[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 8]
[House]
[Pages 11994-12004]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                 INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE COX REPORT

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Biggert). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) 
is recognized for 60 minutes.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I rise tonight to continue 
to provide for our colleagues in the House and for the constituents 
that they represent across the country information relative to the Cox 
report and the way this report is being spun by this administration.
  Madam Speaker, I had wanted to go into much of the information I am 
going to share tonight in more detail yesterday, but because I had to 
leave after 30 minutes, I could not go into detail last evening. I will 
do so tonight.
  Madam Speaker, I want to start off this evening, as I did last night, 
by saying it is not my normal course to spend every evening over a 
given period of time on the floor of this House discussing the same 
issue. But like eight of my colleagues, I spent almost the last year of 
my life focusing on the investigation that we were asked to perform by 
the leadership in both parties in this body on potential security harm 
done to our country by our policies relative to China and other nations 
that might benefit from technology developed here in America.
  We worked tirelessly behind closed doors, cooperating fully with the 
FBI and the CIA, and with the full support of George Tenet, who heads 
the CIA, in trying to determine whether or not there were damages done 
to our national security, and if so, what was the extent of that 
damage.
  We deliberately made a decision when we began the process last summer 
that we would not go into the specifics of campaign finance activity or 
what other motives would have driven policymakers to lower the 
thresholds for exports, or perhaps the reasons why influence would be 
allowed by Chinese nationals and others, both at the White House and to 
other Federal agencies, to

[[Page 11995]]

allow those key players to gain access to the key decisionmakers that 
would benefit them in acquiring technology.

                              {time}  2145

  The nine Members that were a part of the Cox committee represent a 
broad basis of views in this Congress, four Democrats and five 
Republicans, very serious Members; and our goal was and the result was 
a totally nonpartisan effort.
  We looked at every aspect of technology that may in fact pose 
problems for us down the road: whether or not that technology had in 
fact been transferred; if so, to what extent, how it was transferred, 
and what the implications were for our long-term security.
  The almost 1,000-page document that we completed is, I think, very 
detailed and certainly would be required reading for any American. The 
problem is, most American citizens, like most Members of Congress, do 
not have the time to sift through almost 1,000 pages of detailed 
explanations and stories relative to various technologies that had been 
transferred out of the U.S. over the past several decades.
  Therefore, because much of this is contained within the thousand-or-
so-page report, even though 30 percent of that remained classified 
because the administration would not declassify the entire document, 
the media, to a large extent, have chosen not to focus on the substance 
of what is in the Cox committee report.
  Unfortunately, the bulk of the American media, and I say the bulk 
because there are a few exceptions, people like Jeff Girth with the New 
York Times, who has been doing tireless work in this area before our 
report was even issued; people like Carl Cameron at Fox News, who 
continues to do extensive work in this area; people like 60 Minutes, 
who are right now doing research in these areas, and other network 
affiliates, they are the exception. The bulk of the mainstream media 
have chosen to accept the spin that has been given by this White House 
to the work that we did.
  What I am trying to do, Madam Speaker, is to present information to 
our colleagues, which they could, in turn, provide to their 
constituents, of a factual basis that compliments the work that was 
done by the Cox committee.
  Now, the public at large can receive copies of the Cox committee 
report. It is available on the newsstand, or they can get it on the Web 
site that has been established by the Cox committee itself. Many 
libraries now have copies of the Cox committee three-volume series.
  Last evening, I mentioned the fact that I have now established a Web 
site on the Cox report that goes beyond the information that is covered 
in the Cox report and provides the visual explanation of the overview 
of the problem that we dealt with in the Cox committee.
  So our colleagues, Madam Speaker, and all of their constituents can 
now turn to the Internet where they can access the material I am going 
to show this evening, and they can download the actual charts that I am 
going to provide. In addition, smaller versions of these larger charts 
have been made available to every Member of this body. All they have to 
do is contact my office, send a staffer over; and be they Republican or 
Democrat, they can get the charts and all the related information that 
goes with the charts so they can share this information in a factual 
way with their constituents.
  The Web site where our colleagues and the American people across this 
country can access this information is www.house.gov/curtweldon. Any 
American represented by any one of our colleagues can access this 
information through that Web site.
  In fact, last evening, we had a number of contacts from throughout 
the country from people who want to get additional factual information 
in an investigational form, in a condensed form about what actually the 
Cox report focused on.
  As I have said in a series of speeches that I have been giving both 
here and around the country, Madam Speaker, the focus of the Cox 
committee was not just on our laboratories. Now, if my colleagues 
listen to Bill Richardson, the Secretary of Energy and the point person 
that has been asked by the administration to provide the spin for the 
Cox committee report, my colleagues would think that our report only 
focused on our laboratories, Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore 
in particular. Nothing could be further from the truth, Madam Speaker.
  While it is true, the laboratory security was one part of what we 
looked at, it is only one small part of the bigger picture of the way 
that we loosened the controls over our technology for the past 7 years.
  The American people need to understand that this effort was well 
beyond our laboratories. But as I did last night, I want to highlight 
four specific actions that rebut what Secretary Richardson has been 
saying around the country as the point person for this administration 
as he has tried to spin the Cox committee report as though it is only 
concerned with lab security.
  Now, Madam Speaker, our colleagues know full well, because they have 
read the text of Mr. Richardson's speeches, that his focus has been 
something along the lines of this: This administration was the 
administration who uncovered the Chinese espionage in 1995 that 
happened in previous administrations that were run by Republicans, and 
we took aggressive action in this administration to correct those 
problems.
  Secretary Richardson would have the American people believe and would 
have our colleagues believe that this administration had no 
responsibility whatsoever in technology being transferred to China and 
that the only thing they did was that they uncovered the fact that, in 
1995, they learned that China had stolen the designs for our warhead 
capabilities, the W-88 and the W-87, that occurred in previous 
administrations. That has been the extent of Secretary Richardson's 
comments.
  He has also gone on to say, now, look, we have taken steps to correct 
all of this, and today we have corrected the bulk of the problems.
  Well, I am here to rebut that, Madam Speaker. I would like to do it 
in a forum where I could stand directly across from Secretary 
Richardson, or even the President, and have a chance to go at it 
verbally and exchange information, but it looks like that is not going 
to be possible.
  The national media outlets will put Secretary Richardson on the 
Sunday morning talk shows to give the White House spin, but they have 
yet to give full consideration to the factual rebuttal to what 
Secretary Richardson has been saying. So I am going to attempt to do 
that here again on the public record tonight.
  First of all, we must remind the American people that contrary to 
what Secretary Richardson has been saying, it was this administration, 
under the leadership of then-Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary in 1993 
that ended the policy of color coding laboratory security credentials 
at our laboratories. My understanding is that she thought having color 
coded badges was to some extent discriminatory and they were not 
necessary. So under her administration, acting on behalf of Bill 
Clinton, we did away with that process in 1993.
  Now what did that mean? That meant, Madam Speaker, that all of those 
employees at our labs that we used to be able to tell by the color of 
the identifying ID system that they had on them no longer could be 
done, or no longer could be checked, because we did away with that 
color coding, making it much more difficult to determine where 
employees could or could not work or be in a particular classified 
laboratory setting.
  So under Secretary Hazel O'Leary, this administration ended the 
practice of visually being able to identify what people at our labs 
could or could not have access to key areas. Now, obviously that made 
it much easier for unauthorized people to go into areas where they did 
not have appropriate clearance.
  Now, if this policy were so acceptable and defensive, my question is, 
why did this administration 2 weeks ago reinstate the policy as it 
existed under President Reagan, President Bush, and even President 
Carter and before that?

[[Page 11996]]

If this policy change, which Secretary O'Leary made on behalf of Bill 
Clinton in 1993 and 1994, was so critically important and logical, why 
2 weeks ago did they go back to the policy as it was under Republican 
Presidents?
  Was perhaps there some new revelation that this relaxation that 
occurred by the Clinton administration in 1993 and 1994 led to security 
problems in our laboratories? Bill Richardson has yet to answer that 
question.
  Second point, Madam Speaker, we have not heard Bill Richardson talk 
about the fact that it was under Secretary Hazel O'Leary, acting on 
behalf of President Clinton, that FBI background checks of people who 
worked at our labs and visited our labs were put on hold.
  Now, why do we have FBI background checks? They were there to 
discourage people who should not have access to our country's secrets 
to get into places where those secrets were kept. That was not done 
prior to 1993, Madam Speaker. That was done by this administration as a 
major change in policy that opened the floodgates for people to go to 
our labs, who in previous years would not have been allowed access to 
those facilities.
  Bill Richardson has not dealt with that issue, because as he said, 
this administration only inherited problems and did everything to 
correct them.
  Third point. There was an incident involving a retired employee from 
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in the 1993 to 1995 time frame, where 
that employee, former employee, was accused by the Department of Energy 
of having released sensitive classified information to unauthorized 
people. The Department of Energy investigated that employee. The 
Oakland office of the Department of Energy saw fit, based on the 
factual evidence to remove that former employee's classified status so 
that he no longer, as a retiree, had access to classified information.
  The employee appealed that decision to the Secretary of Energy's 
office. Hazel O'Leary herself overturned the decision of the Oakland 
Department of Energy office and allowed that retiree to retain his 
classified status. When that occurred, Madam Speaker, employees all 
across DOE involved in sensitive security areas got the feeling that 
this administration felt that giving away classified secrets was no big 
deal.
  We lowered the threshold for the security clearance process. We 
stopped the FBI background checks. Then we even had an employee who was 
accused by the Department of Energy itself, and found guilty of giving 
classified information. The Secretary herself overturned the Department 
of Energy decision to take away his security clearance.
  Now, those people that I have talked to in the Department of Energy 
who worked under Hazel O'Leary, way more than one or two people, have 
said that under her leadership, there were wholesale actions to 
declassify massive amounts of information, in some cases boxes and 
cartons of records that no one had gone through, simply declassified, 
made available for people to read in a spirit that I guess was 
considered openness, even though these were, in many cases, the most 
important technical secrets that this country had.
  Let me give my colleagues one particular example, Madam Speaker. 
Secretary Richardson has gone around the country, and he has made the 
case that when this administration found the evidence in 1995 that 
China had stolen or received the design for our most capable nuclear 
warheads, the W-88 and the W-87, that this administration immediately 
corrected those problems so they would never occur again. Even though 
Janet Reno cannot properly explain why the Justice Department turned 
down requests for four wiretaps, for efforts by one of our employees at 
one of our labs that we thought was a spy, Secretary Richardson has 
said they took aggressive action.
  Now, that is what he said publicly. I wish he would answer this 
question, because that same year, in 1995, U.S. News and World Report 
published a special report entitled ``Shockwave.'' ``Shockwave'' was 
printed on July the 31, 1995, distributed all across the country and 
around the world. I am sure a number of these copies were sold in 
China.

