[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 10691-10718]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will now resume consideration of S. 1059, which the clerk will 
report.
  The legislative assistant read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1059) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2000 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  Pending:
  Roberts/Warner amendment No. 377, to express the sense of the Senate 
regarding the legal effect of the new Strategic Concept of NATO (the 
document approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., on April 
23 and 24, 1999).
  Warner amendment No. 378 (to Amendment No. 377), to require the 
President to submit to the Senate a report containing an analysis of 
the potential threats facing NATO in the first decade of the next 
millennium, with particular reference to those threats facing a member 
nation or several member nations where the commitment of NATO forces 
will be ``out of area'', or beyond the borders of NATO member nations.
  Wellstone amendment No. 380, to expand the list of diseases presumed 
to be service-connected for radiation-exposed veterans.
  Wellstone amendment No. 381, to require the Secretary of Defense to 
provide information and technical guidance to certain foreign nations 
regarding environmental contamination at United States military 
installations closed or being closed in such nations.
  Wellstone amendment No. 382, to require the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to provide Congress with information to evaluate the 
outcome of welfare reform.
  Specter amendment No. 383, to direct the President, pursuant to the 
United

[[Page 10692]]

States Constitution and the War Powers Resolution, to seek approval 
from Congress prior to the introduction of ground troops from the 
United States Armed Forces in connection with the present operations 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or funding for that 
operation will not be authorized.
  Roth amendment No. 388, to request the President to advance the late 
Rear Adm. (retired) Husband E. Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy 
to the highest grade held as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, 
during World War II, and to advance the late Maj. Gen. (retired) Walter 
C. Short on the retired list of the Army to the highest grade held as 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, during World War II, as was 
done under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 for all other senior 
officers who served in positions of command during World War II.


                         PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent 
that Maj. Clint Crosier, an Air Force fellow in my office, be granted 
floor privileges throughout the proceedings on the fiscal year 2000 
authorization and appropriations bills.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Smith of New Hampshire pertaining to the 
submission of S.J. Res. 25 are located in today's Record under 
``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')


                           Amendment No. 388

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, there 
will be 30 minutes of debate, equally divided, with an additional 10 
minutes under the control of the Senator from Texas, Senator Gramm, 
relative to the Roth amendment No. 388.
  Mr. ROTH. I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Massachusetts.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I strongly support this amendment, which 
will at long last restore the reputations of two distinguished military 
officers who were unfairly scapegoated for the surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor by Japan at the beginning of World War II--Admiral Husband E. 
Kimmel of the United States Navy and General Walter C. Short of the 
United States Army.
  This amendment gives us an opportunity to correct a serious wrong in 
the history of that war. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were the Navy 
and Army commanders at Pearl Harbor during the attack on December 7, 
1941. Despite their loyal and distinguished service, Admiral Kimmel and 
General Short were unfairly singled out for blame for the nation's lack 
of preparation for that attack and the catastrophe that took place.
  Justice for these men is long overdue. Wartime investigations of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor concluded that our fleet in Hawaii under the 
command of Admiral Kimmel and our land forces under the command of 
General Short had been properly positioned, given the information they 
had received, and that their superior officers had not given them vital 
intelligence that could have made a difference, perhaps all the 
difference, in America's preparedness for the attack. These conclusions 
of the wartime investigations were kept secret, in order to protect the 
war effort. Clearly, there is no longer any justification for ignoring 
these facts.
  I first became interested in this issue when I received a letter last 
fall from a good friend in Boston who for many years has been one of 
the pre-eminent lawyers in America, Edward B. Hanify. As a young Navy 
lawyer and Lieutenant J.G. in 1944, Mr. Hanify was assigned as counsel 
to Admiral Kimmel.
  As Mr. Hanify told me, he is probably one of the few surviving people 
that heard Kimmel's testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry. He 
accompanied Admiral Kimmel when he testified before the Army Board of 
Investigation, and he later heard substantially all the testimony in 
the lengthy Congressional investigation of Pearl Harbor that followed 
by the Roberts Commission. In the 50 years since then, Mr. Hanify has 
carefully followed all subsequent developments on the Pearl Harbor 
catastrophe and the allocation of responsibility for that disaster.
  I would like to quote a few brief paragraphs from Mr. Hanify's letter 
of last September, because it eloquently summarizes the overwhelming 
case for long undue justice for Admiral Kimmel. Mr Hanify writes:

       The odious charge of ``dereliction of duty'' made by the 
     Roberts Commission was the cause of almost irreparable damage 
     to the reputation of Admiral Kimmel, despite the fact that 
     the finding was later repudiated and found groundless.
       I am satisfied that Admiral Kimmel was subject to callous 
     and cruel treatment by his superiors who were attempting to 
     deflect the blame ultimately ascribed to them, particularly 
     on account of their strange behavior on the evening of 
     December 6th and morning of December 7th in failing to warn 
     the Pacific Fleet and the Hawaiian Army Department that a 
     Japanese attack on the United States was scheduled for 
     December 7th, and that intercepted intelligence indicated 
     that Pearl Harbor was a most probable point of attack. 
     Washington had this intelligence and knew that the Navy and 
     Army in Hawaii did not have it, or any means of obtaining it.
       Subsequent investigation by both services repudiated the 
     ``dereliction of duty'' charge. In the case of Admiral 
     Kimmel, the Naval Court of Inquiry found that his plans and 
     dispositions were adequate and competent in light of the 
     information which he had from Washington--adequate and 
     competent in the light of the information he had from 
     Washington.

  Mr. Hanify concludes:

       The proposed legislation provides some measure of remedial 
     Justice to a conscientious officer who for years unjustly 
     bore the odium and disgrace associated with the Pearl Harbor 
     catastrophe.

  I have also heard from the surviving son of Admiral Kimmel. He and 
others in his family have fought for over half a century to restore 
their father's honor and reputation. As Edward Kimmel wrote:

       Justice for my father and Major General Short is long 
     overdue. It has been a long hard struggle by the Kimmel and 
     Short families to get to this point.

  No public action can ever fully atone for the injustice suffered by 
these two officers. But the Senate can do its part by acting now to 
correct the historical record, and restore the distinguished 
reputations of Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
  I commend Senator Biden and Senator Roth for their leadership on this 
amendment, and I urge the Senate to support it, and I ask unanimous 
consent that Mr. Hanify's letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

     Hon. Edward M. Kennedy,
     Russell Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Kennedy: I am advised that a Resolution known 
     as the Roth/Biden Resolution has been introduced in the 
     Senate and that it has presently the support of the following 
     Senators: Roth; Biden; Helms; Thurmond; Inouye; Stevens; 
     Specter; Hollings; Faircloth; Cochran and McCain. The 
     substance of the Resolution is to request the President to 
     advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to the grade 
     of Admiral on the retired list of the Navy and to advance the 
     late Major General Walter C. Short to the grade of Lieutenant 
     General on the retired list of the Army.
       Admiral Kimmel at the time of Pearl Harbor was Commander in 
     Chief of the Pacific Fleet then based in Pearl Harbor and 
     General Short was the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
     Department of the Army.
       The reason for my interest in this Resolution is as 
     follows: In early 1944 when I was a Lieutenant j.g. 
     (U.S.N.R.) the Navy Department gave me orders which assigned 
     me as one of counsel to the defense of Admiral Kimmel in the 
     event of his promised court martial. As a consequence, I am 
     probably one of the few living persons who heard the 
     testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry, accompanied 
     Admiral Kimmel when he testified before the Army Board of 
     Investigation and later heard substantially all the testimony 
     before the members of Congress who carried on the lengthy 
     Congressional investigation of Pearl Harbor. In the 
     intervening fifty years I have followed very carefully all 
     subsequent developments dealing with the Pearl Harbor 
     catastrophe and the allocation of responsibility for that 
     disaster.
       On the basis of this experience and further studies over a 
     fifty year period I feel strongly:
       (1) That the odious charge of ``dereliction of duty'' made 
     by the Roberts Commission was the cause of almost irreparable 
     damage to the reputation of Admiral Kimmel despite the fact 
     that the finding was later repudiated and found groundless;

[[Page 10693]]

       (2) I am satisfied that Admiral Kimmel was subject to 
     callous and cruel treatment by his superiors who were 
     attempting to deflect the blame ultimately ascribed to them, 
     particularly on account of their strange behavior on the 
     evening of December 6th and morning of December 7th in 
     failing to warn the Pacific Fleet and the Hawaiian Army 
     Department that a Japanese attack on the United States was 
     scheduled for December 7th at 1:00 p.m. Washington time (dawn 
     at Pearl Harbor) and that intercepted intelligence indicated 
     that Pearl Harbor was a most probable point of attack; 
     (Washington had this intelligence and knew that the Navy and 
     Army in Hawaii did not have it or any means of obtaining it).
       (3) Subsequent investigations by both services repudiated 
     the ``dereliction of duty'' charge and in the case of Admiral 
     Kimmel the Naval Court of Inquiry found that his plans and 
     dispositions were adequate and competent in light of the 
     information which he had from Washington.
       The proposed legislation provides some measure of remedial 
     Justice to a conscientious officer who for years unjustly 
     bore the odium and disgrace associated with the Pearl Harbor 
     catastrophe. You may be interested to know that a Senator 
     from Massachusetts, Honorable David I. Walsh then Chairman of 
     the Naval Affairs Committee, was most effective in securing 
     legislation by Congress which ordered the Army and Navy 
     Departments to investigate the Pearl harbor disaster--an 
     investigation conducted with all the ``due process'' 
     safeguards for all interested parties not observed in other 
     investigations or inquiries.
       I sincerely hope that you will support the Roth/Biden 
     Resolution.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Edward B. Hanify.

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.
  On December 7, 1941, when Pearl Harbor was attacked by Japan, the 
commanders on the ground were Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General 
Short. Rear Admiral Kimmel was serving in the grade of admiral as 
commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and commander in chief, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet. Major General Short was serving in the grade of 
lieutenant general as commander of the U.S. Army Hawaiian Department. 
Based on their performance at Pearl Harbor, both officers were relieved 
of their commands and were returned to their permanent ranks of rear 
admiral and major general on December 16, 1941.
  The duty performance of Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short 
has been the subject of numerous military, governmental, and 
congressional inquiries since that time. The most recent examination 
was by Under Secretary of Defense Edwin Dorn in 1995.
  The Defense Department, after reviewing all of these inquiries, has 
concluded that posthumous advancement in rank is not appropriate. In 
short, in this 1995 review, the Department of Defense concluded that 
Admiral Kimmel and General Short, as commanders on the scene, were 
responsible and accountable for the actions of their commands. 
Accountability as commanders is a core value in our Armed Forces.
  Rear Admiral Kimmel's and Major General Short's superiors at the time 
determined that their service was not satisfactory and relieved them of 
their commands and returned them to their permanent grades. We should 
not, in my judgment, some 57 years later, substitute the judgment of a 
political body--the Congress--for what was essentially a military 
decision by the appropriate chain of command at the time.
  Those who were in the best position to characterize their service 
have done so. Their superiors concluded that Rear Admiral Kimmel and 
Major General Short did not demonstrate the judgment required of people 
who serve at the three- and four-star level. I do not believe that this 
political body should now attempt to reverse that decision made by the 
chains of command in our military service. So I join the chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee in opposing this amendment.
  I also note the letter from the Secretary of Defense to the then 
chairman of our committee, Strom Thurmond, saying the following:

       While Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
     Readiness, Mr. Edwin Dorn, conducted a thorough review of 
     this issue in 1995. He carefully considered the information 
     contained in nine previous formal investigations, visited 
     Pearl Harbor and personally met with the Kimmel and Short 
     families. His conclusion was that responsibility for the 
     Pearl Harbor disaster must be broadly shared, but that the 
     record does not show that advancement of Admiral Kimmel and 
     General Short on the retired list is warranted.
       I appreciate the fact that the overwhelming consensus of 
     the organizations and personnel mentioned in your letter 
     recommend exoneration of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. 
     Absent significant new information, however, I do not believe 
     it appropriate to order another review of this matter.
       Ed Dorn and I both agree that responsibility for this 
     tragic event in American history must be broadly shared, yet 
     I remain confident in the findings that Admiral Kimmel and 
     General Short remain accountable in their positions as 
     leaders.

  To highlight very briefly the findings of the Under Secretary of 
Defense in the Dorn report, referred to by the Secretary of Defense, I 
will quote three or four of the findings.
  Finding 1:

       Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not 
     fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General 
     Short; it should be broadly shared.

  Finding 2:

       To say that responsibility is broadly shared is not to 
     absolve Admiral Kimmel and General Short of accountability.
       Military command is unique. A commander has plenary 
     responsibility for the welfare of the people under his or her 
     command, and is directly accountable for everything the unit 
     does or fails to do. . . . Command at the three- and four-
     star level involves daunting responsibilities. Military 
     officers at that level operate with a great deal of 
     independence. They must have extraordinary skill, foresight 
     and judgment, and a willingness to be accountable for things 
     about which they could not possibly have personal knowledge. 
     . . .
       It was appropriate that Admiral Kimmel and General Short be 
     relieved.

  Then he goes into the information that he had.
  I yield myself just 1 additional minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allard). The Senator may continue.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, finally in finding 3, the Dorn report says:

       The official treatment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short 
     was substantively temperate and procedurally proper.

  Then finally:

       There is not a compelling basis for advancing either 
     officer to a higher grade.
       Their superiors concluded that Admiral Kimmel and General 
     Short did not demonstrate the judgment required of people who 
     serve at the three- and four-star level.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       In sum, I cannot conclude that Admiral Kimmel and General 
     Short were victims of unfair official actions and thus I 
     cannot conclude that the official remedy of advancement on 
     the retired list [is] in order.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that portions of the Dorn 
report and the Secretary of Defense letter in opposition to the 
advancement of these two gentlemen be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

            [Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense]

       Advancement of Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short

       1. Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not 
     fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General 
     Short; it should be broadly shared.
       2. To say that responsibility is broadly shared is not to 
     absolve Admiral Kimmel and General Short of accountability.
       3. The official treatment of Admiral Kimmel and General 
     Short was substantively temperate and procedurally proper.
       There is not a compelling basis for advancing either 
     officer to a higher grade.
       His nomination is subject to the advice and consent of the 
     Senate. A nominee's errors and indiscretions must be reported 
     to the Senate as adverse information.
       In sum, I cannot conclude that Admiral Kimmel and General 
     Short were victims of unfair official actions and thus I 
     cannot conclude that the official remedy of advancement to 
     the retired list in order. Admiral Kimmel and General Short 
     did not have all the resources they felt necessary. Had they 
     been provided more intelligence and clearer guidance, they 
     might have understood their situation more clearly and 
     behaved differently. Thus, responsibility for the magnitude 
     of the Pearl Harbor disaster must be shared. But this is not 
     a basis for contradicting the conclusion, drawn consistently 
     over several investigations, that Admiral Kimmel and General 
     Short committed errors

[[Page 10694]]

     of judgment. As commanders, they were accountable.
                                  ____



                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                Washington, DC, November 18, 1997.
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your interest in 
     exonerating the names of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In 
     the years since the fateful events at Pearl Harbor there have 
     been numerous formal investigations of the events leading up 
     to the attack, including sharp debate over our state of 
     readiness at the time.
       While Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
     Readiness, Mr. Edwin Dorn conducted a thorough review of this 
     issue in 1995. He carefully considered the information 
     contained in nine previous formal investigations, visited 
     Pearl Harbor and personally met with the Kimmel and Short 
     families. His conclusion was that responsibility for the 
     Pearl Harbor disaster must be broadly shared, but that the 
     record does not show that advancement of Admiral Kimmel and 
     General Short on the retired list is warranted.
       I appreciate the fact that the overwhelming consensus of 
     the organizations and personnel mentioned in your letter 
     recommend exoneration of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. 
     Absent significant new information, however, I do not believe 
     it appropriate to order another review of this matter.
       Ed Dorn and I both agree that responsibility for this 
     tragic event in American history must be broadly shared, yet 
     I remain confident in the findings that Admiral Kimmel and 
     General Short remain accountable in their positions as 
     leaders.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Bill Cohen.

