[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 10]
[Senate]
[Pages 13916-13946]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001--Continued

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the Defense 
authorization bill.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2549) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2001 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have in mind, and I think other Members 
do at this juncture, operating under the unanimous consent agreement 
reached last night. I amend that unanimous consent to the extent that 
the senior Senator from West Virginia very graciously is willing to 
withhold the presentation of his amendment until such time that the 
distinguished Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Alaska 
bring up their amendments, which is sequenced, and they indicate to 
this manager that it will not take more than 10 or 12 minutes. 
Therefore, I ask that.
  I further request, following the disposition of the Byrd amendment, 
Mr. Feingold be recognized; following the completion of his amendment, 
the Senator from Illinois, Mr. Durbin, be recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. I understand the Senator from Wisconsin is willing to have 
30 minutes equally divided instead of 40 minutes on his amendment. I 
ask that the unanimous consent agreement be so modified.
  Mr. WARNER. I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Alaska.


                           Amendment No. 3815

   (Purpose: To provide that the limitation on payment of fines and 
penalties for environmental compliance violations applies only to fines 
               and penalties imposed by Federal agencies)

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the Senator from Massachusetts had an 
amendment pending concerning section 342 of this bill. We have 
discussed this. That was an amendment that would change the existing 
text that came from an amendment I suggested. I will offer an amendment 
to strike the existing section 342 and insert language we agreed upon. 
I do believe the Senator from Massachusetts wants to be heard on this. 
I want a word after his comments.
  Mr. KERRY. I suggest the Senator from Alaska go first, since he wants 
to frame the change, and I will be happy to respond.
  Mr. STEVENS. The Senator is very gracious. I have become increasingly 
concerned about the fines that EPA has been assessing against military 
reservations or elements of the Department of Defense, and had 
requested this provision in the bill to curtail that activity. In fact, 
it would have originally applied to similar fines from State and local 
agencies also.
  We have now agreed on a version of this section 342 that will limit 
the fines that can be assessed against military entities by the EPA to 
$1.5 million unless the amount in excess of that is approved by 
Congress. It will be a provision, if accepted, which will be in effect 
for 3 years. My feeling is that there are many things that go into the 
operation of the Department of Defense that are subject to review by 
EPA, and it is my opinion that they have been excessive in terms of 
applying fines against the military departments. I do believe it 
results in an alteration of the lands we have for particular 
installations and it reduces the amount of money available to operate 
those installations when they face these fines.
  This amendment does not prohibit the fines. It only says they cannot 
assess any and have them paid to the EPA in excess of $1.5 million 
unless that fine is approved by an act of Congress.
  I thank the Senator for working this out.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank my good friend from Alaska for his 
efforts to try to reach an accommodation. I listened carefully to the 
arguments of the Senator from Alaska who made it clear that he had a 
very strong belief that certain facilities in the State of Alaska had 
been treated in a way that he believed very deeply was inappropriate 
and resulted in fines that were excessive and, in his judgment, wrought 
with some bureaucratic issues that he had no recourse to resolve.

[[Page 13917]]

  The initial section in the bill reported by the committee would 
regrettably have prohibited the EPA entirely from being able to 
enforce. A number of Members felt very strongly that was an 
overreaction in how we cure the problem that the Senator from Alaska 
was bringing to our attention without destroying the ability of the EPA 
to be able to enforce across the country.
  So we reached an agreement where 98 percent of all those enforcement 
actions in the country which are under $1.5 million, the EPA will 
continue to be able to enforce as it currently does. It is appropriate 
for this 3-year period only to review what the impact may be of some 
larger level over that period of time.
  To have proceeded down the road we were going to proceed, in my and 
other people's judgment, would have created a terrible double standard. 
Under current law, a DOD facility that violates the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act or the Safe Drinking Water Act or the 
Toxic Substances Control Act or the Clean Air Act is subject to the 
same kinds of penalties as a private facility. By waiving sovereign 
immunity and subjecting Federal facilities to fines, we created the 
financial hammer to be able to force a sometimes reluctant Government 
and a Government bureaucracy to comply.
  Congress recognized this principle in 1992 when we passed the law. 
The bill was sponsored by majority leader Mitchell. He said at the time 
that a waiver of sovereign immunity would move us from the disorder of 
Federal noncompliance to a forum in which all entities were subject to 
the same law and to full enforcement action. I am pleased to say it 
passed the Senate by a vote of 94-3, and it passed the House by a vote 
of 403-3. It was signed into law by President Bush, who at the time 
said it would bring all Federal facilities into compliance with 
applicable Federal and State hazardous waste laws.
  I think that very much is our purpose today--to protect our capacity 
to be able to secure that kind of enforcement. I thank the Senator from 
Alaska for his very reasonable approach to this. I think we have been 
able to resolve the most egregious situations about which he has 
expressed appropriate concern, but at the same time we have been able 
to preserve the principle of Federal compliance and the principle of 
all people being treated equally.
  I thank the Chair and I thank the distinguished Senator from West 
Virginia for his courtesy in allowing us to deal with this issue.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia 
for his courtesy and the Senator from Massachusetts. I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment I have at the desk be accepted in lieu of 
the amendment offered by the Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 3815.

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Section 342 is amended by striking the provisions therein 
     and inserting:

     SEC. 342. PAYMENT OF FINES AND PENALTIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
                   COMPLIANCE VIOLATIONS.

       (a) Payment of Fines and Penalties.--(1) Chapter 160 of 
     title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:

     ``Sec. 2710. Environmental compliance: payment of fines and 
       penalties for violations

       ``(a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense or the 
     Secretary of a military department may not pay a fine or 
     penalty for an environmental compliance violation that is 
     imposed by a Federal agency against the Department of Defense 
     or such military department, as the case may be, unless the 
     payment of the fine or penalty is specifically authorized by 
     law, if the amount of the fine or penalty (including any 
     supplemental environmental projects carried out as part of 
     such penalty) is $1,500,000 or more.
       ``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term 
     `environmental compliance', in the case of on-going 
     operations, functions, or activities at a Department of 
     Defense facility, means the activities necessary to ensure 
     that such operations, functions, or activities meet 
     requirements under applicable environmental law.
       ``(B) The term does not include operations, functions, or 
     activities relating to environmental restoration under this 
     chapter that are conducted using funds in an environmental 
     restoration account under section 2703(a) of this title.
       ``(2) The term `violation', in the case of environmental 
     compliance, means an act or omission resulting in the failure 
     to ensure the compliance.
       ``(c) Expiration of Prohibition.--This section does not 
     apply to any part of a violation described in subsection (a) 
     that occurs on or after the date that is three years after 
     the date of the enactment of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``2710. Environmental compliance: payment of fines and penalties for 
              violations.''.
       (b) Applicability.--(1) Section 2710 of title 10, United 
     States Code (as added by subsection (a)), shall take effect 
     on the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2) Subsection (a)(1) of that section, as so added, shall 
     not apply with respect to any supplemental environmental 
     projects referred to in that subsection that were agreed to 
     before the date of the enactment of this Act.

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, regarding the Fort Wainwright central 
heat and powerplant, on March 5, 1999, the EPA Region 10 issued a 
notice of violation against the U.S. Army Alaska claiming they had 
violated the Clean Air Act with their central heat and powerplant.
  After several meetings between regulators and Army officials, the EPA 
sent them a settlement offer proposing that the Army pay a $16 million 
penalty to resolve the alleged clean air violations.
  In the offer, the EPA advised the Army that it would file a formal 
complaint if the Army failed to make a good-faith counteroffer within 
one month. The EPA also indicated that the size of fine sought will 
likely increase if a complaint was filed.
  This $16 million penalty is the largest single fine ever sought from 
the Department of the Army or against any installation within the 
Department of Defense. It also exceeds the combined total of all other 
fines previously sought from the Army.
  While U.S. Army Alaska had been aware for some time that the 50-year 
old central heat and powerplant required numerous upgrades, significant 
progress had been made toward bringing the plant into compliance.
  The Army also had been working closely with the Alaska Department of 
Environmental Conservation--which had been delegated Clean Air Act 
enforcement authority from the EPA--regarding the timetable for 
compliance.
  That same year, in fiscal year 1999, the Army sought and received 
authorization and appropriations from the Congress to build a $16 
million baghouse to control emissions from the plant.
  In addition, an additional $22 million had been budgeted for fiscal 
year 2000 for plant upgrades.
  The Army and the Department of Defense were surprised by the basis 
for the proposed penalty.
  In EPA's settlement letter, EPA stated that it was seeking to recover 
the ``economic benefit'' the Army received by not constructing the 
baghouse sooner.
  Over $15.8 million of the proposed fine, roughly 98 percent, is 
directly tied to the ``saved'' cost that U.S. Army Alaska purportedly 
enjoyed.
  This is also the first time the EPA proposed a fine whose economic 
benefit components dwarf the assessed penalty based on the seriousness 
of the alleged violations.
  Regarding the EPA visit to Shemya Air Force Base, the Air Force had a 
50-year problem of waste and drum accumulation at Shemya Island--
complicated by the large quantity generator status at Shemya AFB. This 
status required processing of accumulated hazardous wastes from the 
island within 90 days of generation. To meet the 90-day requirement, 
airlift had to be

[[Page 13918]]

used as the primary method of disposal of the accumulated hazardous 
wastes. Also, the airlift crews had to have special qualifications to 
handle and process hazardous wastes.
  From 1989 through 1991, 13,781 gallons of hazardous waste were 
shipped off Shemya Island. Following the 1991 Gulf War, airlift outside 
of the Middle East was impossible to get.
  Complicating matters, Elmendorf AFB in Alaska could not handle the 
amounts of hazardous waste being returned from remote Alaskan defense 
sites. Movement of hazardous waste from remote sites came to a 
standstill due to strained airlift requirements and limited hazardous 
waste storage and processing capabilities.
  In January of 1993, the Air Force started airlifting and removing 100 
waste drums every week vice 100 per month.
  Two months later, in March, the EPA gave the Air Force a 10-day 
notice of inspection. During the inspection, the Air Force had 660 
barrels on the Shemya airfield processed awaiting air transportation.
  During the out-briefing with senior Air Force personnel, the 
inspectors commented that the Air Force was making good progress in 
reducing the backlog of waste drums.
  A long period of time ensued between the inspection and the publicly 
announced result and proposed fine by EPA.
  EPA assessed the Air Force a fine of $483,000--this was the largest 
environmental noncompliance fine levied against the Air Force at that 
point in time.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, tonight, Senator Stevens offered an 
amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2001 to amend Section 342. The amendment reflects a compromise reached 
between Senator Stevens, Baucus, Lautenberg and myself. I want to thank 
Senator Stevens for working with us to address grave concerns we had 
with Section 342 of the bill.
  Mr. President, I would like to make a few comments about Section 342 
and discuss why I had such great concerns over the impact it would have 
had on environmental compliance. Section 342, as it was passed out of 
the Armed Services Committee, would have weakened a fundamental 
environmental principle that protects the environment and public health 
in communities across the nation. It is the principle that national 
environmental laws should apply to the federal government in the same 
manner as they apply to state and local governments and to private 
facilities, including companies, universities, hospitals, and nonprofit 
entities.
  Section 342 would have created a double standard by subjecting 
corporations, state and local facilities to one legal standard and 
Department of Defense facilities to a second, weaker standard. More 
importantly, it had the great potential to undermine compliance with 
national environmental and public health protections at military 
facilities across the nation--putting the environment and citizens at 
risk.
  Specifically, the provision amended existing law to require 
Congressional authorization before the DOD pays environmental and 
public health penalties assessed by state and federal authorities in 
excess of $1.5 million or based on ``economic benefit'' or ``size-of-
business'' criteria. As a result, it provided DOD a congressional 
reprieve not provided to any other entity.
  It created a double standard. Under current law, a DOD facility that 
violates the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, or the Clean Air Act is 
subject to the same kind of penalties as a private facility. By waiving 
sovereign immunity--and subjecting federal facilities to fines--we 
create the financial hammer that forces sometimes reluctant government 
bureaucracies to comply. And we apply the law equally to all.
  Congress recognized this principle in 1992 with the enactment of the 
Federal Facilities Compliance Act, which waived sovereign immunity 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The bill was 
sponsored by Majority Leader George Mitchell, who said in floor debate 
that, ``A waiver of sovereign immunity moves us from the disorder of 
Federal noncompliance to a forum in which all entities are subject to 
the same law and to full enforcement action.'' He added that: ``The 
principle [of waving sovereign immunity] is important because, without 
it, there is only voluntary compliance. History demonstrates that 
voluntary compliance does not work.''
  The Federal Facilities Compliance Act had 33 cosponsors in the 
Senate--myself included. It was a bipartisan effort that passed the 
Senate with a vote of 94-3 and the House by a vote of 403-3. It was 
signed into law by President George Bush, who said that, ``The 
objective of the bill is to bring all Federal facilities into 
compliance with applicable Federal and State hazardous waste laws, to 
waive Federal Sovereign immunity under those laws, and to allow the 
imposition of fines and penalties.'' He added, ``Four years ago I 
promised the American people that I would make the federal government 
live up to the same environmental standards that apply to private 
citizens. By signing this bill, we take another step toward fulfillment 
of that promise.''
  It was an important step for the states coping with federal agencies 
that were immune to enforcement and that refused to comply. The 
California Secretary of Environmental Protection, James M. Strock, said 
that in passing the Act, Congress took ``an important step in restoring 
the link between environmental responsibility and remediation of 
environmental damage at federal facilities.'' He continued, ``The Act 
provides an essential tool to states and localities which seek 
compliance with hazardous waste laws.''
  The National Association of Attorneys General applauded the passage 
of the Act. Their statement read that, ``The [legislation] has been 
among the Association's highest priorities on Capitol Hill for the past 
five years. . . . [The] Attorneys General have repeatedly called upon 
Congress to clarify the waiver of federal sovereign immunity, which has 
thus far prevented the states from ensuring compliance at contaminated 
facilities through assessment of fines and penalties.''
  I feel that Section 342 would have rolled back the progress we've 
made with the Federal Facilities Compliance Act and other laws. It 
would have been a mistake. We should allow our law enforcement agencies 
to do their job. Section 342 of the DOD bill was opposed by the 
National Governors' Association, the National Association of Attorneys 
General, and the National Conference of State Legislatures. In a joint 
letter they write that, ``States report that the federal government is 
the nation's largest polluter and military installations are a major 
contributor to that pollution. Section 342 is a step backward from the 
progress we have made in changing the attitude of military 
installations toward compliance with the nation's environmental laws. 
We urge you to support efforts to strike the provisions.'' This letter 
is signed by Governor Kenny Guinn of Nevada, Attorney General Christine 
Gregoire of Washington, and Senator Beverly Gard of Indiana.
  Section 342 was also opposed by the Environmental Council of the 
States. It writes that, ``The state environmental commissioners, along 
with governors, state legislators, attorneys general and other 
officials of state government have insisted that the federal government 
live by exactly the same standards and requirements that it imposes on 
all other parties, and we all oppose this provision in S. 2549. 
Exempting military installations from one of the basic tools of 
environmental enforcement is bad policy, and would seriously erode our 
capacity to ensure our citizens the protection of federal and state 
laws.'' The letter is signed by R. Lewis Shaw, Deputy Commissioner, 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control and 
President of the Council.
  Mr. President, even Governor George W. Bush of Texas recognizes the 
important principle of treating federal facilities as we treat state 
and local governments and private facilities. On Governor Bush's 
website--georgebush.com


[[Page 13919]]

--the Governor has posted his environmental platform. The sixth plank 
in that platform reads as follows: ``Direct active federal facilities 
to comply with the environmental protection laws and hold them 
accountable.'' It continues, ``Governor Bush will expect the federal 
government to lead by example. He believes it is time to end the double 
standard that has federal government acting as enforcer of the nation's 
environmental laws, while at the same time causing pollution that 
violates those laws.''
  Mr. President, last year, a provision similar to Section 342 was 
incorporated into the FY 2000 DOD appropriations bill. The 
Congressional Budget Office evaluated that provision and concluded 
that, ``Based on information from DOD and on conversations with 
representatives of state governments, CBO believes that requiring DOD 
to seek specific authorization from the Congress before paying each 
fine . . . will likely delay the payment of some fines. To the extent 
the Congress fails to authorize fines in the future, it is possible 
that the section would make it more difficult for states and local 
governments to negotiate for compliance with environmental laws.'' The 
letter is signed by Dan. L. Crippen, Director of the CBO.
  Plain and simple, if we had passed Section 342 we would have rolled 
back environmental and public health protections for thousands of 
Americans who live near DOD facilities and for generations who will 
face the costs of cleanup. Our state attorneys--the people in the field 
enforcing our laws--our governors and our state environmental 
commissioners--and even the likely Republican nominee for President are 
telling us it is a mistake to do so.
  Mr. President, the principle is not just rhetoric--it is supported by 
the record. In 1993, compliance by federal facilities with the 
Resources Conservation and Restoration Act was 55.4 percent. Almost 
half of all federal facilities operated out of compliance. Why? Because 
the law was unclear as to whether or not environmental fines could be 
assessed against federal facilities. But with the passage of the 
Federal Facilities Compliance Act in 1992--when DOD and other federal 
facilities faced fines and penalties for the first time--compliance 
started to climb. By 1998, compliance at federal facilities had reached 
88.2 percent. And the opposite has also proven true. Federal compliance 
under the Clean Water Act, which does not have a clear waiver, has 
dropped at federal facilities. In 1993, more than 94 percent of federal 
facilities were in compliance, and by 1998 that number had dropped to 
just 61.5 percent. According to enforcement officials at EPA and state 
government, that decline coincided with court decisions that 
interpreted the Clean Water Act as having only a limited waiver of 
sovereign immunity. To reverse that trend, I understand that Senator 
Coverdell has introduced legislation to waive sovereign immunity for 
federal facilities. That Republican-led initiative now has now been 
cosponsored by Senators Breaux, Chafee, DeWine, Grams, and Voinovich.
  Some argued that last year's provision wouldn't impact enforcement 
because, like Section 342, Congress can authorize the fine. But the 
numbers don't bear out that prediction. Why? Because investigators and 
attorneys knew full well that DOD was about to get a ``Get Out Of Jail 
Free Card'' from Congress. Even the best legal work can be overturned 
if Congress simply decides not to act on an authorization. As a result, 
enforcement actions have dropped off. As with any law, without strong 
enforcement, compliance will fall.
  The principle is simple, Mr. President. If you want people, 
companies, institutions, and the government to comply with the law you 
must be tough on crime--including environmental crime. The way to 
ensure that all facilities comply with the law is to make sure that 
pollution does not pay. If the threat of a large fine is on the 
horizon--if the laws have teeth--everyone will be far more inclined to 
comply.
  Mr. President, I want to focus some on the issue of ``economic 
benefit'' and ``size-of-business'' criteria and what it means to limit 
the federal and state authority to impose a fine based on those 
criteria. There seems to be some confusion as to why a federal or state 
authority would seek a penalty based on economic benefits at a DOD 
facility. The Report language accompanying Section 342 notes that the 
DOD, in the Committee's view, has no economic competitors in regard to 
the Clean Air Act. Therefore, the principle of economic benefit or 
size-of-business should not apply. Mr. President, I believe that is an 
incorrect reading of the Clean Air Act and other relevant statutes.
  Foremost, an economic benefit provision prevents a facility, whether 
it's private or federal, from benefitting financially from 
noncompliance. Federal and state authorities need the power to make 
noncompliance economically unviable. We cannot have a system that 
rewards people for breaking the law. The Report language accompanying 
Section 342 argues that economic benefit is tied to ``competition'' 
among businesses and intended to prevent economic advantage through 
noncompliance. That is a narrow, misreading of the Clean Air Act. For 
example, all across the country, electric utilities--including 
municipal facilities--operate without ``competitors'' as the report 
defines the term. Utilities are guaranteed a market in return for 
providing a set amount of power. This is changing with competition, but 
many did and some still do operate as sanctioned monopolies. But they 
are not exempt from fines and penalties in the Clean Air Act. Further, 
EPA and the states assess ``economic benefit'' fines against hospitals, 
universities, and local and state governments. For example, in a Clean 
Water Act challenge, the United States versus City of San Diego in 
1991, a federal court found that the ``plaintiffs' analysis of economic 
benefit is valid as to municipalities. While it is difficult to 
quantify precisely the savings realized by the City as a result of its 
intransigence, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the city has saved in excess of $300 million over 
approximately the last thirty years by failing to invest in capital 
improvements.'' The case shows that economic benefits apply to 
nonbusiness entities--the City of San Diego and that economic benefit 
is based on ``savings'' from noncompliance.
  Mr. President, ``economic benefit'' and ``size-of-business'' criteria 
are as applicable to DOD as they are to private companies, non-profits, 
states, and other federal agencies. We should not rollback protections 
and create a situation in which a manager within the DOD could 
rationalize noncompliance because it saves money--we must demand 
compliance from federal facilities.
  Further, Mr. President, the use of these criteria to enforce the law 
has been endorsed by the states. The Attorneys Generals, the Governors 
and the Conference of Legislatures specifically addressed this issue in 
their letter opposing Section 342. They write that, ``The economic 
benefit analysis, in particular, is important to states because it 
prevents DOD from considering a fine merely as a cost of doing business 
. . .'' The Environmental Council of the States, which represents our 
state environmental commissioners, writes, ``Section 342 would have 
severely restricted the ability of states to ensure that facilities do 
not realize financial gain through noncompliance. Typically, states 
include in their penalties an amount that offsets these financial 
benefits. In this way, they significantly reduce economic incentives to 
avoid environmental and public health requirements.'' A cursory review 
of state policy conducted by the Governors, Attorneys General and the 
State Commissioners at my request, found that most states use economic 
benefits, including Texas, Montana, South Carolina, Minnesota, 
Colorado, Indiana, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Alaska, Connecticut, 
and California.
  The Armed Services Committee Report with S. 2549 states that ``[i]t 
is the committee's view that the application of the economic benefit or 
size of business penalty assessment criteria to the

[[Page 13920]]