                              {time}  2200

  Because when I traveled to Beijing I saw copies of U.S. News and 
World Report on the shelves that people could buy. The same thing in 
Russia. These copies were available in North Korea, in Iran or Iraq. 
This edition of U.S. News and World Report's Special Supplement were 
sold wherever people would pay the price of whatever this document 
cost, $3.50. What was in this special report on the last page, which I 
showed last evening, was startling.
  On July 31, 1995, this administration, not the Reagan administration, 
not the Bush administration, not the Carter administration, this 
administration leaked the design for our W-87 warhead to U.S. News and 
World Report. Not just the Chinese, the North Koreans, the Iraqis and 
Iranians, anyone who would buy U.S. News and World Report on July 31, 
1995 got a documented diagram of the W-87, which up until that point in 
time was classified.
  Here is the color version of what the Department of Energy released 
to U.S. News and World Report. This design shows in some detail the way 
our most capable nuclear warhead works. It shows and explains the 
process, it shows and locates the technology, the fuel, the process, 
the activity, the physics of the way America's most capable warhead 
would work. This was not secretly stolen by the Chinese, that this 
administration maintains they found in 1995. This diagram was given to 
U.S. News and World Report by this administration in 1995, and 
reproduced in U.S. News and World Report.
  As I said last evening, Madam Speaker, I have been told, and I am 
tracking this down right now, that there was an internal investigation 
within the Department of Energy to find out who leaked this diagram, 
this sensitive diagram to U.S. News and World Report. Because I have 
been told, Madam Speaker, that that individual and group were told to 
stop the investigation. Why? Because the assumption was that this 
diagram came from Hazel O'Leary's office herself.
  Why are we not hearing Secretary Richardson talk about this, Madam 
Speaker? Why is he not talking about in 1995, in July, when this 
diagram for the W-87 was reproduced and sold on newsstands all over the 
world to anyone who would pay the price? This was not some secret 
espionage capability of the Chinese. This was the Department of Energy, 
following Hazel O'Leary's desire to open up to the people of the world 
our most secret information about technologies important to our 
country.
  There is one additional factor that needs to be investigated, Madam 
Speaker. There was an individual, or is an individual employed at the 
Department of Energy who has currently been placed on what I call 
political administrative leave. His name is Edward J. McCallum. He was 
the one who briefed Members of Congress and their staffs about problems 
with one of our nuclear facilities, Rocky Flats. When it was found out 
that he had done the outrageous thing of informing Congress about 
security concerns at one of our nuclear sites, what was the response of 
this administration? They put him on administrative leave. Secretary 
Richardson has announced that he is going to fire Mr. McCallum because 
he claims he gave out classified information.
  Madam Speaker, I cannot believe this is happening in America, but 
there is some added irony here. Madam Speaker, I am providing for the 
Congressional Record, a document dated May 3, 1999, prepared by Mr. 
McCallum which outlines the problems at Rocky Flats and what steps he 
took to correct them.

                    Statement of Edward J. McCallum

       Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to speak with 
     the committee today on the Department of Energy's Safeguards 
     and Security Program. Over the past nine years, I have served 
     as the Director of DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security. 
     In this capacity, I have been responsible for the development 
     and promulgation of policy that governs the protection of the 
     national security assets entrusted to the department, to 
     include those assets that are part of the nation's nuclear

[[Page 11997]]

     weapons program. I am also responsible for providing training 
     and specialized technical advice and assistance to DOE field 
     sites when requested. My office is also charged with 
     conducting special inquiries into incidents of security 
     concern to include, but not limited to, those incidents 
     involving the unauthorized disclosure of classified 
     information.
       As you may know the Department of Energy has placed me on 
     Administrative Leave since April 19, 1999. DOE officials 
     allege that I committed a security infraction by claiming 
     that I disclosed classified information during a conversation 
     with a whistleblower from the Rocky Flats site. Based on the 
     Department's own classification procedures and guidelines 
     (CG-SS-3, Chap 10, Dispersal of Radioactive Material), I 
     firmly believe that these allegations are completely 
     unfounded. I have been an authorized classifier in the DOE 
     and it's predecessor organizations for over 25 years and 
     helped develop the first classification guide in this area in 
     1975. Further DOE also failed to follow its own procedures in 
     investigating these issues before placing me on 
     Administrative Leave. I believe this action to be an obvious 
     act of retaliation against the individual and the office that 
     has tried to bring an increasingly distressing message of lax 
     security at the DOE Laboratories forward since 1995.
       Prior to joining the Office of Safeguards and Security I 
     held several high level positions within the department's 
     safeguards and security program areas. From 1988-1989 I 
     served as Director, Office of Security Evaluations. In 1978 I 
     joined the DOE at the Chicago Operations Office and in 1979 
     became the Director of the Safeguards and Security Division. 
     Prior to joining DOE I served as an officer in the U.S. Army. 
     Active military service included a number of Military 
     Intelligence and Special Forces assignments in Europe and 
     Southeast Asia. I culminated my military duty after over 
     thirty years of active and reserve service.
       In fulfilling my responsibilities as the Director, Office 
     of Safeguards and Security, I have attempted to provide 
     senior DOE management with the most sound, professional 
     judgment possible concerning the status of security within 
     the department, along with recommendations as to how best to 
     rectify shortcomings. As you are no doubt aware, much of what 
     I have offered over recent years has not been altogether 
     positive, nor well received. The steady decline in resources 
     available to the DOE safeguards and security program as well 
     as a lack of priority have allowed the department's 
     protection posture to deteriorate to a point where a program 
     that long operated in a defense in depth mode, where no 
     single point failure permitted the system to fail, can no 
     longer afford such a strategy.
       The information presented in this statement is not new. It 
     has been repeated consistently over the last decade in 
     Departmental reports such as the Annual Reports to the 
     Secretary in 1995, 1996 and 1997 by the Office of Safeguards 
     and Security. External reviews such as the Report to the 
     Secretary in 1991, by General James Freeze, and the Nuclear 
     Command and Control Staff Report on Oversight in the DOE in 
     1998 cite similar concerns. There have also been a large 
     number of General Accounting Office Reports on these areas. 
     However, for numerous reasons the department has not been 
     able to resolve these serious and longstanding problems.


                           Computer Security

       One of the primary interests expressed by the Committee, 
     and indeed widely covered by the media recently, is the loss 
     of classified information from the computer systems at the 
     National Laboratories. Indeed, we may be sitting at the 
     center of the worst spy scandal in our Nation's history.
       The DOE Computer Security Program suffers from a variety of 
     problems. One of the primary concerns is the protection of 
     unclassified sensitive information processed by the 
     Department and the relationship of these systems to the 
     classified architecture. Relatively little guidance has been 
     issued on how to protect sensitive but unclassified 
     information. System administrators are charged with the 
     responsibility for designing their own protective measures. 
     Unfortunately, many of them do not have the computer security 
     background or knowledge required to implement a sound 
     computer security program. Attempts to issue comprehensive 
     guidance by my office and the Chief Information Officer as 
     early as 1995 met with significant Laboratory resistance. 
     Several Laboratories complained that providing protection 
     such as firewalls and passwords were unnecessarily expensive 
     and a hindrance to operations. Implementation of the proposed 
     Computer Security Manual in 1996 would have prevented many of 
     the problems being reported today.
       Another area of great concern is the migration of 
     classified information from systems approved for processing 
     classified data to less secure unclassified processing 
     systems. My office has noted a number of problems in this 
     area to include: Failure to conduct classification reviews 
     before placing information onto an unclassified processing 
     system, intentionally creating unclassified data that is very 
     close to classified data to ease processing, and using 
     personal computers at home to process classified information.
       A variety of computer security tools and techniques, such 
     as encryption devices, firewalls, and disconnect features, 
     are available and their use is required; however, these 
     protective measures are not always used. In some cases, this 
     is due to lack of knowledge by system administrators. In 
     other cases, it is due to lack of funding or priority for the 
     required equipment.


