[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 13]
[House]
[Pages 19535-19549]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



     EXPRESSING SENSE OF HOUSE ON PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the 
resolution (H. Res. 547) expressing the sense of the House of 
Representatives with respect to the peace process in Northern Ireland, 
as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                              H. Res. 547

       Whereas the April 10, 1998, Good Friday Agreement 
     established a framework for the peaceful settlement of the 
     conflict in Northern Ireland;
       Whereas the Good Friday Agreement stated that it provided 
     ``the opportunity for a new beginning to policing in Northern 
     Ireland with a police service capable of attracting and 
     sustaining support from the community as a whole'';
       Whereas the Good Friday Agreement provided for the 
     establishment of an Independent Commission on Policing to 
     make ``recommendations for future policing arrangements in 
     Northern Ireland including means of encouraging widespread 
     community support for these arrangements'';
       Whereas the Independent Commission on Policing, led by Sir 
     Christopher Patten, concluded its work on September 9, 1999, 
     and proposed 175 recommendations in its final report to 
     ensure a new beginning to policing, consistent with the 
     requirements in the Good Friday Agreement;
       Whereas the Patten report explicitly ``warned in the 
     strongest terms against cherry-picking from this report or 
     trying to implement some major elements of it in isolation 
     from others'';
       Whereas section 405 of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg 
     Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 
     2000 and 2001 (as contained in H.R. 3427, as enacted by 
     section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113, and as contained in 
     appendix G to such Public Law) requires President Clinton to 
     certify, among other things, that the Governments of the 
     United Kingdom and Ireland are committed to assisting in the 
     full implementation of the recommendations contained in the 
     Patten Commission report issued on September 9, 1999 before 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other Federal law 
     enforcement agency can provide training for the Royal Ulster 
     Constabulary;
       Whereas a May 5, 2000, joint letter by the British Prime 
     Minister and the Irish Prime Minister stated that 
     ``legislation to implement the Patten report will, subject to 
     Parliament, be enacted by November 2000'';
       Whereas on May 16, 2000, the British Government published 
     the proposed Police (Northern Ireland) bill, which purports 
     to implement in law the Patten report;
       Whereas many of the signatories to the Good Friday 
     Agreement have stated that the proposed Police (Northern 
     Ireland) bill does not live up to the letter or spirit of the 
     Patten report and dilutes or fails to implement many of the 
     Patten Commission's key recommendations regarding 
     accountability, such as, by limiting the Policing Board and 
     Police Ombudsman's powers of inquiry, by failing to appoint a 
     commissioner to oversee implementation of the Patten 
     Commission's 175 recommendations and instead limiting the 
     commissioner to overseeing those changes in policing which 
     are decided upon by the British Government, and by rejecting 
     the Patten Commission's recommendation that all police 
     officers in Northern Ireland take an oath expressing an 
     explicit commitment to uphold human rights;
       Whereas Northern Ireland's main nationalist parties have 
     indicated that they will not participate or encourage 
     participation in the new policing structures unless the 
     Patten report is fully implemented; and
       Whereas on June 15, 2000, British Secretary of State for 
     Northern Ireland Peter Mandelson said, ``I remain absolutely 
     determined to implement the Patten recommendations and to 
     achieve the effective and representative policing service, 
     accepted in every part of Northern Ireland, that his report 
     aimed to secure'': Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
       (1) commends the parties for progress to date in 
     implementing all aspects of the Good Friday Agreement and 
     urges them to move expeditiously to complete the 
     implementation;
       (2) believes that the full and speedy implementation of the 
     recommendations of the Independent Commission on Policing for 
     Northern Ireland holds the promise of ensuring that the 
     police service in Northern Ireland will gain the support of 
     both nationalists and unionists and that ``policing 
     structures and arrangements are such that the police service 
     is fair and impartial, free from partisan political control, 
     accountable . . . to the community it serves, representative 
     of the society that it polices . . . [and] complies with 
     human rights norms'', as mandated by the Good Friday 
     Agreement; and
       (3) calls upon the British Government to fully and 
     faithfully implement the recommendations contained in the 
     September 9, 1999, Patten Commission report on policing.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pitts). Pursuant to the rule, the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Crowley) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).


                             General Leave

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on this measure.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to support H. Res. 547. I joined as an 
original cosponsor of this bill, along with many on our committee and 
others from both sides of the aisle familiar with the problems in 
Northern Ireland.
  In Northern Ireland last spring, the IRA's efforts at putting arms 
beyond use and having that verified by outside observers demonstrated 
their good faith. It made it possible for the power-sharing executive 
to run again and for real, peaceful democratic change.
  As part of that arrangement to restore the executive, in May 2000 the 
British and Irish governments made a firm commitment to the nationalist 
community to fully implement the Patten Commission policing reforms 
that form a core portion of the Good Friday Accord for a new beginning 
in policing.
  The British Government and the unionists have, so far, failed to show 
similar good faith. They firmly need to live up to their agreements in 
the Good Friday Accord, especially concerning real police reform as 
envisioned by the Patten Report of September 1999, a report consistent 
with the terms of the Good Friday Accord.
  A 93 percent Protestant police force will not do in a nearly equally 
divided society. The British Government cannot put aside promised 
change and the Good Friday Accord for temporary tactical or political 
gain, for whatever reason. The Irish National Caucus and other Irish 
American groups here fully support this bill, as well as the SDLP, the 
largest nationalist Catholic party in the north of Ireland whose 
leader, John Hume, won the Nobel Peace Prize.
  Seamus Mallon, the SDLP's deputy minister in charge of the executive, 
stated to our committee and said that failure to implement Patten 
policing proposals will have a damaging effect on the whole psyche of 
the fledgling political process.

                              {time}  2030

  We do not want this, nor can we afford this. The Washington Post 
noted in July that the onus remains on the British Government to 
respond to Catholic objections on its failure to fully implement all of 
Patten's police reforms, since these reforms were part of the agreement 
in the Good Friday Accord. To date, regrettably, they have not 
responded.
  At hearings held last week by the gentleman from New Jersey (Chairman 
Smith) of the Helsinki Commission, a Member of the Patten Commission, 
Dr. Gerald Lynch, the president of the John J. College of Criminal 
Justice in New York, told us that any significant modification of its 
recommendations ``will deprive the people of Northern Ireland of this 
long-awaited police service capable of sustaining support from the 
community as a whole.''

[[Page 19536]]

  We also learned that the current Police Authority in the North has 
said it is ``vital'' that the police bill now before the British 
parliament to carry out Patten be amended.
  Finally, a former adviser to the Northern Ireland secretary of state 
has also told us that the first draft of the bill ``eviscerated Patten. 
The latest version presents a mostly bloodless ghost.''
  There must be policing reform as the Roman Catholic Church and as 
Nationalist Party leaders want, and are entitled to, as well as was 
agreed upon in the Good Friday Accord. The old Unionist ``veto 
politics'' must end.
  I was proud to join as an original cosponsor of this resolution that 
was passed out of our Committee on International Relations without one 
objection. All Members of Congress want to see lasting peace and 
justice to take permanent hold in Northern Ireland, and we should act 
favorably on this proposal.
  The resolution before us, Mr. Speaker, merely calls on the British 
Government to fully and faithfully implement the Patten Commission 
report, to which they agreed, both as part of the Good Friday Accord 
and the recent restoration of power sharing executive in the North.
  If the British Government truly intends to do this, there is nothing 
for them to fear from this bill. If they are not serious about policing 
reform, then they are not in compliance with the Good Friday Accord, 
and the judgment of history will be rightfully harsh.
  Now is the time for us to get it right and to fully support the Good 
Friday Accord.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to voice my support for House Resolution 547. I 
regret that such a resolution is necessary. However, the British 
Government's failure to fully implement the Good Friday Agreement and 
the Patten Commission report is an issue of great concern among many 
Members of this body and must be addressed.
  I want to thank the gentleman from New York (Chairman Gilman) for 
moving this measure along in an expeditious manner, and I want to thank 
my colleague and friend and cochair of the Ad Hoc Committee on Irish 
Affairs here in the House as well, the gentleman from Massachusetts 
(Mr. Neal), for introducing this measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal).
  Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, let me if I can at the outset 
thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and thank the gentleman 
from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) and members of the Committee on 
International Relations for the expeditious manner in which they 
brought this piece of legislation that I authored to the floor.
  Also I think to fully acknowledge that time and again on the issue of 
Ireland, there has been bipartisan support in this House of 
Representatives for the work that has occurred on this side of the 
ocean, as well as on that side of the ocean.
  House Resolution 547, Mr. Speaker, simply urges the British 
Government to fully implement the Patten recommendations on police 
reform in the North of Ireland. The people on the island of Ireland 
support the Patten recommendations, not the Mandelson recommendations.
  Let me give you a little bit of background, if I can, on this issue. 
Probably one of the most difficult problems that has confronted the 
people in the North of Ireland for the better part of the previous 
century was the issue of policing in a small state the size essentially 
of what we would know as Connecticut. But on May 21, 1998, the vast 
majority of the people of the island of Ireland voted for what we know 
as the Good Friday Agreement. In unprecedented numbers, they said yes 
to the future, a future that would include justice, and a future that 
would include reconciliation between the two traditions that have 
resided on that island.
  But as part of that Good Friday Agreement, there was a very special 
provision that cuts to the heart of the discussion that we are having 
this evening. It established an independent commission on policing that 
would make recommendations to the British Government and to the Irish 
Government. The notion was to create a new policing service capable of 
attracting and sustaining support from the community as a whole.
  The Nationalist population currently comprises about 7 percent of the 
Royal Ultra Constabulary. That means that the Unionist community, 
which, by the way, represents about 54 percent of the people in the 
North, nonetheless constitutes 93 percent of the police force. The 
Nationalist community sees them as a force to keep them in line. 
Fundamentally, the issue of policing can change the whole complexion of 
the process in the North of Ireland that we know as the Good Friday 
Agreement.
  Now, let me delve into this a bit more. On September 24, 1999, Chris 
Patten, a conservative member of the British parliament, was chosen to 
review the state of policing in the North of Ireland. He came back, 
and, listen to this number, Mr. Speaker, offered to not only take the 
politics out of policing in the North, but, just as importantly, 
offered 175 recommendations that included changing the name, changing 
the flag and emblems of the RUC, a new oath for all the officers, human 
rights training and a new policing board to be comprised of both 
communities. This evening this Chamber should be grateful for what 
Chris Patten did and the efforts that he extended on behalf of this 
fundamental issue.
  Now, when he came to Washington at the request of the gentleman from 
New York (Chairman Gilman) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. 
Gejdenson), he presented to us a very cogent plan for fundamentally 
restructuring the Royal Ulster Constabulary. What he said at that time 
essentially was this: do not allow my report to be cherry-picked. 
Precisely what is happening at this moment in the North of Ireland is 
the cherry-picking of Chris Patten's recommendations.
  Now, I would remind all present, as well as those viewing across the 
country, that there was a democratic election which people in both 
traditions on both sides of the border voted for in overwhelming 
numbers.
  So what we are saying essentially here is this, that we have had an 
agreement, we have had an election, and now we are going to move the 
goalposts back by another 10 yards, because that is what the 
Nationalist community will deem this intransigence to be.
  Everybody in the British Isles has concluded that there has to be a 
fundamental reform of policing in the North of Ireland. Secretary 
Mandelson's position, however, has been to come back and say, we know 
better, we know more. We have decided that, despite what Chris Patten 
said, despite the Patten recommendations, despite an election, that we 
are now going to compromise the very notion of fully integrating the 
police service or police force in the North of Ireland.
  What is difficult for most of us to digest in this process is 
essentially this: if we are to go back to the recommendations that 
Patten made and essentially say we cannot sell them politically now, it 
invites both sides to say, let us reopen the Good Friday Agreement.
  Now, George Mitchell deserves enormous credit for his good and 
patient work. Bill Clinton deserves great credit for his work. 
Republicans like the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and others 
deserve credit for their work. This has always been bipartisan in 
nature.
  Let me, if I can for a second, read a statement that Vice President 
Gore has asked me to offer on his behalf: ``I also want to make clear 
my position on the Patten Commission's recommendations for police 
reform in Northern Ireland. I urge the British government to fully and 
expeditiously implement these recommendations. The goal of the Patten 
Commission's recommendations is to take politics out of policing and to 
create a police service in Northern Ireland that meets the highest 
possible standards and that enjoys the support of both communities.''

