[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 8]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 10896-10897]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



    CRISIS IN KOSOVO (ITEM NO. 5), REMARKS BY DAVID SWARTZ, FORMER 
                         AMBASSADOR TO BELARUS

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, May 25, 1999

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, on May 6, 1999, I joined with 
Representative John Conyers, Representative Pete Stark, and 
Representative Cynthia McKinney to host the third in a series of 
Congressional Teach-In sessions on the Crisis in Kosovo. If a peaceful 
resolution to this conflict is to be found in the coming weeks, it is 
essential that we cultivate a consciousness of peace and actively 
search for creative solutions. We must construct a foundation for peace 
through negotiation, mediation, and diplomacy.
  Part of the dynamic of peace is a willingness to engage in meaningful 
dialogue, to listen to one another openly and to share our views in a 
constructive manner. I hope that these Teach-In sessions will 
contribute to this process by providing a forum for Members of Congress 
and the public to explore alternatives to the bombing and options for a 
peaceful resolution. We will hear from a variety of speakers of 
different sides of the Kosovo situation. I will be introducing into the 
Congressional Record transcripts of their remarks and essays that shed 
light on the many dimensions of the crisis.
  This presentation is by David Swartz, former Ambassador to Belarus. 
He is a retired foreign service officer and Director of the 
International Institute of the U.S. Department of Agriculture Graduate 
School. His other foreign-service posts included Rotterdam, London, 
Moscow, Kiev, Zurich, Calgary and Warsaw. He is the author of 
``Redirecting the CIA: Keep Agency Out of Policymaking, Make Ambassador 
Boss Overseas'' (Foreign Service Journal, February 1996).
  Ambassador Swartz explains how United States policy in Bosnia 
contributed to NATO's current dilemma in Kosovo. He also states a clear 
position on a central question: Does the United States have an 
overriding national interest in the resolution of strife in the 
Balkans? Ambassador Swartz's comments may be controversial to some, but 
they represent a valuable contribution to our ongoing 
debate.***HD***Presentation by David Swartz to Congressional Teach-In 
On Kosovo
  I think my role today is going to be controversial. And if ever there 
was a conflict that was controversial this one certainly is. So I'm 
pleased to be here. Some of what I'm going to say is going to offend 
some people and possibly some of it will offend everybody, I don't 
know. But at least is may serve as a catalyst to help get the 
discussion going as we move along. But I am being deliberately 
provocative in some places so I warn you in advance and ask your 
indulgence.
  I do wish to express my thanks for the opportunity to present may 
statement this afternoon on U.S.-Kosovo policy. My statement, while 
critical, is non-partisan. It reflects the general reality , in my view 
at least, that U.S. polices in the Balkans over the past eight years 
have reflected bipartisanship, just as criticisms of Administration 
policy, particularly with regard to the Yugoslavia war, have also 
tended to be bipartisan.
  The two key desiderata driving my views on U.S. actions in that 
region and in the Kosovo region are these: First, human suffering must 
be minimized. And that's way ahead of any other. But the second one is: 
clear U.S. national interests justifying involvement must be present. 
Our policies in my view reflect deficiencies on both counts. I will 
very briefly touch on three aspects of that problem. One, how we got to 
where we are. Two, why current policy is wrong. And three, what next. 
Three is perhaps being developed as well speak.
  First, how we got where we are. American involvement in the post-
communist Balkan turmoil stems in large part in my view from a 
questionable policy of premature diplomatic recognition of groups 
asserting sovereignty, particularly Bosnia, in the early 1990's. Some 
groupings in the then-Yugoslavia could genuinely be considered ripe for 
independence, most especially Croatia, and Slovenia, possibly to a 
lesser extent Macedonia. Bosnia, however, could by no reasonable 
standard be considered a nation-state.
  What is Bosnia? Who are Bosnians? What is their history, language, 
literature, religion? What can we point to that is uniquely Bosnian? It 
seems to me that creation of a multi-ethnic state is complicated under 
the best of

[[Page 10897]]

circumstances, and Bosnia in the early 90's was not the best of 
circumstances. At a minimum, a la Switzerland, the disparate groups 
must have a common desire to join together in some higher level of 
governance than just the individual groupings they find themselves in. 
So in Bosnia a so-called country was cobbled together and we know the 
result: ethnic cleansing, massacres, artificiality imposed at Dayton, 
and peace maintained solely through the possibly permanent presence of 
armed forces of external powers. Far from fostering stability in the 
former Yugoslavia, I would argue that the Bosnia so-called settlement 
has served to institutionalize instability. If U.S. involvement in 
Bosnia was the proximate cause of our current troubles, highly 
superficial understanding by our policy makers of the centuries of 
passions, hatreds, vendettas, indeed genocide throughout the Balkans 
was a more deep-seeded problem. If we knew nothing else, we should have 
known that there are no good guys in the region, and that therefore 
aligning ourselves in one or another direction was fraught with danger.