                           Protective Forces

       While much of the attention of late has been directed 
     toward the area of foreign visitors and the protection of 
     classified information, equally serious cause for concern 
     exists in other areas as well. For instance, since 1992, the 
     number of protective forces at DOE sites nationwide has 
     decreased by almost 40% (from 5,640 to the current number of 
     approximately 3,500) while the inventory of nuclear material 
     has increased by more than 30%. The number of Protective 
     Force Officers has declined to the point where it is 
     questionable at some facilities whether the DOE Protective 
     Force could defeat an adversary. By 1996 several facilities 
     were no longer capable of recapturing a nuclear asset or 
     facility if it were lost to an adversary. Indeed, a number of 
     sites stopped even training for this mission because 
     resources had been reduced below the minimum level necessary 
     to expect success. We have had some success in increasing 
     these numbers of recent years so that at this time all sites 
     report they can meet this minimum capability. Several sites 
     are using performance tests to verify that their Protective 
     Force can defeat the adversary; however, many of these tests 
     are not realistic. For example, performance tests sometimes 
     are not consistent in providing the adversary with the 
     weaponry or explosive breaching devices used by terrorist 
     groups. At times artificial ``safety constrains'' are imposed 
     on exercise adversary teams that effectively neutralize their 
     ability to operate. This results in ``winning'' the 
     performance test, in a less than realistic scenario.
       There have been several other consequences of the reduction 
     in the number of Protective Force Officers. First is a 
     relatively older Protective Force (the average Protective 
     Force Officer is now in his/her early 40s). Second, DOE sites 
     are relying on local law enforcement agencies to handle 
     serious security threats. Their ability in nuclear terrorist 
     situations is questionable. Third, sites have difficulty 
     increasing the tempo of security operations during high 
     threat periods. Fourth, Protective Force personnel are 
     displaying lower morale due to reduced training and job 
     stagnation. Finally, an average annual overtime rate in our 
     nuclear weapons facilities of approximately 25% has 
     detrimental effects on safety, training, and response 
     capabilities.


                               Exercises

       A centrally funded and well-integrated National-level 
     security exercise program is critical to meet the safeguards 
     and protection needs of DOE and the nation. Exercises that 
     address site response and management of security crisis are 
     required by regulation to be held annually at critical DOE 
     facilities. However, participation by State and local law 
     enforcement, regional offices of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation (FBI) and other Federal agencies is 
     inconsistent and varies considerably across the complex. 
     Under Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, the 
     Secretary of Energy is directed to conduct exercises to 
     ensure the safety and security of its nuclear facilities from 
     terrorism. DOE is also tasked to support the FBI in its lead 
     as the Federal agency responsible for managing all domestic 
     incidents involving terrorist threat or use of weapons of 
     mass destruction (WMD). In addition, the recent creation of 
     the Department of Justice National Domestic Preparedness 
     Office, the FBI Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), and 
     other National crisis response assets, requires that DOE plan 
     and practice a new and expanded role in supporting a security 
     crisis response beyond the local site and internal Department 
     level.
       Currently, the present DOE organizational structure 
     separates exercise responsibility between Program offices and 
     Safeguards and Security; this hampers the integration of 
     sequential training objectives that can be monitored and 
     tracked and creates confusion at the site level. More 
     importantly, the majority of the funding resides at the site 
     level where expenditures must vie with other program needs 
     each fiscal year, often to their detriment.


                       physical security systems

       Another area of concern involves aging and deteriorating 
     security systems throughout the DOE complex. Physical 
     security systems are critical to ensure the adequate 
     protection of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Many facilities 
     have systems ranging in age from 14 to 21 years, and are 
     based on mid-70's to early-80's technology. Because of the 
     obsolescence of these systems, replacement parts and services 
     are increasingly expensive and hard to obtain. Expensive 
     compensatory measures (i.e., protective force response) are 
     required to ensure needed confidence levels of adequate 
     protection. Older systems are also increasingly vulnerable to 
     defeat by advanced technologies that are now readily and 
     cheaply available to potential adversaries.

[[Page 11998]]

     Continual reductions, delays or cancellations in line-item 
     construction funding increases the vulnerability risks to 
     sites protection capability. Also, DOE is not realizing 
     significant savings available through advancements in 
     technology that have increased detection, assessment, and 
     delay capabilities.
       Some sites are using a variety of nonstandard security 
     alarm and access control systems that have not been fully 
     tested to determine if they contain vulnerabilities, or if 
     they meet Departmental requirements without compensatory 
     measures. Such systems may have back doors or viruses, that 
     allow the insider adversary to cripple the entire site 
     protection system, thus leaving the site vulnerable. Some 
     sites do not have qualified personnel to conduct these 
     vulnerability tests and are generally unwilling to conduct 
     any type of attack on the system to determine if such 
     vulnerabilities can be accomplished.


                       Counterterrorism Measures

       PDD-39, The United States Policy on Counterterrorism, 
     requires all governmental agencies to implement security 
     measures to defend against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
     including chemical and biological weapons. The Office of 
     Safeguards and Security has developed the necessary policies 
     and requirements for implementing PDD-39. Field Elements, 
     however, have been slow to purchase and install explosive 
     detection systems, with only a limited number of sites having 
     done so. Program Offices claim that there is no funding for 
     such equipment.


                           personnel security

       I fear that a recent decision by the department to have 
     program offices fund the cost of clearances for field 
     contractor personnel will have severe repercussions. Since 
     implementing this new approach at the beginning of FY 1999, 
     we have already begun to see a dramatic increase in the 
     backlog of background investigations. As with other security 
     areas, program offices must decide upon competing interests 
     when determining those areas to be funded. Unfortunately, 
     security activities are relegated to a lower tier in terms of 
     importance by some program offices and selected field sites. 
     This appears to be the case with the funding of security 
     background investigations. As the first line of defense 
     against the ``insider'' threat, the adequate funding and 
     timely conduct of reinvestigations is critical to ensuring 
     the department maintains a protection posture commensurate 
     with the level of threat.


                       Roles and responsibilities

       Operating beneath the surface of these major challenges are 
     some fundamental issues that, if properly addressed, could 
     provide the impetus to effect real progress. These 
     challenges, for the most part, are not new, nor are their 
     solutions.
       Organizational Structure: In all of the reviews of the 
     safeguards and security program conducted during the last 
     decade, there is a recurring theme. Simply, the Department's 
     organizational structure of the Safeguards and Security 
     Program is such that programmatic authority and 
     responsibility are not properly aligned. The Safeguards and 
     Security Program in its current structure has one 
     organization developing policy, training and providing 
     technical field assistance (NN), another organization 
     providing funding and ``implementing guidance'' (Headquarters 
     Program Offices), a third organization (Field Site) is 
     responsible for implementation of policy, while a fourth (EH) 
     is responsible for oversight. A fundamental change in both 
     the organizational structure and funding of the Safeguards 
     and Security Program is absolutely necessary before the 
     Department can begin to systematically address the major 
     challenges previously addressed. These organizations must be 
     consolidated with policy, guidance and implementation in one 
     location, with an appropriate budget to participate in the 
     Department decision making.
       Safeguards and Security Program Funding: This is the 
     central, driving issue. Budget cutbacks have adversely 
     affected all of DOE. As previously alluded to, however, when 
     Program Offices face funding shortfalls, there is a tendency 
     to cut security programs on a pro rata basis without the 
     benefit of assessing the impact these cuts would have on the 
     department's protection posture. The implementation of 
     virtually every security program, from the Information 
     Security Program to the Protective Force Program, has 
     suffered significantly as a result. I believe many of these 
     cuts are shortsighted and ill advised as they eventually lead 
     to security lapses. Nevertheless, my office has no authority 
     to force the Program Offices to implement departmental 
     security policies and requirements. Similarly, my office has 
     no funds to provide to Program Offices or Field Elements to 
     help pay for appropriate security measures. Without an 
     adequate budget there is simply no authority.
       Security Policy and Requirements Formulation. DOE security 
     policies and requirements are based upon current threat data 
     and requirements identified by outside intelligence 
     organizations. DOE, the Department of Defense, the Nuclear 
     Regulatory Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
     and the Central Intelligence Agency meet every two years to 
     evaluate current threat data and formulate an agreed upon 
     threat statement that governs security programs throughout 
     the U.S. Government. In addition, the Department of Energy 
     internally reviews this threat statement annually. In DOE 
     parlance, the resulting document is known as the Design Basis 
     Threat. Program Offices are required to use the Design Basis 
     Threat as the baseline for planning security measures. 
     Security requirements are also levied upon the Department by 
     the Office of the President, Congress, and the General 
     Services Administration. For example, Presidential Decision 
     Directive 39 directed all Executive Branch agencies to 
     protect against terrorist attacks. This resulted in an 
     increased need for explosive detection equipment, more 
     frequent security patrols, and hardening of structures. In 
     some cases, Program Offices have directed their field 
     elements not to implement departmental security requirements. 
     This is due to 2 main reasons: The program offices can't 
     afford the new directive, or they simply don't agree with it. 
     In other cases, they have issued interpretive guidance that 
     changes the security policy or undermines the effectiveness 
     of that policy. Again, the Office of Safeguards and Security 
     has no authority to demand compliance with departmental 
     security policies and requirements.