[[Page 19537]]

  Now, I would submit tonight, Mr. Speaker, that if we are to head back 
to a reopening of the Good Friday Agreement, canceling the provisions 
of the Good Friday Accord, we are going to invite the rejectionists to 
step forward. I would ask the rejectionists of the Good Friday 
Agreement a very simple question: tell us your alternative. You have 
always had great moments of outlining what you are against; we would 
like you to tell what your competing proposal is on behalf of what you 
are for.
  It becomes very obvious to all of us who have been in this process, 
myself included, for more than two decades, that they really have no 
alternative to the Good Friday Agreement. They are going to continue to 
chip away at the edges, they are going to continue to be naysayers, 
they are going to continue to criticize all of the parties that have 
brought us to this moment. But the point tonight to remember is this, 
they provide no viable alternative.
  There is no option, that I am aware of, other than the Good Friday 
Agreement. It has met the test of time, it enjoys support across the 
island; and if we are to say tonight that the Patten Commission 
recommendations are to be, as Chris Patten said, cherry-picked or taken 
apart, then what is to prevent the next party from standing and saying, 
we do not like this part of the Good Friday Agreement?
  The term ``royal'' should be taken out of police service. Members of 
the Nationalist community do not want to swear allegiance to the Queen 
upon taking the oath for joining its police service. Chris Patten 
understood that; Tony Blair understood that. That was part of this far-
reaching agreement, that they would not have to swear allegiance to the 
Queen to join the police service. Instead, they would take an oath of 
office similar to the one that patrolmen and patrolwomen across this 
Nation take upon entering that service, simply acknowledging your 
duties.
  I would submit tonight, Mr. Speaker, to Members that are going to 
have a chance to go at this later on, that my words do not ring hollow 
on this occasion. If we allow any part of the Patten Commission 
recommendations to be undone, we invite the naysayers and the 
rejectionists to step to the floor to fill the vacuum. We have to push 
them aside and make them in free elections tell the people what they 
are for or what they are against, as opposed to sitting in the 
inexpensive seats and telling all of us how wrong we have been all 
along the way.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the Members assembled here this evening 
again for their steadfastness.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal) for 
his kind supporting words for this resolution. The gentleman has been a 
long-time leader in the Irish cause in the Congress.
  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 6\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the distinguished chairman of the 
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the 
Committee on International Relations.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Gilman) for his leadership on this very important 
issue, as well as the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley), and my good friend, the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. King), who has been indefatigable for many 
years on this important issue.
  Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal) is 
right in pointing out that this is a bipartisan effort, and we are 
trying to send a clear non-ambiguous message to the British Government 
that we are looking at their policing bill, that we looked at it very 
carefully, and it falls far, far short.
  Last Friday, as chairman of the Subcommittee on International 
Operations and Human Rights and as chairman of the Helsinki Commission, 
I held my sixth hearing in a series of hearings which have delved into 
the status of human rights in the North of Ireland and the deplorable 
human rights record of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the RUC, Northern 
Ireland's police force.

                              {time}  2045

  Our panel of experts were emphatic about the gap that exists between 
the recommendations of the Patten Commission on policing reform and the 
bill that the British Government has now put forth in their attempt to 
comply with the Good Friday Agreement's instructions to ``craft a new 
beginning to policing.''
  Professor Brendan O'Leary, one of our witnesses from the London 
School of Economics and Political Science, testified that the pending 
police bill is, quote, ``a poorly disguised facade'' that does not 
implement the Patten report. He said it was, and I quote again, 
``mendaciously misleading'' for Northern Ireland's Secretary of State, 
Peter Mandelson, to suggest that his government's bill implements the 
Patten report.
  Professor O'Leary reported that the bill improved at the Commons 
stage, yet he testified that the British government's bill is still 
very ``insufficient.'' He called it a ``bloodless ghost'' of Patten and 
referred to it as ``Patten light.''
  Similarly, Martin O'Brien, the great human rights activist and the 
Director of the Committee on Administration of Justice, an independent 
human rights organization in Belfast, expressed his organization's, 
quote, ``profound disappointment at the developments since the 
publication of the Patten report.'' He said that ``only a third or less 
of Patten's recommendations resulted in proposals for legislative 
change.''
  Mr. O'Brien reported that ``a study of the draft seems to confirm the 
view that the British government is unwilling,'' his words, ``to put 
Patten's agenda into practical effect.'' He called it ``a very far cry 
from the Patten report'' and said ``despite much lobbying and extensive 
changes in the course of the parliamentary process to date, there is 
still a very long way to go.''
  Elisa Massimino, from the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, 
testified that the bill ``falls far short of the Patten 
recommendations'' and she pointed to many discrepancies to illustrate 
this. And Dr. Gerald Lynch, the President of John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice in New York and an American appointee to the Patten 
Commission, restated the Commission's unanimous support for full 
implementation and warned, in his words, ``that the recommendations 
should not be cherry picked but must be implemented in a cohesive and 
constructive manner.''
  Mr. Speaker, the witnesses at last week's hearings, as well as 
witnesses at previous hearings, as well as in correspondences that we 
have all received and in the meetings that we have had throughout this 
Capitol and in Belfast and elsewhere, policing has been the issue. In 
fact last year we had Chris Patten himself and the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur to Northern Ireland, Param Cumaraswamy, speak to our 
subcommittee. They too pointed to police reform as the essence of real 
reform in Northern Ireland.
  It is critical to note, then, that despite the progress to date, the 
British government is at a critical crossroads on the path to peace in 
Northern Ireland. The British government has the sole opportunity and 
responsibility for making police reform either the linchpin or the 
Achilles heel of the Good Friday Agreement.
  Accordingly, our legislation today calls upon the British government 
to fully and faithfully implement the recommendations contained in the 
Patten Commission report. The bill is the culmination of years of work 
in terms of trying to get everyone to the point where they have a 
transparent police force that is not wedded to secrecy and cover-up of 
human rights abuses.
  Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 547 does get specific. It points out that the 
police bill in parliament limits the powers of inquiry and 
investigation envisioned by the Patten report for the Policing Board 
and the police ombudsman. Remarkably, the police bill gives the 
Secretary of the State of Ireland a veto authority to prevent a 
Policing Board inquiry if the inquiry ``would serve no useful 
purpose.'' That just turns the bill into a farce, Mr. Speaker.

[[Page 19538]]

  The British government also prohibits the Policing Board from looking 
into any acts that occurred before the bill was enacted. The British 
government's bill also denies the ombudsman the authority to 
investigate police policies and practices and restricts her ability to 
look at past complaints against police officers. And the bill restricts 
the new oversight commissioner to assessing only those changes the 
British government agrees to, rather than overseeing the implementation 
of the full range of the Patten recommendations.
  Mr. Speaker, when Mr. Patten met with our committee, I and many 
others expressed our disappointment that his report contained no 
procedure whatsoever for vetting RUC officers who committed human 
rights abuses in the past. That said, we took some comfort that the 
Commission at least recommended that existing police officers should 
affirmingly state a willingness to uphold human rights. Now we learn 
that the British government's bill guts even this minimalist 
recommendation.
  Mr. Speaker, let me just conclude, and I ask that my full statement 
be made a part of the Record. Two years ago this week, human rights 
defense attorney Rosemary Nelson testified before my subcommittee 
expressing her deepest-held fear that the RUC, which had made numerous 
death threats against her and her family through her clients, would one 
day succeed and assassinate her. The U.N. Special Rapporteur testified 
at the hearing that he was satisfied that there was truth to those 
allegations that defense attorneys were harassed and intimidated by 
members of the RUC.
  As we sadly all know today, Rosemary Nelson was killed, the victim of 
an assassin's car bomb just 6 months after she asked us to take action 
to protect defense attorneys in Northern Ireland. Her murder is now 
being investigated in part by the RUC, the police force that she so 
feared. If the British government's police bill continues to reject 
mechanisms for real accountability, we may never know who killed 
Rosemary Nelson or defense attorney Patrick Finucane. And sadly the 
police force may never be rid of those who may have condoned, perhaps 
helped cover up, or even took part in some of the most egregious human 
rights abuses in Northern Ireland.
  Mr. Speaker, let us have a unanimous vote for this resolution and 
send a clear message to our friends on the other side of the pond that 
we want real reform and that real police reform is the linchpin to the 
Good Friday Agreement.
  Last Friday, as Chairman of the International Operations and Human 
Rights subcommittee and as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I held 
my sixth hearing in a series of hearings which have delved into the 
status of human rights in the north of Ireland and the deplorable human 
rights record of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Northern Ireland's 
police force.
  Our panel of experts was emphatic about the gap that exists between 
the recommendations of the Patten Commission on policing reform and the 
bill that the British government has now put forth in their attempt to 
comply with the Good Friday Agreement's instruction to craft ``a new 
beginning to policing.''
  Professor Brendan O'Leary from the London School of Economics and 
Political Science testified that the pending Policing Bill is ``a 
poorly disguised facade'' that does not implement the Patten report. He 
said it was ``mendaciously misleading'' for Northern Ireland's 
Secretary of State, Peter Mandelson, to suggest that this government's 
bill implements the Pattern report.
  Professor O'Leary reported that the bill was improved at the Commons 
stage, yet he testified that the British government's bill is still 
``insufficient''. He called it a ``bloodless ghost'' of Patten and 
referred to it as ``Patten light.''
  Similarly, Martin O'Brien, Director of the Committee on the 
Administration of Justice, an independent human rights organization in 
Belfast, expressed his organization's ``profound disappointment at the 
developments since the publication of the Patten report.'' He said that 
``only a third or less of Patten's recommendations resulted in proposal 
for legislative change.''
  Mr. O'Brien reported that ``a study of the draft to confirm the view 
that government is unwilling to put Patten's agenda into practical 
effect.'' He called the bill ``a very far cry from the Patten report'' 
and said ``despite much lobbying and extensive changes in the course of 
the parliamentary process to date, there is still a long way to go.''
  Elisa Massimino, from the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, 
testified that the bill ``falls far short'' of the Patten 
recommendations. And Dr. Gerald Lynch, the President of John Jay 
College of Criminal Justice in New York and an American appointee to 
the Patten Commission, restated the Commissions unanimous support for 
full implementation and warned that ``the recommendations not be cherry 
picked but be implemented in a cohesive and constructive manner.''
  Mr. Speaker, the witnesses at last week's hearing, as well as 
witnesses at previous hearings--including Patten himself and U.N. 
Special Rapporteur to Northern Ireland, Param Cumaraswamy--have all 
pointed to police reform as the essence of real reform in Northern 
Ireland. It is critical to note, then, that despite the progress to 
date, the British government is at a critical crossroads on the path to 
peace in Northern Ireland. The British government has the sole 
opportunity--and responsibility--for making police reform either the 
lynchpin--or the Achilles' heel--of the Good Friday Agreement.
  Accordingly, our legislation today calls upon the British Government 
to fully and faithfully implement the recommendations contained in the 
Patten Commission report on policing. Our bill is the culmination of 
our years of work and it is our urging of an ally to do what is right 
for peace in Northern Ireland.
  H. Res. 547 does get specific. It now contains language which I 
offered at the Committee stage to highlight a few of the most egregious 
examples where the proposed Police Bill does not live up to either the 
letter or the spirit of the Patten report. For instance, the Police 
Bill, as currently drafted, limits the powers of inquiry and 
investigation envisioned by the Patten report for the Policing Board 
and the Police Ombudsman. Remarkably, the Police Bill gives the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland a veto authority to prevent a 
Policing Board inquiry if the inquiry would ``serve no useful 
purpose.'' The bill completely prohibits the Policing Board from 
looking into any acts that occurred before the bill is enacted.
  The British Government's Police Bill also denies the Ombudsman 
authority to investigate police policies and practices and restricts 
her ability to look at past complaints against police officers. And the 
bill restricts the new oversight commissioner to assessing only those 
changes the British Government agrees to rather than overseeing the 
implementation of the full range of Patten's recommendations.
  When Mr. Patten himself met without subcommittee, I and many others 
expressed our disappointment that his report contained no procedure for 
vetting RUC officers who committed human rights abuses in the past. 
That said, we took some comfort that the Commission at least 
recommended that the existing police officers should affirmatively 
state a willingness to uphold human rights. Now we learn that the 
British Government's bill guts even this minimalist recommendation.
  Many of the reforms that the Patten Commission recommended, such as 
those addressing police accountability or the incorporation of 
international human rights standards into police practices and 
training, are not issues that divide the nationalist and unionist 
communities in Northern Ireland. One must ask then, who it is that the 
Northern Ireland Secretary of State is trying to protect or pacify by 
failing to implement these recommendations.
  Our witnesses concluded that the British Government is hiding behind 
the division between unionist and nationalists on other issues--such as 
what the police service's name and symbols will be--to avoid making 
changes in accountability structures and human rights standards for the 
police. According to Mr. O'Brien, ``these constraints are there 
apparently to satisfy the concerns of people already in the policing 
establishment who don't want change and don't want the spotlight shown 
on their past activities or future activities.''
  In other words, the future of Northern Ireland is being held captive 
to the interests of the very police service and other British 
Government security services that the Good Friday Agreement sought to 
reform with the creation of the Patten Commission.
  Mr. Speaker, there should be no doubt about the importance of 
policing reform in Northern Ireland as it relates to the broader peace 
process. Mr. O'Brien testified that ``the issue of resolution of 
policing and the transformation of the criminal justice system are at 
the heart of establishing a lasting peace.'' Dr. Gerald Lynch restated 
Chris Patten's oft-repeated statement that ``the Good Friday Agreement 
would come down to the policing issue.''

[[Page 19539]]

  Professor O'Leary's comments were even more somber. He said:

       In the absence of progress on Patten . . . we are likely to 
     see a stalling on possible progress in decommissioning, 
     minimally, and maximally, if one wanted to think of a 
     provocation to send hard line republicans back into full 
     scale conflict, one could think of no better choice of policy 
     than to fail to implement the Patten report . . . I think 
     disaster can follow . . . and may well follow from the 
     failure to implement Patten fully.