  This truism applies equally to our current dilemma in Kosovo. With 
specific regard to Mr. Milosevic in Kosovo, the United States' 
misreading of his intentions is nothing short of shocking. If 
intelligence and diplomatic analysis are good for anything at all, they 
must serve the critical function of providing policy makers with 
accurate prognoses of the intentions of adversaries. We can forgive 
White House ignorance about Milosevic's likely response to a forced 
dictate over Kosovo, and perhaps even that of our Secretary of State. 
However, certainly at a minimum, emissary Richard Holbrooke and his 
well-meaning but judgment-impaired staff, with the hundreds of hours 
they spent in direct contact with Milosevic, should have been able to 
discern his intentions, once it became clear to him that the United 
States' intentions were to carve away his authority in Kosovo. At that 
point, the nonsensical idea that Milosevic would cave under the threat 
of bombing should have been discarded once and for all. Tragically, it 
wasn't.
  My second point: Why our policy is wrong. And this brings me back to 
my two basic desiderata: Minimizing human suffering, and advancing 
clearly identified U.S. interests. A powerful argument has been made in 
some circles, an argument that I find somewhat persuasive, perhaps not 
completely, that the least human suffering in the former Yugoslavia 
would have resulted from the outside world not involving itself at all 
in the internal civil strife. Yes, there would have been oppression, 
yes there would have been killing, but in the end, the argument goes, a 
level of coexistence would eventually have been reached, no doubt for 
the moment at least with Serbia in full charge, in which life would 
have gone on for the masses. Not freedom, perhaps, not automony, 
certainly, but at least basic life. With outside support first for 
Bosnian independence, a wholly unsustainable proposition over the long 
run, and then for an imposed Kosovo settlement, even more implausible, 
great violence resulted, and continues.
  What are U.S. interests? I am not persuaded that we have any 
overriding interests in the Balkan strife and certainly none that would 
justify the course of action on which we are embarked. The NATO 
credibility argument is not persuasive. Had the alliance led by the 
U.S. not constantly threatened Milosevic with military action if he did 
not submit himself to NATO's demands, we would not have found ourselves 
in the put-up-or-shut-up corner. Expansion of the conflict to say, 
Turkey or Greece, or Turkey and Greece, is equally implausible. Clearly 
the conflicts are limits to the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and 
Milosevic' desire to reassert his and Serbia's domination. Support for 
human rights is indeed a laudable national interest, but as suggested 
above, our intervention in the region has had the opposite of the 
desired effect.
  Where we do have strong national interests are vis a vis Russia, and 
there the Kosovo is quite possibly going to result in, if not 
permanent, at least long-lasting damage to reformist elements in 
Russian politics on whom we count for achieving societal 
transformations there. Or alternatively, as now seems quite likely, if 
Russian involvement in the settlement takes place, that might well lead 
to a diluted result bearing little resemblance to our stated conditions 
when we began this war. Or both of those might happen.
  My third point: What next? Having embarked on what in my judgment is 
a foolish and ill-considered air war, it seems to me that the U.S. now 
has only two options: Stop the bombing, cutting whatever deal the 
Russians can broker for us, that now seems to be underway, perhaps, or 
immediately and massively escalate, with the specific twin goals of 
removing Milosevic and eliminating all Serbian fighting units in 
Kosovo. The first option is the one I prefer, because as I said at the 
outset I believe minimizing human suffering must be the goal. Each day 
of bombing is accompanied by more ethnic cleansing, raping and summary 
executions of Kosovars. It of course also leads to casualties among 
Serbia's civilian population. Forty-plus days of bombing have seemingly 
not stopped Milosevic's evil in Kosovo one whit, indeed, have 
accelerated it. The cessation of bombing is of course fraught with 
danger, since it will mean an outcome, no doubt far short of our stated 
objectives when we began this war, it will mean a resurgent Russia on 
the world scene, which might not be a bad thing, but that Russia could 
well be far different from the one we had hoped for, and now a truly 
credibility-deficient NATO. But we should have thought of those matters 
earlier, and in the meantime, each day brings more casualties.
  I for one have reached my tolerance level of the daily dosage of 
atrocity stories juxtaposed with confident NATO spokespersons detailing 
the quote-unquote in the air war the previous night's 600 sorties have 
resulted in, where clearly the latter has not diminished the former.
  The other option is massive force now. I do not advocate this course, 
but it seems to me the only other viable option. Paratroopers dropped 
in throughout Kosovo, going after Milosevic himself on the grounds of 
his long-overdue designation as a wanted war criminal. The other NATO 
partners will balk, and the U.S. should be ready to act alone, wasting 
no more time. Yes, this approach will result in still more deaths, and 
other atrocities among the suffering Kosovars, but at least the end of 
the agony will be sooner than with our present incomprehensible 
approach.
  In sum, the U.S. should not be engaged in this war in the first 
place, but since it is, we must either win it quickly, or get our 
quickly. Otherwise the lives of many, many more innocent people will be 
on our American conscience.

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