                            accomplishments

       I would be less than forthcoming if I failed to mention 
     some positive aspects of the department's safeguards and 
     security program. Let me start by saying that the program is 
     staffed by hard working dedicated men and women throughout 
     the country who are firmly committed to protecting the 
     critical national security assets entrusted to their care. 
     The responsibilities of these individuals are most demanding, 
     even dangerous in some respects. Yet despite the dwindling 
     resources made available to them, these individuals continue 
     to perform in outstanding fashion. Where this department has 
     failed is in providing these professionals the necessary 
     resources to allow them to perform their responsibilities 
     appropriately. The Department has also failed to provide 
     protection so that individuals will bring forward problems 
     and deficiencies without fearing retaliation.
       Progress has been made in some of the areas I previously 
     addressed. In the area of physical security, the Department 
     is working to correct identified weaknesses. Specifically, 
     the Department augmented security at some field sites by 
     deploying new technologies to safeguard special nuclear 
     materials and weapons; worked with other agencies to train 
     departmental protective forces; identified and developed more 
     sophisticated detection and deterrent systems; and hired 
     additional security personnel. New explosive detection 
     systems are being installed at selected nuclear facilities 
     and some sites are upgrading access control systems.
       In the area of information security, the Secretary recently 
     directed the shut down of classified computer operations at 
     three national laboratories until such time as he was assured 
     that information processed on the systems is being done so 
     securely. From a longer-term perspective, the department is 
     requesting a dramatic increase in budget for information 
     security. The additional funding will be used to help further 
     secure the department's classified and unclassified computer 
     networks. The improvements will help strengthen fire walls, 
     develop better intrusion detection devices, and fund rapid 
     response teams to work with the FBI to detect and track cyber 
     intruders.
       In the area of the control, measurement and accountability 
     of special nuclear materials, the Department has established 
     the Fissile Materials Assurance Working Group (FMAWG) to 
     assess needed areas of improvement and make recommendations. 
     In this regard, the FMAWG identified unmeasured materials and 
     initiated actions to resolve discrepancies. They further 
     identified issues regarding the safeguarding of irradiated 
     material and are promulgating policy for implementation. The 
     Department is developing new technologies for tamper 
     indicating devices and proposing pilot projects for field 
     implementation.


                             a path forward

       All of these positive steps are good, necessary actions to 
     ensure the adequacy of our protection posture. More is 
     needed, however. As previously addressed, organizational 
     realignment of safeguards and security activities is sorely 
     needed. I understand that this is now under review by the 
     department. While addressing the problems inherent in the 
     current organizational structure of the Department will not 
     in itself solve all of the issues contained in this report, 
     it will establish the necessary framework to allow resolution 
     in a more effective and lasting manner. Simple organizational 
     realignment, however, by itself, will not result in the 
     fundamental change in approach that is required. The 
     Department should work closely with Congress to establish a 
     budget line item for safeguards and security. Doing so will 
     enable a more accurate accounting and control of safeguards 
     and security expenditures. It will also improve the 
     likelihood that policy will be issued in conjunction with the 
     necessary resources to implement that policy.
       It should be apparent that attempts to have effective 
     internal oversight of the DOE safeguards and security program 
     have failed

[[Page 11999]]

     over a twenty-year period. While there have been high points 
     and periods when oversight has been effective, organizational 
     and budget pressures have played too central a theme for this 
     function to remain within DOE. An organization like the 
     Defense Nuclear Facilities Board should be established to 
     independently review Security at DOE and the Laboratories. 
     Further a direct reporting mechanism should be established to 
     one or more of the Congressional Committees.
       Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the department today 
     as we strive to meet our protection responsibilities is the 
     attitude throughout the complex toward security. There are 
     some that believe that safeguards and security is an overhead 
     expense. I disagree, strongly. Safeguards & security is a 
     mission-critical element. Without it, why bother creating new 
     national defense technologies, if present or future foes can 
     have ready access to it? To treat it as a mission-critical 
     element requires a greater sense of accountability than seen 
     to date. Secretary Richardson has committed to establishing 
     and maintaining a sound safeguards and security program. It 
     will take the commitment not only of the Secretary, however, 
     but of each and every program official throughout the 
     department if this mission essential element is to be 
     fulfilled. It is incumbent upon senior departmental 
     management to make safeguards and security a priority. It is 
     too important to be relegated to a secondary status where its 
     operations are viewed as ancillary. Both Congress and the 
     public rightfully expect our best effort in executing this 
     vital program. We should demand no less from ourselves.
                                  ____



                                         Department of Energy,

                                 Germantown, MD, January 27, 1997.

                    Memorandum for Distribution List

     From: Edward J. McCallum, Director, Office of Safeguards and 
       Security.
     Subject: Status of Safeguards and Security.
       This report provides a comprehensive review of Safeguards 
     and Security activities throughout the Department of Energy 
     complex during 1996 and provides a candid look at the future 
     of the Program. The report is structured to present a 
     Departmental perspective of the Safeguards and Security 
     Program to senior management and all safeguards and security 
     professionals. For the first time the report also contains a 
     section which summarizes safeguards and security 
     participation in National Nuclear Command and Control 
     activities.
       During the past year disturbing trends continued that 
     resulted in additional budget reductions, further diminishing 
     technical resources, reducing mission training and 
     undermining our ability to protect nuclear weapons, special 
     nuclear materials and other critical assets. This is 
     occurring at a time of increased responsibilities resulting 
     from the international transfer of nuclear materials and 
     dismantling of U.S. nuclear weapons. Although traditional and 
     time proven protection principles are still emphasized, it is 
     becoming increasingly difficult to adequately protect our 
     nation's nuclear stockpile in the face of inadequate 
     resources, obsolescent systems, aging protection forces and 
     funding uncertainties. This has increasingly resulted in a 
     ``hollow-force'' that goes below the ``bottom line'' and 
     makes it more difficult to fulfill National Security 
     mandates. It is imperative that the Safeguards and Security 
     downward resource spiral be immediately halted. Further, 
     nuclear materials must be consolidated to reduce costs or 
     additional resources must be found for protection. Adequate 
     investment is essential to sustain a vital Safeguards and 
     Security Program that continues to support the nation's 
     security, the public health, safety and our environment.
       I am confident that the report will be a valuable tool to 
     stimulate open conversation, provide constructive feedback 
     and assist in addressing the continued viability of the 
     Department's Safeguards and Security Program. Collectively, 
     we must continue to strive to maximize the use of our 
     resources necessary to ensure requisite security for the 
     Nation's and the Department's most vital assets.
           Attachment.
                                  ____



                                  Central Intelligence Agency,

                                   Washington, DC, March 16, 1999.
     Dr. Ernest Moniz,
     Acting Deputy Secretary, Department of Energy, Washington, DC
       Dear Dr. Moniz: As the Central Intelligence Agency's 
     representative to the Department of Energy (DOE) Security 
     Management Board, I would like to convey some important 
     perspectives concerning on-going discussions to reorganize 
     the Department's security element. Of concern is 
     consideration that is being given to further decentralize 
     DOE's security management apparatus and assignment of 
     security expenses to indirect costs (i.e., overhead) at the 
     individual sites and Laboratories. In my judgment, and based 
     on our experience at CIA, DOE should undertake such 
     reorganizational and budgetary alignments advisedly.
       Using CIA's experience as an example, reorganization 
     through division can be highly ineffective and inefficient. 
     Shortcomings to CIA's 1994 decision to divide the Office of 
     Security were quickly exposed, including: expensive 
     duplication of security activities, deteriorated management 
     focus over a tangential security program, elimination of a 
     coherent security career service, and dilution of CIA's 
     leadership role in the Community. Adding to the difficulties, 
     security managers under this arrangement had limited control 
     over their fiscal fate, having been placed alongside and 
     beneath numerous budgetary layers.
       Director Tenet recognized these inefficiencies immediately, 
     and placed me in charge of consolidating CIA's program in 
     1997. In addition, he has provided security with a stronger 
     voice in its fiscal future. The process to reconstitute our 
     security apparatus has been challenging; but, its benefits 
     have already become apparent through a stronger, more viable 
     security program.
       The lessons learned after CIA decentralized its security 
     organization have also been experienced by other agencies, 
     several of which have chosen to reconsolidate their 
     activities. With such stark examples of the shortcomings of 
     decentralization in security apparatuses, I urge you to give 
     strong consideration to the implications of such 
     reorganization of DOE.
       Furthermore, in today's world of sophisticated 
     technological threats, and given the developing review at one 
     of the National Laboratories so widely publicized, I would 
     further caution against leading the charge toward field 
     autonomy, and anticipated the Department looking toward 
     reinforcing centralized security expertise.
       When appointed to the Security Management Board a year ago 
     I expected that the Department wanted the input of the 
     representatives from other Agencies in security issues of 
     this nature. In fact, I believed that obtaining such outside 
     counsel on issues of this nature was the purpose for which 
     the Board was created. Unfortunately, my experience with the 
     Board indicates that it is a feckless exercise with no 
     accomplishments almost fifteen months after it was 
     established. I would welcome the opportunity to further 
     discuss my views with you at your convenience.
           Sincerely,

                                      Raymond A. Mislock, Jr.,

                                         Associate Deputy Director
     For Administration for Security.
                                  ____


              [From the Wall Street Journal, May 3, 1999]

      Congress Brings New Inquires Into Weapons Security Failures

                          (By John J. Fialka)

