[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 8]
[House]
[Pages 12020-12024]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                               AMENDMENTS

  Under clause 8 of rule XVIII, proposed amendments were submitted as 
follows:

                               H.R. 1401

                   Offered By: Mr. Cox of California

       Amendment No. 14: At the end of division A (page 326, after 
     line 16), insert the following new title:
          TITLE XIV--PROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROL MATTERS

     SEC. 1401. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
                   CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES WITH THE MISSILE 
                   TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than October 31, 1999, the 
     President shall transmit to Congress a report on the 
     compliance, or lack of compliance (both as to acquiring and 
     transferring missile technology), by the People's Republic of 
     China, with the Missile Technology Control Regime, and on any 
     actual or suspected transfer by Russia or any other country 
     of missile technology to the People's Republic of China in 
     violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The 
     report shall include a list specifying each actual or 
     suspected violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
     by the People's Republic of China, Russia, or other country 
     and, for each such violation, a description of the remedial 
     action (if any) taken by the United States or any other 
     country.
       (b) Matters To Be Included.--The report under subsection 
     (a) shall also include information concerning--
       (1) actual or suspected use by the People's Republic of 
     China of United States missile technology;
       (2) actual or suspected missile proliferation activities by 
     the People's Republic of China;
       (3) actual or suspected transfer of missile technology by 
     Russia or other countries to the People's Republic of China: 
     and
       (4) United States actions to enforce the Missile Technology 
     Control Regime with respect to the People's Republic of 
     China, including actions to prevent the transfer of missile 
     technology from Russia and other countries to the People's 
     Republic of China.

     SEC. 1402. ANNUAL REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE 
                   PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       (a) Annual Report.--The President shall transmit to 
     Congress an annual report on transfers to the People's 
     Republic of China by the United States and other countries of 
     technology with potential military applications, during the 
     1-year period preceding the transmittal of the report.
       (b) Initial Report.--The initial report under this section 
     shall be transmitted not later than October 31, 1999.

     SEC. 1403. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSFER OF SATELLITE 
                   EXPORT CONTROL AUTHORITY.

       Not later than August 31, 1999, the President shall 
     transmit to Congress a report on the implementation of 
     subsection (a) of section 1513 of the Strom Thurmond National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 
     105-261; 112 Stat. 2174; 22 U.S.C. 2778 note), transferring 
     satellites and related items from the Commerce Control List 
     of dual-use items to the United States Munitions List. The 
     report shall update the information provided in the report 
     under subsection (d) of that section.

     SEC. 1404. SECURITY IN CONNECTION WITH SATELLITE EXPORT 
                   LICENSING.

       (a) Security at Foreign Launches.--As a condition of the 
     export license for any satellite to be launched outside the 
     jurisdiction of the United States, the Secretary of State 
     shall require the following:
       (1) That the technology transfer control plan required by 
     section 1514(a)(1) of the Strom Thurmond National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261; 
     112 Stat. 2175; 22 U.S.C. 2778 note) be prepared by the 
     Department of Defense, and agreed to by the licensee, and 
     that the plan set forth the security arrangements for the 
     launch of the satellite, both before and during launch 
     operations, and include enhanced security measures if the 
     launch site is within the jurisdiction of the People's 
     Republic of China or any other country that is subject to 
     section 1514 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.
       (2) That each person providing security for the launch of 
     that satellite--
       (A) be employed by, or under a contract with, the 
     Department of Defense;
       (B) have received appropriate training in the regulations 
     prescribed by the Secretary of State known as the 
     International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (hereafter in 
     this section referred to as ``ITAR'');
       (C) have significant experience and expertise with 
     satellite launches; and
       (D) have been investigated in a manner at least as 
     comprehensive as the investigation required for the issuance 
     of a security clearance at the level designated as 
     ``Secret''.
       (3) That the number of such persons providing security for 
     the launch of the satellite shall be sufficient to maintain 
     24-hour security of the satellite and related launch vehicle 
     and other sensitive technology.
       (4) That the licensee agree to reimburse the Department of 
     Defense for all costs associated with the provision of 
     security for the launch of the satellite.
       (b) Defense Department Monitors.--The Secretary of Defense 
     shall--

