[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 9]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 12944-12946]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



 IKE SKELTON: A MAN OF VISION, A MAN OF COMPASSION, A MAN OF THE WORLD

                                 ______
                                 

                             HON. SAM FARR

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, June 15, 1999

  Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Speaker, I was honored recently to have 
our friend and colleague, Ike Skelton, visit my district in California. 
This gentleman, the Ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services 
Committee, is known to all of us as a man of intensity but earnestness, 
a man of determination but flexibility, a man of integrity above all 
else.
  Congressman Skelton was visiting the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, the Navy's premier school for advanced technical, 
engineering, and strategic education. He was there to address the 
student body of the challenges they face as military leaders in an 
increasingly complex geopolitical world community. While at the school, 
he was presented with an Honorary Degree of Doctor of Military 
Sciences.
  I was so impressed with the lecture Mr. Skelton presented and the 
citation by the NPS Provost, Richard Elster, of Mr. Skelton's 
achievements, I feel compelled to share them with this body. I urge 
everyone to take the time to read these remarks and consider their 
meaning, especially as we struggle here with foreign affairs and 
military and defense questions in a troubled world.

Remarks Accompanying Award of Degree of Doctor of Military Sciences to 
                       the Honorable Ike Skelton

                 (Made by NPS Provost, Richard Elster)

       Under the authority vested by law and with the concurrence 
     of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval 
     Operations, the Naval Postgraduate School is pleased to award 
     the Degree of Doctor of Military Sciences to the Honorable 
     Ike Skelton, Representative of the Fourth District of the 
     State of Missouri to the Congress of the United States.
       Representative Skelton understands the relationship between 
     the nation's security and the maintenance of strong, robust 
     armed forces. He has consistently, and effectively, used 
     every means at his disposal to ensure that the national 
     security policy of the United States recognizes the 
     preeminent role of the armed forces and that the Congress 
     provides resources to the Department of Defense and the 
     military departments accordingly.
       Representative Skelton's regard for the military extends 
     far beyond national security imperatives to genuine, heart-
     felt concern for the well being of every man and woman in 
     uniform. He understands the fundamental relationship between 
     maintaining the most powerful Armed Forces the world has ever 
     known and the education, training, talent, and morale of the 
     individuals who comprise those forces. As Chairman of the 
     Military Personnel and Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed 
     Services Committee, he systematically advanced initiatives to 
     improve the quality of life and opportunities of military 
     personnel. He supported military pay increases and sought to 
     secure acceptance of the principle that military compensation 
     should be comparable to that of the private sector. He 
     oversaw improvements in military health care and attempted to 
     secure a uniform benefit for all eligible personnel, both 
     active duty and retired. In addition, he offered the 
     amendment that repealed the combat exclusion for women on 
     Navy ships.
       Representative Skelton has also demonstrated that a true 
     friend of the armed forces will recognize problems and insist 
     that they be corrected even in the face of strong objections 
     from the civilian and military leadership of the Department 
     of Defense. In the early 1980s, he became convinced that the 
     structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commands 
     was fundamentally flawed. He was one of a handful of 
     legislators who drafted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
     Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Consequently, history 
     will record that he was instrumental in framing one of the 
     three most significant laws relating to national security 
     since the American Revolution.
       As chairman of the Panel on Military Education, 
     Representative Skelton contributed immeasurably to 
     improvements in professional military education. His panel 
     found that the officer corps needs more military strategists 
     and that every officer should understand strategy. An avid 
     student of history, Representative Skelton insisted that 
     staff and war colleges strengthen and expand the study of 
     military history and other subjects related to the 
     development of strategic thinking. Under his leadership, the 
     Panel also effected curriculum changes that greatly enhanced 
     joint military education and raised the academic standards of 
     the schools.
       Representative Skelton continues to exercise great 
     influence over the direction of military education. He has 
     recognized the compelling need for the officer corps to be 
     capable of meeting the challenges resulting from the myriad 
     technological changes that are altering the way wars will be 
     fought in the future. In early 1998, he called upon the Naval 
     Postgraduate School to develop a new paradigm for 
     professional military education, one that would integrate 
     technical and traditional subjects into a single coherent 
     professional military education course of studies.
       Representative Skelton has made other significant 
     contributions to national security too numerous to detail. 
     Years before the current crisis, he urged that additional 
     attention and resources be devoted to recruiting. He has 
     consistently advocated better utilization of the reserve 
     components. He has advanced original proposals for modifying 
     the force structure of the services to meet the challenges of 
     the post-Cold War period.
       In summary, Representative Skelton has made seminal 
     contributions to military affairs in the latter quarter of 
     the Twentieth Century. He epitomizes the ideal linkage that 
     should exist between Americans and their Armed Forces in a 
     democratic republic animated by a strong tradition of 
     civilian control of the military.
       It is an honor to award an honorary doctorate to an 
     American of such singular distinction. Congratulations Mr. 
     Skelton.


