[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 11]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 15525-15526]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                NORTH KOREA NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, July 18, 2000

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to introduce H.R. 4860, the 
``North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2000''.
  I am offering this bipartisan legislation in response to North 
Korea's ongoing proliferation

[[Page 15526]]

of missile and other dangerous weapons technologies to terrorist and 
other rogue states. The United States and our allies have worked hard 
to rein in North Korea's dangerous missile program. There have, from 
time to time, been signs of progress. But a recent headline in New York 
Times accurately summarizes North Korea's current policy: ``North Korea 
Vows to Continue Missile Program''.
  This New York Times story described North Korea's reaction to the 
latest round of diplomacy between the United States and North Korea in 
which the North Koreans were asked once again to stop proliferating 
missile technolgy to rogue states. North Korea deigned to participate 
in this latest round of diplomacy with the United States following the 
Clinton Administration's termination of the 50-year old U.S. embargo of 
North Korea on June 19, 2000.
  The process leading up to the Clinton Administration's termination of 
the embargo on June 19th is worth recounting, because it speaks volumes 
about North Korea's ability to wear down and outflank U.S. negotiators.
  For years it was the Clinton Adminstration's policy that it would end 
the U.S. embargo of North Korea only in connection with a binding 
agreement in which North Korea promised to end missile prolieration. 
The prospect of ending the embargo was the principal inducement that 
the U.S. negotiators had to offer the North Koreans for such a deal.
  But on August 31, 1998, North Korea test fired a three-stage long 
range Taepo Dong missile across Japan, and the Japanese became very 
angry. So angry, in fact that they threatened to end their financial 
support of the Agreed Framework with North Korea--the 1994 agreement in 
which the Clinton Adminstration promised to give North Korea two 
advanced nuclear reactors worth approximately $5 billion in exchange 
for a ``freeze'' of North Korea's nuclear program.
  The Clinton Administration became so alarmed about the risk of 
Japanese withdrawal from the Agreed Framework that it made the 
prevention of any more missile tests by North Korea its highest 
priority. Over the next year, the Administration negotiated diligently, 
and on September 12, 1999, it announced that North Korea had agreed to 
a temporary moratorium on further missile tests. In exchange for the 
moratorium, the Clinton Administration pledged that it would end the 
U.S. embargo of North Korea.
  The Administration had, in other words, given away its leverage on 
the issue of missile proliferation for a temporary deal on missile 
testing. The U.S. negotiators charged with getting an agreement ending 
North Korean proliferation were left with no meaningful inducements to 
offer the North Koreans.
  The Clinton Administration did not immediately end the embargo. For 
nine months, it held off doing so in the hope that a promised ``high 
level visitor'' from North Korea would come to the United States to 
formalize the moratorium on missile testing. No such visitor ever 
materialized, and the moratorium was never formalized, but on June 19, 
2000, the Administration relented and ended the embargo anyway. In 
exchange, the North Koreans agreed to participate in another round of 
talks about missile proliferation.
  The U.S. negotiators went to the talks with no meaningful inducements 
to offer, so the North Koreans boldly requested one: they offered to 
stop missile proliferation in exchange for $1 billion per year in cash 
from the United States.
  The U.S. negotiators rejected this offer out of hand, but the North 
Korean request illustrates a broader truth: now that the Clinton 
Administration has effectively normalized economic relations with North 
Korea, it will have to come up with some other massive bribe in order 
to make progress on missile proliferation. Such a bribe can only help 
shore up the North Korean regime and strengthen its grip on power.
  The North Korea Nonproliferation Act tries to overcome this dilemma 
by restoring the linkage between normalized economic relations with the 
United States and good behavior by North Korea with regard to 
proliferation. The bill does not reverse the Administration's decision 
to end the embargo, but it would require reimposition of the embargo in 
two circumstances: (1) if North Korea violates the missile testing 
moratorium, or (2) if it proliferates to a state sponsor of terrorism 
or a country that has tested long range missiles built with North 
Korean goods or technology.
  The legislation provides the President a national interest waiver 
that he may exercise to promptly terminate the embargo of North Korea 
if it is reimposed pursuant to this legislation.
  The effect of the legislation, therefore, is to underscore to the 
North Koreans that they cannot continue to proliferate dangerous 
weapons technologies to the world's most odious governments without 
paying a price in their relationship with the United States.
  I am pleased to be joined in offering this legislation by some of the 
leaders within the Congress on the issue of proliferation: Congressman 
Ed Markey (D-MA), co-chair of the House Nonproliferation Task Force, 
Congressman Joe Knollenberg (R-MI), and Congressman Frank Pallone (D-
NJ).

