[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 16960-16964]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



 TO AUTHORIZE EXTENSION OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT TO THE PEOPLE'S 
                  REPUBLIC OF CHINA--MOTION TO PROCEED

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
proceed to the postcloture debate on H.R. 4444, which the clerk will 
report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A motion to proceed to the bill (H.R. 4444) to authorize 
     extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade 
     relations treatment) to the People's Republic of China, and 
     to establish a framework for relations between the United 
     States and the People's Republic of China.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Chair recognizes 
the Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, with deep respect, I ask unanimous consent 
to yield first to the distinguished chairman, Mr. Roth.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from North 
Carolina for his usual courtesy.
  Mr. President, I rise today to encourage my colleagues to support the 
motion to proceed to H.R. 4444 and to pass this legislation without 
amendment. Our vote on normalizing trade relations with China will mark 
the most significant vote we take in this Congress. Indeed, it will be 
one of the most important votes we will take during our time in the 
Senate.
  At the outset, I want to be clear--because of PNTR's significance and 
because we have so little time left before the 106th Congress adjourns, 
I will oppose all amendments to PNTR, regardless of their merit.
  The House bill takes the one essential step that we must take to 
ensure that American workers, American farmers and American businesses 
reap the benefits of China's market access commitments.
  There is nothing that we can add to this bill that will improve upon 
its guarantee that our exporters benefit from the agreement it took 
three Presidents of both parties 13 years to negotiate with the 
Chinese.
  I ask my colleagues to join me in adopting this approach because the 
risks of going to conference on this bill, in this political season, 
are too great. Bluntly, a vote to amend is a vote to kill this bill 
and, with it, any chance that U.S. workers, farmers, and businesses 
will benefit from China's accession to the WTO.
  The significance of this vote is due both to the economic benefits 
that will flow from opening China's market to our exports and the 
broader impact that normalizing our trade will have on our relationship 
with China. I want to address each of those points in turn.
  Let me clarify, first, what this debate is about. The vote on PNTR is 
not a vote about whether China will get into the World Trade 
Organization, as some have said. I assure you that China will get into 
the WTO whether we vote to normalize our trade relations with China or 
not.
  What this vote is about, as I indicated at the outset, is whether 
American manufacturers, farmers, service providers, and workers will 
get the benefits of a deal that American negotiators under three 
Presidents of both parties fought for 13 years to achieve. Or, will we 
simply concede the benefits of that deal to their European and Japanese 
competitors for the Chinese market?
  As I explained just prior to the August recess, my reason for 
supporting this legislation is first and foremost because of the 
benefits that normalizing trade with China will offer my constituents 
back home in Delaware.
  China is already an important market for firms, farmers, and workers 
located in my state. Delaware's exports to China in many product 
categories nearly doubled between 1993 and 1998. Delaware's trade with 
China now exceeds $70 million.
  What China's accession to the WTO means to Delaware is a dramatic 
further opening of China's markets to goods and services that are 
critical to Delaware's economy. China, for example, is already the 
second leading market for American poultry products worldwide.
  Poultry producers in Delaware and elsewhere have built that market in 
the face of both quotas and high tariffs. China's accession to the WTO 
will mean that the tariffs Delaware poultry producers face will be cut 
in half, from 20 to 10 percent, and quotas that now limit their access 
to the Chinese market will be eliminated.
  Normalizing our trade relations with China will also make a huge 
difference to the chemical and pharmaceutical industries which make up 
a significant share of my state's manufacturing base.
  In the chemical sector alone, China has agreed to eliminate quotas on 
chemical products by 2002 and will cut its tariffs on American chemical 
exports by more than one-half.
  Delaware is also home to two automobile manufacturing plants, one 
Chrysler and one Saturn. Once in the WTO, China will be obliged to cut 
tariffs on automobiles by up to 70 percent and on auto parts by more 
than one-half.
  The agreement also ensures that U.S. automobile manufacturers will be 
able to sell directly to consumers in China and finance those sales 
directly as our

