to describe the situation prior to any U.S. 
intervention, to help with force protection when U.S. personnel are on 
the ground, and to analyze foreign leadership intentions. Solid 
intelligence allows U.S. policymakers and military commanders to make 
and implement informed decisions.
  Maintaining our intelligence capability is difficult and sometimes 
expensive but absolutely essential to national security. The committee 
has identified a few areas that we think are priorities that need 
additional attention. One area of particular concern is the need to 
recapitalize the National Security Agency to assure our ability to 
collect signals intelligence. Collecting and deciphering the 
communications of America's adversaries provides senior policymakers 
with a unique source of sensitive information. In 1998, and again this 
year, the committee asked a group of highly qualified technical experts 
to review NSA operations. The Technical Advisory Group's conclusions 
were unsettling. They identified significant shortcomings which have 
resulted from the sustained budget decline of the past decade. With 
limited available resources the NSA has maintained its day-to-day 
readiness but has not invested in needed modernization. Consequently, 
NSA's technological infrastructure and human resources are struggling 
to meet emerging challenges.
  The NSA historically has led the way in development and use of 
cutting edge technology. This innovative spirit has helped keep the 
United States a step ahead of those whose interests are hostile to our 
own. Unfortunately, rather than leading the way, the NSA now struggles 
to keep pace with communications and computing advances.
  There is, however, some reason for optimism. The current Director of 
NSA, General Hayden, has developed a strategy for recovery. He has 
undertaken an aggressive and ambitious modernization effort, including 
dramatic organizational changes and innovative business practices. 
These changes and the rebuilding of NSA's infrastructure will, however, 
require significant additional resources. The committee decided that 
this situation demands immediate attention, but the intelligence budget 
faces the same constrained fiscal situation as other areas of the 
Federal budget. We have, therefore, realigned priorities within 
existing resources in order to reverse this downward trend. This was 
not an easy process and we were forced to make some painful tradeoffs, 
but ensuring the future of the NSA is the committee's top priority. We 
cannot stand by and allow the United States to lose this capability. We 
have taken prudent steps in this legislation to make sure NSA will 
continue to be the premier signals intelligence organization in the 
world.
  The bill also attempts to address an imbalance that has concerned the 
committee for some time. We have argued that our ability to collect 
intelligence far exceeds our ability to analyze and disseminate 
finished intelligence to the end user. We spend a tremendous amount of 
the budget developing and fielding satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles 
and all manner of other senors and collection platforms. These programs 
are important but too often new sensors are put into place without 
sufficient thought to how we will process and distribute the additional 
data. No matter how good a satellite is at collecting raw intelligence, 
it is useless if that intelligence never makes it into the hands of a 
competent analyst and then on to an end user.
  This imbalance has been particularly acute at the National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency. At the request of Congress, NIMA has identified 
projected processing shortfalls associated with its future sensor 
acquisition plans. NIMA also outlined a three

[[Page 20249]]

phase modernization to address these shortfalls. Unfortunately, the 
future year funding profile creates a situation that will force the 
intelligence community to either cut deeply into other programs or 
abandon the modernization. The committee has rejected that approach and 
has realigned priorities in order to avoid this budgetary squeeze in 
the out years. It makes no sense to purchase expensive collection 
platforms when the rest of the system cannot handle the amount of 
intelligence produced.
  Beyond the questions of resource allocation, this legislation also 
address several policy issues, including the problem of serious 
security breakdowns at the State Department. Over the course of the 
last 2\1/2\ years the Department has been beset by seemingly 
inexplicable security compromises, the latest being the disappearance 
of a laptop computer in January of this year. This incident, still 
unexplained, follows closely on the heels of the discovery of a Russian 
listening device planted in a seventh floor conference room. 
Subsequently we learned that there was no escort requirement for 
foreign visitors, including Russians, to the State Department. Finally, 
I must mention the 1998 tweed jacket incident. In this case an 
unidentified man wearing a tweed jacket entered the Secretary of 
State's office suite unchallenged by State Department employees and 
removed classified documents. No one knows who he was.
