[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 8]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page 12025]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[[Page 12025]]

             CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 

                United States
                 of America



June 8, 1999





                          EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

                  UNITED STATES-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, June 8, 1999

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, the Administration's toothless 
human rights policy towards China has failed miserably. In the five 
years since President Clinton de-linked China's MFN status from human 
rights considerations, there has been regression--not progress--within 
China. Even standing apart from new revelations of nuclear espionage 
and the skyrocketing U.S.-China trade deficit, this deteriorating 
situation justifies a fundamental reassessment of U.S.-China trade 
policy. A couple of examples may help flesh out the seriousness of the 
matter.
  In 1992 the U.S. and Chinese Governments signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) prohibiting trade in slave-made goods, which was 
followed by a 1994 Statement of Cooperation. Notwithstanding those 
agreements and China's own laws against slave-made exports, Beijing is 
turning the Laogai--the Chinese Gulag--into a profit-making venture. 
Slave-made products--from office supplies to Christmas decorations--
regularly make their way to the shelves of American stores. Even the 
State Department has been forced to admit that ``[f]orced labor is a 
problem'' and that China's cooperation with the MOU ``has been 
inadequate.'' Indeed, the Department reports that in every case where 
the United States asked to visit a suspect facility during 1998, ``the 
[Chinese] Ministry of Justice refused the request, ignored it, or 
simply denied the allegations made without further elaboration.'' In 
short, the MOU is not worth the paper it is written on.
  Similarly, in October 1998, the Chinese regime signed the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Taking the bait, 
the Administration used China's promise to sign the ICCPR as a reason 
not to raise China's human rights violations at last year's meeting of 
the UN Human Rights Commission. The Administration heralded China's 
signature as an improvement--something that would lay the groundwork 
for future human rights accountability within China. Admittedly, the 
ICCPR contains many worthwhile guarantees, such as the right of 
political self-determination (Article 1), the basic rights of criminal 
defendants (Article 14), the right of free expression (Article 19), and 
the right to free elections (Article 25). But within two months after 
signing the ICCPR, the Chinese government violated each of those 
provisions in a brutal, systematic crackdown on democratic dissent that 
continues to this day. In fact, in the last month alone, Chinese 
officials have detained over 150 dissidents.
  The slave labor MOU and the ICCPR signing are only two of many 
examples. But they illustrate a fundamental lesson that we ignore at 
our peril: When dealing with the Communist dictatorship of the People's 
Republic of China, the United States cannot settle for paper promises 
or deferred compliance. We must stop accepting pledges of future 
improvement in place of actual improvements. The Chinese dictatorship 
regularly tells bold-faced lies about the way it treats its own people, 
such as by asserting that no one died at Tiananmen Square, and that 
there is complete religious freedom in China. How, then, can we take 
its word when it comes to matters of mere commerce? We cannot. Reforms 
within China must precede the rewards of WTO membership, and should be 
a prerequisite for annual MFN status.
  When I say ``reforms,'' I do not mean only economic reforms. We must 
also demand respect for the basic rights of the Chinese people. The 
Administration's policy of so-called ``constructive engagement'' on 
behalf of human rights has been a disaster, even according to the 
Administration's own benchmarks.
  In quarterly reports, Amnesty International has been tracking the 
seven human rights policy goals that President Clinton publicly 
announced before his trip to Beijing in 1998. Those reports detail a 
complete lack of progress in all categories, and even some regression, 
during the past year: Release all prisoners of conscience and Tiananmen 
Square prisoners: ``Total failure, Regression''; review all ``Counter-
Revolutionary'' Prison terms: ``Total failure, no Progress''; allow 
religious freedom: ``Total failure, no progress''; prevent coercive 
family planning and harvesting of organs: ``No progress''; fully 
implement pledges on human rights treaties; ``No progress''; review the 
``Re-education through labor'' system: ``Total failure, no progress''; 
and end police and prison brutality: ``Total failure, no progress''.
  The Communist government of the PRC continues to engage in systematic 
violations of basic human rights on a massive scale. It does not allow 
significant political dissent. It prohibits the free exercise of 
religion and imprisons religious leaders, ranging from the 10-year-old 
Panchen Lama to the elderly Catholic Bishop Su of Baoding Province. It 
summarily executes political prisoners in the Xinjiang Uighur 
Autonomous Region. It harvests and sells the internal organs of 
executed prisoners. It forces women who have ``unauthorized'' 
pregnancies to abort their children and submit to sterilization. It 
continues to brutalize the indigenous peoples of Tibet and East 
Turkestan.
  The failure of the Administration's current policy to effect any 
improvement should come as no surprise. While the rulers of the Chinese 
Communist Party may be ruthless and despotic, they are not stupid. If 
there are no costs associated with the brutality that keeps them in 
power, then they have no incentive to become less brutal.
  Thus, when big business and the Clinton Administration really want to 
change Beijing's conduct--for instance, in the effort to get China to 
respect international copyright--what do they do? Do they decide that 
we should be patient, that we should constructively engage for a few 
years, and sooner or later Beijing will come around? No. They use 
economic sanctions--the very same sanctions they say would be 
counterproductive as a means of promoting political and religious 
freedom in China. I am aware of at least three occasions since 1991 
when the U.S. Trade Representative threatened to impose billions of 
dollars in sanctions to vindicate U.S. intellectual property interests. 
In each of those cases, when faced with the sanctions, the Chinese 
government changed its behavior.
  By their actions, big business and the Clinton administration show 
their faith in sanctions. By their reactions, Chinese leaders show the 
efficacy of sanctions. Thus, the question before us is not ``Can 
economic sanctions work?'' It is, ``Why do we use sanctions to protect 
software, but not human life; to protect musical recordings but not 
fundamental political and religious freedoms; to stop movie piracy, but 
not torture?'' In all the years I have been asking that question, I 
have not yet heard a good answer.
  We have abandoned the American ideals of freedom and democracy for 
the sake of marginally cheaper consumer goods. We have squandered our 
patrimony of liberty for the profit of corporations who want access to 
China's inexpensive labor market. The people of the United States are 
waking up to this reality and, I believe, will no longer stand for it.
  It is time to do an about face, to condition expanded trade relations 
upon respect for internationally recognized, fundamental human rights. 
American interests and American values demand no less.

                          ____________________