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  I rise to address the Kimmel-Short resolution which I and Senators 
Biden, Thurmond, and Kennedy introduced to redress a grave injustice 
that haunts us from World War II.
  That injustice was the scapegoating of Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short for the success of the disastrous Pearl Harbor attack. This 
unjust scapegoating was given unjust permanence when these two officers 
were not advanced on the retirement list to their highest ranks of 
wartime command, an honor that was given to every other senior 
commander who served in wartime positions above his regular grade.
  Our amendment is almost an exact rewrite of Senate Joint Resolution 
19, that benefits from the support of 23 cosponsors. It calls for the 
advancement on the retirement lists of Kimmel and Short to the grades 
of their highest wartime commands--as was done for every other officer 
eligible under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.
  Such a statement by the Senate would do much to remove the stigma of 
blame that so unfairly burdens the reputation of these two officers. It 
is a correction consistent with our military tradition of honor.
  Allow me to review some key facts about this issue.
  First, it is a fact that Kimmel and Short were the only two World War 
II officers eligible under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 for 
advancement on the retired list who were not granted such advancement. 
No other officer or official paid a price for their role in the Pearl 
Harbor disaster. That fact alone unfairly perpetuates the scapegoating 
they endured for the remainder of their lives.
  Second, there have been no less than nine official investigations on 
this matter over the last five decades. They include the 1944 Naval 
Court of Inquiry which completely exonerated Admiral Kimmel and the 
1944 Army Pearl Harbor Board who found considerable fault in the War 
Department--General Short's superiors. These investigations include 
that conducted by a 1991 Board for the Correction of Military Records 
which recommended General Short's advancement on the retired list.
  I can think of few issues of this nature that have been as 
extensively investigated and studied as the Pearl Harbor matter. Nor 
can I think of a series of studies conducted over five decades where 
conclusions have been so remarkably consistent.
  They include, first, the Hawaiian commanders were not provided vital 
intelligence they needed and that was available in Washington prior to 
the attack on Pearl Harbor.
  Second, the disposition of forces in Hawaii were proper and 
consistent with the information made available to Admiral Kimmel and 
General Short.
  Third, these investigations found that the handling of intelligence 
and command responsibilities in Washington were characterized by 
ineptitude, limited coordination, ambiguous language, and lack of 
clarification followup.
  Fourth, these investigations found that these failures and 
shortcomings of the senior authorities in Washington contributed 
significantly, if not predominantly, to the success of the surprise 
attack on Pearl Harbor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 4 minutes have expired.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. GRAMM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I understand under the previous order I 
have 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I have the highest regard for Senator Roth, 
our distinguished chairman of the Finance Committee. One can tell by 
looking at all the books on his desk that he has done considerable 
research in this area. I have not done similar research in this area. 
But this is an issue that I have followed for my period of service in 
Congress, and I have followed it in part because of an interest in it, 
and in part because of my interest in the efforts of Dr. Samuel Mudd to 
exonerate his name from the role that he is alleged to have played and 
in fact was convicted of playing in the post-assassination activities 
related to President Lincoln.
  But I have come to the floor today to oppose this amendment because I 
strongly object to Congress getting into the business of rewriting 
history.
  This is an old issue. There has been a lot of talk over the years 
about Admiral Kimmel and about General Short, and about the facts in 
the wake of the greatest military disaster in American history at Pearl 
Harbor. And there is no question about the fact that we were asleep on 
December 7th of 1941. There is no question about the fact that Kimmel 
and Short had a great shortcoming in that they did not talk to each 
other and put together the information they had. But there is probably 
no question about the fact that in the wake of that disaster, there was 
an effort to put the blame on someone. It is also true that subsequent 
studies have concluded there was broad culpability.
  But here is the point I want to make. We have a Board for the 
Correction of Military Records. We have an on-going process within the 
Department of Defense to reevaluate decisions that have been made. This 
decision about Kimmel and Short bubbled all the way up to President 
Bush, who as you know, was the youngest naval aviator in American 
history in World War II.
  President Bush decided to let contemporaries be the judge of 
historical events, and so he made the decision not to override the 
decision of military leaders at the time of Pearl Harbor.
  We had another review that ended on December 15th of 1995. That 
review was headed by Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, Edwin S. Dorn. Dorn concluded that, while it was clear that 
there was broad culpability, there was not sufficient evidence 
available now to override the previous decision, which did not include 
court-martial of these two military leaders; it simply included 
retiring them at their permanent rank rather than their temporary rank.
  Some of you will remember this issue because we went through it with 
a four-star admiral when there were questions about the abuse of women 
on his watch in the Navy. Some of you will remember that we actually 
had to cast a vote in that case. The issue was whether he should retire 
at his permanent rank, which was a two-star admiral, or as a four-star 
admiral. We had a very close vote on the decision to allow him to 
retire with his four-star rank, which he held on the day he left the 
military.
  It is true that normally, military flag officers are allowed to 
retire above

[[Page 10695]]

their permanent rank to the higher temporary rank held on the day they 
are severed from the military. But that is not always the case, and it 
is normally done as an indication that they have provided excellent 
service.
  It was not an extraordinary thing in the wake of Pearl Harbor to, No. 
1, retire the two officers in charge and, No. 2, retire them at their 
permanent rank rather than elevating their rank upon retirement.
  I urge my colleagues, with all due respect to Senator Roth, to let 
history be the judge of what happened at Pearl Harbor. We have a 
process within the Defense Department where recommendations can be 
made, where facts can be gathered on an objective basis, where the 
review can come up to the level of the Secretary of Defense and then 
come to the President, if necessary, to make a final decision. 
President Bush refused to override the judgment of history. The Clinton 
administration, through Under Secretary Dorn, has refused to override 
the judgment of history.
  Now, there is no doubt about the fact that Senator Roth believes he 
is sufficiently knowledgeable about this case to override the judgment 
of history here. But I ask the other 99 Members of the Senate, are we 
sufficiently informed? Do we want to set a precedent here or build on 
precedents, bad precedents in my opinion, that have been set in the 
past, of trying to write history on the floor of the Senate? I think we 
need to leave it to the official process. We need to leave it to 
historians to make these judgments.
  I have been personally involved now for several years with the Dr. 
Mudd case. What has happened in that case is that Dr. Mudd has many 
influential heirs and they have set a goal of exonerating him. We now 
have gone through this extraordinary process where we literally are on 
the verge of making a decision, where the Federal courts have gotten 
involved, not on the issue of whether Dr. Mudd was guilty. Having met 
John Wilkes Booth three times, being a physician whose job it was to 
recognize traits in people, he supposedly treated John Wilkes Booth and 
never recognized him. Contemporaries at the time said no. As a result, 
they sent him to prison. He was later pardoned due to some of the good 
work he did in prison. Never again in his lifetime did he challenge the 
judgment. But yet now we are on the verge of having, because of the 
political influence of that family, a decision in the Defense 
Department to override history.
  I think we make a mistake by doing that. In this case, we have had a 
judgment by President Bush, a naval aviator, a hero of the very war 
where this decision was made, who decided not to rewrite history.
  I think we should not decide to rewrite history here today. I think 
this amendment is well intended and based on tremendous research and on 
a great deal of fact. The point is, we are not the body that should be 
making this judgment. There is a process underway. That process has 
come to the level of the President once; it has come to the level of 
the Under Secretary of Defense once; and in both cases, they have said 
they would allow the judgment of history to stand.
  It is not as if these two military leaders were court-martialed. They 
were simply retired, something that happens every day in the military. 
And they were retired at their permanent rank, which is not ordinary 
but it is certainly not extraordinary.
  What should be extraordinary is that retirement at temporary rank 
ought to be a reward for conspicuous service. And while each of us can 
make our judgment about history that occurred in 1941, almost 58 years 
ago, I do not believe we have the ability, nor do I believe we have the 
moral authority as a political body, to go back and rewrite history. I 
ask my colleagues to oppose this amendment.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  We are not rewriting history. We are merely correcting the record. 
Just let me point out that the Dorn report, which has been mentioned 
time and again by those in opposition, specifically concluded that 
responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on 
the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly 
shared. Let me emphasize that: It should be broadly shared. In other 
words, there were others responsible, primarily in Washington. To place 
the blame on these two gentlemen, who had distinguished military 
careers, is wrong and is unfair. I believe we have a responsibility, a 
duty, to recommend to the President action that corrects this 
unfortunate misdeed.
  In making this decision, let me point out that a number of 
endorsements of my resolution have been received from senior retired 
officers of the highest rank. For example, Arleigh Burke sent a letter 
in which he concluded that:

       It is my considered judgment that when all the 
     circumstances are considered that you should approve this 
     posthumous promotion and recommend it to the President.
       The record is clear that important information, available 
     to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, was never 
     made available to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii.
       Lastly, the Naval Court of Inquiry, which exonerated 
     Admiral Kimmel, concluded that his military decisions were 
     proper based on the information available to him.

  Let me now refer to a letter we received from several distinguished 
members of the Navy: Thomas Moorer, Admiral, U.S. Navy; former 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, William J. Crowe, Admiral, U.S. Navy; 
J.L. Holloway, Admiral, U.S. Navy; Elmo Zumwalt, Admiral, U.S. Navy. 
They wrote:

       We ask that the honor and reputations of two fine officers 
     who dedicated themselves to the service of their country be 
     restored. Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short 
     were singularly scapegoated as responsible for the success of 
     the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941. The 
     time is long overdue to reverse this inequity and treat 
     Admiral Kimmel and [G]eneral Short fairly and justly. The 
     appropriate vehicle for that is the current Roth-Biden 
     Resolution.

  Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, last night the distinguished Senator Roth 
and I had an extensive debate on this issue, and we are basically 
covering much of the same ground this morning. I repeat, I just got off 
the phone with the Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen, his predecessor, 
Bill Perry.
  The Dorn report went through this whole case very carefully.
  I recited the list of some nine tribunals, including the Congress of 
the United States, that reviewed this matter, and certainly did not 
reach any conclusion that the action to which my good friend and 
colleague, the Senator from Delaware, asks the Senate to do today.
  I associate myself with the remarks of our colleague from Texas.
  But it is interesting. This is very extensive research performed by 
our colleague. I took the liberty of taking the book last night and 
going home to read it, which is a summary of the congressional 
hearings. What I find interesting is that the Congress absolutely put 
forward some of the most distinguished Members of the House and the 
Senate to form the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl 
Harbor Attack: Alben Barkley, Senator from Kentucky was the chairman; 
Jere Cooper, Representative from Tennessee, was the Vice Chairman. On 
the Senate side, just look at the names of the individuals. Based on my 
own not personal knowledge but study of their careers in the Senate, 
they certainly were viewed as among the giants of the Senate during 
that critical period in history of World War II: Walter F. George, 
Senator from Georgia; Scott Lucas, Senator from Illinois; Owen 
Brewster, Senator from Maine; Homer Ferguson, Senator from Michigan. 
They were the elderly statesmen, the leaders of the Senate.
  In their report, this is what the Committee on the Investigation of 
the Pearl Harbor Attack found. I refer to page 252. It says:
  ``Specifically, the Hawaiian commands failed'' to do the following. 
By ``the Hawaiian commands,'' of course, they are referring to the 
Naval command under Admiral Kimmel and the Army command under General 
Short:


[[Page 10696]]

       (a) To discharge their responsibilities in the light of the 
     warnings received from Washington, other information 
     possessed by them, and the principle of command by mutual 
     cooperation.

  The record astonishingly shows that these two senior officers, 
located on the principal islands of Hawaii, just did not collaborate 
together and share information and ideas as to how best to plan for the 
defense of the men and women of the Armed Forces, our interest in the 
islands at that time, and the critical assets; namely, Naval ships and 
aircraft that were located at that forward deployed area.

       (b) To integrate and coordinate the facilities for defense 
     and to alert properly the Army and Navy establishments in 
     Hawaii, particularly in the light of the warnings and 
     intelligence available to them during the period November 27 
     to December 7, 1941.
       (c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each 
     of them with the operations of the other, which was necessary 
     to their joint security, and to exchange fully all 
     significant intelligence.

  I am going to repeat that--failure to exchange between the two of 
them and with their subordinant significant intelligence.

       (d) To maintain a more effective reconnaissance within the 
     limits of their equipment.
       (e) To effect a state of readiness throughout the Army and 
     Navy establishments designed to meet all possible attacks.
       (f) To employ the facilities, materiel, and personnel at 
     their command, which were adequate at least to have greatly 
     minimized the effects of the attack, in repelling the 
     Japanese raiders.
       (g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence and 
     other information available to them.

  In fairness, I will read another finding, and that is:

       The errors made by the Hawaiian commands were errors of 
     judgment and not derelictions of duty.

  Had there been dereliction of duty, these two men would have been 
court-martialed. But that was the decision made by the President of the 
United States, two successive Presidents--Roosevelt and Truman--not to 
do that. But they found them guilty of errors of judgment.
  What we are asked to do is to put this body on notice that we are 
reversing the findings of the distinguished bipartisan panel of 
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives after taking all 
of this factual evidence into consideration. Look at the voluminous 
factual situation.
  I asked my good friend last night: Are there any new facts on which 
the Senate could have as a predicate the changing of this decision of 
the joint congressional committee? And, quite candidly, my colleague 
from Delaware said no.
  Just to bring to the attention of the Senate one other part in this 
report, it states on page 556:

       The commanding officers in Hawaii had a particular 
     responsibility for the defense of the Pacific Fleet and the 
     Hawaiian coastal frontier. This responsibility they failed to 
     discharge.

  I repeat, Mr. President, ``This responsibility they failed to 
discharge.''

       The failure of the Washington authorities to perform their 
     responsibility provides extenuating circumstances for the 
     failures of these commanders in the field.

  This committee took into consideration that there were other failures 
but there were extenuating circumstances to bring the judgment of this 
panel to the conclusion that a court-martial was not to be held. But 
they were to be retired in the grades which they were in at permanent 
rank.
  In this record is a request by these two officers to be retired, and 
the decision was made not to advance them at the time of retirement to 
the higher grade. That decision was made by individuals who had fresh 
of mind the facts of this case.
  For us at this date and time to try to reverse that, in my judgment, 
would be to say to all of the tribunals that looked at this case--I 
will recite them again--the Knox investigation of December 1941; the 
Roberts Commission of January 1941; the Hart investigation of June 
1944; Army Pearl Harbor Board, October of 1944; Navy Court of Inquiry, 
October of 1944; Clark investigation, September of 1944; Hewitt 
inquiry, July of 1945----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). The time of the Senator from 
Virginia has expired.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator 
from Virginia be given an additional 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. The Clausen investigation, September 12, 1945; and, the 
joint congressional committee of May of 1945. It is the joint 
congressional committee record--to now, after these many 50-plus years, 
go back and reverse the decisions of all of this work done by 
individuals, as the Senator from Texas pointed out, with the authority 
to render such judgments would be to say to them: All of you are in 
error for not having done what the Senator from Delaware requested the 
Senate do these 50-plus years later.
  I just think that is a very unwise decision. I think the Senator from 
Delaware has put an awful lot of hard work into this. I respect him for 
it. But I simply cannot support the Senator, nor can the current 
Secretary of Defense, and, indeed, the previous Secretary of Defense, 
and others who have looked at this set of documents previously.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
senior Senator from Delaware.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized for 4 
minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me begin by thanking my senior 
colleague, Senator Roth, for carrying the load on this.
  As we look forward to Memorial Day observances this weekend, most of 
us will take time to reflect on the honorable and noble traditions of 
our military. The amendment sponsored by myself and my good friends 
Senator Roth, Thurmond, and Kennedy is an effort to make sure Congress 
does its part to uphold those noble traditions.
  Just to highlight two or three points: First of all, my friend from 
Virginia talks about the historical record. The historical record was 
made at that time when history was least likely to be served in the 
immediate aftermath of a national tragedy, and a need for an 
explanation that the country yearned and desired. I am not suggesting 
those who conducted the original investigation had any benevolent 
intent. I am suggesting that history is best viewed with a little bit 
of distance. There was not any distance. I just ask everyone to think 
about what would happen if something, God forbid, similarly happened 
today and this Senate, this body, and the administration decided they 
needed to investigate something immediately. My overwhelming instinct 
tells me there would be a need to find specific individuals who were 
responsible in order to satisfy our collective need for an answer.
  I respectfully suggest that that is what happened here, and I 
respectfully suggest, as well, that we should not be fearful of the 
truth and we should not be fearful of going back in this open society 
of ours and not rewriting history, but setting the facts straight.
  Ultimately, it is the President who must take action, but it is 
important that we in the Senate send the message that the historical 
truth matters and that it is never too late to acknowledge that the 
government did not treat the two commanding officers at Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941, fairly.
  Here's how I see it. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter 
Short were publicly vilified and never given a chance to clear their 
names.
  If we lived in a closed society, fearful of the truth, then there 
would be no need for the President to take action. But we don't. We 
live in an open society. Eventually, we are able to declassify 
documents and evaluate our past based on at least a good portion of the 
whole story. I believe sincerely that one of our greatest strengths as 
a nation comes from our ability to honor truth and learn the lessons 
from our past.
  If we perpetuate the myth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short bear 
all of the blame for Pearl Harbor then we miss the real story. We fail 
to look at the readiness shortfalls they were facing--the lack of 
adequate reconnaissance planes, pilots, spare parts, and