     
                                  ____
Remarks of Rep. Ike Skelton, Naval Postgraduate School, April 19, 1999, 
                          Monterey, California

       Today, I want to talk to you about the role of Congress in 
     carrying out its Constitutional mandate with respect to the 
     armed forces. Many people do not know that the Constitution--
     in Article I, Section 8--gives Congress the power ``To raise 
     and support armies, . . .'' and ``To provide and maintain a 
     navy,''. Fewer still know that Article I, Section 8, further 
     gives Congress the power ``To make rules for the government 
     and regulation of the land and naval forces;''. Article II of 
     the Constitution designates the President as ``commander in 
     chief of the army and navy . . .'', but no specific authority 
     is granted. Many in the Department of Defense, both military 
     and civilian, are often uncomfortable with what they regard 
     as ``Congressional interference'' in national security 
     affairs. But the system works--the Constitution make Congress 
     the link between the American people and the military whose 
     mission it is to protect them. And, thus, it helps ensure 
     that there is public support for the military.
       Let me give you the history of two areas, which will show 
     you the system working at its best--The Goldwater-Nichols 
     Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and 
     Professional Military Education, commonly known as PME. These 
     two areas are of professional interest to you, and as some of 
     you may know, I was directly involved in Congressional 
     efforts in both of these areas.

[[Page 12945]]