[[Page 16961]]

auto companies do here in the United States.
  What holds true for Delaware holds true for the country as a whole. 
Independent economic analysis by Goldman Sachs suggests that the 
package may mean an increase of as much as $13 billion annually in U.S. 
exports to China. That's right--$13 billion annually.
  What that figure reflects is that China's accession to the WTO will 
benefit every sector of the U.S. economy from agriculture to 
manufacturing to services.
  Agriculture tariffs will be cut by more than half on priority 
products life beef, pork, and poultry. China will also eliminate many 
of the barriers to sales of bulk commodities such as wheat, corn, and 
rice.
  Industrial tariffs would be slashed across the board by more than 
one-half--from an average rate of 24 percent to 9 percent. Equally 
important, American exporters will be able to sell directly to Chinese 
consumers and avoid the restrictions imposed on their sales by the 
state-owned enterprises they must currently use to distribute their 
products in China.
  The deal will create broad new access for Americans services like 
telecommunications, banking and insurance. In particular, I want to 
stress that China not only agreed to open its market to new ventures in 
the banking and insurance areas but agreed to grandfather the existing 
hard-won market access that American financial service firms have 
already achieved. I expect those obligations to be met fully by the 
Chinese.
  The agreement also provides unprecedented safeguards to American 
manufacturers here at home. The agreement reached this past November 
permits the United States to invoke a country-specific safeguard 
against imports from China that may disrupt our markets. In addition, 
the agreement allows the United States to apply special rules regarding 
unfair pricing practices by Chinese firms for 15 years after the 
agreement goes into force.
  The agreement even addresses a concern that has been raised by many 
concerned with the efforts of China to convert U.S. technology to 
military uses. The WTO agreement specifically obliges China to end the 
practice of demanding that American firms cough up their manufacturing 
technology as a condition of exporting to or investing in the Chinese 
market.
  Significantly, the agreement and China's accession to the WTO gives 
the United States rights against Chinese trade practices that we do not 
currently enjoy. It also ensures that the United States has a forum in 
which it will benefit from the support of the rest of China's WTO 
trading partners should disputes over China's obligations arise.
  In the Finance Committee we devoted many hours to consultations with 
the President and his representatives as the negotiations proceeded.
  We devoted an equal number of hours to a review of the agreement 
finally reached this past November. I believe I can speak for my 
colleagues on the committee in saying that there was overwhelming 
support for the agreement so ably negotiated by Ambassador Barshefsky.
  That support is warranted not only by the terms of the agreement but 
by the testimony we heard and the support expressed from a broad and 
diverse spectrum of U.S. interests.
  The agreement was supported not only by U.S. businesses, American 
farmers, and groups representing virtually every sector of the U.S. 
economy. The agreement garnered the support of Presidents from Gerald 
Ford to George Bush, former Secretaries of State and Treasury, and an 
impressive array of national security specialists from Richard Perle to 
General Colin Powell all of whom underscored the importance of China's 
accession to the WTO and normalizing our trade relations with China as 
good not only in economic terms but in strategic terms as well.
  The testimony before the Finance Committee left little doubt that 
China's reemergence as a world power presents challenges to the world 
community and to U.S. interests. But, the testimony before the 
committee was unequivocal on one point--that our interests are best 
served by drawing China into that community of nations, rather than 
isolating China from that community through restrictions on trade.
  General Powell said it best in his public statement on PNTR, 
indicating that--

       * * * from every standpoint--from the strategic standpoint, 
     from the standpoint of our national interests, from the 
     standpoint of our trading and economic interests--it serves 
     all of our purposes to grant permanent normal trading 
     relations to China.