[[Page 12021]]

       (1) ensure that persons assigned as space launch campaign 
     monitors are provided sufficient training and have adequate 
     experience in the ITAR and have significant experience and 
     expertise with satellite technology, launch vehicle 
     technology, and launch operations technology;
       (2) ensure that adequate numbers of such monitors are 
     assigned to space launch campaigns so that 24-hour, 7-day per 
     week coverage is provided;
       (3) take steps to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, 
     the continuity of service by monitors for the entire space 
     launch campaign period (from satellite marketing to launch 
     and, if necessary, completion of a launch failure analysis); 
     and
       (4) adopt measures designed to make service as a space 
     launch campaign monitor an attractive career opportunity.

     SEC. 1405. REPORTING OF TECHNOLOGY PASSED TO PEOPLE'S 
                   REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND OF FOREIGN LAUNCH 
                   SECURITY VIOLATIONS.

       (a) Monitoring of Information.--The Secretary of Defense 
     shall require that space launch monitors of the Department of 
     Defense assigned to monitor launches in the People's Republic 
     of China maintain records of all information authorized to be 
     transmitted to the People's Republic of China, including 
     copies of any documents authorized for such transmission, and 
     reports on launch-related activities.
       (b) Transmission to Other Agencies.--The Secretary of 
     Defense shall ensure that records under subsection (a) are 
     transmitted on a current basis to appropriate elements of the 
     Department of Defense and to the Department of State, the 
     Department of Commerce, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
       (c) Retention of Records.--Records described in subsection 
     (a) shall be retained for at least the period of the statute 
     of limitations for violations of the Arms Export Control Act.
       (d) Guidelines.--The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe 
     guidelines providing space launch monitors of the Department 
     of Defense with the responsibility and the ability to report 
     serious security violations, problems, or other issues at an 
     overseas launch site directly to the headquarters office of 
     the responsible Department of Defense component.

     SEC. 1406. REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF 
                   EXPORTING HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS TO THE 
                   PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       (a) Review.--The Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of 
     Defense, and the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
     other appropriate departments and agencies, shall conduct a 
     comprehensive review of the national security implications of 
     exporting high-performance computers to the People's Republic 
     of China. As part of the review, the Secretary shall conduct 
     empirical testing of the extent to which national security-
     related operations can be performed using clustered, 
     massively-parallel processing or other combinations of 
     computers.
       (b) Report.--The Secretary of Energy shall submit to 
     Congress a report on the results of the review under 
     subsection (a). The report shall be submitted not later than 
     six months after the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     shall be updated not later than the end of each subsequent 1-
     year period.

     SEC. 1407. END-USE VERIFICATION FOR USE BY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
                   OF CHINA OF HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS.

       (a) Revised HPC Verification System.--The President shall 
     seek to enter into an agreement with the People's Republic of 
     China to revise the existing verification system with the 
     People's Republic of China with respect to end-use 
     verification for high-performance computers exported or to be 
     exported to the People's Republic of China so as to provide 
     for an open and transparent system providing for effective 
     end-use verification for such computers and, at a minimum, 
     providing for on-site inspection of the end-use and end-user 
     of such computers, without notice, by United States nationals 
     designated by the United States Government. The President 
     shall transmit a copy of the agreement to Congress.
       (b) Definition.--As used in this section and section 1406, 
     the term ``high performance computer'' means a computer 
     which, by virtue of its composite theoretical performance 
     level, would be subject to section 1211 of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (50 U.S.C. 
     App. 2404 note).
       (c) Adjustment of Composite Theoretical Performance Levels 
     for Post-shipment Verification.--Section 1213 of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(e) Adjustment of Performance Levels.--Whenever a new 
     composite theoretical performance level is established under 
     section 1211(d), that level shall apply for purposes of 
     subsection (a) of this section in lieu of the level set forth 
     in that subsection.''.

     SEC. 1408. PROCEDURES FOR REVIEW OF EXPORT OF CONTROLLED 
                   TECHNOLOGIES AND ITEMS.