  Both the nationalist and unionist communities supported the Good 
Friday Agreement and all that it entailed--including police reform. The 
people of Northern Ireland deserve no less than a police service that 
they can trust, that is representative of the community it serves, and 
that is accountable for its actions.
  In conclusion Mr. Speaker, let me point out to my colleagues that it 
was two years ago this week that human rights defense attorney Rosemary 
Nelson testified before my subcommittee expressing her deepest held 
fear that the RUC, which had made death threats to her and her family 
through her clients, would one day succeed and kill her. The U.N. 
Special Rapporteur, Para Cumaraswamy testified at the same hearing that 
after his investigation in Northern Ireland, he was ``satisfied that 
there was truth in the allegations that defense attorneys were harassed 
and intimidated'' by members of the RUC.
  As many people know, Rosemary Nelson was killed--the victim of an 
assassin's car bomb just six months after she asked us to take action 
to protect defense attorneys in Northern Ireland. Her murder is now 
being investigated, in part, by the RUC--the police force she so 
feared. If the British government's Police Bill continues to reject 
mechanisms for real accountability, we may never know who killed 
Rosemary Nelson, and defense attorney Patrick Finucane. And sadly the 
police force may never be rid of those who may have condoned, helped 
cover-up, or even took part in some of the most egregious human rights 
abuses in Northern Ireland.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to support this measure before us today 
in order to express in the strongest terms possible to the British 
government our support for implementation of the full Patten report and 
its very modest recommendations for a ``new beginning in policing.''

 Statement of Gerald W. Lynch, President, John Jay College of Criminal 
  Justice, The City University of New York, Before the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (The Helsinki Commission), September 
                                22, 2000

       Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission on 
     Security and Cooperation in Europe. I want to thank you for 
     the opportunity to present testimony regarding the work of 
     the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, 
     commonly known as the Patten Commission. I would like to 
     discuss the Policing Bill which is before the British 
     Parliament.
       When I was introduced to the then Secretary of State for 
     Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, she said to me: ``How did you 
     get Ted Kennedy and Ronnie Flanagan to agree on you? (Sir 
     Ronnie Flanagan is the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster 
     Constabulary.) I told the Secretary that I believed they 
     agree on me because John Jay College has provided training 
     around the world emphasizing human rights and human dignity. 
     Moreover, John Jay has had an exchange of police and faculty 
     for 30 years with the British police, and for more than 20 
     years with the Garda--as well as an exchange with the R.U.C. 
     for over 20 years. Over that time there had been hundreds of 
     meetings and interactions among British, Irish and American 
     police and criminal-justice experts. The continuing dialogue 
     had generated an exchange of ideas and technology that was 
     totally professional--and totally non-partisan.
       Many of John Jay's exchange scholars have risen to high 
     ranks in Britain, Ireland and America. The current 
     Commissioner of the police of New Scotland Yard, Sir John 
     Stevens, was the exchange scholar at John Jay for the Fall of 
     1984.
       I am honored to have been selected to be a member of the 
     Patten Commission.
       The Patten Report states that: ``the opportunity for a new 
     beginning to policing in Northern Ireland with a police 
     service capable of attracting and sustaining support from the 
     community as a whole . . . cannot be achieved unless the 
     reality that part of the community feels unable to identify 
     with the present name and symbols associated with the police 
     is addressed. . . . our proposals seek to achieve a situation 
     in which people can be British, Irish or Northern Irish, as 
     they wish, and all regard the police service as their own.
       We therefore recommend:
       The Royal Ulster Constabulary should henceforth be named 
     the Northern Ireland Police Service.
       That the Northern Ireland Police Service adopt a new badge 
     and symbols which are entirely free from any association with 
     either the British or Irish states (We not that the Assembly 
     adopted a crest acceptable to all parties, namely, the symbol 
     of the flax)
       That the union flag should not longer be flown from police 
     buildings
       That, on those occasions on which it is appropriate to fly 
     a flag on police buildings, the flag should be that of 
     Northern Ireland Police Service, and it, too, should be free 
     from association with the British or Irish states''.
       The Patten Commission worked for 15 months. We sought the 
     best professional models and practices for policing a divided 
     society in a democracy. We held meetings not only in Belfast, 
     Dublin, and London but in New York. Washington, California, 
     Canada, Belgium, Spain and South Africa. From the beginning, 
     we met with the police, clergy, politicians, civil-
     libertarians and community groups. We went to police 
     headquarters. We visited every police sub-station in Northern 
     Ireland. We literally talked to thousands of police officers.
       We held 40 hearings throughout Northern Ireland--the first 
     and only time such a commission went directly to the public. 
     These hearings were extremely tense. More than 10,000 people 
     attended. More than 1,000 spoke. Emotions ran high as they 
     described past cruelties and allegations of murder, torture 
     and brutality on both sides.
       We listened. We heard the pain. We felt the suffering. We 
     understood the need to move on to a solution to help forge a 
     future in Northern Ireland that involved more than endless 
     re-creations of the terrible past.
       We realized early in our deliberations that whatever we 
     recommended would need to pass muster not just in Britain and 
     Ireland but with police organizations worldwide.
       Chris Patten said of his work on the Commission: ``It was 
     the most difficult, painful, and emotionally draining thing I 
     have ever done or would ever wish to do.'' I concur 
     completely.
       The Patten report provides a framework on which a police 
     service built on a foundation of human rights can be 
     achieved. Again I quote, ``We recommended a comprehensive 
     program of action to focus policing in Northern Ireland on a 
     human rights-based approach.
       Training will be one of the keys to instilling a human 
     rights-based approach into both new recruits and experienced 
     police personnel. We recommend that all police officers, and 
     police civilians, should be trained . . . in the fundamental 
     principles and standards of human rights and the practical 
     implications for policing. . . . We recommend the human 
     rights dimension should be integrated into every module of 
     police training''.
       Another core issue which has not received the attention of 
     the media is the Patten Commission's recommendation that a 
     new police college be established in Northern Ireland. 
     Central to any organizations ability to imbue its members 
     with a focus on human rights is a facility at which to 
     conduct the necessary work and an appropriate curriculum. An 
     educated police officer is a better police officer.
       The Patten Report stated: ``as a matter of priority, . . . 
     all members of the police service should be instructed in the 
     implications for policing of the Human Rights Act 1998, and 
     the wider context of the European Convention on Human Rights 
     and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human dignity 
     training, along the lines of that offered by John Jay College 
     in New York to the New York Police Department and police 
     services from some fifty countries, should also be provided. 
     Like community awareness training, human rights and human 
     dignity should not be seen as an add-on to training, but as a 
     consideration affecting all aspects of training.'' (Chapter 
     16.21)
       The recommendations of the Patten Commission were 
     unanimous. It is crucial that the recommendations not be 
     cherry picked but be implemented in a cohesive and 
     constructive manner. The people of Northern Ireland deserve 
     no less than this new beginning for policing. Any significant 
     modifications will deprive them of this long awaited police 
     service capable of sustaining support from the community as a 
     whole.
                                  ____


    Statement by Martin O'Brien, Committee on the Administration of 
   Justice, Belfast, Before the U.S. Congress Regarding Policing in 
              Northern Ireland, Friday, 22 September 2000

       Thank you for your invitation to testify today. The 
     Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) is an 
     independent human rights organisation which draws its 
     membership from across the different communities in Northern 
     Ireland. CAJ works for a just and peaceful society where the 
     human rights of all are fully protected. In recognition of 
     its efforts to place human rights at the heart of the peace 
     process, CAJ was awarded the 1998 Human Rights Prize by the 
     then 40 Member States of the Council of Europe. We have a 
     broad remit which covers many conflict-related issues such as 
     prisoners, emergency law, miscarriages of justice, and also 
     issues such as fair employment, the rights of women and 
     children, people with disabilities, and the need for 
     effective government action to prevent racial discrimination.
       Since our foundation in 1981, we have worked consistently 
     on issues of policing

[[Page 19540]]

     and, as early as 1995, CAJ argued for an independent 
     international commission to look into future policing in 
     Northern Ireland. Accordingly we worked hard to ensure that 
     the establishment of such a body would be provided for in the 
     Good Friday Agreement. We welcomed the broad terms of 
     reference given to the Commission by the Agreement, and 
     sought to work constructively with the Commission as soon as 
     it came into being, under the chairmanship of the Chris 
     Patten. We were fortunate in that we had earlier secured 
     funding from the Ford Foundation and others to undertake a 
     major comparative research project into good policing around 
     the world. The findings arising from that study underpinned 
     all our work with the Commission and were, we believe--from a 
     reading of the recommendations--useful to the Commission in 
     its work.
       In testimony in September 1999 to Congress on the findings 
     of the Patten Commission, we concluded that: ``CAJ believes 
     that, in general terms, the Commission has made a very 
     genuine and constructive effort to meet the difficult task 
     imposed on it by the Agreement. They have put forward many 
     thoughtful and positive recommendations about the way 
     forward. Most importantly of all, they have recognized (as 
     did the Agreement itself) that just as human rights must be 
     at the heart of a just and peaceful society in Northern 
     Ireland, it must be at the heart of future policing 
     arrangements.''
       CAJ went on, however, to outline for Congress, some of the 
     serious reservations we, and other human rights groups, had 
     regarding the omissions from the Patten report. Amongst other 
     things, we expressed concern as to the feasibility of 
     bringing about real changes to policing if emergency powers 
     are still retained, if plastic bullets are still deployed, 
     and if officers, known to have committed human rights abuses 
     in the past, remain as serving officers.
       Despite these important shortcomings, however, the main 
     thrust of our submission at that time was to urge Congress to 
     use its best offices to push for speedy implementation of the 
     positive recommendations arising from Patten. Though Patten's 
     recommendations did not address everything that was needed 
     for genuine change, they gave a clear framework within which 
     change could occur, and they pointed all those interested in 
     fundamental reform in the right direction.
       Unfortunately, as we said in our earlier testimony 
     ``implementation is everything'', and in that context, CAJ 
     must report to Congress our profound disappointment at 
     developments since the publication of the Patten report. Our 
     concerns about implementation are twofold. First, many of the 
     changes Patten called for are long over-due, and speed is of 
     the essence. Second, and as important, a hesitant or 
     unwilling approach to major change--which is what we are 
     experiencing--feeds fears that change will be short-lived, 
     and indeed will be under-mined over the longer term.
       One of the key findings of our earlier international 
     research was that political will is always a determining 
     factor in preventing or facilitating successful change. 
     Initially, it seemed to observers that the necessary 
     political will did in fact exist within government for 
     change. Yet, since the publication of the Patten report, the 
     signs have been ominous.
       Patten called for the speedy appointment of an Oversight 
     Commissioner to oversee the pace and nature of change. The 
     Commission said ``we believe that a mechanism is needed to 
     oversee the changes required of all those involved in the 
     development of the new policing arrangements, and to assure 
     the community that all aspects of our report are being 
     implemented and being seen to be implemented''. This 
     recommendation was accepted by government, but Tom 
     Constantine was only appointed on 31 May 2000--almost nine 
     months after the Patten report was published. This tardy 
     appointment meant that the Commissioner was excluded from 
     scrutinising the draft legislation, played no part in the 
     detailed Implementation Plan prepared by the Northern Ireland 
     Office and the policing establishment, and has still to 
     appoint staff, take on a public profile, and produce his 
     first report.
       Given this delay, any change that has taken place to date 
     has been dictated by those who have been responsible for 
     policing over the last 30 years and who have resisted change 
     in the past. Only a third or less of Patten's recommendations 
     resulted in proposals for legislative change, so that the 
     vast majority of the programme of change has been left to the 
     discretion of senior civil servants, and the Chief Constable. 
     Indeed, much of the change--whether in terms of police 
     training, police re-organisation, or in terms of crucial 
     decisions relating to Special Branch, detention centres, the 
     use of plastic bullets, or the extent of stop-and-search 
     activities--lies largely at the discretion of the Chief 
     Constable alone. Only with the appointment of a new Policing 
     Board (the political composition of which is as yet 
     uncertain), and/or an active and high profile Oversight 
     Commissioner, will people outside the policing establishment 
     be able to influence or assess the extent of real change 
     underway.
       The slowness in appointing an external Oversight 
     Commissioner has left government open to the charge that the 
     nature and pace of change has been deliberately left in the 
     hands of those who have so mis-managed policing in the past. 
     This charge is not easily refuted. A study of the draft 
     legislation, for example, merely seems to confirm the view 
     that government is unwilling to put Patten's agenda into 
     practical effect. The draft legislation first presented to 
     the House of Commons in May was a very far cry from the 
     Patten report, and despite much lobbying, and extensive 
     changes in the course of the parliamentary process to date, 
     there is still a long way to go. (I would like, with the 
     Chair's permission, to have read into the record two 
     commentaries on the legislation. One is a short CAJ briefing 
     on the major outstanding concerns in the policing 
     legislation, and the other is a detailed series of amendments 
     which CAJ believes must be introduced if the legislation is 
     to faithfully reflect Patten).
       Of course, to judge by official government statements, one 
     would have thought that government was fulfilling Patten in 
     its first draft legislative text in May. The same claim--to 
     be fulfilling Patten--was still being asserted in July (when, 
     by its own admission, it had already made 52 substantive 
     changes to bring the initial draft in line with Patten). 
     Further amendments have again been promised in the next few 
     weeks, prior to the House of Lords debate. However, on the 
     basis of CAJ's understanding to date, the changes that are to 
     be offered will still not deliver the Patten agenda.
       If government does want to implement Patten, as it says it 
     does, why is it still resistant to a whole range of important 
     safeguards which Patten called for? Why is it impossible to 
     get government agreement to include explicit reference in the 
     legislation to a broad range of international human rights 
     norms and standards? What reason can there be for the 
     government denying any role to the NI Human Rights Commission 
     in advising on the police use of plastic bullets? Why are 
     effective inquiry powers for the Policing Board consistently 
     opposed? Why is the Secretary of State so adamant that the 
     Police Ombudsperson cannot have the powers to investigate 
     police policies and practices that Patten called for? Why was 
     the appointment of the Oversight Commissioner so long 
     delayed, and why is his term of office so curtailed in the 
     legislation?
       There will be some that claim that government cannot move 
     fast on certain issues, precisely because Northern Ireland is 
     divided, and policing is a very divisive issue. While there 
     are, of course, many contentious issues (the name and 
     symbols, for example), none of the important issues listed 
     above divide nationalist and unionist. They do, however, 
     clearly divide those who want to defend the status quo, from 
     those who want a police service that is impartial, 
     representative, and accountable--able and willing to ensure 
     that the rule of law is upheld.
       Some of the obstacles to real change can be detected by a 
     study of the parliamentary record. A government minister, in 
     the course of the Commons debate, resisted any amendments 
     that sought to make policing subject to international human 
     rights and standards. He said: ``Some appalling human rights 
     abuses . . . take place around the world. Those low standards 
     should not be compared with the past activities of the RUC .  
     .  . The RUC carried out a difficult job, often in impossible 
     circumstances. Such comparisons as might be made in the light 
     of the amendment could cause unnecessary offense. We might 
     reasonably say that, against the norms in question, the RUC 
     has a good record on human rights''. Government appears to 
     reject out-of-hand the many past reports of the United 
     Nations, and respected international non-governmental 
     organizations, which criticised the RUC. This stance 
     presumably explains the legislation's failure to address the 
     legacy of the past. Yet, if government is unwilling to admit 
     past problems, can the necessary change occur?
       CAJ's fears about the pace and nature of policing change 
     are further heightened by the government's approach to the 
     separate but complementary Chemical Justice Review (also 
     established as part of the Good Friday Agreement). The 
     interrelationship between policing and the criminal justice 
     system is self-evident. Accordingly, it is extremely 
     disturbing to have to report to Congress that CAJ has serious 
     concerns about the nature and pace of change proposed in the 
     criminal justice sphere also. A new appointment system for 
     judges, changes to the prosecution service, and a re-vamping 
     of the criminal justice system generally, are long-overdue 
     changes. The government timetable clearly does not recognise 
     any urgency; CAJ, however, feels that Northern Ireland cannot 
     afford any further delay.
       Of course, change is inevitably difficult; and change of 
     the scale and nature required in Northern Ireland is 
     particularly difficult. We urge the US Congress to use its 
     best endeavours to lend its support to the UK and Irish 
     governments as they work, with local politicians, to develop 
     a more just and peaceful society in Northern Ireland. In 
     particular, we hope that Congress would work, both directly, 
     and--as appropriate--in conjunction with the US 
     Administration, to:
       1. Urge the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to amend the draft 
     legislation to ensure that it reflects both the letter and 
     spirit of Patten. Urge that the legislation conform in 
     particular, to Patten's exhortation that ``the