[[Page 10697]]

maintenance crews. We fail to look at the flawed intelligence model 
that was used--the disconnect between what was obtained and what got to 
the commanders in the field.
  I mention these things in particular because there are some striking 
parallels to the problems facing today's military. Today's problems are 
of a different scope and scale, but it is important to see the 
parallels so that we can accurately judge our progress and our endemic 
problems.
  The historic record is not flattering to our government in the case 
of the two commanding officers at Pearl Harbor and that is why it is 
our government's responsibility to acknowledge its mistake. I want to 
emphasize that point, because it is important.
  In last night's debate over this amendment, both those for and 
against it agreed on most of the facts. Where there was disagreement, 
it seems to me, was in what to do about the facts. I believe we should 
urge the President to take action, because government action in the 
past shrouded the truth and scapegoated Kimmel and Short.
  I know Senator Roth and Senator Thurmond discussed some of the 
history last night, so I will just briefly review some of the critical 
parts.
  In 1941, after lifetimes of honorable service defending this nation 
and its values, Admiral Kimmel and General Short were denied the most 
basic form of justice--a hearing by their peers. Instead of a proper 
court-martial, their ordeal began on December 18th with the Roberts 
Commission. A mere 11 days after the devastating attack at Pearl 
Harbor, this Commission was established to determine the facts.
  In this highly charged atmosphere, the Commission conducted a speedy 
investigation, lasting little over a month. In the process, they denied 
both commanders counsel and assured both that they would not be passing 
judgement on their performance. That assurance was worthless. Instead, 
the Commission delivered highly judgmental findings and then 
immediately publicized those findings. The Roberts Commission is the 
only investigative body to find these two officers derelict in their 
duty and it was this government that decided to publicize that false 
conclusion. As one might expect, the two commanders were vilified by a 
nation at war.
  Every succeeding investigation was clear in finding that there was no 
dereliction of duty. The first of these were the 1944 Army Board and 
Navy Court reviews. Again, it was government action that prevented a 
truthful record from reaching the public--a decision by the President. 
The findings of both of these bodies that placed blame on others than 
Kimmel and Short were sequestered and classified.
  Fifty-seven years later, such falsehoods and treatment can no longer 
be justified by the necessities of war. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel 
and Major General Walter Short were not singularly to blame for the 
disastrous events of Pearl Harbor in 1941. In fact, every investigation 
of Admiral Kimmel and General Short's conduct highlights significant 
failings by their superiors.
  This amendment does not involve any costs, nor does it seek any 
special honor or award for these two officers. It does not even seek to 
exonerate them from all responsibility. Instead, it seeks simple 
fairness and their equal treatment. They are the only two eligible 
officers from World War II denied advancement on the retirement lists 
to their highest held wartime ranks.
  I know my colleague from Virginia is concerned that there may be a 
long list of junior officers who can make similar claims. It is my 
understanding that there was a list of officers from World War II 
eligible for advancement under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. 
Admiral Kimmel and General Short were the only officers on that list 
that were denied advancement on the retirement list.
  I want to stress again for all my colleagues that this amendment 
simply sets the record straight--responsibility for Pearl Harbor must 
be broadly shared. It cannot be broadly shared if we fail to 
acknowledge the government's historic role in clouding the truth, nor 
if we continue to perpetuate the myth that Kimmel and Short bear 
singular responsibility for the tragic losses at Pearl Harbor.
  These two officers were unjustly stigmatized by our nation's failure 
to treat them in the same manner with which we treated their peers. To 
reverse this wrong would be consistent with this nation's sense of 
military honor and basic fairness.
  As we honor those who have given their lives to preserve American 
ideals and national interests this coming Memorial Day, we must not 
forget two brave officers whose true story remains shrouded and 
singularly tarnished by official neglect of the truth.
  We introduced this amendment as S.J. Res. 19 earlier this year and it 
now has 23 co-sponsors. As I know Senator Roth indicated last night, it 
has the support of numerous veterans organizations and retired Navy 
flag officers. These knowledgeable people and about a quarter of the 
Senate have already spoken up on behalf of justice and fairness.
  I urge the rest of my colleagues to join us and support this 
amendment.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I cannot accept the basic premise on which 
the distinguished Senator from Delaware addresses his case; that is, 
that there was a disposition among good and honest men not to accord 
fairness, equity, and justice to these two individuals. They were the 
subject of repeated inquiries. As a matter of fact, the Roberts 
Commission was headed by a Supreme Court Justice. Throughout the whole 
judicial history, in the common law of England, which we incorporated 
in our judicial history, speedy trial is the essence of our justice. 
The appellate procedure has to thereafter proceed with some expedition. 
You cannot wait 50-some-plus years to address an issue such as this. 
What do you say to the congressional committee? Do you dispute the 
findings of this committee?
  Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. We gave the names of some of the most revered elder 
statesmen of this body who presided, such as Alben Barkley. And, 
indeed, President Truman had to address, in 1947, as Senator Roth and I 
covered last night, the tombstone promotions, which were given to 
officers of this category, and deny them. Truman himself had to make 
that decision. So I say to my good friend, many fair-minded individuals 
have reviewed this case and have come up with the determination that 
they were not the only ones who had culpability, but certainly, as I 
read it, this commission of the Congress of the United States found a 
serious basis for holding the action and making the decision that they 
did.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield a minute?
  Mr. WARNER. I yield such time as the Senator from Michigan needs.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, let me just add to what the Senator from 
Virginia just said in response to our good friend from Delaware. What I 
really fear, perhaps the most, is the substitution of the judgment of a 
political body for the judgment and findings of the appropriate chain 
of command. We are a political body. The chain of command at the time, 
which has been reviewed by the Defense Department, repeatedly made 
findings and held these two officers accountable. For us now to 
substitute our judgment more than five decades later for that of the 
chain of command, it seems to me, is a very, very bad precedent in 
terms of holding officers accountable for events.
  Mr. President, the Department of Defense recently reviewed this 
entire matter--the so-called Dorn report--and I have quoted these 
findings before, but I will pick out two of them, which seems to me go 
to the heart of the matter.
  This is a quote:

       To say that responsibility is broadly shared is not to 
     absolve Admiral Kimmel and General Short of accountability.

  Of course, accountability should be broadly shared, and maybe it 
wasn't as broadly shared as it should have been, but the issue is 
whether or not this accountability, 57 years ago, is going to be set 
aside by a political body 57 years later.

[[Page 10698]]


  Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LEVIN. My time is over, but I will be happy to yield.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 1 minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this is a rhetorical question. The report 
suggested that Generals Marshall and Stark were also partially 
responsible. My point is that the idea that the entirety of the blame, 
that the children and the children of the children of these two men 
will live forever thinking that they were the only two people 
responsible for this, is a historical inaccuracy, unfair, and a blemish 
that is not warranted to be carried by the two proud families whose 
names are associated with them. It is as simple as that.
  Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. ROTH. I ask unanimous consent for 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, what we are talking about today is a matter 
of justice and fairness, a matter that goes to the core of our military 
tradition and our Nation's sense of military honor. Just let me point 
out once again the Dorn report says:

       Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not 
     fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General 
     Short. It should be broadly shared.

  Unfortunately, it was not broadly shared. The only two people who 
were singled out for punishment, or not to be promoted to their wartime 
rank, were Admiral Kimmel and General Short. They were held singularly 
responsible for what happened in Pearl Harbor. That is not fair. That 
is not just. Just let me point out that we have had the essence of the 
tremendous number of endorsements we have received from senior retired 
officers of the highest rank. Once again, I point out that admiral 
after admiral--Burke, Zumwalt, Moorer and Crowe--have asked that this 
be corrected. All we seek today is justice and fairness to two officers 
who served their Nation with excellence.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the admirals the Senator enumerated were 
ones I had the pleasure of knowing, serving with several, and for whom 
I have a great deal of respect. But I note the absence of any similar 
number of Army generals coming forward on behalf of General Short. 
Perhaps the Senator has something in the Record. But I think that 
silence speaks to authenticate the position that this Senator and 
others have taken.
  To the very strong, forceful statement of my colleague who said it is 
implicit that all responsibility for this tragedy is assigned to these 
two individuals, that is not correct. The Dorn report said it is to be 
shared. In fact, General Marshall stepped forward with courage and 
accepted publicly, at the very time this was being examined, his share 
of responsibility.
  So I say others, indeed, General Marshall and others, stepped 
forward.
  Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. ROTH. May I just make a 15-second statement?
  Mr. WARNER. The Chair has ordered the yeas and nays?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. I say, as a courtesy to my good friend and others who 
have sponsored this, we will not, of course, move to table.
  Mr. ROTH. I point out the Army Board for Correction of Military 
Records, in 1991, recommended that General Short be restored to his 
full wartime rank.


                           amendment no. 377

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question now is on 
the Roberts amendment. There is an hour equally divided.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I have had the privilege this year to 
serve as the first chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee's 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. I would like to 
recognize Senator Warner, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 
for his vision and foresight in creating this subcommittee to deal with 
the nontraditional threats to U.S. national security.
  The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities was established 
to provide oversight for the Department of Defense's efforts to counter 
new and emerging challenges to vital United States interests. Through a 
series of hearings and detailed oversight of budget accounts, the 
subcommittee highlighted: the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction; terrorism directed at U.S. targets both at home and 
abroad; information warfare and the protection of our defense 
information infrastructure; and trafficking of illegal drugs. The 
subcommittee sought to identify the technology, operational concepts 
and capabilities we need to deter--and, if necessary--combat these 
perils.
  I would like to briefly highlight the initiatives included in this 
bill to address the emerging threats to our national security:
  Protection of our homeland and our critical information 
infrastructure are two of the most serious challenges facing our Nation 
today. In the area of counterterrorism, the bill before the Senate 
includes full funding for the five Rapid Assessment and Initial 
Detection (RAID) teams requested by the administration, and an increase 
of $107 million to provide a total of 17 additional RAID teams in 
fiscal year 2000. We have further required the Department to establish 
a central transfer account for the Department's programs to combat 
terrorism to provide better visibility and accounting for this 
important effort.
  We have included an Information Assurance Initiative to strengthen 
the Department's critical information infrastructure, enhance oversight 
and improve organizational structure. As a part of this initiative, we 
added $120 million above the President's budget request for programs to 
enhance our ability to combat cyber-attacks. In addition, this 
initiative will provide for a test to plan and conduct simulations, 
exercises and experiments against information warfare threats, and 
allow the Department to interact with civil and commmercial 
organizations in this important effort. The provision encourages the 
Secretary of Defense to strike an appropriate balance in addressing 
threats to the defense information infrastructure while at the same 
time recognizing that Department of Defense has a role to play in 
helping to protect critical infrastructure outside the DOD.
  We have included a legislative package to strengthen the science and 
technology program. This legislation will ensure that since the science 
and technology program is threat-based and that investments are tied to 
future warfighting needs. The legislation is also aimed at promoting 
innovation in laboratories and improving the efficiency of RDT&E 
operations. The bill also includes a $170 million increase to the 
science and technology budget request.
  And finally, in the area of nonproliferation, we have authorized over 
$718 million for programs to assist Russia and other states of the 
former Soviet Union destroy or control their weapons of mass 
destruction. However, it is important to note, this is an increase of 
$29.6 million over the fiscal year 1999 funding level. I would like to 
take a moment to share my thoughts on this issue.
  I am very concerned about the findings of the recently released GAO 
report that the U.S. cost of funding the nuclear material storage 
facility in Mayak, Russia has increased from an original estimate of 
$275 million to $413 million. This Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
project may eventually

[[Page 10699]]

have a price tag of $1 billion. These increased costs to the U.S. have 
occurred because Russia has failed to fund its share of the costs of 
this project. I also understand that the chemical weapons destruction 
facility will not be open until 2006, in part due to Russia's failure 
to provide the needed information about the chemical weapons to be 
destroyed.
  The CTR program is becoming more and more one-sided. This program is 
also in the interest of the Russians. Matter of fact, much of the 
destruction of the Russian inventory, funded by the CTR program, 
enables Russia to meet its obligations under existing arms control 
treaties.
  In addition, I am concerned with the daily press reports that the 
Russians are enhancing their military capabilities. For example:
  Earlier this month, President Yeltsin reportedly ordered the Russian 
military to draw up plans for the development and use of tactical 
nuclear forces.
  On May 4, The Russian Defense Minister threatened to reconsider 
Russian support for the revision of the Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE) Treaty.
  On April 16, the Duma unanimously adopted a resolution calling for 
increased defense budgets.
  Although I have serious concerns about this program, we included an 
authorization for CTR at the budget request of $475.5 million, an 
increase of $35 million over the FY 99 level. However, before FY 2000 
funds may be obligated we require the President to recertify that the 
Russians are foregoing any military modernization that exceeds 
legitimate defense requirements and are complying with relevant arms 
control agreements. The most recent certification by the Administration 
was completed before these numerous statements by Yeltsi and other 
Russian officials.
  I am also concerned with the deficiencies in the management and 
oversight of the DOE programs in Russia--in particular, the Initiative 
for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and the Nuclear Cities Initiative 
(NCI). If these programs are to succeed, we need to get past the 
implementation problems pointed out in the GAO report, in press 
reports, by our House colleagues, and by the Russians. In addition, the 
Russian economic crisis and lack of infrastructure are making these 
programs more difficult to manage. I am afraid if we do not exercise 
strong oversight now we are in danger of losing these programs.
  I have proposed a number of initiatives that I believe will go a long 
way towards correcting the deficiencies in the management of the IPP 
program, establishing a framework for effective implementation and 
oversight of both programs, and ensuring that sufficient accountability 
exists. Further, I believe the U.S. nonproliferation goals and U.S. 
national security will be better served by these improvements.
  Finally, I believe DoE should spend FY 2000 tightening up the 
implementation of IPP and NCI rather than broadening the program. 
Therefore, the committee authorized the IPP and NCI below the 
administration's request of $30 million for each program. The bill 
includes an authorization of $15 million for NCI and an authorization 
of $25 million for IPP, an increase of $2.5 million for each program 
over FY 99 levels. These are the only programs in the entire DoE 
nonproliferation budget that the committee authorized below the budget 
request. Overall, we authorized $266.8 million for DoE nonproliferation 
programs in the former Soviet Union countries--an increase of $13.4 
million over FY 99.
  I believe the bill before you takes significant steps to focus the 
Department of Defense's efforts to counter new and emerging threats to 
vital national security interests. I urge my colleagues to support this 
bill.
  Once again, Mr. President, I am asking the support of my colleagues 
for a simple sense of the Senate that calls also for complete 
transparency on the part of the President and Senate consideration 
regarding the de facto editing of the original North Atlantic Treaty.
  My sense of the Senate asks the President to certify whether the new 
Strategic Concept of NATO, the one adopted at the 50th anniversary of 
NATO in Washington about a month ago--this formalization of new and 
complicated United States responsibilities in Europe, as evidenced by 
the war in Kosovo and the possibility of future Kosovos around the 
world--is in fact a document that obligates the United States in any 
way, shape, or form.
  If so, my sense of the Senate affirms that this body be given the 
opportunity to debate, to accept or to reject, the new blueprint for 
future NATO operations, these actions which will undoubtedly include 
substantial components of our own Armed Forces engaged completely 
outside the province of the original treaty.
  Yesterday the distinguished Senator from Michigan, my colleague and 
my friend, Senator Levin, asked where the Congress was in 1990, in 
regard to the last Strategic Concept adoption. The Senator has rightly 
pointed out there were changes made in the Concept at that particular 
time. Without question, that should have been an alarm bell of things 
to come. But there are key differences, I tell my friend, in the world 
today as opposed to the world in 1990.
  Second, and just as important, there are significant differences 
regarding the Strategic Concept adopted in April of 1999, just a month 
ago, which is the document that I hope is still on the desk of all 
Senators, and the Concept that was adopted in 1990 as referenced by the 
Senator.
  First of all, Bosnia had not occurred and, more especially, Kosovo 
was not the proof of the direction that NATO intended to go. That 
direction is an offensive direction. That is not meant to be a pun.
  The crafting of language in the new Strategic Concept was carefully 
done. Look, my colleagues, if you will, at the removal of the following 
wording of paragraph 35 of the 1991 Concept. I will repeat it:

       The alliance is purely defensive in purpose. None of its 
     weapons will ever be used except in self defense.

  That was removed. That removal was not an oversight. The current 
Strategic Concept sets in motion a new NATO that is inconsistent with 
article 1 of the 1990 treaty or concept. The North Atlantic Treaty, 
article 1:

       The parties undertake as set forth in the Charter of the 
     United Nations to settle any international dispute which they 
     may be involved in by peaceful means, in such a manner that 
     international peace and security and justice are not 
     endangered, and to refrain in their international relations 
     from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent 
     with the purpose of the United Nations.

  That was in 1990, the reference to the United Nations, to settle any 
international dispute by peaceful means, not by military means.
  The original wording and intent of article 4 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty is straightforward. The North Atlantic Treaty, article 4:

       The parties will consult together when in the opinion of 
     any of them the territorial integrity--

  All the debate about whether we are conducting a military campaign 
and crossing borders of a sovereign state, I say it again:

       The parties will consult together when in the opinion of 
     any of them the territorial integrity or political 
     independence or the security of any of the parties is 
     threatened.

  However, paragraph 24 of the new Concept significantly alters article 
4 of the NATO treaty in the following way:

       Arrangements exist within the alliance for consultation 
     among the allies under article 4 of the Washington Treaty--

  My colleagues, pay attention to this--

     and, where appropriate, the coordination of their efforts 
     including the responses to such risks.

  The portion that includes ``the coordination of their efforts 
including their responses to such risk,'' it is new, and strongly 
suggests offensive action, i.e., Kosovo. It is a possible response to a 
threat, and that is a radical shift for NATO--not from 1949 but also 
from 1990.
  The new Concept has significantly expanded the global coverage of 
NATO. For example, paragraphs 20, 21, and 22 clearly indicate a global 
reach for NATO.

[[Page 10700]]

  Paragraph 20 states:

       The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-
     Atlantic stability, to human suffering and to armed 
     conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the 
     conference by spilling over to neighboring countries 
     including NATO countries or in other ways, and could also 
     affect the security of neighboring states.