                           Goldwater-Nichols

       Around the time I began my service in Congress--the late 
     1970's and early 1980's--the U.S. military experienced a long 
     series of substandard operational performances, including a 
     number of failures and some disasters: Vietnam, Pueblo, 
     Mayaguez, Desert One, Beirut, and Grenada.
       In the wake of these events, it became clear to a number of 
     Members of Congress, including me, that something was wrong 
     and that a solution needed to be found. I began meeting with 
     our military leaders, both active and retired, to discuss the 
     state of our military and determine what Congress could do to 
     help fix the problems. Indeed, it was not just a question of 
     Congress wanting to help fix the problems. As I mentioned 
     earlier, it was our responsibility under the Constitution to 
     fix the problems.
       Among those I met with was a fellow Missourian, General 
     Maxwell Taylor, the Commanding General of the 101st Airborne 
     Division at Normandy, and a former Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff. Well in his 80's by the time I talked to 
     him, but still every inch a soldier, General Taylor shared 
     with me the perspectives he had gained in his long, 
     illustrious military career, both in combat and staff 
     assignments. It was General Taylor who first raised with me 
     the issue or reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as 
     critical to solving the problems in our armed forces.
       When other distinguished military leaders and thinkers 
     raised this same concern, I decided that the issue of Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff reorganization needed some attention. So, I 
     introduced legislation to abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
     Needless to say, that bill was going nowhere, but it did get 
     people's attention, and it did help start the debate on the 
     need for reform.
       More importantly, I got involved with this issue on the 
     House Armed Services Committee, working with other Members 
     and Staff who had an interest in this area. Former 
     Congressman Dick White of Texas had held a series of often 
     sparsely attended hearings on the subject, along with a House 
     Armed Services Committee staffer who I like to refer to as a 
     national treasure--Archie Barrett, a retired Air Force 
     Colonel who had published a study on Defense Reorganization. 
     The contributions of this outstanding American in this area 
     are immeasurable, I am very pleased that Archie is with us 
     today because if any of you have tough questions, he can 
     answer them. When Congressman White retired, I inherited 
     Archie and the issue.
       As you might expect, many of the senior civilian and 
     military leaders of the Department of Defense were opposed to 
     any reform or reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
     including Defense Secretary Weinberger, General John Vessey, 
     the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and indeed every member of 
     the Joint Chiefs. If you know your history, you will not be 
     surprised to learn that the Navy was especially opposed. Then 
     Secretary of the Navy John Lehman called me an ``arm chair 
     strategist'' in a Washington Post op-ed article. He didn't 
     mean it as a compliment. Then Vice Admiral Frank Kelso 
     lectured me like a school boy when I visited Norfolk. 
     ``You don't know what you are doing,'' he told me.
       We did have some strong support from within the active and 
     retired military, however, including General David Jones, the 
     former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shy 
     Meyer, the former Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Harry 
     Train, former CINCLANT. There were even some within the Navy 
     with opposing views. After Admiral Kelso's lecture, his boss, 
     Admiral Lee Baggett, the CINCLANT, pulled me aside and 
     privately told me, ``you are doing the right thing.''
       Here are some of the problems that Congress discovered 
     during our hearings on the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
       The joint, or force employment, side of the DOD structure 
     was weak and often ineffective. On the other hand, the 
     service, or input, side of DOD was so strong that it 
     regularly stepped beyond its mission of organizing, training, 
     and equipping forces. The services tended to dominate the 
     joint side, often to achieve parochial interests.
       The Joint Chiefs of Staff, a committee, was collectively 
     the principal military adviser to the President, the National 
     Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Service 
     Chiefs were often unable to fulfill their dual-hat 
     responsibilities. Decisions on the most fundamental national 
     security issues were watered down or not given at all. It was 
     General Taylor who testified that the Joint Chiefs often 
     failed to answer the mail because the Chiefs could not 
     resolve interservice disputes.
       The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was only a spokesman for 
     the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. If the Committee could 
     not speak, or could only render watered-down pronouncements 
     based on the lowest common denominator of agreement, the 
