[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 11]
[House]
[Pages 15334-15347]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



           RUSSIAN-AMERICAN TRUST AND COOPERATION ACT OF 2000

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call 
up House Resolution 555 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 555

       Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
     shall be in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 
     4118) to prohibit the rescheduling or forgiveness of any 
     outstanding bilateral debt owed to the United States by the 
     Government of the Russian Federation until the President 
     certifies to the Congress that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation has ceased all its operations at, removed all 
     personnel from, and permanently closed the intelligence 
     facility at Lourdes, Cuba. The bill shall be considered as 
     read for amendment. The amendment recommended by the 
     Committee on International Relations now printed in the bill 
     shall be considered as adopted. The previous question shall 
     be considered as ordered on the bill, as amended, and on any 
     further amendment thereto to final passage without 
     intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate on the 
     bill, as amended, equally divided and controlled by the 
     chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on 
     International Relations; (2) an amendment in the nature of a 
     substitute printed in the Congressional Record pursuant to 
     clause 8 of rule XVIII, if offered by Representative 
     Gejdenson of Connecticut or his designee, which shall be 
     considered as read and shall be separately debatable for one 
     hour equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an 
     opponent; and (3) one motion to recommit with or without 
     instructions.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is 
recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the 
customary 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts 
(Mr. Moakley), my colleague and friend, pending which I yield myself 
such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, 
all time yielded is for the purpose of debate on this subject only.
  Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 555 provides for House consideration of H.R. 
4118, The Russian-American Trust Cooperation Act. The modified closed 
rule provides 1 hour of general debate, equally divided between the 
chairman and ranking member of the Committee on International 
Relations. In addition, the rule makes in order a minority substitute 
and one motion to recommit, with or without instructions; in other 
words, 2 bites at the apple. I am aware of no Members who sought to 
offer amendments to the bill. Indeed, the only amendment offered during 
committee consideration that I know of has been actually incorporated 
into the bill.
  Recognizing the time constraints in the floor calendar during this 
time of year and the relative simplicity of this bill, this is a fair 
and balanced rule, in my view, and I urge its support.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4118 is relatively straightforward as a piece of 
legislation, but it is enormously important from a national security 
perspective. Let me explain. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4118 prohibits the U.S. 
Government from restructuring or rescheduling any of Russia's debt with 
the United States until the President certifies that the Russian 
government has ceased operating its intelligence eavesdropping facility 
which happens to be located nearby in Lourdes, Cuba.
  I know that many Members have passionate feelings about Cuba; but to 
me, this has little to do with U.S. policy towards Cuba; it has 
everything to do with protecting American citizens and our national 
security. It is absolutely inconceivable to me, and I think to most 
Americans, that the United States would provide aid and loans to Russia 
at a time when, according to press reports, the Russian government pays 
Cuba hundreds of millions of dollars a year to operate a facility it 
uses to eavesdrop on the United States and on our business and what is 
going on here.
  For years now, the defense and intelligence community has been 
pointing out the danger posed by the Lourdes' listening facility. 
Relying solely on open-source information and press reporting, and I 
want to reiterate that point, all of this is based on open-source and 
media reports, the site at Lourdes is of concern for the following 
reasons: first, the Russian government allegedly pays up to $300 
million each year in rent to the Cuban government for the facility. 
Second, the Russian government has reportedly invested over $3 billion, 
that is B, billion, for the operation and modernization of this huge 
intelligence base. Third, the Russian government, following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, has apparently significantly 
stepped up its intelligence collection activities against the United 
States from its Lourdes base, and this is, of course, before the 
currently elected president of Russia, Mr. Putin, was elected and it is 
well known that Mr. Putin comes out of the intelligence community as a 
former KGBer; and I do not know what his view is on the subject of 
Lourdes, and I suspect it is time we find out.
  Reportedly in recent years, Russian intelligence agencies have funded 
major facility and equipment upgrades and enhancements at the Lourdes 
site. Finally, the experts familiar with the Lourdes facility, 
including Russian defectors and former U.S. Government officials, 
assert that the Lourdes site is being used by the Russian government to 
collect personal information about American citizens and proprietary 
information about U.S. corporations.

                              {time}  1615

  Clearly, this capability offers the means to conduct cyberwarfare 
against the United States and its people. That is something most 
Americans understand and do not want to have happen.
  Given the obvious national security implications, I am deeply puzzled 
by the Clinton-Gore administration's adamant opposition to this bill. 
It seems we have a very clear case where the Russians, with the 
assistance from Cuba, are engaged in activity in direct conflict with 
U.S. national security.
  Through the leadership of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), 
the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and others, we have 
found a way to apply real pressure to Russia to cease its activities at 
Lourdes. Yet, I understand the Clinton-Gore administration is opposed.
  I would submit that their opposition to this bill is an example in a 
very long list that makes the Clinton-Gore administration's disdain for 
security policy appear again one more time before us, inexplicable as 
it is.
  The Clinton-Gore administration, and in particular, Vice President 
Gore, who spearheaded administration policy toward Russia through the 
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, has repeatedly claimed that it had 
achieved a special relationship of trust with Russian, referring to 
them as partners.
  I want to quote from the minority views that accompany this bill, 
because it contains truly amazing statements from the Clinton and Gore 
administration and its allies in Congress.
  The minority suggest that ``the extent to which Lourdes may target 
U.S. individual or corporate communications is uncertain.'' We know it 
is there. We are just not really sure how much they are listening to or 
what they are getting, I guess is what that means.
  Further, the minority suggests that allowing the Russians to 
eavesdrop on the United States to the Lourdes facility is a way of 
``guaranteeing a certain level of political trust between Russia and 
the United States.
  These statements remind me of many times that President Clinton has 
told the American people that our children

[[Page 15335]]

could sleep peacefully at night because there were no nuclear missiles 
pointed at the United States. That is a very nice sentiment, it is a 
great statement and I wish it were true, but it is not. It gives the 
American people a false sense of security.
  I think likewise the many press reports and the testimony by the 
Russian defectors and the others contradict the reassurances in the 
minority reports that the Lourdes site is nothing to be concerned 
about. I think it is something to be definitely concerned about.
  I think the American people deserve better than those kinds of 
assurances, which cannot be backed up. I encourage my colleagues to 
support this bill. I think that the Republican government needs to 
understand and be made accountable that it has to honor its financial 
obligations, and that the Lourdes site must be shut down if it hopes to 
truly build a relationship of real trust between our two peoples.
  Finally, I encourage my colleagues to send a very strong signal to 
the Clinton-Gore administration that the American people will no longer 
stand for their culture of disdain for security, whether it is the 
State Department laptops, bugging at the State Department, Los Alamos, 
or the many things we have been reading about. It is clear that lack of 
good security has been a hallmark of this administration from day one, 
and it is not acceptable. It is expensive, it is painful, and it is 
affecting our national security in a negative way.
  I encourage my colleagues to support this fair rule and the 
underlying bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the bill for which this rule provides consideration 
addresses some very valid security concerns in Cuba. However, Mr. 
Speaker, I think they could be addressed in a better way.
  I believe the best way to engage Cuba is first to lift the food and 
medicine embargo, and then to open up trade and commercial dialogue. In 
all likelihood, the approach this bill takes will not adequately 
address American security concerns. Instead, it will further isolate 
Cuba, which will make it even more susceptible to outside influences 
other than ours.
  My colleagues say that the way to improve human rights in China is to 
expand trade, an open dialogue. I say we should do the same in Cuba.
  Mr. Speaker, when I was in Cuba just a few months ago our chief of 
mission, which would be our ambassador if we recognized Cuba, told me 
that her diplomats never have any face-to-face discussions with Cuban 
officials. They just do not talk. It is much harder to stay enemies 
with someone that you actually talk with.
  The United States is the last country on Earth that still is not 
talking to Cuba. I suspect that this adds to our problems greatly, 
because, Mr. Speaker, as many of my colleagues probably know, the Cold 
War actually ended 9 years ago. Russia is no longer the Soviet Union. 
In fact, it is no longer Communist.
  The debt restructuring is very important to the stability of Russia. 
A Russian default could upset any attempt at Russian economic reforms. 
That is something we want to avoid at all costs, because it could 
eventually threaten our own national security.
  This is not leadership. We are not showing our strengths by 
withholding debt relief to Russia. We need to stand by our commitments 
and assist Russia as it works to become a true democracy with a market 
economy, but strangled by this debt, they will never get there.
  This bill holds the debt hostage to our outdated Cold War policy. Mr. 
Speaker, that could have very, very serious ramifications.
  Mr. Speaker, I would be the first one to say that we have to address 
surveillance issues. The United States communications are sacred. They 
should be protected. But if we are concerned about the types of 
security threats coming from Cuba, I think we should talk to people in 
Cuba the way we talk to everybody else. Why should they be any 
exception?
  There are some who believe we should continue to isolate Cuba. They 
believe we should refuse food, we should refuse medicine. We should 
refuse any conversation with our neighbors to the south, regardless of 
the effect on the Cuban people or American businesses.
  Mr. Speaker, we have tried isolating Cuba for 40 years. It is not 
working. This bill is well-intentioned, but might risk making things 
worse. Let us open the policy up. Let us send our diplomats in. Let us 
get talking. That is how we protect ourselves and everyone else. That 
is how we should protect ourselves here.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would point out that this bill asks Russia to stop 
renting the facility, and have it shut down that way. So we are dealing 
and focusing on Russia, not on Cuba in this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Diaz-Balart), my colleague and a member of the Committee 
on Rules.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Sanibel, 
Florida, for yielding time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the rule, as well as the 
underlying legislation. I commend the gentleman from New York (Chairman 
Gilman) and the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss), and especially 
my colleague, the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), the 
author of the legislation, for their hard work in bringing forth this 
important bill to prohibit rescheduling of debt to Russia until it 
removes its intelligence personnel and closes the personnel base, the 
spying facility, in Cuba.
  Almost a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a Communist 
dictator continues to oppress and brutalize a country only 90 miles 
from our shores, denying the people of Cuba the most basic freedoms, 
including the freedom of speech, the right to assemble, the right to 
democratic elections, the right to participate in political parties and 
labor unions, the right to a free press; in other words, Mr. Speaker, 
the right of self-determination and the rule of law.
  Cuba is going to be free, it is inevitable. But I think it is without 
any doubt in the national interests of the United States for Cuba to be 
free as soon as possible. I think it is important that we touch upon 
just a few of the reasons why.
  We in Congress have the ability to receive research from many so-
called think tanks. Obviously, they are institutions of research. One 
of the most respected, I believe, and certainly well-informed of those 
research institutes is the William Casey Institute of the Center for 
Security Policy.
  In a recent report, they wrote, ``American advocates of normalization 
contend that Cuba no longer poses any threats to the United States, and 
that the U.S. embargo is therefore basically an obsolete and harmful 
relic of the Cold War. Unfortunately, this view ignores the abiding 
menacing character of the Cuban dictatorship.
  ``This is all the more remarkable given the emphasis Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen, among other Clinton administration officials, 
has placed on asymmetric threats, the very sort of threats that 
Castro's Cuba continues to pose to American citizens and interests.''
  The Russian intelligence-gathering facilities in Cuba, which is what 
this legislation is dealing with, specifically, the vast signal 
intelligence facilities operated near Lourdes by Havana's and Moscow's 
intelligence services, permit the wholesale collection of sensitive 
United States military, diplomatic, and commercial data, and the 
invasion of millions of Americans' privacy.
  The Cuban regime, with Russia's help, has the capability to conduct 
sustained and systematic information warfare against the United States. 
A stunning example of the potentially devastating consequences of this 
capability that this legislation is dealing with was recently provided 
by former Soviet military intelligence Colonel Stanislav Lunev.

