[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 11]
[Senate]
[Pages 15060-15061]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                           WHAT PRICE LEGACY?

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the peace talks that President Clinton has 
been hosting at Camp David between Prime Minister Barak of Israel and 
Chairman Arafat of the Palestinian Authority appear to be reaching 
their climax. The President has made clear from the outset that the 
negotiations would be difficult, but that it was his hope to recreate 
the spirit of the Camp David summit hosted by President Carter more 
than 20 years ago that resulted in the historic peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel.
  The goal of the current discussions is no less ambitious than the 
peace treaty between Israel and Egypt that was enshrined in the first 
Camp David accords. Certainly, a peace agreement between the Israelis 
and the Palestinians would be a welcome advance in the quest for a 
lasting peace in the Middle East. We would all like these discussions 
to lead to an end to the conflict that has caused so much suffering and 
instability in that troubled region.
  Whether such a positive outcome is possible is still very much in 
doubt. There is no guarantee of success; indeed, many think the chances 
are dim. But when there is a chance for peace, the opportunity should 
be seized.
  That being said, Mr. President, it should be made clear what the role 
and responsibility of the United States are here. The most important 
role of the United States is our ability to serve as the facilitator of 
these discussions. That is due to the nature of our relations with 
Israel and the Palestinians, and the personalities of the leaders 
involved at this time in history.
  But providing a forum and encouragement for the Israelis and 
Palestinians to solve their own conflict should not be translated into 
a commitment to solve the conflict for them. Stability in the Middle 
East, including the state of relations between Israel and the 
Palestinians, is a matter of great importance to the United States, but 
it is not our conflict. It is theirs. We can

[[Page 15061]]

help them find common ground, but ultimately it is their ground to 
find.
  This distinction is significant in light of the potential cost of a 
peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Figures 
ranging from $15 billion to $40 billion have been floated in the media 
over the past several days as the possible sums that U.S. taxpayers 
will be asked to contribute to a peace agreement. If history is any 
guide, this is only the beginning.
  According to the Congressional Research Service, from 1979 through 
2000, the United States has provided over $68 billion to Israel, and 
over $47 billion to Egypt to support the Camp David accords. That 
amounts to more than $115 billion in U.S. tax dollars to two countries 
alone. Besides that, from 1994 and 2000, the United States has provided 
$927 million--almost a billion dollars--to the Palestinians.
  I wonder how many Americans are aware of this. I wonder how many 
Americans knew, at the time of the first Camp David summit, that the 
price of an Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement would be an open-ended 
financial commitment of U.S. tax dollars exceeding $100 billion. Yet 
after more than 20 years of paying the bills, that is indeed the cost. 
And there is no end in sight.
  Mr. President, there has been a lot of talk about President Clinton's 
legacy and Secretary of State Albright's legacy. I appreciate their 
zeal to achieve historic agreements and to be remembered for their 
achievements. I recognize that peace between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians would be a crowning achievement. But what legacy at what 
price? Are we going to be told somewhere down the line that in order 
for the Israelis and Palestinians to agree--and this does not include 
the Syrians--the Administration had to promise them billions and 
billions of dollars in U.S. taxpayer aid? Why is it the responsibility 
of the United States Congress to pay to implement an agreement that we 
are not a party to, and about which we have, so far, received no 
details?
  There is a disturbing tendency on the part of the Administration, and 
it is by no means unique to this Administration, to negotiate 
agreements and make costly financial commitments behind closed doors, 
and then inform the Congress, in so-called ``consultations,'' after the 
fact. I fear that is what is contemplated again, and I think it is 
wrong.
  If consultations are happening, that is news to me. As ranking member 
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I have not been consulted, and 
perhaps for good reasons. I am not aware of any other Senator who has 
been approached by any administration official who has suggested what 
the price of implementing a peace agreement might be, or why it is the 
responsibility of the American taxpayers to pay that price. I say this 
particularly when it was only last year that the Congress provided a 
total of $1.6 billion to Israel and the Palestinians to implement the 
Wye River agreement--another deal that was made without any prior 
consultations, as far as I know, with Congress. Again, I fear we are 
being led down the path of ``sign now, pay later'' without even knowing 
how much we are going to be asked to pay later, or why.
  Now, I recognize that the discussions underway at Camp David may 
fail. There may be no agreement. That would be unfortunate. But 
whatever the outcome, I want to remind the administration, and the 
Israelis and Palestinians, that the negotiations are being hosted by 
the administration, not by the Congress, not by the Appropriations 
Committees of the Congress. No one should assume that the check is in 
the mail. No one should assume that we are going to dig another hole 
for ourselves the way we did the last time there was such a negotiation 
at Camp David.
  We all want to see peace in the Middle East, and if there is a 
legitimate need for funding to implement a peace agreement, we can 
discuss what role the United States should play--but not after the 
commitments have already been made, not after the ink has already 
dried, not if this ancient Senator has anything to say about it.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

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