  The point is that NATO justifies action well beyond the original 
boundaries of NATO and now includes threats to member states anywhere 
in the world. Is that what we want the NATO of the future to be?
  I say to my friend from Michigan, he is right that Congress was 
asleep at the switch when the Strategic Concept of 1990 was adopted. 
But there is no reason for Congress to remain asleep in 1999. In 
fairness to my colleagues, no one envisioned that in less than 9 years 
the purely defensive alliance of NATO would have conducted offensive 
action out of area, against a sovereign nation, albeit a terribly 
oppressive nation, in an action that was not in our vital national 
interests.
  Let me share some comments I have gleaned from the Foreign Media 
Reaction Daily Digest which all Members receive from the U.S. 
Information Agency. This is from the leading press around the world, as 
they view, in terms of their commentary, what this Strategic Concept 
means to them.
  I know some critics, myself included, will say their views, some of 
the views, are unimportant or biased or that they are from state-run 
presses. I know that. But I think they are a valuable tool to 
understand how we and NATO are being perceived by non-NATO members--and 
some NATO members as well. Here is the summary--early May:

       The Alliance's adoption of a ``new strategic concept''. . . 
     has swung to the negative [in regard to the comments by the 
     foreign press]. Criticism of the Alliance's vision of a ``new 
     world order''. . . . many underscored the problems with 
     NATO's expanded purview and questioned the feasibility of 
     trying to promote and impose--beyond European borders and 
     ``by force if necessary''--a ``consistent'' standard on human 
     rights. The vast majority of media outside of Europe remained 
     harshly critical of NATO's [read the U.S.'s] new blueprint, 
     with most reiterating their concerns that NATO is 
     ``transforming itself into a global police force, ignoring 
     the role of the U.N.'' . . . NATO is being enlarged--both 
     spatially and doctrinally--in order to ensure U.S. military 
     and political dominance over Europe, Russia and the rest of 
     the world.

  I don't buy that, but it is important to understand that other 
countries certainly think that.
  It goes on to say:

       The idea that a part of the world, formed by the most 
     ``civilized'' nations, can be responsible for the respect of 
     human rights in the whole world--resorting, if necessary, to 
     the use of force . . . is neither viable nor fair.

  They are asking:

       . . . whether Kosovo is an exception or a rule in NATO's 
     new strategy, and whether the Allies will be equally firm, 
     but also consistent, when its comes to the Kurds . . . 
     Tibetans, Palestinians, Tutsis, Hutus [or] Native Americans. 
     Ethnic cleansing in Chechnya, Turkey, Colombia, Indonesia 
     show that NATO is now punishing randomly, that is only 
     enemies and only those countries that don't have any nuclear 
     weapons.

  Mr. President, several headlines--and I do not agree with all of 
these headlines--in May should be brought to the attention of my 
colleagues.
  The newspaper Reforma in Mexico:

       What is the reason for the desire to impose a solution in 
     defense of the Albanians in Yugoslavia while at the same time 
     three ethnic groups that hate each other are forced to co-
     exist in Bosnia? What could happen in Mexico in the future? 
     Within several months, NATO members [have now agreed] to 
     intervene anywhere they see fit without the need to consult 
     with the U.N. and to run the risk of a veto from Russia or 
     China. This will be a two century jump backwards.

  That is from Mexico. I am not saying it speaks for the entire country 
of Mexico, although President Zedillo said much the same thing.
  Ethnos, a paper in Greece:

       What occurred in Washington was the U.N.'s complete 
     weakening. It is now a mere onlooker of NATO's decisions and 
     initiatives. What has taken place is the complete overthrow 
     of the legal system.

  A newspaper called Folha de S. Paulo in Brazil:

       NATO celebrates its 50th anniversary and in practice 
     formalizes the end of the U.N. As it has become clear this 
     past month, the world's power is, in fact, in NATO, meaning 
     in the hands of the United States. And, almost no Government 
     dares to protest against it.

  The Economist in Great Britain, a respected newspaper:

       Limping home from Kosovo would certainly oblige NATO to 
     rethink its post-Cold War aims of intervention, not just for 
     member's defense, but also for broader interest in 
     humanitarian and international order. NATO might go into 
     terminal decline. The Alliance needs to persist in explaining 
     to other countries the principles that guided NATO's decision 
     to intervene in Kosovo. This necessity is not so much to 
     prove that this was a just cause but to reassure a suspicious 
     world that NATO has not given itself the right to attack 
     sovereign nations at whim.

  Il Sole 24-Ore. of Italy:

       We cannot say what emerged from the weird birthday-summit 
     war council in Washington is a strategic concept. Indeed, 
     NATO should have been more precise about its future. The war 
     in Kosovo forces us to revise international law as we have 
     known it.

  This is from a newspaper in a country that is a NATO ally:

       The concept suggests laying the foundation of an ``ethical 
     foreign policy.'' A democratic West which tolerates ethnic 
     and religious diversities, which is stable and economically 
     free, can even fight to give these values to other people. It 
     is a very nice picture, but to impose freedom is a 
     contradiction in terms.

  Another headline: Al-Dustur in Jordan, the new King of which just 
paid a visit to this country:

       The Anglo-American alliance imposed on NATO during the 
     summit in Washington is a new orientation marked by 
     imperialist arrogance and disregard for the rest of the 
     world.

  Those are pretty strong words.

       This is a serious danger that faces the world, and to 
     overcome it all non-NATO countries should cooperate and seek 
     to develop weapons of mass destruction.

  Is that what the new Strategic Concept is leading to in the minds of 
some of the critics in foreign countries?
  Al Watan in Kuwait, the country we freed in regard to Desert Storm:

       NATO does not have a strategy for the next 50 years, except 
     America will remain the master, Europe the subordinate, 
     Russia a marginalized state and the rest of the world 
     secondary actors.

  That is pretty tough criticism.
  Asahi newspaper in Japan:

       One such lesson is that members of an alliance often resort 
     to their own military activities, paying scant attention to 
     the trend of the U.N. Security Council, or international 
     opinion. Another lesson is that the United States, the only 
     superpower, often acts in accordance with its own logic or 
     interests rather than acting as supporter for its allies.

  This newspaper sums it up:

       This has relevance to the U.S.-Japanese military alliance.

  The newspaper Hankyoreh Shinmun of South Korea, an ally:

       The summit decision to give the Alliance an enlarged role 
     in the future is a dangerous one in that it may serve in the 
     long term to merely prop up America's hegemonic endeavors. 
     The talk of NATO's expanded role confuses everyone and even 
     threatens global peace. NATO's new role could unify countries 
     like Russia and China that oppose U.S. dominance, provoking a 
     new global conflagration between them and the West.

  In Taiwan, The China Times:

       NATO's new order requires different agents to act on the 
     U.S.'s behalf in different regions and to share the peace-
     keeping responsibility for the peace of greater America. In 
     the Kosovo crisis, NATO on one hand tries to stop the 
     Yugoslav government's slaughter. On the other hand, to show 
     respect for Yugoslav sovereignty it also opposes Kosovar 
     independence. This means that a country cannot justify human 
     rights violations by claiming national sovereignty. By the 
     same token, calls for independence in a high tension area are 
     forbidden since they would naturally lead to war. These two 
     principles have now become the pillars of the NATO strategic 
     concept. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait have also repeatedly 
     received similar signals: Beijing should not use force 
     against Taiwan, and Taiwan should not declare independence.

  There is a parallel.
  Finally, in India, the newspaper Telegraph:

       NATO will definitely try to make things difficult for 
     nations like India which are planning to join the nuclear 
     league. Though Russia, and now China, are seeking India's 
     cooperation and active participation to build a multi-polar 
     world order against the United States, Deli appears to be 
     reluctant to play. This reluctance stems from the fear that 
     the West, with help from Pakistan, might turn Kashmir into 
     another Kosovo, highlighting human rights violations in the 
     valley and Kashmir then might become a fit case for NATO 
     intervention.


[[Page 10701]]


  I do not buy that. I do not think we are going to do that. Some of 
the warnings, some of the descriptions that I have just read to my 
colleagues, I do not buy, but it shows you the attitude, it shows you 
how other people feel about the new Strategic Concept.
  We have the same kind of commentaries from Argentina, from Canada, 
from Mexico again.
  La Jornada, a newspaper in Mexico:

       The decision by NATO leaders to turn that organization from 
     a defensive into an offensive entity and to carry out 
     military actions regardless of the U.N. is a defeat of 
     civilized mechanisms that were so painfully put in place 
     after World War II. If the Alliance really wanted to impose 
     democratic values by force, it should start by attacking some 
     of its own members, like Turkey, which carries out systematic 
     ethnic cleansing campaigns against the Kurds.

  Tough words.
  My point remains that this new Strategic Concept, a concept that 
radically alters the focus and direction of NATO, has been adopted 
without the consultation of the Senate. Are we willing, as Senators, to 
stand by and not debate, discuss, or give consent to a document that 
fundamentally alters the most successful alliance in history? What we 
discussed, what we ratified in regard to expansion is totally different 
than the new Strategic Concept. It has had no debate, it has had no 
discussion and, yet, it is a blueprint for our involvement in the 
future of NATO.
  It is a document that fundamentally alters the most successful 
alliance in history and one that may cost the blood of our men and 
women and billions of dollars from our Treasury. We should at least 
debate it.
  I urge my colleagues to support my sense-of-the-Senate amendment. I 
reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The Chair recognizes the Senator 
from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will be voting for this amendment because 
it is worded very differently from earlier versions. This version of 
the amendment simply requires the President to certify whether or not 
the new Strategic Concept of NATO imposes any new commitment or 
obligation on the United States.
  In 1991, we had major changes in the alliance's Strategic Concept. 
These were huge changes. Section 9 of the alliance's new Strategic 
Concept in 1991, for instance, said:

       Risks to allied security are less likely to result from 
     calculated aggression against the territory of the allies but 
     rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that 
     may arise from serious economic, social and political 
     difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial 
     disputes which are faced by many countries in Central and 
     Eastern Europe. They could lead to crises inimical to 
     European stability and even to armed conflicts which could 
     involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries.

  Then in paragraph 12, it says:

       Alliance security must--

  This is 1991--not this new one, but the Strategic Concept that was 
adopted in 1991.

       Alliance security must take into account the global 
     context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other 
     risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital 
     resources, and actions of terrorism and sabotage.

  The reason that this 1991 Strategic Concept was not sent over to the 
Senate for ratification was very straightforward, very simple, in my 
judgment; and that is that the Strategic Concept then did not contain 
new commitments or obligations for the United States. This is a 
strategic concept; this is not a legally binding document. This is not 
a treaty-specific document which contains obligations and commitments 
on the part of the parties. This is a strategic concept document, both 
in 1991 and in 1999.
  So when my good friend from Kansas says that I said the Congress was 
asleep in 1991, the Congress was not asleep in 1991. The Congress was 
exactly right in 1991. When this Strategic Concept was adopted in 1991, 
there were no new obligations or commitments that required the Senate 
to ratify this document. And there are no new obligations or 
commitments now.
  The President has already told us that. He has already sent a letter 
to Senator Warner. The President has sent a letter to Senator Warner 
dated April 14, 1999, that says:

       The Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or 
     obligations for the United States.

  So the certification, which is required in this amendment--and 
rightfully so, by the way, in my judgment--has already been made. I see 
no reason it would not be made again.
  So I do not believe that the Congress was sleeping in 1991, and it 
surely is not sleeping now. Senator Roberts is, as far as I am 
concerned, very appropriately saying to the administration, if this 
contains new commitments or obligations--if it contains new obligations 
and commitments--then you should send this to us as a treaty amendment.
  Of course, I happen to think that is correct. This amendment does not 
find that there are new obligations and commitments. An earlier version 
of this amendment, by the way, did. This amendment does not do that. 
This amendment says to the President: Tell the Congress whether or not 
the new Strategic Concept--those are the precise words of this 
amendment--constitutes, involves, contains, new obligations or 
commitments.
  Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator yield?
  Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator points out that the letter was sent to me--
correct--in response to a letter that I forwarded to the President. 
That is in last night's Record.
  First, we welcome the Senator's support on this. But I think he would 
agree with me that that letter was written at the time when the 
language was still being worked, and of course it predates the final 
language as adopted by the 50th anniversary summit. That language is 
the object of this, I think, very credible inquiry by Mr. Roberts, 
myself, and others.
  Mr. LEVIN. It is very appropriate.
  Mr. WARNER. It is very well that the Senate may forward a letter that 
puts this matter to rest and, most importantly, clarifies in the minds 
of our other allies, the other 18 nations, exactly what this document 
is intended to say from the standpoint of America, which, I point out 
time and time again, contributes 25 percent of the cost to the NATO 
operations.
  Mr. LEVIN. I think that is correct. The timing of the letter is 
exactly as the chairman says it is. But the statement of the President 
is that ``the Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or 
obligations for the United States.''
  The caption of the amendment by the Senator from Kansas is ``Relating 
to the legal effect of [this] new Strategic Concept.'' I think it is 
quite clear from our conversations with the State Department that the 
President can, indeed, and will, indeed, make this certification, and 
should--and should. I think it is an important certification.
  I commend the Senator from Kansas. I think we need clarity on this 
subject. If there is a legally binding commitment on the United States 
in this new Strategic Concept, it ought to be sent to the Senate for 
ratification. But if this 1999 Strategic Concept is like the 1991 
Strategic Concept--not a legally binding document but a planning 
document, a document setting out concepts, not legal obligations--that 
is a very different thing.
  NATO has adopted strategic concepts continually during its existence. 
By the way, again, let me suggest there is nothing much broader than 
section 12 of the 1991 Strategic Concept which said: ``Alliance 
security must take into account the global context.'' Does that 
represent a binding commitment on the United States? It surely did not, 
in my judgment, and need not have been submitted to the Senate for 
ratification. I believe that the current Concept, which has been 
adopted, does not contain legally binding commitments.
  Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will yield, the amendment, as carefully 
crafted, does not have the word ``legal'' in it. It imposes any ``new 
commitment.'' Indeed, there are political commitments that give rise to 
actions from time to time. So I recognize the Senator's focus on 
``legal,'' but it does not limit the certification solely to

[[Page 10702]]

legal. It embraces any new commitment or obligation of the United 
States.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I think it clearly means the legal effect of 
this. But let us, rather than arguing over what is in or not in this 
amendment--I understand that there was going to be an effort made here 
to clarify language on the certification. If there is going to be such 
an effort, I would ask that be made now and that we then ask for the 
yeas and nays so we are not shooting at a moving target here. Really, I 
think it would be useful, if in fact that change relative to the 
certification requirement is going to be sent to the desk, it be sent 
to the desk at this point; and then I am going to ask for the yeas and 
nays.
  Mr. ROBERTS. If the Senator will yield?
  Mr. LEVIN. I do yield.


                     Amendment No. 377, As Modified

(Purpose: Relating to the legal effect of the new Strategic Concept of 
                                 NATO)

  Mr. ROBERTS. I do have that clarification in the form of an 
amendment, which I send to the desk, and I ask unanimous consent that 
in title X, at the end of subtitle D, that this amendment would be 
added.
  Mr. BIDEN. Reserving the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. BIDEN. There is objection. I would like to reserve the right to 
object, if you let me explain; otherwise, I will just simply object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I reserve the right to object because if, in fact, the 
Senator wishes to change his amendment, I ask that we consider on line 
7 adding the word ``legal,'' because failure to do so rewrites 
constitutional history here. Presidents make commitments all the time. 
Commitments and obligations do not a treaty make and do not require a 
supermajority vote under the Constitution by the Senate to ratify those 
commitments. I, at least for the time being, object and hope that after 
we finish this debate, before we vote, my colleague and I can have a 
few minutes in the well to see whether he will consider amending it to 
add the word ``legal'' on line 7 of his amendment. So I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will yield the floor in just 2 minutes. I 
read this document quite clearly as meaning any new commitment or 
obligation, because it uses the word ``impose.'' I know no other way to 
impose an obligation or a commitment other than legal. When you use the 
word ``impose,'' it seems to me it is quite clear that that means it is 
imposed. So that is the way I read this language. If others want to 
read the language in a different way, they may. But I think that the 
certification requirement, which the Senator from Kansas wants to move 
into the front of this amendment instead of in the sense-of-the-Senate 
part of it, is simply a clarification of what was always the clear 
intent, which is that there be such a certification. And I think that 
that is more of a technical change than anything.
  I have no objection to an amendment which moves the certification 
requirement to the front of the amendment before the sense-of-the-
Senate language and imposes that as a certification requirement--not 
sense of the Congress but as a requirement on the President. In my 
judgment, there is no doubt but that it is only if there is a legally 
binding commitment or obligation that this would require a referral to 
the U.S. Senate, because no other requirement or obligation other than 
one that is legally binding on us would rise to the dignity of a 
treaty.
  I hope the Senator will have a chance to move the certification 
requirement to an earlier position in his amendment. If I could just 
ask one question of my friend from Kansas, as I understand, that is 
what the modification does provide and nothing more; is that correct?
  Mr. ROBERTS. I say to the Senator, I am not sure. I had thought we 
had an agreement that there would not be an objection to the amendment 
by unanimous consent. That obviously is not the case. We are going to 
have to consider this. Let us work on this.
  I will be happy to visit here on the floor with the Senator from 
Delaware and my good friend from Michigan. I am not entirely clear, 
after listening to the Senator, that his description of this amendment 
is the one that I have. Let us work it out, and if push comes to shove, 
although I think it is entirely reasonable for a Senator to be allowed 
to amend his own amendment, if this has caused some concern on the part 
of both Senators, we can always bring this up as a separate amendment, 
which may be the best case. If, in fact, you say ``legal,'' you put the 
word ``legal'' in there, obviously I do not think the President is 
going to have any obligation to report on anything. In terms of 
obligation, if I might say so, if the Senator will continue to yield, 
if Kosovo is not an obligation, I am not standing here on the floor of 
the Senate. That is my response.
  Why don't we visit about this if we can, and then, if necessary, we 
will just introduce an amendment at a later time as a separate 
amendment.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Michigan yield me 1 
minute?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Just 1 minute and then afterwards I see others will seek 
recognition to speak.
  I want to make it clear, I do not know where the Senator got the 
impression that there would be no objection. I did not agree to that. 
What I suggested was that when he asked me whether or not I objected, I 
asked him to withhold until after I made my talk and asked some 
questions. Then I would not object. We are getting the ``cart before 
the horse'' here. I want to make it clear, I may not ultimately object. 
I just want to have an opportunity to speak to this before he sends his 
amendment to the desk.
  Mr. ROBERTS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Smith of New Hampshire be added as an original cosponsor of Roberts 
amendment No. 377.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Chair.
  I thank the Senator from Kansas for pursuing this, because I do think 
it is a very important amendment. I think it is very important that we 
ask the President to come forward and tell us if this new Strategic 
Concept we have all been reading imposes a new commitment or obligation 
on the United States.
  The original NATO treaty, the whole treaty, is very clear. It is a 
defensive alliance. That has never been questioned until what is 
happening today in Kosovo, which is clearly not defensive. It is 
offensive. NATO has started airstrikes on a sovereign nation that is 
not a member of NATO. So I think it is, before our eyes, evolving into 
a new Strategic Concept for NATO, and I think we most certainly must 
have the right to approve it. It is an addition to a treaty obligation 
that was made 40-plus years ago.
  Now, I am not necessarily against NATO having an offensive part of a 
treaty obligation, but I am absolutely certain that the Senate must 
approve this kind of added obligation and that we not walk away from 
the very important concept that a treaty sets out certain obligations 
and it is required to be ratified by Congress. And most certainly, we 
must ratify the changing of a treaty obligation from a defensive 
alliance to an offensive alliance.
  There is no question that the founders of our country chose to make 
it difficult to declare war. They chose to make it difficult to declare 
war by giving the right to Congress. They could have given it to the 
President, but they were going away from the English system, where the 
King declared war and