  Opponents of this legislation have often tried to downplay the 
importance of normalizing our trade relations with China. They argued 
that we are entitled to the benefit of the WTO agreement based on our 
bilateral trade arrangements with China dating back to 1979. They argue 
that we will suffer no competitive disadvantage if we fail to take the 
steps necessary on our end to comply with our own WTO obligations.
  I want to lay that argument to rest. That argument was contradicted 
by Ambassador Barshefsky, by our own legal counsel, and by every trade 
expert consulted by the Finance Committee.
  However, just to make sure, my distinguished colleague and the 
ranking member of the Finance Committee, Senator Moynihan and I, 
together with the chairman and ranking member of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, specifically put that question to the General 
Accounting Office.
  The GAO has had a team following the WTO negotiations with the 
Chinese closely for several years. We asked them for their assessment 
of the terms of the agreement and whether we could rely on our 1979 
agreement to obtain the benefits of China's accession to the WTO.
  The GAO, in testimony before the committee and in a report it 
released prior to House passage of PNTR, concluded that the 1979 
bilateral arrangement would not guarantee the rights three Presidents 
of both parties spent 13 years negotiating with the Chinese.
  According to the GAO, the essential step in obtaining the benefits of 
China's accession to the WTO was the passage of PNTR. Indeed, the GAO 
emphasized that failure to approve PNTR would ``put U.S. business 
interests at a considerable competitive disadvantage'' in the Chinese 
market.
  In other words, the single step we must take to obtain the benefits 
of the Chinese agreement to open their markets is the passage of H.R. 
4444.
  In light of that fact, let me turn briefly to an explanation of the 
legislation before us. The bill authorizes the President to normalize 
our trade relations with China when China has completed the WTO 
accession process provided that the terms of China's accession are 
equivalent to those negotiated this past November.
  That action will assure that American firms, farmers, and workers 
will receive the benefit of the bargain Ambassador Barshefsky struck 
with China.
  But, the House bill does considerably more to ensure that we get the 
benefit of our bargain and more to address many of the concerns that 
opponents of this legislation have raised regarding China's human 
rights practices and more to encourage the development of political 
pluralism in China.
  On the trade front, the House bill provides for the aggressive 
monitoring of China's compliance with its WTO obligations and the 
enforcement of U.S. rights under the WTO agreement.
  The bill would offer particular help to small- and medium-size 
businesses, and to workers, in making use of the remedies available 
under U.S. law to address any violations of U.S. WTO rights or to 
address any unfair Chinese trade practices.
  In addition, the House bill implements the special safeguard 
mechanism that was a part of the November agreement. In effect, the 
bill provides the counterpart in domestic law to the provisions of the 
bilateral agreement that offer import-sensitive industries in the 
United States protection in any dramatic surge in imports from China 
that disrupt U.S. markets.
  The bill also addresses a concern that I am sure all of us share with 
respect to Taiwan's economic future. Taiwan has applied for admission 
to the World

[[Page 16962]]

