[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 10]
[Senate]
[Pages 14448-14449]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                   CHINA AND NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, 3 years ago I came to the Senate floor to 
talk about China and how the United States can best achieve its 
national interests in the Far East.
  I spoke then on the eve on two summits which went a long way toward 
putting the U.S.-China relationship on a firmer foundation. I called 
for a patient, principled engagement strategy designed to win greater 
Chinese compliance with international norms in the areas of human 
rights, nonproliferation, and trade.
  Three years later, there has been some progress, but also some 
setbacks.
  U.S.-China relations remain dogged by uncertainties--each side 
harbors doubts about the other's intentions, doubts reinforced by 
allegations of Chinese espionage and the tragic mistaken U.S. bombing 
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. China's fear of how we might 
exploit our position as the world's only superpower is matched by our 
concerns over China's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
its intimidation tactics against Taiwan. China's leaders decry U.S. 
``hegemony'' and ``interference in their internal affairs.'' We worry 
about whether the Dragon will breathe fire at its neighbors, or just 
blow smoke.
  So today I rise at what I believe may be a pivotal moment which will 
determine our Nation's future in Asia not just for this year, or next 
year, but for 10 years, 20 years, and into the world my grandchildren 
will inherit.
  Three decisions--on national missile defense, on invoking sweeping 
new unilateral sanctions on China, and on extending permanent normal 
trade relations to China--will help shape U.S. strategic doctrine and 
irrevocably alter the security landscape in East Asia for decades to 
come. They are decisions which must be made in the context of 
revolutionary changes underway on the Korean Peninsula and an awakening 
China which wants to play in major leagues, but is not sure it wants to 
abide by all the rules of the game.
  Today I wish to address the first of these three major decisions--
national missile defense--as it relates to China and recent 
developments on the Korean peninsula.
  Mr. President, I rise with optimism--my mother calls me a 
``congenital optimist.'' Not the optimism of a Phillies fan--a blind, 
fervent optimism born each spring, matured each summer, and dashed 
against the rocks by fall. No, I speak with the confidence which flows 
from the enormous capacity and good will of the American people. I am 
optimistic because we now enjoy an unprecedented opportunity to shape 
the future in ways which will enhance our national security and 
preserve our prosperity.
  I reject the path of unrelieved pessimism and lack of common sense 
which, to me, underlies much of the thinking of those who believe China 
must be an enemy of the United States, and that North Korea can neither 
be deterred nor persuaded to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear missile 
capability.
  I reject the pessimism which says that American idealism and the 
dynamism of American markets are somehow incapable of handling the 
opportunities which will be ours as China joins the World Trade 
Organization and opens its markets to the world.
  But my optimism is informed by realism.
  Let me put it bluntly: China does not believe that National Missile 
Defense is oriented against North Korea. According to those who justify 
a limited national missile defense on the basis of the North Korean 
threat, North Korea is ruled by a nutcase who by 2005 will be in 
position to launch an ICBM with weapons of mass destruction against the 
United States, and will do so without giving one thought to the 
consequences.
  Who can blame China for questioning this rationale for a national 
missile defense? I question it myself.
  The notion that North Korea's leader Kim Jong-il is going to wake up 
one morning and decide to attack the United States with long-range 
missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction is absurd!
  The notion that 5 or 10 long-range missiles would deter us from 
defending South Korea is equally bogus. Did the Soviet Union's ability 
to devastate the United States prevent us from defending Europe for a 
generation and West Berlin in 1961, even in the face of superior Warsaw 
Pact strength on the ground? No.
  Did it stop us from forcing the removal of missiles from Cuba in 
1963, or from supplying Afghan mujaheddin in their successful struggle 
against Soviet forces? No.
  Has China's ability to deliver a nuclear strike against a dozen or 
more U.S. cities prevented us from defending Taiwan? No, again.
  Moreover, in the wake of the first North-South Summit meeting ever, 
the prospects for peaceful reconciliation between North and South Korea 
are better today than they have been in my lifetime. I'm not saying 
that peace on the Korean Peninsula is a ``done deal.'' Far from it. 
North Korea has not withdrawn its heavy artillery. North Korea has not 
abandoned its missile program. North Korea has not halted all of its 
support for international terrorist organizations. There is a 
tremendous amount of hard work to be done.
  But look at the facts that relate to our decision on national missile 
defense.
  The last time North Korea launched a missile, I remind my colleagues, 
was on August 31, 1998. On that day, a three stage Taepo-Dong missile 
flew over Japan. The third stage of the missile apparently failed to 
perform as the North Koreans had hoped, but the mere existence of the 
third stage surprised many of our experts and caused them to reassess 
the North's capabilities and to advance the date by which North Korea 
might develop an ICBM to 2005.
  But since August 1998, North Korea has not launched a long-range 
missile. It recently extended indefinitely the test-launch moratorium 
it implemented 15 months ago. Negotiations