[[Page 10703]]

implemented the same war. They wanted a division of responsibility, and 
they wanted it to be difficult to put our troops in harm's way. Indeed, 
every President we have had has said that it should be difficult to put 
our troops in harm's way; perhaps until this President, that is.
  So it is important that we pass this amendment and that the President 
certify that we either do have a new obligation or we do not. I think 
we do, and I think we need to debate it.
  As I said, I am not against NATO having some offensive 
responsibilities. I do question that they have in our NATO treaty the 
right to do what they are doing right now. I think we need to debate 
it, and I think we need to clarify exactly what would be in a new 
offensive strategy that would be a part of a NATO treaty obligation of 
the United States of America.
  I can see a role for NATO that would declare that we have security 
interests that are common and that we would be able to determine what 
those common security interests are and that we would fight them 
together, stronger than any of us could fight independently. I do not 
know that Kosovo meets that test, but I think others certainly do 
believe that. I do believe that a Desert Storm does meet the test or 
Kim Jong-Il, with nuclear capabilities, does meet that test.
  Mr. President, I support the amendment, and I ask unanimous consent 
to be added as a cosponsor of the amendment. I think it is incumbent on 
the Senate to stand up for our constitutional responsibility and that 
is what this amendment does.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, may I ask how much time I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 5 minutes remaining.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I do not know if the Senator from Delaware would like to 
speak at this moment.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would, if I may.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. The distinguished Senator from Michigan indicated that I 
could yield myself such time as he has remaining.
  Mr. President, I say to my friend from Kansas, I have no objection, 
after talking to him, if he wishes to send his amendment to the desk 
now. I will yield the floor.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I send a modification to my amendment to 
the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be so modified.
  The amendment (No. 377), as modified, is as follows:

       In title X, at the end of subtitle D, add the following:

     SEC. 1061. LEGAL EFFECT OF THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO.

       (a) Certification Required.--Not later than 30 days after 
     the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall 
     determine and certify to the Senate whether or not the new 
     Strategic Concept of NATO imposes any new commitment or 
     obligation on the United States.
       (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that, if the President certifies under subsection (a) that 
     the new Strategic Concept of NATO imposes any new commitment 
     or obligation on the United States, the President should 
     submit the new Strategic Concept of NATO to the Senate as a 
     treaty for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification 
     under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution of 
     the United States.
       (c) Report.--Together with the certification made under 
     subsection (a), the President shall submit to the Senate a 
     report containing an analysis of the potential threats facing 
     NATO in the first decade of the next millennium, with 
     particular reference to those threats facing a member nation, 
     or several member nations, where the commitment of NATO 
     forces will be ``out of area'' or beyond the borders of NATO 
     member nations.
       (d) Definition.--For the purpose of this section, the term 
     ``new Strategic Concept of NATO'' means the document approved 
     by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
     meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., on 
     April 23 and 24, 1999.

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that ``In title X 
at the end of subtitle D'' be added to my original amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, one of the things that we sometimes confuse 
here--I know I do--is what is a political obligation and what is a 
constitutional obligation. I respectfully suggest that there is no 
constitutional requirement for the President of the United States--this 
President or any future President--to submit to the Senate for 
ratification, as if it were an amendment to a treaty, a Strategic 
Concept that is a political document. We use the words interchangeably 
on this floor. A new commitment or obligation, as I said, does not a 
treaty make.
  Our Strategic Concept has always been a political, not legal 
document. Before last month's summit, NATO had revised the Strategic 
Concept five times in the past and never once had required the Senate's 
advice and consent. Doing so now would gravely undermine NATO's 
alliance and our efforts, as well as being a significant overreach in 
terms of our constitutional authority.
  Let's not be fooled by the fact that the Roberts-Warner amendment 
only expresses the sense of the Senate. My concern is that unless we 
know exactly its dimension, it will be read in other NATO capitals as 
much more than it is. Just as my friend from Kansas quoted from the 
headlines and editorials of other newspapers--I might note that they 
were not governments, but other newspapers--I point out that people in 
other countries can misread actions taken by a country or group of 
countries. My concern is that in NATO capitals our actions will be 
misread.
  The amendment sets out political criteria in point 1; and then in 
point 2 transforms them into legally binding ones that would require 
the Senate's advice and consent. This is a clever use of a non 
sequitur.
  NATO's Strategic Concept has always given political guidance to the 
alliance's members. To that extent, this sixth revision of the 
Strategic Concept imposes commitments. But contrary to the assertions 
made by my distinguished friend from Kansas, it in no way changes the 
fundamental purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.
  We should oppose this amendment for four reasons, but if we are not 
going to oppose it now that it has been changed from its original 
amendment, we should at least recognize four important points:
  One, to suggest that--if it were to be suggested--the Strategic 
Concept should be treated as an amendment to the treaty would set a 
terrible precedent and send a horrible signal at a time when we are 
striving to maintain alliance unity.
  It would signal our NATO allies that the United States will not 
implement the new Strategic Concept without formal Senate advice and 
consent.
  If we pass this amendment, couldn't the British, French, or Germans 
say tomorrow that they are going to disregard NATO's operating 
procedures? Couldn't they say tomorrow that they are no longer going to 
be bound by their commitment to beef up their military capacity as they 
committed to in 1991?
  Given that NATO's decisions require unanimity, and that all 19 NATO 
member parliaments might then assert that they would have to ratify 
each and every future change in an operating procedure, we would be 
building in chaos to the alliance. How could we operate under those 
circumstances?
  The second point I want to make is that we should remember that there 
have been many other changes in the Strategic Concept, as my friend 
from Michigan has pointed out, and they were never considered the 
equivalent of a new international treaty.
  As I mentioned, before this year, NATO's original 1949 Strategic 
Concept had been revised five other times. Included among those were 
three fundamental transformations.
  In 1957, the alliance adopted a new strategy, which would have 
shocked my friend from Kansas. It was called Massive Retaliation. Talk 
about a commitment--a commitment that was,

[[Page 10704]]

I might add, totally consistent with the provisions of the treaty. It 
was an operating procedure.
  In 1967, NATO abandoned the doctrine of Massive Retaliation in favor 
of the doctrine of Flexible Response. And then, in 1991, to continue to 
make the treaty relevant operationally, NATO recognized that after the 
end of the Soviet threat, NATO would nonetheless be confronted by a 
series of new threats to the alliance's security, such as ethnic 
rivalries and territorial disputes. It altered the Strategic Concept 
accordingly.
  These were dramatic changes to alliance strategy, yet not once did 
the Senate, notwithstanding the fact it was not asleep, believe it had 
to provide its advice and consent.
  There was a great deal of discussion about the 1991 Strategic 
Concept. I participated in it, others participated in it, and it 
revolved around what was the purpose of NATO and how we were 
operationally going to function now that the worry was no longer having 
50 Soviet divisions coming through the Fulda Gap in Germany--a 
recognition that the territorial integrity of member states was still 
threatened, and instead of Soviet divisions rolling through the Fulda 
Gap with Warsaw Pact allies, there was a different threat, nonetheless 
real, nonetheless warranting this mutual commitment made to defend the 
territorial integrity of member states.
  We discussed it. We debated it. There were those who thought it 
didn't go far enough. There are those who thought it went too far. But 
it wasn't that we were asleep and didn't pay attention. In fact, maybe 
it was because--and I am not being facetious--my friend was in the 
House where they don't deal with treaties, where it is not their 
constitutional obligation, and where foreign policy is not the thing 
they spend the bulk of their time on. But we weren't asleep over here. 
In fact, the current 1999 version of the Strategic Concept is much more 
similar to its 1991 predecessor than the 1991 document was to any of 
its predecessors.
  My third point is simple. The revised Strategic Concept does not 
require advice and consent because it is not a treaty.
  The rules under U.S. law on what constitutes a binding international 
agreement are set forth in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States, as well as in the State Department regulations 
implementing the Case-Zablocki Act.
  Under the Restatement, the key criterion as to whether an 
international agreement is legally binding is if the parties intend 
that it be legally binding and governed by international law. 
(Restatement, Sec. 301(1)).
  Similarly, the State Department regulations state that the ``parties 
must intend their undertaking to be legally binding and not merely of 
political or personal effect.'' (22 Code of Federal Regulations 
Sec. 181.2(a)(1)).
  Thus, many agreements that are not binding are essentially political 
statements. There is a moral and political obligation to comply in such 
cases, but not a legal one.
  The most well-known example of such a political statement is the 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975, negotiated under the Ford administration 
and credited by most of us as the beginning of the end of the Soviet 
Union, the most significant political act that began to tear the Berlin 
Wall down. That was a political statement--commitments we made, but not 
of treaty scope requiring the advice and consent of the Senate.
  The second key criterion is whether an international agreement 
contains language that clearly and specifically describe the 
obligations that are to be undertaken.
  An international agreement must have objective criteria for 
determining the enforceability of the agreement. (22 C.F.R. 
Sec. 181.2(a)(3)).
  Another criterion is the form of the agreement. That is, a formal 
document labeled ``Agreement'' with final clauses about the procedures 
for entry into force is probably a binding agreement. This is not a 
central requirement, but it does provide another indication that an 
agreement is binding. (22 C.F.R. Sec. 181.2(a)(5)).
  A reading of the Strategic Concept clearly indicates that it is not a 
binding instrument of which treaties are made.
  Rather, the Strategic Concept is merely a political statement with 
which my colleague from Kansas and others disagree. I respect that. I 
respect their disagreement with the political commitment that was made. 
But their political disagreement with a political commitment does not 
cause it to rise to the level of a binding treaty obligation requiring 
the advice and consent of the Senate, no matter how important each of 
them may be, no matter how relevant their objectives may be, no matter 
how enlightened their foreign policy may be.
  Rather, the Strategic Concept is merely a political statement that 
outlines NATO's military and political strategy for carrying out the 
obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty.
  Nowhere in the Strategic Concept can you find binding obligations 
upon the members of NATO.
  For, if that were the case, all of our European allies as of a year 
ago, with the exception of Great Britain, would have been in violation 
of their treaty obligations--would have been in violation of their 
treaty obligations because of the commitments they made to build up--I 
will not bore the Senate with the details--their military capacity. Yet 
no one here on the floor has risen to suggest over the past several 
years, even though we have decried their failure to meet their 
obligations, that they have violated their treaty obligations.
  Instead, the language of the Strategic Concept contains general 
statements about how NATO will carry out its mission.
  The most important question, as I stated, is the intent of the 
parties. As the President wrote to the Chairman of the Committee on 
Armed Services on April 14, ``the Strategic Concept will not contain 
new commitments or obligations for the United States.''
  Of course, the Strategic Concept creates a political commitment. And 
we take our political commitments seriously.
  All member states, the United States included, assume political 
obligations when they take part in the alliance's integrated military 
planning.
  That is what target force goals are all about. And, Mr. President, 
that lies at the heart of burden-sharing, whose importance several of 
us continually stress to our NATO allies.
  The 1999 Strategic Concept creates a planning framework for NATO to 
act collectively to meet new threats if they arise.
  So I would summarize the key point in this way: the Strategic Concept 
imposes political obligations to create military capabilities, but it 
does not impose legal obligations to use those capabilities.
  My fourth point is that I understand the concern that NATO's core 
mission--alliance defense--not be altered. It has not been.
  Our negotiators at last month's NATO summit did exactly what the vast 
majority of Senators wanted.
  They consciously incorporated the Senate's concerns that NATO remain 
a defensive alliance when they negotiated the revised Strategic 
Concept.
  The revised Strategic Concept duplicates much of the language 
contained in the Kyl amendment to the Resolution of Ratification on 
NATO Enlargement.
  You all remember the Kyl amendment. We were not asleep at the switch. 
We were not failing to pay attention. We debated at length--my friend 
from Virginia, and I, and others--NATO enlargement. It is one of the 
few areas on which we have disagreed.
  We debated at length the Kyl amendment. Let me remind my colleagues 
that the amendment was adopted by the Senate in April of 1998 by a 90-9 
vote.
  Rather than reviewing the specifics of the document, because time 
does not permit, nor do I think memories have to be refreshed that 
clearly, because everyone remembers, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
allowed to enter into the Record a document provided by

[[Page 10705]]

the Clinton administration that reviews paragraph by paragraph the 
similarities between the Kyl amendment and the 1999 Strategic Concept.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

          The Kyl Amendment and the Strategic Concept of NATO

(Document drafted for Assistant Secretary of the State Marc Grossman on 
 April 29, 1999 and handed out by Secretary Grossman to Members of the 
                         Senate on May 5, 1999)

       Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Marc Grossman in 
     SFRC testimony on April 21: ``During the NATO enlargement 
     debate some 90 Senators led by Senator Kyl passed an 
     amendment laying out clear criteria for NATO's updated 
     Strategic Concept. We heard your message and made the 
     criteria established by Senator Kyl our own.''
       Language from the Kyl Amendment: ``The Senate understands 
     that the policy of the United States is that the core 
     concepts contained in the 1991 Strategic Concept of NATO, 
     which adapted NATO's strategy to the post-Cold War 
     environment, remain valid today, and that the upcoming 
     revision of that document will reflect the following 
     principles:''


               I. First and foremost, a military Alliance

       Strategic Concept Paragraph 6: ``. . . safeguard freedom 
     and security . . . by political and military means.''
       SC Para 25: ``. . . a broad approach to security which 
     recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and 
     environmental factors in addition to the indispensable 
     defense dimension.''


       II. Principal foundation for defense of security interests

       SC Para 4: ``. . . must safeguard common security interests 
     in an environment of further, often unpredictable change.''
       SC Para 8: ``. . . the Alliance enables them through 
     collective effort to realize their essential national 
     security objectives.''
       SC Para 25: ``NATO remains the essential forum for 
     consultation . . . and agreement on policies bearing on 
     security and defense commitments . . .''


   III. Strong U.S. leadership promotes/protects U.S. vital security 
                               interests

       SC Para 27: ``. . . a strong and dynamic partnership 
     between Europe and North America . . .''


   IV. U.S. leadership role through stationing forces in Europe, key 
                               commanders

       SC Para 42: ``presence of US conventional and nuclear 
     forces in Europe remains vital . . .''
       SC Para 62: ``. . . supreme guarantee of the security of 
     Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the 
     Alliance, particularly those of U.S.''