[[Page 15336]]

  As one of the most senior Russian military intelligence officers to 
come to this country, Lunev revealed that in 1990 the Soviet Union 
acquired America's most sensitive Desert Storm battle plans, including 
General Schwarzkopf's famed ``Hail Mary'' flanking maneuver, prior to 
the launch of the U.S. ground war in the Persian Gulf.
  Moscow's penetration of such closely-guarded American military 
planning via its Cuban facility, which this legislation is dealing 
with, may have jeopardized the lives of literally thousands of U.S. 
troops in the event that the intelligence had been forwarded to Saddam 
Hussein at that time by Soviet premier Gorbachev.
  By the way, Moscow pays over $200 million a year to this day to the 
Castro regime for the intelligence-gathering post, for the Russian 
intelligence-gathering post 90 miles from the shores of the United 
States. Even though they get a lot of money from the U.S. taxpayer, Mr. 
Speaker, the Russians turn around and pay over $200 million a year to 
Castro for the intelligence facility that the Russians maintain in 
Cuba.
  Recent news reports have brought forth that the same types of 
concerns that existed during Desert Storm due to the intelligence-
gathering operations in Cuba that this legislation is dealing with, the 
same types of concerns that existed during Desert Storm due to the 
intelligence-gathering operations in Cuba that the Russians maintain 
and the intelligence-gathering operations that Castro maintains with 
the help of the Russians, these same concerns remained during our 
recent operations in Iraq and in Kosovo.
  Drug trafficking, money-laundering, assistance to narcoterrorists in 
Colombia and elsewhere, harboring murderers and many other fugitives 
from U.S. justice, those are but a few of the actions of the Cuban 
dictatorship which point out why a free and democratic Cuba as soon as 
possible is definitely in the national interests of the United States, 
as well, obviously, as in the national interests of Cuba.
  But the intelligence post that we are dealing with today 
specifically, and that is the issue today brought forth by the 
legislation of the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), is 
certainly another very key reason.
  In conclusion, I urge both the adoption of the rule and the 
underlying bill, for which I commend my colleagues, and especially the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) for bringing forward.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern).
  Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts 
for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, as the distinguished dean of the Massachusetts 
delegation noted, H.R. 4118 raises legitimate security issues. However, 
the bill puts forth the worst possible recommendation on how to deal 
with these issues.
  Mr. Speaker, the Cold War is over. We are now in an era of 
engagement. Unfortunately, the sponsors of this bill want to link our 
policy with Russia to the failed U.S. policies towards Cuba. This bill 
would undermine U.S. leadership on engagement with Russia. It would 
cripple U.S. leadership in the Paris Club, that negotiates debt 
forgiveness and rescheduling of debt for Russia. It would place 
Russia's shaky economy in an even more precarious situation.
  Why? Because the sponsors of this bill reject U.S. engagement with 
Cuba. If we had relations with Cuba, the United States could negotiate 
directly with the Cubans and the Russians about how to resolve the 
security issue.
  Even worse, this bill will actually create new security problems for 
the United States. The United States maintains many listening stations 
around the world. We enjoy a significant advantage over Russia. Why do 
we want to bring public attention to these intelligence matters?

                              {time}  1630

  H.R. 4118 is part of the same effort that would deny Americans the 
right to travel to Cuba, and that would deny our farmers the ability to 
finance the sale of food and medicine to the people of Cuba. Sadly, the 
leadership of this Congress has, in a back room deal, refused to allow 
this House to work its will on that issue.
  It is also part of the effort to block all efforts to pursue a new 
policy towards Cuba, one that engages the Cuban people, in order to 
ensure a peaceful transition to democracy.
  This bill is a lose-lose proposition for American interests. I urge 
my colleagues to oppose H.R. 4118.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it is my great honor to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the distinguished chairman of the 
House Committee on International Relations.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I support the adoption of this rule for consideration of 
H.R. 4118, the Russian-American Trust and Cooperation Act of 2000.
  This measure addresses a very serious situation, a situation that 
confronts our Nation with regard to espionage being conducted against 
our American Armed Forces, against our citizens, and against our 
companies from an expansive intelligence facility located in Cuba.
  This measure also addresses a very serious situation with regard to 
the financial support that the Communist regime of Fidel Castro 
receives from the Russian Federation for the use of that intelligence 
facility.
  In brief, this measure prohibits any further debt relief for the 
Russian government on the debts it owes to the United States until it 
closes down that espionage facility in Cuba; but the bill does contain 
a provision, adopted with bipartisan support in our Committee on 
International Relations, that grants the President limited waiver 
authority in the application of the requirements of this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the expeditious work done by my colleague 
and the other members of the Committee on Rules to bring this bill to 
the floor.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, as my colleagues probably know, there is a 
Democratic Caucus going on, so I do not have any of my speakers here, 
so I will let the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) take over.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am privileged to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Goodling), chairman of 
the Committee on Education and the Workforce.
  Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the rule for 
H.R. 4118, the Russian-American Trust in Cooperation Act of 2000, 
introduced by the gentlewoman from Florida (Chairman Ros-Lehtinen). 
While the Cold War may have ended 10 years ago, the threat of Russian 
espionage remains alive and well on the island of Cuba.
  Few Americans may know that the Russian government still maintains an 
agreement with the Castro regime that allows the Russians to operate an 
intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba, the largest espionage complex 
outside the former Soviet Union. With over 1,500 Russian engineers, 
technicians and military personnel, the Russian government is able to 
monitor communications activity in the United States and gather 
personal information about U.S. citizens. In fact, this facility 
enabled the Russians to intercept sensitive information about U.S. 
military operations during the Gulf War.
  Now we have received startling news from our own intelligence that 
the Russian government is increasing its presence at Lourdes. It has 
been reported that the Russians have spent more than $3 billion to 
modernize and expand the Lourdes facility.
  Our government must respond immediately and forcefully by prohibiting 
the forgiveness of bilateral debt owed to the U.S. by the Russian 
Federation and instruct our representative to the Paris Club of 
official creditors to vote against the rescheduling or forgiving of 
such debt until the President certifies that the Russian government has 
stopped all operations, removed all personnel, and permanently closed 
the

[[Page 15337]]