DOD is inconsistent with the statutory language and the legislative 
history under the [Clean Air Act.]'' Again, I disagree and suggest that 
is narrow and incorrect reading of the Act. I believe a plain reading 
of the Clean Air Act makes it clear that all fines and sanctions apply 
to DOD. Section 118(a) of the Act reads as follows: ``Each department, 
agency, and instrumentality of executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of the Federal Government . . . shall be subject to, and 
comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, 
administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the 
control and abatement of air pollution in the same manner, and to the 
same extent as any nongovernmental entity. The preceding sentence shall 
apply (A) to any requirement whether substantive or procedural 
(including any record keeping or reporting requirement, any requirement 
respecting permits and any other requirement whatsoever), (B) to any 
requirement to pay a fee or charge imposed by any State or local agency 
to defray the costs of its air pollution regulatory program, (C) to the 
exercise of any Federal, State, or local administrative authority, and 
(D) to any process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or 
local courts, or in any other manner.'' In addition, the managers 
report for the 1990 amendments regarding Section 118(a) reads that, 
``the new language is intended to refute the argument [DOD is not 
subject to fee requirements] and to affirm the obligation of federal 
agencies to comply with all requirements, including such fees or 
charges.'' I add that Section 118(b) of the Clean Air Act is titled 
``Exemptions'' and it specifically delineates under what circumstances 
the DOD can be exempted from enforcement action--and it makes no 
reference to the size of a fine or the criteria set forth in the 
penalty section. The Clean Air Act is very clear on this point.
  Mr. President, Section 342 reached beyond the Clean Air Act. It also 
applies to the Resources Conservation and Restoration Act, Toxic 
Substances Control Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act. I believe that 
a plain reading of RCRA and the Federal Facilities Compliance Act makes 
clear that DOD should be treated the same as private facilities. There 
is no ambiguity in the law or the legislative history. In the floor 
debate Senator Mitchell said, ``A waiver of sovereign immunity moves us 
from the disorder of Federal noncompliance to a forum in which all 
entities are subject to the same law and to full enforcement action.'' 
At the bill signing Bush said, ``The objective of the bill is to bring 
all Federal facilities into compliance with applicable Federal and 
State hazardous waste laws, to waive Federal Sovereign immunity under 
those laws, and to allow the imposition of fines and penalties.'' 
Section 102 of RCRA reads, ``The Federal, State, interstate, and local 
substantive and procedural requirements referred to in this subsection 
include, but are not limited to, all administrative orders and all 
civil and administrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether 
such penalties or fines are punitive or coercive in nature or are 
imposed for isolated, intermittent, or continuing violations.'' In 
regard to EPA actions against DOD, the Act reads that, ``The 
Administrator may commence an administrative enforcement action against 
any department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, 
legislative, or judicial branch of the Federal Government pursuant to 
the enforcement authorities contained in this Act. The Administrator 
shall initiate an administrative enforcement action against such a 
department, agency, or instrumentality in the same manner and under the 
same circumstances as an action would be initiated against another 
person.'' Mr. President, I believe the law is clear. The Report 
language with S. 2549 offers us an inaccurate reading of the Clean Air 
Act and fails to address other environmental law statutes it impacts.
  Some have suggested that Section 342 would have almost no impact on 
enforcement because few cases exceed $1.5 million. As a result, we will 
rarely--if ever--need a congressional authorization to impose a fine. 
That's simply wrong. Section 342 reads that congressional authorization 
is needed if the fine exceeds $1.5 million or if it is based on 
``economic benefit'' or ``size of business'' criteria. In theory, Mr. 
President, all fines originating with the Environmental Protection 
Agency would have been caught by Section 342, regardless of their size. 
It is EPA's policy and that of many states that all fines should 
incorporate the economic benefit gained from noncompliance. It is 
difficult to know how many fines will need to pass through the new 
process created by Section 342 and how many will not be authorized or 
authorized at a lower amount. But, we do know that it could be a fine 
of any size, no matter how small.
  Moreover, the threat of a large fine will be gone if Section 342 
passed. This alone will deter compliance. The Congressional Budget 
Office specifically noted in its letter from last year that, ``the 
States, local governments, and federal agencies often use the threat of 
theses fines as part of the negotiation with facilities to achieve 
compliance with environmental laws.'' The Attorneys General--the people 
in the field doing the work--write of Section 342 that, ``The threat of 
a significant fine or penalty is one of the more effective ways state 
officials have for encouraging violators, including military 
installations, to take responsibility for the environmental 
consequences of their operations.'' Any prosecutor, whether they are 
involved in a criminal action, or civil environmental compliance, will 
tell you that the threat of long jail term or a large fine is critical 
to enforcing the law. Finally and most importantly, Mr. President, by 
giving the largest violators, those fined over $1.5 million, a chance 
for congressional reprieve, Section 342 created a perverse system where 
only the most egregious violators get a special legal loophole 
unavailable to less egregious violators. It is a bad precedent.
  Mr. President, the compromise we have reached does not resolve all of 
my concerns, but it addresses many of them. Under the agreement reached 
tonight, offered by Senator Stevens and passed, all fines of $1.5 
million or more, assessed against DOD by a federal agency for 
environmental noncompliance, over the next three years, must be 
approved by Congress. State enforcement actions are not impacted by 
this agreement and our state Attorneys General can continue to enforce 
the law as they now do. The concepts of economic benefits and size of 
business remain in place in our environmental enforcement at the state 
and federal level. Only fines equal to or in excess of $1.5 million 
will require a congressional authorization and that result in only a 
small percentage of fines needing authorization. And it expires in 
three years. I do have some concerns with the agreement. By requiring a 
congressional authorization on fines of $1.5 million or more, we 
provide the most egregious violators a congressional reprieve and, 
therefore, it will limit our ability to deter noncompliance because the 
threat of a large fine will be reduced. However, I want to note and 
recognize the concerns Senator Stevens has raised. Enforcement power, 
whether it sits with the EPA or the states, can be abused. The 
agreement expires in three years. In that time, Congress will have a 
close look at EPA's actions in assessing large fines.
  Again, I want to thank Senators Stevens, Baucus and Lautenberg.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of Senator 
Kerry's effort to make sure the Federal government plays by the same 
environmental rules that the private sector lives by. The Defense 
Department, in carrying out its military mission operates a vast, 
sprawling industrial complex with a potentially huge impact on the 
environment.
  I think I'm only stating the obvious when I say it's absolutely 
crucial to make sure that the Defense Department and all federal 
agencies are held to the same environmental standards that apply to the 
private sector.
  Under most current environmental laws, that's already the case. 
Federal facilities, including military installations, are subject to 
civil penalties for

[[Page 13921]]

violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, certain 
provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Safe Drinking Water 
Act, and the Clean Air Act. Congress specifically recognized the 
importance of these penalties when it passed the Federal Facility 
Compliance Act of 1992.
  During the past several months I've received letters on this issue 
from environmental and state organizations, as well as the Statement of 
the Administration's strong opposition to this provision. I ask 
unanimous consent that copies of these letters be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                     June 6, 2000.
       Dear Senator: On behalf of millions of our members 
     nationwide, we urge you to support the Kerry amendment to 
     strip an extremely damaging legislative provision included in 
     the National Defense Authorization bill for fiscal year 2001 
     (sec. 342 of S. 2549). This provision would make a permanent 
     change in the law that could delay and even block DOD from 
     having to pay civil penalties for environmental violations 
     occurring at DOD facilities. We strongly urge you to support 
     this effort to remove it from the authorization bill this 
     year.
       Section 342 of the authorization bill would require 
     specific congressional authorization for the payment of 
     environmental fines and penalties that exceed $1.5 million, 
     or those that are based on the application of economic 
     benefit or size-of-business criteria. This provision also 
     would block the use of funds to implement supplemental 
     environmental projects that may be required as part of, or in 
     lieu of, a proposed civil penalty. Section 342 would negate 
     the current law that requires that the DOD pay fines and 
     penalties assessed by state and federal regulatory agencies 
     for violations of environmental laws just like every other 
     federal agency or private party that violates the law. This 
     provision has far-reaching ramifications and yet has not had 
     the benefit of any public hearings to allow the Congress to 
     examine the full impacts of the action.
       This provision was added specifically in response to a 
     large environmental fine proposed by the U.S. Environmental 
     Protection Agency at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. At Fort 
     Wainwright, the Army operates the largest coal burning power 
     plant owned by the U.S. military. According to EPA documents, 
     violations at this facility appear to be more extensive than 
     any found to date in private coal-fired power plants. The 
     Fort Wainwright facility clearly should pay state and federal 
     penalties for at least 11 years of continual and serious 
     violations of clean air standards (which may have even given 
     rise to at least one criminal investigation by the Army). The 
     Kerry amendment would also require a General Accounting 
     Office report to Congress on the circumstances surrounding 
     the Fort Wainwright facility.
       Section 342 would undermine years of progress at federal, 
     state and local levels towards improved environmental 
     compliance by federal agencies. Congress has repeatedly 
     declared that both state and federal environmental regulators 
     should have the clear authority to enforce most environmental 
     laws at federal facilities, including Defense Department 
     installations. For example, in 1992 Congress enacted the 
     Federal Facilities Compliance Act, clarifying regulatory 
     agencies' authority to enforce laws governing the treatment, 
     storage, disposal, and cleanup of hazardous wastes. In 
     signing that law, President Bush noted that it represented a 
     step towards fulfilling his promise to the American people 
     that ``the Federal Government live up to the same 
     environmental standards that apply to private citizens.'' 
     Implementation of Section 342 could severely undermine this 
     trend towards better compliance and likely will result in 
     increased violations.
       This provision could create a perverse incentive for the 
     military to incur large fines so that it can seek respite 
     from Congress. Additionally, without the threat of economic 
     benefit fines, DOD would have less incentive to comply with 
     state and federal environmental laws and be more likely to 
     divert resources that should be spent on environmental 
     compliance to other military projects. Military facilities 
     will be above the law--eroding public confidence in 
     government. Dan L. Crippen, the Director of the Congressional 
     Budget Office (CBO), found that since 1994 the DOD has paid 
     over $14 million in fines--most of which have been paid to 
     state and local governments. The CBO also found that this 
     program ``will likely delay payment of some fines'' and could 
     ``make it more difficult for state and local governments to 
     negotiate for compliance with environmental laws.''
       This provisions impairs a valuable tool that states have 
     used to improve environmental protection and derails the 
     current trend toward federal facility accountability. 
     Creating a special exemption for DOD from penalties for 
     environmental violations sends the message that this federal 
     agency can ignore and discount the laws by which everyone 
     else must abide. Because of the serious ramifications for 
     federal accountability and protection of the environment and 
     public health, we strongly urge you to oppose Section 342 of 
     the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization bill and support 
     the Kerry amendment to strike it.
           Sincerely,
         Robert Dewey, Vice President of Government Relations and 
           External Affairs, Defenders of Wildlife; Courtney Cuff, 
           Legislative Director, Friends of the Earth; Faith 
           Weiss, Legislative Counsel, Natural Resources Defense 
           Council; James K. Wyerman, Executive Director, 20/20 
           Vision; Aimee R. Houghton, Associate Director, Center 
           for Public Environmental Oversight; Joan Mulhern, 
           Legislative Counsel, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund; 
           Betsy Loyless, Political Director, League of 
           Conservation Voters; Anna Aurilio, Staff Scientist, 
           U.S. Public Interest Research Group; Cindy Shogan, 
           Alaskan Wilderness League; Dan L. Astott, President, 
           AMAC: The AuSable Manistee Action Council; Craig 
           Williams, Director, Chemical Weapons Working Group, 
           Berea, KY; Peter Hille, Chairman, Kentucky 
           Environmental Foundation, Berea, KY; Theresa Freeman, 
           Executive Director, Military Toxics Project; Elizabeth 
           Crowe, Director, Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons, 
           Citizens Coalition, Berea, KY; Carol Jahnkow, Executive 
           Director, Peace Resource Center of San Diego; Marylia 
           Kelly, Executive Director, Tri-Valley CAREs 
           (Communities Against a Radioactive Environment), 
           Livermore, CA; Naomi Shultz, Steering Committee, Common 
           Ground, Berea, KY; DelMar Callaway, Community Co-Chair, 
           McClellan AFB RAB; Walter R. Stochel, Jr., Edison, NJ; 
           Richard Hugus, Otis Conversion Project, Falmouth, MA; 
           Peter Strauss, President, PM Strauss & Associates, San 
           Francisco, CA.
                                  ____



                    NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION

               NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL

               NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES

                                                     May 18, 2000.
     Hon. Ted Stevens,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
     Hon. Robert C. Byrd,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman and Senator Byrd: We, the undersigned, 
     are writing in opposition to a proposal we understand might 
     be offered for inclusion in the FY 2001 Defense 
     Appropriations bill and which would require Congressional 
     approval for payment of large environmental penalties issued 
     against the Department of Defense. This proposal would be 
     similar to the language in the FY 2001 defense authorization 
     bill. Section 342 of Subtitle E. This provision would, if 
     enacted, limit the waiver of sovereign immunity enacted by 
     Congress in the 1992 Federal Facilities Compliance Act and 
     the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments, among other laws 
     and continues an unfortunate policy created in last year's 
     Appropriations law.
       The language proposed would prohibit payment of large fines 
     or penalties for violations of environmental laws at military 
     installations from funds appropriated in the bill unless 
     authorized by Congress. Such a proposal has the unfortunate 
     effect of interjecting the legislature into what should be an 
     independent system of law enforcement operated by the states 
     and other environmental regulators. This approach to 
     environmental regulation undermines the ability of states to 
     use the threat of penalties as a means of forcing federal 
     facilities to take responsibility for the environmental 
     consequences of their operations.
       The fact that this language applies only to large penalties 
     is of little comfort. The federal government is the nation's 
     largest polluter and military installations are a major 
     contributor to that pollution. The threat of significant 
     penalties can only be an effective deterrent to environmental 
     violations where the penalty may be potentially proportional 
     to the cost of compliance. A requirement for Congressional 
     approval of penalties of a certain size unduly limits the 
     ability of states to use this threat to effectively regulate 
     the Department of Defense.
       Congress recognized the importance of penalties in 1992 
     when it enacted the Federal Facilities Compliance Act 
     clarifying the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Resource 
     Conservation and Recovery Act. With the aid of the Federal 
     Facilities Compliance Act and vigilance by states and other 
     environmental regulators, we are finally making progress 
     toward changing the attitude toward environmental compliance 
     at federal facilities. We urge you to oppose any proposal 
     that weakens the ability of states to continue to assess 
     fines and penalties in whatever levels are determined by the 
     states as necessary to ensure compliance.
           Sincerely,
     Christine Gregorie,
       Attorney General of Washington, President, NAAG.
     Ken Salazar,
       Attorney General of Colorado, Co-Chair,

[[Page 13922]]

     NAAG Environmental Committee.
     Governor Kenny C. Guinn,
       State of Nevada, NGA Chair, Committee on Natural Resources.
     Senator Beverly Gard,
       Indiana State Senate, Chair, NCSL Environment Committee.
                                  ____

         Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
           and Budget,
                                     Washington, DC, June 6, 2000.

                   Statement of Administration Policy


    S. 2549--National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001

       The Administration supports prompt congressional action on 
     the national defense authorization bill for FY 2001 and 
     appreciates the Armed Services Committee's support for many 
     of the President's national defense priorities. S. 2549, 
     however, raises serious budget, policy, and constitutional 
     concerns as outlined below in the SAP and in the attachment.


                        Environmental Provisions

       The Administration strongly opposes section 342, which 
     would require DOD to obtain specific authorization to comply 
     with environmental fines and penalties assessed against the 
     Department. The Administration is opposed to any limitation 
     on the ability of DOD to pay fines or penalties it is liable 
     for under law. This provision could erode public confidence 
     in the commitment of DOD to comply with environmental laws. 
     The Administration also believes that all Federal agencies 
     should be held fully accountable for environmental violations 
     and should be held to the same standards as the private 
     sector.

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, these letters are opposed to 
authorization or appropriation language that limits the importance of 
penalties in deterring environmental violations.
  In fact, the letter signed by twenty-one environmental groups states 
``Creating a special exemption for DoD from penalties for environmental 
violations sends the message that this federal agency can ignore and 
discount the laws by which everyone else must abide.''
  My final point is that every time the Senate Environmental and Public 
Works Committee has raised this topic in hearings, the Committee has 
leaned toward expanding the role of fines and penalties in enforcing 
environmental laws at federal facilities. They did that so federal, 
state, and local governments would have all the tools they need to make 
sure all federal facilities comply with health and environmental laws.
  Finally, as the Administration pointed out, ``all federal agencies 
should be held fully accountable for environmental violations and 
should be held to the same standards as the private sector.''
  That is precisely what the Kerry amendment would do and I urge my 
colleagues to support it.
  Mr. STEVENS. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  THE PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 3815) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. KERRY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
West Virginia is recognized.


                           amendment no. 3794

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the China trade measure which passed the 
House eliminates the annual congressional renewal of most-favored-
nation treatment of China, and gives China permanent normal trade 
relations with the United States. This legislation has not yet been 
scheduled for action on the Senate floor, yet there is already a 
concerted effort to defeat any amendments by Senators which might 
deviate from the provisions of the bill as passed by the House. The 
fear is that a different Senate version would require a conference 
committee, and another House vote, both of which may make it more 
uncertain that the legislation will be enacted this session.
  Given this situation, which is an obvious egregious deviation from 
the traditional role of the Senate in foreign affairs, those of us who 
believe that the House bill can be improved must find a way to pass 
separate legislation which still addresses matters of importance in the 
burgeoning U.S.-Chinese trade relationship. There is one particular 
area, in which I believe the House bill and the amendments passed to 
it, are silent, and cry out for some adequate treatment, and that is in 
the area of national security. The administration argued in getting 
enough votes for its China trade bill in the House, that it is in the 
national security interest of the United States to pass the bill. I do 
not believe that for one moment. That is quite an assertion given the 
brutal Communist dictatorship in China, which systematically violates 
the agreements it has signed with us, and which routinely pressures 
U.S. firms to hand over key technologies as the price for doing 
business in China. This is the same Chinese dictatorship which talks 
about financial war with the United States, and which periodically 
intimidates Taiwan with threats of invasion. This is the same Chinese 
dictatorship which hunts down dissenters, hunts down free expression, 
and religious organizations with a club.
  Despite this assertion, there is no mechanism to thoroughly and 
regularly assess the national security impacts on, and implications of, 
the developing trading relationship with China. The huge trade and 
dollar surpluses that are amassed by the Chinese Government and the 
tensions between the United States and China on trade and national 
security issues, as well as on human and labor rights, need informed 
and periodic review. There are those who argue that our annual debate 
over renewal of most-favored-nation treatment of China did not amount 
to much because we never failed to renew MFN. However, annual MFN 
review was of great importance to the Chinese Government, since it 
certainly provided a regular open window to expose questionable Chinese 
trading, human rights, military, and other policies to a wide audience.
  Such monitoring and regular reporting to Congress from a reliable 
source is particularly important in an era where massive and unbalanced 
trade flows are certain to continue, and where, because of China's 
membership in the WTO, U.S. bilateral leverage and congressional 
authority under the commerce clause have been severely reduced. I would 
contend that the U.S.-Chinese relationship is likely to be of enduring 
concern to this body. Surely, the national security implications of 
that relationship, the impacts of massive trade deficits which now 
approach some $70 billion a year, the voracious appetite of the Chinese 
Government for military technologies, and the pressures it brings on 
our Asian allies are important to us. The implications of systematic 
unfair trade practices by the Chinese Government, of dumping into our 
markets, of not enforcing and not complying with agreements they have 
signed with us, and of pressuring Western companies to hand over 
important technologies as a price for doing business in China and as a 
quid pro quo for being able to relocate and invest in China, should be 
of concern to the elected representatives of the American people.
  The chief Chinese imports from the United States are primarily 
sophisticated manufactured products, like aircraft, telecommunications 
equipment, and semiconductors. Many of these technologies have multiple 
uses, both civilian and military. China's development effort is heavily 
dependent on Western companies as sources of capital and technology. 
There are some who contend that the large surpluses, as well as the 
capital, and many technologies are being funneled to a concerted effort 
to fuel a military buildup which the Chinese could not otherwise 
muster. There are those who contend that we are unwittingly giving the 
Chinese the tools to intimidate Taiwan, our democratic friend, and our 
other Asian allies, such as Thailand, South Korea, Japan, and the 
Philippines.
  Chinese military officers have recently written about the need to 
practice financial war, cyber war, and other economic and 
technologically sophisticated means of affecting the security 
relationship with the United States. Given the technological prowess of 
the

[[Page 13923]]

United States in prosecuting the Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict, the 
Chinese have been reportedly alarmed regarding the obsolescence of 
their military machine and their military practices. The standing 
armies, upon which they have traditionally relied, cannot perform 
effectively against the new weaponry demonstrated by the United States 
in those conflicts. There are those in China who believe that their 
long-term interests lie in competition and possibly confrontation with 
the United States, and thus in order to compete they must rapidly 
acquire a range of technologies and expertise that is only available 
from Western firms. Are we unwittingly supplying those factions in 
China with the means to confront us? Certainly our own self-interest 
would dictate that we need to monitor these trends systematically and 
periodically and that is the purpose of the Byrd-Warner amendment.
  I think that it is only prudent that we provide for an annual 
systematic review and a report to the Congress on the full range of 
national security implications engendered by the increased trade and 
investment relationship with China. The House has a commission in its 
China trade bill, an executive-legislative commission to monitor a 
staggering range of human rights and democracy-building reforms in 
China. It has a full plate of responsibilities. While this sort of 
monitoring is certainly important, no less important should be the 
existence of a congressional commission to focus on the national 
security relationship between our two nations. The President has argued 
that it is in our national security interest to further open and widen 
our trading relations with China. That proposition should be regularly 
tested by an independent commission, which has the narrow mandate of 
monitoring our growing bilateral relationship with an eye toward United 
States security concerns.
  The Congress last year created a 12-person commission, equally 
divided between Republicans and Democrats, to examine our growing 
negative trade balance. The Trade Deficit Review Commission will likely 
finish its work in a few months, with a report to the Congress and the 
President, on the implications of our global deficits, recommending new 
practices, institutions and policies. It has already conducted hearings 
and studies on the Chinese relationship. Mr. Warner and I suggest that 
this same commission is an appropriate tool, extended and refocused, to 
conduct an annual Chinese assessment and review. Such a refocused 
commission would serve as a good companion to the one proposed by the 
House bill on human rights and democratic reforms in China. Its 
existence and assessments would certainly help to repair the dangerous 
erosion of congressional involvement in, and leverage over, foreign 
commerce envisioned as essential to our national well being by the 
framers. It would help to replace congressional monitoring of China 
resulting from her accession to the World Trade Organization, in an 
area critical to the deeply rooted constitutional responsibilities of 
this body.
  That is the purpose of the amendment which Senator Warner and I and 
other Senators have offered. In summary, the commission would review 
the national security implications of our trade and investment 
relations with China, including the following elements:
  One, the portion of trade in goods and services dedicated by the 
Chinese Government to military systems;
  Two, an analysis of the statements and writings of Chinese officials 
bearing on the intentions of the Chinese Government regarding military 
competition with and leverage over the United States and its Asian 
allies;
  Three, the military actions taken by the Chinese Government over the 
preceding years bearing on the national security of the United States 
and its Asian allies;
  Four, the acquisition by the Chinese Government of advanced military 
technologies and systems through U.S. trade and Chinese procurement 
policies;
  Five, the use of financial transactions, capital flows, and currency 
manipulations to affect the national security of the United States;
  Six, actions taken by the Chinese Government in the context of the 
WTO which are adverse to U.S. national security interests;
  Seven, an overall assessment of the state of any security challenges 
to the U.S. by the Chinese Government and whether the trend from 
previous years is increasing or declining; and finally, the commission 
would also provide recommendations for action, including any use of the 
national defense waiver provision that already exists in the GATT 
Treaty, and applies to the WTO. This article, article 21 of the GATT, 
has never been used by any nation state, but remains available to be 
triggered if the Congress finds some aspect of our growing relationship 
with China on the trade account which adversely affects our national 
security and needs to be stopped or somehow moderated.
  In addition to these matters, there is also growing concern over the 
activities of China in transferring missile technologies to other 
nations, affecting the security of the United States and, also, our 
Asian allies. The proliferation of such technologies to Pakistan is the 
subject of ongoing discussions between the United States and the 
Government of China. Unfortunately, the Chinese have given no sign that 
they intend to halt their highly dangerous trade in missile 
technologies and components.
  Many Senators have expressed their concern over this practice, 
including the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Thompson, and 
the distinguished Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Torricelli. It is my 
intention, and my expectation, and it is the intention of my very close 
and dear colleague, Senator Warner--it is our intention and expectation 
that the U.S.-China Security Review Commission will investigate, report 
and make recommendations on Chinese trade in missile components, which 
affects our long-term security and that of our Asian allies. In this 
amendment by Mr. Warner and myself, both paragraphs (E), dealing with 
military actions taken by the Chinese Government, and (J), requiring an 
overall assessment of the state of the security challenges presented by 
China to the United States provide ample mandate to the commission to 
conduct such investigations on a regular basis.
  I will be happy to yield the floor to my colleague, Mr. Warner.
  I cannot yield the floor to another Senator. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am, indeed, very honored to be a 
principal cosponsor with my friend and fellow member of the Armed 
Services Committee on this piece of legislation. This is a very 
important step. China should not perceive this as a threat. China 
should not perceive this in any other way than a positive step by the 
Congress to establish or keep in place this ongoing commission for the 
purpose of advising the Congress from time to time.
  We do not have as individual Members--of course, our committees 
perform oversight, but we do not have an opportunity, on a daily or 
weekly basis, to monitor the various criteria as set forth in the Byrd-
Warner legislation. This commission will, again, be established by the 
Congress with six Members appointed by the Senate and six Members 
appointed by the House in a bipartisan manner, and it will be the 
watchdog to inform us from time to time.
  China in this millennium will compete with the United States, the 
world's only superpower, on a broad range of fronts--not just foreign 
affairs, not just national security, not just trade and economics, but 
in areas which we cannot even envision tonight, as this new millennium 
unfolds and this cyberspace in which we are all involved engulfs us day 
after day. The distinguished Senator from West Virginia pointed out 
some representations by certain individuals in China about their desire 
to get more involved in cyberspace for national security reasons. That 
is one of the important functions of this commission.
  I am very pleased to join with him because China will be the 
competitor.