                           V. Common threats

       a. potential re-emergence of hegemonic power.
       SC Para 20: ``. . . large-scale conventional threat is 
     highly unlikely, but the possibility of such a threat 
     emerging exists.''
       b. rogue states and non-state actors with WMD.
       SC Para 22: ``. . . can pose a direct military threat to 
     Allies' populations, territory, and forces.''
       c. wider nature, including disruption of flow of vital 
     resources, other transnational threats.
       SC Para 24: ``. . . of a wider nature, including acts of 
     terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the 
     disruption of the flow of vital resources.''
       d. conflict stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, 
     historic disputes, undemocratic leaders.
       SC Para 20: ``Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial 
     disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse 
     of human rights, and the dissolution of states . . .''


                 vi. core mission is collective defense

       SC Para 27: ``. . . Alliance's commitment to the 
     indispensable transatlantic link and the collective defense 
     of its members is fundamental to its credibility and to the 
     security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.''
       SC Para 28: ``The maintenance of an adequate military 
     capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the 
     common defense remain central to the Alliance's security 
     objectives.''


               vii. capacity to respond to common threats

       SC Para 52: ``The size, readiness, availability and 
     deployment of the Alliances military forces will reflect its 
     commitment to collective defense and to conduct crisis 
     response operations, sometimes at short notice, distance from 
     home stations . . .''
       SC Para 52: ``They must be interoperable and . . . must be 
     held at the required readiness and deployability, and be 
     capable of . . . complex joint and combined operations, which 
     may also include Partners and other non-NATO nations.''


   viii. integrated military structure: cooperative defense planning

       SC Para 43: ``. . . practical arrangements . . . based on . 
     . . an integrated military structure . . . include collective 
     force planning, common funding, common operational planning . 
     . .''


  ix. nuclear posture: an essential contribution to deter aggression; 
U.S. nuclear forces in europe; essential link between europe and north 
            america ensure uncertainty in mind of aggressor

       SC Para 42: ``presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear 
     forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, 
     which is inseparably linked to that of North America.''
       SC Para 46: ``. . . remain essential to preserve peace.''
       SC Para 62: ``. . . fulfill an essential role by ensuring 
     uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor . . .''


  x. burdensharing: shared responsibility for financing and defending

       SC Para 30: ``. . . Allies have taken decisions to enable 
     them to assume greater responsibilities . . .;'' will enable 
     all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective 
     contribution to the missions . . . of the Alliance;'' ``. . . 
     will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as 
     required.''
       SC Para 42: ``The achievement of Alliance's aims depends 
     critically on the equitable sharing of the roles, risks and 
     responsibilities . . . of common defense.''

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me also remind my colleagues that 
NATO's decisions require unanimity. I know we all know that. We got 
that unanimity at a recent Washington summit after long and tough 
negotiations.
  By appearing to withhold U.S. support for the revised Strategic 
Concept--and perhaps eventually even blocking its implementation--this 
amendment, if misread, would put the alliance in great jeopardy.
  And that could lead to the collapse of NATO, which I am sure is not 
the goal of my colleague from Kansas.
  One final comment. I know that my friend from Kansas is strongly 
opposed to the conduct of the current war in Yugoslavia, and, while 
disagreeing with him, I respect his views.
  But, I would remind him and the rest of my colleagues that the 1999 
revision of the Strategic Concept is neither the justification for, nor 
the driving force behind, NATO's bombing campaign or actions in Kosovo.
  NATO's bombing campaign began a full month before the newest revision 
of the Strategic Concept was approved at the Washington Summit.
  To sum up, there are no compelling political or legal arguments for 
the Roberts amendment. in terms of making this concept subject to 
treaty amendment.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in voting against this amendment.
  I yield the floor. I thank my colleagues.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, might I inquire of the distinguished 
acting Presiding Officer how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Five minutes.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Presiding Officer.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from 
Oklahoma, Mr. Inhofe, be added as an original cosponsor of the Roberts 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from 
Colorado, my friend and colleague, 3 minutes of the remaining time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. I thank the Senator from Kansas for yielding.
  I ask unanimous consent that I be made a cosponsor of the Roberts 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Doug Flanders 
of my staff have floor privileges during the entire debate on the 
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1999.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the Roberts 
amendment. The reason I do that is I think that the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, which we refer to as NATO in this debate, is 
suffering from mission creep. I look at what has happened with the 
Strategic Concept in 1991. I look at the passing of the 1999 new 
Strategic Concept, and I think it becomes clear how mission creep is 
moving in.

[[Page 10706]]

  In 1991, NATO established a new Strategic Concept which altered the 
concept dramatically from the original treaty. It allowed for more 
flexibility in the ability to get into a wide range of military 
operations. However, I add that it did maintain in part 4, under 
Guidelines for Defense, entitled ``Principle of Alliance Strategy''--I 
want to quote specifically from that Strategic Concept.

       The alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of 
     fundamental principles. The alliance--

  And this is underlined--

       The alliance is purely defensive in purpose. None of its 
     weapons will ever be used except in self defense. And it does 
     not consider itself to be anyone's adversary.

  Then, if we look at the 1999 new Strategic Concept, it still says 
that their core purpose is the collective defense of NATO members. It 
adds that NATO:

       . . . should contribute to peace and stability in the 
     region.

  But, while a lot of the debate here on the floor has been about what 
does the Concept say, the important point I want to make here is what 
is important is what it does not say. In the 1999 new Strategic 
Concept, there is no mention that the alliance will never use its 
weapons except in self-defense. So, in 1991 the new Strategic Concept 
said the alliance was purely defensive in purpose. In 1999, there is no 
mention that the alliance will never use its weapons other than in 
self-defense.
  I think that is a real important distinction. That is why I think it 
is so important we have a debate on the mission of NATO.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. The Chair 
recognizes the Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I compliment my colleague from Kansas for 
this amendment. I know there are additional speakers--on this side, at 
least--who desire to speak on it, so I ask unanimous consent both sides 
have an additional 8 minutes to speak on this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, will my colleague yield 3 minutes?
  Mr. ROBERTS. I am delighted to yield my distinguished colleague and 
friend 3 minutes.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for this amendment. I 
think this is a very important amendment. I wish we would debate it at 
much greater length, because I am afraid, from some of the things I 
have read, from comments made by the President of the United States, 
that he is expanding NATO's role, commitment, obligation, frankly, far 
beyond the treaty we have signed, which has been so successful, the 
50th anniversary of which we commemorated this year.
  I look at the President's statement he made on May 27, 1997. He did 
this in concert with French President Chirac and Russian President 
Yeltsin in France. He stated:

       In turn, we are building a new NATO. It will remain the 
     strongest alliance in history, with smaller, more flexible 
     forces, prepared to provide for our defense, but also trained 
     for peacekeeping.

  He goes on, and I will just read the last sentence:

       It will be an alliance directed no longer against a hostile 
     bloc of nations, but instead designed to advance the security 
     of every democracy in Europe--NATO's old members, new 
     members, and non-members alike.

  A couple of days later he made a speech at the United States Military 
Academy, a commencement speech at West Point, May 31, 1997:

       To build and secure a new Europe, peaceful, democratic and 
     undivided at last, there must be a new NATO, with new 
     missions, new members and new partners. We have been building 
     that kind of NATO for the last three years with new partners 
     in the Partnership for Peace and NATO's first out-of-area 
     mission in Bosnia. In Paris last week, we took another giant 
     stride forward when Russia entered a new partnership with 
     NATO, choosing cooperation over confrontation, as both sides 
     affirmed that the world is different now. European security 
     is no longer a zero-sum contest between Russia and NATO; but 
     a cherished, common goal.

  Clearly, President Clinton is trying to redefine NATO's mission far 
beyond a defensive alliance, as our colleague from Kansas pointed out. 
The purpose in the charter of NATO under article 5 was a defensive 
alliance. Now he is expanding it to include nonmembers. He is including 
out-of-area conflicts. He includes ethnic conflicts or trying to 
resolve ethnic conflicts. I think, clearly, if he is going to do so, he 
needs to rewrite the NATO charter and submit that as a treaty to the 
Senate for its ratification.
  So I compliment my colleague for this amendment. I think it is one of 
the most important amendments we will consider on this bill. I urge my 
colleagues to vote in favor of the Roberts amendment, and I thank him 
for his leadership.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, how much time do we have remaining now?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator controls 7 minutes.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Sessions be added as an original cosponsor of the Roberts amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I yield the distinguished Senator 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Kansas for 
bringing forward a very critical amendment. I spent 17 years as a U.S. 
attorney or assistant U.S. attorney, representing the United States in 
court. I am looking at the legal implications of this amendment as a 
lawyer for the United States.
  What we are doing here is very, very historic. This Congress has 
ratified a defensive treaty. We are moving into a new world. We are 
looking at an entirely different approach to life, and the President is 
unilaterally expanding the commitments of this Nation under the guise 
of a new NATO that is involved in new missions, as the Senator from 
Oklahoma has just noted; committing us solemnly with the same depth of 
commitment that we put our lives, our fortunes, and our honor to 
preserve the integrity of democracy against totalitarian communism for 
all of these years.
  That is what is being asked here. To have that done without full 
debate and full approval of this Congress is astounding and would 
represent a major legal erosion of the powers of the Senate and the 
Congress, particularly the Senate, to review these matters. So I cannot 
express too strongly how important it is this Senate reassert its 
historic responsibility to advise and consent to involvement in these 
kind of foreign policies.
  Once the President commits us, we pay for it. Right now this action 
in Kosovo amounts to 19 NATO nations meeting and deciding how to deploy 
the U.S. Air Force. We are paying for this war in their own backyard, 
and they are voting on how to conduct it. We simply have to get a 
better grip on it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 2 minutes have expired.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I thank the Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I ask my colleague whether I could have 10 seconds to 
have some fellows granted the privilege of the floor? They have been 
waiting outside. May I do that without taking anybody's time?
  Mr. ROBERTS. Certainly.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Ben 
Highton, Rachel Gragg, John Bradshaw, and Michelle Vidovic, who are 
fellows, be granted the privilege of the floor for the duration of the 
consideration of this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I know the Senator from Delaware, the 
Senator from Alabama, and others have been talking about the legal 
ramifications of what this amendment is all about. You can study the 
sections and subsections and sub-subsections and quote all of these 
things, but I think we all know this was an alliance that was set up to 
be a defensive alliance. Now we are getting into something that is far 
more than that.
  But I would put out two things that have not been said. First of all, 
I just

[[Page 10707]]

came back from the Canada-United States interparliamentarian meeting up 
there. It is very clear to me they are involved in this, with a very 
modest contribution, only because we are in there. I wonder how many 
other of these countries are getting involved because we are providing 
that leadership.
  No. 2, my concern about this is not a legalistic concern. It is what 
effect is this having on our state of readiness. I happen to be 
chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee. This is what is very 
frightening. We can remember in this Chamber in 1994, in 1995, talking 
about Bosnia; we were going to be sending people over to Bosnia. What 
was the main argument used? We have to protect the integrity of NATO. 
Then we have the same thing coming up on Kosovo. It has come up in 
other places, too.
  These are areas where we do not have national strategic interests. 
What it has done is to put us in a position where we cannot carry out 
the minimum expectations of the American people or our national 
military strategy, which is to defend America on two fronts.
  I want to tell you how proud I was of General Hawley the other day, 
Air Combat Command, who came out and said we, right now, are not in a 
position to respond if we should be called upon to respond in areas 
where we do have a national strategic interest such as North Korea or 
the Persian Gulf.
  It is very, very important that we get to the bottom of this and we 
make a determination as to what our future commitments are going to be 
as far as NATO is concerned.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. The Senator 
from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe this debate is taking on 
excellent participation. I think we can allocate another 10 minutes to 
both sides--10 minutes under the control of the Senator from Kansas and 
10 minutes under the control of my distinguished colleague from 
Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, and I do not plan to 
object, I wonder if the Chair can inform us as to how much time is 
remaining on both sides under the previous extension.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Almost 3 minutes on this side and 8 minutes on 
the side of the Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I want to protect the rights of the Senator from Minnesota 
who has been waiting.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to my colleague, this is an 
important debate. I agree with both of the managers. We should go on 
with the debate. I ask the question whether or not I may bring this 
amendment up after the caucuses or speak for a while but then have some 
time later.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I can address that and make a suggestion. 
On this side, we are prepared to accept the third amendment. I suggest 
perhaps at the hour of 12:25, the distinguished ranking member and I 
and Mr. Wellstone can address the three amendments and conclude them 
before the caucus. Will that be convenient?
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I say to my colleague, I thank him for two of the 
amendments. I am committed to having a rollcall vote on the welfare 
tracking amendment, so that would not work out for me. I am pleased to 
go on with this debate, and I will come back later.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Will the distinguished Senator yield?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this is the first time we have known of 
the Senator's desire to have a rollcall vote on the third amendment. We 
are prepared to accept it.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from Virginia, I 
appreciate working with him on the other amendments. I have been down 
this path before with voice votes and then it is out in conference. I 
am committed to having a debate and vote on this. I am sorry my 
colleague is surprised by this. I am more than willing to wait. I think 
this debate is very important. I will come back later and do this.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want the opportunity to consult with the 
chairman of the committee that has jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of the third amendment and with the majority leader and presumably the 
minority leader, and set a time for the rollcall vote, which the 
Senator is entitled to have. For the moment, we are prepared to accept 
the two amendments and then allow the debate----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the time is set for 
the Wellstone amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. On the two amendments from Senator Wellstone.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if the chairman will yield, may I make a 
suggestion that after we conclude the debate on the pending amendment, 
we immediately proceed to the first of the two Wellstone amendments, 
accept those before lunch, and then determine at that time whether to 
conclude the debate on the third. In any event, the rollcall vote on 
the third amendment will have to come after lunch under the existing 
unanimous consent agreement.
  Mr. ROBERTS. If the Senator will yield, basically how much additional 
time to the time we have left has the Senator asked for? I am not sure 
there are any more Members who want to speak on the minority side. I 
can wrap up in 5 minutes or less. I am adding cosponsors every minute, 
so I am happy to stay here for a while.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, for the purpose of the party caucuses, we 
hope to complete all debate on the underlying amendment circa 12:30, 
which is roughly a half hour. I wish to speak a few more minutes on the 
amendment offered by the Senator from Kansas, as does the ranking 
member.
  My suggestion is, if possible, while Senator Wellstone is on the 
floor, do the voice voting of his two amendments, reserving, of course, 
scheduling the third, and then we can continue with this debate. It 
will not take but a minute on the two voice votes on the two Wellstone 
amendments.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I have no problem.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. WARNER. We have not put it in the form of a unanimous consent 
request.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I apologize. I was in a discussion with 
the staff on the majority side. What are we talking about here?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the suggestion was we immediately take up 
the two Wellstone amendments that we are going to voice vote, then go 
back to the Roberts amendment, and then come back to the third 
amendment afterwards.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. That will be fine with me.


                     Amendment No. 381, As Modified

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, first, on amendment No. 381, I send a 
modification to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified.
  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:

       On page 83, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:

     SEC. 329. PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TO THE PUBLIC 
                   REGARDING ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION AT U.S. 
                   MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FORMERLY OPERATED BY THE 
                   UNITED STATES THAT HAVE BEEN CLOSED.

       (a)(1) Requirement To Provide Information and Guidance.--
     The Secretary of Defense shall publicly disclose existing, 
     available information relevant to a foreign nation's 
     determination of the nature and extent of environmental 
     contamination, if any, at a site in that foreign nation where 
     the United States operated a military base, installation, and 
     facility that has been closed as of the date of enactment of 
     this Act.
       (2) Congressional list.--Not later than September 30, 2000, 
     the Secretary of Defense shall provide Congress a list of 
     information made public pursuant to paragraph (1).
       (b) Limitation.--The requirement to provide information and 
     guidance under subsection (a) may not be construed to 
     establish on the part of the United States any liability or 
     obligation for the costs of environmental restoration or 
     remediation at any site referred to in subsection (a).
       (c) National Security.--Information the Secretary of 
     Defense believes could adversely affect U.S. National 
     Security shall not be released pursuant to this provision.