       Washington.--House and Senate investigators are launching 
     new inquires into the Energy Department's $800 million 
     security program and how it failed to stop the apparent 
     compromise of many of the nation's most valuable nuclear-
     weapons secrets.
       Rep. John D. Dingell, the Michigan Democrat who led several 
     of the House Commerce Committee's previous investigations in 
     the 1980s and early 1990s, charged that the department runs a 
     system of ``inverse reward and punishment.'' People who have 
     identified lax security at the nation's defense labs have 
     been punished and those who somehow finesse, ignore or abuse 
     the program have been rewarded, he said.
       The panel will hold hearings this week on the latest 
     example of this seeming paradox: Edward McCallum, the Energy 
     Department's top internal critic of security deficiencies, 
     has been put on leave and is being investigated by the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigations for allegedly leaking secret 
     information. At the same time, Wen Ho Lee, the former Los 
     Alamos nuclear-weapons scientists who allegedly transferred 
     many of the nation's most sensitive nuclear-weapons codes to 
     an unprotected computer between 1983 and 1995, is described 
     by the FBI as being ``unprosecutable.''
       There is no evidence that China obtained any of the codes, 
     although Mr. Lee met with China's weapons experts on two 
     occasions during the 1980s and Chinese scientists were among 
     the most frequent visitors to the lab.
       The Commerce Committee has threatened to subpoena 13 Energy 
     Department officials who know about the investigation of Mr. 
     McCallum, a 25-year department veteran who, among other 
     things, has complained about difficulties in trying to 
     protect the secret computer system at Los Alamos. The network 
     of 2,000 computers is used to store digital models of nuclear 
     tests that show, moment-to-moment, how nuclear weapons work.
       Committee members have invited Mr. McCallum to testify 
     along with another department veteran, Glenn Podonsky, who 
     runs internal inspections for the agency. While Republicans 
     are leading the charge in the various congressional 
     investigations, the two witnesses and others are expected to 
     tell of foul-ups and budget shortfalls that date to the 
     Carter administration.
       Energy Department reports show that Mr. Podonsky, as early 
     as 1994, had identified the problem that researchers could 
     transfer data from the secured computer system to the 
     unprotected one.
       Over the weekend, Department of Energy officials said that 
     a classified report prepared by U.S. intelligence agencies in 
     November showed that there had been numerous efforts to 
     penetrate the weapons laboratories' unclassified computer 
     system. The secret report also noted that China was among

[[Page 12000]]

     a number of nations the laboratories should regard as a 
     threat. Still, investigators didn't examine Mr. Lee's 
     computer until March and didn't close down the classified 
     system until last month. The report's findings were first 
     published in the New York Times.
       Brooke Anderson, a spokeswoman for Energy Secretary Bill 
     Richardson, said the secretary ``is extremely concerned that 
     the hearing may bring potential disclosures of classified 
     information and his priority is to protect the national 
     security.'' Mr. Richardson, a former member of the Commerce 
     Committee, irritated its leaders after a security hearing 
     last week, accusing the panel of ``exhuming the past.''
       David Tripp, Mr. McCallum's lawyer, said the information 
     involved in the allegations against Mr. McCallum wasn't 
     classified and that he is being punished for being ``a pain 
     in the neck'' about exposing security problems. Rose 
     Gottemoeller, the assistant energy secretary who removed Mr. 
     McCallum from his job, denied that was the reason, calling 
     Mr. McCallum ``a valued security professional'' who has made 
     ``major improvements.''
       Despite substantial spending on ``gates, guards and guns,'' 
     one problem that had received relatively little scrutiny is 
     the so-called insider threat. As the Cold War has faded, the 
     threat has grown because many Americans now shun careers in 
     engineering, physics and mathematics--skills in demand at the 
     weapons labs. The shortage forced the labs to turn to 
     foreign-born experts who had become naturalized U.S. 
     citizens, such as Mr. Lee, Taiwanese whose skills included 
     modeling nuclear-weapons explosions on supercomputers.
                                  ____


            [From the TelePort of: Ed McCallum, May 7, 1999]

     To: Al Santoli.
     Memo: This is draft and has not been given to DOE except 
       verbally. It clearly shows there was no classified unless 
       DOE wants to change the published rules./Ed


                                 draft

                                         Herndon, VA, May 6, 1999.
     Subject: Classification Analysis of Rocky Flats Transcripts
     Mr. Joseph Mahaley,
     Director, Office of Security Affairs, U.S. Department of 
         Energy, Washington, DC.
       Dear Joe: Since I have not been given the opportunity to 
     present my technical analysis of the classification decisions 
     that I made during the subject discussions with the DOE 
     contractor whistleblower, Mr. Jeff Peters, I will do so now. 
     The presentation being made in this letter should have been 
     part of the first step of the inquiry process described in 
     DOE Manual 471.2-1B, 7a.(1), and should have been completed 
     before proceeding with any inquiry. If both sides of a 
     technical discussion had been laid on the table before the 
     Department's classification authority, I firmly believe a 
     determination would have been made at that time that the tape 
     conversation and subsequently released transcripts were 
     unclassified.
       To date, six authorized classifiers have assessed the 
     transcripts. Two areas of the conversation have been 
     identified for further review. First, reference is made to 
     ``20 percentile'' and ``80 percentile'', but no further 
     context is provided by either speaker. Even if the reader can 
     speculate the discussion relates to protective force computer 
     modeling, no specific scenario is developed, no specific 
     facility (e.g. building or vault, as stated in Topic 610 of 
     CG-SS-3) is identified, and no specific attack developed.
       DOE Classification Guide, CG-SS-3, Chapter 6, 
     ``Vulnerabilities'', D. states clearly that information must, 
     ``meaningfully aid a terrorist or other malefactor in 
     targeting DOE facilities or bypassing security measures . . 
     .''.
       Vulnerability is defined in Appendix A, Definitions of CG-
     SS-3, as ``an exploitable capability or an exploitable 
     security weakness. . . . If the vulnerability were detected 
     and exploited by an adversary, then it would reasonably be 
     expected to result in a successful attack . . .''. Clearly, 
     no exploitable vulnerability is discussed within the meaning 
     and intent of this classification guide that has been used by 
     DOE for over 25 years.
       The second area of conversation identified for review is 
     the statement ``Put some HE on top of it and boost it up--you 
     don't need to take it in the middle of Denver, it's going in 
     the middle of Denver anyway.'' This portion of the 
     conversation refers to a radiological dispersal device. CG-
     SS-3, Chapter 3, ``Malevolent Dispersal of Radioactive 
     Material'', provides detailed guidance for classification in 
     this area:
       Paragraph C, states that for information to be classified 
     it must be,'' . . . detailed, specific information that, if 
     not controlled, would significantly enhance the probability 
     of such a dispersal''. Further elements of the same paragraph 
     require elements such as ``Details of specialized access 
     procedures to areas or equipment . . .''. ``Detailed 
     scenarios (combining details of radioactive source type, size 
     and form; container design; dispersal mechanism design) . . 
     .''
       Topic 1101.1 states specifically ``Trivial or generally 
     known methodology'' is Unclassified.
       Topic 1030, ``Design of credible Radiation Dispersion 
     Device (RDD), states a design is ``Unclassified for 
     unsophisticated designs.''
       Topic 1052 cites ``Generic description of methods that 
     could be used to disperse radioactive material (e.g., fire, 
     explosives)'' as Unclassified.
       Special nuclear materials discussed in the conversations 
     have been publicly associated with the nuclear weapons 
     program and included in Section 51 of the Atomic Energy Act 
     of 1954. They are defined as ``Pure Products'' and as ``High-
     Grade Materials'' in unclassified DOE Regulations and in CG-
     SS-3.
       Further, information concerning radioactive source term and 
     scenarios of worst case dispersal with consequence estimates 
     are contained in great detail in Safety Analysis Reports for 
     each site. These reports contain worst case scenarios for 
     radiological releases. They are unclassified, published and 
     available in DOE Public Reading Rooms and periodically on the 
     internet.
       I know of no other issues that have been reviewed or could 
     be considered even close to classified information. Further, 
     I was given a 30-minute briefing on Defense Programs weapons 
     design program(s) in the past. Nothing I have seen or heard 
     of these programs would void or invalidate the published 
     guidance in CG-SS-3.
       I firmly believe that I have not disclosed classified 
     information and have not crossed any boundaries, real or 
     imagined. In no case were details or specifics provided any 
     reader. Speculation might cause a reader to draw conclusions 
     that are completely external to these illegally recorded 
     conversations. The transcripts have been reviewed by a number 
     of authorized classifiers and all have reached the conclusion 
     that the conversation does not contain classified information 
     and in no way crossed any prohibited boundaries.
       I believe I have seen a rush to judgment on this 
     classification issue and subsequent actions that violate the 
     procedures published in DOE classification guidance and DOE 
     Manuals relative to the investigation of a potential 
     compromise. If the basic elements of ``due process'' had been 
     followed this would have only been a technical discussion 
     with possible clarified technical guidance provided by one 
     side or the other. In closing, if Defense Programs believes 
     these elements are so sensitive, then why weren't adequate 
     physical protections immediately put in place to allay their 
     concerns?
           Sincerely,
                                  ____



