[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 10]
[Senate]
[Pages 14442-14443]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                   UNMANNED COMBAT VEHICLE INITIATIVE

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, since January, I have been working on an 
initiative that deals with introducing new cutting-edge technology into 
the combat arms of our Armed Services. The initiative is to have one-
third of our airborne deep strike aircraft remotely operated within 10 
years, and one-third of our ground combat vehicles remotely operated 
within 15 years.
  I asked one of our ``Captains of Industry,'' Mr. Kent Kresa, the 
Chief Executive Officer of Northrop Grumman, for his assessment of the 
technical feasibility for such an undertaking. He expressed his 
unqualified support for the initiative, saying that it was certainly 
feasible from a technical viewpoint. His thoughts have been published 
in the July 2000, issue of National Defense, the magazine of the 
National Defense Industrial Association. I ask unanimous consent this 
article be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                  [From National Defense, July, 2000]

                For Unmanned Systems, the Time Has Come

                            (By Kent Kresa)

       Today's technology gives us the ability to do things in 
     different ways. All we really need is determination. In 
     preparing for future conflicts, the area of unmanned systems 
     is one where institutional determination has not matched 
     technological reach. But that may be about to change.

[[Page 14443]]

       Sen. John Warner, R-Va, chairman of the Armed Services 
     Committee, recently announced that he supports efforts to 
     make one-third of the U.S. operational deep strike aircraft 
     unmanned by 2010, and one-third of ground vehicles unmanned 
     by 2015.
       Such a significant change in how the United States conducts 
     military operations would have a profound impact on future 
     national security efforts. Having spent many years of my 
     career in the defense industry working on unmanned systems, I 
     believe Warner's goals are reasonable aspirations. In my 
     view, such an acceleration reflects both a technological 
     possibility and an operational necessity. Certainly, there 
     are technological challenges to be overcome, but the greatest 
     obstacle may be our past experiences and concepts.
       A senior defense official commented last year that, by the 
     year 2050, there will be no manned aircraft in the military 
     inventory. A growing number of senior officers see this 
     transition as inevitable. However, most do not see it as 
     imminent. The 50-year period suggested in that observation 
     approximates the chronological distance separating Kitty Hawk 
     from Sputnik.
       Although there are certainly issues to be resolved, 
     particularly regarding command and control, we know 
     considerably more today about building and controlling 
     unmanned vehicles than the Wright Brothers did about 
     rocketry.
       Certainly, there are those who harbor reservations about 
     unmanned systems. But I have been surprised at the growing 
     acceptance of these technologies across the Defense 
     Department. Field commanders, in particular, increasingly are 
     confident and comfortable about conducting unmanned strikes. 
     During Operation Desert Fox--the fourth-day campaign against 
     Iraq in December 1998--72 percent of the strikes were 
     conducted by unmanned cruise missiles. By comparison, during 
     the first four days of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, only 6 
     percent of the strikes were conducted with cruise missiles.
       Although the scales of these two operations were 
     significantly different, this dramatic shift to unmanned 
     strike systems reflects a fundamental operational change.
       As Gen. Michael Ryan, Air Force chief of staff, has 
     commented on several occasions, cruise missiles and other 
     standoff munitions are merely unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
     on a ``one-way trip.'' Transitioning to UAVs that are re-
     usable and capable of making numerous trips dropping less 
     costly precision munitions is within our near-term 
     technological ability.
       Calculations suggest that in fewer than 10 missions, 
     unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) dropping ordnance 
     similar to Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) become 
     considerably more cost-effective than cruise missiles. 
     Furthermore, these calculations do not consider additional 
     cost savings resulting from lower manning and routine 
     operational costs.
       In the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 
     mission area, UAVs already are well accepted. The recent 
     testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee by Gens. 
     Wesley Clark and Anthony Zinni, commanders-in-chief of two of 
     our more important regional commands, reflects this trend. 
     Both articulated the need for a larger number of UAVs for ISR 
     missions that ``are 24-hour-a-day capable and are adverse-
     weather capable.''
       In my view, this is a near-term possibility. Assets such as 
     the Global Hawk system provide such a capability. When teamed 
     with other key ISR assets, such as the joint surveillance 
     target attack radar system (JSTARS) and the airborne warning 
     and control system (AWACS), U.S. commanders will have a 
     formidable capability for seeing their operational area in 
     real-time, in all weather. Other assets--such as the Predator 
     UAV, the Army's new tactical UAV, and the Navy's vertical 
     take-off UAV--will offer high-fidelity battlefield 
     surveillance to tactical commanders.


                         organizational issues

       There are numerous tactics, techniques, and procedures, as 
     well as organizational and operational issues to be resolved 
     on how all of these systems work together, and how they are-
     controlled and integrated to form a common operational 
     picture. But the work currently under way by the Joint Forces 
     Command's experimentation program will highlight the major 
     issues and suggest reasonable solutions.
       A study on unmanned systems conducted by the Government 
     Electronics and Information Technology Association (GEIA) 
     last fall concluded that in all areas--air, land and sea--
     both institutional and technological barriers to the expanded 
     use of unmanned systems were dropping rapidly. The report 
     concluded that a heavy reliance on UAVs in both the ISR and 
     attack roles would happen sooner, rather than later. This 
     suggest that others in industry, as well as the government, 
     share this perspective.
       Unmanned systems address two pressing problems. First, not 
     only will they be less expensive to build, but their 
     ownership costs will be lower. Since the aircraft fly 
     themselves, their ``mission managers'' can be trained on 
     simulators. The aircraft can be kept in storage until needed, 
     thus lowering operations and maintenance costs that currently 
     consume a high percentage of the defense budget.
       Second, unmanned systems empower our troops, while lowering 
     the risks that they assume. In an age where manpower is 
     becoming more expensive, and sensitivity to casualties more 
     prominent, performing ``dirty and dangerous'' missions with 
     unmanned systems is likely to become an imperative. Moreover, 
     by removing the real constraints associated with having 
     humans on board, unmanned systems can provide greater range, 
     greater mission endurance, and great agility. Such systems 
     expand the options available to national and operational 
     leaders.
       The issue of greater use of UAVs is less ``can we do it?'' 
     than ``do we want to do it?'' In my view, the first question 
     is already answered: We can do it. The second question is a 
     function of institutional commitment and funding. Warner's 
     bold vision is certain to stimulate discussion that will 
     inevitably lead others to the conclusion that several 
     factors--strategic, operational, and fiscal-- indicate that 
     we must make this transformation. When that question is 
     resolved, those of us in the defense industry are confident 
     that we are prepared to do our part in making that vision a 
     reality.

     

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