       (a) Recommendations for Prioritization of National Security 
     Concerns.--The President shall submit to Congress the 
     President's recommendations for the establishment of a 
     mechanism to identify, on a continuing basis, those 
     controlled technologies and items the export of which is of 
     greatest national security concern relative to other 
     controlled technologies and items.
       (b) Recommendations for Executive Department Approvals for 
     Exports of Greatest National Security Concern.--With respect 
     to controlled technologies and items identified under 
     subsection (a), the President shall submit to Congress the 
     President's recommendations for the establishment of a 
     mechanism to identify procedures for export of such 
     technologies and items so as to provide--
       (1) that the period for review by an executive department 
     or agency of a license application for any such export shall 
     be extended to a period longer than that otherwise required 
     when such longer period is considered necessary by the head 
     of that department or agency for national security purposes; 
     and
       (2) that a license for such an export may be approved only 
     with the agreement of each executive department or agency 
     that reviewed the application for the license, subject to 
     appeal procedures to be established by the President.
       (c) Recommendations for Streamlined Licensing Procedures 
     for Other Exports.--With respect to controlled technologies 
     and items other than those identified under subsection (a), 
     the President shall submit to Congress the President's 
     recommendations for modifications to licensing procedures for 
     export of such technologies and items so as to streamline the 
     licensing process and provide greater transparency, 
     predictability, and certainty.

     SEC. 1409. NOTICE OF FOREIGN ACQUISITION OF UNITED STATES 
                   FIRMS IN NATIONAL SECURITY INDUSTRIES.

       Section 721(b) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 
     U.S.C. 2170(b)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The President'';
       (2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Whenever a person engaged in interstate commerce in 
     the United States is the subject of a merger, acquisition, or 
     takeover described in paragraph (1), that person shall 
     promptly notify the President, or the President's designee, 
     of such planned merger, acquisition, or takeover. Whenever 
     any executive department or agency becomes aware of any such 
     planned merger, acquisition, or takeover, the head of that 
     department or agency shall promptly notify the President, or 
     the President's designee, of such planned merger, 
     acquisition, or takeover.''.

     SEC. 1410. FIVE-AGENCY INSPECTORS GENERAL EXAMINATION OF 
                   COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST ACQUISITION BY THE 
                   PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OF MILITARILY 
                   SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY.

       Not later than January 1, 2000, the Inspectors General of 
     the Departments of State, Defense, the Treasury, and Commerce 
     and the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     shall submit to Congress a report on the adequacy of current 
     export controls and counterintelligence measures to protect 
     against the acquisition by the People's Republic of China of 
     militarily sensitive United States technology. Such report 
     shall include a description of measures taken to address any 
     deficiencies found in such export controls and 
     counterintelligence measures.

     SEC. 1411. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY SECURITY IN DEPARTMENT OF 
                   DEFENSE.

       (a) Enhanced Multilateral Export Controls.--
       (1) New international controls.--The President shall work 
     (in the context of the scheduled 1999 review of the Wassenaar 
     Arrangement and otherwise) to establish new binding 
     international controls on technology transfers that threaten 
     international peace and United States national security.
       (2) Improved sharing of information.--The President shall 
     take appropriate actions (in the context of the scheduled 
     1999 review of the Wassenaar Arrangement and otherwise) to 
     improve the sharing of information by nations that are major 
     exporters of technology so that the United States can track 
     movements of technology and enforce technology controls and 
     re-export requirements.
       (b) Office of Technology Security.--(1) There is hereby 
     established in the Department of Defense an Office of 
     Technology Security. The Office shall support United States 
     Government efforts to--
       (1) establish new binding international controls on 
     technology transfers that threaten international peace and 
     United States national security; and
       (2) improve the sharing of information by nations that are 
     major exporters of technology so that the United States can 
     track movements of technology and enforce technology controls 
     and re-export requirements.
       At the end of subtitle A of title XXXI (page 419, after 
     line 3), insert the following new section:

     SEC. 3106. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CYBER 
                   SECURITY PROGRAM.