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I will take a very brief period of time 
on each amendment. Basically what this amendment says is:

       The Secretary of Defense shall publicly disclose existing, 
     available information relative to a foreign nation's 
     determination of

[[Page 10708]]

     the nature and extent of environmental contamination, if any, 
     at a site in that foreign nation where the United States 
     operated a military base, installation, and facility that has 
     been closed as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

  I thank both colleagues, and I really hope these amendments will be 
supported in conference committee.
  To make a long story short, when we leave a country, close our base, 
quite often what happens is that there is some environmental 
contamination. We want to make sure those countries have access to 
information as to the extent of what chemicals or substances are there 
which might pose a danger to their citizens.
  It is a very reasonable amendment. It is important for our foreign 
relations with these countries. I believe it has strong bipartisan 
support. I thank Senator Levin and Senator Warner for their support and 
make the request--I think both Senators will do this--that this be kept 
in conference committee. That is why I do not need a recorded vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. May I seek clarification of our colleague from Minnesota, 
on his third amendment: What number does he designate this being? He 
just mentioned he wanted to send an amendment--
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I thought we were going to do two amendments right 
now: One is on environmental impact when we close bases, and the second 
amendment is on atomic vets, both of which the Senator is prepared to 
accept.
  Mr. WARNER. Correct.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. The third amendment, No. 382, deals with tracking, 
reporting on what is actually happening in the country right now with 
welfare reform.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am familiar with that, and the Senator 
first wishes to amend the text of No. 382?
  Mr. WELLSTONE. No; I just did--
  Mr. WARNER. You just did it.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I modified amendment No. 381.
  Mr. WARNER. Addressing No. 382, what amount of time will the Senator 
require for debate on No. 382?
  Mr. WELLSTONE. The UC provides for an hour equally divided.
  Mr. WARNER. And does the Senator wish to adhere to that previous 
order?
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I say to my colleague, yes, I have been trying to get 
this amendment on the floor for some time. I am talking to a good 
friend, my friend from Virginia, as I make my case. I believe my friend 
from Virginia will agree that this is well worth the focus on the part 
of the Senate.
  Mr. WARNER. I am only addressing procedure.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. One hour equally divided is the UC.
  Mr. WARNER. We would like to complete that amendment by 1 o'clock. 
Will the Senator reduce his amount of time? In all likelihood, we will 
yield back the half hour reserved for us, because there is not likely 
to be any opposition.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I am delighted if there is not any 
opposition. If the Senator is going to yield back his time, clearly--I 
do need to go to the caucus, but I would rather not yield back time. I 
will try to shorten my presentation. If there is not a response, so be 
it; we will get a strong vote.
  Mr. WARNER. For the convenience of the Senate, does the Senator think 
he can give us any estimate as to how he can shorten it from a half 
hour down to, say, 10 or 12 minutes?
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I am not going to shorten this 
amendment to 10 or 12 minutes in any way, shape or form, because it is 
too important to have a chance to talk about what is happening to these 
women and children and make sure that we track what is happening.
  Mr. WARNER. I am just seeking to try to accommodate the Senate.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. We should stay with the UC agreement.
  Mr. WARNER. Beg your pardon?
  I have to address the Chair. There is a UC requirement of the 
expenditure of that time prior to the normal weekly recess today at 
12:30?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is.
  Mr. WARNER. This is the dilemma that the Senator from Virginia, the 
manager of the bill has, in that, as drawn, the UC of last night 
requires it to be completed prior to 12:30. So now let's figure out how 
we accommodate the Senate. Perhaps we can move your amendment to some 
point this afternoon, that is, amendment No. 3, when the Senator could 
avail himself of the full 30 minutes, if he so desires.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I would be more than willing --if 
several of my colleagues want to speak on the very important amendment 
that Senator Roberts has offered, I would be willing to bring my 
amendment up right after the caucuses and go to it right then.
  Mr. WARNER. If I may say, Mr. President, right after our caucuses are 
votes on other amendments, including Senator Roberts' amendment.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. After we have those votes then I would bring the 
amendment up.
  Mr. WARNER. I will need to check other commitments we made with 
regard to time. I will work on it and come back in a minute or two and 
clarify this.
  In the meantime, if we can proceed with the Roberts amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. ROBERTS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Kansas.


                     Amendment No. 377, As Modified

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I inquire, after all that, how much time 
do we have remaining on either side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three minutes on the Senator's side; 8 minutes 
on the other side.
  Mr. ROBERTS. But was there a request by unanimous consent that either 
party wanted some additional time? The minority has 8 minutes 
remaining; is that not correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Does the chairman want to speak on this? Is that 
correct? You wish to speak on the Roberts amendment?
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct, for about 3 minutes, in support.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I can get my remarks done in 5, so I ask unanimous 
consent that we add 8 minutes, along with the other 8 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Bingaman of New Mexico be added as a cosponsor of the Roberts 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I yield the distinguished chairman--what was the 
request, Mr. Chairman, 3 minutes, 5 minutes?
  Mr. WARNER. I would suggest that we try to conclude the Roberts 
amendment in 5 or 10 minutes. Then we will proceed to the Wellstone 
amendment, and then we can adhere to the time agreements.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I ask the distinguished chairman, how much time would 
the distinguished chairman like?
  Mr. WARNER. Just 2 minutes.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I yield the distinguished Senator 2 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to address the document that was 
submitted to the Senate by the Senator from Delaware entitled: The Kyl 
Amendment and the Strategic Concept of NATO. I went back and asked the 
Senator from Delaware to clarify the date, time, group, and when it was 
prepared and submitted to the Senate. He is doing that.
  But I just wish to draw the attention to the Senate, as I read this 
document--and I have seen it before--it simply refers to those portions 
in the Kyl amendment that were incorporated into the final draft of the 
Strategic Concept. But it does not, on its face, nor do I believe it 
was intended to, say that it covered everything by the new Strategic 
Concept.
  Indeed, I agree with the Senator from Kansas this document in no way 
is intended to represent that it encompasses all of the new Strategic 
Concept. The Senator from Kansas is quite

[[Page 10709]]

properly pointing out there are those of us--the Senator from Kansas, 
myself, and others--who feel the Strategic Concept went beyond the Kyl 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Might I inquire of my distinguished friend from Michigan 
if he, the minority, seeks any additional time?
  Mr. LEVIN. We are just using about 3 of our 8 minutes.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I would be happy if the Senator would like to proceed at 
this time. I would like to close, if that is all right.
  Mr. LEVIN. Sure.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support this amendment for the reasons 
previously given. It does not reach any conclusion as to whether there 
are any additional obligations upon the United States. Unlike earlier 
versions, it simply asks the President to certify whether or not there 
are additional obligations imposed on the United States.
  I have read from what was called then the new Strategic Concept of 
NATO in 1991. At the heading of that Concept, it was stated that:

       The alliance recognizes that developments taking place in 
     Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which 
     its aims would be met in the future.

  And, indeed, adopted language such as:

       Alliance security must also take into account the global 
     context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other 
     risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction, disruption of flow of vital resources, 
     actions of terrorism and sabotage.

  That did not impose any new obligations. It is very broad language.
  Listen to some of this language in this 1991 alliance new Strategic 
Concept:

       The primary role of the alliance military forces to 
     guarantee security and territorial integrity of member states 
     remains unchanged [we said in 1991]. But this role must take 
     account of the new strategic environment in which a single 
     massive and global threat has given way to diverse and 
     multidirectional risks. Allied forces have different 
     functions to perform in peace, crises, and war.

  That is section 40 in 1991.
  How about this one, section 41:

       Allies could be called upon to contribute to global 
     stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations 
     missions.

  How about that for a mission in 1991? Did that impose an obligation 
on us, legal obligation on this body, or on this Nation? Boy, I hope 
not. Not in my book it did not.

       Allies could be called upon to contribute to global 
     stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations 
     missions.

  This was adopted in 1991 as a new Strategic Concept. That did not 
impose a thing on us. It was a new Strategic Concept adopted by NATO, 
not a legally binding commitment on the alliance.
  It was not submitted to us then as a treaty change because it was not 
a treaty change, nor is this new Strategic Concept of 1999 legally 
binding upon us any more than the 1991 Strategic Concept was.
  So I think we ought to adopt this amendment. It is something which is 
highly appropriate to ask the President whether or not the new 
Strategic Concept of NATO imposes any new commitment or obligation on 
the United States, the key word there to me being ``imposes.''
  I ask, Mr. President, before I yield the floor, that the yeas and 
nays be ordered on this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the privileges 
of the floor be granted to the following Pearson Fellow on the staff of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, Joan Wadelton, during the pendency of 
the Department of Defense Authorization legislation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
  Again, I will be supporting this amendment.
  Mr. ROBERTS. With the debate we have had on the floor, although there 
is support--and the better part of judgment would be for me to simply 
yield the floor--we will try to split the shingle one more time. The 
debate is centered around whether or not the new Strategic Concept 
adopted at the 50th anniversary of NATO is legally binding, a treaty, 
or different from the 1991 Concept, let alone the 1949 Concept.
  Let me just say that the 1991 document really stressed that--as a 
matter of fact, it assured--no NATO weaponry will ever be used 
offensively. We are sure doing that now in regard to Kosovo. In 
addition, in terms of the 19 parties who met in Washington, I am sure 
that each one of them certainly thought it was binding. And if the men 
and women in the uniform of all our allies do not think it is binding, 
I think they had better look for a new definition.
  I believe any document that contains even tacit commitment by the 
United States and other nations to engage in new types of NATO 
missions--and let me simply say that these missions are now described 
as problems with drugs, problems with social progress, with reform, 
with ethnic strife; about the only thing that is not in there is don't 
put gum in the water fountain--outside the domain of the original 
treaty, as well as a commitment to structure military forces 
accordingly, can be considered an international agreement.
  I refer again to the U.S. Department of State Circular 175, the 
Procedure on Treaties, that sets forth eight considerations available 
for determining whether or not an agreement or an accord should be 
submitted to the Senate for ratification. Four of them I will repeat 
again: The extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks 
affecting the Nation as a whole--if Kosovo is not a risk, I do not know 
what is--whether the agreement can be given effect without the 
enactment of subsequent legislation by the Congress; past U.S. 
practices as to similar agreements; the preference of Congress as to a 
particular type of agreement.
  It seems to me, if I recall the debate and the two copies of the 
original 1949 document, and then the Strategic Concept document, No. 1, 
they said no offensive weapons. No. 2, they said we are going to stay 
within our borders and we will meet with you before we go outside the 
borders and go wandering in the territory of a sovereign nation. Then 
lastly, we are going to consult with the U.N. It is going to be in 
cooperation with the U.N. All that is different.
  I think to say that it is not different in regard to 1991 is simply 
not accurate.
  I don't know. I suppose per se, legally--I am not a lawyer--that this 
Strategic Concept is not a treaty. But it sure walks like a treaty duck 
and it quacks like a treaty duck and it is wandering into different 
areas like a treaty duck. In the quacking and the walking, it is 
causing a lot of problems.
  I simply say, in closing, I do respect the Senator from Michigan and 
his support and the Senator from Delaware for his accommodating my 
amendment. It is true that the Senator from Delaware said that I was in 
the House of Representatives, the other body, what Senator Byrd refers 
to as the lower body. In 1990 we were not asleep. We were not asleep at 
all. We admired the Senator from Delaware from afar. We were 
spellbound, as a matter of fact, by his oratorical skills, his 
sartorial splendor, and his ability to be heard above all in the 
Senate, regardless of whether the acoustical system was working or not. 
So I thank the Senator from Delaware for his comments.
  I urge Senators to support this amendment and send a strong message 
that we are adhering to our constitutional right when we change an 
agreement that in effect directly affects the lives of our American men 
and women and our national security, that the Senate stepped up to the 
plate.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back. Under the 
previous order, the Roberts-Warner

[[Page 10710]]

amendment No. 377 will be temporarily laid aside.
  Mr. WARNER. And the vote will occur, Mr. President, if you continue 
to read the order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The vote will occur after the Roth amendment 
at 2:15.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
  Now, Mr. President, we are ready to receive the comments under the 
standing order for the day from our distinguished colleague from 
Minnesota. These comments will be relative to what I call the third 
amendment, No. 382. Perhaps we could take this time to vote the first 
two by voice.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, besides the environmental assessment 
amendment, the second amendment we are taking deals with atomic vets--
is that correct--compensation for atomic vets? I am pleased to do so, 
and I thank both my colleagues for their help and comments.
  Mr. WARNER. We are happy to be of accommodation. Would the Senator 
urge the adoption of the two amendments?
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I urge the adoption of the two amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the two amendments are 
agreed to.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. These are amendments Nos. 380 and 383?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendments 380 and 381.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I am sorry, 380 and 381.
  Mr. LEVIN. As modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. As modified.
  The amendments (No. 380 and No. 381), as modified, were agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 380

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on an amendment I 
offered that would remove some of the frustrating and infuriating 
obstacles that have too often kept veterans who were exposed to 
radiation during military service from getting the disability 
compensation they deserve. This amendment would add three radiogenic 
conditions to the list of presumptively service-connected diseases for 
which atomic veterans may receive VA compensation, specifically: lung 
cancer; colon cancer; and tumors of the brain and central nervous 
system. It is based on a bill I introduced during the last Congress, S. 
1385, the Justice for Atomic Veterans Act.
  At the outset, let me say that this amendment was accepted and 
adopted by the Senate just a few months ago as a part of S. 4, the 
Soldiers', Sailors', Airmen's, and Marines' Bill of Rights Act of 1999. 
Because that bill appears to be dead on arrival in the House, I am 
offering it on the Defense Authorization bill. I think this amendment 
was relevant to S. 4 and it is certainly relevant to this bill. But I 
mention the history of this amendment to my colleagues in the belief 
that what was acceptable to the Senate three months ago will be 
acceptable today.
  I want to explain why this amendment is topical to the Defense 
Authorization bill. I believe that the way we treat our veterans does 
send an important message to young people considering service in the 
military. When veterans of the Persian Gulf War don't get the kind of 
treatment they deserve, when the VA health care budget loses out year 
after year to other budget priorities, when veterans benefits claims 
take years and years to resolve, what is the message we are sending to 
future recruits?
  How can we attract and retain young people in the service when our 
government fails to honor its obligation to provide just compensation 
and health care for those injured during service?
  One of the most outrageous examples of our government's failure to 
honor its obligations to veterans involves ``atomic veterans,'' 
patriotic Americans who were exposed to radiation at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki and at atmospheric nuclear tests.
  For more than 50 years, many of them have been denied compensation 
for diseases that the VA recognizes as being linked to their exposure 
to radiation--diseases known as radiogenic diseases. Many of these 
diseases are lethal forms of cancers.
  I received my first introduction to the plight of atomic veterans 
from some first-rate mentors, the members of the Forgotten 216th. The 
Forgotten 216th was the 216th Chemical Service Company of the U.S. 
Army, which participated in Operation Tumbler Snapper. Operation 
Tumbler Snapper was a series of eight atmospheric nuclear weapons tests 
in the Nevada desert in 1952.
  About half of the members of the 216th were Minnesotans. What I've 
learned from them, from other atomic veterans, and from their survivors 
has shaped my views on this issue.
  Five years ago, the Forgotten 216th contacted me after then-Secretary 
of Energy O'Leary announced that the U.S. Government had conducted 
radiation experiments on its own citizens. For the first time in 
public, they revealed what went on during the Nevada tests and the 
tragedies and trauma that they, their families, and their former 
buddies had experienced since then.
  Because their experiences and problems typify those of atomic 
veterans nationwide, I'd like to tell my colleagues a little more about 
the Forgotten 216th. When you hear their story, I think you have to 
agree that the Forgotten 216th and other veterans like them must never 
be forgotten again.
  Members of the 216th were sent to measure fallout at or near ground 
zero immediately after a nuclear blast. They were exposed to so much 
radiation that their Geiger counters went off the scale while they 
inhaled and ingested radioactive particles. They were given minimal or 
no protection. They frequently had no film badges to measure radiation 
exposure. They were given no information on the perils they faced.
  Then they were sworn to secrecy about their participation in nuclear 
tests. They were often denied access to their own service medical 
records. And they were provided no medical follow-up.
  For decades, atomic veterans have been America's most neglected 
veterans. They have been deceived and treated shabbily by the 
government they served so selflessly and unquestioningly.
  If the U.S. Government can't be counted on to honor its obligation to 
these deserving veterans, how can young people interested in military 
service have any confidence that their government will do any better by 
them?
  I believe the neglect of atomic veterans should stop here and now. 
Our government has a long overdue debt to these patriotic Americans, a 
debt that we in the Senate must help to repay. I urge my colleagues on 
both sides of the aisle to help repay this debt by supporting this 
amendment.
  My legislation and this amendment have enjoyed the strong support of 
veterans service organizations. Recently, the Independent Budget for FY 
2000, which is a budget recommendation issued by AMVETS, Disabled 
American Veterans (DAV), Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA), and the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), endorsed adding these radiogenic 
diseases to VA's presumptive service-connected list.
  Let me briefly describe the problem that my amendment is intended to 
address. When atomic veterans try to claim VA compensation for their 
illnesses, VA almost invariably denies their claims. VA tells these 
veterans that their radiation doses were too low--below 5 rems.
  But the fact is, we don't really know that and, even if we did, 
that's no excuse for denying these claims. The result of this 
unrealistic standard is that it is almost impossible for these atomic 
veterans to prove their case. The only solution is to add these 
conditions to the VA presumptive service-connected list, and that's 
what my amendment does.
  First of all, trying to go back and determine the precise dosage each 
of these veterans was exposed to is a futile undertaking. Scientists 
agree that

