[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 1380-1381]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                   IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1999

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. What is the 
status of the legislation at this time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are considering H.R. 1883 under a time 
limit.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Under that time limit, can the Senator from New Mexico 
speak?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If he yields himself time.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted to speak for 7 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of the 
legislation before us. This legislation is only one of many important 
steps required to counter the greatest threat to U.S. security in this 
era--the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  I am not being an alarmist. I am being a realist. The proliferation 
of nuclear, chemical, and biological technologies and the means to 
deliver them

[[Page 1381]]

present a growing threat to U.S. security. This is a threat which we 
have only begun to address in the changed security environment of the 
21st century.
  Mr. President, I would like to mention three important aspects of the 
problem as stated by George Tenet, the Director of Central 
Intelligence, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence early 
in February.
  First, Russia and China no longer represent the only missile threat 
to the United States. The missile threat to U.S. interests and forces 
from other nations is here and now.
  Second, South Asian nations are establishing doctrine and tactics for 
the use of their missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear 
rivalry between India and Pakistan steadily intensifies. The potential 
for miscalculation, misperception and escalation of the conflict in 
Kashmir is high.
  Third, the countries we previously considered technology importers 
are now assuming roles as ``secondary suppliers.'' This compounds the 
proliferation problem and confounds our ability to control or defend 
against it.
  As outlined in the most recent Intelligence Community assessment of 
Ballistic Missile Threats, by the year 2015 the U.S. will not only face 
the ongoing challenges of large-scale missile threats from China and 
Russia. U.S. cities will also confront a real threat from other 
actors--North Korea, probably Iran, and possibly Iraq.
  One must mention that Intelligence Community's estimate excludes the 
possibility of social or political changes in those countries that 
would change the calculus. Also, the missile arsenals of these nations 
would be much smaller, limited to smaller payloads, and less reliable 
than Chinese or Russian capabilities.
  At the same time, these remain a lethal and less predictable threat. 
Acute accuracy is not required for missiles tipped with nuclear, 
biological, or chemical warheads. And the U.S. cannot bank on rational 
actions from dictators like Saddam Hussein or Kim Chong-il.
  At the same time that the threat increases, global changes make non-
proliferation efforts even more difficult. Three specific aspects in 
the current international security environment will impede U.S. efforts 
to control or minimize this threat.
  First, Russia--hard currency starved and heavily indebted--is a 
willing merchant--most notably of conventional defense items, but the 
U.S. Russian sales are not limited to this. This legislation attempts 
to address this aspect through creating incentives for the Russian 
government and others to implement and enforce stricter export controls 
on private actors or institutes in their dealings with Iran.
  Second, North Korea and their No-Dong missile sales are altering 
strategic balances in the Middle East and Asia. While the 
administration's new strategy for engagement with North Korea may 
retard developments that require testing, such as reliability of long-
range missiles, many suspect that the North Korean missile program 
continues and that its role as a supplier of medium-range missile 
technology has not been addressed.
  Third, technology advances and rapid international economic 
integration alter and confuse the means by which the United States can 
control military advances of other nations. The list of potentially 
threatening dual-use technologies continues to grow. This is especially 
true of information technologies--command, control, communication, and 
information technologies, C-31, now comprise about 75 percent of a 
modern military's capability. But potential dual use is also true of 
nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile technologies.
  The proliferation threat will remain our Nation's No. 1 security 
challenge in the 21st century. At the same time, the United States will 
be most vulnerable to this threat. As George Tenet, our head of the 
CIA, also noted, U.S. hegemony has become a lightning rod for the 
disaffected.
  As Americans enjoy unprecedented prosperity, many in the world remain 
disaffected. These disaffected represent a group who resent our power 
and our prosperity. Our success fuels the intensity of their claims and 
their feelings. The same forces aligned against our nonproliferation 
objectives apply to terrorist organizations as well, whether state 
sponsored or not. A disaffected Iran, despite some moderating trends, 
remains an active state supporter of terrorism.
  Terrorist groups will continue to increase their destructive or their 
potential for disruption through rapidly evolving and spreading 
technologies. Again, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
agents offer cheap means to achieve highly lethal terror. Acquisition 
of information technology may not only greatly improve a terrorist 
group's means for organization and coordination and attack, these 
technologies offer increasing potential for massive, possibly 
crippling, disruption of U.S. information infrastructure.
  This legislation is a small step, but a good one, in addressing the 
problem of supplying WMD technologies to Iran. But we have much more 
work to do. We must prevent, when prevention is possible, such as 
providing safeguards for nuclear materials in Russia and controlling 
access to technology and know-how as best we can and in as many cases 
as we can.
  We must also find the most effective means to defend against such 
threats, such as training and equipping policemen and firemen to 
respond to these attacks and pursuing the best technological solutions 
to defend against them.
  I believe the United States is not pursuing with sufficient vigor the 
means of greatest potential against missile threats. For example, 
directed energy technologies represent the next revolutionary step in 
military technologies. Laser technologies in particular dramatically 
alter U.S. potential to counter a missile attack. Missile defense at 
the speed of light will improve effectiveness and efficiency, 
substantially reducing the cost-per-kill ratios.
  Despite this understanding, the budget of the President cut the 
airborne laser program $92 million. In addition, the defense budget 
reduced science and technology spending, according to our first 
estimates, by more than $1 billion. It is not easy to understand. The 
administration proposes sacrificing the potential of real defense 
against proliferation threats, although it seems very clearly to be a 
shortsighted approach.
  I have been working as hard as I can, and in some instances at the 
forefront, on some prevention efforts, especially with respect to 
proliferation threats from Russia. I hope this year for stepped up 
measures of prevention, especially regarding the threat of nuclear 
proliferation in the form of the brain drain from Russia. At the same 
time, where I can, I will put on a full court press to improve the 
science and technology budget for the Pentagon, especially as it 
pertains to the most promising means of missile defense and directed 
energy.
  I hope my colleagues will join in ensuring that every means of 
proliferation prevention is pursued. I also invite my colleagues to 
join in increasing the means of our military laboratories to provide 
for our national defense.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on 
passage of H.R. 1883 occur at 11:30 a.m. on Thursday, February 24.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRAMS. In light of this agreement, there will be no rollcall 
votes today.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for not to 
exceed 10 minutes out of order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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