       (a) Increased Funds for Counterintelligence Cyber 
     Security.--The amounts provided in section 3103 in the matter 
     preceding paragraph (1) and in paragraph (3) are each hereby 
     increased by $8,600,000, to be available for 
     Counterintelligence Cyber Security programs.

[[Page 12022]]

       (b) Offsetting Reductions Derived From Contractor Travel.--
     (1) The amount provided in section 3101 in the matter 
     preceding paragraph (1) (for weapons activities in carrying 
     out programs necessary for national security) is hereby 
     reduced by $4,700,000.
       (2) The amount provided in section 3102 in the matter 
     preceding paragraph (1) of subsection (a) (for environmental 
     restoration and waste management in carrying out programs 
     necessary for national security) is hereby reduced by 
     $1,900,000.
       (3) The amount provided in section 3103 in the matter 
     preceding paragraph (1) is hereby reduced by $2,000,000.
       At the end of title XXXI (page 453, after line 15), insert 
     the following new subtitle:
        Subtitle F--Protection of National Security Information

     SEC. 3181. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``National Security 
     Information Protection Improvement Act''.

     SEC. 3182. SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT ON ESPIONAGE 
                   BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       (a) Reports Required.--The President shall transmit to 
     Congress a report, not less often than every six months, on 
     the steps being taken by the Department of Energy, the 
     Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
     the Central Intelligence Agency, and all other relevant 
     executive departments and agencies to respond to espionage 
     and other intelligence activities by the People's Republic of 
     China, particularly with respect to the theft of 
     sophisticated United States nuclear weapons design 
     information and the targeting by the People's Republic of 
     China of United States nuclear weapons codes and other 
     national security information of strategic concern.
       (b) Initial Report.--The first report under this section 
     shall be transmitted not later than January 1, 2000.

     SEC. 3183. REPORT ON WHETHER DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SHOULD 
                   CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
                   RESPONSIBILITY.

       Not later than January 1, 2000, the President shall 
     transmit to Congress a report regarding the feasibility of 
     alternatives to the current arrangements for controlling 
     United States nuclear weapons development, testing, and 
     maintenance within the Department of Energy, including the 
     reestablishment of the Atomic Energy Commission as an 
     independent nuclear agency. The report shall describe the 
     benefits and shortcomings of each such alternative, as well 
     as the current system, from the standpoint of protecting such 
     weapons and related research and technology from theft and 
     exploitation. The President shall include with such report 
     the President's recommendation for the appropriate 
     arrangements for controlling United States nuclear weapons 
     development, testing, and maintenance outside the Department 
     of Energy if it should be determined that the Department of 
     Energy should no longer have that responsibility.

     SEC. 3184. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE AND OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

       (a) In General.--The Department of Energy Organization Act 
     is amended by inserting after section 212 (42 U.S.C. 7143) 
     the following new sections:


                    ``office of foreign intelligence

       ``Sec. 213. (a) There shall be within the Department an 
     Office of Foreign Intelligence, to be headed by a Director, 
     who shall report directly to the Secretary.
       ``(b) The Director shall be responsible for the programs 
     and activities of the Department relating to the analysis of 
     intelligence with respect to nuclear weapons and materials, 
     other nuclear matters, and energy security.
       ``(c) The Secretary may delegate to the Deputy Secretary of 
     Energy the day-to-day supervision of the Director.


                    ``office of counterintelligence

       ``Sec. 214. (a) There shall be within the Department an 
     Office of Counterintelligence, to be headed by a Director, 
     who shall report directly to the Secretary.
       ``(b) The Director shall carry out all counterintelligence 
     activities in the Department relating to the defense 
     activities of the Department.
       ``(c) The Secretary may delegate to the Deputy Secretary of 
     Energy the day-to-day supervision of the Director.
       ``(d)(1) The Director shall keep the intelligence 
     committees fully and currently informed of all significant 
     security breaches at any of the national laboratories.
       ``(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term 
     `intelligence committees' means the Permanent Select 
     Committee of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of that Act is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 212 the following new items:

``Sec. 213. Office of Foreign Intelligence.
``Sec. 214. Office of Counterintelligence.''.