  The only conclusion that I can draw is that the State Department 
culture does not place a priority on security. Despite Secretary 
Albright's efforts to correct procedural deficiencies and to emphasize 
the need for better security, we have not seen much progress. The 
authorization bill contains a provision requiring all elements of the 
State Department to be certified as in compliance with regulations for 
the handling of Sensitive Compartmented Information. This is the most 
highly classified information and is controlled by the Director of 
Central Intelligence. If a component of the State Department is not in 
compliance with the applicable regulations, then that office will no 
longer be allowed to retain or store this sensitive information. It is 
unfortunate that this provision is necessary, but we must make it clear 
to individuals who handle classified material that we are serious about 
enforcing security rules.
  A broader but related area of concern is the ability of the U.S. 
Intelligence community to meet the counterintelligence threats of the 
21st Century with current structures and programs. We can no longer 
worry only about the intelligence services of adversaries such as the 
old Soviet Union, North Korea, or Cuba. We must deal with ever more 
sophisticated terrorist organizations and international crime 
syndicates capable of launching their own intelligence and 
counterintelligence efforts. We also face challenges from friendly 
states seeking access to economic data and advanced U.S. technology.
  All of these changes argue for a major retooling of a U.S. 
counterintelligence apparatus designed for the cold war. The Director 
of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, and the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense have undertaken an effort, referred to as CI-21, 
to design the structures and policies that we will need to cope with 
cutting edge technology and with the emergence of threats from 
nontraditional sources. I have been encouraged by the early progress 
made on the CI-21 effort. We have chosen not to include legislative 
provisions in the bill with the hope that the agencies involved will 
reach agreement and finalize the CI-21 plan. The report accompanying 
the bill strongly encourages them to do so and I reiterate that 
encouragement.
  One provision in the bill that has created a bit of controversy is 
the section that closes a gap in existing law related to the 
unauthorized disclosure of classified material. This provision will 
make it a felony for a U.S. government official to knowingly pass 
classified material to someone who is not authorized to receive it. I 
say that this provision closes a gap because many categories of 
classified information are covered by existing statutes. This includes 
nuclear weapons data and defense information. Unfortunately much 
sensitive intelligence information does not fall into one of the 
existing definitions. Disclosure of this information could compromise 
sensitive sources and in some cases endanger peoples lives. The 
provision in the bill has been carefully crafted to avoid first 
amendment concerns and the chairman and I will offer a technical 
amendment incorporating suggestions made by the Attorney General. It is 
my understanding that she supports the provision as amended.
  Another provision which merits further explanation is the section 
dealing with treaty implementing legislation. This language provides 
that future criminal laws enacted to implement treaties will not apply 
to intelligence activities unless those activities are specifically 
named in the legislation. On its face this could be interpreted as 
exempting our intelligence community from the law regardless of the 
nature of the activity. In fact, this only applies to activities which 
are otherwise lawful and authorized. Intelligence activities are 
subject to an extensive set of statutes, regulations and presidential 
directives. These rules try to balance our need for intelligence to 
protect our national security with the American sense of values and 
ethical behavior.
  Intelligence gathering--spying--is an inherently deceitful activity. 
To protect our military forces, thwart terrorist acts, or dismantle 
drug trafficking organizations, we gather information through 
surreptitious means. We either convince people to betray their country 
or cause, or we use intrusive technical means to find out what people 
are doing or saying. This may make some people uncomfortable, but it is 
absolutely essential to protecting American interests. Treaties that 
proscribe certain kinds of behavior should not inadvertently restrict 
these intelligence activities. If the Congress intends to apply treaty 
implementing legislation to intelligence activities, then we should say 
so explicitly. We want to be precise and ensure that intelligence 
operatives in the field understand what we expect of them. Ambiguity 
and uncertainty are more likely to create problems. This provision will 
put the burden on Congress to make the determination of which treaty 
restrictions we want to apply to intelligence activities.