                                         Department of Energy,

                                 Germantown, MD, February 3, 1999.
     Memorandum for Joseph S. Mahaley, Director, Office of 
       Security Affairs
     From: Edward J. McCallum, Director, Office of Safeguards and 
       Security
     Subject: Hagengruber Study.
       I have completed my initial review of the subject document 
     and offer the following impressions. These thoughts are not 
     intended to be all inclusive, nor do they address all of the 
     facts that I find questionable. In this regard, I have 
     directed the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) Program 
     staff to conduct a thorough review of the entire report with 
     respect to its factual accuracy. Upon completion of this 
     review, detailed comments regarding factual inaccuracies will 
     be forwarded. Beyond the factual accuracy of some of the 
     items found in the report, however, it is evident that this 
     study not only misses the mark of the task assigned, but if 
     left unchallenged could serve to damage the Department's 
     standing in the security and intelligence community at large.
       In reading the report, I am struck by the elementary 
     understanding it portrays of the Safeguards and Security 
     (S&S) Program, specifically as it relates to the national 
     level directives that provide much of the foundation for many 
     of the areas called into question. There is no mention of the 
     Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) or the requirements 
     contained therein governing federal agencies and their 
     policies toward counterterrorism, explosives detection, 
     radiological sabotage, and chemical/biological weapons 
     defense. In fact the assertions offered are in direct 
     contradiction to President Clinton's policy on 
     Counterterrorism promulgated in PDD-39. For a study that 
     spent the better part of a year examining the Department's 
     S&S Program, I find this glaring omission of national 
     policies to be alarming. Furthermore, it conveys a lack of 
     understanding of the environment in which the Department 
     operates that consequently diminishes the value of any 
     findings or recommendations.
       Beyond the lack of depth of understanding of S&S Program 
     requirements, however, I find the team failed to answer the 
     only question that was posed to them. Specifically, whether 
     current--DOE practices ensure that Special Nuclear Material 
     (SNM) and Nuclear Weapons are adequately protected against 
     Raidological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear 
     Device (IND) threats. The short statements in the report that 
     we need to change policies to require a higher standard of 
     protection of SNM is gratuitous and provides no new 
     information. The single graphic depicting greater quantities 
     of explosives relative to SNM types was recognized long ago 
     when the Atomic Energy Commission began this program, and 
     again in 1988 when the graded safeguards table for SNM 
     protection was established. I was disappointed to find that 
     the validation of specific time lines of existing guidelines 
     currently in the Secretary's office awaiting

[[Page 12001]]

     completion of this study were completely avoided.
       Equally disappointing is the amount of effort and detail 
     directed at the management and organizational issues that 
     have been previously reported in numerous studies to include 
     your Report to the Secretary of October 1997 and the OSS 
     Annual Report to the Secretary of January 1997. That the 
     fragmented and divisive S&S structure is difficult to manage 
     is well acknowledged and has been addressed repeatedly by DOE 
     through reorganization and restructuring (e.g., SAI 26). 
     There is no new information here, and the recommendations 
     offered are confusing and inconsistent with one another. The 
     solution as I understand it would further decentralize 
     authority and responsibility to field sites thereby 
     recreating the exact same environment as existed in 
     Counterintelligence prior to the issuance of PDD 61.
       The report wades through a plethora of symptoms and offers 
     the often repeated Laboratory rhetoric to limit Headquarters 
     involvement and trust the contractor to carry out the 
     government's mission. Trust is not the question, execution 
     is. As you know, cost is an essential element of risk 
     management. The House of Representatives, Committee on 
     Commerce, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee 
     challenged the DOE on the oversight of its contractor's S&S 
     programs throughout the 1980's and early 1990's. Senator 
     Glenn asked the same questions in Senate, Government Affairs 
     Committee hearings. These facts are either unknown or ignored 
     by the report team. I have yet to hear an allegation that DOE 
     provides too much oversight of our contractors except from 
     the Labs. Consequently, the suggestion that S&S should be 
     funded through a site's overhead budget is simply 
     irresponsible. It is unclear to me how this would be the 
     preferred method of funding. Such a move would further remove 
     the Department's control over this critical area. It is 
     precisely this approach to safeguards and security as an 
     ``overhead'' function that has led to many of our 
     difficulties. It further underscores the lack of 
     understanding of the mission essential element of safeguards 
     and security as it relates to the Department's overall 
     mission. It is precisely this type of thinking that Admiral 
     Crowe's January 1999 report on the embassy bombings in 
     Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam warns against. In his cover letter 
     to Secretary Albright he expresses concern about the ``. . . 
     relative low priority accorded security concerns throughout 
     the US government--by the Department, other agencies in 
     general, and on the part of many employees both in Washington 
     and in the field.'' Admiral Crowe goes on to advise that, 
     ``Saving lives and adequately addressing our security 
     vulnerabilities on a sustained basis must be given higher 
     priority by all those involved if we are to prevent such 
     tragedies in the future.''
       Again, this lack of understanding leads to another 
     distrubing assertion found in the report. Specifically that: 
     ``Safeguards and security is not a mission of DOE. Rather, 
     safeguards and security is the responsibility of the DOE and 
     contractor management at individual sites.'' Such a statement 
     is contrary to Department of Energy's Strategic Plan of 
     September 1997. Under the Strategic Plan's National Security 
     Strategic Goal is the objective to ``ensure the vitality of 
     DOE's national security enterprise.'' In support of this 
     objective is a strategy to ``ensure the protection of nuclear 
     materials, sensitive information and facilities.'' The fact 
     that safeguards and security is found in the Strategic Plan 
     as well as in the Secretary's Performance Agreement with the 
     President clearly raises its level of import to more than ``a 
     requirement of operation.''
       A final point worthy of note is the complete lack of 
     understanding of the Department's Design Basis Threat (DBT) 
     process. The FBI, CIA, DOE, and the military services as well 
     as the Nuclear Command and Control Staff have developed the 
     existing Design Basis Threat over a number of years. It has 
     been extensively reviewed and supporting studies issued by 
     the DIA. Sandia, as well as our other Labs, have been asked 
     to comment and participate in the development process. To 
     describe the process and approach as flawed further 
     underscores the superficial nature and questionable analysis 
     found in the report.
       Perhaps most distressing is the lack of balance in its 
     approach to the critical safeguards and security issues 
     facing the Department. Rather, what is provided is a very 
     parochial Defense Programs/Laboratory view that ignores not 
     only the external drivers found in national level policies, 
     but a total lack of understanding of specific procedures 
     implementing these policies. Suffice to say, I am strongly 
     opposed to the continued funding of Phases II and III of this 
     effort. If Phase I is any indication of the quality of effort 
     that might be expected, any further funding in this regard 
     would be imprudent at best. Nonetheless, if the program is 
     continued, I strongly suggest we manage the direction and 
     quality of the next phase.
       As stated in this and other studies, successful resolution 
     of the issues facing this Department relative to safeguards 
     and security will require a concentrated effort on the part 
     of all interested parties to include the Office of Defense 
     Programs and the National Laboratories. What concerns me is 
     that critical information concerning these issues is missing 
     from this study. While such an omission may serve certain 
     short term interests, it is not in the best interest of the 
     Department or the nation. As an agency, we must endorse and 
     implement two significant objectives concerning our 
     protection strategy: (1) to protect our nation's critical 
     assets from those who would cause our nation harm, and (2) to 
     protect the forces that secure our facilities from 
     unnecessary vulnerability. To do any less is to undermine our 
     national security responsibility, which is without question, 
     a core mission of this Department.

  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, Mr. McCallum has been 
punished and has been placed on administrative leave and may lose his 
job. Guess who now sits on the corporate board of directors, being 
paid, overseeing the operation of that same facility? You guessed it, 
Madam Speaker. Hazel O'Leary. Hazel O'Leary now sits on the board of 
directors of the company that oversees the Rocky Flats facility that 
Mr. McCallum attempted to bring to the attention of the Congress was 
being protected in a woefully inadequate way. What is the response of 
this administration? To make him the scapegoat.
  It is a shame that he did not precede Notra Trulock, because as many 
of my colleagues know, it was Notra Trulock who began to blow the 
whistle on this administration for not paying attention in 1995 to 
security breaches that were occurring in the Department of Energy. But 
Notra Trulock lucked out. Because when the administration realized that 
what Notra Trulock was saying was true, they could not go after him. 
They gave Notra Trulock a $10,000 bonus and now Notra Trulock is on 
national media programs and talks about how the administration has 
gotten its act together.
  It is a shame that Mr. McCallum did not precede Notra Trulock. 
Perhaps he would have gotten the $10,000 raise for being the whistle-
blower. I can tell my colleagues, Madam Speaker, I am not going to sit 
by, and neither are a number of our colleagues, and see an innocent 
individual doing his job professionally be railroaded out of his 
position because this administration is embarrassed over the policies 
of their lack of control and decontrol in security measures involving 
our national laboratories, our Department of Energy facilities, our 
defense installations, and our military and other technology.
  The American people, Madam Speaker, can now read the statement of Mr. 
McCallum for themselves in tomorrow's Congressional Record. The 
American people also now, Madam Speaker, can read information I 
provided last evening giving the big picture of the China connection. I 
want to review that again today in some more detail.
  As a member of the Cox committee, I had the opportunity, over the 7 
months that we worked aggressively on this project, to meet a number of 
senior and very capable intelligence officers and people within our 
intelligence establishment who are absolutely frustrated by what they 
see occurring in this administration on security issues. When we 
completed the Cox Commission report, I knew that the American people 
would not sit through and read, for the most part, a document that is 
almost a thousand pages in length. Very difficult to understand.
  So working with this group of people, and I would add for the record, 
who are today currently employees of this administration, so I cannot 
name them because they will be given the same treatment as Mr. McCallum 
has been given, these people have given me the information that I am 
providing to our colleagues and to the American people.
  This chart, Madam Speaker, for the first time, even though it looks 
like a hodgepodge of blocks, it can be pulled down on the Internet 
site, as I have said earlier, and this site is www.house.gov/
curtweldon. This document gives the full pictorial representation of 
what we think China had planned to acquire western technology.
  Now, should we fault China for establishing this network? Probably, 
yes. But as many have said, what country does not spy or look to 
acquire technology from other countries? I would