Lourdes facility. The bill would provide the President a waiver if he 
certifies that doing so is in the national interest of the United 
States and that the Russian government is in compliance with 
multilateral and bilateral nonproliferation and arms limitation 
agreements.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Gilman), the distinguished chairman of the House Committee on 
International Relations, for moving this important bill to the floor.
  I urge my colleagues to support the efforts of the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from New York (Chairman 
Gilman).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it is indeed a privilege to yield 3 minutes to 
the distinguished gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), the 
chairman of the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and 
Trade.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank, first of all, 
the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence for his support and, indeed, his enthusiasm 
for this bill. He is a staunch defender of U.S. national security 
interests and has been an unwavering ally in our efforts to curtail the 
threat posed by the Russian espionage facility at Lourdes, Cuba.
  I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the distinguished 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the chairman of the Committee on 
International Relations, for his leadership and assistance in moving 
this bill through the committee process.
  As has been explained, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4118, a bill that I 
introduced in March of this year, documents several things. First, it 
documents the threat that is the Lourdes facility. Secondly, it 
documents the need for the legislation, and that is that the Russian 
Federation continues to have contempt for its financial obligations to 
the U.S. Thirdly, it provides a solution, that is, the prohibition of 
debt rescheduling and forgiveness.
  H.R. 4118 documents the billions of dollars that the Russian 
Federation has spent and continues to spend in the leasing, the 
upgrading, and operation of its Lourdes post, providing much-needed 
financial support to the Castro regime to help keep it afloat. It 
underscores also the continued relation between the Russian 
intelligence service and the Castro tyranny by citing reports of a 
high-ranking Russian military delegation traveling to Cuba in December 
1999 to discuss the continuing operation of Lourdes.
  It refers to open sources which classify the Lourdes facility as the 
greatest single overseas asset for Russian intelligence, with 1,500 
Russian engineers, technicians, military personnel, as well as tracking 
dishes and satellite systems, all tasked with intercepting computer 
communications, telephone calls, and faxes, as well as with the 
capacity to engage in cyberwarfare against the U.S.
  The bill cites reports confirming the use of Lourdes to steal U.S. 
commercial and trade secrets as well as to collect personal information 
on American citizens in the private and government sectors.
  H.R. 4118 is a focused bill which addresses specific policy issues, 
and this rule reflects this.
  It enjoys the support of the majority leader and the majority whip, 
who are cosponsors of this measure; of the gentleman from New York 
(Chairman Gilman) of the Committee on International Relations; and of 
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the distinguished chairman of 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, who, as we have seen, 
is managing debate on the rule.
  The bill has Democrat cosponsorship and was passed in the committee 
on a voice vote with minority support. It was reported out as amended 
by compromised language offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. 
Gejdenson), the ranking member of the Committee on International 
Relations.
  I thank the Committee on Rules for reporting this rule. I ask my 
colleagues to vote in favor of the rule so that we can move forward 
with consideration of H.R. 4118, a bill which seeks to utilize the 
withholding of debt forgiveness and rescheduling to curb Russian 
behavior running contrary to our U.S. national security concerns.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire of the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Goss) if he has any remaining speakers.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to advise the gentleman from 
Massachusetts, through the Chair, that we have no requests for further 
speakers. I am going to make a brief closing remark after the gentleman 
yields back.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I await the remarks of the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I simply would put it this way. If we had an aircraft 
carrier parked off any part of the United States that was bristling 
with antennas and flying a foreign flag, people would want to know what 
was going on.
  When there was evidence that that aircraft carrier was being used to 
obtain information that we regard as private information, our personal 
communications, our telephone calls, so forth, I know most Americans 
would want the United States Government to take action. That is not a 
far cry from the situation we are looking at.
  The largest intelligence gathering facility is, in fact, at Lourdes, 
Cuba; and there is no doubt it is being used. Russians are having a 
hard time making ends meet. Yet they are still willing to put $300 
million a year, or something thereabouts, into renting this facility; 
so presumably, they are getting at least that much back in their 
dividend, and that is undoubtedly at our expense.
  It is worth noting that this weekend we are going to be renegotiating 
the debt. The Russians are going to be asking us one more time, could 
we do them a favor. I do not think most Americans want us to be paying 
our tax dollars to the Russians to spy on us, to take our secrets. That 
is what this bill seeks to stop.
  My colleagues can remember the uproar we had just last week here when 
the Xinhua news agency for the People's Republic of China proposed to 
build a building that had line-of-sight capability on the United States 
Pentagon, the seat of the defense operations. There was huge uproar. 
That has been stopped because of the concern of spying.
  Well, if we are able to stop something that simple, certainly we 
ought to make an effort to stop something as meaningful as what is 
going on at Lourdes. Nobody wants Big Brother reading their mail or 
looking over their shoulder or spying at them especially when Big 
Brother is not American; and, as all Americans know, we do not spy on 
ourselves in this country. So if we are being spied on, it is by 
somebody else, and we should stop it.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge the support of the rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the 
previous question on the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 555, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 4118) to prohibit the rescheduling or forgiveness of any 
outstanding bilateral debt owed to the United States by the government 
of the Russian Federation until the President certifies to the Congress 
that the Government of the Russian Federation has ceased all its 
operations at, removed all the personnel from, and permanently closed 
the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba, and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Fossella). Pursuant to House Resolution 
555, the bill is considered read for amendment.
  The text of H.R. 4118 is as follows:

                               H.R. 4118

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

[[Page 15338]]



     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Russian-American Trust and 
     Cooperation Act of 2000''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Government of the Russian Federation maintains an 
     agreement with the Government of Cuba which allows Russia to 
     operate an intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba.
       (2) The Secretary of Defense has formally expressed 
     concerns to the Congress regarding the espionage complex at 
     Lourdes, Cuba, and its use as a base for intelligence 
     activities directed against the United States.
       (3) The Secretary of Defense, referring to a 1998 Defense 
     Intelligence Agency assessment, has reported that the Russian 
     Federation leases the Lourdes facility for an estimated 
     $100,000,000 to $300,000,000 a year.
       (4) It has been reported that the Lourdes facility is the 
     largest such complex operated by the Russian Federation and 
     its intelligence service outside the region of the former 
     Soviet Union.
       (5) The Lourdes facility is reported to cover a 28 square-
     mile area with over 1,500 Russian engineers, technicians, and 
     military personnel working at the base.
       (6) Experts familiar with the Lourdes facility have 
     reportedly confirmed that the base has multiple groups of 
     tracking dishes and its own satellite system, with some 
     groups used to intercept telephone calls, faxes, and computer 
     communications, in general, and with other groups used to 
     cover targeted telephones and devices.
       (7) News sources have reported that the predecessor regime 
     to the Government of the Russian Federation had obtained 
     sensitive information about United States military operations 
     during Operation Desert Storm through the Lourdes facility.
       (8) Academic studies assessing the threat the Lourdes 
     espionage station poses to the United States cite official 
     United States sources affirming that the Lourdes facility is 
     being used to collect personal information about United 
     States citizens in the private and government sectors, and 
     offers the means to engage in cyberwarfare against the United 
     States.
       (9) It has been reported that the operational significance 
     of the Lourdes facility has grown dramatically since February 
     7, 1996, when then Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, issued 
     an order demanding that the Russian intelligence community 
     increase its gathering of United States and other Western 
     economic and trade secrets.
       (10) It has been reported that the Government of the 
     Russian Federation is estimated to have spent in excess of 
     $3,000,000,000 in the operation and modernization of the 
     Lourdes facility.
       (11) Former United States Government officials have been 
     quoted confirming reports about the Russian Federation's 
     expansion and upgrade of the Lourdes facility.
       (12) It was reported in December 1999 that a high-ranking 
     Russian military delegation headed by Deputy Chief of the 
     General Staff Colonel-General Valentin Korabelnikov visited 
     Cuba to discuss the continuing Russian operation of the 
     Lourdes facility.

     SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON BILATERAL DEBT RESCHEDULING AND 
                   FORGIVENESS FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President--
       (1) shall not reschedule or forgive any outstanding 
     bilateral debt owed to the United States by the Government of 
     the Russian Federation, and
       (2) shall instruct the United States representative to the 
     Paris Club of official creditors to use the voice and vote of 
     the United States to oppose rescheduling or forgiveness of 
     any outstanding bilateral debt owed by the Government of the 
     Russian Federation,

     until the President certifies to the Congress that the 
     Government of the Russian Federation has ceased all its 
     operations at, removed all personnel from, and permanently 
     closed the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba.

     SEC. 4. REPORT ON THE CLOSING OF THE INTELLIGENCE FACILITY AT 
                   LOURDES, CUBA.

       Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, and every 120 days thereafter until the President 
     makes a certification under section 3, the President shall 
     submit to the Committee on International Relations of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate a report (with a classified annex) 
     detailing--
       (1) the actions taken by the Government of the Russian 
     Federation to terminate its presence and activities at the 
     intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba; and
       (2) the efforts by each appropriate Federal department or 
     agency to verify the actions described in paragraph (1).

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The amendment printed in the bill is 
adopted.
  The text of H.R. 4118, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 4118

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Russian-American Trust and 
     Cooperation Act of 2000''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Government of the Russian Federation maintains an 
     agreement with the Government of Cuba which allows Russia to 
     operate an intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba.
       (2) The Secretary of Defense has formally expressed 
     concerns to the Congress regarding the espionage complex at 
     Lourdes, Cuba, and its use as a base for intelligence 
     activities directed against the United States.
       (3) The Secretary of Defense, referring to a 1998 Defense 
     Intelligence Agency assessment, has reported that the Russian 
     Federation leases the Lourdes facility for an estimated 
     $100,000,000 to $300,000,000 a year.
       (4) It has been reported that the Lourdes facility is the 
     largest such complex operated by the Russian Federation and 
     its intelligence service outside the region of the former 
     Soviet Union.
       (5) The Lourdes facility is reported to cover a 28 square-
     mile area with over 1,500 Russian engineers, technicians, and 
     military personnel working at the base.
       (6) Experts familiar with the Lourdes facility have 
     reportedly confirmed that the base has multiple groups of 
     tracking dishes and its own satellite system, with some 
     groups used to intercept telephone calls, faxes, and computer 
     communications, in general, and with other groups used to 
     cover targeted telephones and devices.
       (7) News sources have reported that the predecessor regime 
     to the Government of the Russian Federation had obtained 
     sensitive information about United States military operations 
     during Operation Desert Storm through the Lourdes facility.
       (8) Academic studies assessing the threat the Lourdes 
     espionage station poses to the United States cite official 
     United States sources affirming that the Lourdes facility is 
     being used to collect personal information about United 
     States citizens in the private and government sectors, and 
     offers the means to engage in cyberwarfare against the United 
     States.
       (9) It has been reported that the operational significance 
     of the Lourdes facility has grown dramatically since February 
     7, 1996, when then Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, issued 
     an order demanding that the Russian intelligence community 
     increase its gathering of United States and other Western 
     economic and trade secrets.
       (10) It has been reported that the Government of the 
     Russian Federation is estimated to have spent in excess of 
     $3,000,000,000 in the operation and modernization of the 
     Lourdes facility.
       (11) Former United States Government officials have been 
     quoted confirming reports about the Russian Federation's 
     expansion and upgrade of the Lourdes facility.
       (12) It was reported in December 1999 that a high-ranking 
     Russian military delegation headed by Deputy Chief of the 
     General Staff Colonel-General Valentin Korabelnikov visited 
     Cuba to discuss the continuing Russian operation of the 
     Lourdes facility.

     SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON BILATERAL DEBT RESCHEDULING AND 
                   FORGIVENESS FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the President--
       (1) shall not reschedule or forgive any outstanding 
     bilateral debt owed to the United States by the Government of 
     the Russian Federation, and
       (2) shall instruct the United States representative to the 
     Paris Club of official creditors to use the voice and vote of 
     the United States to oppose rescheduling or forgiveness of 
     any outstanding bilateral debt owed by the Government of the 
     Russian Federation,

     until the President certifies to the Congress that the 
     Government of the Russian Federation has ceased all its 
     operations at, removed all personnel from, and permanently 
     closed the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba.
       (b) Waiver.--
       (1) In general.--The President may waive the application of 
     subsection (a)(1) with respect to rescheduling of outstanding 
     bilateral debt if, not less than 10 days before the waiver is 
     to take effect, the President determines and certifies in 
     writing to the Committee on International Relations of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate that--
       (A) such waiver is necessary to the national interests of 
     the United States; and
       (B) the Government of the Russian Federation is 
     substantially in compliance with multilateral and bilateral 
     nonproliferation and arms limitation agreements.
       (2) Additional requirement.--If the President waives the 
     application of subsection (a)(1) pursuant to paragraph (1), 
     the President shall include in the written certification 
     under paragraph (1) a detailed description of the facts that 
     support the determination to waive the application of 
     subsection (a)(1).
       (3) Submission in Classified Form.--If the President 
     considers it appropriate, the written certification under 
     paragraph (1), or appropriate parts thereof, may be submitted 
     in classified form.
       (c) Periodic Reports.--The President shall, every 180 days 
     after the transmission of the written certification under 
     subsection (b)(1), prepare and transmit to the Committee on 
     International Relations of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report 
     that contains a description of the extent to which the 
     requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection 
     (b)(1) are being met.

[[Page 15339]]



     SEC. 4. REPORT ON THE CLOSING OF THE INTELLIGENCE FACILITY AT 
                   LOURDES, CUBA.

       Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, and every 120 days thereafter until the President 
     makes a certification under section 3, the President shall 
     submit to the Committee on International Relations of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate a report (with a classified annex) 
     detailing--
       (1) the actions taken by the Government of the Russian 
     Federation to terminate its presence and activities at the 
     intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba; and
       (2) the efforts by each appropriate Federal department or 
     agency to verify the actions described in paragraph (1).

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 555, the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from Connecticut 
(Mr. Gejdenson) each will control 30 minutes of debate on the bill.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).


                             General Leave

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on H.R. 4118.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that, at the 
conclusion of my remarks, the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen), the Chair of the Subcommittee on International Economic 
Policy and Trade, be permitted to control the balance of the time on 
this side.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the measure we are considering in the House today, H.R. 
4118, the Russian-American Trust and Cooperation Act, speaks to the 
twin issues of Russian electronic espionage conducted against our 
United States Armed Forces, against our companies and our citizens, and 
the Russian government's financial support for the Communist regime of 
Fidel Castro in Cuba, support that is provided by means of the hundreds 
of millions of dollars of annual rent paid for the use of a site in 
Cuba to conduct such espionage against our Nation.
  Mr. Speaker, there are at least two fundamental questions that we 
need to address in this measure: first, why is the Russian government 
conducting such an expansive campaign of espionage against the United 
States at a time when we are supposed to be building a new relationship 
in this post-Cold War world?
  Second, how does the Russian government explain that they have the 
financial means to turn over to the Castro regime every year Russian 
oil and commodities estimated to be worth as much as $300 million that 
it could otherwise sell to raise its own revenues, while at the same 
time Russia is claiming to the United States Government and its other 
creditors that it cannot afford to pay its debts to them?

                              {time}  1645

  Mr. Speaker, I suspect that many of our colleagues are not aware of 
the Russian track record with regard to meeting its debt obligations of 
the last 8 years. Permit me to take a moment to suggest a review of our 
committee's report on this bill, which lays out that track record in 
some detail, and let me summarize it in this manner:
  Where the Russian government felt it could get away with not paying 
its debts, it did so; and that is particularly true with regard to its 
private, commercial creditors who, after years of Russian refusal to 
make payments, were earlier this year forced to write off over $12 
billion in Russian debts. Twelve billion dollars as a matter of write-
off.
  Where the Russian government could not readily ignore its 
obligations, such as its debts to governments, including the United 
States, it sought out and won multiple reschedulings. Russia's debts to 
the United States Government have been rescheduled five times since 
1993.
  While Russia has manipulated its creditors, private and public, it 
has found the means to provide an estimated $2 billion in financing 
every 7 years to pay the Castro regime for the use of its espionage 
facility in Cuba. Over the past year, Russian officials have begun 
stating they expect the United States and their other official 
creditors to simply forgive a large part of their debt.
  That is a far cry from the statements of Russian officials in 1992 
and in 1993, when they laid claim to the former Soviet regime's assets 
around the world, embassies, gold stocks, foreign bank accounts, and 
solemnly vowed to take on the payment of that regime's debts. It now 
appears that the assets proved welcome but the debts were inconvenient. 
And as we see in so many other situations, the Russian government now 
wants to avoid its commitments. My colleagues, I leave it to other 
Members who are here today to speak to the character of espionage that 
is conducted by the Russian government from its Cuban facility.
  It is a major concern for my colleagues when we learn the following: 
That sophisticated Russian listening devices have been placed in our 
State Department headquarters itself; that the number of Russian spies 
sent to the United States has risen sharply in recent years; and when 
we hear our FBI Director Louis Freeh state that Russian intelligence 
agencies present, ``A very formidable, very ominous threat to this 
country, to the infrastructure and to our economy.''
  My colleagues, this measure is quite direct in its intent. If the 
Russian government wants further debt relief from our Nation, then it 
should close down its espionage facility in Cuba and stop supplying the 
hundreds of millions of dollars of support that that facility's 
operation provides to Fidel Castro.
  A bipartisan amendment to the bill adopted by our Committee on 
International Relations provides the President with the authority to 
waive that prohibition for purposes of debt rescheduling for the 
Russian government, but not for any debt forgiveness, if he can certify 
that that is in the national interest of our Nation.
  By passage of this measure, the House will make it clear to our own 
policymakers that it is time to strongly focus on this issue. If we are 
to have a new relationship with Russia, and if the Russian government 
seeks the support of our Nation, such as continued debt relief, then it 
is time that it hears clearly from our government about those actions 
that we do not appreciate; that supporting the Castro regime and spying 
on American citizens and our companies is not appreciated.
  Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this 
measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  It is interesting that we are now going to drive our Russia policy, a 
country that has a significant nuclear arsenal, and that we are trying 
to get to transition to a full democracy, we are going to drive the 
Russian policy from Havana. If this was the free market, it would be as 
if we were going to Edsel to design Fords and to Beta to run the Sony 
business empire.
  The Cuba policy has not worked. It does not work today. It leaves us 
looking foolish. We give PNTR to China; we will not sell food and 
medicine to Cuba. And now what we are going to try to do for the first 
time, as I understand it, is we are going to try to tie up our 
financial relations, in hopes to rebuild a Russia in the post-Soviet 
era, we are going to tie it all to what happens in Havana. Now, the 
Bush administration, the previous Republican administration, apparently 
never saw this facility as an obstacle to either American or 
multilateral assistance to Russia.
  When we take a look at what we have here, we have a process where a 
delegation in this Congress, that is set on continuing a failed policy, 
now wants to weld the failed policy against Cuba to a policy of trying 
to deal with Russia in the post-Soviet era. It seems to me that this is 
not in America's best interest.
  There are clearly debates we can have about the listening facility in

[[Page 15340]]