[[Page 13924]]

The Senate and the House--the Congress collectively--needs its own 
resource, and I underline that. I commend my distinguished colleague 
and friend from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. BYRD. Otherwise, the Congress is at the mercy of an 
administration--the administration--for information.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
  Mr. BYRD. In this case, this commission will report to the Congress, 
so we do not have to depend upon information from the Executive; we 
have our own.
  Mr. WARNER. Of course, Mr. President, from time to time, committees 
of this body--indeed, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on Armed Services, the Governmental Affairs Committee--take active 
roles, but they do not do it every single day as this commission will 
monitor, together with the chairman and members and the staff.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to the amendment 
offered by my distinguished colleague from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd. I 
do so because the commission created by this legislation is, in my 
view, flawed. That is why I tried to work with my good friend from West 
Virginia to address the concerns that I am raising. Unfortunately, we 
were unable to come to an agreement. For the following reasons, I must 
oppose this amendment and I urge my colleagues to do the same.
  First, let me say that if my colleague's intent is to establish a 
commission to provide sound advice to Congress regarding our broader 
relationship with China and its effect on our national security, then 
there are ways to create a meaningful mechanism for doing just that. 
One, for example, would have been to build the Senator's concerns into 
the quadrennial defense review required under previous versions of the 
National Defense Authorization Act. By giving the responsibility to a 
standing body like the National Defense Panel that already conducts the 
quadrennial defense review, we would have saved the taxpayers' money, 
while getting the benefit of the unchallenged expertise of many of the 
foremost authorities on our national security and on military matters. 
And, we would have put the report in Congress' hands by next spring.
  Instead, my colleague has adopted an approach I have not seen in my 
years in the Senate. He wants to take the commissioners, staff and 
clerical personnel of a commission constructed for very different 
purposes and employ it to look at our security relationship with China. 
That commission--the Trade Deficit Review Commission--is staffed with 
commissioners and staff appointed due to their expertise in economic 
policy. Frankly, this is simply the wrong group to undertake a serious 
review of the impact on our national security of our relationship with 
China. And, there is absolutely no benefit in terms of accelerating the 
progress toward a final report when compared to giving the 
responsibility to the National Defense Panel.
  I must say that I do not understand my friend's interest in 
perpetuating the life of the Trade Deficit Review Commission for this 
task. The Trade Deficit Review Commission is already overdue in 
providing us its report on the trade deficit. My expectation when we 
created that commission was that we would have had its work product by 
now. Instead, my colleague recently supported a three-month extension 
so the Trade Deficit Review Commission could complete its now amply-
delayed report. In my view, we should let the Trade Deficit Commission 
complete its existing work, rather than burdening it with new 
responsibilities, even if only administrative in nature, before it has 
completed its primary task.
  Second, I am concerned that the way the issues as stated in my 
friend's bill could be read to imply that the United States already 
considers China an enemy and a threat to our national security. China 
clearly is an emerging force in the international arena. In many ways, 
China's emergence could be beneficial to the United States. There are, 
nonetheless, concerns, which I share, regarding the PRC's behavior on 
security-related matters. Those issues bear careful scrutiny.
  Having said that, it should also be clear that the shape and 
direction of the relationship between our countries is evolving and 
remains to be shaped. What that suggests is the need for a thoughtful, 
comprehensive and, most importantly, balanced review of the security 
implications of our bilateral relationship with China. That is, in 
fact, what I suggested to my colleague we should do.
  Third, I offered my friend my thoughts on the technical changes 
needed to make the commission's job clear. I worry, however, that, as 
it stands now, the commission's duties will be extremely difficult for 
any commissioner to decipher. For example, the proposed commission is 
supposed to examine the ``portion of trade in goods and services that 
the People's Republic of China dedicates to military systems or systems 
of a dual nature that could be used for military purposes.'' The 
problem is no country dedicates its trade to military systems. That is 
simply not a meaningful concept. I am not even sure what a ``system of 
a dual nature'' is? It is, furthermore, literally impossible for a 
country to dedicate a portion of a trade surplus to its military budget 
because a trade surplus is not cash in hand, as the proposal implies.
  Similarly, the proposal simply misunderstands the nature of the World 
Trade Organization and particularly Article XXI if it asks for 
recommendations as to how China's participation there would harm us or 
whether Article XXI should be more frequently invoked. What the WTO 
provides is a forum in which to negotiate the reduction of tariffs and 
other trade barriers. What do we have to fear from China lowering its 
trade barriers in national security terms? As to Article XXI, that 
provision is invoked when we do something to China in trade terms, not 
when China does something to us.
  That leads me to my final point. What the statement of the proposed 
commission's duties makes clear, and what I object to most strongly to, 
is its premise. There are many issues that I could conceive of 
addressing in a serious, comprehensive and balanced review of our 
security relationship with China. Issues related to regional stability 
and weapons proliferation to name just two. But, what this amendment 
suggests is that our commercial engagement with China somehow threatens 
our national security interests--that in some way, the fact that we buy 
toys and appliances from the Chinese, and the fact that they buy 
agricultural products and heavy equipment from us endangers the 
American people. That is simply not the case.
  Nor is there anything about China's upcoming accession to the World 
Trade Organization that makes such a review any more relevant. After 
all, China has committed to open its market to our goods and services 
to gain entry to the WTO. China's accession to the WTO does nothing to 
reduce our security. If anything, it reduces a point of friction in our 
relationship with China in a way that is only positive.
  Under the circumstances, I cannot support the creation of a permanent 
commission with an uncertain mission that would not reach many of the 
fundamental issues that should be addressed in our relationship with 
China. I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment as well.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the clerk read the other cosponsors of 
the amendment, in addition to Mr. Warner and myself.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the names.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Byrd, for himself, Mr. Warner, Mr. Levin, Mr. Hollings, 
     Mr. Helms, Mr. Breaux, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Campbell, Mrs. Lincoln, 
     and Mr. Wellstone.

  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair, and I thank the clerk.
  Mr. President, I ask for a vote on the amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, with the concurrence of my distinguished

[[Page 13925]]

senior colleagues, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
3794.
  The amendment (No. 3794) was agreed to.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
3767, as amended.
  The amendment (No. 3767), as amended, was agreed to.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. BYRD. Do we not wish to proceed on the vote on the amendment in 
the first degree, as amended?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We have agreed to the first and the second-
degree amendments.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair. I thank all Senators. And I thank my 
colleague, Mr. Warner.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague, the senior Senator from West 
Virginia.
  Now, from the unanimous consent agreement, the distinguished Senator 
from Wisconsin is to be recognized.


                           Amendment No. 3759

   (Purpose: To terminate production under the D5 submarine-launched 
                       ballistic missile program)

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Wisconsin is recognized.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3759 and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold], for himself, Mr. 
     Harkin, Mr. Wellstone, and Mr. Wyden, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 3759.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 31, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:

     SEC. 126. D5 SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM.

       (a) Reduction of Amount for Program.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of this Act, the total amount authorized to 
     be appropriated by this Act is reduced by $462,733,000.
       (b) Prohibition.--None of the remaining funds authorized to 
     be appropriated by this Act after the reduction made by 
     subsection (a) may be used for the procurement of D5 
     submarine-launched ballistic missiles or components for D5 
     missiles.
       (c) Termination of Program.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     terminate production of D5 submarine ballistic missiles under 
     the D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile program after 
     fiscal year 2001.
       (d) Payment of Termination Costs.--Funds available on or 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act for obligation 
     for the D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile program may 
     be obligated for production under that program only for 
     payment of the costs associated with the termination of 
     production under this Act.
       (e) Inapplicability to Missiles in Production.--Subsections 
     (c) and (d) do not apply to missiles in production on the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, quite simply, this amendment will 
terminate the future production of the Navy's Trident II missile. I am 
pleased to be joined in this effort by the Senator from Iowa, Mr. 
Harkin, the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. Wellstone, and the Senator from 
Oregon, Mr. Wyden.
  I have made it a priority to seek to eliminate unnecessary Government 
spending. To the occasional consternation of some in this Chamber and 
elsewhere, I have come to the floor time and time again to try to scale 
back or terminate costly Federal programs, many of which have outlived 
their usefulness.
  In my view, the Trident II program is just the kind of cold war relic 
that we can and should eliminate.
  The Trident II, also called the D-5, is the Navy's submarine-launched 
ballistic missile. It was designed specifically to be a first-strike 
strategic missile that would attack targets inside the Soviet Union 
from waters off the continental United States.
  By halting further production of the Trident II missile, we would 
save American taxpayers more than $460 million in fiscal year 2001 
alone, and according to the CBO, we would save $2.6 billion over the 
next 10 years, from 2001 to 2010.
  The Navy now has in its arsenal 372 Trident II missiles, and has 
requested funding this year for an additional 12. The legislation 
currently before this body includes more than $430 million for those 
additional 12 missiles.
  It also authorizes an additional $28.8 million for advanced 
procurement for still more Trident II missiles that the Navy hopes to 
purchase in future years.
  Let me be clear. My amendment would halt production of additional 
Trident II missiles. It does not in any way prevent the Navy from 
operating or maintaining its current arsenal of 372 Trident II 
missiles.
  I would like to take a moment to talk about the Trident II, its 
predecessor, the Trident I, and the reasons why I believe this Trident 
II program should be terminated.
  The Trident II is deployed aboard the Navy's fleet of 18 Ohio-class 
submarines. Ten of these subs are equipped with Trident II missiles. 
The oldest eight subs in the fleet are equipped with the older Trident 
I, or C-4, missile.
  The Navy is already moving toward downsizing its Trident fleet from 
18 to 14 in order to comply with the provisions of the START II treaty. 
Some observers suggest simply retiring the four oldest Ohio-class 
submarines in order to achieve that goal. Others support converting 
those subs, which carry the older Trident I missle, to carry 
conventional missiles. The CBO estimates that this conversion alone 
would cost about $3.3 billion over 10 years.
  That leaves four other submarines that are equipped with the older 
Trident I missiles. The Navy wants to backfit those four subs to carry 
newer Trident II missiles.
  The Navy's current goal is to have 14 submarines with 24 Trident II 
missiles each, for a total of 336 missiles, with a number of additional 
missiles for testing purposes. The CBO estimates that a total of 425 
missiles would be required to fully arm 14 submarines and have 
sufficient missiles also for testing. That would mean the purchase of 
at least 53 more missiles.
  We already have 372 Trident II missiles--more than enough to fully 
arm the 10 existing Trident II submarines and to maintain an inventory 
for testing. So why do we need 12 more?
  Why do we need to spend the taxpayers' money on advanced procurement 
to buy even more missiles in future years?
  And why do we need to backfit the aging remains of the Trident I 
fleet at all? Ten fully-equipped Trident II submarines are more than 
capable of being an effective deterrent against the moth-balled Russian 
submarine fleet and against the ballistic missile aspirations of rogue 
states, including China and North Korea.
  And the aging Trident I subs won't outlast the Trident I missiles 
they currently carry, let alone the additional Trident II missiles the 
Navy wants to build for them to the tune of about $40 million per 
missile.
  The CBO has recommended terminating the further production of the 
Trident II missile, which would save $2.6 billion over the next 10 
years, and retiring all eight of the Trident I submarines, which would 
save an additional $2.3 billion over the next 10 years, for a total 
savings of $4.9 billion.
  I do recognize that there is still a potential threat from rogue 
states and from independent operators who seek to acquire ballistic 
missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. I also recognize that 
our submarine fleet and our arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons still 
have an important role to pay in warding off these threats. Their role, 
however, has diminished dramatically from what it was at the time of 
the

[[Page 13926]]

cold war. Our missile procurement decisions should really reflect that 
change and it should reflect the realities of the post-cold-war world.
  Our existing inventory of 372 Trident II missiles is far superior to 
any other country on the globe. And each of these missiles contains 
eight independently targetable nuclear warheads, for a total of 192 
warheads per submarine. The 372 missiles currently in the Navy's 
inventory contain 2,976 warheads. Each warhead packs between 300 to 450 
kilotons of explosive power.
  For a comparison--which is really quite striking--the first atomic 
bomb that the United States dropped on Hiroshima generated 15 kilotons 
of force. Let's do the math for just one fully-equipped Trident II 
submarine.
  Each warhead can generate up to 450 kilotons of force. Each missile 
has eight warheads, and each submarine has 24 missiles. That equals 
86.4 megatons of force per submarine. That is the equivalent of 5,760 
Hiroshimas. Let me say that again: the power of 5,760 Hiroshimas on 
just one submarine.
  The Navy currently has 10 such submarines, and they want to backfit 
another four with these devastating weapons. It is hard to imagine why 
we need to procure more of these weapons when those we already have 
could destroy the Earth many times over.
  And it is especially hard to comprehend why we need more Trident II 
missiles when we take into account the fact that the Trident II is only 
one of the several types of ballistic missiles the Department of 
Defense has in its arsenal.
  The world is changing. Earlier this year, the Russian Duma ratified 
the START II treaty, a move that seemed highly unlikely just 1 year 
ago. And Russia has also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty, something that this body regrettably failed to do last fall.
  I cannot understand the need for more Trident II missiles at a time 
when the Governments of the United States and Russia are in 
negotiations to implement START II and are also discussing a framework 
for START III. These agreements call for reductions in our nuclear 
arsenal, not increases. To spend scarce resources on building more 
missiles now is short sighted and could seriously undermine our efforts 
to negotiate further arms reductions with Russia.
  The debate on the underlying legislation is one about priorities. We 
should stop spending taxpayer dollars on defense programs that have 
unfortunately survived the cold war and should instead concentrate on 
military readiness and better pay and benefits for our men and women in 
uniform.
  So I urge my colleagues to support this sensible amendment, which has 
been endorsed by Taxpayers for Common Sense, the Center for Defense 
Information, the Peace Action Education Fund, the Union of Concerned 
Scientists, the Council for a Liveable World, Physicians for Social 
Responsibility, and the 20/20 Vision Education Fund.
  Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Feingold 
amendment. I happen to believe we need a strong national defense. I 
think an important ingredient in having a strong national defense is 
that we have a defense system that is technologically advanced over any 
opposition we may face in the world; that we have a versatile defense 
system; and that we have some mobility so we can avoid duplication.
  A key ingredient of a strong national defense is our submarine 
program, which includes the submarine-launched ballistic missile. An 
important part of a submarine-launched ballistic missile is the D-5.
  The Feingold amendment would cut $462.7 million in funds to procure 
the Trident D-5 missiles and, in effect, would terminate the D-5 
production program. For that reason, I strongly oppose this amendment.
  The Department of Defense also happens to oppose this amendment. That 
was not an easy decision. There was a lot of consideration on what 
should be the proper level of defense and how submarine defenses should 
be a part of that. The Navy, after a considerable amount of thought, 
decided they needed to outfit a total of 14 Trident submarines with the 
D-5 missile. This will require a total inventory of 425 Trident 
missiles. With the fiscal year 2000 budget, the Navy will have 53 
missiles left to procure to meet this inventory objective. We have gone 
through most of the program. We are not going to have much left, as far 
as funding missiles, after this fiscal year.
  In 1994, there was a nuclear posture review. This review was done by 
the Department of Defense and it has been persistently evaluated. The 
conclusion is that the U.S. needs 14 Trident submarines at a minimum to 
be able to maintain a two-ocean SLBM force that is stabilizing, 
operationally effective, and which enhances deterrence.
  The Department of Defense is planning on maintaining 14 Trident 
submarines for the foreseeable future regardless of arms control 
developments. Current plans are to maintain 14 boats under START II as 
well as under START III. Terminating the D-5 program, after fiscal year 
2000, would mean the Navy would only have enough missiles to outfit 11 
boats. Over time, as operational flight testing uses up an already 
inadequate missile inventory, you begin to reduce the number of 
submarines you would be able to maintain on operational status even 
further. We would decidedly have a lack of missiles to meet the goal 
for a two-ocean SLBM force.
  The Feingold amendment cuts the entire fiscal year 2001 budget 
request for D-5 production. However, even if the Congress wanted to 
terminate the D-5 program following the fiscal year 2001 procurement, 
the Navy would still need to spend over $330 million in procurement 
funds to terminate the production program. Hence, the Feingold 
amendment would not only prematurely stop production, but it would also 
preclude orderly termination of the program.
  Way back in January of this year, in a report to Congress, the 
Secretary of Defense stated that the impact of procuring less than 425 
of the D-5 missiles would be very severe. Specifically, the Secretary 
of Defense indicated that such a decision would have adverse impacts on 
the effectiveness of the U.S. strategic deterrent, severely weaken 
reliability, accuracy, and safety assessments associated with the D-5 
operational flight test program, and would undermine the strategic 
missile industrial and production base of the United States at a time 
when the D-5 missile is the only strategic missile still in production.
  The Secretary's report also indicated that termination of the D-5 
missile before the planned completion of 425 missiles would result in a 
unilateral reduction of deployed U.S. strategic warheads in both the 
START I and the START II regimes and is not consistent with U.S. START 
III plans.
  The Navy also looked at retaining older C-4 missiles to fill in the 
lack of the D-5 missiles. It concluded that this would be even more 
costly and inefficient than simply completing the D-5 production run.
  With only 53 missiles to procure, termination at this point will 
produce only marginal savings and will have a severe operational impact 
on our ability to maintain a stable deterrent force.
  It is based on these factors that I strongly urge my colleagues to 
oppose the amendment by the Senator from Wisconsin.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to debate 
this with the Senator from Colorado. I will clear up a couple of 
factual points before I make a few general statements.
  First, as I understand it, the question of termination costs will not 
be a problem that will be absorbed because of

[[Page 13927]]

this amendment, because any unexpended funds can be used for purposes 
of the termination costs. I don't think that is a major objection.
  Secondly, I believe the Senator suggested this would have some impact 
on missiles already in production. That is not the case. That is not 
the way our amendment is drafted. That is not what it will do.
  The most important point is that the Senator from Colorado indicates 
that these missiles are a key ingredient in our national defense. Let's 
assume that is the case. The fact is, we already have 372 of these 
missiles. I believe the burden is on those asking for this additional 
funding to show that that is not enough.
  Assuming it is a key ingredient, do we really need more than 372? Do 
we really need these additional 53 missiles? As I indicated earlier, we 
have 2,976 warheads based on our current 372 missiles, and that is the 
equivalent of 25,760 Hiroshimas per submarine. I think the burden is on 
those wanting to spend this additional money to show that we need a 
stronger deterrent than that.
  The Senator from Colorado suggested adverse impacts on deterrence if 
we don't do these additional 12. After 25,760 Hiroshimas per submarine, 
we need additional deterrence? I didn't hear a single statement from 
the Senator from Colorado suggesting exactly what the real adverse 
impacts are of just not doing these additional missiles.
  I suggest the money is desperately needed not only in general but, 
even within the defense budget, for the people who serve our country, 
their pay, their conditions, their housing, readiness, including that 
of the National Guard, for example. In my State, the people in the 
National Guard desperately need these resources, for example, for 
inventory, for training. They are very strapped. They are now taking a 
great deal of responsibility for our standing Army. To me, the 
priorities are wrong. We have more than adequate deterrence with these 
372 missiles.
  I suggest the case has not been made, as it must be, by those who 
want to make the expenditure for these additional missiles.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I will respond, if I may.
  The amendment cuts funds which would require termination of the 
program, plain and simple. DOD has repeatedly reviewed that very 
question. Each time they have concluded we need 53 additional missiles.
  Keep in mind, the goal originally was set up that we needed to 
maintain a submarine force in the Pacific Ocean as well as the Atlantic 
Ocean. It was determined that, at a minimum, we had to have 14 
submarines, and we needed to have them adequately armed in order to 
provide the defenses we need.
  The Trident submarine is the core of the U.S. strategic deterrent 
force, and the Trident force is the most survivable leg of our 
strategic triad.
  I think it is important we go ahead and complete this program, 
recognizing that we are towards the end of manufacturing of the 
missiles.
  I think it only makes sense that we complete it and maintain a strong 
defense. I believe a strong defense does serve as a deterrent, and it 
helps assure world peace. For that reason, I strongly oppose the 
amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has 3 minutes 25 
seconds.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I don't know how much more I will debate 
this. I want to respond to the point about the study and analysis that 
the Senator from Colorado appears to rely on most exclusively. That 
analysis was done prior to the time the Russian Duma approved START II. 
This is an example. It is not looking at the present relationship we 
have and our goals with regard to Russia and the future negotiations, 
not only with regard to what is going on now, but with START III.
  The whole point is that we have to look at current realities, look at 
what we have--372 missiles--and their capacity, and our goals as to 
what message we want to send to Russia as we negotiate what is hoped to 
be a reduction in the nuclear arsenals. I think it is simply not only 
an unwise expenditure, but also an attitude that does not reflect what 
we are trying to accomplish with regard to our negotiations with 
Russia.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I believe I need to respond again. We have 
had a report as late as January of this year, and it is that we should 
maintain 14 Trident submarines not only through START I and II, but 
also START III. So I think this is forward looking. I think it helps us 
assure our goals of a strong defense. It maintains a versatile force 
and keeps us technologically advanced, with the mobility we need. I 
think it is an essential aspect of our defense, and I think it would be 
foolhardy for us to cut the funds necessary to fully develop the 425 D-
5 missiles for the Trident submarine.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of our time on 
this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, might I inquire? I was off the floor. Have 
the yeas and nays been ordered for tomorrow?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, that is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. It is ready to be sequenced tomorrow for the purpose of 
voting?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senators. We are now ready to hear from our 
distinguished colleague from Illinois, if he is ready.
  I will ask our colleague from Illinois two questions. One, on the 
assumption that Mr. Levin will soon return to the floor, I ask if we 
could interrupt for the purpose of clearing some en bloc amendments, 
which will enable the staff who otherwise would be here to return to 
their offices and use their time productively. We will ask for that at 
the appropriate time. Has the Senator indicated the amount of time he 
might seek for purposes of debate?
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, there are three Members on the floor who 
will be seeking recognition, and we anticipate a maximum of 60 minutes 
on this side. I don't know how much is needed on the other side.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator. In looking this over, I am inclined 
to think that we can, in the course of the conference, gain some 
support. I hope it remains in a factual manner and that the legislative 
history you are about to make in terms of your remarks, together with 
your colleagues, support what is in this amendment.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I thank the chairman for his forbearance 
in scheduling this debate. I don't think any of us had hoped it would 
occur at 8:30 at night, but that is the situation we are in. This is a 
very important debate.


                           Amendment No. 3732

 (Purpose: To provide for operationally realistic testing of National 
 Missile Defense systems against countermeasures, and to establish an 
                independent panel to review the testing)

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Durbin], for himself, Mr. 
     Wellstone, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Kennedy, 
     Mr. Harkin, and Mr. Wyden, proposes an amendment numbered 
     3732.