[[Page 12002]]

say we are the fools if we are stupid enough to allow China to access 
information that we should be controlling. And that is why I think the 
bulk of the responsibility here, Madam Speaker, lies with our own 
government. It was our government that failed the American people.
  This chart outlines the Central Military Commission of the People's 
Liberation Army of China. The red boxes on this chart, which are too 
difficult to read without having the chart directly in front of you, 
are the various military commands and entities that are a part of the 
Central Military Commission that we know have been involved in engaging 
and in acquiring technology for China. Now, some of that acquisition 
has been legal, and there is nothing wrong with that. If they can buy 
it, how can we fault China for buying things we are legally willing to 
sell them or other countries will sell them? Some of it was not legal. 
By and large, though, much of what they got, they got through legal 
manipulation that we allowed to occur.
  The green boxes are those entities and banks and financial 
institutions here, in Hong Kong and Macao, as well as in Europe and 
Asia, that were designed to fund the acquisition of these technologies. 
Now, because they could not buy them directly, front companies were 
established, and they are the blue boxes. We estimate there were 
hundreds and hundreds of front companies established by the Chinese to 
acquire technologies, paid for by these entities, to go to the arms of 
the People's Liberation Army, because that is a desire they had for 
these specific technologies.
  A very elaborate scheme, but very simple. The financing through the 
entities to buy it go back to those entities that wanted to improve 
their missile systems, their nuclear programs, their computing 
capabilities, the design of their fighter aircraft, whatever the need 
might be. Again, if we are stupid enough to sell sensitive technology, 
how can we just blame China for buying it in the open market? This was 
the network.
  Now, we can see that what we did not look at in the Cox committee is 
what influenced these people to allow this technology to flow. Was it 
money, was it influence, was it a desire to increase economic activity 
for American companies? What was the motivation? We did not look at 
that in our China committee effort. We thought that should be a follow-
on once we determined that there was security harm done to our country. 
That is why I prepared this document and the document I am going to 
follow up with.
  There are some connections here, Madam Speaker, that the American 
people need to look at, because some of these green boxes have attached 
to them campaign donations. Ted Sioeng, $200,000 to $400,000 to the 
Democratic National Committee. Or John Huang and James Riady, and all 
of these people who contributed millions of dollars to the Democratic 
National Committee. Or the temple that gave, through Maria Hsia, 
$50,000 at a fund-raiser at a temple of impoverished religious leaders. 
Those connections need to be pursued.
  This information, Madam Speaker, has been investigated much more 
thoroughly by the FBI and the CIA than I have. Now, I have seen some of 
the classified versions of this, which are far more elaborate, which I 
obviously cannot show publicly. What I have shown here is an 
unclassified version of the connections between these agencies that 
have been publicly identified. And in response to a question by a 
Member of Congress at a public hearing, Louie Freeh, the director of 
the FBI, was asked: ``How much of the information that we are aware 
about in public form, like this, compares to what you know in the FBI 
and the CIA about what happened in this entire series of 
transactions?'' This was the response of FBI director Louie Freeh. 
``The public knows about 1 percent.'' One percent of what went on that 
we have in the FBI and the CIA in terms of these connections. One 
percent, Madam Speaker, which means that 99 percent beyond this our 
intelligence and our law enforcement agencies know about but we do not.

                              {time}  2215

  Madam Speaker, the individual that Louis Freeh assigned to 
investigate this, Charles LaBella, when he got through all of this 
evidence, well beyond what I have, wrote a memorandum to Louis Freeh 
that I have been told is almost 100 pages in length. That then resulted 
in Louis Freeh sending a memo to Janet Reno saying there is enough 
evidence here that you better impanel a special investigative effort, 
an independent counsel, because of what may be here. Janet Reno refused 
Louis Freeh and refused Mr. LaBella. That document has never been 
released to the Members of Congress nor the American public. In fact, I 
am not aware of any Member of Congress that has read that memo. But I 
can tell you, Madam Speaker, every Member of this body and every 
citizen in America should demand of this President one thing, and, that 
is, to release the LaBella memorandum. If this President and Vice 
President Gore have nothing to hide, if there are no connections, if 
there is no scandal, if there is no grand scheme, if there are no 
implicating factors, it can all go away very quickly by releasing the 
LaBella memorandum. That document has been subpoenaed by the Congress 
and it has been refused by Janet Reno to be turned over to us so that 
we have not had the opportunity to see what Charles LaBella said was 
there in that 99 percent of information that we do not know about. What 
I have given to the American people is the unclassified information 
that they can read, and it in itself is revealing. In fact, Madam 
Speaker, you will notice there are lines connecting many of these 
boxes. The solid lines indicate direct working relationships between 
the PLA entities, the financing entities, and the front companies. So 
they are directly linked. The dotted lines, which are fewer in number, 
are those where there is a loosely connected relationship but not a 
direct relationship. Now, the logical question is, ``Well, hold it, 
Congressman, you can't just draw lines. You've got to provide some 
documentation.'' Well, we did. Again working with existing employees of 
this government who have been frustrated by what they have seen 
occurring have helped me identify 26 documents that are available on 
the public record that are not classified, that include newspaper 
articles, research documents, business reports, company annual reports 
where you can connect the lines. Each of the numbers on this chart 
which corresponds with a line gives you a specific document that you 
can read which I have outlined and identified in the Congressional 
Record yesterday which you can get off of my web site which gives you 
the public information that supports the linkage between these various 
entities. It is public information. Now, that is not all. And the media 
when I brought this out last week said, ``Well, wait a minute, you 
haven't established a direct relationship.'' I cannot show classified 
information here. That is a violation of our Federal laws. I have given 
unclassified documentation which without a doubt shows the connections 
between the major players in the effort to allow China to acquire 
technology that they have been wanting to buy.
  Now, the administration would have us believe that this is really all 
concocted by China and that we should make China the evil empire. I am 
not doing that, Madam Speaker. I cannot blame China if decisions made 
by this administration allowed technology to flow legally, and that is 
what occurred in most cases. The influence that was peddled by these 
financial people ended up lowering the controls over our regulation of 
technology being sold abroad. The influence exercised by these people 
and their money influenced key decisionmakers in this administration. 
In my opinion, that lies in terms of fault at the feet of this 
administration itself. And as much as we would like to totally blame 
China, I blame our own government.
  Now, are there instances where China went too far? Absolutely. And I 
would say this again on the record. If we can document that there is 
direct espionage that took place at our labs or at other facilities, we 
should use the full

[[Page 12003]]