Cuba. Some would argue it helps both sides when we have these mutual 
listening facilities, to make sure that international arms agreements 
are monitored by the sides, giving people a level of comfort. But even 
putting that aside, what we want to do here with this legislation is we 
will prevent the United States from its participation in Paris Club 
activities because we think this is one more nail in Fidel Castro's 
coffin. Well, for 40 years we have tried these plots. We have cut off 
food, we have cut off medicine, we have cut off trade, we have provided 
embargoes while we have opened up relations with China.
  In China, we are told, by the way, that a completely undemocratic 
system that locks people up even who join exercise clubs, that this new 
commercial relationship will bring about democratic change and 
democratic institutions. It is the way to move forward. In Cuba we are 
told that 40 years of isolation is not enough; that if we can just 
isolate Cuba a little longer, this policy will work.
  Well, my colleagues, it does seem time to bring back Edsel, the car 
Edsel, and the Beta format for Sony. This policy makes no sense for 
America's national interest. It is in our interest to make sure that 
the Russians repay their Soviet-era debt. If the United States uses 
this legislation to end the rescheduling of debt, what will happen? 
Well, if the Soviets choose to not repay the debt at that point, what 
is the damage to Russia? The damage is to America's creditors. We do 
not get the money back.
  So it seems to me that this is bad from an arms control perspective; 
it is bad from trying to work with Russia to get it through the stage 
in the post-Soviet era; it seems to make no sense at all to tie a 
failed Cuban policy to Russia; and it is clearly a mistake for the 
United States to disrupt our relations in the Paris Club. I would hope, 
Mr. Speaker, that we would recognize that we need a new policy.
  I know, Mr. Speaker, there are a large number of Republicans and 
Democrats who now see the need for a new policy in trying, frankly, to 
engage Cuba. Because it seems to me that when we have the better 
product, and when we show it to the other side, we do not undermine the 
United States, we undermine Cuba.
  I can tell my colleagues that my parents fled the Soviet Union. We 
came to the United States. And in those early days, when we had the 
first visits by Soviet leaders, my mother and father said to me, 
Kruschev probably believes that he is being shown a Potemkin village; 
that when Kruschev came to the United States and saw grocery stores 
full of food and nice homes, she was convinced, and she was probably 
right, that Kruschev probably thought there was this barren wasteland 
beyond what he was being shown. By the time of Gorbachev, and even 
Brezhnev before him, they recognized ours was a great success and 
theirs was a horrendous failure.
  Let Americans of Cuban descent and others easily travel to Cuba. Let 
the Cuban people see what freedom is all about. Let us not fear contact 
with the Cuban dictatorship. Every time an American in a free America 
has contact with Cuba, it undermines totalitarianism. Let us get rid of 
this policy that has hurt America's interest for 40 years.
  And let us take a look for just one more moment to explain how silly 
some of what happens is. In my district there is a gentleman who 
exports hardwoods; and at one point several years ago, he shipped a 
shipment of hardwoods, oak, white oak, from eastern Connecticut to 
Japan. The Office of Foreign Control Authority grabbed all of his bank 
accounts. Why? It turned out the Cuban government owned a piece of the 
holding company in Japan, and we were taking his bank accounts away 
under the Trading With the Enemies Act.
  We have created this insanity which more than isolating Cuba has 
isolated the United States and the world community. Every one of our 
democratic governments sees this as a policy that does not work. Let us 
try something new. Let us find a way to make sure the Cuban people 
understand that Americans care about the Cuban people; it is the type 
of government they have that we are against. Let us get rid of the 
hypocrisy of giving PNTR to China while we will not sell food and 
medicine to Cubans. Let us not tie our Russia policy to a failed policy 
in Cuba.
  This is not going to change what happens in Cuba; it is not going to 
change what happens in Russia. It is just one more attempt to try to 
drive, I guess, all of our foreign policy out of how we see a failed 
policy in Cuba and continue it elsewhere around the globe. Reject this 
bill. It will not do much at the end of the day. It is just a bad idea.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the threat posed by Russia's facility at Lourdes is not 
new. The Freedom Support Act of 1992 clearly underscored the dangers to 
U.S. national security, as did ensuing legislation.
  Secretary of Defense Cohen stated in a May 1998 letter to the 
Congress, ``I remain concerned about the use of Cuba intelligence 
activities directed against the United States.'' And he further 
emphasized his concerns with the signals intelligence facility at 
Lourdes and what benefits the Cuban government may reap from this 
facility.
  This latter statement sums up the dual threat that the Lourdes 
facility poses related to Russia's specific actions as well as the 
financial resources it affords the Cuban dictatorship through its 
yearly payments of $200 million to $300 million to the Castro regime 
for Lourdes.
  However, after 8 years of talks, 8 years of providing the Russian 
Federation with billions of dollars in U.S. aid of one sort or another, 
8 years of rescheduling the Russian debt at different intervals, what 
has happened is that Lourdes remains a serious problem. In fact, 
evidence suggests that there has been an increase, not a reduction, of 
the threat posed by the Lourdes facility.

                              {time}  1700

  Coinciding with a February 7, 1996, order by then Russian President 
Yeltsin demanding that the Russian intelligence community increase its 
gathering of U.S. and other Western economic and trade secrets, 
multiple open sources confirm that the Russian Federation began a 
multi-billion dollar upgrade and expansion of the Lourdes facility, 
which included, according to open sources and public statements by 
former U.S. officials and Russian and Cuban defectors, the addition of 
satellite dishes, voice recognition facilities, more sophisticated 
computers for intercepting specific telephone numbers, faxes, and 
computer data, and the means by which to engage in cyberwarfare against 
the United States.
  In fact, the ongoing sophisticated and organized cyberattacks that 
the Pentagon's military computer systems were subjected to in early 
1999 came from a company routing through Russian computer addresses. 
These attacks have been occurring since 1998 and are believed to be 
stemming from the Lourdes facility.
  Other public sources and reports refer to the jamming of U.S. FAA 
transmissions as an example of how Lourdes is used for cyberwarfare, 
which directly threatens the lives of all Americans.
  On November 5, 1998, a Moscow publication reported that the Lourdes 
espionage facility provide between 60 and 70 percent of all 
intelligence data about the United States, including highly sensitive 
military information about our own Armed Forces. Such a penetration of 
closely guarded American military planning jeopardizes the lives of 
thousands of our men and women in uniform.
  The use of Lourdes, however, according to academic studies and news 
reports quoting officials and unofficial sources, is not limited to 
secret U.S. military operations. Its targets include the interception 
of sensitive diplomatic, commercial, and economic traffic as well as 
private U.S. telecommunications. And these targets coincide with the 
previously mentioned

[[Page 15341]]

mandate by Russian President Yeltsin that the focus of Russian 
intelligence had to be commercial and industrial espionage against the 
U.S. in particular.
  According to surveys of the American Society for Industrial Security, 
commercial espionage bleeds the U.S. economy of at least $24 billion a 
year. However, nothing is being done to address Russia's active 
participation in a practice which has such devastating costs for 
American companies.
  The economic traffic intercepted by Lourdes includes Federal Reserve 
deliberations, planned U.S. mergers and acquisitions, competitive 
bidding processes, data which could be used to bank-roll Russian global 
operations to the detriment of American equities.
  The disdain for U.S. security extends into the private realm, as 
revealed by the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in August 
1996, who stated, ``Lourdes is being used to collect personal 
information about U.S. citizens in the private and government 
sectors.''
  Still, the threat does not end there. Cuban engineers and officials 
of Cuba's Ministry of the Interior, which is Castro's intelligence 
service, who have defected to the United States in the last 5 years 
have stated that information on the U.S. obtained through the Lourdes 
espionage facility is offered by the Russians as a gift or is sold to 
regimes in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and China.
  There are daily mail runs between the Lourdes facility and a Cuban 
intelligence office nearby. These are often used to exchange 
information and provide the Castro regime with valuable U.S. political 
and commercial data. According to defectors, this data is used by Cuban 
spies to target specific individuals and American companies in an 
attempt to undermine U.S. policy.
  As the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the distinguished 
chairman of the Committee on International Relations, has stated, the 
Russians have made a mockery of the debt rescheduling process; and they 
have ridiculed and scoffed at the United States for our continued 
willingness in recent years to look the other way, even when there is 
overwhelming evidence that Russia uses its alleged limited resources to 
indeed expand its espionage activities against the U.S. and to provide 
much-needed funds and information to the enemies of our country.
  U.S. willingness to reschedule Russian debt while ignoring the threat 
posed by the Lourdes espionage facility has not only given the Russian 
Federation the impression that it can undermine U.S. national security 
with impunity, but it has sent a signal to the Castro regime that a 
foreign presence in Cuba which threatens the safety of the American 
people will be tolerated and indeed even encouraged.
  For this reason, the Cuban dictatorship is affording China's military 
and intelligence services the opportunity to build their own listening 
post near Lourdes. It has engaged with Chinese Government technical 
experts who are assisting the Castro regime with infomatics and 
communications. This will assist the Cuban Foreign Service in what 
Castro officials term their worldwide struggle against the U.S. by 
increasing their Internet capabilities.
  H.R. 4118, Mr. Speaker, a bill which I introduced in March of this 
year with several of our colleagues is a critical step in addressing 
the threats posed by Lourdes and sends an unequivocal message to the 
Russian Federation that here in the United States we will no longer 
allow ourselves to be manipulated into debt rescheduling for a country 
which demonstrates a blatant disregard for U.S. security and the safety 
of our American people.
  Russia cannot continue to claim poverty and ask for debt 
restructuring from the U.S., whether bilaterally through the Paris Club 
or at the upcoming Economic Summit in Japan, all the while providing 
$200 million to $300 million a year in rental payments to the Castro 
regime. The claims by the Russian Federation fall flat in the face of 
logic.
  If Russia has hundreds of millions of dollars for upgrades to the 
Lourdes espionage facility, if Russia has hundreds of millions of 
dollars to build an additional espionage base for the Castro regime at 
Bejucal nearby, then it has funds to cover its Ex-Im Bank exposure of 
over $2.2 billion or its $1.9 billion in outstanding loan guarantees 
under the Commodity Credit Corporation of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture or any of its debt to the U.S.
  This cannot and must not continue. H.R. 4118 affords us the necessary 
leverage to correct this situation. It holds the Russian government 
accountable for its actions. It prohibits the forgiveness and 
rescheduling of Russian debt to the United States until the Russian 
Federation discontinues its operations and closes its Lourdes facility.
  While it does provide for a national security waiver by the 
President, the waiver applies only to debt forgiveness and requires 
certification and reporting to us in the Congress.
  I ask my colleagues to act. The time is now to protect our secrets, 
our security, and the American people. I urge my colleagues to vote for 
H.R. 4118.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Waters), I yield myself such time as I may consume to 
just say that the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) would 
make a better case if she argued that the Castro government was a 
threat to the people of Cuba where they do not have full freedom and 
they do not have a lot of things that they ought to have.
  It is a little hard to convince us that we are somehow threatened in 
the United States by Castro. And for all the listening the Russians 
have done from the Cold War to today, the United States is the singular 
superpower; and that the policy the gentlewoman supports has failed to 
have an impact on the Castro government for 40 years.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GEJDENSON. I yield to the gentlewoman from Florida.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I believe that if the gentleman reads 
the bill, it is very clear. We are talking about the threat that is 
posed by the Russian listening post in Cuba. It happens to be stationed 
in Cuba. It could be stationed anywhere else. It is a threat to the 
U.S. security, and I am not the only one to say it.
  My colleague can ask Secretary Cohen whether he believes that the 
intelligence facility of the Russians, and that is the topic of concern 
here, is a threat to the U.S. national security or not.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I thank the 
gentlewoman for her comments. But the reality is what she is trying to 
do is make our failed Cuba policy control our Russia policy. That is a 
mistake.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Waters).
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the time that has been allotted 
to me by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson).
  I would continue his discussion and help to point to the fact that we 
know that the gentlewoman on the opposite side of the aisle and many 
others will have ongoing criticism of Castro and his policies, and it 
will surface on every issue possible. We know that this is a single 
issue with some of our colleagues; and they are determined that, 
whenever they have the opportunity, they are going to try and use it to 
once again point to what they would consider the failed policies of the 
Cuban government.
  However, we cannot allow those kind of arguments to get in the way of 
our Government's ability to provide security for the people of the 
United States of America. The security of the American people is the 
first priority in our relationship with Russia.
  I would like to just read to my colleagues part of a Statement of 
Administration Policy that will make this very clear. The 
administration sent us a document which says:
  ``We share congressional concerns about the Lourdes facility and its 
intelligence collection activities. However, this legislation is not 
likely to be an effective lever on Russian actions. The United States, 
like Russia, maintains a number of signals intelligence facilities 
around the world. One important function of such facilities for both