[[Page 19541]]

     fundamental purpose of policing should be, in the words of 
     the Agreement, the protection and vindication of the human 
     rights of all''. Congress should make it clear that future 
     US-UK policing cooperation is dependent to a large extent on 
     Patten's recommendations being fully implemented.
       2. Congress should urge the UK and Irish governments to 
     recognise the importance of greater external oversight of the 
     transition process, and ask that the Oversight Commissioner 
     be accorded the resources and remit necessary to this vital 
     work.
       3. Congress should commit itself to monitoring developments 
     closely in the coming months, and urge the US Administration 
     to do the same. Congress may, for example, want to consider 
     holding further Hearings in due course to receive a progress 
     report on developments.
       To conclude, I hardly need to remind the Chairperson that, 
     defence lawyer and CAJ executive member, Rosemary Nelson, 
     testified before him and other members of Congress on issues 
     of policing almost two years ago--on the 29 September 1998.
       The concerns she raised in her testimony, her terrible 
     murder a short while later, and the subsequent police 
     investigation, remind us--if we need reminding--that policing 
     change in Northern Ireland is not an abstract or intellectual 
     debate. It is about the lives of real people. We must bring 
     about policing change in Northern Ireland; and we must ensure 
     that that change is right.
       Everything that the US Congress can do to help those of us 
     on the ground secure such change will, as always, be greatly 
     appreciated.
       Thank you.
                                  ____


  Testimony of Elisa Massimino, Director, Washington Office, Lawyers 
  Committee for Human Rights, on Protecting Human Rights and Securing 
 Peace in Northern Ireland: the Vital Role of Police Reform, September 
                                22, 2000


                            I. introduction

       Chairman Smith and members of the Commission, thankyou for 
     inviting me to testify today. You have been a true champion 
     of human rights in the Congress, and you and your dedicated 
     staff have done so much to shine a spotlight on human rights 
     problems in Northern Ireland and around the world. Your 
     leadership on these issues has made a real difference. We 
     want to take this opportunity to commend you for this 
     important work, and to thank you.
       The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has been working to 
     advance human rights in Northern Ireland since 1990. We have 
     published a number of reports about the intimidation and 
     murder of defense lawyers in Northern Ireland, with 
     particular focus on the cases of solicitors Patrick Finucane 
     and Rosemary Nelson. As you know well, the precarious 
     situation of defense lawyers in Northern Ireland is closely 
     linked to the emergency law system and to the conduct of the 
     police. For the last year and a half, we have paid special 
     attention to the peace process in Northern Ireland and, in 
     particular, the central issue of police reform. We appreciate 
     the opportunity to be here today to share with you our views 
     on the status of efforts by the British Government to 
     implement the recommendations made by the Patten Commission.


 ii. the patten commission recommendations and the pending Police Bill

       The Patten Commission's mandate was as ambitious as it was 
     critically important to Northern's Ireland's future. The Good 
     Friday Agreement called on the Commission to propose a new 
     structure for policing in Northern Ireland that would make 
     the police service accountable, representative of the society 
     in policies and reflective of principles of human rights. 
     (The Agreement, Policing and Justice, para. 2)
       Although we were disappointed that the Patten Commission 
     did not directly address some key issues, such as the 
     continued use of emergency powers, which provides the 
     breeding ground for many of the human rights abuses that 
     persist in Northern Ireland, we believe that, on the whole, 
     the Patten Commission successfully integrated human rights 
     principles into its program for reform. The Patten Commission 
     Report provides a clear roadmap for building an effective and 
     publicly-supported police force. If the British Government 
     were to fully implement the Patten Commission's 
     recommendations, it could make Northern Ireland a model for 
     other civil societies transitioning from conflict to peace.
       But unfortunately, the British Government has taken a 
     different path. Despite more than 50 substantive amendments, 
     the bill now pending in Parliament that is meant to implement 
     the Patten Commission recommendations falls far short of 
     doing so. There are serious deficiencies in the legislation 
     now under consideration, many of which have been discussed in 
     detail by my colleagues on this panel. But I would like to 
     highlight three issues regarding the Police Bill that are of 
     particular concern to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
     because they directly undermine the central principles of 
     accountability and human rights around which the Patten 
     Commission recommendations revolve. Last month in a letter to 
     Peter Mandelson, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
     we raised these and other concerns in detail. I would like to 
     submit a copy of that letter, dated August 16th, for your 
     review and for the record.
     A. Limitations on the policing board and police ombudsman
       The Policing Board and the Police Ombudsman are entities 
     intended to be responsible for monitoring police conduct. The 
     current Police Bill, however, places crippling limitations on 
     these bodies that would significantly reduce their 
     effectiveness. For example, the Bill would undermine the 
     Policing Board's ability to conduct reviews of ongoing police 
     operations. Likewise, the Bill fails to clearly provide the 
     authority for the Police Ombudsman to investigate police 
     practices and policies, in addition to allegations of past 
     abuse. A credible system of investigation and inquiry into 
     alleged abuses and abusive practices is one of the best 
     guardians against such practices. But if the Police Bill is 
     approved in its current form, with significant limitations on 
     the powers of the Policing Board and Ombudsman, the capacity 
     for creating such a system will be severely limited.
     B. The oversight commissioner
       Implementation of the Patten Commission reforms was thought 
     by no one to be a simple task, which is why the position of 
     Oversight Commissioner was viewed as so important. But the 
     long delay in appointing an individual to serve in that post, 
     and the limitations that have been placed on his mandate, 
     create formidable barriers to his effectiveness. In part due 
     to the delay in his appointment, the Oversight Commissioner 
     has played no role in the process of drafting the Police 
     Bill. The British Government published its Implementation 
     Plan before the Oversight Commissioner was even appointed; 
     the RUC likewise came up with its own ``Programme for 
     Change'' with no input from the Oversight Commissioner. These 
     two documents, which purport to guide the implementation of 
     the Patten Commission recommendations, appear now to be the 
     measuring stick by which the Oversight Commissioner intends 
     to judge implementation. And yet these plans--the 
     Government's and the RUC's--do not themselves fully implement 
     the Patten Commission recommendations. This seems to us to 
     relegate the role of the Oversight Commissioner to that of 
     making sure that the police follow through on the changes 
     they decide they want to undertake--a far cry from ensuring 
     that the Patten Commission reforms are truly implemented.
     C. Reference to international human rights standards
       Although the British Government has repeatedly asserted 
     that it ``recognizes the importance of human rights,'' its 
     ongoing resistance to inserting reference to international 
     human rights standards into the language of the Police Bill 
     raises serious questions. The conduct of police in Northern 
     Ireland has been the subject of numerous reports by non-
     governmental human rights organizations and UN bodies, 
     including by Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, the UN Special 
     Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers. Many of 
     these reports have concluded that police conduct in Northern 
     Ireland violates internationally recognized human rights 
     standards. Chairman Patten, in his statement accompanying the 
     release of the Commission's report, highlighted the central 
     importance of human rights standards to the Commission's 
     approach to police reform: ``We recommend a comprehensive 
     programme of action to focus on policing in Northern Ireland 
     on a human rights-based approach. We see the upholding of 
     fundamental human rights as the very purpose of policing, and 
     we propose that it should be instilled in all officers from 
     the start--in the oath they take, in their training, and in 
     their codes of practice and in their performance appraisal 
     system.'' In light of this clear statement of the human 
     rights foundations of the Patten Commission's 
     recommendations, the failure to incorporate reference to 
     international human rights standards into the Police Bill is 
     striking.
       The failure of the British Government to adequately address 
     these concerns with the Police Bill, combined with the slow 
     pace of other reform measures, has already led to an erosion 
     of confidence in the ongoing process and doubts about the 
     Government's intentions. Many who support reform have begun 
     to wonder whether the Government is abandoning its stated 
     intention to fully implement the Patten Commission 
     recommendations. This perception will have serious 
     consequences for the long-term prospects for peace. For 
     example, under the Patten Commission proposals, 600 police 
     officers were supported to volunteer to retire by the end of 
     next month. This proposal was based on the assumption that 
     adequate compensation would be offered as an incentive to 
     retire. But so far, only 91 officers have come forward to 
     volunteer. According to a Police Federation spokesman quoted 
     in a recent article in the Daily Telegraph, the Government 
     has stated that no officer should benefit beyond the sum they 
     would earn if they remained on the force. When the Police 
     Federation asked the Government what incentive this would 
     give officers to retire, they

[[Page 19542]]

     were not given a credible answer. I would ask that a copy of 
     this September 10th article be included in the record of this 
     hearing.