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 53, after line 23, insert the following:

[[Page 13928]]



     SEC. 243. OPERATIONALLY-REALISTIC TESTING AGAINST 
                   COUNTERMEASURES FOR NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE.

       (a) Testing Requirements.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     direct the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization--
       (1) to include in the ground and flight testing of the 
     National Missile Defense system that is conducted before the 
     system becomes operational any countermeasures (including 
     decoys) that--
       (A) are likely, or at least realistically possible, to be 
     used against the system; and
       (B) are chosen for testing on the basis of what 
     countermeasure capabilities a long-range missile could have 
     and is likely to have, taking into consideration the 
     technology that the country deploying the missile would have 
     or could likely acquire; and
       (2) to determine the extent to which the exoatmospheric 
     kill vehicle and the National Missile Defense system can 
     reliably discriminate between warheads and such 
     countermeasures.
       (b) Future Funding Requirements.--The Secretary, in 
     consultation with the Director of the Ballistic Missile 
     Defense Organization shall--
       (1) determine what additional funding, if any, may be 
     necessary for fulfilling the testing requirements set forth 
     in subsection (a) in fiscal years after fiscal year 2001; and
       (2) submit the determination to the congressional defense 
     committees at the same time that the President submits the 
     budget for fiscal year 2002 to Congress under section 1105(a) 
     of title 31, United States Code.
       (c) Report by Secretary of Defense.--(1) The Secretary of 
     Defense shall, except as provided in paragraph (4), submit to 
     Congress an annual report on the Department's efforts to 
     establish a program for operationally realistic testing of 
     the National Missile Defense system against countermeasures. 
     The report shall be in both classified and unclassified 
     forms.
       (2) The report shall include the Secretary's assessment of 
     the following:
       (A) The countermeasures available to foreign countries with 
     ballistic missiles that the National Missile Defense system 
     could encounter in a launch of such missiles against the 
     United States.
       (B) The ability of the National Missile Defense system to 
     defeat such countermeasures, including the ability of the 
     system to discriminate between countermeasures and reentry 
     vehicles.
       (C) The plans to demonstrate the capability of the National 
     Missile Defense system to defeat such countermeasures and the 
     adequacy of the ground and flight testing to demonstrate that 
     capability.
       (3) The report shall be submitted not later than January 15 
     of each year. The first report shall be submitted not later 
     than January 15, 2001.
       (4) No annual report is required under this section after 
     the National Missile Defense system becomes operational.
       (d) Independent Review Panel.--(1) The Secretary of Defense 
     shall reconvene the Panel on Reducing Risk in Ballistic 
     Missile Defense Flight Test Programs.
       (2) The Panel shall assess the following:
       (A) The countermeasures available for use against the 
     United States National Missile Defense system.
       (B) The operational effectiveness of that system against 
     those countermeasures.
       (C) The adequacy of the National Missile Defense flight 
     testing program to demonstrate the capability of the system 
     to defeat the countermeasures.
       (3) After conducting the assessment required under 
     paragraph (2), the Panel shall evaluate--
       (A) whether sufficient ground and flight testing of the 
     system will have been conducted before the system becomes 
     operational to support the making of a determination, with a 
     justifiably high level of confidence, regarding the 
     operational effectiveness of the system;
       (B) whether adequate ground and flight testing of the 
     system will have been conducted, before the system becomes 
     operational, against the countermeasures that are likely, or 
     at least realistically possible, to be used against the 
     system and that other countries have or likely could acquire; 
     and
       (C) whether the exoatmospheric kill vehicle and the rest of 
     the National Missile Defense system can reliably discriminate 
     between warheads and such countermeasures.
       (4) Not later than March 15, 2001, the Panel shall submit a 
     report on its assessments and evaluations to the Secretary of 
     Defense and to Congress. The report shall include any 
     recommendations for improving the flight testing program for 
     the National Missile Defense system or the operational 
     capability of the system to defeat countermeasures that the 
     Panel determines appropriate.
       (e) Countermeasure Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``countermeasure''--
       (1) means any deliberate action taken by a country with 
     long-range ballistic missiles to defeat or otherwise counter 
     a United States National Missile Defense system; and
       (2) includes, among other actions--
       (A) use of a submunition released by a ballistic missile 
     soon after the boost phase of the missile;
       (B) use of anti-simulation, together with such decoys as 
     Mylar balloons, to disguise the signature of the warhead; and
       (C) use of a shroud cooled with liquid nitrogen to reduce 
     the infrared signature of the warhead.

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, what we are going to discuss this evening 
is one of the most expensive, and perhaps one of the most important, 
elements in our Nation's national defense. We are going to discuss the 
national missile defense system.
  The reason for its importance, I guess, could be summarized in 
several ways. First, it is an extraordinary expenditure of money. It is 
anticipated that if we are going to meet our first goal by 2005, we 
will spend up to $60 billion. That is an exceptional expenditure, even 
by Federal standards, even by the standards of the Department of 
Defense.
  Second, those who support this system are telling us that our goal is 
to basically protect America from attack by rogue missiles, by those 
enemies of the United States who might launch a missile at us and 
threaten our cities and population. So the importance of the system we 
are talking about cannot be overstated.
  Third, we know that if we go forward with this, we run the risk of 
complicating our negotiations with other countries in the world--
particularly Russia and China--about the reduction in their nuclear 
arsenals. So this is high-stakes poker. We are talking about a 
decision, in terms of our national defense, which may be one of the 
most important in history.
  I have a very straightforward amendment that will require that the 
national missile defense system test realistic countermeasures before 
becoming operational, and that an independent review panel--the Welch 
panel--assess the testing program in light of these countermeasure 
problems. The President is slated to decide soon whether to deploy a 
national missile defense system. This bill we are debating authorizes 
spending almost $5 billion in the next fiscal year for this program.
  The Congressional Budget Office has estimated the contemplated 
national missile defense total cost at $60 billion, when all components 
are considered. Whether one thinks that deciding to deploy a national 
missile defense system at this moment is a good idea or not, I hope we 
can all agree that once that system becomes operational, it should 
work. If we are going to spend $60 billion, we ought to have a high 
level of confidence that it will in fact protect us from rogue states 
firing a missile. If the fate of America will truly hang in the 
balance, we owe this Nation and every family and every mother, father, 
and child our very best effort in building a credible, effective 
deterrence.
  Such a high level of confidence is not possible until this system is 
tested against likely responses from emerging missile states, known as 
countermeasures or decoys. If the missile system cannot discriminate 
between warheads and decoys, it is, as a practical matter, useless 
because enemies will simply be able to overwhelm it with cheap decoys.
  At this point, I will yield time to my colleagues who have gathered 
here to be part of this debate. At the end of their statements, I will 
reclaim my time and conclude.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask at this time if I may clear some 
amendments and ask unanimous consent that the time consumed by the two 
managers not in any way be counted against the time for the Senator 
from Illinois.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


    Amendments Nos. 3733, 3734, 3737, and 3762, As Modified, En Bloc

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, Senator Levin and I have several 
amendments cleared by myself and the ranking member, some of which have 
been modified. I call up amendments Nos. 3733, 3737, 3734, and I send 
to the desk a modified version of amendment No. 3762. I ask unanimous 
consent that these amendments be considered en bloc, that the Senate 
agree to the amendments, and that the motions to reconsider be laid on 
the table.
  Finally, I ask unanimous consent that statements relating to 
individual amendments be printed at the appropriate place in the 
Record.

[[Page 13929]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments (Nos. 3733, 3734, 3737, and 3762, as modified) were 
agreed to, as follows:


                           AMENDMENT NO. 3733

    (Purpose: To authorize grants for the maintenance, repair, and 
renovation of school facilities that serve dependents of members of the 
           Armed Forces and Department of Defense employees)

       On page 123, between lines 12 and 13, insert the following:

     SEC. 377. ASSISTANCE FOR MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND RENOVATION 
                   OF SCHOOL FACILITIES THAT SERVE DEPENDENTS OF 
                   MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND DEPARTMENT OF 
                   DEFENSE CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES.

       (a) Grants Authorized.--Chapter 111 of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) by redesignating section 2199 as section 2199a; and
       (2) by inserting after section 2198 the following new 
     section:

     ``Sec. 2199. Quality of life education facilities grants

       ``(a) Repair and Renovation Assistance.--(1) The Secretary 
     of Defense may make a grant to an eligible local educational 
     agency to assist the agency to repair and renovate--
       ``(A) an impacted school facility that is used by 
     significant numbers of military dependent students; or
       ``(B) a school facility that was a former Department of 
     Defense domestic dependent elementary or secondary school.
       ``(2) Authorized repair and renovation projects may include 
     repairs and improvements to an impacted school facility 
     (including the grounds of the facility) designed to ensure 
     compliance with the requirements of the Americans with 
     Disabilities Act or local health and safety ordinances, to 
     meet classroom size requirements, or to accommodate school 
     population increases.
       ``(3) The total amount of assistance provided under this 
     subsection to an eligible local educational agency may not 
     exceed $5,000,000 during any period of two fiscal years.
       ``(b) Maintenance Assistance.--(1) The Secretary of Defense 
     may make a grant to an eligible local educational agency 
     whose boundaries are the same as a military installation to 
     assist the agency to maintain an impacted school facility, 
     including the grounds of such a facility.
       ``(2) The total amount of assistance provided under this 
     subsection to an eligible local educational agency may not 
     exceed $250,000 during any fiscal year.
       ``(c) Determination of Eligible Local Educational 
     Agencies.--(1) A local educational agency is an eligible 
     local educational agency under this section only if the 
     Secretary of Defense determines that the local educational 
     agency has--
       ``(A) one or more federally impacted school facilities and 
     satisfies at least one of the additional eligibility 
     requirements specified in paragraph (2); or
       ``(B) a school facility that was a former Department of 
     Defense domestic dependent elementary or secondary school, 
     but assistance provided under this subparagraph may only be 
     used to repair and renovate that facility.
       ``(2) The additional eligibility requirements referred to 
     in paragraph (1) are the following:
       ``(A) The local educational agency is eligible to receive 
     assistance under subsection (f) of section 8003 of the 
     Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
     7703) and at least 10 percent of the students who were in 
     average daily attendance in the schools of such agency during 
     the preceding school year were students described under 
     paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(B) of section 8003(a) of the 
     Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
       ``(B) At least 35 percent of the students who were in 
     average daily attendance in the schools of the local 
     educational agency during the preceding school year were 
     students described under paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(B) of 
     section 8003(a) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
     of 1965.
       ``(C) The State education system and the local educational 
     agency are one and the same.
       ``(d) Notification of Eligibility.--Not later than June 30 
     of each fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall notify 
     each local educational agency identified under subsection (c) 
     that the local educational agency is eligible during that 
     fiscal year to apply for a grant under subsection (a), 
     subsection (b), or both subsections.
       ``(e) Relation to Impact Aid Construction Assistance.--A 
     local education agency that receives a grant under subsection 
     (a) to repair and renovate a school facility may not also 
     receive a payment for school construction under section 8007 
     of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 7707) for the same fiscal year.
       ``(f) Grant Considerations.--In determining which eligible 
     local educational agencies will receive a grant under this 
     section for a fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     take into consideration the following conditions and needs at 
     impacted school facilities of eligible local educational 
     agencies:
       ``(1) The repair or renovation of facilities is needed to 
     meet State mandated class size requirements, including 
     student-teacher ratios and instructional space size 
     requirements.
       ``(2) There is a increase in the number of military 
     dependent students in facilities of the agency due to 
     increases in unit strength as part of military readiness.
       ``(3) There are unhoused students on a military 
     installation due to other strength adjustments at military 
     installations.
       ``(4) The repair or renovation of facilities is needed to 
     address any of the following conditions:
       ``(A) The condition of the facility poses a threat to the 
     safety and well-being of students.
       ``(B) The requirements of the Americans with Disabilities 
     Act.
       ``(C) The cost associated with asbestos removal, energy 
     conservation, or technology upgrades.
       ``(D) Overcrowding conditions as evidenced by the use of 
     trailers and portable buildings and the potential for future 
     overcrowding because of increased enrollment.
       ``(5) The repair or renovation of facilities is needed to 
     meet any other Federal or State mandate.
       ``(6) The number of military dependent students as a 
     percentage of the total student population in the particular 
     school facility.
       ``(7) The age of facility to be repaired or renovated.
       ``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Local educational agency.--The term `local 
     educational agency' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 8013(9) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
     of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7713(9)).
       ``(2) Impacted school facility.--The term `impacted school 
     facility' means a facility of a local educational agency--
       ``(A) that is used to provide elementary or secondary 
     education at or near a military installation; and
       ``(B) at which the average annual enrollment of military 
     dependent students is a high percentage of the total student 
     enrollment at the facility, as determined by the Secretary of 
     Defense.
       ``(3) Military dependent students.--The term `military 
     dependent students' means students who are dependents of 
     members of the armed forces or Department of Defense civilian 
     employees.
       ``(4) Military installation.--The term `military 
     installation' has the meaning given that term in section 
     2687(e) of this title.''.
       (b) Amendments to Chapter Heading and Tables of Contents.--
     (1) The heading of chapter 111 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:

                 ``CHAPTER 111--SUPPORT OF EDUCATION''.

       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by striking the item relating to section 2199 and 
     inserting the following new items:

``2199. Quality of life education facilities grants.
``2199a. Definitions.''.
       (3) The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A, 
     and at the beginning of part III of subtitle A, of such title 
     are amended by striking the item relating to chapter 111 and 
     inserting the following:

``111. Support of Education.................................2191''.....

       (c) Funding for Fiscal Year 2001.--Amounts appropriated in 
     the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2001, under the 
     heading ``Quality of Life Enhancements, Defense'' may be used 
     by the Secretary of Defense to make grants under section 2199 
     of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a).
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 3734

 (Purpose: To postpone implementation of the Defense Joint Accounting 
            System (DJAS) pending an analysis of the system)

       On page 123, between lines 12 and 13, insert the following:

     SEC. 377. POSTPONEMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF DEFENSE JOINT 
                   ACCOUNTING SYSTEM (DJAS) PENDING ANALYSIS OF 
                   THE SYSTEM.

       (a) Postponement.--The Secretary of Defense may not grant a 
     Milestone III decision for the Defense Joint Accounting 
     System (DJAS) until the Secretary--
       (1) conducts, with the participation of the Inspector 
     General of the Department of Defense and the inspectors 
     general of the military departments, an analysis of 
     alternatives to the system to determine whether the system 
     warrants deployment; and
       (2) if the Secretary determines that the system warrants 
     deployment, submits to the congressional defense committees a 
     report certifying that the system meets Milestone I and 
     Milestone II requirements and applicable requirements of the 
     Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (divisions D and E of Public Law 
     104-106).
       (b) Deadline for Report.--The report referred to in 
     subsection (a)(2) shall be submitted, if at all, not later 
     than March 30, 2001.
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 3737

  (Purpose: To repeal the prohibition on use of Department of Defense 
 funds for the procurement of a nuclear-capable shipyard crane from a 
                            foreign source)

       On page 32, after line 24, add the following:

[[Page 13930]]



     SEC. 142. REPEAL OF PROHIBITION ON USE OF DEPARTMENT OF 
                   DEFENSE FUNDS FOR PROCUREMENT OF NUCLEAR-
                   CAPABLE SHIPYARD CRANE FROM A FOREIGN SOURCE.

       Section 8093 of the Department of Defense Appropriations 
     Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-79; 113 Stat. 1253) is amended by 
     striking subsection (d), relating to a prohibition on the use 
     of Department of Defense funds to procure a nuclear-capable 
     shipyard crane from a foreign source.
                                  ____



                    amendment no. 3762, as modified

  (Purpose: To provide for the humane administration of Department of 
 Defense secrecy oaths and policies, consistent with national security 
needs, where workers and communities at nuclear weapons facilities may 
have had their health compromised by exposure to radioactive and other 
                         hazardous substances)

       On page 415; between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:

     SEC. 1061. SECRECY POLICIES AND WORKER HEALTH.

       (a) Review of Secrecy Policies.--The Secretary of Defense 
     in consultation with the Secretary of Energy shall review 
     classification and security policies and; within appropriate 
     national security constraints, ensure that such policies do 
     not prevent or discourage employees at former nuclear weapons 
     facilities who may have been exposed to radioactive or other 
     hazardous substances associated with nuclear weapons from 
     discussing such exposures with appropriate health care 
     providers and with other appropriate officials. The policies 
     reviewed should include the policy to neither confirm nor 
     deny the presence of nuclear weapons as it is applied to 
     former U.S. nuclear weapons facilities that no longer contain 
     nuclear weapons or materials.
       (c) Notification of Affected Employees.--(1) The Secretary 
     of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of Energy shall 
     seek to identify individuals who are or were employed at 
     Department of Defense sites that no longer store, assemble, 
     disassemble, or maintain nuclear weapons.
       (2) Upon determination that such employees may have been 
     exposed to radioactive or hazardous substances associated 
     with nuclear weapons at such sites, such employees shall be 
     notified of any such exposures to radiation, or hazardous 
     substances associated with nuclear weapons.
       (3) Such notification shall include an explanation of how 
     such employees can discuss any such exposures with health 
     care providers who do not possess security clearances without 
     violating security or classification procedures or, if 
     necessary, provide guidance to facilitate the ability of such 
     individuals to contact health care providers with appropriate 
     security clearances or discuss such exposures with other 
     officials who are determined by the Secretary of Defense to 
     be appropriate.
       (d) The Secretary of Defense in consultation with the 
     Secretary of Energy shall, no later than May 1, 2001, submit 
     a report to the Congressional Defense Committees setting 
     forth:
       (1) the results of the review in paragraph (a) including 
     any changes made or recommendations for legislation; and
       (2) the status of the notification in paragraph (b) and an 
     anticipated date on which such notification will be 
     completed.


                           amendment no. 3733

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I am deeply concerned about the 
condition of the classrooms within our military dependent schools. A 
number of our classrooms contain asbestos, roofs leak, classes are 
overcrowded, three or four teachers have to share the same desk, 
science labs are 30 plus years old and potentially unsafe, and some 
schools are not in compliance with the American with Disabilities Act.
  I am ashamed that military families who live on base are forced to 
send their kids to school facilities in these conditions. I was even 
more disturbed when I found out the many other school districts that 
teach large numbers of military dependents have similar infrastructure 
problems.
  Amazingly most kids have done well despite this environment but I 
worry about the impact the deteriorating school facilities has on 
declining military retention and recruitment. The condition of these 
schools is clearly a quality of life issue for military families.
  Mr. President, I offer an amendment today to help alleviate these 
problems and ensure a safe and comfortable learning environment for 
more than 80,000 children of members of our armed forces.
  My amendment establishes a grant program within the Department of 
Defense to assist school districts with repair and renovation costs for 
facilities used to educate large numbers of military kids. The program 
would enable qualified school districts to apply for grants up to $5 
million every two years to help meet health and safety, class size, 
ADA, asbestos removal, and technology requirements.
  The program would also assist school districts faced with significant 
enrollment increases due to increases in on-base housing or mission 
changes. Lastly, school districts could seek assistance for repair and 
renovation costs of Department of Defense owned schools being 
transferred to a local school district.
  For example, at Robins Air Force Base in Georgia a DOD owned 
elementary school is being transferred to the local school district but 
$4 million in repairs is needed to bring the school up to the local 
district's safety and fire standards.
  Why is Department of Defense assistance needed? Most of the school 
districts serving large numbers of military children have limited 
bonding ability or no tax base to raise the necessary capital funding.
  For example, seven public schools districts that serve military 
dependents are located solely on the military installation and in turn 
have no tax base or bonding authority. The seven schools rely on impact 
aid and state funding and almost all repair or renovation expenditures 
come at the expense of instructional funding.
  The Department of Education is authorized to provide construction 
funding for impacted schools but only $10 million is provided for 
hundreds of impacted schools nationwide. An additional $5 million is 
available for school facilities owned by the Department of Education 
but the needs of those schools far exceed the available funding.
  The Department of Education has essentially abdicated its 
responsibility to ensure a safe and comfortable learning environment at 
federally impacted schools. We often hear of the need for more federal 
dollars for school construction but who deserves this more than the 
children whose parents serve in our armed forces.
  Schools that teach large numbers of military dependents receive 
supplemental impact aid assistance through the Department of Defense, 
$30 million in FY 2000 benefitting about 130 schools. However, the 
funding is not sufficient to meet major repair and renovation costs.
  A comprehensive program is needed to address this serious quality of 
life issue. And, without Department of Defense assistance tens of 
thousands of military children will continue to learn in inadequate and 
unsafe facilities.
  This amendment would benefit the 30 most heavily impacted school 
districts that teach military children.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this important quality 
of life issue that will benefit more than 80,000 military children.


                    amendment no. 3762, as modified

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment to correct an 
absurdity in our application of important secrecy policies. This issue 
would be a laughable example of bureaucratic intransigence except that 
it is harming workers who may have gotten sick from working on our 
nuclear weapons.
  I'm sure that by now all my colleagues are aware that many of our 
citizens were exposed to radioactive and other hazardous materials at 
nuclear weapons production plants in the United States. While working 
to protect our national security, workers at places like Paducah, 
Kentucky, Portsmouth, Ohio, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee were subjected to 
severe hazards, sometimes without their knowledge or consent. We 
recently passed an amendment to provide compensation to some of those 
who became seriously ill because of their dangerous work at nuclear 
weapons plants.
  The dangers at these plants thrived in the darkness of government 
secrecy. Public oversight was especially weak at a factory for 
assembling and disassembling nuclear weapons at the Iowa Army 
Ammunition Plant in Middletown, Iowa. I first found out about the 
nuclear weapons work there from a constituent letter from a former 
worker, Robert Anderson. He was concerned that his non-Hodgkins 
lymphoma was

[[Page 13931]]

caused by exposures at the plant. But when I asked the Department of 
Energy about the plant, at first they denied that any nuclear weapons 
work took place there. The constituent's story was only confirmed when 
my staff saw a promotional video from the contractor at the site that 
mentioned the nuclear weapons work.
  The nuclear weapons production plants were run not by the Defense 
Department but by the Atomic Energy Commission, which has since been 
made part of the Department of Energy. The Department of Energy has 
since acknowledged what happened, and is now actively trying to help 
the current and former workers in Iowa and elsewhere by reviewing 
records, helping them get medical testing and care, and seeking 
compensation. I was pleased this past January to host Energy Secretary 
Richardson at a meeting with former workers and community members near 
the plant. The Department specifically acknowledges that the Iowa Army 
Ammunition Plant assembled and disassembled nuclear weapons from 1947-
1975. And their work has helped uncover potential health concerns at 
the plant, such as explosions around depleted uranium that created 
clouds of radioactive dust, and workers' exposure to high explosives 
that literally turned their skin yellow.
  But at the Iowa nuclear weapons plant the Defense Department was 
inseparably intertwined with the AEC. The AEC operations were located 
on the site of an Army ammunition plant. The workers at both sides of 
the plant actually worked for the same contractor, workers often 
switched between the plant parts, and workers on both sides of the 
plant were even exposed to many of the same hazardous materials, 
including beryllium and depleted uranium. Thus former workers at the 
plant do not always clearly distinguish the Army from the AEC.
  And while the Department of Energy is investigating what happened and 
seeking solutions, the Army is stuck, still mired in a nonsensical 
policy. It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ``neither 
confirm nor deny'' the presence of nuclear weapons at any place at any 
time. They could not admit that nuclear weapons were assembled in Iowa 
without admitting that there were nuclear weapons in Iowa. So they 
write vaguely about ``AEC activities,'' but don't say what those 
activities were.
  There have been no nuclear weapons at the Iowa site since 1975, but 
it's well known that weapons were there before that. The DOE says the 
weapons were there. A promotional video of the Army contractor at the 
site even says the weapons were there. But the Army can't say it. This 
makes the Army look ridiculous.
  But worse, it sends the wrong signal to the former workers. These 
workers swore oaths never to reveal what they did at the plant. And 
many of them are still reluctant to talk. They are worried that their 
cancers or other health problems were caused by their work at the 
plant. But they feel that they can't even tell their doctors or site 
cleanup crews about the materials they worked with or the tasks they 
did. They don't want to violate the oaths of secrecy they took. One 
worker at the Iowa plant said recently, ``There's still stuff buried 
out there that we don't know where it is. And we know people who do 
know, but they will not say anything yet because they are still afraid 
of repercussions.'' Instead of helping those workers speak out, the 
Army is forced to share their silence.
  And Mr. President, to make the position even more indefensible for my 
workers in Iowa, the Pentagon is not even consistently applying the 
``neither confirm nor deny,'' or ``NCND,'' policy. A document recently 
released by the Pentagon stated that the U.S. had nuclear weapons in 
Alaska, Cuba, Guam, Hawaii, the Johnston Islands, Midway, Puerto Rico, 
the United Kingdom, and West Germany. After the document was released, 
a Department spokesman said on television that the U.S. never had 
nuclear weapons in Iceland. Why can the Pentagon talk about nuclear 
weapons in Iceland but not in Iowa?
  Mr. President, for the health of our workers, it's time for the 
Pentagon to come clean. No one is more concerned with keeping real 
nuclear secrets than I am. But the Pentagon must not hide behind 
inconsistent policies when workers' lives may be at risk.
  This amendment is narrowly targeted to require the Defense Department 
and Energy Department to review their classification and secrecy 
policies and change them if they prevent or discourage workers at 
nuclear weapons facilities from discussing possible exposures with 
their health care providers. The amendment specifically recognizes that 
this must be done within national security constraints. It also directs 
the Departments to contact people who may have been exposed to 
radioactive or hazardous substances at former nuclear weapons 
facilities, including the Iowa plant. The Department is to notify them 
of any exposures and of how they can discuss the exposures with their 
health care providers and other appropriate officials without violating 
secrecy oaths or policies.
  I hope all my colleagues will support this common-sense change for 
government consistency and worker health.