[[Page 15342]]

countries is to collect information to verify arms control agreements. 
Successive administrations have steadfastly resisted attempts to define 
national technical means of verification or to circumscribe the 
location and use of such systems. Such a hindrance would run counter to 
fundamental U.S. national security interests and, in particular, to 
their ability to conduct arms verification. Legislation like this bill 
may rebound adversely to the United States by inviting Russia and other 
countries to pursue similar charges against U.S. facilities they 
characterize as threatening. Additional explanation or information 
relating to facilities such as Lourdes can be provided in classified 
briefings.''
  Basically what the administration is telling us is to butt out of 
their ability to negotiate in the best interest of this country.
  We all have our peeves. We all have our dislikes. But we cannot 
create foreign policy on the floor of this Congress one by one based on 
our own narrow interests.
  I will grant my colleagues and I will not try to take away from any 
Member their feelings about Cuba or any other country that they wish to 
talk about. But I would ask them to restrain from trying to dictate 
foreign policy and tie the hands of this Government when it gets before 
the Paris Club to negotiate debt relief.
  I was on the floor of this Congress just a few days ago where we all 
agreed that we were going to do debt relief. We have given the signal 
to our Government which direction we want to go in. We are leaders in 
this world; and we have got to go to the Paris Club, and we have got to 
negotiate for debt relief, and we have got to have Russia's interest at 
heart when we do that.
  Now, make no mistake about it, yes, we have facilities. God knows 
where our facilities are. We spy where we have to spy. We look into 
what we have to look into. And that is why we have such a large 
intelligence community.
  So let us not mix up our dislike for Castro and our effort to want to 
continue the embargo with this bill that we have before us. This is not 
in the best interest of this country. I ask my colleagues to vote 
against it.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, before I yield to my colleague from 
California, I yield myself such time as I may consume to remind our 
colleagues on the other side that perhaps they could read the bill, and 
they would find out that we are not talking about the embargo, we are 
not talking about trade sanctions. And, yes, we do have many listening 
facilities, I would say to my friend from California, in the world that 
we are not asking anyone for debt forgiveness and rescheduling of our 
debt.
  The difference is that in this bill we say Russia wants rescheduling 
of their debt, and we believe that U.S. taxpayers should have 
assurances that their monies are being used wisely. I think our 
national security is a very important consideration, and that is why we 
are putting these safeguards in any negotiations with the Russians 
about rescheduling of the debt.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, first of all, we are not talking about 
forgiveness here as much as rescheduling, which is again in our 
interest. If they default at some point, that hurts us, the lenders.
  Additionally, does the gentlewoman think that our present policy with 
Cuba has diminished Russian influence there or increased it? It seems 
to me, if they want to diminish Russian influence in Cuba, bring down 
the embargo and there will be less room for it.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, this bill is not 
about diminishing any power. This bill says national security is 
important to us in the United States. This bill also says that Russia 
owes billions of dollars to the United States, that we have a right to 
protect U.S. taxpayers' money by putting conditions on the forgiveness. 
We do have listening posts throughout the world and we are not asking 
anyone else to forgive our debt.

                              {time}  1715

  Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Rohrabacher) who understands that this bill deals with national 
security and the protection of the U.S. taxpayer.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4118. 
I am an original cosponsor of this bill. Let us get down to some 
basics. I know there is a major attempt by some when discussing this 
bill to try to refocus the debate on something that has nothing to do 
with this bill, and, that is, a general policy towards Cuba. We are not 
discussing a general policy towards Cuba. Any attempt to focus on a 
general policy towards Cuba is nothing more than an effort to get 
people not to confront the common sense alternative and the common 
sense policy that is being advocated in H.R. 4118.
  I would ask anyone reading the Congressional Record or listening to 
the debate or my colleagues on either side of the aisle to ponder this 
question: Does it make sense for us to offer debt relief to a country, 
to a regime, namely, Russia, if Russia is using the economic resources 
that we are then making available to them through that debt relief to 
finance a facility that is aimed at undercutting American security, at 
a facility that is aimed at gathering intelligence that will put 
America's military personnel in jeopardy? Does that make sense? Does it 
make sense for us to do a favor for someone, the Russians, giving them 
resources so they can spend more money to put American lives in 
jeopardy?
  If that does not make any sense, then you should support H.R. 4118, 
because it makes no sense to help finance someone who is putting their 
money into a facility that is aimed at gathering intelligence that puts 
the lives of American military personnel at risk. That is as simple as 
it gets. I do not understand how anybody can argue on the other side, 
except, of course, to try to talk about the general Cuba policy to 
deflect a reasonable discussion on the issue.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, does the gentleman realize that one of the 
highest priorities of this country is to reduce and control arms in 
Russia? Does the gentleman realize that we have spent a considerable 
amount of time and we have already rescheduled debt in the interest of 
helping to get rid of dangerous weapons in Russia and making this world 
a safer place? Does the gentleman realize that is the top priority?
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Reclaiming my time, that may be a stated goal of the 
administration, but obviously this is the difference between goals and 
what reality, what comes from those goals and what is a result of the 
goals, in seeking the goal. Yes, we have a goal of lots of wonderful 
things for Russia. As long as we act like a bunch of saps, as long as 
we act like we can be taken advantage of, giving debt restructuring 
while they are doing things in a belligerent way to the United States, 
and providing resources for an intelligence facility in Cuba, providing 
hundreds of millions of dollars of resources to an intelligence 
facility in Cuba that puts the lives of American military personnel at 
risk is a belligerent act on the part of the Russian government towards 
the United States.
  We should not reward this type of belligerence by restructuring their 
debt. There is no moral equivalence between an American intelligence 
post and that of Russia. There is no moral equivalence between a 
Communist dictatorship in Cuba and other democratic societies. We 
should not be restructuring the debt of a country that is belligerent 
towards us and using their money to put the lives of American military 
personnel at risk.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey (Mr. Menendez) with whom I have some differences on this 
particular issue, but I am so often together with him that I am very 
happy to yield to him.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished ranking member 
of the committee for yielding time,

[[Page 15343]]

even though I find this one of those occasions where I have to disagree 
with him.
  Mr. Speaker, I know that there are people in the House who would want 
to paint this bill strictly about U.S.-Cuba relations. They believe it 
is a good time to do that. They believe it is propitious because of the 
set of circumstances that exists in the country and it would be easy to 
do so. But in my mind what this bill is about, it is about ending Cold 
War investments that Russia is still spending in Cuba.
  I know everybody talks about let us end our Cold War mentality. Let 
Russia end its Cold War mentality. If any people need peace dividends 
more than even our citizens do, it is the Russian citizens. And 
clearly, the expenditures of moneys that they expend at the Lourdes spy 
station is in fact not a peace dividend to the people of Russia but is 
in fact totally unnecessary for the purposes that they have. The 
Russian government's continued operation of its intelligence gathering 
facility at Lourdes, Cuba is used to spy not just against military and 
political targets but, many observers believe, against commercial and 
technological interests in America. Public reports reveal that Russia 
has, in fact, expanded and modernized the Lourdes facility in recent 
years. So it is not only just having something that it had, it is 
expanding it. And we continue to assist Russia.
  I have been one of those who have believed that in fact we have to 
assist Russia, and I have cast my votes on behalf of assisting Russia. 
But, my God, do we have to assist Russia to expand their spy facilities 
at Lourdes against the national interests of the United States, against 
the national security of the United States? I think not.
  Now, Russian government revenues are estimated to total about $20 
billion annually. The $200 million or more in yearly rent paid to the 
Cuban regime for use of the Lourdes site, therefore, represents a 
significant amount of the Russian government's annual revenues. And it 
is an affront to be asked to support yet another rescheduling of 
Russia's government debt to the United States and other governments or 
outright forgiveness of all or part of that debt when Russia spends an 
estimated 1 percent of its budget to spy on American citizens from this 
facility alone in Cuba, just from this facility alone.
  Mr. Speaker, it is long past time that the Russian government close 
this spy facility which represents a clear threat to the country. I 
certainly urge support of the gentlewoman's legislation. I believe it 
is in the national interests of the United States to do so.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, following the very eloquent words of 
the minority whip, I am honored to yield 5 minutes to another great 
patriot, the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) our 
majority whip.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentlewoman from Florida 
giving me the time, and I congratulate her on bringing this bill to the 
floor. It is a very meaningful piece of legislation that I hope the 
American people will pay some attention to.
  Mr. Speaker, Members should support this bill and demand 
accountability in our relations with Russia. The simple fact that 
American taxpayers are targeted by a Russian intelligence facility on 
Cuban soil demonstrates the predictable fruits of this administration's 
flawed and failed foreign policy and its alarming disregard for our 
national security.
  The Vice President has positioned himself as the architect of our 
relationship with Russia. He brags about it. Those policies have been a 
dismal failure. Our relations with Russia have fallen to the lowest ebb 
than at any time since the Cold War.
  It is this administration's insane contention that Russian spying 
from this facility in Cuba enhances our relationship because it fosters 
trust. The fact that this facility remains open shows this 
administration's empty commitment to national security. American 
foreign policy should be negotiated from a position of strength, not 
the capitulation of appeasement.
  This administration has tossed good dollars after bad to prop up 
failing, inefficient and corrupt institutions in Russia. For years, 
keeping Boris Yeltsin in office was seemingly our sole goal. The 
administration propped up Yeltsin at all costs as he and his cronies 
ransacked the government while they lined their own pockets.
  Sound relations with Russia must begin with accountability. 
Unfortunately, the administration still has not embraced this 
fundamental concept. Their answer is to blindly pour more money at the 
problem. Clinton and Gore want to either restructure or forgive 
billions of dollars that Russia owes the United States.
  We cannot forget that Russia's vast potential is not bound up in the 
destiny of any one man or one faction. Rather, success lies with the 
growth of those institutions that allow democracy to take root. Without 
the proper foundation, the Russian people will never know the blessings 
of a stable democracy.
  Until that day comes, we must remain vigilant, and this cutting-edge 
spy facility is a bad sign. Many Americans will be shocked to learn 
that at the same time this administration is ready to write off 
billions of dollars that Russia owes the United States, the Russians 
are subsidizing Fidel Castro's evil regime with hundreds of millions of 
dollars.
  Russia leases an intelligence gathering facility at Lourdes, Cuba. 
The committee reports that this annual payment may consume as much as 1 
percent of Russia's entire budget. Money, of course, is fungible. Money 
sent to Russia for a high purpose can be misapplied to fund 
inappropriate activities. Intelligence gathered from this site may well 
be shared by Russia with regimes hostile to America. The simple cost of 
operating this facility alone directly benefits the most dangerous 
regime in our hemisphere.
  We should not ask the American taxpayer to subsidize a hostile 
facility that is targeting the Nation from the foot of our continent. 
This is a regime that does evil to its people. The Russian lease for 
the Lourdes espionage center is an important source of hard currency 
for Fidel Castro.
  It is strongly against our national interests to have an espionage 
facility actively stealing our vital national secrets, pilfering 
economic information, and collecting private information about 
individual Americans. This is simply wrong and we should not be paying 
for it.
  Members should demand that Russia be given no economic support until 
this facility is out of business. They can do that by supporting this 
bill.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I would just like to say that we need to focus on what we are trying 
to do here. We are trying to run our Russia policy through Havana. If 
you want to reduce Russian influence in Cuba, then bring down the 
embargo. The reason that Cuba does so much with Russia is it does not 
have other alternatives. Our present Cuba policy has failed for 40 
years. The idea that we come down to the floor and make all these great 
new charges and somehow it is going to make this failed policy work is 
mindless.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota 
(Mr. Pomeroy).
  Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time and want to follow along on his comments. As the preceding 
speaker, the majority whip indicated, this is not really about Russia, 
it is about Cuba. How I wish we could have an opportunity to discuss 
the full range of issues about Cuba, because the majority whip has 
stood singularly to stop this floor from the consideration of 
overturning the outdated, ineffective sanctions on the sale of food and 
medicine to Cuba, and he will not even let that proposal come up as 
proposed by the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Nethercutt) for full 
consideration of the House.
  So that part of the Cuba question never comes to the floor. It is 
only this part, the piling-on part, the continuing of the outdated 
sanctions part, all inconsistent with this theme, that comes to the 
floor for consideration.
  As to the issue before us, it is very, very bad business. Last week 
we