Trade Organization and its accession process is essentially complete.
  The House bill expresses the sense of Congress that the WTO should 
approve Taiwan's accession to the WTO at the same time that it approves 
China's. As a matter of WTO rules, there is no need to debate Taiwan's 
designation or its relationship to China. The WTO rules permit the 
accession of Taiwan regardless of its designation.
  China has long provided assurances that it would not stand in the way 
of Taiwan's accession at the same time China itself enters the WTO, and 
I expect China to live up to those assurances, just as the House bill 
makes clear.
  Apart from securing the trade benefits of China's accession to the 
WTO, the House bill represents an important step forward on the issues 
of human rights, internationally-agreed labor standards, and religious 
freedom.
  In an innovative approach, the bill would create a commission made up 
of members of both the Congress and the executive branch, modeled on 
the successful domestic counterpart to the Helsinki Commission on human 
rights, to monitor Chinese practices in those areas, as well as the 
development of the rule of law and democracy.
  One of the significant advantages of the approach adopted by the 
House bill is that it ensures a constructive, ongoing review of China's 
practices throughout the year, rather than what has become an 
unproductive once-a-year effort tied to a congressional vote.
  More fundamentally, the commission will ensure that the United 
States' concerns and our message to the Chinese leadership regarding 
Chinese human rights practices is undiluted by a debate over whether to 
renew China's trade status.
  There are some who have suggested that the bill should have gone 
farther. They suggest that the bill should have empowered the proposed 
commission to address national security concerns as well.
  Those concerns, however, have been mooted by the recent action taken 
by the Senate in the context of the Defense authorization bill. I 
congratulate my distinguished colleagues, Senators Warner, Levin, and 
Byrd, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the committee's 
ranking member, and one of the most senior members of that panel, for 
proposing the creation of a separate commission to look at precisely 
those issues of national security and the link between those issues and 
our expanding trade relationship with China.
  In sum, the House bill preserves what we in the Finance Committee 
sought to do in the bill we reported out, which was to ensure that 
American firms, farmers, and workers gain the benefits of the agreement 
reached this past November, and take additional steps to secure those 
trade benefits and offers a new approach to addressing U.S. concerns 
regarding human rights practices in China.
  I believe that H.R. 4444 not only merits our support, but that it 
strikes a careful and appropriate balance of the interests we have in 
our broader relationship with China.
  For that reason, I intend not only to support the legislation as 
drafted, but, as I said at the outset, I will oppose any amendment to 
the House bill no matter how meritorious the amendment might be 
standing on its own.
  That brings me to my final point. There are a number of my colleagues 
that see this vote as an opportunity to link other issues to our 
trading relationship with China.
  I am certain that we will have the opportunity to debate amendments 
on everything from the release of political prisoners to China's 
implementation of a one-child policy to its recurring threats against 
Taiwan to issuers of weapons proliferation. I respect my colleagues' 
point of view and recognize that these are serious issues that should 
remain a part of the broader dialog with China on our bilateral 
relations.
  What I fundamentally disagree with is the approach of linking 
progress in those areas to our trade with China.
  I do so for three reasons. First, the approach of linking progress to 
our trading relations with China has proved to be a failure. We have 
tried the approach of linking progress in other areas, such as human 
rights, to trade and it simply has not worked. It is time to try a 
different approach.
  Second, the threat of economic sanctions would only work if the 
target country believes that there is something fundamental at risk. 
Here, I want us to think through the logic of voting ``no'' on PNTR. 
The net effect of a ``no'' vote on PNTR would be to cut off U.S. 
exports to China.
  China already has access to our market. We do not enjoy reciprocal 
access to China's market. That is what the WTO agreement provides. In 
voting ``no'' on PNTR, we would only be voting to deny ourselves the 
benefits of the WTO agreement to American firms, farmers, and workers.
  Denying ourselves the benefit of the WTO agreement is simply no 
threat to the Chinese. They will simply obtain the goods, services, and 
technology they want from other WTO members.
  In other words, even if you accepted the logic of economic sanctions, 
voting ``no'' on PNTR does not serve the objective of modifying China's 
behavior or the views of its leadership.
  Finally, there are some who decry the pursuit of profit when issues 
of human rights and human freedoms are at stake. While I share their 
concerns for human rights conditions in China, I feel compelled to say 
that they are wrong and their criticisms are misplaced.
  In the end, human freedom is indivisible. It is not neatly divided 
between political freedom and economic freedom, as some suggest. 
Economic freedom is freedom, pure and unadulterated. The reason is 
that, absent economic freedom, no person has the wherewithal to defend 
their political rights.
  What that means in practical terms in the context of modern China is 
that we should do whatever we can to empower the Chinese people to 
pursue their own course toward freedom.
  One essential step toward that goal is to ensure that the Chinese 
people are free to pursue their own economic destiny free from the 
heavy hand of the state. That is because the roots of political 
pluralism lie in economic interests that differ from those of the 
Chinese Communist Government and those of the Chinese leadership.
  The noted Chinese human rights activist Fu Sheni, active in defense 
of Chinese human rights and political freedoms since the 1979 Democracy 
Wall Movement, has made this point more eloquently than I can.
  In a public statement on PNTR, Fu emphasized that:

