[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 9]
[Senate]
[Pages 13315-13316]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ``SCIENCE AT ITS BEST, 
                        SECURITY AT ITS WORST''

 Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, earlier this week the President's 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board released its report on security and 
counterintelligence operations at the nuclear weapons laboratories of 
the Department of Energy.
   The report's title--Science at its Best, Security at its Worst--
neatly encapsulates the Board's findings. This report reiterates and 
clearly delineates problems within our nuclear laboratories that other 
reports have also detailed. No one should be surprised.
  Let me simply list a few of this newest report's more compelling 
conclusions:

       At the birth of DOE, the brilliant scientific breakthroughs 
     of the nuclear weapons laboratories came with a troubling 
     record of security administration. Twenty years later, 
     virtually every one of its original problems persists.
       The nuclear weapons and research functions of DOE need more 
     autonomy, a clearer mission, a streamlined bureaucracy, and 
     increased accountability.
       More than 25 years worth of reports, studies and formal 
     inquires . . . have identified a multitude of chronic 
     security and counterintelligence problems at all of the 
     weapons labs.
       Organizational disarray, managerial neglect, and a culture 
     of arrogance--both at DOE headquarters and the labs 
     themselves--conspired to create an espionage scandal waiting 
     to happen.
       The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy 
     that has proven incapable of reforming itself.
       Lastly, the report states: Reorganization is clearly 
     warranted to resolve the many specific problems with security 
     and counterintelligence in the weapons laboratories, but also 
     to address the lack of accountability that has become endemic 
     throughout the entire Department.

  These findings are nothing new.

[[Page 13316]]

  When Senators Kyl, Murkowski, and I introduced our amendment to the 
Defense Authorization calling for reorganization and streamlining 
within the Department of Energy, one of the charges leveled against us 
was that no hearings had been held on this issue. That old, tired claim 
that ``we need more hearings'' is used every time Congress tries to act 
on an urgent matter.
  Sometimes that may be true. In this instance, we have undoubtedly 
destroyed a major forest with all the paper documenting DOE 
mismanagement in just the past 15 years. We have done studies; we have 
held hearings; the House has held hearings; we have asked for a review 
by the GAO, by the CRS, by outside groups, and we must have 25 pounds 
of recommendations gathering dust right now.
  Today, my friend Secretary Richardson is implementing a new round of 
reforms at DOE. Mr. President, you should know that, while I have been 
critical of some past Secretaries for failing to give sufficient 
attention to these matters, Secretary Richardson is clearly indicating 
a willingness to tackle these issues.
  However, Secretaries come and go. Reforms introduced during any 
specific tenure of a Secretary often do not endure after their 
departure. The Rudman report states, and I quote, ``the Department of 
Energy is incapable of reforming itself--bureaucratically and 
culturally--in a lasting way, even under an activist Secretary.''
  I can tell you from my own experience that it is sometimes hard to 
figure out just who is responsible in any given situation at DOE. Under 
the current structure the programs within one office, comply with 
policies set by a second office, in accordance with procedures set by a 
third office, verified by a fourth office. When I look at something 
like that, I have to wonder, ``Who is in charge?''
  The experts involved in producing the Rudmann Report asked a number 
of DOE officials to whom they report, who whom they were responsible. 
The most common response was ``it depends.''
  This myriad of oversight and review does not improve performance. To 
the contrary, in some cases it diminishes performance. It is my view 
that it is frequently easier to be an overseer than the responsible 
party. As overseers have multiplied, the line between oversight and 
responsibility has been blurred and sometimes disappears. The frequent 
result is that, when mistakes are made, everyone thinks they were an 
overseer, and nobody takes responsibility.
  Mr. President, the national laboratories, especially the ones in my 
state, literally saved millions of lives through their work in World 
War II and during the cold war. They abound with dedicated, patriotic, 
and truly gifted men and women, working for this nation's security as 
their top priority. We should not make the labs a scapegoat for an 
ineffective bureaucracy. We need a fundamental re-emphasis on the 
nuclear weapons work at DOE, recognizing that the rules and regimes 
that govern the rest of the DOE cannot be entirely used in the nuclear 
weapons complex.
  I would like to show you an organizational chart of DOE's current 
structure as it pertains to our nuclear weapons program. This chart is 
found on page 17 of the new report. As one can readily discern, it's a 
toss up who or what office might have oversight in a given situation in 
a maze such at this. Just one glance at this chart makes the point.
  The PFIAB Report demands legislative changes. Again, I quote, ``The 
Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven 
incapable of reforming itself.'' The PFIAB Report makes some very 
specific recommendations as to what changes are necessary. The authors 
recommend that Congress pass and the President sign legislation that:

       Creates a new, semi-autonomous Agency for Nuclear 
     Stewardship.
       Streamlines the Nuclear Stewardship management structure.
       Ensures effective administration of safeguards, security, 
     and counterintelligence at all the weapons labs and plants by 
     creating a coherent security/CI structure within the new 
     agency.

  The organizational chart outlining this new organization looks 
something like this. This can be found on page 50 of their report.
  Creation of a semi-autonomous agency for our nuclear weapons work is 
precisely what I have been pushing over the last several weeks. Indeed, 
what I and my colleagues Senator Kyl and Senator Murkowski have 
proposed boils down to a true ``Chain of Command'' approach, with all 
the discipline this entails. I truly believe, and today's report 
confirms, that this approach, if it had been used in the past, may have 
avoided some of the security problems and will help us avoid them in 
the future.
  The Rudman Report is a significant, timely contribution to the 
accumulating evidence that we must act to ensure that brilliant science 
and tight security are compatible within our nuclear weapons 
infrastructure.
  I would like to congratulate Chairman Rudman and the members of the 
PFIAB for the tremendous contribution their findings will make to the 
dialog on how to best preserve our nuclear secrets and still maintain 
the greatest scientific research centers in the world.
  The recommendations made in this report parallel what I and my 
colleagues tried to do several weeks ago. Perhaps this additional 
evidence will persuade others that it is long past time for Congress to 
take decisive action. I encourage my colleagues to read the report and 
draw their own conclusions about the need for organizational reform at 
DOE.

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