[[Page 15344]]

marked up a foreign operations appropriations bill. The fact of the 
matter is we know that extension of taxpayer aid to other countries is 
at an all-time low relative to the size of our economy, at least in the 
context of recent history. So we have to have private economic 
opportunity flowing across the world and in the global marketplace. It 
will be a critical part of bringing developing countries along.

                              {time}  1730

  If any action by this Congress would push Russia into defaulting upon 
its debt, the ramifications would be felt far beyond Russia. They would 
be felt in countries like Brazil, struggling to get their economic 
house in order. They would be felt in countries like South Korea and 
Malaysia and elsewhere, as the market would contract and pull 
investment capital out of those developing countries.
  Mr. Speaker, I cannot really think of a more unfair, unbalanced 
debate as what this bill introduces today, nor can I think of much that 
would do more to stop global development in these Third World countries 
and other developing countries all in the name of misguided Cuban 
policy.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is 
remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Fossella). The gentlewoman from Florida 
(Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) has 3\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) has 11\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time and 
encourage the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) to use up his 
time.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to point out to my colleagues particularly 
on the other side of the aisle that the Bush administration, and this 
facility existed throughout the entire Bush administration, did not try 
to interfere with international rescheduling of Russian debt or any 
other actions based on this that I know of and that anybody has been 
able to present to me.
  During the Bush administration, this facility was there. They 
certainly did not interfere with debt, and the gentlewoman from Florida 
(Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), although it is again a bill that I thought made no 
sense. But the President already has the authority under Helms-Burton 
to withhold, I think, an equal amount of money from Russia, if the 
President so chooses. So what we have here again is it is all driven by 
how do we stop Cuba, how do we stop Cuba.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GEJDENSON. I yield to the gentlewoman from Florida.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, the rescheduling has started since the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. The Clinton administration has been 
rescheduling the debt time and time again with no protection for the 
U.S. taxpayers.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, in the last 2 years 
of the Bush administration, they had this same $3.1 billion of Soviet-
era debt sitting around. There was several years of end to the Soviet 
Union. You have Helms-Burton. The fundamental problem is we have a 
policy that has not worked for 40 years. If we want to reduce Russian 
influence in Cuba, let Americans in.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. 
Jackson-Lee).


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair would remind Members that it is 
not permissible to use wireless telephones or other personal electronic 
devices on the floor. Such devices should be disabled while in the 
Chamber.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the distinguished gentlewoman 
from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) is a colleague and a beloved associate 
here in this House.
  Let me say that I am against oppression and certainly recognize that 
we need to join together in a bipartisan manner to address many foreign 
policy issues. But this legislation clearly ties the hand of the 
President of the United States, the Commander in Chief.
  We did not do it for previous administrations, and we should not do 
it now. Frankly, this is debt created in Russia during Communist times. 
I am a Member of the Committee on Science, and we realized that the 
Russian government is part of the international space station.
  They could not pay their bill. But we recognized in the interests of 
international friendship, collegiality and working together on an 
important initiative that this issue of the space station, we should 
not penalize Russia because of having fallen on hard times.
  This is what this legislative initiative does. It penalizes Russia 
because it has fallen on hard times, and it penalizes the Commander in 
Chief who is attempting to create peace. What would anyone say if we 
passed legislation dealing with peace proceedings that I agree with, 
and since I am on the floor of the House, I do not know the status of 
it, that kept the President from acting to develop a Middle East peace 
agreement because we did something negative to negate those 
negotiations?
  This legislation will negate the negotiations of helping Russia. I 
believe if we have concerns with the Cuban government, we need to deal 
with it in a sense of having widespread discussions, working with 
concern to the issues of those who are for Cuba or against Cuba.
  Mr. Speaker, I do not believe this particular legislative initiative 
does this country well in terms of its national and international 
responsibility as a world power creating peace and not war, to pass 
this legislation would undermine our relationships with Russia. We do 
not solve the problems that I believe my friends are attempting to 
solve.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I will close at this point, and just rise to say that in 
no other part of our society would we continue to press a failed 
policy. Ford Motor Company dropped Edsel pretty quickly. Sony made a 
valiant effort to have Beta change the format, but once it was clear it 
did not work, they abandoned it.
  Mr. Speaker, for some reason, we have continued this Cuba policy for 
40 years. We have Helms-Burton that isolates us globally, and the 
President has to continue to waive. In that language, there is already 
legislation. There is language that would give the President more 
ability to act if he was so inclined to on this issue.
  America's interests are not served by trying to drive all of our 
foreign policy through Havana. The United States interests in dealing 
with Russia, with its large nuclear force is far more important to 
American security than trying to even topple the government of Castro.
  I would like to see Castro gone. I would like to see a democracy 
there. I would like to see the people of Cuba living a better standard 
of living. I would like to see American farmers selling the food crops 
and American pharmaceuticals selling them the medicine they need to 
give their people a better life. I would like to see an end to this 
policy which for 40 years has only isolated America and not isolated 
Castro.
  Ladies and gentlemen of this Chamber, we know why we are here. This 
is not about Soviet-era debt and the rescheduling of it at the Paris 
Club, if America, and this is kind of an esoteric debate for many 
people, if we fail to fulfill our responsibilities of the Paris Club, 
if this legislation passes and would go into effect, it would remove 
our ability to help the poorest of the poor countries, in doing away 
with their debt and trying to help them alleviate poverty.
  There are so many issues that America is involved in. So much of the 
agenda, what happens in the world, is critical to this country, but yet 
we continue to try to drive all of that foreign policy, all of our 
interests through Havana. It has not worked for 40 years, and if you 
keep it up for another 40, it still is not going to work.