     Chairman could only be an ineffective spokesman. One former 
     National Security Adviser to the President stated that on a 
     number of occasions he had witnessed the JCS Chairman unable 
     to provide advice to the National Security Council on the 
     most fundamental military issues of the day because the JCS 
     had failed to develop collective advice. At other times, 
     because the JCS Committee valued unanimity, the advice was so 
     bland that it was of little value. One former Secretary of 
     Defense stated that JCS advice was less than useless.
       The Joint Staff was largely composed of non-competitive 
     officers, often on their first staff tour. It was a dead-end 
     assignment. The Joint Staff served the Chiefs collectively, 
     and it was smothered with a thousand procedures that 
     subordinated it to service positions. For example, every word 
     of every Joint Staff paper--the source of formal JCS 
     advice--had to be approved by every service before it 
     could be submitted to the JCS for its consideration.
       The Unified Commanders (the CINCS)--the Commanders of U.S. 
     forces in the field on whom the nation would depend for its 
     survival in case of hostilities--were tied down like Gulliver 
     by constraints contained in JCS-issued directives.
       The CINCS had few of the authorities you would expect a 
     commander to possess:
       They could not hire or fire their subordinate commanders or 
     staffs.
       They lacked Court Martial authority.
       They could not employ their forces as they saw fit to 
     accomplish their mission, Rather, they were required to 
     employ forces only in accordance with service doctrine.
       They did not control ammunition, food supplies, and the 
     myriad other materials needed to conduct campaigns. Each 
     service had its own line of supply.
       Their authority over their subordinate service component 
     commanders was very tenuous--the component commanders' 
     principal loyalty was to their service.
       Let's look at how these problems in the organization of the 
     JCS before 1986 contributed to some of the failed missions I 
     mentioned earlier:
       In Vietnam, there were at least two land chains of command 
     and four air chains of command reaching from the Pentagon to 
     forces in the theater.
       Desert One--the disastrous 1980 attempt to rescue hostages 
     held by Iran--was conducted by forces of all four services. 
     Those forces met for the first time during the operation, had 
     never exercised as a joint team, and were led by multiple 
     commanders responding to multiple chains of command.
       In the terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, 
     the serpentine chain of command wound through six layers of 
     command, including officers from every service, before it 
     reached the ill-fated Colonel commanding the Marine 
     contingent on the ground--the Secretary of Defense; the CINC 
     at Mons, Belgium; DCINC at Stuttgart, Germany; CINCNAVEUR 
     with headquarters in both London and Naples; Sixth Fleet 
     Commander in the Mediterranean; and the Naval Task Force 
     commander off the coast of Lebanon.
       The tragic Beirut bombing, with 241 U.S. casualties, was 
     the event that really convinced many Members that Congress 
     needed to find out what was wrong within the Department 
     of Defense, and to take steps to correct the problems. The 
     late Congressman Bill Nichols, a highly respected Member 
     from Alabama, was especially galvanized by Beirut. 
     Congressmen Hopkins, Aspin, and Kasich, as well as 
     Senators Goldwater, Cohen, Nunn, and Levin, were also 
     deeply involved in the legislation that eventually was 
     named the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
     Reorganization Act of 1986.
       You know the major provisions of the Act, so I will not go 
     over them in detail. However, allow me to summarize the Act's 
     effect:
       Now, the JCS Chairman, not the Committee, is the principal 
     military advisor, a role exemplified by General Colin Powell 
     during Just Cause and the Persian Gulf War.
       Now, the Joint Staff reports to the Chairman. It is 
     composed of talented and qualified officers, and it is 
     possibly the most powerful staff in the Department of 
     Defense.
       Now, the CINCS posses the requisite command authorities, as 
     was so amply demonstrated by General Schwartzkopf in the Gulf 
     War.
       Of course, Goldwater-Nichols was not the sole cause of 
     reversing the negative trend in operational performance since 
     1986. It is worth noting, however, that the U.S. Armed Forces 
     have experienced fourteen years of outstanding success in 
     conducting contingency operations since that year. Of 
     particular note are Operation Just Cause in Panama and, 
     Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as I mentioned 
     previously.
       Finally, it is important to point out that it was not the 
     goal of Goldwater-Nichols to weaken the services. To the 
     contrary, Goldwater-Nichols was intended to push them firmly 
     back into their legislatively assigned roles--organizing, 
     training, and equipping forces to carry out the missions 
     assigned to the CINCs. I do not know if Goldwater-Nichols has 
     fully accomplished this objective, but it has made a 
     difference.