  I have served on the Intelligence Committee for almost 8 years now 
and I have had the privilege of serving as vice chairman since January. 
During that time I have made a few observations that I would like to 
share. Since I am leaving the committee and the Senate at the end of 
this year, I have no vested interest other than my continuing belief in 
the importance of the committee's work conducting oversight of the 
intelligence community.
  My experience leads me to the conclusion that excessive turnover is 
seriously hampering the effectiveness of the Intelligence Committee--a 
committee the Senate relies upon and points to in reassuring the 
American people that the intelligence community is being appropriately 
monitored by their elected representatives. Because of the 8-year 
limitation, member turn-over can be, and often is dramatic. For 
example, when the 107th Congress convenes next January, 5 of the 7 
currently serving Democrats will have departed the committee. At the 
end of the 107th Congress, 5 of the 8 currently serving Republicans 
will leave the committee.
  Over time, this brain drain diminishes the committee's ability to 
discharge its responsibilities. For example, in 1994 the committee 
dealt with the Aldrich Ames espionage case, arguably the most 
devastating counterintelligence failure of the cold war. The committee 
produced a report extremely critical of the CIA in this case and of the 
way the CIA and FBI dealt with counterintelligence in general. The Ames 
debacle led to a major restructuring of our national 
counterintelligence system with significant legislative input. Yet 
today, there is only one member on the majority side who served on the 
committee during that period, and at the end of this year there will be 
no members on the Democratic side. This lack of corporate

[[Page 20250]]

memory greatly reduces the committee's effectiveness.
  This committee deals with sensitive and complex issues, and much of 
the committee's business involves the technical agencies such as the 
National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office. To 
understand these issues a Senator must invest significant time to 
committee briefings and hearings. There is no outside source to go to 
stay abreast of developments in the intelligence community. Just about 
the time members are beginning to understand these issues they are 
forced to rotate off the committee. This makes no sense.
  The rationale behind the term limits was two fold. First, it was 
feared that the intelligence community could over time co-opt 
permanently serving members. In fact, new members who have little 
experience with the workings of the intelligence community are more 
dependent on information provided by the intelligence agencies. SSCI 
members are no more likely to be co-opted by the intelligence community 
than the members of other authorizing committees are likely to be co-
opted by the Departments and agencies they oversee. The second reason 
term limits were enacted stemmed from the understandable view that the 
SSCI would benefit from a flow of fresh ideas that new members would 
bring. But because of naturally occurring turnover, new members have 
regularly joined the committee, irrespective of term limits. Since the 
SSCI was created 24 years ago, approximately sixty Senators have served 
on the committee. Members have served an average of just over 5 years--
and approximately 60 percent of committee members have served on the 
committee less than 8 years. This historical record confirms that 
vacancies will continue to occur regularly on the SSCI, thus allowing 
the new faces and fresh ideas. At the same time, however, members who 
have a long-term interest in the area of intelligence should continue 
to serve and develop expertise.
  My second observation relates to the committee's authority but also 
to a larger issue that is the question of declassifying the top line 
number for the intelligence budget. It is difficult to conduct a 
thorough and rationale debate concerning intelligence policy without 
mentioning how much money we spend on our intelligence system. 
Declassifying the top line budget would allow for a healthy debate 
within the Congress about the priority we place on intelligence. I 
would provide greater visibility and openness to average Americans, 
whose tax dollars fund these programs. Disclosure of the overall budget 
would provide these benefits without damaging U.S. national security. 
DCI Tenet declassified the budget numbers for top past budgets with no 
adverse effects, but has declined to continue this practice. I hope 
that the Congress and the next administration will revisit this issue 
and left this unnecessary veil of secrecy.
  Finally, Mr. President, I want to thank the staff of the Intelligence 
Committee for the work they do and for the support they have given me 
as vice chairman. The committee is staffed by professionals dedicated 
to ensuring that the intelligence community enhances U.S. national 
security and does so in strict compliance with the intent of Congress. 
