[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 9]
[Senate]
[Pages 12786-12787]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                        CHALLENGE OF THE BALKANS

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, as we have learned repeatedly over the 
last three months, few things seem to go as planned in the Balkans. In 
fact, I think the warning ``expect the unexpected'' is quickly becoming 
the first rule of statecraft in the post-cold-war world.
  The provocative and disturbing occupation of the airport in Pristina 
by 200 Russian paratroopers has surely complicated our peacekeeping 
mission in Kosovo. Even more importantly, it exemplifies the huge 
challenge confronting us as we seek to build a relationship with a 
former superpower adversary that works to out mutual benefit and that 
of the world's.
  I do not know if this action is evidence of a growing breach between 
Russia's political and military leadership or if Russia's political 
leaders sanctioned it. I don't pretend to be a scholar of Russian 
politics. I do know, however, that Russia's continued refusal to accept 
NATO's command over

[[Page 12787]]

the entire peacekeeping effort in Kosovo, whether the Russian 
government or some independent-minded Russian generals issue that 
refusal, challenges the viability of the fragile peace we are 
committing 50,000 NATO troops to enforce. It is a challenge we must 
overcome immediately, with steady nerve and firm resolve.
  Even though, NATO obviously has the power and authority to work its 
will in Pristina, overcoming the challenge should not require us to 
forcibly evict the Russians from the airport. But neither does it 
require us to pretend that the challenge is so insignificant that it 
doesn't merit our notice. It is a problem, although not yet a disaster, 
and it requires our swift and sure-footed response to resolve it as 
quickly as possible.
  We must take the necessary steps to prevent the reinforcement of 
those troops. But, more importantly, we must make abundantly clear to 
Moscow that we consider this action to be evidence that Russia cannot 
yet be trusted as good faith partners in preserving European stability. 
It even casts doubt on their efforts to convince Mr. Milosevic to 
accept NATO's terms for a settlement, raising the suspicion that there 
were hidden commitments to secure a de facto partition of Kosovo.
  Until those suspicions can be allayed--which would require, of 
course, Russian troops to accede to NATO's authority at the airport--
progress in constructing a new and mutually beneficial relationship 
between the United States and its allies and Russia will suffer. The 
coming G-7 meeting in Germany, which was intended to consider efforts 
to assist the collapsed Russian economy, must now result in a clear, 
unequivocal statement that no such assistance will be forthcoming while 
Russian leaders either tolerate or are unable to stop attempts by their 
forces to undermine our efforts in Kosovo.
  Moreover, we should exact some specific and public assurance from the 
putative leader of Russia, Boris Yeltsin--since the word of his 
ministers is no longer credible--that Russia will play either a 
constructive role or no further role in Kosovo. A constructive role 
will entail, of course, Russia's acquiescence in the unified NATO 
command of the entire operation.
  There must be no Russian sector in Kosovo even if we select some 
other euphemism to describe it because most Kosovars believe, quite 
understandably, it is a pseudonym for the partition of Kosovo. Few if 
any ethnic Albanians will return unarmed to an area where their 
security is the responsibility of troops whose loyalties were 
demonstratively pledged to the Serb persecutors.
  The United States recognizes the importance of achieving stable, 
mutually beneficial relations with Russia. We expect Russia to 
recognize that its best interests lie in friendship with NATO and not 
in old hostilities that stretch back to the cold war and beyond. The 
Russian military should be capable of recognizing that its interests 
are best served by better relations as well. An army that cannot 
adequately feed and fuel itself, or that is unable to offer a minimum 
standard of life to its soldiers should see the error in nursing old 
enmities at the expense of progress toward the common goal of a more 
secure world.
  The United States expects nothing more of Russia than that it acts in 
its own best interests, for its best interests are compatible with the 
cause for peace and justice in Kosovo, and everywhere else for that 
matter.

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