     SEC. 3185. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AT DEPARTMENT OF 
                   ENERGY NATIONAL LABORATORIES.

       (a) Program Required.--The Secretary of Energy shall 
     establish and maintain at each national laboratory a 
     counterintelligence program for the defense-related 
     activities of the Department of Energy at such laboratory.
       (b) Head of Program.--The Secretary shall ensure that, for 
     each national laboratory, the head of the counterintelligence 
     program of that laboratory--
       (1) has extensive experience in counterintelligence 
     activities within the Federal Government; and
       (2) with respect to the counterintelligence program, is 
     responsible directly to, and is hired with the concurrence 
     of, the Director of Counterintelligence of the Department of 
     Energy and the director of the national laboratory.

     SEC. 3186. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT OTHER DEPARTMENT 
                   OF ENERGY FACILITIES.

       (a) Assignment of Counterintelligence Personnel.--(1) The 
     Secretary of Energy shall assign to each Department of Energy 
     facility, other than a national laboratory, at which 
     Restricted Data is located an individual who shall assess 
     security and counterintelligence matters at that facility.
       (2) An individual assigned to a facility under this 
     subsection shall be stationed at the facility.
       (b) Supervision.--Each individual assigned under subsection 
     (a) shall report directly to the Director of the Office of 
     Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.

     SEC. 3187. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS.

       (a) Counterintelligence Polygraph Program Required.--The 
     Secretary of Energy, acting through the Director of 
     Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, shall carry 
     out a counterintelligence polygraph program for the defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy. The program shall 
     consist of the administration on a regular basis of a 
     polygraph examination to each covered person who has access 
     to a program that the Director of Counterintelligence and the 
     Assistant Secretary assigned the functions under section 
     203(a)(5) of the Department of Energy Organization Act 
     determine requires special access restrictions.
       (b) Covered Persons.--For purposes of subsection (a), a 
     covered person is any of the following:
       (1) An officer or employee of the Department.
       (2) An expert or consultant under contract to the 
     Department.
       (3) An officer or employee of any contractor of the 
     Department.
       (c) Additional Polygraph Examinations.--In addition to the 
     polygraph examinations administered under subsection (a), the 
     Secretary, in carrying out the defense activities of the 
     Department--
       (1) may administer a polygraph examination to any employee 
     of the Department or of any contractor of the Department, for 
     counterintelligence purposes; and
       (2) shall administer a polygraph examination to any such 
     employee in connection with an investigation of such 
     employee, if such employee requests the administration of a 
     polygraph examination for exculpatory purposes.
       (d) Regulations.--(1) The Secretary shall prescribe any 
     regulations necessary to carry out this section. Such 
     regulations shall include procedures, to be developed in 
     consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, for identifying and addressing ``false 
     positive'' results of polygraph examinations.
       (2) Notwithstanding section 501 of the Department of Energy 
     Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7191) or any other provision of 
     law, the Secretary may, in prescribing regulations under 
     paragraph (1), waive any requirement for notice or comment if 
     the Secretary determines that it is in the national security 
     interest to expedite the implementation of such regulations.
       (e) No Change in Other Polygraph Authority.--This section 
     shall not be construed to affect the authority under any 
     other provision of law of the Secretary to administer a 
     polygraph examination.

     SEC. 3188. CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF 
                   DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY REGULATIONS RELATING TO 
                   THE SAFEGUARDING AND SECURITY OF RESTRICTED 
                   DATA.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 18 of title I of the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) is amended by inserting 
     after section 234A the following new section:
       ``Sec. 234B. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of 
     Department of Energy Regulations Regarding Security of 
     Classified or Sensitive Information or Data.--
       ``a. Any individual or entity that has entered into a 
     contract or agreement with the Department of Energy, or a 
     subcontract or subagreement thereto, and that commits a gross 
     violation or a pattern of gross violations of any applicable 
     rule, regulation, or order prescribed or otherwise issued by 
     the Secretary pursuant to this subtitle relating to the 
     safeguarding or security of Restricted Data or other 
     classified or sensitive information shall be subject to a 
     civil penalty of not to exceed $500,000 for each such 
     violation.
       ``b. The Secretary shall include, in each contract entered 
     into after the date of the enactment of this section with a 
     contractor of the Department, provisions which provide an 
     appropriate reduction in the fees or amounts paid to the 
     contractor under the