       The annual argument over NTR renewal exerts no genuine 
     pressure on the Chinese Communists and performs absolutely no 
     role in compelling them to improve the human rights 
     situation. . . . [I]mprovement of the human rights situation 
     and advancement of democracy in China must mainly depend on 
     the greatness of the Chinese people, in the process of 
     economic modernization, gradually creating the popular 
     citizen consciousness and democratic conscience and 
     struggling for them. It will not be achieved through the 
     action of the U.S. Congress in debating Normal Trade 
     Relations. . . .

  Fu's point was echoed by the China Democracy Party, founded 2 years 
ago, in its public statement on PNTR. In declaring its support for 
China's accession to the WTO and for the normalization of our trade 
relations with China, the Democracy Party stated:

       We believe the closer the economic relationship between the 
     United States and China, the more chances to politically 
     influence China, the more chances to monitor human rights, 
     and the more effective the United States to push China to 
     launch political reforms.

  The Democracy Party's statement went on to say that the Communist 
leadership's power in China is ``planted in state ownership.'' A vote 
for PNTR is a vote to end the Communist leadership's monopoly on power 
within Chinese society. A vote against PNTR would condemn the Chinese 
people to work for the state-owned enterprises that are the Communist 
leadership's most effective means of political control.
  That is why, beyond the economic benefits for my home state of 
Delaware and for our nation as a whole, I support normalizing our trade 
relations with

[[Page 16963]]

