[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 9]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 12732-12734]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                            HON. TOM BLILEY

                              of virginia

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, June 10, 1999

       The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of 
     the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1401) to 
     authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 for 
     military activities of the Department of Defense, to 
     prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal years 2000 
     and 2001, and for other purposes:

  Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express a number of 
concerns about H.R. 1401, the National Defense Authorization Act for 
FY2000, as well as about the process used to bring this legislation to 
the floor of the House. Key provisions of this legislation, along with 
a number of amendments made in order under the rule, address programs 
and activities of the Department of Energy that fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Committee on Commerce under the Rules of the House. 
Several examples will serve to highlight these areas of concern.
  Section 3165 of H.R. 1401 consolidates responsibility for nuclear 
weapons activities, facilities, and laboratories under DOE's Assistant 
Secretary for Defense Programs. This effort to reorganize the 
responsibilities at the Department of Energy falls within the Committee 
on Commerce's responsibility for the general management of the 
Department of Energy, including its organization. The facts that have 
come to light about lax security controls at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory highlight the dangers of a nuclear weapons laboratory trying 
to police its own security. Secretary

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Richardson is moving toward the appointment of a security ``czar'' at 
DOE headquarters who would oversee security for all DOE facilities, 
laboratories, and operations. This section of H.R. 1401, however, would 
run directly counter to that approach by giving the program office, 
Defense Programs, responsibility for its own safeguards and security 
operations. Separate from the merits of a particular organizational 
solution, we should also preserve the prerogative of the Secretary of 
Energy to adapt his organization to changing circumstances. H.R. 1401 
locks in a particular structure legislatively.
  The Commerce Committee has a long history of ensuring that DOE 
maintains a system or independent checks on its program offices, 
including its work on the Department of Energy Organization Act. The 
Commerce Committee believes it is essential to maintain the safeguard 
and security function independent from the Defense Programs office. The 
same is true of other oversight functions, such as environmental 
protection and occupational health and safety. These should not be 
integrated into the DOE program offices, but should maintain the 
independence necessary to do the job right.
  Amendment No. 2, offered by Mr. Spence, requires preparation of a 
plan to transfer all of the national security functions of the 
Department of Energy to the Department of Defense. Such a move is 
unwise, as it would violate the long-standing policy in this country of 
keeping the development of nuclear weapons and materials under the 
control of a civilian agency, separate from the military departments 
which might have to employ those weapons. This policy dates back to the 
original Atomic Energy Act enacted shortly after the end of World War 
II. Integrating all of these functions into the Department of Defense 
is a risky policy, and represents an unreasoned reaction to the recent 
Chinese espionage problems. This amendment would also impose stricter 
controls on foreign contacts by DOE employees, consultants, and 
contractors. While such controls may make sense in light of recent 
events at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, this provision has the 
potential to sweep too broadly, possibly encompassing any employee of 
DOE contractors who possess a security clearance. This could pose an 
impossible burden on DOE to monitor the foreign contacts of all of 
these potentially-covered persons.
  The approach taken on this issue by Amendment No. 1, offered by Mr. 
Cox and Mr. Dicks, is preferable. However, the Cox-Dicks amendment also 
makes a number of significant organizational changes to the Department 
of Energy, changes which are appropriately under the jurisdiction of 
the Committee on Commerce. While many of these changes make sense from 
a substantive perspective, such as the creation of separate Offices of 
Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence within the Department of 
Energy, these would be changes better handled by the Committee pursuant 
to its authority over the management of the Department of Energy.
  These jurisdictional concerns extend to the process used to bring 
H.R. 1401 to the floor. The normal intercommittee review process for 
the rule for this legislation, and for consideration of amendments to 
H.R. 1401, has been extremely truncated. The Committee on Commerce, one 
of the committees with primary jurisdiction over Department of Energy 
programs, has had only a minimal opportunity for review and comment on 
these major substantive provisions. While the situation with respect to 
China is highly charged and does call for a timely legislative 
response, we must remember that our internal House procedures are there 
for a reason--to ensure that we reach sound legislative decisions. 
Taking shortcuts with the normal committee review process increases the 
risk that we will pass legislation with unintended consequences. I have 
articulated many of these concerns in a letter to Chairman Spence, and 
I will insert it into the Record at this point.

                                    U.S. House of Representatives,


                                        Committee on Commerce,

                                     Washington, DC, May 24, 1999.
     Hon. Floyd Spence,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am following up on my correspondence 
     of May 21, 1999 concerning H.R. 1401, the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. After consultation 
     with the Parliamentarians, we continue to believe that 
     several provisions of H.R. 1401, as ordered reported, may 
     fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Commerce. 
     These provisions include:
       Section 321--Remediation of Asbestos and Lead-Based Paint. 
     One reading of this provision would permit a waiver of 
     applicable law with respect to the remediation of asbestos 
     and lead-based paint. I am sure that that is not the 
     legislative intent of the language, however.
       Section 653--Presentation of United States Flag to Retiring 
     Members of the Uniformed Services not Previously Covered;
       Section 3152--Duties of Commission. This section, as 
     ordered reported, makes clear that the Commission on Nuclear 
     Weapons Management formed pursuant to Section 3151 will 
     specifically deal with environmental remediation. Such 
     matters are traditionally within the jurisdiction of the 
     Commerce Committee. I understand, however, that you have 
     deleted subsection (a)(9) from this section, and therefore 
     the Committee registers no jurisdictional objection.
       Section 3165--Management of Nuclear Weapons Production 
     Facilities and National Laboratories. As ordered reported, 
     this section contains a number of provisions which we feel 
     strongly fall within the Committee's Rule X jurisdiction over 
     management of the Department of Energy. In particular, we are 
     concerned about provisions which move functions heretofore 
     carried out by various offices within the Department to the 
     direct control of the Assistant Secretary for Defense 
     Programs. We believe that this kind of wholesale 
     reorganization of DOE functions must be considered by all of 
     the committees of jurisdiction, including the Committee on 
     Commerce.
       However, recognizing your interest in bringing this 
     legislation before the House expeditiously, the Commerce 
     Committee has agreed not to seek a sequential referral of the 
     bill based on the provisions listed above. By agreeing not to 
     seek a sequential referral, the Commerce Committee does not 
     waive its jurisdiction over the provisions listed above or 
     any other provisions of the bill that may fall within its 
     jurisdiction. The Committee's action in this regard should 
     not be construed as any endorsement of the language at issue. 
     In addition, the Commerce Committee reserves its right to 
     seek conferees on any provisions within its jurisdiction 
     which are considered in the House-Senate conference.
       I request that you include this letter in the Record during 
     consideration of this bill by the House.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Tom Bliley,
                                                         Chairman.