                  iii. breaking the cycle of impunity

       As so many societies transitioning from conflict to peace 
     have learned, building a culture of human rights and 
     accountability will require having a process for addressing 
     past violations. Because we believe that future progress in 
     developing a rights-sensitive police force in Northern 
     Ireland depends on breaking the existing cycle of impunity, 
     we urged the Patten Commission to make recommendations to the 
     British Government in two specific cases: the 1989 murder of 
     Patrick Finucane and the murder of Rosemary Nelson last year. 
     We regret that the Commission's report was silent with 
     respect to these cases. While we understand Mr. Patten's 
     conclusion that the Commission's work was ``forward-
     looking,'' our own experience in situations such as these has 
     been that societies cannot reconcile until the legacy of past 
     abuses is squarely confronted. Although it is clear that not 
     all of these abuses can be addressed or rectified, there are 
     certain cases that embody the most profoundly entrenched 
     practices and problems that the peace process seeks to 
     overcome. If a solid foundation for the future is to be laid, 
     these cases must be resolved.
       For this reason, we urge the Helsinki Commission to 
     continue its vigilant attention to the Finucane and Nelson 
     case, at the same time as it examines broader reforms 
     proposed by the Patten Commission. Because I know you share 
     our keen interest in these two cases, Chairman Smith, I will 
     devote the remainder of my testimony to summarizing the 
     current status of those cases.
     A. Patrick Finucane
       Now is a critical moment in the struggle for justice in the 
     Finucane case. As you know, the Lawyers Committee has done 
     extensive research into the circumstances surrounding the 
     murder and has concluded that there is compelling evidence to 
     suggest that British Army intelligence and the RUC were 
     complicit in the murder. Three weeks ago, Prime Minister Tony 
     Blair met with the family of Mr. Finucane. The meeting was 
     brokered by Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, who himself endorsed an 
     independent inquiry after meeting with the Finucane family in 
     February. During that meeting, Mr. Ahern was provided with a 
     new report by British Irish Rights Watch (BIRW) that details 
     further credible evidence of collusion. Although the same 
     report was provided to the British Government, there has yet 
     to be a reply to the substance of the allegations in the 
     report.
       Nonetheless, during the meeting this month with Prime 
     Minister Blair, members of the Finucane family, along with 
     Paul Mageean from CAJ and Jane Winter from BIRW, presented 
     the BIRW report and other information supporting the 
     allegation of official collusion in the murder of Mr. 
     Finucane. Mr. Blair appeared to be deeply concerned by the 
     allegations and pledged that he would read and consider all 
     the evidence. He conveyed to the Finucane family that he 
     ``personally'' wants to know if the allegations are true and 
     would put anyone guilty of collusion ``out of a job.''
       On September 8th, we wrote a letter to Prime Minister Blair 
     to urge him to authorize an independent inquiry. As we stated 
     in the letter, ``We firmly believe that such an independent 
     public inquiry will serve both to help learn the truth about 
     the circumstances surrounding the murder and to publicly 
     confirm [the British] government's commitment to establishing 
     official accountability for human rights abuses.'' I have 
     included a copy of our letter to Prime Minister Blair with my 
     testimony and ask that it be included in the record.
       Establishment of an independent inquiry would be a 
     significant breakthrough, and we urge you, Chairman Smith, 
     and your colleagues in the Congress to do all you can to 
     encourage Mr. Blair to make this decision.
       A look at the current status of the Stevens investigation 
     reveals how desperately necessary such an independent inquiry 
     is in this case. The current 18 month-long inquiry is the 
     third such investigation by Mr. Stevens, who began the first 
     of these investigations in 1990.
       As we have testified previously, we believe the Steven's 
     investigation is inadequate and lacks the capacity to uncover 
     the truth about allegations of official collusion in the 
     murder. As you may recall, we reported to you last March that 
     Mr. Steven had arrested and brought murder charges against 
     William Stobie, a former UDA quartermaster who worked or RUC 
     Special Branch, in June 1999. At Mr. Stobie's bail hearing, 
     lawyer for the Crown told the high court that recent 
     statements made by journalist Neil Mulholland led to Stobie's 
     arrest. However, Mr. Stobie's lawyer revealed at the bail 
     hearing that Stobie had been interviewed in 1990 for more 
     than 40 hours by members of the RUC Special Branch. These 
     interviews, which included Stobie's confession to supplying 
     the weapons used in the murder, were transcribed and have 
     been available to the authorities since 1990. Among other 
     things, these notes identify the names of the members of the 
     RUC Special Branch who had been warned about the murder. At 
     that time, the authorities never charged Stobie with murder, 
     and the Director of Public Prosecutions dropped unrelated 
     firearms charges against him in 1991.
       Since the last congressional hearing into these matters, 
     the charges against Mr. Stobie have been lessened to aiding 
     and abetting murder. We have also learned that a key witness 
     in the prosecution of Mr. Stobie may no longer be available 
     and the charges against Mr. Stobie may be dropped entirely. 
     If brought to trial, Mr. Stobie reportedly intends to reveal 
     the full extent of the RUC's involvement in the murder of Mr. 
     Finucane.
       This past August, Mr. Steven's team, now directed by 
     Commander Hugh Orde, seized thousands of intelligence 
     documents from British army headquarters revealing new 
     evidence of Loyalist and military collusion in the murder of 
     Mr. Finucane that reportedly will be used to arrest new 
     suspects. This new development contrasts with the 1995 
     decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions not to 
     prosecute anyone from the military. This decision was reached 
     despite evidence of collusion arising out of information 
     relating to Brian Nelson, a double agent recruited by British 
     Army Intelligence while he served as chief intelligence 
     officer for the Ulster Defense Association. The recent 
     discovery of these intelligence documents also suggests the 
     involvement of Brigadier John Gordon Kerr. Mr. Kerr, now a 
     British military attache in Beijing, oversaw Brian Nelson at 
     the time of the Finucane murder and allegedly gave testimony 
     during the inquest of Mr. Finucane under the pseudonym 
     Colonel J.
       Despite compelling evidence that appears to suggest the 
     identities of the intellectual authors of the murder, the 
     Stevens inquiry continues to drag on. Establishment of an 
     independent inquiry would finally ensure that the allegations 
     of official collusion in the murder are squarely addressed.
     B. Rosemary Nelson
       In addition to the Finucane case, the Lawyers Committee 
     also believes that the British Government should authorize an 
     independent inquiry into the murder of defense lawyer 
     Rosemary Nelson. We view resolution of her case as essential 
     to the success of new accountability mechanisms in Northern 
     Ireland.
       As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, Loyalist paramilitaries 
     claimed responsibility for the murder of Rosemary Nelson, who 
     was killed by a car bomb on March 15, 1999. Prior to her 
     death, Ms. Nelson received numerous death threats, including 
     those made by RUC officers relayed through her clients. Ms. 
     Nelson never received government protection despite many 
     appeals made to the Northern Ireland Office and the RUC to 
     protect her life, including those made by Dato' Param 
     Cumaraswamy, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
     Independence of Judges and Lawyers. During the time that Ms. 
     Nelson became a target of official harassment, she herself 
     became an outspoken critic of the RUC, and, thanks to you 
     Chairman Smith, was able to bring her case all the way to the 
     U.S. Congress. At that time, she expressed deep fear 
     regarding her safety and that of her family.
       The current criminal investigation of Ms. Nelson's murder 
     is lead by London detective Colin Port and has been underway 
     for almost a year and a half. To date, the investigation team 
     has taken 1,700 statements, spoken to more than 7,000 
     potential witnesses and unearthed 7,000 lines of inquiry, but 
     has yet to charge anyone in connection with the murder. 
     Because Mr. Port's investigation is limited to the specific 
     circumstances of the murder, we do not believe that his team 
     can effectively address the larger issue of who authored the 
     crime and whether official collusion was involved. 
     Furthermore, Mr. Port does not address the threats made 
     against Ms. Nelson by RUC officers, and this practice 
     continues today.
       In the past we have expressed concern regarding the British 
     Government's inadequate response to Ms. Nelson's situation, 
     not only regarding the failure to provide her protection but 
     also to discipline those officers alleged to have harassed 
     her. We believe that both of these issues must be addressed 
     if the new accountability structures established by the 
     Police Bill are to be effective.
       In particular, the new Police Ombudsmen office must be able 
     to have full power and independence to investigate complaints 
     against the new police force. As we have shared with you in 
     previous testimonies, the RUC's investigation into Ms. 
     Nelson's complaints were found to be inadequate and 
     unsatisfactory by the Independent Commission for Police 
     Complaints (ICPC). The file sent to the Director of Public 
     Prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence to support 
     prosecution or discipline and these officers still serve as 
     police officers. Colleagues of Ms. Nelson viewed hers as the 
     ``test case,'' and Ms. Nelson allegedly filed her complaint 
     to test the adequacy of the system. To be effective, the new 
     Ombudsman will have the added challenge of proving to those 
     subject to police harassment that they can place their 
     confidence in the investigation mechanism.
       Our deep concern regarding accountability mechanisms in 
     Northern Ireland has intensified since we recently learned 
     that another lawyer was under threat and has been the target 
     of harassment and threats by the

[[Page 19543]]

     RUC. Solicitor Padraigan Drinan was Rosemary Nelson's 
     colleague and took on some of Ms. Nelson's cases after her 
     death. To those who want to focus on the future, I would like 
     to emphasize that today that the British government still has 
     the opportunity to avert another tragedy. But it must make 
     sure that it learns the lesson from past errors and uses them 
     to correct a system that has completely failed to protect its 
     citizens against police abuse.


                             iv. conclusion

       Lasting peace cannot take hold in Northern Ireland until 
     the British Government demonstrates the willingness and 
     ability to secure justice for the families of Rosemary Nelson 
     and Patrick Finucane and a commitment to creating a 
     representative and accountable police force for Northern 
     Ireland's future. Thank you.
                                  ____


           Why Failing to Implement the Patten Report Matters

                     (By Professor Brendan O'Leary)

     The present political position in Northern Ireland
       The Belfast Agreement of April 10, 1998 was a major 
     achievement (O'Leary 1999a). Novel institution-building was 
     flanked by peace and confidence-building processes involving 
     cease-fires by paramilitary organisations, the release of 
     their incarcerated prisoners, and commitments to protect 
     human rights, entrench equality, demilitarise the region, 
     assist in decommissioning by the proxies of paramilitaries, 
     and the reform of the administration of justice and policing.
       Implementing the Agreement was always going to be 
     difficult. But as I deliver this testimony just four items, 
     all in the domain of confidence-building, await full or 
     effective beginnings in implementation. These are:
       1. Decommissioning by republican and loyalist 
     paramilitaries;
       2. The reform of the system of criminal justice;
       3. Demilitarization; and
       4. Policing reform.
       These items are inter-linked. Full demilitarization and 
     full decommissioning are mutually interdependent. 
     Decommissioning--the timetable for which has been postponed 
     by the agreement of the parties who made the Agreement--is 
     seen in republican circles as conditional on the UK 
     government fulfilling its public promises to implement the 
     Patten Report. A specific promise is said to have been given 
     to that effect in Spring 2000--amidst negotiations that 
     linked police reform, decommissioning and the lifting of the 
     suspension of the Agreement's institutions unilaterally 
     imposed by the UK Secretary of State in February (a measure 
     that in many eyes breached international law).
       The UK government states that it is implementing the Patten 
     Report in full. Indeed its Prime Minister, the Secretary of 
     State for Northern Ireland, and the Explanatory Notes issued 
     by the Northern Ireland Office accompanying the Police Bill 
     currently before the UK Parliament, flatly declare their 
     intention to give effect to the recommendations of the Patten 
     Commission. That has not been true, and is still manifestly 
     not true.
       In contrast the UK government often implies, usually in 
     off-the-record briefings, that it cannot implement the Patten 
     Report in full because of the `security situation'. This more 
     honest position, albeit in dissembling contradiction with its 
     official one, would have credibility if the necessary 
     preparatory legislative and managerial steps to implement 
     Patten in full when the security situation is satisfactory 
     had been taken. They have not.
     Why the Patten Report was necessary, and its recommendations
       Policing has been so controversial that the parties to the 
     Agreement could not concur on future arrangements (McGarry 
     and O'Leary 1999). The former Irish prime minister, Dr. 
     Garret FitzGerald, has described policing in Northern Ireland 
     as having the status of Jerusalem in the Israeli-Palestinian 
     peace process (FitzGerald 2000). The parties did agree the 
     terms of reference of an Independent Commission on policing, 
     eventually chaired by Christopher Patten, a former 
     Conservative minister in the region and now a European 
     Commissioner.
       To have effective police rooted in, and legitimate with, 
     both major communities was vital to the new settlement. It 
     would persuade all citizens that law enforcement would be 
     applied impartially, help extirpate that species of 
     paramilitarism that is becoming an exclusively criminal 
     enterprise, and foster a law-abiding climate in which to 
     conduct business.
       Eight criteria for policing arrangements were mandated in 
     the Belfast Agreement. They were to be:
       1. Impartial;
       2. Representative;
       3. Free from partisan political control;
       4. Efficient and effective;
       5. Infused with a human rights culture;
       6. Decentralised;
       7. Democratically accountable `at all levels'; and
       8. Consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Belfast 
     Agreement.
       The Patten Commission engaged in extensive research and 
     interaction with the affected parties, interest groups and 
     citizens, and published its report in September 1999. It did 
     not, and could not, meet the hopes, or match the fears, of 
     all; but the Commissioners, a distinguished and 
     representative array of domestic and international personnel, 
     undoubtedly met the terms of reference of the Agreement 
     (O'Leary 1999b).
       The Patten Report was a thorough, careful and imaginative 
     compromise between unionists who maintained that the existing 
     RUC already met the terms of reference of the Agreement and 
     those nationalists, especially republicans, who maintained 
     that the RUC's record mandated its disbanding. The Report was 
     not, however, simply designed to address the concerns of 
     policing Northern Ireland. It applied state-of-the-art 
     managerial and democratic thinking in its recommendations 
     (O'Leary 1999b).
       The UK Government welcomed the Patten Report and promised 
     to implement it. However the Police Bill presented to 
     Parliament in the Spring of 2000 was an evisceration of 
     Patten, and condemned as such by the SDLP, Sinn Fein, the 
     Womens' Coalition, the Catholic Church, non-governmental and 
     human rights organizations, such as the Committee on the 
     Administration of Justice. It was also criticized by the 
     Irish Government, the U.S. House of Representatives (H. Res. 
     447, 106th Congress), and a range of Irish Americans, 
     including apparently, President Clinton.
       To demonstrate the veracity of the critics' complaints let 
     me briefly compare some of Patten's recommendations with the 
     original Bill.
       Impartiality: Patten recommended a neutral name, the 
     Northern Ireland Police Service. The Royal Ulster 
     Constabulary was not a neutral title so it was recommended to 
     go, period. Patten also recommended that the display of the 
     Union flag and the portrait of the Queen at police stations 
     should go--symbols in his view should be `free from 
     association with the British or Irish states'. These 
     recommendations were a consequence of Patten's terms of 
     reference, and of the Agreement's explicit commitment to 
     establishing `parity of esteem' between the national 
     traditions, and the UK's solemn commitment to `rigorous 
     impartiality' in its administration.
       The original Bill proposed that the Secretary of State have 
     the power to decide on the issues of names and emblems, and 
     thereby ignored Patten's explicit recommendations.
       Representativeness: Patten recommended affirmative action 
     to change rapidly the proportion of cultural Catholics in the 
     police, and envisaged a programme of at least ten-years. Even 
     critics of affirmative action recognized the need to correct 
     the existing imbalance--in which over 90 per cent of the 
     police are local cultural Protestants.
       The original Bill reduced the period in which the police 
     would be recruited on a 50:50 ratio of cultural Catholics and 
     cultural Protestants to three years, requiring the Secretary 
     of State to make any extension, and was silent on 
     `aggregation', Patten's proposed policy for shortfalls in the 
     recruitment of suitably qualified cultural Catholics.
       Freedom for partisan control. Patten proposed a Policing 
     Board consisting of 10 representatives from political 
     parties, in proportion to their shares of seats on the 
     Executive, and 9 members nominated by the First and Deputy 
     First Ministers. These recommendations guaranteed a 
     politically representative board in which neither unionists 
     nor nationalists would have partisan control.
       The original Bill introduced a requirement that the Board 
     should operate according to a weighted majority when 
     recommending an inquiry. Given known political dispositions 
     this was tantamount to giving unionist and unionist-nominated 
     members a veto over inquiries, i.e. partisan political 
     control, and therefore a direct violation of Patten's terms 
     of reference.
       Efficient and effective policing. Patten avoided false 
     economies when recommending a down-sizing of the service, 
     advocated a strong Board empowered to set performance 
     targets, and proposed enabling local District Policing 
     Partnership Boards to engage in the market-testing of police 
     effectiveness.
       The original Bill empowered the Secretary of State, not the 
     Board, to set performance targets, made no statutory 
     provision for disbanding the police reserve, and deflated the 
     proposed District Policing Partnership Boards--apparently 
     because of assertions that they would lead to paramilitaries 
     being subsidized by tax-payers.
       Human Rights Culture. Patten proposed that new and serving 
     officers should have knowledge of human rights built into 
     their training, and re-training, and their codes of practice. 
     In addition to the European Convention, due to become part of 
     UK domestic law, the Commission held out international norms 
     as benchmarks: ``compliance . . . with international human 
     rights standards . . . are . . . an important safeguard both 
     to the public and to police officers carrying out their 
     duties'' (Patten, 1999, para 5.17). Patten's proposals for 
     normalizing the police--through dissolving the special branch 
     into criminal investigations--and demilitarizing the police 
     met the Agreement's human rights objectives.
       The original Bill was a parody of Patten. The new oath was 
     to be confined to new officers. No standards of rights higher 
     than