China. It is a vote for freedom and that is where I will cast my lot 
every time.
  I thank my colleagues and urge their support for the motion to 
proceed and for passage of this essential legislation.
  Once again, I thank my distinguished colleague from North Carolina.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). Under the previous order, the 
Senator from North Carolina is recognized for up to 15 minutes.
  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I say to my distinguished and long-time 
friend from Delaware that I seldom disagree with him, but this time I 
do, and it is a doozy.
  Madam President, the pending bill, H.R. 4444, which proposes to give 
permanent most-favored-nation trading status to Communist China, is 
perhaps the most ill-advised piece of legislation to come to the Senate 
floor in my 28 years as a Senator.
  As the Senate considers this issue, the ultimate question is an 
ominous one: Will granting permanent most-favored-nation status to 
Communist China advance the foreign policy interests of the United 
States?
  My genuine conclusion is that by doing so, the United States Senate 
will be making a mockery of common sense.
  Now, there is no question that giving permanent most-favored-nation 
trade status to China may advance the business interests of various 
sectors of the U.S. corporate community. But the Senate, amidst all the 
high pressure tactics, must not confuse business interests with the 
national interest of the American people.
  America's principal national interest, vis-a-vis mainland China, is 
to seek to democratize China, hoping that China will conduct its 
foreign relations in a civilized fashion, and stop behaving in a rogue 
fashion, as the Chinese Communists have done for the past 50 years.
  We must dare to ponder the most realistic of questions--for example: 
Will granting permanent most-favored-nation trade status to Communist 
China persuade its rulers to retreat from their threats to invade 
Taiwan if Taiwan does not negotiate reunification with the Communist 
mainland?
  Will China all of a sudden cease its relentless military buildup in 
the Taiwan Strait?
  Will China halt its brazen land grabs in the Spratly Islands?
  Will China stop its reckless proliferation of weapons among its 
fellow criminal regimes around the world?
  Any Senator answering any such questions in the affirmative should 
wait around until the Sugar Plum Fairy dances down Lollipop Lane. The 
fact is, the United States has had normal trade relations with 
Communist China for the past 20 years. Yet Communist China's behavior 
has not improved one iota; it has worsened dramatically on every one of 
these fronts during those two decades of normal trade.
  Communist China has become more, not less, threatening to Taiwan 
during the past 20 years. Twenty years ago Communist China was not 
making incursions across the maritime boundaries of the Philippines, 
but today it is arrogantly doing so.
  Two reports delivered to Congress by the CIA this year make crystal 
clear that China's weapons proliferation continues apace--flatly 
contradicting testimony by the Clinton State Department in 1999 before 
the Foreign Relations Committee of which I happen to be chairman.
  Let's examine further this exotic pig in a poke.
  As everyone knows--with the possible exception of anybody on a trip 
to the Moon for the past few years--Communist China dramatically 
lowered its threshold for using military force against Taiwan in its 
notorious White Paper this past February. For years, China has assured 
that it would invade Taiwan only if Taiwan declared independence. That 
was preposterous on its face--but now, China says it will invade Taiwan 
if Taiwan merely delays reunification talks with China for too long.
  That is not progress to me, Mr. President; it is instead clearly 
dangerous regression in China's policy toward Taiwan. And guess what. 
It happened just 3 weeks before the President sent this legislation to 
Capitol Hill.
  Angry threats against Taiwan have become more frequent and 
increasingly venomous, both in the Chinese press and from the mouths of 
Chinese leaders. Recent headlines in Chinese newspapers have talked of 
smashing Taiwan and drowning Taiwan in a sea of fire. In a March 28 
article in the South China Morning Post, Chinese President Jiang Zemin 
was quoted as saying ``If we were to take military action, it should be 
sooner rather than later.''
  The Chinese have also directed those threats at us. China has 
repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons against American cities if 
the U.S. comes to Taiwan's defense. As recently as April 11, an article 
appeared in another Hong Kong paper entitled: ``Nuclear War Will 
Certainly Break Out If The United States Gets Involved''--that is to 
say, Taiwan.
  If that attitude is the fruit of normal trade relations with China, 
then by all means, it is indeed bitter fruit.
  Lest anyone think that China is merely engaging in bluster, consider 
this: the year 2000 will mark the 11th straight year that China's 
military budget will increase by double digits. What is China doing 
with all that money?
  Well, one thing is a pair of Russian destroyers armed with the 
Sunburn missile, which skims the sea at Mach 2.5--about 2,000 miles per 
hour--and has an effective range of 65 miles and can carry nuclear 
warheads. In answer to a question I asked at a Foreign Relations 
Committee hearing in February, the Secretary of State replied: ``The 
terminal flight path of the Sunburn makes it very difficult for any 
U.S. defense system, including Aegis, to track and shoot down the 
Sunburn.''
  China began shopping for this missile just after we sent carriers 
near Taiwan in 1996; China has spent over $2 billion for two destroyers 
and at least thirty-two missiles.
  Madam President, I doubt that the American people will be heartened 
to know that our $68 billion trade deficit with China helped pay for 
this latest Chinese threat to American sailors.
  And this is just the tip of the iceberg. Other Chinese weapons 
purchases (that the American taxpayers are financing through our trade 
policies) include Russian advanced fighters, air-to-air missiles, and 
submarines. Most, if not all, of this weaponry is designed for a Taiwan 
scenario, helping to tip the balance of power in that region further 
and further away from democratic Taiwan and toward the Communists in 
Beijing.
  This is yet another product of our let's trade-at-any-cost policy 
with China.
  That is the reason I am here today to speak against this piece of 
legislation. It may pass, but it will never do it with my vote or my 
support.
  Madam President, I earlier mentioned increased Chinese aggression in 
the Spratly Islands. We must bear in mind that, in 1995, China seized 
some small islands called Mischief Reef in the South China Sea. 
Mischief Reef is just 100 miles off the coast of the Philippines and 
over 1,000 miles from the Chinese mainland. With this brazen land grab 
having gone unopposed, even verbally, by anyone other than our 
Philippine allies, China reached out again in late 1998.
  In October of that year, China began a crash construction project and 
by January of 1999, had replaced some ramshackle huts on Mischief Reef 
with permanent structures that have been frequented by Chinese warships 
and are deemed as dual-use capable by military experts.
  Twenty years of annual trade favors to China were not enough to ward 
off these blatant violations of international norms, but I, for one, 
await with bated breath the day when China withdraws from Mischief Reef 
because of pressure from the World Trade Organization.
  Don't hold your breath, Madam President; it's not going to happen.
  We can also see the absurdity of U.S. policy toward China by taking a 
look at China's proliferation record. In 1998, President Clinton 
certified that China could be trusted--let me repeat that.