[[Page 12023]]

     contract in the event of a violation by the contractor or 
     contractor employee of any rule, regulation, or order 
     relating to the safeguarding or security of Restricted Data 
     or other classified or sensitive information. The provisions 
     shall specify various degrees of violations and the amount of 
     the reduction attributable to each degree of violation.
       ``c. The powers and limitations applicable to the 
     assessment of civil penalties under section 234A shall apply 
     to the assessment of civil penalties under this section.''.
       (b) Clarifying Amendment.--The section heading of section 
     234A of that Act (42 U.S.C. 2282a) is amended by inserting 
     ``Safety'' before ``Regulations''.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections in the first 
     section of that Act is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 234 the following new items:

``234A. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of Department of Energy 
              Safety Regulations.
``234B. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of Department of Energy 
              Regulations Regarding Security of Classified or Sensitive 
              Information or Data.''.

     SEC. 3189. INCREASED PENALTIES FOR MISUSE OF RESTRICTED DATA.

       (a) Communication of Restricted Data.--Section 224 of the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2274) is amended--
       (1) in clause a., by striking ``$20,000'' and inserting 
     ``$400,000''; and
       (2) in clause b., by striking ``$10,000'' and inserting 
     ``$200,000''.
       (b) Receipt of Restricted Data.--Section 225 of such Act 
     (42 U.S.C. 2275) is amended by striking ``$20,000'' and 
     inserting ``$400,000''.
       (c) Disclosure of Restricted Data.--Section 227 of such Act 
     (42 U.S.C. 2277) is amended by striking ``$2,500'' and 
     inserting ``$50,000''.

     SEC. 3190. RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO NATIONAL LABORATORIES BY 
                   FOREIGN VISITORS FROM SENSITIVE COUNTRIES.

       (a) Background Review Required.--The Secretary of Energy 
     may not admit to any facility of a national laboratory any 
     individual who is a citizen or agent of a nation that is 
     named on the current sensitive countries list unless the 
     Secretary first completes a background review with respect to 
     that individual.
       (b) Moratorium Pending Certification.--(1) During the 
     period described in paragraph (2), the Secretary may not 
     admit to any facility of a national laboratory any individual 
     who is a citizen or agent of a nation that is named on the 
     current sensitive countries list.
       (2) The period referred to in paragraph (1) is the period 
     beginning 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act 
     and ending on the later of the following:
       (A) The date that is 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (B) The date that is 45 days after the date on which the 
     Secretary submits to Congress a certification described in 
     paragraph (3).
       (3) A certification referred to in paragraph (2) is a 
     certification by the Director of Counterintelligence of the 
     Department of Energy, with the concurrence of the Director of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that all security 
     measures are in place that are necessary and appropriate to 
     prevent espionage or intelligence gathering by or for a 
     sensitive country, including access by individuals referred 
     to in paragraph (1) to classified information of the national 
     laboratory.
       (c) Waiver of Moratorium.--(1) The Secretary of Energy may 
     waive the prohibition in subsection (b) on a case-by-case 
     basis with respect to any specific individual or any specific 
     delegation of individuals whose admission to a national 
     laboratory is determined by the Secretary to be in the 
     interest of the national security of the United States.
       (2) Not later than the seventh day of the month following a 
     month in which a waiver is made, the Secretary shall submit a 
     report in writing providing notice of each waiver made in 
     that month to the following:
       (A) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (B) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (3) Each such report shall be in classified form and shall 
     contain the identity of each individual or delegation for 
     whom such a waiver was made and, with respect to each such 
     individual or delegation, the following information:
       (A) A detailed justification for the waiver.
       (B) For each individual with respect to whom a background 
     review was conducted, whether the background review 
     determined that negative information exists with respect to 
     that individual.
       (C) The Secretary's certification that the admission of 
     that individual or delegation to a national laboratory is in 
     the interest of the national security of the United States.
       (4) The authority of the Secretary under paragraph (1) may 
     be delegated only to the Director of Counterintelligence of 
     the Department of Energy.
       (d) Exception to Moratorium for Certain Individuals.--The 
     moratorium under subsection (b) shall not apply to any person 
     who--
       (1) is, on the date of the enactment of this Act, an 
     employee or assignee of the Department of Energy, or of a 
     contractor of the Department; and
       (2) has undergone a background review in accordance with 
     subsection (a).
       (e) Exception to Moratorium for Certain Programs.--In the 
     case of a program undertaken pursuant to an international 
     agreement between the United States and a foreign nation, the 
     moratorium under subsection (b) shall not apply to the 
     admittance to a facility that is important to that program of 
     a citizen of that foreign nation whose admittance is 
     important to that program.
       (f) Sense of Congress Regarding Background Reviews.--It is 
     the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Energy, the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
     Director of Central Intelligence should ensure that 
     background reviews carried out under this section are 
     completed in not more than 15 days.
       (g) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
       (1) The term ``background review'', commonly known as an 
     indices check, means a review of information provided by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding personal 
     background, including information relating to any history of 
     criminal activity or to any evidence of espionage.
       (2) The term ``sensitive countries list'' means the list 
     prescribed by the Secretary of Energy known as the Department 
     of Energy List of Sensitive Countries.