                     Amendments Nos. 3816 and 3817

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send two amendments to the desk which 
have been cleared by myself and the ranking member. Therefore, I ask 
unanimous consent that the Senate consider these amendments en bloc, 
they be agreed to, and the motions to reconsider laid upon the table. 
Finally, I ask that any statements relating to any of the individual 
amendments be printed at the appropriate place in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments (Nos. 3816 and 3817) were agreed to, as follows:


                           AMENDMENT NO. 3816

 (Purpose: To streamline the requirements for procurement notice when 
    access to notice is provided electronically through the single 
 Governmentwide point of access designated in the Federal Acquisition 
                              Regulation)

       On page 303, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:

     SEC. 814. PROCUREMENT NOTICE THROUGH ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO 
                   CONTRACTING OPPORTUNITIES.

       (a) Publication by Electronic Accessibility.--Subsection 
     (a) of section 18 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
     Act (41 U.S.C. 416) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``furnish for 
     publication by the Secretary of Commerce'' and inserting 
     ``publish'';
       (2) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
       ``(2)(A) A notice of solicitation required to be published 
     under paragraph (1) may be published by means of--
       ``(i) electronic accessibility that meets the requirements 
     of paragraph (7); or
       ``(ii) publication in the Commerce Business Daily.
       ``(B) The Secretary of Commerce shall promptly publish in 
     the Commerce Business Daily each notice or announcement 
     received under this subsection for publication by that 
     means.''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(7) A publication of a notice of solicitation by means of 
     electronic accessibility meets the requirements of this 
     paragraph for electronic accessibility if the notice is 
     electronically accessible in a form that allows convenient 
     and universal user access through the single Government-wide 
     point of entry designated in the Federal Acquisition 
     Regulation.''.
       (b) Waiting Period for Issuance of Solicitation.--Paragraph 
     (3) of such subsection is amended--
       (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking 
     ``furnish a notice to the Secretary of Commerce'' and 
     inserting ``publish a notice of solicitation''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``by the Secretary of 
     Commerce''.
       (c) Conforming Amendments for Small Business Act.--
     Subsection (e) of section 8 of the Small Business Act (15 
     U.S.C. 637) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``furnish for 
     publication by the Secretary of Commerce'' and inserting 
     ``publish'';
       (2) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
       ``(2)(A) A notice of solicitation required to be published 
     under paragraph (1) may be published by means of--
       ``(i) electronic accessibility that meets the requirements 
     of section 18(a)(7) of the Office of Federal Procurement 
     Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 416(a)(7)); or
       ``(ii) publication in the Commerce Business Daily.
       ``(B) The Secretary of Commerce shall promptly publish in 
     the Commerce Business

[[Page 13932]]

     Daily each notice or announcement received under this 
     subsection for publication by that means.''; and
       (3) in paragraph (3)--
       (A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking 
     ``furnish a notice to the Secretary of Commerce'' and 
     inserting ``publish a notice of solicitation''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``by the Secretary of 
     Commerce''.
       (d) Periodic Reports on Implementation of Electronic 
     Commerce in Federal Procurement.--Section 30(e) of the Office 
     of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 426(e)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in the first sentence, by striking ``Not later than 
     March 1, 1998, and every year afterward through 2003'' and 
     inserting ``Not later than March 1 of each even-numbered year 
     through 2004''; and
       (2) in paragraph (4)--
       (A) by striking ``Beginning with the report submitted on 
     March 1, 1999,''; and
       (B) by striking ``calendar year'' and inserting ``two 
     fiscal years''.
       (e) Effective Date and Applicability.--This section and the 
     amendments made by this section shall take effect on October 
     1, 2000. The amendments made by subsections (a), (b) and (c) 
     shall apply with respect to solicitations issued on or after 
     that date.
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 3817

(Purpose: To authorize a land conveyance, Mukilteo Tank Farm, Everett, 
                              Washington)

       On page 543, strike line 20 and insert the following:

                    Part III--Air Force Conveyances

     SEC. 2861. LAND CONVEYANCE, MUKILTEO TANK FARM, EVERETT, 
                   WASHINGTON.

       (a) Conveyance Authorized.--The Secretary of the Air Force 
     may convey, without consideration, to the Port of Everett, 
     Washington (in this section referred to as the ``Port''), all 
     right, title, and interest of the United States in and to a 
     parcel of real property, including any improvements thereon, 
     consisting of approximately 22 acres and known as the 
     Mukilteo Tank Farm for the purposes of permitting the Port to 
     use the parcel for the development and operation of a port 
     facility and for other public purposes.
       (b) Personal Property.--The Secretary of the Air Force may 
     include as part of the conveyance authorized by subsection 
     (a) any personal property at the Mukilteo Tank Farm that is 
     excess to the needs of the Air Force if the Secretary of 
     Transportation determines that such personal property is 
     appropriate for the development or operation of the Mukilteo 
     Tank Farm as a port facility.
       (c) Interim Lease.--(1) Until such time as the real 
     property described in subsection (a) is conveyed by deed, the 
     Secretary of the Air Force may lease all or part of the real 
     property to the Port if the Secretary determines that the 
     real property is suitable for lease and the lease of the 
     property under this subsection will not interfere with any 
     environmental remediation activities or schedules under 
     applicable law or agreements.
       (2) The determination under paragraph (1) whether the lease 
     of the real property will interfere with environmental 
     remediation activities or schedules referred to in that 
     paragraph shall be based upon an environmental baseline 
     survey conducted in accordance with applicable Air Force 
     regulations and policy.
       (3) Except as provided by paragraph (4), as consideration 
     for the lease under this subsection, the Port shall pay the 
     Secretary an amount equal to the fair market of the lease, as 
     determined by the Secretary.
       (4) The amount of consideration paid by the Port for the 
     lease under this subsection may be an amount, as determined 
     by the Secretary, less than the fair market value of the 
     lease if the Secretary determines that--
       (A) the public interest will be served by an amount of 
     consideration for the lease that is less than the fair market 
     value of the lease; and
       (B) payment of an amount equal to the fair market value of 
     the lease is unobtainable.
       (d) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal 
     description of the property to be conveyed under subsection 
     (a) shall be determined by a survey satisfactory to the 
     Secretary of the Air Force and the Port.
       (e) Additional Terms.--The Secretary of the Air Force, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, may 
     require such additional terms and conditions in connection 
     with the conveyance under subsection (a) as the Secretary of 
     the Air Force considers appropriate to protect the interests 
     of the United States.

                 Part IV--Defense Agencies Conveyances

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, for the time allotted in debate in support 
of the amendment, I would like to yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Minnesota, Senator Wellstone.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Thank you, Mr. President. I am very proud to have 
worked with Senator Durbin to be a cosponsor and have Senator Kerry 
here on the floor as well.
  I think this important amendment requiring more realistic testing of 
the national missile system is an extremely important step for us to 
take. First of all, it requires more realistic testing. Second, it 
calls for the reconvening of the Welch commission to independently 
evaluate the testing program. Third, it requires a report to the 
Congress on the adequacy of the program.
  This is the fourth time since the late fifties that we have talked 
about a missile defense program. Each time there is a tremendous amount 
of enthusiasm. Then scientists and independent observers do a careful 
analysis. After that, the enthusiasm wanes. I do not believe this time 
will be any different.
  I am sure every Senator read on Sunday morning that this past 
Saturday's test was an utter failure. What you may not know is that an 
earlier test was unsuccessful as well. But regardless of the actual 
successes and failures of the tests, the fact is, the current testing 
program does not test the feasibility of the system in the real world. 
Current testing determines whether or not the system works against 
cooperative targets on a test range. This methodology is insufficient 
to determine the technological feasibility of the system against likely 
threats. At present, even if the tests had been hailed as total 
successes, they would have proved nothing more than the system is 
unproven against real threats. At present, we know that this system 
might work if the other side is not making it hard to detect its 
weapons. This hardly seems a reason to move forward to deployment.
  Some might argue that this amendment demands too much. Some might 
argue that today's testing program is a first step in a long process 
towards full deployment. But demanding an adequate testing program, 
which is what this amendment calls for, certainly does not put the bar 
too far. It sets it where any reasonable person or scientist would put 
it. We must stick to development and work within the confines of a 
realistic test before even considering moving to deployment.
  The aim of the national missile defense is to defend the United 
States from limited attacks by intercontinental-range ballistic 
missiles armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. However, 
biological or chemical weapons can be divided into many small warheads 
called submunitions. These submunitions could overwhelm the planned 
defense, and more importantly, because some munitions allow for more 
effective dispersal of biological and chemical agents, an attacker 
would have a strong incentive to use them even in the absence of 
missile defenses. When it comes to biological warfare and these 
biological and chemical agents, the greater likelihood is that they 
will be carried by suitcase into this country. I pray that doesn't 
happen.
  Current testing does not take countermeasures into account. An attack 
could overwhelm the system by using something as simple as ballooned 
decoys, for example, by deploying nuclear weapons inside balloons and 
releasing numerous empty balloons along with them. Or an attacker could 
cover its nuclear warheads with cooled shrouds which would prevent the 
interceptor from detecting it. We are talking about testing which takes 
into account these countermeasures. That is what we would have to deal 
with.
  Current testing does not take these countermeasures into account. The 
Pentagon assessment will consider only whether the first phase of the 
system would be effective against a threat with no credible 
countermeasures. It will not consider whether the full system would be 
effective against a threat with realistic countermeasures. Any decision 
on whether or not the United States should deploy a national missile 
defense should take into account how effective that system is likely to 
be in the real world, not just whether or not it works against 
cooperative targets on a test range.
  Unfortunately, the technological feasibility of the proposed national 
defense system, which will be determined in the Pentagon's upcoming 
deployment readiness review, will be assessed

[[Page 13933]]

precisely on the basis of such test results. Even worse, it will be 
based upon only a few tests.
  The administration requested that the Pentagon provide an estimate of 
whether a national missile defense can be deployed in 5 year's time. 
General Kadish, the head of the Pentagon's ballistic missile defense 
program, has described the 2005 timetable as ``high risk.'' He has made 
it clear that the timetable is much faster than military planners would 
like. The recommendation of the Pentagon's own Office of the 
Operational and Test Evaluation Program stated clearly that the 
deployment readiness review ``is a strongly `schedule driven' 
approach'' rather than one based upon results.
  Is it too much to ask that we be certain that this system works 
before we move ahead with deployment?
  That is what this amendment is about.
  If the proposed national missile defense system is to have any 
possibility of enhancing U.S. security, it must work, and it must work 
well. At present, the evidence isn't there to prove that it does, and 
the tests underway to establish that proof are simplified and 
unrealistic. We must demand that any deployment decision on national 
missile defense be postponed until the system has been tested 
successfully against real-world realistic threats.
  Last year, I voted against a resolution urging the administration to 
make a decision to deploy a national missile defense system. I believed 
then, as I do now, that a decision to deploy before a decision is made 
there needs to be a careful evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
system.
  I also believe that we need to look at this in the context of overall 
U.S. security needs. The goal should be to increase U.S. security--not 
to undermine it. Deploying a system now, I fear, does the opposite. It 
threatens to disrupt the current arms control regimen and undermine the 
credibility of our commitment to nonproliferation.
  Deployment of a national missile defense system would be a violation 
of the ABM Treaty. Are we prepared to discard this arms control 
regimen? I worry--and I think every Senator, Democrat and Republican 
alike, worries--about proliferation of these weapons of mass 
destruction. If this regimen of arms control breaks down with Russia--
and, perhaps even more importantly, breaks down with China, then there 
is India, then there is Pakistan, then there is South Korea, then there 
is Japan--I fear the direction in which we are moving.
  Colleagues, for 40 years the United States of America has led 
international efforts to reduce and contain the danger from nuclear 
weapons. We must not now renounce the responsibilities of that 
leadership with a hasty and shortsighted decision that will have 
lasting consequences. We must answer a number of questions before we 
proceed:
  Does it make sense to unilaterally deploy a system now if the result 
might be to put the American people at even greater risk?
  Should we take the time to work with allies and others to find a 
mutually acceptable nonthreatening way of proceeding?
  Have the threats to which we are responding been exaggerated and more 
driven by politics than accurate threat assessments and hard science?
  Is the technology there to deploy a system that would actually work 
in the real world?
  This amendment speaks directly to that last question.
  I urge my colleagues to demand to know more about the complexities of 
a national missile defense system prior to deploying that system. I 
don't think that is an unreasonable request.
  The failure of Saturday's test is only a fraction of the real story. 
Even a successful test would prove nothing given the current testing 
conditions.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment requiring a more 
realistic testing of the national missile defense system, reconvening 
the Welch panel to independently evaluate a testing program, and 
requiring a report to the Congress on the adequacy of the program.
  We should not commit ourselves blindly to a program that can cost 
billions of dollars and could very well decrease our overall security 
rather than to enhance it. Our future and our children's children's 
future could depend on the decision we make on this amendment. Let's do 
the right thing. I hope we can have a strong vote on this amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask my colleague a question and the time 
allocated to the Senator from Virginia be charged for the portion of 
the colloquy I use.
  The Senator makes a fairly strong statement indirectly at our former 
colleague, Senator Cohen, now Secretary of Defense, that he would 
proceed blindly on this program which is so vital to the security of 
the United States, assuming, as you say, under the full criteria that 
the President addressed goes forward--that he would go blindly. Is that 
a purposeful choice of words directed at this distinguished former 
colleague who, in my judgment, having been on the Armed Services 
Committee 22 years and having served 18 or 19 of those years with him, 
I cannot imagine undertaking the responsibility to oversee a program of 
this importance and proceeding, as the Senator said, ``blindly.''
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to my colleague I can't imagine 
the Secretary of Defense doing that, either. My plea was to Senators. I 
said we must not proceed blindly and I urge all Members to understand 
the complexity of this testing and to at least call for a thorough 
evaluation to make sure that this system will really work. My comments 
were not directed to Secretary Cohen.
  I also say to my colleague, I don't believe the Secretary of Defense 
has made a final recommendation to the President.
  Mr. WARNER. I certainly agree.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. In light of the failure of this past week, I don't 
know what the Secretary's decision will be.
  I think all Members are just making the reasonable request that 
before we go forward with deployment, let's have the kind of 
operational testing that will prove that this system will work in the 
real world against credible threats, and let's have an independent 
evaluation by the Welch commission and have at least a report to the 
Congress.
  That is what I am referring to, I say to my colleague from Virginia. 
I am glad he asked the question. In no way would I direct these 
comments toward the Secretary of Defense.
  Mr. WARNER. I have to say with all due respect to our three 
colleagues, opponents on this amendment, indirectly this amendment is 
suggesting that the Department is not proceeding in a prudent way 
towards their responsibilities on this program. I have to state that.
  I do not find any specific fault with some of the requests made but 
momentarily when I take the floor in my own right, I will have 
documentation to show that the Welch panel is doing the very things for 
which the Senator asked. I will point to the fact that the Secretary of 
Defense has said in previous testimony what he is doing on this 
program. In fact, I say to the Presiding Officer, being a member of the 
Armed Services Committee and indeed the chairman of the strategic 
subcommittee, I asked the Secretary of Defense to come up at his 
earliest opportunity and report to the Committee on Armed Services. He 
has agreed to do so shortly after his return from his trip currently in 
Asia. I thought he addressed the test program, which did, regrettably, 
end in a failure, I thought in a very courageous and forthright way he 
addressed that failure to the American public and, indeed, the world.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I probably need not respond. I appreciate my 
colleague's comments.
  One final comment in response to his comments. One of the things I 
have liked best about preparing for this amendment for me as a Senator 
has been the way I imagined Senate work to be. I tried to immerse 
myself on this issue and get the best security briefings from the 
Pentagon, get other briefings from other people in the Pentagon, and 
talked to a whole range of experts. The Welch Commission report is a 
very interesting report.

[[Page 13934]]

  This amendment certainly says we need to make absolutely sure that we 
are involved in the kind of testing that will show this system will 
work before we move forward. That is true. That is certainly the 
premise of this amendment. I think this is a reasonable premise. 
Senators ought to raise these kinds of questions. That is why we are 
here. That is why I think this amendment is important.
  Mr. WARNER. The Welch panel was before the Armed Services Committee 
just last week and testified.
  Mr. KERRY. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. KERRY. It is my understanding, and I ask the Senator from 
Virginia, that the testing that has been laid out in the protocols that 
I have seen contemplates testing almost exclusively from off the coast 
of California and Kwajalein Island, which by their own admission, the 
military has said are less than ideal in representing the multiple 
different sources from which a legitimate attack could come.
  There is nothing in any protocol that I have seen to date suggesting 
that the testing that will take place meets the kind of testing that 
the Senator from Illinois is looking for.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will look into that. I recognize the 
military had indicated that this perhaps doesn't give them the 
diversity of tests they desire.
  Certainly, I am interested in the comment that this Nation is faced 
with a multiple of sources, and that confirms my concern about the 
overall threat posed to this Nation by the rogue or accidental firing 
of a missile. That is why we need this national missile defense 
program.
  Mr. KERRY. If the Senator will yield further for a question, when we 
talk about multiple sources, it is possible for a so-called rogue 
state--and the term itself is one that is perhaps questionable today, 
but the so-called rogue state could take a rusty tanker, fit it out 
with the capacity to shoot, drive it out of a harbor to almost any 
location in an ocean in the world, and decide to shoot from there. Is 
that accurate?
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. KERRY. If we are strictly testing between one location, one 
direction, and our radar system is specifically positioned to 
anticipate an attack from a certain location, if that were to be the 
case, we would face a completely different situation, would we not?
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct. There is a diversity of scenarios 
we have to protect this Nation against. This test program was designed 
in large measure to prioritize those sources from whence an attack 
might emanate.
  Mr. KERRY. Finally, I ask the Senator, the entire program is 
currently driven by a date essentially arrived at by the national 
intelligence estimate, that suggested that 2005 is the first date there 
might be a possibility of a missile being fired; is that correct?
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct, as a result of the national intelligence 
estimate.
  Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield.
  Mr. KERRY. We are on the time of the Senator from Virginia or I 
wouldn't be doing this.
  Mr. WARNER. Let's make it clear. I think in my request I said the 
time that I consumed would be chargeable to my side.
  Mr. KERRY. I thought it was the entire colloquy.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allard). That was the exchange with the 
Senator from Minnesota. The Senator has been yielding for questions on 
his time.
  Mr. WARNER. Let's make it clear for purposes of future colloquies. 
The time consumed by Mr. Levin and myself will be charged to our side, 
and the time for response will be charged to the other side.
  Mr. KERRY. With that understanding, I am afraid I have to refrain 
from this colloquy.
  Mr. LEVIN. I say to my good friend from Massachusetts, I happen to 
agree with his thoughts on this subject. We are very close in terms of 
our views. However, there is a complete misunderstanding about the year 
2005. That is not the year when the intelligence estimates say North 
Korea will be able to pose a threat to us.
  Mr. KERRY. Correct; they can do it today.
  Mr. LEVIN. They can do it today. But 2005 is the year which the 
Secretary of Defense thought at the time he was making an assessment 
some time ago would be the earliest time that we would be able to field 
the national missile defense.
  So everybody--in the media, on this floor and just about everywhere--
has now taken the common wisdom that the 2005 date is when the national 
intelligence estimate says the threat will arrive.
  That is not what the national intelligence estimate is. The threat is 
any time when a three-stage Taepo Dong II could deliver a several-
hundred-kilogram payload anywhere in the United States. And that day is 
when they next test it.
  With the general point my good friend from Massachusetts is making, I 
happen to agree with what he is saying. I certainly support the good 
Senator from Illinois on his amendment, but I think we ought to try to 
change the wisdom which has evolved around that date or the assumption 
or the press coverage of that date.
  Everybody uses that date for the wrong reason. Whether it is possible 
to reverse it, correct it, I don't know. But I think it would help the 
debate a great deal if we were able to look at that date for what it 
is, which is the first date that the Secretary of Defense thought, at 
the time he made the assessment some months ago, that a national 
missile defense could possibly be deployed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. I ask for a clarification now of the time that has been 
allocated to each side and how much is remaining. I have requests from 
several of my colleagues, and I want to give them all a chance.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 51 minutes, 41 
seconds. The Senator from Illinois has 44 minutes, 43 seconds.
  Mr. DURBIN. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. 
Kerry.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Illinois for his leadership, and I thank also the Senator from 
Minnesota for his common sense, leadership, and eloquence on it.
  This is really a matter of--I guess the best word to summarize it--
common sense. My prayer is that we in the Senate are not going to 
become prisoners of politics on an issue that is as critical to the 
national security interests of our country--indeed, of the world. This 
is the most important arms decision we will make in years. I am not 
going to get into the comparisons of when the last one was, but 
certainly in the last 10 or 15 years. I think what the Senator from 
Illinois is asking for ought to fit into the political philosophy of 
every single member of the Republican Party. I would have hoped the 
Senator, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 
would say we should accept this amendment. How is it that we could be 
talking about deploying a weapons system?
  Mr. WARNER. What did the Senator say?
  Mr. KERRY. I said to the distinguished chairman of the committee, I 
don't understand why he would not want to accept this, because, as a 
matter of common sense, every Member of the Senate ought to be 
interested in knowing that if we are going to spend $10 billion, $20 
billion, $40 billion, $60 billion, $100 billion to create a weapons 
system, a defensive or offensive system, we ought to know that it 
works. We ought to know it can accomplish its goal.
  Some of the best scientists in the United States of America are not 
politicians. They do not come at this as Republicans and Democrats, 
conservatives and liberals. They are scientists. They win Nobel Prizes 
for their science. They go to MIT, Stanford, New York University, all 
over this country.
  Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator yield for a moment?
  Mr. KERRY. We have a limited time.