[[Page 16964]]

  He certified that China could be trusted with our nuclear materials, 
paving the way for the longstanding desire of some U.S. companies to 
export nuclear reactors to China. Then, in testimony before the Foreign 
Relations Committee in March 1999, Assistant Secretary of State Stanley 
Roth gave China a clean bill of health on proliferation.
  I am not kidding. That is so.
  Mr. Roth stated that China had actually become part of the solution 
to proliferation problems.
  It didn't take long for Assistant Secretary Roth's testimony to be 
exposed as--let me find a gentle word--maybe ``incomplete'' is the 
nicest word I can find. In April 1999, the Washington Times reported 
that China was continuing its secret transfer of missile and weapons 
technology to the Middle East and South Asia. A follow-up story in July 
detailed China's continuing shipments of missile materials to North 
Korea. These press reports were verified twice this year by none other 
than the Central Intelligence Agency in its semi-annual proliferation 
reports to Congress.
  But I guess we are supposed to believe that more trade will solve 
that sort of problem.
  But I am not convinced--not by my distinguished friend from Delaware, 
not by all of the businessmen who have called on me, not by anybody.
  In sum, Communist China's foreign policy behavior has become 
increasingly antithetical to U.S. national interests during the past 20 
years of so-called ``normal'' trade relations. It is difficult to see 
how making the status quo permanent will cause any improvement 
whatsoever.
  Of course, the direction of China's foreign policy will hinge largely 
on whether the Chinese government democratizes and begins to treat its 
own people better than under the existing Communist regime.
  All of us know the horror stories of things perpetuated against the 
Chinese people by their own government. But here again, the record of 
engagement--or shall I state it more clearly, appeasement--has yielded 
miserable results.
  In fact, China was somewhat more inclined toward reform 15 years ago 
than it is today. In the mid-and-late 1980s, China's leadership at 
least express some sympathy for reform, and for the students and others 
who were demanding it. But these reforms were ousted, replaced by 
hardline Stalinists who massacred the students and began a decade-long 
campaign of brutal repression. You can't describe it any way otherwise. 
Senator Wellstone and I will have more to say about human rights in 
China at a later time, but I believe the U.S. State Department's 1999 
Human Rights Report says it all.
  This is not Jesse Helms. This is the State Department of the United 
States of America. And the last time I checked it was under the purview 
of a fellow named Bill Clinton.
  The State Department said:

       The Chinese Government's poor human rights record 
     deteriorated markedly throughout the past year, as the 
     Government intensified efforts to suppress dissent.

  Do you want to hear that again?
  The State Department of the United States said: ``The Chinese 
Government's poor human rights record deteriorated markedly throughout 
the past year, as the Government''--meaning the Chinese Government--
``intensified efforts to suppress dissent.''
  Many supporters of this legislation, if not most, insist that the way 
to improve this miserable situation is to reward Communist China with 
permanent most-favored-nation trade status. Madam President, I find 
absolutely no evidence whatsoever to support such an assertion.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Idaho is recognized for up to 15 minutes.
  Mr. CRAIG. Madam President, thank you very much.
  I ask unanimous consent that Senator Moynihan follow me to make his 
opening statement on PNTR, and that he use such time as he may consume 
for that statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________