                    Professional Military Education

       During 1988 and 1989, I was Chairman of the Panel on 
     Military Education of the House Armed Services Committee. I 
     have a confession to make--I did not want to get involved in 
     studying Professional Military Education. I thought nothing 
     could be more boring. Archie Barrett had to use his 
     considerable powers of persuasion to convince that this area 
     needed to be studied. I am glad that he was successful. The 
     subject matter was fascinating, and I believe the work of the 
     Panel was productive.

[[Page 12946]]

       The Panel was formed because the House Armed Services 
     Committee perceived little or no effort by DOD to comply with 
     a key provision of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. That provision 
     required DOD to examine the professional military education 
     schools and make changes where necessary to ensure that 
     officers were being prepared to participate with other 
     services in joint operations and to serve in joint 
     assignments.
       The Panel visited every staff college, and every war 
     college. We held a hearing at most of them, as well as 
     hearings in Washington. After more than a year, we issued a 
     comprehensive 200-page report that contained roughly 100 
     recommendations for changes in military education.
       At this point, I had planned to discuss each of these 100 
     recommendations in detail. However, I know you all want to 
     get home for dinner tonight, so I will only outline in brief 
     what we found in regard to Navy PME.
       First, the good news: We found that the Naval War College 
     was hands-down the best service war college.
       Next, the bad news: Naval officers attended at most only 
     one year of professional military education whereas the other 
     services took pains to ensure that their most competitive 
     officers received two years. As a consequence, the 
     intermediate PME course at Newport was almost an identical 
     twin of other. I suggested that the Navy consider providing 
     intermediate Professional Military Education at the Naval 
     Postgraduate School. Moreover, in light of the pressing need 
     for the officer corps of the future to be able to grasp the 
     potential of new technologies to change the way wars are 
     fought, and to understand how to employ technologically 
     advanced weapons and equipment, I wrote the Chief of Naval 
     Operations suggesting that an intermediate PME curriculum at 
     the Naval Postgraduate School, ``could interweave the 
     technological lessons that abound throughout military history 
     with an appreciation of what technology offers today and a 
     perspective of the future challenges facing officers in the 
     post-industrial era.''
       Recently, I learned that the Navy is planning to offer its 
     intermediate course at the Naval Postgraduate School starting 
     later this year. This is a giant step in the right direction, 
     and I am pleased that the Navy, at least in part, is taking 
     my suggestion seriously. Eventually, I would really like to 
     see the Naval Postgraduate School, in partnership with the 
     Naval War College, be allowed to develop a genuine 
     intermediate PME curriculum that uniquely integrates studies 
     intended to increase technological literacy of the student 
     officers with traditional PME.


                               Conclusion

       Let me conclude by giving you a charge: Make the Armed 
     Forces a better institution as a consequence of your service. 
     During your careers, I urge you continuously to examine 
     your consequence of your service. During your careers, I 
     urge you continuously to examine your service, the joint 
     military elements, and the Department of Defense from a 
     detached, objective perspective. As you progress in rank, 
     use your influence to rectify flaws where you find them. 
     Many, perhaps most, of the problems discovered by Congress 
     in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in 
     Professional Military Education had been identified in 
     studies as far back as the 1950's. If DOD had acted--if 
     senior civilian and military leaders had initiated needed 
     changes--legislation would not have been required. Change 
     was opposed by those who wanted to preserve narrow 
     parochial interests. The result of that opposition to 
     change was, as mentioned before--Vietnam, Desert One, 
     Beirut, Grenada. Do not allow your service, the joint 
     military elements, or the Department of Defense to repeat 
     the mistakes of the past during your watch.
       The best way to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past is 
     to commit to a lifelong study of military history. Consider 
     how General Schwartzkopf used the lessons of history in at 
     least three instances in his successful Desert Storm 
     campaign:
       First, the thorough 40-day air campaign which preceded the 
     ground war recalls the failure to conduct adequate 
     bombardment at the island of Tarawa in November of 1943. The 
     price paid for that failure at Tarawa was heavy Marine Corps 
     casualties. In the Gulf War, the ability of Iraqi forces to 
     offer opposition to our forces was severely reduced.
       Second, consider the successful feint carried out by the 
     1st Cavalry Division prior to the actual start of the ground 
     war. This recalls Montgomery's strategy at the Battle of the 
     Marinth Line in North Africa against the German Afrika Corps. 
     This action led up to the decisive battle at El Alamein.
       Third, by utilizing a leftward flanking movement when he 
     launched the ground war, General Schwartzkopf was taking a 
     page from the book of Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson at 
     the Battle of Chancellorsville. As you will recall, Jackson's 
     forces conducted a brilliant flanking maneuver and completely 
     surprised Union forces under General Joseph Hooker, in the 
     May 1963 battle.
       Thank you for the opportunity to address you today. God 
     bless you, and I wish you all in your careers.

     

                          ____________________