  Finally, I must take this opportunity to discuss a matter that will 
have a tremendous impact on the future of the market for 
telecommunications services. Section 151 of the bill adds a new section 
2282 to Title 10 of the U.S. Code to prohibit the Secretary of Defense 
from obligating monies to buy a commercial satellite communications 
system or to lease a communications service, including mobile satellite 
communications, unless doing so would not cause harmful interference 
with the Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers used by the 
Department of Defense (DoD). It is my hope that the provision is 
intended only to provide policy guidance to the DoD regarding the 
protection of the GPS from harmful interference by other users of the 
radio spectrum. However, the specific language in section 151 goes much 
further and has potential unintended consequences that may undermine 
the spectrum management process under which both the public and the 
government have operated successfully for many years.
  Spectrum management issues fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Commerce Committee. As our Members have learned over the years, 
spectrum management is a complex task that requires detailed analysis 
and consideration. We have also learned that advocacy for spectrum 
policy for one purpose cannot be considered in a vacuum or without 
considering the impact it will have on other spectrum users.
  The use of the government-created GPS network of satellites by the 
public has mushroomed over the last several years. Private companies 
continue to create valuable position location devices that will assist 
in the protection of life and property. We should take appropriate 
steps to protect and promote the use of the GPS network. In fact, two 
years ago, the Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85) which included a section endorsing 
and enacting into law the presidential policy on the sustainment and 
operation of GPS issued in March 1996. The section also directed the 
Secretary of Defense not to accept any restriction on the GPS system 
proposed by the head of any other department or agency in the exercise 
of that official's regulatory authority that would adversely affect the 
military potential of GPS. Members of the Committee on Commerce were 
appointed as conferees on this provision and participated in the 
conference negotiations.
  The GPS network of satellites, like all spectrum users, operates in a 
community of spectrum users. Neighboring users of the band included the 
U.S.-promoted and licensed Mobile Satellite System networks such as 
GlobalStar, Iridium, Ellipso and Constellation, one of which is already 
fully operational and another of which is poised to commence operations 
later this year. Several agencies of the U.S. Government, including the 
DoD, have worked domestically and internationally to resolve the many 
technical issues surrounding the operations of these systems and the 
standards

[[Page 12734]]

their equipment must meet to protect the community of spectrum users. 
As I understand it, DoD has not opposed the operations of any of the 
licensed Mobile Satellite Systems. In fact, it already is a customer of 
one of these systems.
  Moreover, the FCC is in the midst of a number of proceedings that 
address protection standards between GPS and its spectrum neighbors. 
DoD and the defense community will have ample opportunity to 
participate in the ongoing FCC proceedings and to work with 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) within the 
Department of Commerce, the appropriate agencies for spectrum 
management, to ensure that their interests are protected.

  In May of this year, the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, 
and Consumer Protection of the Commerce Committee held a legislative 
hearing on the reauthorization of NTIA. As part of that hearing, 
Assistant Secretary Larry Irving, Administrator of NTIA, indicated that 
``NTIA is also addressing issues that will protect the radio spectrum 
currently used by the global positioning system (GPS) and facilitate 
the expansion of GPS services. . . . In order for GPS to be used 
reliably and confidently as a worldwide utility, the radio spectrum 
within which it operates must be protected . . . NTIA will also 
continue its efforts to work with the Department of Transportation, the 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, the FCC, and the 
private sector to ensure that spectrum is available in the future for 
this purpose.''
  It is my firm belief that we should not circumvent these ongoing 
processes unless absolutely necessary. There is no reason to interfere 
at this time. If, at the end of the day, DoD is not comfortable with 
the resolution of the administrative process and can demonstrate the 
potential harm to GPS, the Commerce Committee is prepared to consider 
its concerns and take action as necessary. I would also urge DoD and 
other GPS users to participate in the proceedings now before the FCC. 
The defense authorization process should not be used to end-run the 
spectrum management process that has worked so well for so long. It is 
interesting to note that DoD has made clear in conversations with 
Commerce Committee staff that it did not request nor does it seek 
inclusion of section 151 in the defense authorization process.
  Accordingly, I believe that section 151, coupled with two spectrum-
related provisions within the Senate's Department of Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Sec. Sec. 1049 and 1050 of S. 
1060), may have a negative impact on telecommunications policy. The 
Commerce Committee will be active to ensure that the inclusion of any 
provision within the final version of a defense authorization bill not 
interfere or cause harm to telecommunications policy. I respectfully 
request that these concerns be taken into account during further 
consideration of this legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to comment on H.R. 1401, 
the Defense Authorization Bill for fiscal year 2000.

                          ____________________