                          Summary of H.R. 4860


                North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2000

       1. Reports to Congress.--The President shall submit a 
     report to Congress every six months identifying all instances 
     in which there is credible information that North Korea has--
       (a) taken an action inconsistent with North Korea's 
     obligations under--
       (1) the agreement with the United States of September 12, 
     1999, to suspend launches of long range missiles, or
       (2) any future international agreement in which North Korea 
     agreed to limits on its testing, deployment, or proliferation 
     of missiles or missile technology; and
       (b) transferred to a foreign country, on or after the date 
     of enactment, goods, services, or technology listed on a 
     nonproliferation control list (i.e., NSG, MTCR, Australia 
     Group, CWC, and Wassenaar control lists).
       2. Discretionary Reimposition of Sanctions.--The President 
     is authorized to reimpose any or all of the restrictions on 
     commerce with North Korea that were in place under the 
     Trading With the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and 
     the Department of Commerce's Export Administration 
     Regulations prior to September 12, 1999, if a semiannual 
     report to Congress under this Act indicates that there is 
     credible information that, on or after the date of enactment, 
     North Korea transferred to a foreign country goods, services, 
     or technology listed on a nonproliferation control list 
     (i.e., NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, CWC, and Wassenaar control 
     lists).
       3. Mandatory Reimposition of Sanctions.--In addition, the 
     president shall reimpose all of the restrictions on commerce 
     with North Kroea that were in place under the Trading With 
     the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Department 
     of Commerce's Export Administration Regulations prior to 
     September 12, 1999, within 10 days of submitting a semiannual 
     report to Congress under this Act indicating that there is 
     credible information that North Korea has--
       (a) taken an action inconsistent with North Korea's 
     obligations under--
       (1) the agreement with the United States of September 12, 
     1999, to suspend launches of long range missiles, or
       (2) any future international agreement in which North Korea 
     agreed to limits on its testing, deployment, or proliferation 
     of missiles or missile technology; or
       (b) transferred, on or after the date of enactment, goods, 
     services, or technology listed on a nonproliferation control 
     list (i.e., NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, CWC, and Wassenaar 
     control lists) to--
       (1) any country listed on the U.S. list of state sponsors 
     of terrorism, or
       (2) any country that has tested a long-range missile 
     incorporating goods or technology knowingly transferred to 
     such government by North Korea.
       4. Determination that North Korea Did Not Knowingly Act.---
     In the case of any action by North Korea that otherwise would 
     require the President to reimpose restrictions on commerce 
     with North Korea, that requirement shall cease to apply if 
     the President determines and reports to Congress that there 
     is substantial doubt that North Korea knowingly took that 
     action.
       5. National Interest Waiver.--In any instance in which the 
     President was required by this Act to reimpose restrictions 
     on commerce with North Korea, he may, not less than 30 days 
     after reimposing such restrictions, and following 
     consultation with Congress, waive the continued imposition of 
     such restrictions if he determines and reports to Congress 
     that such waiver is important to U.S. national security 
     interests of the United States.
       6. Authorities of the President if North Korea Enters A 
     Binding International Agreement Regarding Missile 
     Proliferation.--If North Korea enters a binding international 
     agreement that satisfies United States concerns regarding the 
     transfer by North Korea to other countries of missiles and 
     missile technology, the President is authorized to--
       (a) support the commercial launch in the United States or 
     other countries of satellites for North Korea; and
       (b) waive sanctions that are in place against North Korea 
     pursuant to U.S. missile technology and other 
     nonproliferation legislation.

     

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