[[Page 13935]]


  Mr. WARNER. You asked me a question.
  Mr. KERRY. If we can do it on the Senator's time?
  Mr. WARNER. Of course. You asked if I would accept it, as chairman of 
the committee, one of the managers. The answer is yes. I think our 
distinguished colleague from Illinois knows that. We have said to him 
three times: We accept the amendment. Am I not correct? Let the Record 
indicate he is nodding assent to the question. The Senator from 
Michigan has urged him we would accept it.
  So rally on, dear colleague. We will listen to you. I don't mean to 
deflate your argument as to why we would not do it, because we have 
offered to do it.
  Mr. KERRY. This is the most welcome acceptance of the power of my 
argument I have ever had on the floor of the Senate. I thank the 
distinguished chairman. But I am confident what the Senator from 
Illinois wanted to do--and I share this belief--was to have the Senate 
talk about this. I think we ought to talk about this. So I do not think 
taking 1 hour to discuss something which hopefully will pass 
overwhelmingly, or that we then accept, is inappropriate. I think we 
need to think about this.
  Mr. WARNER. No one is suggesting that.
  Mr. KERRY. We face a situation where we are talking about putting 
together a system that the best scientists in the world tell us could 
literally be rendered absolutely inoperative, if it is simply deployed; 
all you have to do is put the system out there, and you have the 
ability to create decoys with fairly unsophisticated technology. In 
fact, General Welch himself has said in his report, and he said it 
before the Armed Services Committee the other day, that they anticipate 
the C-1 deployment, which is the deployment currently contemplated, 
with countermeasures by year 2005, is a deployment in which they 
anticipate current technology, current state-of-the-art technology, has 
the ability to deploy countermeasures.
  They say you could have bomblets. After the stage separates in outer 
space and it is in that midstage, you could have bomblets, up to 100 of 
them, released from 1 single warhead. Strictly speaking, that is not a 
countermeasure because it is not directed at the entire system. But it 
is a countermeasure in that it voids the effectiveness of the system or 
the capacity of the system to work effectively.
  I ask my colleagues to look around the wall of this Chamber. I 
counted earlier, in the great amount of time we had to wait for this 
debate, 88 lights up there on the outer section. That is fewer than 100 
of these bomblets. I ask you to just look at those. We are supposed to 
talk about a system that would be effective enough to destroy bombs 
coming at us from outer space, at a spacing far greater than any of 
those lights, at tens of hundreds of miles an hour, with the capacity 
to distinguish and break through every single one of them to prevent a 
chemical weapon or biological weapon, that could be completely lethal 
to the entire city of New York, Los Angeles, to a whole State, from 
hitting this country.
  Does anybody here really believe we are going to be able to go down 
that kind of sophisticated, discriminative capacity? Some say maybe we 
might get there in 10 years, 20 years, 30 years; that we might have 
that ability if everything worked correctly. Maybe we can develop that 
kind of system ultimately. But at what cost? Then the question is, What 
is the next tier of countermeasure that defeats whatever it is we did 
to defeat their countermeasure?
  People sit here and say: Don't worry about that, Senator; we are just 
going to have a technological superiority.
  All you have to do is go back to the cold war, 50 years of point-
counterpoint; step-counterstep. We do the atom bomb; they do the atom 
bomb. We do the hydrogen bomb; they do the hydrogen bomb. We put them 
on long-range aircraft; they put them on long-range aircraft. We MIRV; 
they MIRV. They do Sputnik; we do Sputnik.
  Out of all of the measures through the entire cold war, the United 
States of America was the first to do them almost every single time. I 
think the record is all but once and maybe twice. Every single time we 
did it, it may have taken them 5 years, it may have taken them 7 years, 
but they did it. And finally we decided that we were safer by passing 
the ABM Treaty and beginning to move in the opposite direction, first 
with SALT and then with START.
  Now all we are asking in this amendment is let's be certain, before 
we spend these billions of dollars. I happen to support this. I want to 
be very clear about this. I support the notion of developing a limited, 
capable, mutually deployed system for national defense that could, 
indeed, strike down a potential rogue missile or accidental firing. No 
leader of the United States could responsibly suggest we are going to 
write off an entire city or State, or half our country. Of course we 
have an obligation to go down that road, but we have an equal 
obligation to do it in a way that does not wind up upsetting the entire 
balance of the arms race, or our current process of diminishing arms, 
that does not tell all our allies the United States is going to break 
out, at some point, of their regime at our own will; that we have not 
established a sufficient level of scrutiny, of transparency, of 
mutuality, that brings people along with us so they understand where we 
are going.
  I say to my friend, I am all for continuing as rapidly as we can the 
technological development, the research, the capacity to do this, but 
don't we want to do it in a way that guarantees we have a system that 
can do what it sets out to do without inviting a set of unintended 
consequences that actually wind up making the world not as safe as we 
were when we began the process? That is all we are asking.
  I can envision a world where the Russians and the Chinese and others 
decide we are all safer if we have a capacity to prevent a terrorist 
from firing some kind of missile from anywhere, but we are only safer 
if other countries move along with us and perceive that they are 
sharing in that safety and that, somehow, it is not a new measure 
directed by the United States against their current level of perceived 
security or threat level.
  All of this is an ongoing process of perceptions: How they perceive 
us; how we perceive them. It is important to be sensitive to those 
perceptions.
  I believe what the amendment of the Senator from Illinois will do 
will actually build on General Welch's recommendations. It will 
explicitly set out what the BMDO should do. It will require ground and 
flight testing that will make the system safer and better. It will 
ultimately guarantee us that we will get the kind of system we want.
  General Welch says he intends for the independent review team to 
address these countermeasure issues. It seems to me what the Senator 
from Illinois is doing is guaranteeing that the Congress is going on 
record, just as we did in saying we think we ought to pursue this, just 
as we did in suggesting that there are certain threshold levels that we 
ought to respond to with respect to our intelligence.
  My final comment is, picking up where the Senator from Michigan 
closed, the 2005 deadline is exactly what the Senator from Michigan 
defined it as. It is, in effect, an out-of-the-sky, artificially 
arrived at deadline. Yet it has been driving this debate and driving 
the Congress' actions. We have time to pursue this thoughtfully and 
efficiently. That is what this amendment sets out to do. I congratulate 
the Senator from Illinois.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. The Senator 
from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I may address my colleague on my time 
and his reply can be charged to his time, I wish to associate myself 
with the response of my distinguished colleague from Michigan with 
regard to 2005. He is absolutely correct. The threat exists today. The 
warhead content is a different subject for a different time, but it is 
a part of this equation in calculation of time.
  I am pleased the Senator from Massachusetts said on the floor tonight 
that

[[Page 13936]]

he supports going forward with the concept of what we call the Cochran 
bill which was signed by the President of the United States. That is my 
understanding of what he said. He did vote for it. But he said 
collectively, we, and he opened his arms. The record also shows that 
the other two colleagues on this amendment did not vote for the Cochran 
bill and were two of the three who voted against it. The ``we'' I think 
we want to make a little clearer.
  Here is my problem with this amendment, and I find myself in somewhat 
of an awkward position. I am defending Bill Cohen, my good friend, the 
Secretary of Defense of the administration with which my colleagues 
pride themselves with a long-time association. Fine.
  Here is what it says on page 4 of the amendment:

       Independent Review Panel.-- (1) The Secretary of Defense 
     shall reconvene the Panel on Reducing Risk in Ballistic 
     Missile Defense Flight Test Program.

  There it is, ``shall reconvene.''
  Here is the panel to which he was speaking which reported to the 
Nation on June 13 of this year, and on page 3, General Welch and his 
colleagues said the following:

       The IRT believes that design discrimination capabilities 
     are adequate to meet the defined C-1 threat. However, more 
     advanced decoy suites are likely to escalate the 
     discrimination challenge. The mid-course phase BMD concept 
     used in the current NMD program has important architectural 
     advantages. At the same time, that concept requires critical 
     attention to potential countermeasure challenges.

  Precisely what my colleague from Massachusetts is saying. Let me 
finish:

       There is extensive potential in the system design to grow 
     discrimination capabilities. The program to more fully 
     understand needs and to exploit and expand this growth 
     potential to meet future threats needs to be well defined, 
     clearly assigned, and funded now.

  The concluding sentence:

       A panel of the IRT is continuing work in this area.

  When you direct the Secretary of Defense to do something the panel is 
already doing, I say to my good friends and colleagues, what is this 
about? That is why we will not accept the amendment. It has some 
constructive parts to it, but you are directing the Secretary of 
Defense to do something he is already doing. That is my concern.
  Mr. KERRY. If I can answer the distinguished Senator, and I know the 
Senator from Illinois will talk about it more, the truth is, if you 
read the Senator's amendment in full, the Senator is very precise about 
those kinds of tests that he thinks the Congress ought to guarantee 
take place.
  The Secretary of Defense is a friend of mine, too. I went to meet 
with him 3 weeks ago on this very subject to spend some time talking it 
through with him, but I find nothing inappropriate, nor do I think he 
would as a former Member of this Chamber, in this Chamber expressing 
its will in requiring a certain set of tests with respect to a system.
  This is not the first time we will have required the Secretary of 
Defense to do something. In point of fact, when we pass the DOD 
authorization bill, we have literally hundreds of directives for the 
Secretary of Defense with respect to housing, treatment of deployments, 
recruitments--there are countless numbers of ways we direct him to do 
things. It is entirely appropriate we direct him----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I agree, but the amendment says clearly 
you shall do something he is already doing.
  Mr. KERRY. I say to my friend from Virginia, I read that report very 
carefully. There is nothing in it that guarantees to me--there is 
terminology about further investigation, further evaluation, but that 
could be on paper; that could be a computer model; that could be in any 
number of ways that they decide satisfy a fairly strong compulsion, 
shall we say, within the institution to build.
  What we want to guarantee is that compulsion is appropriately 
measured against a clear empirical standard that we are establishing. I 
find absolutely nothing inconsistent in that.
  Moreover, with respect to the date that is compelling us--I know the 
chairman of the committee will agree with me on this --the fact is that 
significant changes have been made in the intelligence estimating 
process which has also made many people nervous about how people want 
to push this process a little bit.
  The Senator from Michigan talked about the possibility of a missile 
being fired by North Korea. Until, I think, a year ago or 2 years ago--
I will finish very quickly. I am not going to go on long. I want to 
make this point because it is important.
  We used to measure in an intelligence estimate more than mere 
possibility. We measure intention, and it was only in response to the 
1995 Rumsfeld process that suddenly we changed the way we evaluate 
this. We now no longer contemplate intention; we merely look at 
possibility. I say to my friend, it may be a possibility that North 
Korea has one missile that they could fire, but they would have to be 
beyond insane to do it because they would not last on the face of this 
planet more than 30 minutes because of our response.
  So do they have an intention to do it, particularly when you measure 
it against the Perry mission, when you measure it against Kim Dae-
jung's recent visit and the entire rapprochement that is currently 
taking place? Are we to believe this is a legitimate threat we should 
be responding to with such speed that will not guarantee the kind of 
testing the Senator from Illinois is asking for?
  That is our point. I think this is one where there are suspicions 
sufficient to raise questions about the guarantees that the testing 
will be there that we need.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague.
  It is important we do have colloquies on this issue. You have hit on 
a very important point, and that is ``contentious.'' Throughout our 
long history, through the cold war with the former Soviet Union--
indeed, today with Russia--there was always the underlying predicate 
that the Soviet Union--and now Russia--would handle decisionmaking as 
it relates to strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles in a 
responsible way.
  Up until recently, we knew very little about North Korea, we knew 
very little about the intentions of the deceased leader, and now the 
new leader. Some ground has been broken. I happen to be on the cautious 
side.
  So let us watch, not just for a month, not just for 2 months, but for 
over a period of time. It may well be that we can get a different 
perspective and understanding about the new leadership. But as yet, we 
cannot, and we have to rely on much in the past.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator from Illinois for his indulgence 
because he has allowed us to go ahead longer than he gave me. I thank 
him.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, what is the status of the time allocation 
for both sides?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois has 32 minutes 42 
seconds; and the Senator from Virginia has 42 minutes 48 seconds.
  Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I yield myself no more than 3 minutes to make one 
point.
  Let me say, first to the chairman of the committee, who has been kind 
enough to stay here this evening for this important debate, that I 
think the level of exchange and dialog here this evening is an 
indication of the knowledge on the subject of the Members who have 
stayed and the level of their interest. I hope it adds to the national 
debate.
  I also say to the chairman of the committee, I believe all of us in 
this Chamber share mutual respect for our current Secretary of Defense. 
I think he is doing an excellent job. Nothing that any of us have said 
or will say should bring into question our admiration and respect for 
his ability and his service to our country.
  I also tell my colleagues, I had the good fortune, in preparing for 
the debate, to go through a classified briefing and also to meet with 
Director Philip Coyle, who is in charge of Operational

[[Page 13937]]

Test and Evaluation at the Department of Defense under the leadership 
of Secretary Cohen.
  I asked him to put in common terms, that I can take back to a town 
meeting in Illinois, what we are talking about when we use the words 
``technologically feasible.''
  He said: Well, consider it this way. Is it technologically feasible 
to hit a hole in one in golf? Yes. Is it technologically feasible to 
hit a hole in one if the hole you are shooting at is moving? Yes, but 
it is getting a little more difficult. Is it technologically feasible 
to hit a hole in one if the hole you are shooting at is moving, as is 
the flag in that hole, and five or six other flags are moving as well, 
and you are not sure which one is actually the hole you are shooting 
at? Yes, I suppose that is technologically feasible, but now it is 
getting to be very difficult.
  But it raises the very question of this debate about countermeasures.
  I would like to quote and make part of this Record a letter that was 
sent to me on July 11 by Philip Coyle, director of the Office of 
Operational Test and Evaluation, in which he said:

       This letter is to support your effort to reinforce the need 
     for realistic testing of the National Missile Defense (NMD) 
     system. It is still very early in the developmental testing 
     of NMD. As we move forward, test realism will need to grow 
     with system capability, and it will become more and more 
     important to achieve realistic operational conditions in NMD 
     system tests. This will include realistic countermeasures and 
     engagement conditions.
       The very nature of missile defense means that it will not 
     be possible to demonstrate all possible engagements in open 
     air flight intercept tests. Accordingly, it will be necessary 
     to develop realistic ground test simulations including 
     realistic hardware-in-the-loop and scene generation 
     facilities. I especially appreciate your commitment to both 
     ground based and open air flight tests.
       If I can provide additional information, please don't 
     hesitate to call me.

  I say to the chairman of the committee, it is true that we are giving 
a directive to the Department of Defense and it is also true that the 
gentleman in charge of the testing under this program has said to us he 
believes it is an honest effort to make certain the system works.
  Mr. WARNER. Could the distinguished Senator provide us with a copy of 
that letter?
  Mr. DURBIN. I would be happy to.
  Mr. WARNER. Perhaps it would be important to put it in the Record.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                           Office of the Secretary of Defense,

                                    Washington, DC, July 11, 2000.
     Hon. Richard J. Durbin,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Durbin: This letter is to support your effort 
     to reinforce the need for realistic testing of the National 
     Missile Defense (NMD) system. It is still very early in the 
     developmental testing of NMD. As we move forward, test 
     realism will need to grow with system capability, and it will 
     become more and more important to achieve realistic 
     operational conditions in NMD system tests. This will include 
     realistic countermeasures and engagement conditions.
       The very nature of missile defense means that it will not 
     be possible to demonstrate all possible engagements in open 
     air flight intercept tests. Accordingly, it will be necessary 
     to develop realistic ground test simulations, including 
     realistic hardware-in-the-loop and scene generation 
     facilities. I especially appreciate your commitment to both 
     ground based and open air flight tests.
       If I can provide additional information, please don't 
     hesitate to call me.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Philip E. Coyle,
                                                         Director.

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I yield 6 minutes to the Democratic leader 
on our Armed Services Committee, Senator Levin of Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first, I commend the Senator from Illinois 
for this amendment. It is a very important amendment. It really shows 
congressional interest in an area which is going to require a great 
deal of attention. That is the statement of General Welch himself, 
which my good friend from Virginia just read.
  I want to reread one of the lines in the Welch report, which is that: 
``more advanced decoy suites are likely to escalate the discrimination 
challenge. The mid-course phase BMD concept used in the current 
national missile defense program has important architectural 
advantages. At the same time, that concept requires critical attention 
to potential countermeasure challenges.''
  The countermeasures issue requires critical attention.
  What the Senator from Illinois is saying is that the Congress should 
pay some attention to this, not just the executive branch. I have no 
doubt, and my good friend from Virginia has no doubt, Secretary Cohen 
will pay attention to this. We do not know if the next Secretary of 
Defense will be as interested in this issue--we hope he will be--as 
this Secretary.
  But the fact that the executive branch is doing something has never 
prevented the Congress from putting something into law. We have had 
Presidents who have had Executive orders that we agree with, that we 
repeat in law. Why would we hesitate to simply express our own view, 
show congressional interest, and reinforce something which hopefully 
the Defense Department will continue to do? So it is not unusual for us 
to direct something. I think we ought to adopt this amendment 
overwhelmingly.
  This is a very complicated system. The Senator from Virginia pointed 
out that a few of our colleagues voted against the Cochran bill. Almost 
all of us voted in favor of it. One part of the Cochran bill said it 
should be our national policy--it is our national policy--to deploy a 
system when ``technologically feasible'' or words to that effect.
  But there is another provision in the Cochran bill which was added by 
amendment, by the Senator from Louisiana, Ms. Landrieu, which I 
cosponsored, which said that it is also the policy of the United States 
to seek to continue to reduce, by negotiations, the number of nuclear 
weapons in this world. That is also the policy of the United States.
  We have two policies--a policy to deploy a limited missile defense 
and a policy to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. What happens when 
those two policies clash is unresolved in the Cochran bill.
  We must continue on both those courses. If there is a conflict 
between deploying a limited defense, after it is technologically 
proven--assuming it is--and reducing the number of nuclear weapons 
through continuing negotiations, if there is a conflict--as there 
apparently is at the moment, since Russia says she will not reduce 
further nuclear weapons if we are going to unilaterally deploy a 
national missile defense--if and when there is such a conflict, that 
conflict will have to be resolved under the circumstances at that time.
  So I think the Senator from Massachusetts was very proper in using 
the term ``we'' because many of us supported the Missile Defense Act 
because of the presence of a number of policies, both to deploy a 
system when technologically feasible, subject to appropriation, as well 
as to reduce, through negotiations, the number of nuclear weapons in 
this world.
  This amendment is a commonsense, fly-before-you-buy amendment. It is 
consistent with the Senate's traditions. And it is something we have 
almost always required.
  The few times we have deviated from the fly-before-you-buy approach, 
we have paid heavily for it, at least in a number of those instances. 
We should test against countermeasures. We are testing against 
countermeasures. This amendment simply says that it wants the Welch 
panel to be reauthorized, to continue in existence, to report to the 
Congress on defenses against countermeasures.
  Finally, I will reread the one line which I think is so important 
from the Welch panel: The national missile defense program requires 
critical attention to potential countermeasures challenges.
  That says it all to me. The current system does not address future 
countermeasure threats. It only addresses the so-called C-1 threat, as 
the Senator from Massachusetts pointed out. There are going to be in 
the future much

[[Page 13938]]

more sophisticated countermeasures which this system has to be able to 
address or else it won't make sense to deploy. That is what we would be 
going on record as saying we believe is important. We would be doing 
what the Welch panel says is important: paying critical attention to 
potential countermeasures challenges, saying that the Congress cares 
about this issue, that it makes sense to us that as part of any 
decision of operational effectiveness, that there be testing against 
reasonably likely countermeasures that could be faced by a national 
missile defense.
  I am glad my good friend from Virginia believes this is kind of a 
commonsense amendment, that it reinforces what the Secretary is already 
doing. I think it is very appropriate for Congress to do exactly that, 
to show our support when we do support something that is done by the 
executive branch and to state our opinion on the subject, and to put it 
in law so the next Secretary of Defense realizes it is in law and that 
there is congressional interest in the subject.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 6 minutes have expired.
  The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have no better friend than my 
distinguished colleague from Michigan. What troubles me is he used the 
term ``reauthorize.'' Congress never authorized the Welch panel. It was 
convened by the Secretary of Defense.
  Mr. LEVIN. I said the Secretary, not Congress.
  Mr. WARNER. My friend used the term this amendment ``reauthorizes.'' 
I say to my good friend, Congress had nothing to do with it. This is a 
panel of the Secretary of Defense. The amendment language says ``to 
reconvene.'' It is not necessary to reconvene something which is 
ongoing. I want accuracy in this debate.
  Mr. LEVIN. If my friend will yield, if I said Congress reauthorized 
instead of urging the Secretary to reconvene and to keep reconvened, I 
stand corrected and am happy to stand corrected.
  I think the intent was clear, however, of what the Senator from 
Michigan said.
  Mr. DURBIN. If the Senator from Virginia is not seeking time, I will 
continue allocating.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator may go ahead.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Rhode Island, Mr. Reed.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Durbin amendment. I 
commend him for raising this very important issue this evening.
  This debate has already illustrated the knowledge of the participants 
and also the commitment of both sides in this debate to try to reach a 
very important and principled decision with respect to national missile 
defense. The obvious fact is that this is the most expensive military 
program we have contemplated, perhaps, in the history of this country, 
and there is a great deal riding on it.
  It is not only financial, it is also strategic in terms of our 
increased security in the world and in terms of the reaction of our 
allies, reaction of potential adversaries, all of which makes this 
debate critical.
  At the heart of this debate--one of the reasons the Senator from 
Illinois is contributing mightily to the debate--is the issue of 
countermeasures. The importance of countermeasures should be obvious to 
all of us. My colleague from Massachusetts talked about this. In the 
history of conflict, for every development, there is an attempt to 
circumvent or to neutralize that development. So it should be no 
wonder, as we contemplate deploying a national missile defense, our 
adversaries are at this time thinking of ways they could, in fact, 
defeat such a national missile defense.
  There are two general ways to do that. One is to build more launchers 
with more warheads so you essentially overwhelm whatever missile 
defense we have in place. Or--this is probably the most likely 
response--you develop countermeasures on your missiles to confuse our 
defense and allow your missiles to penetrate despite our national 
missile defense.
  At the heart of what we should be doing in contemplating the 
deployment and funding of this system is ensuring that in the testing 
we pay particular attention to the issue of countermeasures, because 
that is the most likely response of an adversary to defeat the system 
we are proposing. That is common sense in many respects. Anyone with a 
cursory knowledge of history would immediately arrive at that 
conclusion.
  This is not a merely theoretical discussion. Sophisticated 
countermeasures already exist. They are the penetrating aids which are 
on most of the Russian missiles. There is the possibility, of course, 
that these penetrating aids will either be copied by rogue nations or, 
in fact, be traded or exchanged to these rogue nations.
  I found very interesting a report by the intelligence community which 
was unclassified and issued last September. In their words:

       We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles 
     would also develop various responses to U.S. theater and 
     national defenses. Russia and China each have developed 
     numerous countermeasures and probably are willing to sell the 
     requisite technologies.
       Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq, 
     probably would rely initially on readily available 
     technology--including separating RVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV 
     reorientation, radar absorbing material, booster 
     fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple balloon 
     decoys--to develop penetration aids and countermeasures.
       These countries could develop countermeasures based on 
     these technologies by the time they flight test their 
     missiles.