     SEC. 3191. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO ACCESS BY FOREIGN 
                   VISITORS AND EMPLOYEES TO DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
                   FACILITIES ENGAGED IN DEFENSE ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Security Clearance Review Required.--The Secretary of 
     Energy may not allow unescorted access to any classified 
     area, or access to classified information, of any facility of 
     the Department of Energy engaged in the defense activities of 
     the Department to any individual who is a citizen of a 
     foreign nation unless--
       (1) the Secretary, acting through the Director of 
     Counterintelligence, first completes a security clearance 
     investigation with respect to that individual in a manner at 
     least as comprehensive as the investigation required for the 
     issuance of a security clearance at the level required for 
     such access under the rules and regulations of the 
     Department; or
       (2) a foreign government first completes a security 
     clearance investigation with respect to that individual in a 
     manner that the Secretary of State, pursuant to an 
     international agreement between the United States and that 
     foreign government, determines is equivalent to the 
     investigation required for the issuance of a security 
     clearance at the level required for such access under the 
     rules and regulations of the Department.
       (b) Effect on Current Employees.--The Secretary shall 
     ensure that any individual who, on the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, is a citizen of a foreign nation and an employee 
     of the Department or of a contractor of the Department is not 
     discharged from such employment as a result of this section 
     before the completion of the security clearance investigation 
     of such individual under subsection (a) unless the Director 
     of Counterintelligence determines that such discharge is 
     necessary for the national security of the United States.

     SEC. 3192. ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
                   STANDARDS AT NATIONAL LABORATORIES AND OTHER 
                   DEFENSE FACILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.

       (a) Report on Security and Counterintelligence Standards at 
     National Laboratories and Other DOE Defense Facilities.--Not 
     later than March 1 of each year, the Secretary of Energy, 
     acting through the Director of Counterintelligence of the 
     Department of Energy, shall submit a report on the security 
     and counterintelligence standards at the national 
     laboratories, and other facilities of the Department of 
     Energy engaged in the defense activities of the Department, 
     to the following:
       (1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (b) Contents of Report.--The report shall be in classified 
     form and shall contain, for each such national laboratory or 
     facility, the following information:
       (1) A description of all security measures that are in 
     place to prevent access by unauthorized individuals to 
     classified information of the national laboratory or 
     facility.
       (2) A certification by the Director of Counterintelligence 
     of the Department of Energy as to whether--
       (A) all security measures are in place to prevent access by 
     unauthorized individuals to classified information of the 
     national laboratory or facility; and
       (B) such security measures comply with Presidential 
     Decision Directives and other applicable Federal requirements 
     relating to the safeguarding and security of classified 
     information.
       (3) For each admission of an individual under section 3190 
     not described in a previous report under this section, the 
     identity of that individual, and whether the background

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     review required by that section determined that information 
     relevant to security exists with respect to that individual.