[[Page 19544]]

     those in the European Convention were to be incorporated into 
     police training and practice. Responsibility for a Code of 
     Ethics was left with the Chief Constable. It explicitly 
     excluded Patten's proposed requirement that the oath of 
     service `respect the traditions and beliefs of people'. 
     Normalization and demilitarization were left unclear in the 
     Bill and the Implementation Plan.
       Decentralization: Patten envisaged enabling local 
     governments to influence the Policing Board through their own 
     District Policing Partnership Boards, and giving the latter 
     powers `to purchase additional services from the police or 
     statutory agencies, or from the private sector', and matching 
     police internal management units to local government 
     districts.
       The original Bill, by contrast, maintained or strengthened 
     centralization in several ways. The Secretary of State 
     obtained powers that Patten had proposed for the First and 
     Deputy First Ministers and the Board, and powers to issue 
     instructions to District Policing Partnership Boards; and 
     neither the Bill nor the Implementation Plan contained clear 
     plans to implement the proposed experiment in community 
     policing.
       Democratic Accountability. Patten envisaged a strong, 
     independent and powerful Board to hold the police to account, 
     and to replace the existing and discredited Police Authority 
     (Patten, 1999:para 6.23), and recommended an institutional 
     design to ensure that policing would be the responsibility of 
     a plurality of networked organizations rather than the 
     monopoly of a police force. The police would have 
     `operational responsibility' but be held to account by a 
     powerful Board, and required to interact with the Human 
     Rights Commission, the Ombudsman and the Equality Commission.
       The Bill radically watered down Patten's proposals, 
     empowering the Secretary of State to oversee and veto the 
     Board's powers, empowering the Chief Constable to refuse to 
     respond to reasonable requests from the Board, preventing the 
     Board from making inquiries into past misconduct, and 
     obligating it to have a weighted majority before inquiring 
     into present or future misconduct. Astonishingly this led the 
     existing discredited Policing Authority, correctly, to 
     condemn the Bill, a response that no one could have predicted 
     when the UK Government welcomed Patten.
       Matching the Agreement? Patten was consistent with the 
     terms of reference and spirit of the Belfast Agreement. The 
     original Bill was not, being incompatible with the `parity of 
     esteem' and `rigorous impartiality' in administration 
     promised by the UK Government. Manifestly it could not 
     encourage `widespread community support' since it fell far 
     short of the compromise that moderate nationalists had 
     accepted and that Patten had proposed to mark a `new 
     beginning'.
       Waiting for Explanations. What explains the radical 
     discrepancy between Patten and the original Bill?
       The short answer is that the Bill was drafted by the 
     Northern Ireland Office's officials under Secretary of State 
     Peter Mandelson's supervision. They appeared to `forget' that 
     the terms of reference came from the Belfast Agreement, and 
     that Patten's recommendations represented a careful and 
     rigorous compromise between unionists and nationalists. 
     Indeed they appear to have treated the Patten Report as a 
     nationalist report which they should appropriately modify as 
     benign mediators.
       Even though Patten explicitly warned against `cherry-
     picking' the Secretary of State and his officials believed 
     that they had the right to implement what they found 
     acceptable, and to leave aside what they found unacceptable, 
     premature, or likely to cause difficulties for pro-Agreement 
     unionists or the RUC.
       The Bill suggested that the UK government was:
       Determined to avoid the police being subject to rigorous 
     democratic accountability,
       Deeply distrustful of the capacity of the local parties to 
     manage policing at any level, and
       Concerned to minimise the difficulties that the partial 
     implementation of Patten would occasion for First Minister 
     David Trimble and his party, the Ulster Unionists, by 
     mininising radical change and emphasising the extent to which 
     the `new' service would be a mere reform of the RUC.
       Under pressure the UK Government has retreated: whether to 
     a position prepared in advance only others can know, but 
     skilled political management is not something I shall 
     criticise it for.
       From Evisceration to `Patten Light'. Accusing its critics 
     of `hype', `rhetoric' and`hyerbole' the UK Government 
     promised to `listen' and to modify the Bill. Mr. Mandelson 
     declared that he might have been too cautious in the powers 
     granted the Policing Board. Indeed the Government was 
     subsequently to accept over 60 SDLP-driven amendments to 
     bring the Bill more into line with Patten. This, of course, 
     demonstrated that its original `spin' had been a lie. Since 
     the Bill was so extensively modified--as the Government now 
     proudly advertises--it confirms that the original Bill was 
     radically defective in relation to its declared objectives, 
     for reasons that remain unexplained.
       The Bill was improved in the Commons Committee stage, but 
     insufficiently. The quota for the recruitment of cultural 
     Catholics is now better protected. The Policing Board has 
     been given power over the setting of short-run objectives, 
     and final responsibility for the police's code of ethics. 
     Consultation procedures involving the Ombudsman and the 
     Equality Commission have been strengthened, and the First and 
     Deputy First Ministers will now be consulted over the 
     appointment of non-party members to the Board. The weighted 
     majority provisions for an inquiry by the Board have gone, 
     replaced by the lower hurdle of an absolute majority.
       Yet any honest external appraisal of the modified Bill must 
     report that it is still not the whole Patten. If the first 
     draft eviscerated Patten, the latest version of presents a 
     mostly bloodless ghost. The modified Bill rectifies some of 
     the more overt deviations from Patten, but on the crucial 
     issues of police accountability and ensuring a `new 
     beginning' it remains at odds with Patten's explicit 
     recommendations.
       As the Bill is about to recommence its progress through the 
     Lords, the UK Government has started to shift its public 
     relations. The new line is that the `full Patten' would 
     render the police less effective, e.g., in dealing with 
     criminal paramilitarism. The implication is that anyone who 
     disagrees must be soft on crime (and its paramilitary 
     causes). The new line lacks credibility: Patten combined `the 
     new public management' and democratic values in a rigorous 
     formula to ensure no trade-off between effectiveness and 
     accountability.
       Let me identify just some of the outstanding respects in 
     which the modified Bill fails to implement Patten.
       Oversight Commissioner. Patten recommended an Oversight 
     Commissioner to `supervise the implementation of our 
     recommendations'. The UK Government has--under pressure--put 
     the commissioner's office on a statutory basis, which it did 
     not intend to do originally, but has confined his role to 
     overseeing changes `decided by the Government'. If Mr. 
     Mandelson and his colleagues were committed to Patten they 
     would charge the Commissioner with recommending, now or in 
     the future, any legislative and management changes necessary 
     for the full and effective implementation of the Patten 
     Report. That he refuses to do so speaks volumes. In addition 
     the Commissioner's role currently remains poorly specified. 
     Since the Commissioner is a former US policeman. American 
     government pressure might appropriately be directed towards 
     explicitly giving his office the remit that Patten envisaged.
       Policing Board. Patten recommended a Policing Board to hold 
     the police to account, and to initiate inquiries into police 
     conduct and practices. Mr. Mandelson has prevented the Board 
     from inquiring into any act or omission arising before the 
     eventual Act applies (clause 58 (11) of the Bill). I believe 
     that this is tantamount to an undeclared amnesty for past 
     police misconduct, not proposed by Patten. Personally I would 
     not object to an open amnesty, but this step is dishonest, 
     and makes it much less likely that `rotten apples' will be 
     rooted out, as promised.
       The Secretary of State will now have the extraordinary 
     power to prevent inquiries by the Board because they `would 
     serve no useful purpose', a power added at the Report stage 
     in the Commons--needless to say not in Patten. The only 
     rational explanation for this power is that the Government 
     has chosen to compensate itself for the concessions it made 
     in the Commons Committee when it expanded the Board's remit 
     to be more in line with Patten. So what it has given with one 
     hand, on the grounds that it had been too cautious, it has 
     taken away with two clumsy feet.
       The Secretary of State will additionally have the authority 
     to approve or veto the person appointed to conduct any 
     inquiry (clause 58 (9)). And he intends having power to order 
     the Chief Constable to take steps in the interests of 
     economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, whereas Patten 
     envisaged this role for the Board.
       The UK Government suggests its critics are petty. Its line 
     is `Look how much we have done to implement Patten, and how 
     radical Patten is by comparison with elsewhere'. This `spin' 
     is utterly unconvincing. The proposed arrangements would 
     effectively seal off past, present and future avenues through 
     which the police might be held to account for misconduct; 
     they are recipes for leaving them outside the effective ambit 
     of the law, and of managerial scrutiny.
       And be it noted: Patten is not radical, especially not by 
     the standards of North America. Canada and the USA have long 
     made their police democratically accountable and socially 
     representative. Patten is only radical by the past standards 
     of Northern Ireland.
       Ombudsman. Patten recommended that the Ombudsman should 
     have significant powers (Patten, 1999, para 6.42) and should 
     `exercise the right to investigate and comment on police 
     policies and practices', whereas in the modified Bill the 
     Ombudsman may make reports, but not investigate (so it is not 
     a crime to obstruct her work). The Ombudsman is additionally 
     restricted in her retrospective powers (clause 62), once 
     again circumscribing the police's accountability for past 
     misconduct.