force of our law to prosecute those people who in fact spied on 
America, much like we have done in the past. But we cannot blame a 
country if we willingly sold them the bulk of this technology because 
of influence they were able to get by putting some money around or by 
currying favor with certain people.
  Let me go to the second chart, Madam Speaker. The second chart, which 
was also prepared with the help of existing employees that work for 
this government who are in sensitive positions, gives the time line, 
the time line of liberalized and decontrolled technologies to the 
People's Republic of China. But I want you to know, it was not just 
China that benefited from these policies. Many of these policy 
decisions benefited a number of countries who were able to legally buy 
our technology.
  Now, I am not against our companies selling technology abroad. In 
fact, I am an advocate of our companies being able to sell and compete 
in the world marketplace. But, Madam Speaker, that is not what occurred 
here. What occurred here was the elimination in a wholesale way of a 
legitimate process that was in place under previous administrations to 
monitor technology and to do it with our allies. As I mentioned last 
night, the reason I started this chart in 1993 was not because that is 
when Bill Clinton took office, it was because in 1993 this President 
ended a process called COCOM. COCOM was an organized group of our 
allied nations and Japan that met on a regular basis to monitor 
sensitive technology that was produced in any one of the allied 
countries. There was an agreement that none of those COCOM nations 
would sell sensitive technology to countries that we thought might use 
it against us, so that none of our companies were hurt because all the 
countries that have this technology were working together so that no 
one could benefit.
  It was this administration in 1993 that unilaterally decided to end 
COCOM, did away with it. Without even consulting with our allies, we 
said, ``We're doing away with this process.'' From 1993 on, the 
floodgates opened. Because now you had companies in Great Britain and 
France and Japan who said, ``Wait a minute, there's no more COCOM, 
we're not going to let the U.S. sell this technology abroad, we're 
going to sell competing technology.'' So now you had a mad scramble, 
you had American companies trying to keep up with German, French, 
Italian, British and Japanese firms who now saw American companies 
selling technologies that under COCOM they could not sell. So the 
European countries and Japan said, ``Wait a minute, we're going to sell 
that technology as well,'' and you had a mad scramble to sell 
technology in a totally uncontrolled fashion. That began in 1993 under 
this administration. The Commerce Department will tell you it was good 
for business. Some business leaders will tell you it was good for 
business. We on the Cox Committee will tell you it was bad for America. 
Other allied nations will tell you it was bad for international 
security. Proliferation has never been worse than it has been for the 
past 6 years. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, India, Pakistan, 
all have cutting-edge technologies that up until 1993 were tightly 
controlled by COCOM, all of that ended by this administration. That is 
the focus of the Cox report.
  The chronology of this chart takes each technology separately: 
warhead design, machine tools, low observable technologies, 
telecommunications, propulsion systems, high-powered computers, 
encryption technology, space launch technology, and analyses when key 
decisions were made by this administration and gives you the month and 
the date that allowed technologies to flow that up until these dates 
were controlled. And you can see by the number of red dots here that 
during this time frame, the floodgates opened. We said, ``We'll sell 
anything and everything and we won't consult with our allies.'' So you 
have had a mad competition among companies in countries that up until 
1993 worked together to make sure that no one could unfairly have a 
larger share of the market with sensitive technologies. After 1993, the 
demise of COCOM, the floodgates opened. Everything and anything was for 
sale. Our companies got their way, they got to sell whatever they 
wanted, foreign countries and companies the same thing, and China took 
advantage of it.
  Now, there are some interesting other factors about this chart, Madam 
Speaker. You will notice a gray area in the center of this chart, 
starting in 1995, ending in 1997. Why did I make that gray? Because in 
1995, we have been told by Bill Richardson that this administration 
found out that China was acquiring our most sensitive technology. And 
if you listened to Secretary Richardson, this is what he said: ``Boy, 
when we found that out, we took aggressive action. We said, `We're not 
going to let China steal our technology.'''
  Well, that is what he said. The color in the blue, Madam Speaker, and 
all the red dots you see here, just under Space Launch alone, 15 
separate actions after this administration knew that China had stolen 
our design technologies that they took in 3 years to give more 
technology to countries like China. And that is across the board, Madam 
Speaker. So the blue indicates where this administration knew that 
China was trying to acquire this technology and doing it illegally, 
opened the floodgates even further for more technology.
  There is one more factor here, Madam Speaker. All of us in America 
know when the elections were held. It is kind of interesting when you 
look at this chart from a distance that the bulk of the clustering of 
these dots are in and around the time frame of 1996. I wonder what was 
happening in that year, Madam Speaker? Might that have been the year 
when the presidential elections were being held? Could there be some 
coincidence that many of these key decisions in terms of policy changes 
were being done because elections were being held and maybe people were 
interested and from the standpoint of corporate America in having 
policymakers make determinations to allow more products to be sold 
overseas, could that be a reason? That is what the LaBella memorandum 
referred to, Madam Speaker, that this country needs to see for itself, 
the reasons why these decisions were made. Why did we change our policy 
so much? Why did we allow access? Why did we totally decontrol 
technologies in a way that was not being aware and cognizant of our own 
security concerns?
  But it goes beyond these issues, Madam Speaker. Let us move down to 
this next item here. PRC Nationals to U.S. High Tech Companies. It was 
in 1994, in fact it was in March, that Chinese nationals to our U.S. 
labs and our U.S. high tech companies was allowed. The COMEX review of 
foreign nationals was abandoned, by this administration. That was in 
1994. I am sure that was done because the companies wanted less hassle 
of foreign nationals going into our high tech companies. And over here 
in 1997, we revised our deemed exports policy to allow foreign 
nationals to work at U.S. high tech companies. Now, that was in 1997. 
These were decisions made that allowed more Chinese nationals to work 
in our high tech companies in America. And how about the high tech 
furnace approval for weapons of mass destruction? That approval was 
given in 1998, Madam Speaker, a technology that gives China capability 
for the production of weapons of mass destruction. Even though this 
administration said when they found out about the theft of nuclear 
secrets, they took aggressive action to control it.
  Let us go down further, Madam Speaker. During this same period of 
time, China and Russia were both violating international arms control 
agreements. The Missile Technology Control Regime, the control of 
exports. We caught them on a number of occasions. In fact, in last 
night's special order, and again the American people can read this 
through my web site or get a copy of it through the Congressional 
Record last evening--and I did not do the work, the Congressional 
Research did the work--we documented the arms control violations that 
we caught Russia and China involved in

[[Page 12004]]

over 6-year time period. Here is that chronology as documented by the 
Congressional Research Service.

                              {time}  2230

  The dates, the type of transfer, who the transfer went to are all 
documented. This was not done by some partisan group; it was done by 
the Congressional Research Service, a part of the Library of Congress.
  These violations of arms control agreements by China, were they sent 
technology? Where did they send the technology to? Let us look at the 
chart.
  Well, they sent technology to Pakistan, Iran; Iran? North Korea. 
Syria. They sent solid propellant production technology to Libya, Iran, 
Egypt. They sent missile accelerometers and gyroscopes to Iran, Syria, 
Libya, Egypt and Pakistan. They sent antiship missiles to Iran. They 
sent more material to Pakistan; chemical weapons technology to Iran 
again.
  All of these transfers done by China.
  What was the response of this administration? Nothing.
  On, yes, two times out of about 17 or 21, I forget which it is, they 
did impose temporary sanctions; but they eventually waived them.
  So not only are we getting Chinese access in a way they never had 
access before, not only were we helping to expedite and grease the 
skids for the financing of the purchase of technologies, but we were 
ignoring violations of arms control agreements that China was required 
to abide by. We did not call them on these violations.
  And at the bottom of the chart, Madam Speaker, even though I could 
not complete it, I was only able to do this up through 1996, I list a 
number of times that the major players in the Chinese financing scams 
visit at the White House, not visited Members of Congress, but were in 
private visits in the White House itself.
  In the case of John Huang, in the one year of 1993 alone, we know of 
12 times he was in the White House. In 1994, twice; in 1995, let us 
see, one, two, three times; or 1994, three times; 1995, three times. 
These are people that are involved in that elaborate scheme of 
organizations and financing entities that were given direct access to 
our White House, to our top policy maker to our commander in chief, to 
our key leaders who were then being pressured to relax our policies 
relative to technology being sold abroad.
  Madam Speaker, these two charts represent the pictorial view of the 
Cox committee report. They represent what needs to be explored further.
  I am not here as a partisan, Madam Speaker. Both times I ran for 
mayor of my hometown I was the nominee of the Republican Party and the 
Democrat Party both times I ran. I work with many Democrats in this 
body and frequently get up on the floor of this House and praise our 
Democrat colleagues for their leadership role on defense and security 
issues. I have joined with members of the Democrats on a number of key 
issues involving social policy, family medical leave, environmental 
policies, protection for our workers, and I have supported the 
President and the administration in some of those issues which my party 
has not been supportive of. But, Madam Speaker, when it comes to 
national security, we have a big problem here. This needs to be looked 
at beyond the Cox committee.
  To me, I know why in my mind Janet Reno turned down the 
recommendation of Louis Freeh based on the memos sent by Charles 
LaBella to appoint an independent counsel. I am convinced, Madam 
Speaker, the evidence is there. I am convinced that 99 percent that we 
have been told we have not seen yet has far more than many people in 
this country want to become public.
  I am also convinced, Madam Speaker, that we had better pay attention 
here. This is not some story about a dress, this is not some intern in 
the White House. This is not some story about a travel office. This is 
not even about Republicans or Democrats. Madam Speaker, this is about 
the very core of what our country is about. No one, no party official 
in either party, no elected leader, has the right to allow a wholesale 
technology faucet to open that we are going to have to pay the price 
for.
  Now, if I am overreaching, Madam Speaker, I do not think I am 
because, a member of the Cox committee having sat through as many of 
those meetings as any one of my colleagues, with perhaps the exception 
of Chairman Cox himself, I know what evidence the FBI and the CIA has, 
and I have only seen a small fraction of what is not on this chart. I 
know there is much more.
  If there is nothing there, Madam Speaker, the President can clear 
this entire issue up in a heartbeat. All he has to do is release the 
entire unabridged version of the Charles LaBella memo to Louis Freeh. 
If there is nothing to hide, if there is nothing to these connections, 
if there is no story, I will be happy.
  I do not think that is the case, Madam Speaker. I think the reason 
why Janet Reno did not accept Louis Freeh's recommendation, based on 
LaBella's memo, is because she knew what is there. That document that 
LaBella prepared, which I understand is quite voluminous, goes into 
extensive detail and actually points to individual people.
  Madam Speaker, this country, this democracy, needs the American 
people and its elected officials to see the overview of the evidence 
that LaBella gave to Freeh that now remains closed and confidential. If 
there is nothing there, then there is no problem with the memo; if 
there is no evidence, if there is no story, if there is no substance, 
the whole thing will go away, and the China story will end, and we will 
make the necessary corrections to our own policies.
  Madam Speaker, I would encourage every one of our colleagues and 
every constituent in every district of a Member of this body and the 
other body to demand that this administration do one thing: release the 
full text, the uncensored text, of the Charles LaBella memorandum to 
Louis Freeh. Let us see what evidence they thought may be there in 
terms of a greater scheme for the Chinese to acquire technology by 
facilitating and greasing the skids of certain key people and certain 
key agencies that ended up with America's security being harmed. That 
was the unanimous vote of all nine members of the Cox committee, that 
America's national security has been harmed by the actions that we 
investigated in the Cox committee work.
  We cannot just stop with this document, and we cannot rely on the 
mainstream media because with the exception of a few people like those 
that I have mentioned and some others, the mainstream media is too 
stinking lazy to go through the investigative details necessary to 
uncover what is here. We need to have this administration come clean, 
give us the uncensored text of what Charles LaBella said to Louis Freeh 
which only went to Janet Reno. When that happens, we will then know the 
true extent of the China connection and its impact with this 
administration.

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