     SEC. 3193. REPORT ON SECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF NATIONAL 
                   LABORATORY COMPUTERS.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than March 1 of each year, 
     the National Counterintelligence Policy Board shall prepare a 
     report, in consultation with the Director of 
     Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, on the 
     security vulnerabilities of the computers of the national 
     laboratories.
       (b) Preparation of Report.--In preparing the report, the 
     National Counterintelligence Policy Board shall establish a 
     so-called ``red team'' of individuals to perform an 
     operational evaluation of the security vulnerabilities of the 
     computers of the national laboratories, including by direct 
     experimentation. Such individuals shall be selected by the 
     National Counterintelligence Policy Board from among 
     employees of the Department of Defense, the National Security 
     Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation, and of other agencies, and may be detailed 
     to the National Counterintelligence Policy Board from such 
     agencies without reimbursement and without interruption or 
     loss of civil service status or privilege.
       (c) Submission of Report to Secretary of Energy and to FBI 
     Director.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the report 
     shall be submitted in classified and unclassified form to the 
     Secretary of Energy and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation.
       (d) Forwarding to Congressional Committees.--Not later than 
     30 days after the report is submitted, the Secretary and the 
     Director shall each separately forward that report, with the 
     recommendations in classified and unclassified form of the 
     Secretary or the Director, as applicable, in response to the 
     findings of that report, to the following:
       (1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 3194. GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON 
                   DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DEFENSE-RELATED COMPUTERS.

       (a) Procedures Required.--The Secretary of Energy shall 
     establish procedures to govern access to classified 
     information on DOE defense-related computers. Those 
     procedures shall, at a minimum, provide that each employee of 
     the Department of Energy who requires access to classified 
     information shall be required as a condition of such access 
     to provide to the Secretary written consent which permits 
     access by an authorized investigative agency to any DOE 
     defense-related computer used in the performance of the 
     defense-related duties of such employee during the period of 
     that employee's access to classified information and for a 
     period of three years thereafter.
       (b) Expectation of Privacy in DOE Defense-Related 
     Computers.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
     (including any provision of law enacted by the Electronic 
     Communications Privacy Act of 1986), no user of a DOE 
     defense-related computer shall have any expectation of 
     privacy in the use of that computer.
       (c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
       (1) The term `DOE defense-related computer'' means a 
     computer of the Department of Energy or a Department of 
     Energy contractor that is used, in whole or in part, for a 
     Department of Energy defense-related activity.
       (2) The term ``computer'' means an electronic, magnetic, 
     optical, electrochemical, or other high-speed data processing 
     device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, 
     and includes any data storage facility or communications 
     facility directly related to, or operating in conjunction 
     with, such device.
       (3) The term ``authorized investigative agency'' means an 
     agency authorized by law or regulation to conduct a 
     counterintelligence investigation or investigations of 
     persons who are proposed for access to classified information 
     to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for 
     obtaining and retaining access to such information.
       (4) The term ``classified information'' means any 
     information that has been determined pursuant to Executive 
     Order No. 12356 of April 2, 1982, or successor orders, or the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to require protection against 
     unauthorized disclosure and that is so designated.
       (5) The term ``employee'' includes any person who receives 
     a salary or compensation of any kind from the Department of 
     Energy, is a contractor of the Department of Energy or an 
     employee thereof, is an unpaid consultant of the Department 
     of Energy, or otherwise acts for or on behalf of the 
     Department of Energy.
       (d) Establishment of Procedures.--Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Energy shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary 
     to implement this section.

     SEC. 3195. DEFINITION OF NATIONAL LABORATORY.

       For purposes of this subtitle, the term ``national 
     laboratory'' means any of the following:
       (1) The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, 
     California.
       (2) The Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New 
     Mexico.
       (3) The Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New 
     Mexico.
       (4) The Oak Ridge National Laboratories, Oak Ridge, 
     Tennessee.