The staff is unique in the Senate in that the vast majority are 
nonpartisan and go about their business without regard to any political 
agenda. The four members of the staff with partisan affiliations, the 
staff directors and their deputies, approach their work with same 
spirit of bipartisanship that always has been a hallmark of the 
committee. Let me single our Bill Duhnke and Joan Grimson, the majority 
staff director and deputy for their excellent cooperation and the 
courtesy they have extended this year. I should note that Joan is not 
here today because she is off on maternity leave. I extend my 
congratulations to her and her husband on the birth of their first 
child, Jacqueline Anna. I also thank Melvin Dubee, my deputy minority 
staff director. Melvin brings a wealth of experience to the job, and it 
has been reflected in the sound advice I have come to depend on him to 
provide. Vicki Divoll, who joined the committee staff as counsel in 
January, also has been invaluable to me during the preparation of this 
legislation and in dealing with other legal issues.
  Finally, I would have been lost as vice chairman without the guidance 
and advice of Al Cumming, the minority staff director. Al kept me well 
informed and helped me focus on issues that will have a lasting impact 
on the functioning of the intelligence community. The staff has done 
superb work on this legislation.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank Senator Bryan for his comments. 
Obviously, as I said, this is very important legislation. The 
Intelligence Committee does good work, important work for our 
committee. It has been partially delayed by misunderstandings which we 
have worked out. I think everybody is satisfied with this. I thank the 
chairman for his persistence. I yield to the chairman of the committee.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I want to take a minute or two and talk 
about my colleague from Nevada, Senator Bryan. He is going to be 
leaving the Senate soon. As the vice chairman of the committee--a long-
term and long-time member of the Senate Intelligence Committee--he has 
been a delight to work with most of the time. Seriously. He puts a lot 
of effort into what we do on the Senate Intelligence Committee.
  I would be remiss if I did not bring that up as we pass this bill 
tonight. We have a conference to go to. We will be spending a lot of 
time together in the waning days of this Congress. Dick Bryan served 
this country well, first as a State legislator, as the attorney general 
of his State, as the Governor of his State, and in two terms in the 
U.S. Senate. I have worked with him on a lot of issues, and I can say 
this: He is a hard worker, he is smart, he is going to be prepared, he 
is going to be tough, and he is going to put the Nation first.
  Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, if I may respond to the excessively 
generous comments of my chairman, my colleague, and my friend, the 
reality is that working with him has been a pleasure. Without his 
cooperation and, obviously, trying to work in a bipartisan way to 
process this piece of legislation and other things we have done since 
the two of us have been privileged to serve as chairman and vice 
chairman, we would not be here today with this bill.
  I acknowledge his leadership. The good citizens of Alabama have a 
fine Member here and a person with whom I have been privileged to work 
for the last 12 years I have been in the Senate, and most especially 
this last year when we have served in our respective roles on the 
Intelligence Committee. I thank him publicly.

                          ____________________



  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to discuss 
legislation arising from the investigation by the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, which has been 
conducting oversight on the way the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation have responded to allegations of 
espionage in the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. 
This bipartisan proposal will improve the counterintelligence 
procedures used to detect and defeat efforts by foreign governments to 
gain unlawful access to our top national security information by 
improving the way that allegations of espionage are investigated and, 
where appropriate, prosecuted.
  Together with Senators Torricelli, Grassley, Thurmond, Sessions, 
Schumer, Feingold, Biden, Helms and Leahy, I introduced the 
Counterintelligence Reform Act on February 24 of this year. The 
Judiciary Committee unanimously reported the bill on May 18, and it was 
referred to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which also 
deals with espionage matters.
  The Senate Intelligence Committee unanimously reported the bill on 
July 20, and has included the measure as an amendment to the 
Intelligence Authorization bill which passed the Senate today.