[[Page 19545]]

       Name and Symbols. Patten wanted a police rooted in both 
     communities, not just one. That is why he recommended that 
     the name of the service be entirely new: The Northern Ireland 
     Police Service.
       The Bill, as a result of a Government decision to accept an 
     amendment tabled by the Ulster Unionist Party, currently 
     styles the service `The Police Service of Northern Ireland 
     (incorporating the Royal Ulster Constabulary)'. The Secretary 
     of State promised an amendment to define `for operational 
     purposes'--to ensure that the full title would rarely be 
     used, and that the parenthetic past generally be excluded. He 
     broke this commitment at Report Stage.
       Secretary of State Mandelson has been mendaciously 
     misleading in declaring that he is merely following Patten's 
     wishes that the new service be connected to the old and avoid 
     suggestions of disbanding. This line is a characteristic 
     half-truth: Patten proposed an entirely new and fresh name, 
     and proposed linkages between the old and new services 
     through police memorials, and not the re-naming proposed by 
     Ken Maginnis, MP, Security Spokesman for the Ulster Unionist 
     Party.
       Patten unambiguously recommended that the police's new 
     badge and emblems be free of association with the British or 
     Irish states, and that the Union flag should not fly from 
     police buildings. The Bill postpones these matters.
       Why do these symbolic issues matter? Simply because the 
     best way to win widespread acceptance for police reform is to 
     confirm Patten's promised new beginning by following his 
     proposed strategy of symbolic neutrality. Full re-naming and 
     symbolic neutrality would spell a double message: that the 
     new police is to be everyone's police, and the new police is 
     no longer to be primarily the unionists' police. This 
     symbolic shift would mightily assist in obtaining 
     representative cultural Catholic recruitment and in winning 
     consent for the new order amongst nationalists as well as 
     unionists. Not to follow Patten's recommendations in these 
     respects would also spell a double message: that the new 
     police is merely the old RUC re-touched, and remains a police 
     linked more to British than Irish identity, i.e. a recipe for 
     the status quo ante.
       Consuequences of Failing to Implement Patten in Full. 
     Unless the UK Government makes provision for Patten to be 
     fully implemented, there will be grave consequences.
       Disaster may come in two forms. Its weakest form is taking 
     shape. The SDLP, Sinn Fein and the Catholic Church are most 
     unlikely to recommend that their constituents consider 
     joining the police, and may well boycott the Policing Board 
     and District Policing Partnership Boards. That will leave the 
     police without Patten's promised `new beginning', lacking 
     full legitimacy with just less than half of the local 
     electorate, an institutional booby-trap.
       We must not forget that over three hundred police were 
     killed in the current conflict, but we must also not forget 
     that the outbreak of armed conflict in 1969 was partly caused 
     by an unreformed, half-legitimate police service, responsible 
     for seven of the first eight deaths.
       In its strongest form disaster would de-couple nationalists 
     and republicans from the Agreement, and bring down its 
     political institutions. Failure to deliver Patten will mean 
     that Sinn Fein will find it extremely difficult to get the 
     IRA to go further in decommissioning. The argument will be: 
     `The UK Government has reneged on a fundamental commitment 
     under the Agreement so why should republicans disarm and 
     leave people to be policed by an unreformed service?' In turn 
     that will lead to unionist calls for the exclusion of Sinn 
     Fein from ministerial office, and to a repeat of Mr. 
     Trimble's gambit used earlier this year: `decommission now or 
     I'll resign now'.
       The day before I flew to Washington I was in Northern 
     Ireland and watched Mr. Trimble in effect repeat this threat 
     in the Assembly under challenge from his hard-line unionist 
     opponents. If decommissioning does not happen because of 
     Secretary of State Mandelson's failure to deliver fully on 
     Patten, the SDLP will not be able or willing to help 
     prioritize decommissioning, unless it prefers electoral 
     suicide. The IRA will find it difficult to prevent further 
     departures to the Real and Continuity IRAs, except by 
     refusing to budge on arms. In turn that will at some stage 
     prompt a resignation threat from the First Minister. In 
     short, a second collapse of the Agreement's institutions 
     looms.
       This vista and worse can and must be avoided.
     Final thoughts and answers
       It may be thought: ``Is this analysis partisan?''; and ``Is 
     not Mr. Mandelson's conduct designed to help Mr. Trimble who 
     is in a precarious position?''
       My answer to the first question is `no'. I have a long 
     record of advocating bi-national resolutions of the conflict 
     that are fair to both nationalists and unionists.
       The answer to the second question must be a very qualified 
     `yes'. `Saving David Trimble' may account for Mr. Mandelson's 
     tampering with Patten's proposals on symbolic matters. But it 
     does not account for his evisceration of the efforts to have 
     a more accountable and human-rights infused service--here the 
     Secretary of State has succumbed to lobbying by security 
     officials.
       Another answer to the second question is more 
     straightforward: Mr. Mandelson must not unilaterally abandon 
     or re-negotiate the Agreement or the work of Commissions sent 
     up under the Agreement at the behest of any party.
       A third answer I would propose is that pro-Agreement 
     unionists can, eventually, accept the full Patten, because 
     they know that a legitimate and effective police is necessary 
     to reconcile nationalists to the continuation of the Union--
     the reason they signed the Agreement.
       Lastly, I believe that the Patten Report is not only what 
     Mr. Mandelson should fully implement under the Agreement as 
     proof of rigorous impartiality in his administration, but 
     also what he should implement even if there were to be no 
     Agreement.

  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
Smith) for his comments. I recognize the gentleman's work on human 
rights throughout the world. Not just in Northern Ireland, but 
throughout the world. But especially in Northern Ireland.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. 
McCarthy).
  Mrs. McCARTHY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues here 
for taking up this battle, and that is what it is. Many have been 
fighting this for many, many years. But since I have been here the last 
4 years, we have seen progress. For the first time in Northern Ireland, 
people had hope. People thought peace was right there.
  Well, peace is there, but we have some things that we have to work 
out. One of the strongest things we have to work on is making sure that 
we send a strong message from this great body that we have to keep with 
the Patten agreement.
  Mr. Speaker, we have seen even in our own country when the people 
lose faith in the police departments, we see the anger that is in those 
communities. So there are things that we have to make sure that are 
done and the Patten agreement covers those things. The Patten agreement 
can work for Northern Ireland.
  One of the things that we have seen constantly, every time we bring 
up the Patten agreement, we see them trying to chip away a little bit. 
They do not like the agreement. So what are they trying to do? Are they 
trying to break the whole fragile agreement that we have for Good 
Friday? This is what we are all fighting for.
  Tomorrow many of us here, actually, will have 40 women from Northern 
Ireland. We are going to have Protestant and Catholic women. They are 
going to be following us around so that we can show them how 
legislative work goes, because they are willing to make this work. They 
will spend 2 weeks here in this country to see how our government works 
and they want to go home and make this work.
  Well, the only way it is going to work is really making sure that we 
put the pressure on to make sure the Patten agreement is lived up to. 
That is our job, and it is really a small part. We are here, we are 
here in Washington, D.C. We do not have to face the fear many Northern 
Irish people have to fear of the police officers. We can change that. 
Peace can come to that country. I am proud to be with all of my 
colleagues to stand here and make a difference.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. King), a cochairman of our Irish Caucus, and a member of 
our Committee on International Relations.
  Mr. KING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Gilman), chairman of the Committee on International Relations, for 
yielding me this time. At the very outset I want to commend him for the 
outstanding job he has done for so many years, not just in the last 6 
that he has been chairman of the Committee on International Relations, 
but for more than two decades as a real warrior in the cause of peace 
and justice in Ireland.
  We also have to commend the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), 
chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human 
Rights for the invaluable work that he has done in holding hearings 
that go right to the depth of the allegations

[[Page 19546]]

against the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and right to the heart of the 
problems which have inflicted law enforcement and the criminal justice 
system in Northern Ireland for far too many years, for at least the 
last three decades.
  Also, I have to commend the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal) 
for the tremendous work he has done, not just during the 12 years he 
has been in Congress, but the years before that when he was the mayor 
in Springfield, Massachusetts, and just for the tremendous amount of 
dedication and enthusiasm and unyielding tenacity he brings to this 
entire issue of peace and justice in Ireland.
  Mr. Speaker, I know that if the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Meehan) were here tonight, in fact he has asked me to say this on his 
behalf, there is nobody in the House of Representatives he looks up to 
more in providing moral leadership and guidance than the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Neal). And the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Meehan) asked me to put that on the public record this evening.
  As the gentleman from Massachusetts said earlier, this is a 
bipartisan issue. I want to commend President Clinton for the job that 
he has done. I know that tonight the gentleman read into the record a 
statement from Vice President Gore. The gentleman from New York 
(Chairman Gilman) and I and the gentleman from New Jersey (Chairman 
Smith) can report last week Governor Bush also has put out a statement 
calling for the full implementation of the Patten Commission report, 
which shows that this clearly is a bipartisan issue. It is an issue on 
which all men and woman of goodwill can stand together.
  What we are faced with tonight, today, and for the next weeks and 
months in the north of Ireland is a true crisis. If the Good Friday 
Agreement is premised on concession and compromise. The Good Friday 
Agreement itself was a compromise. The Good Friday Agreement itself was 
based on very strong concessions made by all sides, particularly by the 
Catholic community, the Nationalist community, the Republican community 
who made very deep concessions in return for a pledge by the British 
and Irish governments that all the provisions of the Good Friday 
Agreement would be carried out.
  Mr. Speaker, no provision was more important in the Patten Commission 
than the section dealing with police reform, because in the north of 
Ireland for three decades the Royal Ulster Constabulary was guilty of 
the most vicious and gross human rights violations imaginable. It is 
hard for us as Americans to envision in the English speaking world, in 
the United Kingdom which stands for the Magna Carta and justice and 
law, that there was such brutality systematically carried out. Not the 
type of brutalities that occur by accident, not those that are 
incidental, but brutalities that were root and branch a part of the 
policing in Northern Ireland.
  Torture, murder of children, intentional killings, intentionally 
maimings. This was all part of the police policy in the north of 
Ireland. So the police have to be reformed. That was an integral part, 
the integral part of the Good Friday Agreement. And the Patten 
Commission, which was chaired by Chris Patten, a conservative MP, a 
former conservative MP, a minister in Margaret Thatcher's government, 
he came up with a series of reforms which, again, were themselves a 
compromise.
  There is much that is lacking, as the gentleman from New Jersey 
(Chairman Smith) has pointed out time and again. The Patten Commission 
itself, the Patten Commission recommendations themselves are deficient. 
Yet now the British Government is attempting to compromise the 
compromise. It is attempting to water down the compromise of the Patten 
Commission to come out with a series of reforms that will not be 
reforms at all. It will just be a readjustment of the status quo. It 
will be a continuation of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Not even under 
a new name, because the old name will still remain. It will be a 
subset, but it will still be there and this is wrong.
  Mr. Speaker, the entire peace process is at risk. The entire peace 
process is being put at risk by the British Government, by the Ulster 
Unionist Party, and probably nothing is more aggravating than to hear 
someone like David Trimble, who is head of the Ulster Unionist Party, 
to say that we in the Congress should not get involved, that the 
American Government should not get involved. The reality is that on the 
night the Good Friday Agreement was reached and the morning that it was 
signed, David Trimble would not sign it until he was assured by 
President Clinton that the U.S. would stay involved. And now that we 
are involved he is saying that we should get out and back away from the 
agreement and allow it to go back to the status quo. The way it was for 
three decades and seven decades and even three centuries, if we want to 
go all the way back, where the Catholic community was systematically 
discriminated against and had their rights violated.
  It is essential for us in the Congress to stand together. It is 
essential for the President to speak out as clearly as he has in the 
past to let the British Government know, to let Tony Blair know, let 
the British Secretary of State, Peter Mandelson, know that they cannot 
continue to violate the rights of Catholics. They cannot take the 
Nationalist community for granted.
  The fact is an agreement was signed, an international agreement, and 
the British Government has the absolute obligation to enforce that 
agreement. It cannot back down and cannot succumb to blackmail from 
David Trimble, because if it does it puts at risk the entire peace 
process and we will go back to the situation that ruined so many 
innocent lives for so many years. Mr. Speaker, if that happens the 
blood will be on the hands of the British government and the Ulster 
Unionist Party.

                              {time}  2100

  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from the 
Bronx, New York (Mr. Engel), a stalwart leader in protecting the rights 
of all of the people of Ireland, particularly from the North of 
Ireland.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Crowley), my friend, for yielding time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to echo the words of all the eloquent colleagues 
who have spoke before me on both sides of the aisle. The gentleman from 
New York (Mr. King) has it exactly right, the Good Friday Agreement of 
April 1998 was a compromise, and that compromise established a 
framework for the peaceful settlement for the conflict in the North of 
Ireland. Once you start to unravel a compromise, then everybody wants 
to change it, and that is why it is important that we stick to that 
compromise and not let one side try to blackmail everybody else into 
getting their way.
  I rise in support of H. Res. 547. This vital accord which was 
negotiated by former Senator George Mitchell provided for the 
establishment of an independent commission to make recommendations on 
how to fix the problems and abuses that have plagued policing in the 
North of Ireland.
  The commission lead by Sir Christopher Patten concluded its work on 
September 9, 1999, and proposed 175 recommendations in its final 
report. In May of this year, the British Government published a bill 
which purports to implement the Patten report. Unfortunately, the draft 
bill certainly does not live up to the letter or spirit of the Patten 
report and dilutes many key recommendations of the Patten Commission.
  The problems of the North of Ireland will never be resolved until the 
egregious human rights violations caused by the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary are permanently ended and the unit replaced by a police 
service truly representational of the population of the region; and as 
the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal) pointed out, the population 
right now is 5,446.
  This important resolution that rightly calls for full and speedy 
implementation of the Patten Commission report is a way to correct the 
years of police abuses and gain the support of