  Frankly, what we are testing against today is a very small fraction 
of these possible countermeasures penetrating aids. We have selected a 
very discrete set of the most primitive countermeasures, and we have 
used that as our benchmark to determine whether or not the proposed 
national missile defense system will work well enough to fund 
development and ultimate deployment, when, in fact, our own 
intelligence community is telling us today there are numerous 
sophisticated penetrating aids that are readily available.
  They are also telling us that as we build up this national missile 
defense, our potential adversaries, while they build their missiles, 
are not just waiting around. They are also developing their 
countermeasures. So countermeasures takes on a very important role in 
our deliberations.
  Senator Durbin has identified this critical issue and has focused the 
attention of the Senate on how we will respond to this particular 
issue. His response is not only principled but is entirely logical.
  What he is saying is, let's ensure that in the testing process, we 
don't test the just rudimentary countermeasures, we test for robust 
countermeasures. If we can defeat those countermeasures, then we have a 
system that not only we can deploy, but that system will be much more 
stable, much more effective over time; in effect, increasing the 
longevity of the system. When we are going to spend upwards of $60 
billion--I think that was one figure quoted; frankly, I believe 
whatever figure we have now, it will be much more when we finish paying 
the price--if we are spending that much money, we don't want to buy 
something that has a half-life of 1 year, 2 years, 3 years or 4 years. 
We want something that will justify the expense and defend the country 
against likely threats for many years.
  Senator Durbin used the analogy of golf. The other analogy that is 
very popular to try to bring into popular parlance what is going on 
here is essentially what we are trying to do is hit a bullet with 
another bullet, small objects flying through space at relatively large 
speeds. Think about how difficult that is right now.
  We have made progress in terms of supercomputers, in terms of large-
scale computer capacity. So the problem of identifying a speeding 
bullet and then calculating instantaneously through billions of 
calculations its trajectory and then sending that message to another 
bullet is a daunting physical problem, but we have made progress.
  However, the countermeasures takes that daunting task and infinitely 
increases its complexity because to our system and our kinetic kill 
vehicle

[[Page 13939]]

that is hurling through space, it won't be only one target; it could be 
multiple targets. To differentiate those targets, identify the real 
targets, and strike it in a matter of seconds is an incredibly complex 
technological task.
  So I believe, once again, that the Senator has identified something 
that is critical to our responsibilities--not the responsibility of the 
Secretary of Defense, not the President's responsibility, but our 
responsibility as the Senate of the United States to supervise, to 
carefully review, and, ultimately, through appropriations and 
authorization, to give the final say about this system. That is our 
responsibility, and we would be rejecting that responsibility if we 
didn't look hard and insist that the executive look hard at this whole 
issue of countermeasures.
  The other issue that has been discussed tonight is, why should we 
tell the Department of Defense to do something such as this when they 
are already doing it? Well, the simple answer is: We do it all the 
time.
  Here are a few examples recently: Last December, the F-22, a very 
sophisticated fighter aircraft, was supposed to start its low-rate 
initial production; but this decision was delayed because there was 
dissatisfaction with its progress, with whether or not it was living up 
to its capabilities. We mandated tests because we were unsatisfied with 
the deployment schedule and its ability to be brought to the forces in 
the field. That was done much further along the line than the place we 
are in developing the national missile defense. In many respects, we 
are doing the same thing with the Joint Strike Fighter this year.
  So it is not unusual to tell the Department of Defense, or to look 
over the Secretary's shoulder and say, even though you might be doing 
it, we want to make sure you are doing it, we want to make sure that 
they are looking specifically at the countermeasures. We want to know 
more specifically, when he talks about the capacity of this system to 
grow, will it grow up to all the countermeasures listed by the 
Intelligence Committee? Will it go from C-1 to C-2? We are not sure 
whether it will reach that ultimate test of countermeasures. This is a 
valuable role we must play.
  There is another aspect to this whole debate, which I think should be 
noted. It is a very difficult thing and, in some respects, an 
intellectual challenge. For years and years, decades and decades, we 
have relied upon deterrence policy----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 10 minutes of the Senator have expired.
  Mr. DURBIN. I yield an additional 1 minute to the Senator.
  Mr. REED. I will wrap up quickly.
  We have relied upon deterrence policy. At the heart of deterrence 
policy is the notion that the other side is rational, and they will 
calculate the damage you can do them just as you can calculate the 
damage that is done by them.
  What has changed now? I would say that intellectually why we are even 
having this debate is we have abandoned this concept of rationality. We 
don't think North Korea is rational. Again, that is an assumption that 
we have to look at closely as we look at some of these other things. In 
some respects, if they are totally irrational, then maybe there is a 
little hope of deterring them from doing anything, even with the 
national missile defense. But that is the difference. That is why my 
colleague from Massachusetts said we used to think about intentions, 
and now we don't. We made an intellectual decision we weren't going to 
look at that because we concluded they were irrational. I suggest that 
as we pursue this debate, we should look seriously at whether or not 
that assumption is valid.
  I thank the Senator from Illinois. I yield back my time.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Rhode Island. How 
much time is remaining on our side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eleven and a half minutes remain.
  Mr. DURBIN. Unless the Senator from Virginia wants to seek time, I 
will conclude at this point, as briefly as possible.
  Mr. WARNER. I welcome that. We have had a good debate. Having said 
that, let's wrap it up and pay our respects to the Presiding Officer 
and the staff who have all indulged us for this period of time.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, why do we test? We test so we can justify 
the taxpayers of America the expenditure of their hard-earned money in 
the defense of our country, to make certain that the expenditure is 
made in a way that we can stand and be proud of it.
  Secondly, we test to make sure that whatever we are building in the 
defense of this country will work. That is all this amendment is about. 
It is to make certain if the national missile defense is to go forward 
and to provide assurance to American families not only now but for 
years to come, it is because we have a missile defense system that will 
work.
  We have heard from a variety of different experts that the question 
of countermeasures is a critically important question. In the language 
of this amendment, we are asking the Secretary of Defense to come 
forward and give us guidance as to what the state of countermeasures 
might be in the world and to judge whether or not our missile defense 
system can deal with those countermeasures and whether we are testing 
to make certain that that happens. That is the bottom line.
  The response from the Senator from Virginia, and virtually every 
Senator who has spoken, is the understanding that what we are asking 
for in this amendment is reasonably calculated to ensure that any 
missile defense system, in fact, gives us a real sense of security and 
not a false sense of security.
  This amendment is not intended to derail the national missile defense 
system. It is intended to make certain that the system, if America 
comes to rely on it for national defense, actually works.
  In years gone by, when we hurried along the testing process, we have 
had some sorry results. The B-1 bomber went into production in the late 
1970s and wasn't fully integrated into flying units for 24 years. There 
were major problems with avionics, the engines, and the defensive 
stealth configuration that costs literally hundreds of millions of 
dollars. Adequate testing did not take place before money was spent on 
a system that was not capable of meeting the need of our national 
defense. Let us not allow that to happen when it comes to something as 
critical as our national missile defense system.
  I thank the Senator from Virginia for his patience this evening. I 
hope he believes, as I do, that this valuable debate will not only help 
the Senate but the country on this very important issue in a much more 
complete fashion. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. I daresay the final conference 
report in the Armed Services bill will draw on this amendment for 
certain portions of the law that we will write.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I also thank the chairman for making 
this a very important substantive debate. I thank the ranking minority 
member.
  Mr. WARNER. I wonder if my colleagues might consider reviewing their 
position on the Cochran bill, while there may be other opportunities to 
express affirmation.
  Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator from Virginia. We will.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe the regular order would provide 
that we have concluded the matters in the unanimous consent agreement 
as it relates to this bill. We can wrap up for the night on this bill. 
I will yield to my colleague.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, if I might, I don't believe I asked for 
the yeas and nays on the amendment. I do so now.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I believe the proposed amendment on 
testing of our National Missile defense system is overly broad, 
unnecessary, and counterproductive.
  The amendment asks that we direct the Defense Department to conduct 
testing of our National Missile Defense

[[Page 13940]]

system against--and I quote--``any countermeasures (including decoys) 
that . . . are likely, or at least realistically possible, to be used 
against the system.'' And it defines a countermeasure as ``any 
deliberate action taken by a country with long-range ballistic missiles 
to defeat or otherwise counter a United States National Missile Defense 
system.'' With language as broad as this, there is virtually no bound 
to what we would be directing the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization, as a matter of law, to go off and test against. I don't 
believe it is useful to legislate such broad and open-ended 
requirements.
  Nor is it necessary. There is already a process in place to ensure 
that the National Missile Defense system--like every other weapon 
system we have--is properly tested against the likely threats if faces, 
including potential countermeasures. Our acquisition system has a 
methodical process by which requirements for any new weapon system are 
studied and approved, and National Missile Defense is no different. 
Moreover, there is an independent operational test and evaluation 
organization in the Defense Department as a second layer of oversight 
to make sure new systems are adequately tested. With those processes in 
place, there is no need for a third layer of requirements, levied in an 
overly broad statute, to deal with some vague technical notions that 
someone somewhere has imagined.
  There are possible countermeasures to every weapon and those are 
considered as a matter of course in the design and testing of every 
system. We don't have legislation directing realistic operational 
testing against any possible countermeasures for the F-22, for example, 
and I see no reason to single out this particular weapon system for 
such treatment.
  Most of the recent talk about countermeasures to the NMD system has 
been generated by wild accusations from some college professors who 
have long opposed missile defenses of any sort. They would have us 
believe that countermeasures can become reality for even 
technologically unsophisticated nations simply because they can be 
imagined. But in the real world, in which ideas have to be translated 
to design, and design to hardware, and the hardware tested, the reality 
is far different.
  Those who are building our missile defense system understand this and 
that is why they have built in to that system the capability to deal 
with countermeasures as they evolve. The pending amendment would direct 
a reconvening of the Welsh Commission to examine this issue, but the 
fact is that General Welsh and his team have already looked at this 
issue. This is what he told the Senate just a couple weeks ago:

       There is very significant potential designed into the C-1 
     [initial NMD] system to grow to beyond the capability to deal 
     with those countermeasures. The problem with estimates as to 
     what people can give was that--the Chinese will share it, the 
     Russians will share it--it's one thing to share technology, 
     it's something else to incorporate it into your system. And, 
     so unless they share an all-out system ready to launch, there 
     is still a very significant technical challenge to 
     integrating somebody else's countermeasure technology into 
     your offensive weapons system.

  Those who believe it will be easy for rogue states to incorporate 
countermeasures into their long-range ballistic missiles should 
consider what happened last Friday night in the test of the National 
Missile Defense system. A Minuteman target missile was launched from 
Vandenberg Air force Base carrying a dummy warhead and a balloon decoy. 
No nation except perhaps Russia has more experience than the United 
States with technically sophisticated countermeasures, and those who 
say such measures will be easy for rogue states to deploy derided this 
balloon decoy as laughably simple. Well, the decoy didn't deploy 
properly. As Undersecretary of Defense Jacques Gansler noted following 
the test, ``Others have said how easy it is to put up decoys, by the 
way. This is the proof that one decoy we were trying to put up didn't 
go up.''
  Mr. President, countermeasures will eventually challenge the National 
Missile Defense system, just as they have challenged every other 
weapons system that has ever been deployed. But they aren't anywhere 
near as easy to perfect as opponents of missile defense would have us 
believe, and we already have adequate measures in place to ensure the 
National Missile Defense system is adequately designed and tested to 
account for potential countermeasures. This legislation is vague, 
overly broad, and unnecessary. I urge Senators to vote against it.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment being 
offered by my colleague, Senator Durbin, calling for effective testing 
of the National Missile Defense (NMD) program now under development by 
the Department of Defense.
  When the President signed H.R. 4, the National Missile Defense Act of 
1999, into law a year ago, he made the statement that ``any NMD system 
we deploy must be operationally effective, cost-effective, and enhance 
our security.'' The key word in the President's statement, Mr. 
President, is ``effective.'' In other words, before we decide to move 
ahead with the NMD program, among other important considerations, we 
must be confident that the system will be an ``effective'' one.
  Last year, when we debated this matter in the Senate, I spoke with my 
colleague, Senator Cochran, who agreed with me that we shouldn't buy 
the system until we know that it will work. It's common sense, of 
course, to hold back on a decision to purchase something until we know 
that it will work as advertised. We know that as private consumers. The 
same is true for the government as a consumer.
  Indeed, that is the policy of the Department of Defense (DoD) with 
respect to its purchase of ALL major weapon systems. DoD's policy 
instruction governing acquisition of all major weapon systems, DoD 
Directive 5000.1, contains a number of provisions intended to ensure 
that the customer, DoD as well as the nation as a whole, will get what 
we pay for.
  The bottom line for the Department of Defense regarding 
``effectiveness'' is whether a weapon system is tested successfully in 
realistic operating situations. The DoD instruction states that 
``before purchasing a weapon system from the production line, the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation must report to the 
Secretary of Defense that the system is operationally effective and 
suitable for use in combat.'' That should be true for missile 
interceptors as well as for conventional guns, tanks, and airplanes.
  Mr. President, the Congress has on many occasions expressed its 
commitment to the taxpayer that the billions spent on weapons will 
provide the nation with the real military capability we may need. The 
provision of DoD Instruction 5000.1 that I have cited is one such 
example. Another was legislation enacted during the 1980's requiring 
warranties on all major weapon systems and their components.
  We also, know, Mr. President, that when we fail to require that a 
system meet operational standards, we pay a heavy price. In the early 
1980's, the Congress appropriated over $20 billion dollars to purchase 
100 B-1B bombers. The problem was that we had never tested them. The B-
1B looked like the B-1A, but in fact was a far different weapon. It 
needed to be tested. We didn't do it and went ahead with the purchase. 
Mr. President, we now know the unfortunate history of that purchase. It 
wasn't until recently that the DoD used the B-1B in combat, and even 
then under very special operational circumstances. In the intervening 
decade and a half, the Air Force chose other ways to get the job done. 
I'm convinced that, in part, it was because the Air Force knew that the 
B-1B would not have been capable of getting the job done. There are 
other expensive examples I could use to illustrate the price we've paid 
for inadequate testing. Design flaws in the C-5 and F-18 have ended up 
costing the taxpayer a bundle. I'm sure you've recently read the news 
reports about flaws in the protective suits for our troops to use in a 
chemical or biological warfare environment. They weren't adequately 
tested either.

[[Page 13941]]

  The amendment Senator Durbin is sponsoring today seeks simply to 
affirm Congressional commitment to the taxpayer, to the men and women 
in uniform who must operate our weapons, and to the nation that must 
depend on it for our defense. I am pleased to cosponsor this amendment 
that would require that the NMD system be tested against possible 
countermeasures that are likely, or at least realistically possible, to 
be used to accompany attacking warheads that potential enemies could 
launch against us. The amendment calls for the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization (BMDO) to plan ground and flight tests to address 
those threats, to seek funds to support what's needed to meet them, and 
to report annually on the status and progress of the NMD program 
regarding countermeasures. In short, Mr. President, the amendment 
proposes concrete actions to ensure that we know the exact nature of 
the threat, that we plan appropriate technical responses, and that we 
test adequately to make sure that those responses work.
  We are all aware of the recent outcome of the latest NMD flight test, 
IFT-5. In that test, a developmental test, the kill vehicle failed to 
separate from its booster to engage the incoming target warhead. Mr. 
President, this was a test designed and conducted under very 
controlled, hardly realistic, conditions. It was a test in which all 
the pieces of the complex NMD system were given special capabilities to 
carry out their job in a controlled, experimental environment.
  I think we can all agree that it's appropriate to walk before we run. 
In ``walking'' through this test, IFT-5, we have discovered once again 
how difficult it is to ``hit a bullet with a bullet'' even though we 
think we know how each piece of the system will function. I'd like to 
emphasize, Mr. President, that this was not an operational test under 
realistic conditions that DoD requires for every other major weapon 
system before it decides to go ahead and buy it. This was a controlled, 
laboratory test in which one of the pieces we thought we know most 
about failed.
  I believe that although the NMD test program to date indicates that 
we are developing some amazing capabilities, we are a very long way 
from being confident that the NMD system as a whole will work. Indeed, 
in order for an NMD test to be truly realistic, there are a whole host 
of variables that must differ significantly from the conditions that 
were present during the IFT-5 test. In order to be more realistic, for 
example, future tests should reorient the basic geographic direction of 
the test from West to East rather than East to West. The flight test 
envelope would have to be greatly enlarged. Various types of 
countermeasures, the subject of the amendment, should be used. Actual 
military personnel who would operate the system should be at the 
controls. Information from the warning system should reflect likely 
warning times. We are a very long way from realistic testing the NMD 
system in those regards and a number of others. This amendment 
addresses only one of those variables, albeit a very important one. 
Adopting this amendment will provide us with critical information about 
the feasibility of the NMD system to get the job done. Committing 
ourselves to procuring and deploying the NMD system until we know the 
answers to questions regarding key operational capabilities would be 
premature and ill-advised.
  There are other critical factors that will play important and 
necessary roles in determining whether the President will commit the 
nation to deploying NMD. Surely the nature of the threat must be 
assessed and reassessed to make sure that this program is warranted. 
Surely the possible responses of our allies and potential adversaries 
will play an important part in the President's calculation. At the end 
of the day, the President will have determined whether the nation is 
more or less secure as a result of deciding to deploy the NMD system.
  In the meantime, as responsible stewards for public expenditures, it 
behooves us to take all measures necessary to ensure that the billions 
we are spending for NMD are giving the taxpayer real dividends. This 
amendment is an important means to make that happen. I urge all of my 
colleagues to support realistic testing before committing the nation to 
procurement and deployment of NMD. Thank you, Mr. President. I yield 
the floor.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, this discussion of a national missile 
defense system comes at a timely moment. As we struggle to complete 
action on our thirteen appropriations bills that fund the Federal 
Government, we are confronted with many unmet needs and the desire to 
reduce the amount the Federal Government takes from the American 
taxpayers' hard earned income. The budget agreement locks in spending 
limits and requires a balanced budget, thereby preventing us from 
increasing spending on missile defense without cutting other programs. 
The debate over how much to spend in research on a national missile 
defense (NMD) system and whether it is time to make a decision on 
deployment strongly effects both the government's ability to meet the 
needs of Americans and the likelihood that we will be able to return 
money to the taxpayers of this country. The costs of such a system and 
the choices it would force us to make must be carefully weighed against 
the benefit of an NMD system, the chances that it would work, and the 
effect that deployment would have on the arms control agenda of the 
United States.
  The decision on how much to spend on an NMD research program cannot 
be made without considering these questions. We must ask how much we 
can afford to spend on defense. I argue that national security also has 
a social component: affordable health care for all Americans, better 
job opportunities, a strong education system and economic security for 
America's seniors are all facets of a strong America. Without these 
things, military technology cannot protect America from the real 
threats against us.
  I have long supported a reasonable program of research and testing of 
anti-ballistic missile technologies, while opposing efforts to throw 
huge increases at the program. I hope that thoughtful research will 
lead to some technological breakthroughs on ways to counter ballistic 
missiles. Their proliferation, especially in the hands of irresponsible 
leaders such as North Korea's Kim Jong Il, requires that we actively 
investigate possible defenses. We cannot ignore the emergence of new 
nuclear threats to the United States.
  A premature decision to deploy an inadequately tested national 
missile defense system would also be a risk to national security. We 
cannot afford to spend huge amounts of money on a system we are not 
certain would work, or on a system that might provoke the very reaction 
from rogue states that we are ultimately trying to prevent. I am a 
strong believer in strengthening international non-proliferation 
regimes such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty, which I am very disappointed the Senate has failed to 
ratify. Successful non-proliferation efforts are worth every penny! The 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has also served us well for many years, 
and we must be careful to not throw out a valuable asset in our rush to 
jump on the newest technology.
  I am pleased to be a cosponsor of Senator Durbin's amendment to add 
some important requirements to any national missile defense testing 
regime. This amendment would require realistic testing of an NMD system 
against the countermeasures that might be deployed against it. Senator 
Durbin's amendment would help ensure that if we move to consider 
deployment of an NMD system, we would have a realistic assessment of 
that system's expected performance. Any evaluation of the effectiveness 
of an NMD system must consider not only the capabilities of the system 
itself, but its ability to survive what we expect might be thrown up to 
defeat it. Without this information, it would be hard to judge the true 
utility of such a system, and easy to overestimate its performance.
  This past Friday's failed test of a space intercept brings into 
sharper focus the issue of claims and performance of an NMD system. 
Without realistic tests proving the expectations of

[[Page 13942]]

researchers, we can never be sure that laboratory results can be 
duplicated in practice. It might be tempting to rush to deploy a system 
that appeared to provide significant protection for the American 
people. Passage of this amendment would help ensure that any system 
have a reasonable chance of working before it is considered for 
deployment.
  I continue to believe that our greatest vulnerability to nuclear 
attack is not from a nuclear bomb delivered by an intercontinental 
ballistic missile, but rather from a nuclear devise slipped into the 
country in some much less visible way, like hidden in some cargo coming 
into a major U.S. seaport. Committing many billions of dollars to 
deploy the proposed defense systems would do nothing to protect us 
against this very real threat. At this time, it would be much more 
productive to invest these funds in stopping the spread of nuclear 
technologies and in using other means to counter terrorist 
organizations and other rogue elements.
  Personally, I believe that the politics of missile defense have 
gotten way out ahead of the science of missile defense. This amendment 
would help restore the proper order of these concepts. I urge my 
colleagues to support the Durbin amendment.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, the Durbin amendment to the fiscal year 
2001 Defense authorization bill is a common sense proposal that will 
ensure that a National Missile Defense system is properly tested before 
it becomes operational.
  President Clinton is expected to make a decision in the next few 
months on whether or not to begin the deployment of a National Missile 
Defense system. He has said that the decision will be based on four 
criteria: the readiness of the technology, the impact on arms control 
and our relations with Russia, the cost of the system, and the threat. 
Based on these criteria, I do not believe that a decision to deploy 
should be made at this time.
  This amendment deals with just one of these criteria, the readiness 
of the technology. It says that the National Missile Defense system 
should be tested against realistic decoys and other counter-measures 
before it becomes operational. Initial operating capability is now 
scheduled for 2005.
  Let me be clear, this amendment would not prevent a deployment 
decision this year, nor would it delay the deployment of the system.
  Mr. President, this is no different from school. if you cannot pass 
the exams, you cannot graduate. In this case, if NMD cannot pass a test 
against realistic counter-measures, it will not be made operational. 
There will be no social promotion of missile defense. The strategic 
implications of this system are too great. We do not want to make a 
system operational that we are not sure will work against an incoming 
warhead.
  Now the opponents of this legislation might say: Senator Boxer, this 
amendment is unnecessary. The U.S. would never make a missile defense 
system operational that wouldn't work.
  Well, in 1969 the U.S. made a decision to deploy the Safeguard 
missile defense system to defend U.S. missile against incoming Soviet 
missiles. This system would have used Spartan missiles armed with small 
nuclear warheads to intercept incoming ICBMs.
  On October 1, 1975, after spending $6 billion (over $20 billion in 
today's dollars), the first ABM site became operational at Nekoma, 
North Dakota. Five months later the project was terminated.
  Why was the project terminated? Because it didn't work. There were at 
least two major problems with the Safeguard system. First, its radars 
were vulnerable to destruction by Soviet missiles. Destruction of these 
radar systems would blind the defensive system. Second it was found 
that when the nuclear warheads on defending Spartan missiles were 
detonated, these explosions themselves would also blind the radar 
systems. You do not have to be a rocket scientist to know that it is 
important for the system to work before it is made operational.
  So why is the Senator from Illinois concerned about countermeasures? 
A September 1999 National Intelligence Estimate warned that emerging 
missile states would use counter-measures.
  Let me quote from the unclassified version of the report:

       Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would 
     rely initially on readily available technology--including 
     separating warheads, spin-stabilized warheads, warhead 
     reorientation, radar absorbing material, booster 
     fragmentation, low power jammers, chaff, and simple balloon 
     decoys.