  Few tasks are more important than protecting our national security, 
so

[[Page 20251]]

building and maintaining bipartisan support for this legislation to 
correct the problems we identified during the course of our oversight 
was my top priority. The reforms contained in this legislation will 
ensure that the problems we found are fixed, and that the national 
security is better protected in the future.
  To understand why this legislation is necessary, I would like to 
review two of the cases that the subcommittee looked at--the Wen Ho Lee 
case and the Peter Lee case. Former Los Alamos scientist Dr. Wen Ho Lee 
was arrested on December 10, 1999, and charged with 59 counts of 
violating the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and unlawful gathering and 
retention of national defense information. In a stunning reversal on 
September 13, the government accepted a deal in which Dr. Lee would 
plead guilty to one count of unlawfully retaining national defense 
information and would be sentenced to time served, in exchange for 
telling what he had done with the tapes. There remains a question as to 
whether Department of Justice officials tried to make up for their 
blunders in this case by throwing the book at Dr. Lee. The Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Department of Justice Oversight will continue to hold 
hearings on this matter, but it has been clear from the beginning that 
the Department of Justice bungled the investigation of Dr. Lee.
  The critical turning point in this case came on August 12, 1997, when 
the Department of Justice's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review 
(OIPR) turned down an FBI application for an electronic surveillance 
warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA. OIPR 
believed that the application was deficient because it did not show 
sufficient probable cause, and therefore decided not to let the 
application go forward to the special FISA court.
  In making this determination, the DoJ made several key errors. The 
Department of Justice used an unreasonably high standard for 
determining probable cause, a standard that is inconsistent with 
Supreme Court rulings on this issue. For example, one of the concerns 
raised by OIPR attorney Allan Kornblum was that the FBI had not shown 
that the Lees were the ones who passed the W-88 information to the PRC, 
to the exclusion of all the other possible suspects identified by the 
DoE Administrative Inquiry. That is the standard for establishing guilt 
at a trial, not for establishing probable cause to issue a search 
warrant.
  DoJ was also wrong when Mr. Kornblum concluded that there was not 
enough to show that the Lees were ``presently engaged in clandestine 
intelligence activities.'' The information provided by the FBI made it 
clear that Dr. Lee's relevant activities continued from the 1980s to 
1992, 1994 and 1997, yet that was deemed to be too stale, and the DoJ 
refused to send the FBI's surveillance request to the FISA court.
  When FBI Assistant Director John Lewis raised the FISA problem with 
the Attorney General on August 20, 1997, she delegated a review of the 
matter to Mr. Dan Seikaly, who had virtually no experience in FISA 
issues. It is not surprising then, that Mr. Seikaly again applied the 
wrong standard for probable cause. He used the criminal standard, which 
requires that the facility in question be used in the commission of an 
offense, and with which he was more familiar, rather than the relevant 
FISA standard which simply requires that the facility ``is being used, 
or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power.''
  The importance of DoJ's erroneous interpretation of the law as it 
applied to probable cause in this case should not be underestimated. 
Had the warrant been issued, and had the FBI been permitted to conduct 
electronic surveillance on Dr. Lee, the Government would probably not 
be in the position--as it is now--of trying to ascertain what really 
happened to the information that Dr. Lee downloaded. There should be no 
doubt that transferring classified information to an unclassified 
computer system and making unauthorized tape copies of that 
information--seven of which contain highly classified information and 
remain unaccounted for--created a substantial opportunity for foreign 
intelligence services to access our most important nuclear secrets.
  The FISA warrant could have and should have been issued at several 
points, some before and some after it was rejected in 1997. Each key 
event where the FISA warrant was not requested and issued represents 
another lost opportunity to protect the national security. For example, 
Dr. Lee was identified by the Department of Energy's Network Anomaly 
Detection and Intrusion Recording system (NADIR) in 1993 for having 
downloaded a huge volume of files.
  As the name of the system implies, it is designed to detect unusual 
computer activity and look out for possible intruders into the 
computer. Individuals who monitored the lab's computers knew that Dr. 
