[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 1382-1383]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                   IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1999

  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act. I note, as many do, the encouraging election 
results that happened this past week within Iran. I say encouraging 
because perhaps that country is moving towards a more open policy, a 
better policy of engagement with the rest of the world and the United 
States.
  I want to point out some facts and some reasons that this act should 
be passed. Iran remains a danger to the United States and to our 
friends in the Middle East, particularly to Israel. It is a fact.
  Iran continues as the largest state supporter of international 
terrorism, the bankroller of munitions supplied to Hezbollah in Lebanon 
and to Islamic Jihad and Hamas. It is still opposed to the Israeli 
peace process and to peace under any circumstances with Israel.
  Those are all the facts, and they remain the facts, in spite of the 
fact that a so-called moderate President Khatami has been in power in 
Iran for 2\1/2\ years. I know some would say he does not have full 
control, and he doesn't, nor will he after these elections. This will 
remain the factual situation even after this election.
  I don't think the United States should act on hope but on fact. The 
recent Hezbollah attacks on Israeli soldiers could not have happened 
without Iranian approval. Those attacks, made possible by the continued 
funneling of arms from Iran to Hezbollah, were undertaken primarily to 
derail the peace process. After all, Israel has already committed 
itself to withdraw from Lebanon by July.
  Even more worrisome is Iran's effort to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction and the missiles to be able to deliver them. The 
administration has already sanctioned 10 Russian entities for providing 
dangerous technologies to Iran but readily admits that the flow 
continues. Thousands of Russian scientists and technicians are at work 
in Iran helping these efforts. This remains the fact today.
  Iran has already flight-tested a missile capable of reaching Israel 
and is working on longer range missiles capable of carrying nuclear 
warheads. Fact.
  Under the guise of peaceful nuclear energy development, Iran is 
spending billions to develop a nuclear infrastructure. Iran, a country 
rich in both oil and natural gas, needs to develop

[[Page 1383]]

nuclear energy about as much as Alaska needs artificial snowmaking 
machines.
  The picture gets worse. CIA Director Tenet, in testimony before the 
Armed Services Committee earlier this month, forecast the possibility 
that Iran might become a supplier in its own right of missile 
technology as it develops its own indigenous production capability. 
Fact.
  Those are the facts. Iran is getting this dangerous technology from 
North Korea and China, but its primary source remains Russia. Russian 
entities have assisted Iran in the development of a missile capable of 
hitting Israel. They are also the main technology sources for a longer 
range missile, the Kosar, that could hit the heart of Europe with 
nuclear warheads. Fact.
  The Russian Government has also signed peaceful nuclear cooperation 
agreements with Iran to build nuclear power reactors. Iran is 
reportedly using this legal cooperation to make clandestine efforts to 
procure nuclear material and to develop the ability to produce weapons-
grade nuclear material on its own.
  The administration sought to get the Russian Government to stop this 
flow, and the Russians have taken some steps. They have passed 
legislation to create an export control regime, for example, but they 
have done little to enforce it. Not one Russian has been convicted of 
passing dangerous technology to Iran. Not a single Russian has been 
convicted under this law.
  That is why we must keep the heat on. This legislation requires the 
President to report to Congress, in a classified form if he deems it 
necessary, credible information on any entity anywhere in the world 
that is providing Iran with dangerous technology. It then authorizes 
him to sanction those entities. If he chose not to, he would then 
report to Congress on his rationale for not sanctioning. So, in the 
first instance, this legislation captures China, North Korea, and any 
others who are providing Iran the wherewithal to obtain weapons of mass 
destruction and the missiles to deliver them.
  It goes a step further. Over the past few years, the Russians have 
been unable to meet their limited financial obligations to the creation 
of the international space station, so we have been helping them out, 
paying part of their funding in addition to our own, considerably 
larger, space station obligations. As it happens, the recipient of this 
money, the Russian Space Agency, their NASA, is also the Russian 
governmental entity with jurisdiction over any entity in Russia dealing 
with missile technology.
  Therefore, this legislation requires the President to certify three 
things before we can continue to pay the Russian share of the space 
station: That it is Russian policy to stop proliferation to Iran, that 
they are taking the steps necessary to prevent the proliferation, and 
that no entity under the jurisdiction of the Russian space station is 
cooperating with the Iranian missile program.
  If we are going to pay Russian obligations, then we have the right to 
suggest they must do everything they can to stop the proliferation to 
Iran--something that threatens not only America and our friends but, 
ultimately, Russia as well. It cannot be in Russia's interests to have 
a nuclear-armed Iran sitting on its borders.
  Some may say, with the recent elections in Iran in which the 
moderates appear to have done very well, indeed this is not the time to 
push this legislation. Unfortunately, as I pointed out earlier, even 
under the reportedly moderate President Khatami over the last 2\1/2\ 
years, Iranian support for terrorism and its weapons technology 
acquisition have not diminished. Those facts remain.
  Hard-liners remain in charge of Iranian security and foreign policy; 
they will after this election, as well. It may be that at some point in 
the future Iranian moderates may seek a different course. They have not 
to date. But for now, they have neither the ability nor necessarily the 
interest. They appear much more interested in reforming Iranian 
domestic policy than in all of these problems they are creating 
internationally. That means we cannot let down our guard. We must do 
everything we can to stop the flow of technology, to raise the cost of 
developing weapons of mass destruction, and to delay the time at which 
Iran could have such a capability.
  This is the purpose of this legislation and why I strongly urge its 
adoption. While the timing of this legislation may not seem the best, 
perhaps it is the absolute right time. We need to make clear to the 
Iranian people, particularly their leadership on foreign policy and 
these terrorist items, that this is unacceptable behavior for them and 
for the rest of the world to have to tolerate. The development of these 
weapons, the sponsorship of terrorism, the development of the missile 
capacity that could so threaten its neighbors and much of Europe is not 
responsible behavior. This is something we cannot tolerate, and we are 
sending that clear message at this time.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________