[[Page 14449]]

are underway right now with the objective of curtailing North Korea's 
development and export of long-range missiles.
  Now the pessimists say that North Korea will never agree to forego 
development, deployment, or export of long-range ballistic missiles.
  But then, the pessimists also said that the North Koreans would never 
open their nuclear facilities to round-the-clock monitoring by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, would never stop construction on 
its heavy water nuclear reactors, would never permit World Food Program 
monitoring of food deliveries throughout North Korea, would never hold 
a summit meeting with South Korea, would never undertake economic 
reforms, and so on. Guess what? They have been wrong on all counts.
  And what does Kim Dae-jung, the President of South Korea, have to say 
about the temperament of Kim Jong-il? All evidence points to a North 
Korean leader who is intelligent, rational, and coldly calculating. Not 
the type of guy who gets up on the wrong side of bed in the morning and 
decides to ensure the complete annihilation of his country by launching 
a few nuclear missiles at the United States.
  How does all this relate to China? The fact is, North Korea is in a 
world of hurt since the collapse of the Soviet Union. China is the 
North's major trading partner and aid donor, and it has successfully 
urged North Korea to engage with South Korea and curtail its missile 
testing.
  Why? Is it because China wants to be helpful to us? Perhaps. But I 
doubt it.
  No. China is acting in its own self interest. China knows that if 
North Korea presses ahead with its missile program, the United States 
is almost certain to deploy a national missile defense against that 
threat. And if we do, even a limited system will seriously undermine 
China's tiny nuclear deterrent.
  China has only a handful of old, silo-based, liquid-fueled missiles 
capable of delivering a nuclear payload to the United States. Beijing 
calculates that any U.S. system sufficient to deal with 10-12 North 
Korean missiles could also handle 10-20 Chinese ICBMs. And guess what? 
Notwithstanding our repeated protests to the contrary, they are 
probably right.
  So how can we expect China to respond if we foolishly rush ahead with 
deployment of this unproven, expensive, national missile defense, for 
which the rationale is evaporating as I speak?
  Well, for starters, China will have no further incentive to use its 
influence with North Korea to rein in the North's nuclear missile 
ambitions. And North Korea, with no reason to trust the United States, 
may opt to end its missile launch moratorium and proceed full speed 
with the testing, deployment, and export of long-range ballistic 
missiles.
  Second, if we rush to deploy limited NMD, China itself will surely 
take steps to ensure the survivability of its nuclear arsenal. They 
have made that painfully clear. We already know that they are planning 
to move from silo-based liquid-fueled rockets to mobile, solid-fueled 
rockets which will be much harder for us to locate and destroy. They 
are probably going to do that no matter what we do.
  But they have not decided how many missiles to manufacture, or 
whether to MIRV them. Our actions will have a huge impact on their 
thinking. We already sent one unfortunate signal when the Senate 
rejected the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. If we want to guarantee 
that China will go from fewer than two dozen ICBM's to 200 or 2,000, 
then by all means, let's just forge ahead with a national missile 
defense without any consideration for how that decision will affect 
China's nuclear posture and doctrine.
  And if China responds as I fear they might, how will India respond? 
Pakistan? Japan? And if in 5 or 10 years Japan feels compelled to go 
nuclear, how will South Korea respond?
  Mr. President, there is a reason why our allies in East Asia are 
urging caution with respect to the deployment of a national missile 
defense. They understand that bad U.S.-China relations are bad for 
regional stability. Listen to what a leading strategist in South Korea, 
Dr. Lho Kyong-soo of Seoul National University, recently wrote about 
missile defenses, China, and implications for the U.S.-South Korea 
alliance:

       Needless to say, minus a clear-cut image of North Korea as 
     the `enemy,' the security rationale underpinning the alliance 
     is seriously weakened . . .
       Much will depend on how the relationship between the United 
     States and China evolves in the years ahead. If the 
     relationship becomes antagonistic, Seoul will find itself in 
     an extremely delicate position vis-a-vis Beijing, a situation 
     that it would clearly like to avoid at all costs.
       There appears to be little awareness in Washington, 
     however, how its China policy, should it be mishandled, could 
     have possibly adverse consequences in terms of alliance 
     relations with Seoul, and, in all likelihood, with Tokyo as 
     well. The cautious stance taken by Seoul with respect to the 
     acquisition of even a lower-tier Theater Missile Defense 
     capability is but one example of Seoul's desire not to 
     unnecessarily create friction with Beijing.

  So, Mr. President, this is a serious business.
  I believe this body has not yet taken the time to consider the 
implications of deploying a limited national missile defense for our 
broader strategic interests in East Asia. I intend to raise these 
issues and others in the days ahead. If we are not to squander our 
material wealth and our world leadership, we must consider carefully 
whether a missile defense will maximize our overall national security.

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