Lee's activities had generated a report from the NADIR system, but 
didn't do anything about it. They didn't even talk to him. An 
opportunity to correct a problem, to protect national security, just 
slipped away.
  In 1994, Lee's massive downloading would have again showed up on 
NADIR, but DoE security people never took action. Now, we're told, they 
can't even find records of what happened. Yet another missed 
opportunity to protect the national security by looking into what was 
going on.
  When Wen Ho Lee took a polygraph in December 1998, DoE misrepresented 
the results of this test to the FBI. DoE told the FBI that Dr. Lee 
passed this polygraph when, in fact, he had failed. This error sent the 
FBI off the trail for two months.
  When Wen Ho Lee failed a polygraph on February 10, 1999, the FISA 
warrant should have been immediately requested and granted. It wasn't.
  The need for legislation to address these problems is obvious. The 
unclassified information on this case shows clearly that it was 
mishandled. The classified files make that point even more clear. Last 
year the Attorney General asked an Assistant U.S. Attorney with 
substantial experience in prosecuting espionage cases to review the Wen 
Ho Lee matter. That prosecutor, Mr. Randy Bellows, conducted a thorough 
review of the case and confirmed all of our major findings: the case 
was badly mishandled, the FISA request should have gone forward to the 
court. The list goes on. Our counter-intelligence system failed in this 
case, and the information at risk is too important to let this dismal 
state of affairs continue.
  The Counterintelligence Reform Act of 2000 will help to ensure that 
future investigations are conducted in a more thorough and effective 
manner. Among the key provisions in this legislation is one that amends 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, by requiring that, 
upon the request of the Director of the FBI, the Secretary of State, 
the Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence, the 
Attorney General shall personally review a FISA application. If the 
Attorney General decides not to forward the application to the FISA 
court, that decision must be communicated in writing to the requesting 
official, with recommendations for improving the showing of probable 
cause, or whatever defect OIPR is concerned with.
  Under this legislation, when a senior official who is authorized to 
make FISA requests goes to the Attorney General for a personal review, 
that senior official must personally supervise the implementation of 
the recommendations. This provision will ensure that when the national 
security is at stake, and where there is a serious disagreement over 
how to proceed, the Attorney General and other senior officials are the 
ones who work together to resolve disputes, and that the matter is not 
delegated to attorneys who have never worked with FISA before.
  The Counterintelligence Reform Act also addresses the matter of 
whether an individual is ``presently engaged'' in a particular activity 
to ensure that genuine acts of espionage which are belatedly discovered 
are not improperly eliminated from consideration. As FISA is currently 
worded, it is possible for someone like Mr. Kornblum to conclude that 
actions as recent as a couple of years ago or even a few months are

[[Page 20252]]

too stale to contribute to a finding of probable cause. Although I do 
not agree with Mr. Kornblum's interpretation of the law, I am confident 
that the changes contained in the Counterintelligence Reform Act will 
make it clear that activities within a reasonable period of time can be 
considered in determining probable cause.
  The investigation of Dr. Lee was also mishandled in the field, where 
the FBI and the Department of Energy often failed to communicate. For 
example, after OIPR rejected the FBI's 1997 FISA application, the FBI 
told the Department of Energy that there was no longer an investigative 
reason to leave Dr. Lee in place, and that the DoE should do whatever 
was necessary to protect the national security. Unfortunately, no 
action was taken by DoE until December 1998, some 14 months after the 
FBI had said it was no longer necessary to have him in place for 
investigative reasons.
  To address this problem, and to ensure that there is no 
misunderstanding about when the subject of an espionage investigation 
should be removed from classified access, the Counterintelligence 
Reform Act requires that decisions of this nature be communicated in 
writing. The bill requires the Director of the FBI to submit to the 
head of the department or agency concerned a written assessment of the 
potential impact of the actions of the department or agency on a 
counterintelligence investigation. The head of the affected agency will 
be required to respond in writing to the recommendation of the FBI. 