[[Page 19547]]

both nationalists and unionists for peace in the North of Ireland.
  I urge passage of H.Res. 547. I hope it is unanimous, and all of us 
in this Congress that have worked so long for peace and justice in the 
North of Ireland, while it is within our grasp, we cannot let those who 
want to destroy the agreement to get their own ways and succeed.
  Mr. Speaker, if peace is to come, then we must take the ball, we must 
run with it and support H.Res. 547.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Payne).
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Gilman), chairman of the Committee on International Relations, and the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) from the Helsinki Commission, the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. King), and to my colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley) and the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), who has introduced this 
resolution.
  Let me say that the Good Friday Accord established an international 
body chaired by Chris Patten, and it called to bring a new beginning to 
policing in Northern Ireland with a police service capable of 
attracting and sustaining support from the community as a whole.
  In September 1999, over 170 recommendations for change were given, 
such things as the power of a policing board should be looked at, the 
appointment of its members should be looked at carefully, the 
centrality of human rights, they talked about a name change, the future 
of full time reserves, the power of the police ombudsperson, a 
statutory basis to work from the International Oversight Commission. 
There are a number of things that were talked about in this very 
thorough report.
  Mr. Speaker, we are disappointed that the watered-down version that 
has come forth does not stand up to what the people of Ireland, North 
and South, wanted, a new beginning; and we believe that there is much 
room for improvement.
  We heard just on Friday very distinguished persons, Dr. Gerald Lynch, 
president of John Jay College. We listened to experts who came from 
Ireland to talk about what was going on, Brendan O'Leary, and Martin 
O'Brien, and our own Elisa Massimino from the Washington office of 
Lawyers Committee; and they all said, person after person, that there 
has to be real reform; there has to be change if this new policing is 
going to serve all of the people.
  Mr. Speaker, I would just urge that we support the resolution by the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), my colleague, and that we urge 
a thorough look at what the Patten report really said and try to 
implement those changes that have been recommended in that great 
report.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my friend, the 
gentlewoman from New York City (Mrs. Maloney).
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Crowley) for yielding the time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman's leadership on this issue and 
so many others. I rise in support of this resolution, which reaffirms 
our Nation's commitment to the Northern Ireland peace process and 
expresses our strong support for the policing recommendations of the 
Patten Commission.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank very much the author of this bill, the gentleman 
from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), a long-term leader of the Irish Caucus, 
and the gentleman from New York (Chairman Gilman) of the Committee on 
International Relations for his staunch and strong support.
  Many of the Members of the Irish Caucus have already spoken, and it 
shows the strong bipartisan support that has come together on this 
issue. It has been well over 2 years since the Good Friday Agreement 
was signed and Northern Ireland has come a long way toward a lasting 
peace acceptable to all sides. That agreement was supported first and 
foremost by the people of Northern Ireland, Britain and Ireland itself.
  With such broad support, the peace process has been able to withstand 
numerous attacks and remain on track. Nevertheless, there still are a 
number of obstacles that stand in the way of a permanent peace, and one 
of the most significant hurdles is the effective implementation of the 
policing recommendations developed by the Patten Commission.
  Everyone agrees that police reform needs to take place, and 
accountability needs to be part of it. The gentleman from New York (Mr. 
King), my colleague, outlined many of the abuses and why this is such a 
deep-felt proposal by so many of the people. The recommendations were 
supported by all sides, but with one condition, that all of the 
recommendations were completely implemented. In this way both sides 
could be assured that final policing arrangements were fair to 
everyone.
  Unfortunately, although they were issued over a year ago, these 
recommendations have yet to be implemented. Legislation proposed in the 
British parliament fails to include all of the recommendations and 
nationalists in Northern Ireland have expressed their displeasure with 
this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I end by commending the President of the United States, 
George Mitchell and many others who have worked hard for this peace 
accord; and I really urge complete and total adoption of this 
resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining 2\1/2\ 
minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, the devolution of power from Westminster to Belfast and 
its related components have been difficult endeavors for all parties 
involved. The terms of the negotiations demand sacrifices by loyalists 
and nationalists alike in order to achieve a successful implementation 
of the Good Friday Agreement. It troubles me to report that the 
sacrifices necessary for a viable solution in Northern Ireland have not 
been made to the fullest.
  A key factor in achieving a lasting peace in Northern Ireland will be 
a police force that has the respect and trust of the entire population. 
The importance of police reforms in Northern Ireland cannot be 
overstated. It is essential for the local police force to garner the 
trust of the people it serves. The average citizen, regardless of race, 
religion or nationality, should be able to call on the police and have 
them come to carry out their functions, not serve as an occupying army.
  Mr. Speaker, people can talk until they are blue in the face about 
how to accomplish true police reform. Unfortunately, dialogue has its 
limitations. True reform requires action. It has been suggested that 
the only way we can accurately measure police reform in Northern 
Ireland will be the day when young nationalists walk into a police 
station in Belfast, submit an application and subsequently display 
conduct that is honorable, ethical and enthusiastic for the people of 
Northern Ireland without fear of favor.
  In the British parliament, the Northern Ireland Police Bill has been 
introduced as the vehicle for implementing the Patten Commission. 
However, there is a significant disparity between the bill and the 
recommendations proposed by Mr. Patten in his report.
  Mr. Speaker, failure to bridge this gap could put the peace process 
in extreme peril. Just yesterday, Northern Ireland First Minister David 
Trimble met Northern Ireland Secretary Peter Mandelson at the Labour 
Party Conference in Brighton to warn him that the Good Friday Agreement 
could collapse if the British Government did not make concessions to 
his party with regard to reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
  There has been an effort on the part of the British agreement to 
dilute the recommendations of the Patten Commission. I view this report 
as the minimum that must be done to promote equity and equality in 
policing in Northern Ireland. I am concerned by the government's recent 
approach of the cherry-picking parts of the Patten Commission as if it 
were an a-la-carte menu.

[[Page 19548]]

  Mr. Speaker, I have had the opportunity to meet Mr. Patten, so I know 
the countless hours he has put into a proposal that should be the 
blueprint for a new force.
  This process was fair and open to all sides. To make changes at this 
point to a plan that was so carefully crafted will not serve anyone 
well. This report and this commission would not have been needed if 
there was not an injustice to correct.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge the British Government to follow the spirit of 
the Good Friday Agreement and uphold their commitment. I want to thank 
my colleagues here this evening, especially the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), for offering this measure; the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Gilman); the gentleman from New York (Mr. King); the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith); and all the other colleagues.
  I want to thank this administration who deserves a great deal of the 
credit for bringing this process forward, particularly Mr. Mitchell. I 
hope we can bring the Mitchell amendment, or measure, before us calling 
upon the Noble committee to give him the Noble Peace Prize. I do not 
think anyone deserves it more than he does at this point in time.
  Mr. Speaker, a vote in favor of this resolution will send a message 
to our friends across the Atlantic that the United States supports its 
efforts and encourages the adherence of all aspects of the Good Friday 
Agreement without exception; and, therefore, I urge my colleagues to 
support H. Res. 547.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, let me close by noting that some in unionism say 
Patten's police reforms go too far too fast. I have here in my hand a 
1985 Belfast newspaper, the Irish News, where the SDLP's Seamus Mallon 
was calling for RUC reform more than 15 years ago. This is dated August 
19, 1985.
  Mr. Speaker, I call on the British parliamentarians to let us get on 
with police reform and let us live by the Good Friday Accord. 
Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to cast a strong vote in support of 
H. Res. 547.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to be an original cosponsor 
of this resolution, and I congratulate Mr. Neal for authoring it. With 
this Sense of Congress, we commend the parties to Northern Ireland's 
peace process for their achievements to date. But, we also call on the 
British Government to come to its senses on the issue of police reform.
  All the parties deserve praise for the progress they have made so 
far. The Good Friday Agreement stands as a remarkable achievement and 
the best hope for lasting peace in Northern Ireland.
  The seating of Northern Ireland's new executive, alongside the power 
sharing Assembly, was a crucial step towards solidifying peace and 
democracy in Northern Ireland.
  Also critical were IRA steps towards disarmament. Weapons 
decommissioning is one of the two most pressing and sensitive issues 
facing Northern Ireland.
  The other is police reform.
  Without full implementation of the recommendations for police reform 
made by the Patten Commission--a commission called for in the Good 
Friday Agreement--a full peace will remain elusive.
  Common sense calls for the name of the police force--the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (and I cannot imagine a more British-sounding name than 
that)-- to be changed. And for the membership in the police force--now 
93 percent Protestant and a scanty 7 percent Catholic--to be formed 
more equitably to reflect the near even population split in the 
community.
  Mr. Speaker, we are once again at a perilous point. The answers lay 
in moving forward to full implementation of the Good Friday accords--to 
pull participatory, accountable and representative government and rule 
of law in Northern Ireland--not in stagnation and trepidation.
  Vote today to support this important resolution.
  Ms. ESHOO. I rise today in support of this Resolution which commends 
both groups for their progress towards implementing the Good Friday 
Peace Accords. This momentous peace agreement is just the first of many 
difficult steps that must be taken to ensure equality.
  The Peace Accords created an Independent Commission to make 
recommendations on the Northern Island policing forces. This Resolution 
urges the swift implementation of the recommendations of the 
Independent Commission. The Independent Commission calls for further 
integration of Catholics into the policing force to 16% in four years 
and 30% in ten years and for new badge and symbols free of the British 
or Irish states. It also includes a dramatic reduction in the size of 
the force from 11,400 to 7,500 full-time personnel. These 
recommendations are vital to the long-term stability of the peace 
agreement. It is crucial that the policing force somewhat represent the 
community that it is meant to protect. The Royal Ulster Constabulary is 
92% Protestant and serves a community comprised of 56% Protestant and 
42% Catholic.
  Mr. Speaker, Belfast is the last city in Europe to be divided by a 
wall. Let's take an important step and pass this Resolution to begin 
the movement for equality.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Res. 547, 
introduced by my good friend and colleague, Congressman Neal of 
Massachusetts.
  All parties should be commended for progress under the Good Friday 
Accord of April 1998. What was once described as an intractable 
conflict between Nationalists and Unionists in Northern Ireland never 
to be solved, has seen unprecedented calm and cooperation under the 
Good Friday Framework guided by Senator George Mitchell.
  The seating of the executive of the power-sharing Assembly was a 
crucial moment of solidifying peace in Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, 
two sensitive areas of implementation under Good Friday lagged behind 
the others: weapons decommissioning and police reform.
  The impasse over weapons decommissioning became so strong that it 
first halted implementation of the Executive last fall, and then forced 
its suspension in February just as it had been established. A 
settlement emerged when the Irish Republican Army agreed to allow its 
weapons dumps to be inspected by a distinguished international group 
led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and former African 
National Congress general secretary Cyril Ramaphosa. The weapons dumps 
were inspected and the National Assembly resumed in April.
  Subsequently, the other looming issue of police reform moved to the 
fore. The Good Friday Accord called for police reform because it is 
apparent that a police force composed of 93% Protestant and 7% Catholic 
could not have sufficient credibility with a Northern Ireland community 
that is split 58% Protestant, 42% Catholic.
  To help create a police force that had credibility across all 
communities, Chris Patten, a leader in Britain's Conservative Party and 
former Governor of Hong Kong, was enlisted to produce a blueprint for 
the future. His 1999 report recommended wholesale change including 
restoring democratic and local accountability to policing, changing the 
police force's symbols (name, insignia, uniform) to make them 
community-neutral, as well as down-sizing and re-balancing the 
composition of the force to reflect the make-up of the communities in 
Northern Ireland.
  It is important to note that this document represented a compromise 
itself. While the current version of the implementing legislation in 
the British House of Commons incorporates a number of the Patten 
recommendations, it falls short in a few--particularly in the area of 
the name change of police service, where it postpones a decision. While 
only symbolic, the current name of the police service, the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary, infuriates Nationalists because the name implies 
allegiance to the Queen and uses the British term for Northern 
Ireland--anathema for recruiting more Nationalists into the police 
service. The Patten Commission recommended the more neutral ``Northern 
Ireland Police Service.''
  The current version of the bill in the British House of Commons still 
fell short enough that moderate Nationalists such as Seamus Mallon 
abstained when it came up for vote in June. Peace has perservered in 
Northern Ireland over the past two years when leaders from both sides 
have followed the tenets of the Good Friday Accord. Good Friday called 
for full and thorough police reform and the Patten Commission delivered 
that fair reform. It should be implemented in full.
  As the Washington Post said in an editorial in July, ``. . . the onus 
remains on the British government to respond to Catholic objections. 
This is because the Catholics have the Good Friday Agreement on their 
side. The deal called for the appointment of a special police 
commission, headed by a respected British politician, Chris Patten; the 
ensuing report laid down the contours of reform. The Catholic side is 
only asking that this report be implemented fully. London should be 
happy to do that . . .''
  I urge my colleagues to support H. Res. 547.
  Mr. LUCAS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of 
House Resolution

[[Page 19549]]

547, a bipartisan resolution calling upon the British Government to 
fully implement reforms to Northern Ireland's police force. These 
reforms are long overdue and are a crucial part of the overall peace 
process in this troubled region.
  After a quarter century of political violence that left thousands 
dead, the people of Northern Ireland have taken a brave step forward. 
The Irish are on the brink of a new era of peace with Catholics and 
Protestants, for the first time, sharing in government responsibility. 
The people have spoken and the spirit of peace is alive and strong.
  As part of the historic Good Friday Agreement, an independent 
commission was established to make recommendations for future policing 
needs. The focus of the report was to take politics out of the police 
force. The population of Northern Ireland is divided almost equally 
between Protestants and Catholics, yet the police force is nearly 
entirely made up of Protestants. With a record of brutality and human 
rights abuses, this type of demographic cannot work to protect the 
citizens fairly. In order for these communities and families to feel 
safe, reforms are desperately needed.
  When the Patten Commission completed its report, it included almost 
200 recommendations. Among other things, the Patten Commission calls 
upon the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) to change names and symbols, 
to increase the number of Catholic officers and to provide human rights 
training and a code of ethics. We must all remember that the Patten 
report itself was a compromise between the Unionist and Nationalist 
perspectives. It is not acceptable to compromise further on a 
compromise already made. The Patten report must be implemented without 
any significant change.
  I have a deep interest in seeing the historic Good Friday Agreement 
go forward and policing reform must go hand in hand with this effort. 
We must work to advance this peace process and implement each and every 
one of the Patten report's recommendations.
  It is not an easy task that the Irish have before them, but rather an 
extremely difficult and defining one. As the world's greatest 
superpower and home to over 40 million Irish-Americans, the United 
States must honor its commitment and stand up for peace and justice. We 
must lead in promoting human rights for all the world's citizens and 
lend our strong support to the people of Northern Ireland as they 
continue this journey towards peace.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pitts). The question is on the motion 
offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) that the House 
suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 547, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor 
thereof) the rules were suspended and the resolution, as amended, was 
agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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