[[Page 15345]]

  The strongest tool in a democracy's arsenal is contact. The more 
contact of Cuban-Americas and other Americans with the people in Cuba, 
the more pressure there would be on Castro for change.
  Reject this proposal. Let us start looking for a rational, bipartisan 
policy and not continue down this path.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), who is the esteemed chairman of 
the Committee on International Relations.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. 
Gejdenson) says what we need is contact; this is the wrong kind of 
contact. We are talking about Russian espionage, and let me note the 
nature of Russian espionage that is carried out against our country.
  The Sunday Times newspaper of London stated in a report on January 
26, 1997 that the Lourdes base, the largest spy facility outside of 
Russia, is staffed by about 1,500 Russians. Intelligence reports, using 
satellites and high speed computers, they pick up millions of microwave 
transmissions every day and communicate with Russian spies operating on 
the American continent.
  Mr. Stanislav Lunev, a former colonel in the Russian GRU military, 
has said the following, and I quote, ``the strategic significance of 
the Lourdes facility has grown dramatically since the secret order from 
Russian Federation President Yeltsin of 7 February 1996 demanding that 
Russian intelligence community step up the theft of American and other 
western economic and trade secrets. It currently represents a 
formidable and ominous threat to the U.S. national security, as well as 
the American economy and infrastructure.''
  Mr. Speaker, one other report is Izvestiya, the Russian newspaper, 
November 1998, the Russian intelligence facility in Lourdes, Cuba 
``provides between 60 percent and 70 percent of all Russian 
intelligence data about the United States.''
  These are the kind of contacts we are concerned about, not the 
diplomatic contacts. We are concerned about Russian espionage against 
our Nation.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to close on the bill with the remaining 
time, and I would like to thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Gilman), as well as the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), who 
has always been very cooperative in our Committee on International 
Relations, and we have enjoyed bipartisan support on a myriad of 
issues, including this one, in spite of the tone and tenor and rhetoric 
of the debate on the floor.
  It is a bipartisan bill. This bill is not about the trade embargo. It 
is not about economic sanctions. It is about Russian espionage. It is 
about protecting U.S. national security. It helps prevent the theft of 
political diplomatic and commercial secrets. It protects the American 
people.
  It protects the taxpayers from bearing the burden once and again of 
Russia's failure to pay its debt, and it upholds congressional 
priorities regarding fiscal responsibility and exerts congressional 
oversight over foreign policy priorities.
  I will continue to work on my good friend, the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) and have the gentleman see the light about 
what this bill does, and what, in fact, it does not do.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 4118, 
the Russian-American Trust and Cooperation Act of 2000. I am proud to 
be an original cosponsor of this measure, which was introduced by my 
good friend from Florida, Representative Ros-Lehtinen, in March of this 
year. The point of this bill is clear: United States taxpayers should 
not have to subsidize espionage activities directed against them, or 
help to fund the repressive Castro dictatorship.
  Right now, more than 1,500 Russian engineers, technicians, and 
military personnel are stationed at an intelligence base in Lourdes, 
Cuba where they are using tracking dishes, satellites, and other 
equipment to intercept telephone calls, faxes, and computer 
communications within the United States. This espionage facility--the 
largest operated by Russia outside the former Soviet Union--was used to 
obtain sensitive military information during Operation Desert Storm, 
and is now being used to collect personal information about U.S. 
citizens. The Russian government has spent more than $3 billion to 
modernize and operate that base.
  The Lourdes spy base is also a large source of revenue for the Castro 
regime. The Government of Russia pays Fidel Castro somewhere between 
$100 to $300 million per year to lease the facility.
  The bill before us today makes clear that the United States does not 
want to underwrite this highly improper and destructive activity. The 
bill prohibits the President from forgiving any bilateral debt owed by 
Russia to the United States until he can certify that Russia has closed 
down the Lourdes spy base. It also requires that the President report 
to Congress on actions taken by Russia to terminate its activities at 
Lourdes, and on U.S. efforts to verify those actions. The bill also 
grants the President authority to waive the debt forgiveness 
prohibition if he determines that such waiver is in the national 
interest of the United States.
  If the government of Russia wants the United States to forgive its 
debts, then it should first stop squandering its limited resources on 
efforts to spy on U.S. citizens, and to prop up the bankrupt 
dictatorship in Havana. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 555, the previous question is ordered on 
the bill, as amended.
  The question is on engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


              Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Gejdenson

  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from Connecticut opposed to 
the bill?
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Yes, I am, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Gejdenson moves to recommit the bill H.R. 4118 to the 
     Committee on International Relations with instructions to 
     establish a bipartisan national commission to study and 
     report to the President on the exercise of the presidential 
     waiver in section 3(b)(2) of the bill with regard to United 
     States national interests in the context of other possible 
     actions (including changes in United States policy toward 
     Cuba) and provide that the restriction contained in section 
     3(a) of the bill on rescheduling or forgiving debt owed by 
     the Government of the Russian Federation to the United States 
     shall become effective only after the date on which the 
     commission submits such report to the President.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) is recognized for 5 minutes in support of 
his motion to recommit.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I would just say to my colleagues I will 
not use my entire 5 minutes, but say to the gentlewoman from Florida 
(Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), who I get along with very well, and we have worked 
together on many issues, she said she wanted to let the light in.
  Mr. Speaker, I am giving her a chance here with this motion to 
recommit to let the light in. What this motion simply does it creates a 
bipartisan commission to take a look at the best way to take care of 
our interests in this area.
  I think it is clear that if we want to diminish Russia's interests in 
Cuba, if we want to increase America's interests in Cuba, if we want to 
increase American national security, then we will vote for this 
commission to give us a chance to examine the policy, to figure out 
what is really best for the United States. For 40 years we have not 
made progress, but only to isolate America.
  Let us end the isolation. Let us let the light in. Support this 
motion to recommit. It is a bipartisan study. The leadership of this 
Congress is Republican. My colleagues have plenty of voice. Let us not 
keep us in the dark, let America see where the light is and it is in a 
new Cuba policy.

[[Page 15346]]


  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak against the motion.
  Mr. Speaker, this motion, in effect, kills the bill. If my good 
friend from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) was so enamored of this 
amendment, he should have offered it in the committee stage, and he did 
not.
  The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) crafted the waiver he 
seeks to amend. It is his very language that is in the bill, now he is 
amending that. This is not a Cuba study commission bill.
  The other side wants to hide. They want to ignore. They want to 
confuse the very real and imminent and growing threat posed by the 
Lourdes facility, and that is, in fact, what this bill does.
  It is not about sanctions. It is not about U.S. Cuba policy. It is 
about Russian espionage, and it is about protection of the U.S. 
taxpayer.

                              {time}  1745

  A very similar proposal that my good friend, the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), is proposing today was soundly defeated 
just a few short weeks ago in the Senate, after it became abundantly 
clear that such a commission is nothing more than a waste of the 
taxpayers' money; that it would be a waste of time and effort given 
that it duplicates the role that we exert in the U.S. Congress through 
hearings, through briefings, through meetings, legislation on this 
issue.
  Ironically, this proposal even infringes upon the existing authority 
of the President and the executive agencies which on a regular basis 
make modifications to export controls and other regulations that guide 
U.S. policy toward any government, especially the Castro regime.
  However, what is astonishing about this attempt is the apparent 
willingness of the minority to appease the brutal tyrant who rules Cuba 
with an iron grip, the willingness of the minority to sacrifice the 
safety, the privacy, and security of the American people. I know the 
minority does not want that. Our constituents expect us to defend their 
interests, to defend their hard-earned dollars, and we should not be 
using it for the purpose of appeasing a dictator who is a declared 
enemy of the United States. It is inconceivable to see my colleagues on 
the other side go to this extreme.
  We have had many blue ribbon committees and commissions studying the 
issue of U.S.-Cuba relations and other issues. In fact, right now in 
Havana is a delegation, and they will be reporting back to the 
Committee on Ways and Means in a few months about lifting sanctions and 
other issues. The Council on Foreign Relations headed by Bernie 
Aaronson had this similar proposal just a few months ago. We have had 
countless commissions and countless task forces and blue ribbon groups 
studying this ad nauseam, and I do not think that the taxpayers want to 
see their funds used and manipulated in this way.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield the remaining time to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Menendez) to speak on this motion.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. 
Ros-Lehtinen) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I have to oppose the motion to recommit of the 
distinguished gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), and the 
reason I do so is I do not believe that this body should delegate to 
any entity its powers and its rights to have a bipartisan commission on 
any issue.
  We are the representatives elected by the people of the United States 
to make crucial policy decisions, including decisions in foreign 
policy; not some unelected group of individuals chosen maybe because of 
their economic interests in this issue. And the fact of the matter is I 
do not believe that we should abrogate our powers and our 
responsibilities as legislators to any unelected commission to 
determine foreign policy. Let us have a commission on the Middle East; 
let us have a commission on a whole host of other places in the world. 
The fact of the matter is that would not be the course of events that 
we should pursue, and I urge my colleagues to reject the motion to 
recommit.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remaining time to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the chairman of the Committee on 
International Relations.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. 
Ros-Lehtinen) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to recommit with 
instructions because I do not believe that it is germane to the 
underlying bill. This measure addresses a very real threat to American 
security and privacy posed by the operation of a sophisticated Russian 
eavesdropping facility in Cuba. These days our papers are filled with 
articles that debate Internet privacy. I wonder how many Americans are 
aware that the Russians are operating an electronic spy center in our 
own backyard violating the very privacy of communications in our Nation 
each and every day.
  I regret that our good friend, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. 
Gejdenson), has offered this motion which seeks to divert attention to 
a separate issue, our U.S.-Cuba relations. Let us stick to the subject 
before us. This bill is about Russian debt relief and Russian 
espionage. Let us not try to look away from this issue by way of the 
motion to recommit.
  I remind our colleagues this is Russian espionage. Vote against the 
motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Fossella). All time having expired, 
without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to 
recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The motion to recommit was rejected.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum 
is not present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 275, 
nays 146, not voting 13, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 414]

                               YEAS--275

     Aderholt
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Borski
     Boyd
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Capps
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth-Hage
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Crane
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     Mascara
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Menendez

[[Page 15347]]


     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Paul
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stabenow
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Turner
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wu
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--146

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Berman
     Berry
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Boucher
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Cummings
     Davis (IL)
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Gejdenson
     Gonzalez
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Larson
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Slaughter
     Snyder
     Stark
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--13

     Baca
     Barton
     Boswell
     Brady (TX)
     Campbell
     Hilleary
     Lazio
     McIntosh
     Murtha
     Napolitano
     Smith (WA)
     Spratt
     Vento

                              {time}  1810

  Ms. SANCHEZ and Mrs. MINK of Hawaii changed their vote from ``yea'' 
to ``nay.''
  Mr. PHELPS and Mr. CROWLEY changed their vote from ``nay'' to 
``yea.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Mr. BRADY of Texas. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 414. I was 
inadvertently detained and was not recorded. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``yea.''

                          ____________________