This requirement with ensure that what happened in the Wen Ho Lee 
case--where the FBI said he could be removed from access but the Energy 
Department didn't pull his clearance for another 14 months--won't 
happen again.
  To avoid the kind of problems that happened when the DoE ordered a 
Wackenhut polygraph in December 1998, this legislation prohibits 
agencies from interfering in FBI espionage investigations.
  The provisions of this bill will make an important contribution to 
improving the way counter-intelligence investigations are conducted. 
The subcommittee's investigation of the Wen Ho Lee case has made it 
abundantly clear that improvements in these procedures are necessary, 
and the reforms outlined in this legislation are specifically tailored 
to provide real solutions to real problems.
  The subcommittee also looked at the espionage case of Dr. Peter Lee, 
who pleaded guilty in 1997 to passing classified nuclear secrets to the 
Chinese in 1985. According to a 17 February 1998 ``Impact Statement'' 
prepared by experts from the Department of Energy,

       The ICF data provided by Dr. [Peter] Lee was of significant 
     material assistance to the PRC in their nuclear weapons 
     development program. . . . For that reason, this analysis 
     indicates that Dr. Lee's activities have directly enhanced 
     the PRC nuclear weapons program to the detriment of U.S. 
     national security.

  Dr. Peter Lee also confessed to giving the Chinese classified anti-
submarine warfare information on two occasions in 1997. Under the terms 
of the plea agreement the Department of Justice offered to Peter Lee, 
however, he got no jail time. He served one year in a half-way house, 
did 3,000 hours of community service and paid a $20,000 fine. 
Considering the magnitude of his offenses and his failure to comply 
with the terms of the plea agreement--which required his complete 
cooperation--the interests of the United States were not served by this 
outcome.
  The subcommittee's review of the Peter Lee case led to the inevitable 
conclusion that better coordination between the Department of Justice, 
the investigating agency--which is normally the FBI--and the victim 
agency is necessary to ensure that the process works to protect the 
national security. One of the problems we saw in this case was the 
reluctance of the Department of the Navy to support the prosecution of 
Dr. Peter Lee. A Navy official, Mr. John Schuster, produced a memo that 
seriously undermined the Department of Justice's efforts to prosecute 
the case. This memorandum was based on incomplete information and did 
not reflect the full scope of what Dr. Peter Lee confessed to having 
revealed. As a consequence of the breakdown of communications between 
the Navy and the prosecution team, the 1997 revelations were not 
included as part of the plea agreement.
  This legislation contains a provision that will ensure better 
coordination in espionage cases by requiring the Department of Justice 
to conduct briefings so that the affected agency will understand what 
is happening with the case, and will understand how the Classified 
Information Procedures Act, or CIPA, can be used to protect classified 
information even while carrying out a prosecution. In these briefings 
Department of Justice lawyers will be required to explain the right of 
the government to make in camera presentations to the judge and to make 
interlocutory appeals of the judge's rulings. These procedures are 
unique to CIPA, and the affected agency needs to understand that taking 
the case to trial won't necessarily mean revealing classified 
information. The Navy's position, as stated in the Schuster memo, that 
``bringing attention to our sensitivity concerning this subject in a 
public forum could cause more damage to the national security that the 
original disclosure,'' was simply wrong. It was based on incomplete 
information and a misunderstanding of how the case could have been 
taken to trial without endangering national security. The provisions of 
this legislation which require the Department of Justice to keep the 
victim agency fully and currently informed of the status of the 
prosecution, and to explain how CIPA can be used to take espionage 
cases to trial without damaging the national security, will ensure that 
the mistakes of the Peter Lee case are not repeated.
  I appreciate the efforts of my colleagues on the Judiciary Committee 
and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence who have worked with me 
and the cosponsors of this bill. I am confident that the reforms we are 
about to pass will significantly improve the way espionage cases are 
investigated and, if necessary, prosecuted.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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