  It goes on to say that ``Russia and China each have developed 
numerous counter-measures and probably are willing to sell the 
requisite technology.''
  Many of our best scientists have said that the planned NMD system 
would be defeated by counter-measures. An April 2000 report released 
jointly by the Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies 
Program found that ``the current testing program is not capable of 
assessing the system's effectiveness against a realistic attack.''
  So Mr. President, this is an important amendment. It would ensure 
that our NMD system is tested against realistic counter-measures and 
require detailed reports from the Secretary of Defense and the 
Independent Review Panel which is headed by retired Air Force General 
Larry Welch.
  I congratulate my friend, Senator Durbin, for offering this important 
amendment and I urge the Senate to adopt it.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I want to extend my personal gratitude to 
the Armed Services Committee Chairman and the Ranking Member, as well 
as to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Readiness 
for their consideration of my recommended language at Sec. 361 of this 
bill. This provision requires the Secretary of Defense to report on the 
consequences of high OPTEMPO on military aviation and ground equipment. 
Let me explain why I applaud this provision. My particular interest is 
somewhat more focused on aviation assets.
  Quite simply, we need to know the adverse effects that the worldwide 
contingency operations engaged in by our military high-performance 
aircraft are having on the integrity of the aircraft's frame, engines 
and other components.
  I raise this issue, Mr. President, because my state proudly hosts the 
Ogden Air Logistics Center at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. Just recently, 
a team of depot technicians at Hill discovered that the mechanical 
assembly designed to brake or halt the rise and fall of the stabilizer 
on the Air Force KC-135 tanker had been prematurely wearing out because 
of a surge of KC-135 flight activity, much of it related to the frantic 
deployment schedules that these aircrews are tied to.
  The shortage of replacement parts for the stabilizer braking system 
forced the Air Force to come up with a methodology to refurbish the old 
part. There had never been a refurbishment of the braking assembly 
before this time.
  This is an important fact because the engineering design missed a 
critical step in the refurbishment process designed to heat out 
hydrogen that risked getting into microscopic fissures in the brake 
ratchet. This would have eventually embrittled the system, causing the 
stabilizer to fail. It would have meant with near certainty that we 
would have lost aircraft in midair flight as well as some aircrew 
lives.
  The Secretary of the Air Force, Whitten Peters, has commended the 
depot technicians for their astute recommendations to the Air Force 
Materiel Command to ground the KC-135 fleet; this was done, and I am 
convinced that lives were saved.
  But I am no less convinced that we need better visibility over the 
rapidly aging aircraft airframes and other parts are suffering from the 
near-frenetic flying schedules and deployments that they and their 
crews are committed to. Put more directly: we cannot and must not push 
these brave aircrews into harm's way in aircraft that are even remotely 
vulnerable to critical component failures.
  Mr. President, my concern extends to all tactical and strategic, as 
well as support and service support aviation assets used in these 
contingency and

[[Page 13943]]

peacekeeping operations by the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force. 
The provision asks for a study of the effects of these deployments on 
all such assets. Wisely, the Committee has added Army aviation since 
its predominately rotary wing--or helicopter--operations warrant 
inclusion in the scope of this assessment.
  If one looks at the Air Force commitments, which have carried the 
bulk of many of the contingency operations, the statistics are as 
staggering as they are telling: 18,400 sorties over Iraq; 73 percent of 
the air assets patrolling the Northern watch no-fly zone which produced 
75 percent of the total number of sorties in that region. In the 
Southern Watch no-fly zone, the Air Force also provided 35 percent of 
the total air assets and produced 68 percent of the sorties. But I 
don't want to ignore the Navy with its carrier-based aircraft that 
undergo take-off and, especially, landing procedures that create 
unimaginably harsh stresses on aircraft. Many members of this body have 
witnessed carrier operations and know precisely what I am talking 
about. Some of our colleagues, like my good friends John McCain and Tom 
Harkin, are even former Navy carrier pilots.
  The Secretary of Defense has tried to deal with this issue. And we 
have tried to help him in the past year. Secretary Bill Cohen cited in 
his report to Congress this February that aging systems, spot spare 
parts shortages, and high OPTEMPO [high operating tempo] are placing 
increased pressure on materiel readiness.'' The Secretary has testified 
to his ``particular concern'' for ``negative readiness trends in 
mission capable rates for aircraft.'' Last year, Congress provided DOD 
with $1.8 billion in Kosovo emergency supplemental funding to meet the 
most urgent demands.
  Yet, our equipment is aging. The average age of Air Force aircraft is 
now 20 years old. Our state of art air-to-ground mission aircraft, the 
F-16, has a technology base older than most of its pilots, some of whom 
are flying F-16 aircraft that have been in service longer than they 
have been alive! The problems of corrosion, fatigue and even parts 
obsolescence are rampant. I spend much time at Hill Air Force Base in 
my state of Utah. There are certain critical components that are still 
tied to vacuum tube technology. Imagine that! How many of us still 
listen to vacuum tube radios; some of our younger staff members may not 
even know what they are! Some of our top-of-the-line tactical fighter 
aircraft use gyroscopes--which are absolutely critical to positional 
accuracy--that are several generations old. It bothers me greatly to 
hear people complain about ``gold-plated'' military aircraft. I would 
invite any of them to join me in a tour of the Ogden, Utah, depot. When 
they see the condition of components from our best tactical fighters 
being serviced, I suspect they would better understand the real meaning 
of courage.
  But let me conclude with a word about the most important resource in 
this equation: people. We have reduced our forces by 30 percent and 
increased deployments by nearly 400 percent. The effect is exactly what 
you would expect. Recently, the Marine Corps' Commandant and the Army 
Chief of Staff announced that deployments of their aviation and ground 
equipment are now 16 times the rate during the Cold War. Unprecedented 
pilot losses, reaching a 33 percent level in the Navy, 15 percent in 
the Air Force and 21 percent in the Marine Corps. But the most critical 
losses are found among the highly specialized aircraft service 
technicians. Specialists in electronic components, air traffic control, 
armaments and munitions, and other technical specialties, at all levels 
of service, short-term, mid-term and long-term, are leaving in 
unprecedented numbers. Even the Air Force's valiant Expeditionary Air 
Force concept, which organizes a highly mobile slice of the Air Force 
into 10 task forces, called ``Air Expeditionary Forces,'' faces 
technical enlisted skill shortages which still burden the fewer and 
fewer technicians who remain on active duty, according to a General 
Accounting Office study on military personnel released in early March 
2000.
  Mr. President, I want to thank my colleagues for listening to this 
long presentation regarding my concerns for the state of our military 
aircraft and the people who fly and service them. I know that most will 
join with me and the committee in calling for a full review of the 
consequences of the unprecedented peacetime demands being made on our 
people and their equipment.


                    National Guard ChalleNGe Program

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am seriously concerned about Section 910 
of S. 2549, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2001.
  Section 910 would effect the transfer of responsibility for the 
National Guard Youth ChalleNGe program from the Chief of the National 
Guard Bureau to the Secretary of Defense and would amend the limitation 
on federal funding for the National Guard Challenge program to limit 
only Department of Defense funding. This language removes the National 
Guard Bureau from the ``chain of command'' and from its statutory role 
as the channel of communication between the federal government and the 
states (10 U.S.C. Sec. 10501).
  Youth ChalleNGe exists in 25 states and is a federal/state 
partnership program. While there is partial federal funding (which is 
capped by law at $62.5 million per year), the ChalleNGe staff members 
are state employees who meet state teacher and counselor certification 
requirements. All legally binding cooperative agreements currently in 
place are between the Governors and the Chief, National Guard Bureau.
  ChalleNGe is a highly successful program that takes at-risk youths 
and gives them the opportunity to turn their lives around and become 
productive members of their communities. Since the program was 
established, with my assistance in 1991, more than 4,500 young 
Americans have graduated. Of this number, more than 66% have earned 
their GED or high school diploma; more than 12% entered the military, 
and more than 16% enrolled in college.
  ChalleNGe is a program in demand by the states. If it were not for 
the cap on spending, more states would have a ChalleNGe program. 
Transferring authority from the National Guard to the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs could only have a 
negative impact and upset a program that is operating extremely well 
under the auspices of the National Guard Bureau. It would add another 
layer of bureaucracy and require the State National Guard programs to 
relate through an altogether new ``chain of command'' for the Youth 
ChalleNGe program, while maintaining the existing ``chain of command'' 
for all other National Guard activities.
  On June 16th of this year, I participated in the graduation ceremony 
of the cadets of the Mountaineer ChalleNGe program at Camp Dawson, West 
Virginia. In all my years of delivering commencement speeches and high 
school diplomas, I can say without reservation that this was the most 
impressive group of students that I have ever encountered. The 
graduates sat at full attention throughout the event, with obvious 
pride in their hard-earned achievements and serious commitment to a 
future on the right path. Such transformation can not be achieved by 
mere bootcamp exercises alone. It takes a tough-love approach with 
caring and compassionate instructors who want to see the lives of these 
troubled youth turned around forever. The National Guard offers these 
young people the very virtues--leadership, followership, community 
service, job skills, health and nutrition, and physical education--that 
are in keeping with the Guard's tradition of adding value to America 
and it certainly showed in West Virginia.
  Let us not punish this fine organization which is doing an 
exceptional job in helping youth in-need.
  Mr. WARNER. It is my understanding that the committee report language 
may not fully and adequately explain the intent of the Committee. The 
Committee's intent is to reaffirm the role of the Secretary of Defense 
to establish policy for and oversee the operation of DOD programs. I 
intend to

[[Page 13944]]

see that the conference report language adequately expresses the view 
that the National Guard is to continue to administer the Youth 
ChalleNGe program under the oversight and direction of the Secretary of 
Defense.
  Mr. LEVIN. I think the Chairman has a workable solution. It is not 
the intent of the Committee that the National Guard should lose its 
ability to administer this highly successful program. Rather, the 
intent is that there be adequate policy direction and oversight of the 
Youth ChalleNGe program by the Secretary of Defense.
  Mr. BYRD. I had intended to offer an amendment to clarify this issue. 
However, I believe that the comments of the distinguished Chairman and 
Ranking Minority Member of the Armed Services Committee have helped 
clear up this matter. I hope the conference report will further clarify 
the matter.


                conveyance authority for utility systems

  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I am very concerned about a provision 
contained in H.R. 4205, the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2001, regarding the conveyance authority for utility 
systems at U.S. military installations. The House proposes to change 
existing law in a manner that jeopardizes the ability of a municipal 
utility in Washington, Tacoma Power, to participate in the competitive 
selection process and acquire Fort Lewis' electric utility system. Fort 
Lewis is Washington's major Army base. I oppose changes to DOD's 
current conveyance authority, when that change impedes competition.
  The Department of Defense is privatizing utility systems at military 
bases throughout the county. Military bases are considered Federal 
enclaves, and therefore are subject to Federal, rather than State, law. 
The language contained in H.R. 4205 dramatically weakens existing 
Federal law by subjecting military bases to State laws, regulations, 
rulings and orders in the competitive bid process of their utility 
systems. This would have a negative impact on DOD utility privatization 
efforts in my state of Washington. The reason for this is that utility 
service territories in Washington are established by service area 
agreements--contracts--rather than by State decree. Eliminating the 
Federal law that applies on military bases would create a host of legal 
questions, the effect of which is to foster litigation and undercut the 
DOD privatization process in Washington.
  Because I am not a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and 
would therefore not be privy to Conference Committee negotiations, I 
respectfully request your assistance in assuring that whatever utility 
language is included in the FY01 Defense Authorization bill properly 
takes into account the unique circumstances of Washington.
  Mr. WARNER. I share the Senator's concerns regarding the impact the 
House language might have on competition, and will work with you to 
ensure that Washington state's issues are addressed during the 
conference. Any suggestions you may have on this matter would be most 
welcome.
  Mr. GORTON. I thank the Senator in advance for your commitment to 
this effort. I look forward the working with you in the coming weeks to 
see that this issue is resolved in a favorable manner.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this past year, the men and women of the 
Armed Forces proved, once again, the value of a strong and ready 
military. Since the end of the Cold War, our Armed Forces have been 
busier, and have conducted a greater variety of missions around the 
world, than at any other time during our nation's history, short of 
war.
  Our forces ended Serb aggression in Kosovo, brought peace to East 
Timor, and aided earthquake victims in Turkey. At this moment, American 
service men and women are monitoring the demilitarized zone in Korea, 
enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq, patrolling the Arabian Gulf for 
oil smugglers, and assisting in the battle against drugs in Central and 
South America. These activities are in addition to the daily operations 
they conduct at home and with our allies overseas to maintain the 
readiness of our forces.
  Our National Guard and Reserve members continue as equal partners in 
carrying out our national security and national military strategies. 
Last May, in the span of only one week, C-5 transport aircraft from the 
439th Airlift Wing at Westover Air Reserve Base in Massachusetts 
carried helicopters and equipment to Trinidad-Tobago to aid in the war 
against drugs, flew the Navy's new mini-submarine to Hawaii, an 
unprecedented accomplishment and a tribute to their ingenuity and 
resourcefulness, airlifted Marines to Greece, carried supplies to 
Europe, and continued their very important training at home.
  Last week, over a hundred citizen-soldiers from Bravo Company of the 
368th Engineer Combat Battalion left their homes in Attleboro, 
Massachusetts for duty in Kosovo.
  These are just a few examples of what Guard and Reserve members from 
every state, do for us each day around the world.
  We ask the men and women of our Armed Forces to prepare for and 
respond to every contingency, from supporting humanitarian relief 
efforts, peacekeeping, and enforcing United Nations sanctions, to 
fighting a full-scale Major Theater War. A quarter million of our 
service members are deployed around the world to deter aggression, keep 
the peace, promote democracy, and foster goodwill and cooperation with 
our allies, and even with our potential adversaries.
  All of our men and women in uniform put our nation's interests above 
their own. When called upon, they risk their lives for our freedom. As 
a nation, we often take this sacrifice for granted, until we are 
reminded of it again by tragic events such as the April training 
accident in Arizona, where 19 Marines lost their lives in the line of 
duty. These Marines paid the ultimate sacrifice for their country, and 
it was fitting for the Senate to honor them with a resolution. I 
commend my colleague Senator Snowe for her leadership on that 
resolution.
  More recently, this week, two Arizona Army Guardsmen lost their lives 
when their Apache helicopter crashed in a night training exercise. Two 
Navy pilots were killed in a training accident in Maryland. The cost of 
training in the name of peace and security is high.
  One of Congress' most important duties is to make sure that our Armed 
Forces are able to meet the many challenges of an increasingly unstable 
international environment. Both the Director of Central Intelligence 
and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency testified before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee that, more than at any other time 
in the nation's history, we are at risk of ``substantial surprise'' by 
adversaries. Their views are supported by the worldwide expansion of 
information technology, the proliferation of dual-use technology, and 
the fact that the expertise to develop weapons of mass destruction is 
available and for hire on the open market.
  The growing resentment by potential adversaries of our status as the 
last superpower makes us susceptible to hostile acts ranging from 
computer attacks to chemical or biological terrorism. Our military must 
be equipped to deter this aggression and, if necessary, counter it. The 
FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Bill takes a positive step 
toward doing so.
  The many activities which our forces have undertaken and maintained 
in the past decade, in spite of reduced resources, has taken a toll on 
our people, their equipment, and readiness. This bill continues the 
increases in defense spending needed to reverse this trend that the 
President and Congress began last year. At $310 billion, this bill 
represents real growth, and a necessary investment in the future of the 
nation's security. At the heart of our armed forces are the soldiers, 
sailors, airmen and marines who took the oath of office to support and 
defend the Constitution against all of our enemies, foreign and 
domestic. Clearly, without them, we could not preserve our freedom. 
Attracting young men and women to serve, and retaining them in an all-
volunteer force, is more challenging

[[Page 13945]]

than ever. Last year, Congress authorized the largest pay raise in 
nearly two decades, reformed the pay table, and restored the 50% 
retirement benefit. This year, we continue these efforts to support our 
service members and their families, by granting a 3.7 percent pay 
raise, which is one-half percent above inflation. We also provide for 
the gradual reduction to zero--over five years --of out-of-pocket 
housing expenses for service members living off base, and we provide 
better military health care for family members. The bill also directs 
the implementation of the Thrift Savings Plan that Congress authorized 
last year. The welfare of the men and women of our armed forces is 
rightly at the center of this year's Defense Authorization Bill.
  The bill also takes a bold and necessary step to honoring the promise 
of lifetime health care for military retirees. The Armed Services 
Committee heeded the needs of our military retirees, and addressed 
their number one priority--the cost of prescription drugs. The Defense 
Authorization Bill expands the Base Realignment and Closure pharmacy 
benefit--already available to 450,000 retirees--to the entire 1.4 
million Medicare-eligible military retiree community. This benefit lets 
all men and women in uniform know that we care about their service, and 
that a career in the military is honorable and worth pursuing. It also 
lets all military retirees know that Congress is listening, cares, and 
is willing to act on their behalf.
  The bill also continues and expands health care demonstration 
programs to evaluate how we can best address the health care needs of 
these retirees. We must complete the evaluation of these programs and 
move to answer their needs. I am hopeful that soon, we will be able to 
do more.
  The bill also enhances efforts to prepare for and respond to other 
threats. It authorizes five additional Civil Support Teams to a total 
of 32 by the end of FY 2001. The teams will be specially trained and 
equipped to respond to the suspected use of weapons of mass destruction 
on American soil. While we hope they will never be needed, we must be 
prepared for any emergency.
  The bill adds $74 million for programs to protect against chemical 
and biological agents, and it funds the research and development for a 
second generation, single-shot anthrax vaccine. The men and women of 
our Armed Forces need this support now.
  Each service has taken steps to protect the environment, but too 
little has been done to detect and deal with the effects of unexploded 
ordnance. On the Massachusetts Military Reservation, unexploded 
ordnance may be contaminating the soil and groundwater in the area. 
This situation is unacceptable. If it is not addressed now, it could 
cause irreparable harm to the environment and the people who live 
there.
  Unexploded ordnance is a problem in every active and formerly-used 
live-fire training facility. The bill includes $10 million to develop 
and test new technologies to detect unexploded ordnance and analyze and 
map the presence of their contaminants, so that they can be more easily 
cleaned up. For too many years, this issue has been ignored. The time 
has come for the Department of Defense to take on the task of removing 
UXO. This step is essential to ensure the continued operation of 
training ranges, which are vital to the continued readiness of our 
forces and the safe reuse of facilities that have been closed.
  Last May, the country felt the effect of a simple computer virus that 
disabled e-mail systems throughout the world, and cost industry 
billions of dollars. The ``Love Bug'' virus also reportedly infected 
classified e-mail systems within the Department of Defense. Last year, 
more than 22,000 cyber-attacks took place on DOD computer systems--a 
300 percent increase over the previous year. The cyber threat to 
national security will become more complex and more disruptive in the 
future. Our armed forces must be better prepared to deal with this 
threat and to protect these information systems. The bill adds $77 
million to address this serious and growing threat.
  In the Seapower Subcommittee, under the leadership of our 
distinguished chair, Senator Snowe, we heard testimony and continued 
concern about the Navy's force structure, the shipbuilding rate, and 
the overall readiness of the fleet. I support the Secretary of the 
Navy's decision to increase R&D spending for the new land-attack 
destroyer, DD-21, but I am concerned about the delay in the program, 
the effect of this delay on fire support requirements of the Marine 
Corps, and its effect on our shipbuilding industrial base.
  The bill includes $550 million for DD-21 research and development. It 
also asks the Navy to report to Congress on the feasibility of starting 
DD-21 construction in FY 2004, as originally scheduled, for delivery by 
2009, and the effects of the current delay on the destroyer 
shipbuilding industrial base.
  To ease the strain on the shipbuilding industrial base, the bill 
authorizes the extension of the DDG-51 multi-year procurement, approved 
by Congress in 1997, to include procurements through fiscal year 2005. 
This increase will bring greater near-term health to our destroyer 
shipyards. It could raise the Navy's overall shipbuilding rate to an 
acceptable level of 9 ships for each of those years, and it could save 
almost $600 million for these ships by avoiding the additional unit 
cost of building them at a smaller rate. This increase benefits the 
Navy, the shipyards, and the shipyard workers, and it is fiscally 
responsible.
  I am particularly concerned about one section of the bill that closes 
the School of the Americas and then reopens it as the Defense Institute 
for Hemispheric Security Cooperation.
  Despite the additional human rights curriculum, I am concerned that 
well-known abuses by the School's graduates have caused irreparable 
harm to its credibility. The School accounts for less than 10 percent 
of the joint education and training programs conducted by the U.S. 
military for Latin American forces, but it has graduated some of the 
most notorious human rights abusers in our hemisphere.
  A report of the UN Truth Commission on the School implicated former 
trainees, including death squad organizer Robert D'Abuisson, in 
atrocities committed in El Salvador. During the investigation of the 
1989 murder of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador, it turned out that 19 
of the 26 people implicated in this case were graduates of the School. 
Other graduates include Leopoldo Galtieri, the former head of the 
Argentine junta, Manuel Noriega, the former dictator of Panama, and 
Augusto Pinochet, the former dictator of Chile. In September 1996, 
after years of accusations that the School teaches soldiers how to 
torture and commit other human rights violations, the Department of 
Defense acknowledged that instructors at the School had taught such 
techniques.
  I welcome the Army's recognition that human rights and civil-military 
relations must be a top priority in our programs with Latin America. 
The provision in this bill, will close the School and immediately 
reopen it with a new name at the same location, with the same students 
and with much of the same curriculum. But this step will not solve the 
problems that have plagued this institution.
  I commend my colleague, Representative Moakley, for his leadership on 
this issue and his proposal to create a Task Force to assess the type 
of education and training appropriate for the Department of Defense to 
provide to military personnel of Latin American nations. These issues 
demand our attention, and we must address them more effectively.
  In summary, I commend my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee 
for their leadership in dealing with the many challenges facing our 
nation on national defense. This bill keeps the faith with the 2.2 
million men and women who make up our active duty, guard, and reserve 
forces. It is vital to our nation's security, and I urge the Senate to 
approve it.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a previous 
unanimous consent agreement regarding the ``boilerplate language'' for 
completing the Defense authorization be modified with the changes that 
I now send to the desk.

[[Page 13946]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The unanimous consent agreement, as modified, is as follows:

       I ask unanimous consent that, with the exception of the 
     Byrd amendment on bilateral trade which will be disposed of 
     this evening, that votes occur on the other amendments listed 
     in that Order beginning at 9:30 A.M. on Thursday, July 13, 
     2000.
       I further ask unanimous consent that, upon final passage of 
     H.R. 4205, the Senate amendment, be printed as passed.
       I further ask unanimous consent that, following disposition 
     of H.R. 4205 and the appointment of conferees the Senate 
     proceed immediately to the consideration en bloc of S. 2550, 
     S. 2551, and S. 2552 (Calendar Order Numbers, 544, 545, and 
     546); that all after the enacting clause of these bills be 
     stricken and that the appropriate portion of S. 2549, as 
     amended, be inserted in lieu thereof, as follows:
       S. 2550: Insert Division A of S. 2549, as amended;
       S. 2551: Insert Division B of S. 2549, as amended;
       S. 2552: Insert Division C of S. 2549, as amended; that 
     these bills be advanced to third reading and passed; that the 
     motion to reconsider en bloc be laid upon the table; and that 
     the above actions occur without intervening action or debate.
       Finally, I ask unanimous consent with respect to S. 2550, 
     S. 2551, and S. 2552, that if the Senate receives a message 
     with respect to any of these bills from the House of 
     Representatives, the Senate disagree with the House on its 
     amendment or amendments to the Senate-passed bill and agree 
     to or request a conference, as appropriate, with the House on 
     the disagreeing votes of the two houses; that the Chair be 
     authorized to appoint conferees; and that the foregoing occur 
     without any intervening action or debate.

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