[[Page 10711]]

the dose reconstruction performed for the VA is notoriously unreliable.
  GAO itself has noted the inherent uncertainties of dose 
reconstruction. Even VA scientific personnel have conceded its 
unreliability. In a memo to VA Secretary Togo West, Under Secretary for 
Health Kenneth Kizer has recommended that the VA reconsider its 
opposition to S. 1385 based, in part, on the unreliability of dose 
reconstruction.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of Dr. Kizer's 
memo be printed in the Record at the end of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  [See exhibit 1.]
  Mr. WELLSTONE. In addition, none of the scientific experts who 
testified at a Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee hearing on S. 1385 on 
April 21, 1998, supported the use of dose reconstruction to determine 
eligibility for VA benefits.
  Let me explain why dose reconstruction is so difficult. Dr. Marty 
Gensler on my staff has researched this issue for over five years, and 
this is what he has found.
  Many atomic veterans were sent to ground zero immediately after a 
nuclear test with no protection, no information on the known dangers 
they faced, no badges or other monitoring equipment, and no medical 
followup.
  As early as 1946, ranking military and civilian personnel responsible 
for nuclear testing anticipated claims for service-connected disability 
and sought to ensure that ``no successful suits could be brought on 
account of radiological hazards.'' That quotation comes from documents 
declassified by the President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation 
Experiments.
  The VA, during this period, maintained classified records 
``essential'' to evaluating atomic veterans' claims, but these records 
were unavailable to veterans themselves.
  Atomic veterans were sworn to secrecy and were denied access to their 
own service and medical records for many years, effectively barring 
pursuit of compensation claims.
  It's partly as a result of these missing or incomplete records that 
so many people have doubts abut the validity of dose reconstructions 
for atomic veterans, some of which are performed more than fifty years 
after exposure.
  Even if these veterans' exposure was less than 5 rems, which is the 
standard used by VA, this standard is not based on uncontested science. 
In 1994, for example, GAO stated: ``A low level dose has been estimated 
to be somewhere below 10 rems [but] it is not known for certain whether 
doses below this level are detrimental to public health.''
  Despite persistent doubts about VA's and DoD's dose reconstruction, 
and despite doubts about the science on which VA's 5 rem standard is 
based, these dose reconstructions are used to bar veterans from 
compensation for disabling radiogenic conditions.
  The effects of this standard have been devastating. A little over two 
years ago the VA estimated that less than 50 claims for non-presumptive 
diseases had been approved out of over 18,000 radiation claims filed.
  Atomic veterans might as well not even bother. Their chances of 
obtaining compensation are negligible.
  It is impossible for many atomic veterans and their survivors to be 
given ``the benefit of the doubt'' by the VA while their claims hinge 
on the dubious accuracy and reliability of dose reconstruction and the 
health effects of exposure to low-level ionizing radiation remain 
uncertain.
  This problem can be fixed. The reason atomic veterans have to go 
through this reconstruction at all is that the diseases listed in my 
amendment are not presumed to be service-connected. That's the real 
problem.
  VA already has a list of service-connected diseases that are presumed 
service-connected, but these are not on it.
  This makes no sense. Scientists agree that there is at least as 
strong a link between radiation exposure and these diseases as there is 
to the other diseases on that VA list.
  You might ask why I've included these three diseases in particular--
lung cancer; colon cancer; and tumors of the brain and central nervous 
system--in my amendment. The reason is very simple. The best, most 
current, scientific evidence available justifies their inclusion. A 
paper entitled ``Risk Estimates for Radiation Exposure'' by John D. 
Boice, Jr., of the National Cancer Institute, published in 1996 as part 
of a larger work called Health Effects of Exposure to Low-Level 
Ionizing Radiation, includes a table which rates human cancers by the 
strength of the evidence linking them to exposure to low levels of 
ionizing radiation. According to this study, the evidence of a link for 
lung cancer is ``very strong''--the highest level of confidence--and 
the evidence of a link for colon and brain and central nervous system 
cancers is ``convincing''--the next highest level of confidence. So I 
believe I can say with a great deal of certainty, Mr. President, that 
science is on the side of this amendment. And I ask unanimous consent 
that a copy of the table I just mentioned be printed in the Record at 
the conclusion of my remarks.
  Last year, the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee reported out a 
version of S. 1385, the Justice for Atomic Veterans Act, which included 
three diseases to be added to the VAs presumptive list. Two of those 
diseases, lung cancer and brain and central nervous system cancer, I 
have included in my amendment. The third disease included in the 
reported bill was ovarian cancer. Mr. President, I'd like to explain 
why I substituted colon cancer for ovarian cancer. It is true that the 
1996 study I just cited states that the evidence of a linkage for 
ovarian cancer to low level ionizing radiation is ``convincing,'' just 
as it is for colon cancer. But Mr. President, there are no female 
atomic veterans. The effect of creating a presumption of service 
connection for ovarian cancer is basically no effect--because no one 
could take advantage of it. However, the impact of adding colon cancer 
as a presumption for atomic veterans is significant; atomic veterans 
will be able to take advantage of that presumption.
  The President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments 
agreed in 1995 that VA's current list should be expanded. The Committee 
cited concerns that ``the listing of diseases for which relief is 
automatically provided--the presumptive diseases provided for by the 
1988 law--is incomplete and inadequate'' and that ``the standard of 
proof for those without presumptive disease is impossible to meet and, 
given the questionable condition of the exposure records retained by 
the government, inappropriate.'' The President's Advisory Committee 
urged Congress to address the concerns of atomic veterans and their 
families ``promptly.''
  The unfair treatment of atomic veterans becomes especially clear when 
compared to both Agent Orange and Persian Gulf veterans. In 
recommending that the Administration support S. 1385, Under Secretary 
for Health Kenneth Kizer cited the indefensibility of denying 
presumptive service connection for atomic veterans in light of the 
presumption for Persian Gulf War veterans and Agent Orange veterans.
  In 1993, the VA decided to make lung cancer presumptively service-
connected for Agent Orange veterans. That decision was based on a 
National Academy of Sciences study that had found a link only where 
Agent Orange exposures were ``high and prolonged,'' but pointed out 
there was only a ``limited'' capability to determine individual 
exposures.
  For atomic veterans, however, lung cancer continues to be non-
presumptive. In short, the issue of exposure levels poses an almost 
insurmountable obstacle to approval of claims by atomic veterans, while 
the same problem is ignored for Agent orange veterans.
  Persian Gulf War veterans can receive compensation for symptoms or 
illnesses that may be linked to their service in the Persian Gulf, at 
least until scientists reach definitive conclusions about the etiology 
of their health problems. Unfortunately, atomic veterans aren't given 
the same consideration or benefit of the doubt.
  I believe this state of affairs is outrageous and unjust. The 
struggle of

[[Page 10712]]

atomic veterans for justice has been long, hard, and frustrating. But 
these patriotic, dedicated and deserving veterans have persevered. My 
amendment would finally provide them the justice that they so much 
deserve.
  Let me say this in closing. As I have worked with veterans and 
military personnel during my time in the Senate, I have seen a 
troubling erosion of the Federal Government's credibility with current 
and former service members. No salary is high enough, no pension big 
enough to compensate our troops for the dangers they endure while 
defending our country. Such heroism stems from love for America's 
sacred ideals of freedom and democracy and the belief that the nation's 
gratitude is not limited by fiscal convenience but reflects a debt of 
honor.
  This is one of those issues which test our faith in our government. 
But the Senate can take an important step in righting this injustice. I 
urge my colleagues from both sides of the aisle to join me in helping 
atomic veterans win their struggle by supporting my amendment.

                               Exhibit 1


                               Department of Veterans Affairs,

                                                   April 21, 1998.
     From: Under Secretary for Health (10).
     Subject: Request for Reconsideration of the Department's 
         Position on S. 1385 (Wellstone).
     To: Secretary (00).
       1. I request that you reconsider the Department's position 
     on S. 1385 (Wellstone), which would add a number of 
     conditions as presumptive service-connected conditions for 
     atomic veterans to those already prescribed by law. I only 
     learned that the Department was opposing this measure last 
     night on reading the Department's prepared testimony for 
     today's hearing; I had no input into that testimony. Indeed, 
     my views on this bill have not been obtained. I would 
     strongly support this bill as a matter of equity and 
     fairness.
       2. I do not think the Department's current opposition to S. 
     1385 is defensible in view of the Administration's position 
     on presumed service-connection for Gulf War veterans, as well 
     as its position on Agency Orange and Vietnam veterans.
       3. While the scientific methodology that is the basis for 
     adjudicating radiation exposure cases may be sound, the 
     problem is that the exposure cannot be reliably determined 
     for many individuals, and it never will be able to be 
     determined in my judgment. Thus, no matter how good the 
     method is, if the input is not valid then the determination 
     will be suspect.
       4. I ask that we formally reconsider and change the 
     Department's position on S. 1385. I feel the proper and 
     prudent position for the Department is to support S. 1385.
     Kenneth W. Kizer, M.D., M.P.H.
                                  ____

       Table 8.4--Strength of evidence that certain human cancers 
     are induced following exposure to low levels of ionizing 
     radiation.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Evidence                              Cancer
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Very strong............................  Leukemia, Female breast,
                                          Thyroid, Lung.
Convincing.............................  Stomach, Colon, Bladder, Ovary,
                                          Brain/CNS, Skin.
Weak, inconsistent.....................  Liver, Salivary glands,
                                          Esophagus, Multiple myeloma,
                                          Non-Hodgkin lymphoma, Kidney.
Not convincing.........................  CLL, Male breast, Hodgkin's
                                          disease, Cervix, Prostate,
                                          Testes, Pancreas, Small
                                          intestine, Pharynx,
                                          hypopharynx, larynx, Certain
                                          childhood cancers, Skeleton
                                          support tissues.
Only at very high doses................  Bone, Connective tissue,
                                          Rectum, Uterus/Vagina.
High-Let exposures: Thorotrast (TH-      Liver, Leukemia, Bone, Lung.
 232), Radium, Radon.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           amendment no. 381

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, my amendment, amendment 381, entitled 
``Provision of Information and Guidance to the Public Regarding 
Environmental Contamination at U.S. Military Installations Formerly 
Operated by the United States that Have Been Closed,'' is a simple, 
straightforward amendment, but one which can potentially go a long way 
toward ensuring that the United States leaves a positive environmental 
legacy behind when we withdraw from military bases overseas. As we have 
withdrawn from our bases around the world, the U.S. military has taken 
some steps to clean-up contamination at those bases before leaving. But 
there are still many convincing reports that contamination has been 
left behind. As the New York Times noted last December in an editorial, 
``Fuels, lubricants, cleaning fluids and other chemicals are leaching 
into groundwater, and unexploded shells linger on testing grounds long 
after American soldiers leave.'' This is especially true in the 
Philippines, where we withdrew from Subic Bay and Clark Air Base, in 
1992. And it will soon apply to Panama where will finish our withdrawal 
at the end of 1999.
  I understand very well that the Pentagon has no legal obligations 
under our treaties with these countries to pay for a clean-up of 
environmental contamination. And I am not calling for any funding for 
such a clean-up. What this amendment requires the Pentagon to do is 
simply to provide as much information as possible and to cooperate in 
interpreting that information so that nations such as the Philippines 
can complete environmental studies to tell them exactly what has been 
left behind.
  So far the Pentagon has turned over substantial information to the 
Philippine government, but it has done so slowly and grudgingly. We 
need to be more forthcoming to help the Filipinos deal with this issue 
before the contamination in the Subic and Clark areas causes further 
health problems.
  This amendment is intended to protect the legacy of the U.S. in those 
countries where we maintained bases. It does not look at the 
environmental issue as a legal issue but as a moral one. At a time when 
anti-Americanism may be growing in certain parts of the world we need 
to ensure that in those countries that are our longtime allies, we do 
what we can to promote a positive image of the U.S. even after we leave 
our bases.
  We will continue to have close military and political relations with 
countries such as the Philippines and Panama and we should not let this 
environmental issue fester and become an impediment to good relations.
  The amendment as modified applies only to bases already closed. 
Initially I had intended to extend it to bases which would be closing 
in the future, which would include our facilities in Panama. However, 
since I understand that sensitive negotiations are underway on this 
very issue between the U.S. and Panama and I did not want this 
amendment to in any way interfere with the successful conclusion of 
those negotiations. But I want the record to show that I believe that 
we should be very forthcoming in releasing information on environmental 
conditions at our facilities in Panama as we close them. I would like 
to see the Pentagon avoid the long delays in providing information 
which we have seen in the Philippine case by following the spirit of 
this amendment. Of course, if we see a similar problem in the case of 
Panama we may have to revisit this issue next year and propose a 
similar provision to require the Department of Defense to make 
information available publicly.
  If we assist our strategic partners in their efforts to complete 
environmental baseline studies, it is quite likely that any clean-up 
which occurs down the road will be done by American companies, who are 
the leaders in this field. Without the information and the necessary 
studies these countries are unable to identify the scope of the problem 
and begin to move toward some type of amelioration. Once the studies 
are in hand they may be able to approach international lenders, such as 
the World Bank, for funding and subsequently some clean-up contracts 
may go to U.S. companies.
  Mr. President, when we close our bases and leave behind environmental 
contamination, the people who suffer from the contamination are almost 
always people already living in poverty and already struggling to 
maintain good health. They do not also need to contend with a toxic 
legacy left by the U.S. military. Just to highlight one of the most 
disturbing cases, I want to discuss the situation in the Philippines 
and especially at the site of the former Clark Air Base.
  According to a recent report in the Philippine Star Newspaper, a 
forensic expert at the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) identified 29 
persons who were living at volcano evacuation centers who were found to 
be suffering from various ailments attributed to mercury and nitrate 
elements left by the Americans when they abandoned their air base at 
Clark in 1991.
  ``The clinical manifestation exhibited by the patients were 
consistent with chemical exposure,'' the report

[[Page 10713]]

said. It noted that 13 children aged one to seven ``manifested signs 
and symptoms of birth defects and neurological disorders,'' adding that 
``four females suffered spontaneous abortions and still births.''
  ``These can be attributed to mercury exposure,'' the report said. It 
also reported ``central nervous system disorders, Kidney disorder and 
cyanosis'' among the persons at evacuation center at Clark, ailments he 
said can be traced to nitrates exposure.''
  Earlier, the CHR forensic office staff collected water samples from 
the deep wells at the evacuation center in Clark and the Madapdap 
resettlement site for volcano victims in Mabalacat, Pampanga.
  The samples were later brought to the metals lab of the Environmental 
Management Bureau (EMB) for analysis. In a report dated April 16, the 
EMB found 200 milligrams of mercury per liter of water and from 386 to 
27 mg of nitrate per liter of water in the Clark area.
  ``These two chemicals, together with coliform for bacteria were found 
to be present in water in values exceeding the standard set by the 
WHO,'' the report said.
  The report recommended the immediate removal of the residents at 
Clark, and the thorough diagnosis and treatment of the patients.''
  Among the victims identified in the report were Edmarie Rose Escoto, 
5; Kelvin, 7; Martha Rose Pabalan, 4; 8-month-old Alexander; Sara 
Tolentino, and Abraham Taruc, who all had deformities to their lower 
limbs and cannot walk.
  Rowell Borja, 5, and Sheila Pineda, 3, both had congenital heart 
ailments. Skin disorders were also found prevalent in other children, 
while cysts and kidney disorders were observed in adults.
  The People's Task Force for Bases Cleanup (PTFBC) has pointed out 
that ``there is more than enough preliminary evidence of the toxic 
waste problem at the former U.S. bases in the Philippines.''
  Among the documents that have confirmed the presence of toxic wastes 
at the former bases are pamphlets from the U.S. Department of Defense 
entitled ``Environmental Review of the Drawdown Activities at Clark 
Airbase'' (September 1991) and ``Potential Restoration sites on Board 
the U.S. Facility, Subic Bay.'' (October 1992).
  The PTFBC also cited 2 reports of the U.S. Government Accounting 
Office titled ``Military Base Closure, U.S. Financial Obligations at 
the Philippines'' (Oct. 1992) as well as an independent report of the 
WHO on May 9, 1992.
  Mr. President, I recently received a letter from the Philippine Study 
Group of Minnesota expressing their concerns about the environmental 
contamination left by the U.S. military at the former Clark Air Base. 
They reported the results of a trip to the Philippines by two young 
Filipina-American women, Christina Leano and Amy Toledo, who have been 
working with the affected populations near Clark field and have been 
meeting with my staff in Minnesota and here in Washington.
  When these two young women returned from the Philippines, they 
communicated the concern of the Filipino people about the problems of 
toxic waste remaining at both Clark and Subic. The problems are of 
sufficient concern to municipal governments near Clark that they tried 
to develop systems to deliver alternative water sources to the affected 
populations. However, they do not have the necessary resources. They 
said that the concerns of the people near Clark have been front page 
news in the Philippines and Philippine Senator Loren Legarda will soon 
hold hearings in this issue. The Philippine Study Group of Minnesota 
wrote to me, and I quote:

       These bases . . . have severe problems that demand 
     immediate attention. It is very unfortunate that the U.S. 
     Department of Defense will not admit that they left polluted 
     sites when they vacated the bases. Contrary to statements 
     made by Secretary of State Albright, when she was in the 
     Philippines last summer, the Department of Defense will not 
     even release important documents needed by Philippine 
     Development authorities.

  We need at a minimum to see that all relevant documents are turned 
over to Philippine authorities. This includes key documents such as 
information on the construction of the wells and water supply system at 
Clark and hydrologic surveys for Clark which should be released to the 
Clark Development Corporation (CDC). Currently, the CDC does not have 
drawings or data on the water system and they are trying to improve the 
water delivery system without the data they need. The Philippine Study 
Group of Minnesota say they ``are incredulous that the Defense 
Department will not even release those non-military technical documents 
that would be of great help to Philippine authorities.''
  This amendment would require the Defense Department to do that. It is 
a simple, reasonable step toward improving the environmental situation 
for the people of the Philippines. It is a step in the direction of 
assuring our allies that when the U.S. closes a military base, it 
leaves behind a legacy of friendship, cooperation, and sensitivity to 
environmental justice--not a toxic legacy.
  Mr. President, we have a long history with the Philippines. From the 
turn of the century until 1991, except for the period of Japanese 
occupation during WWII, U.S. military forces used lands in Central 
Luzon and around Subic Bay in the Philippines as military bases which 
grew to be among the largest U.S. overseas bases in the world. The main 
purpose of Subic Bay Naval Base was to service the U.S. Navy Seventh 
Fleet. Forested lands were also used for training exercises. Clark Air 
Base served as a major operations and support facility during the 
Korean and Vietnam conflicts.
  In 1991, more than 7,000 military personnel were stationed at Clark 
in addition to dependents and civilian support. Operations carried out 
on the bases included, but were not limited to: fuel loading, storage, 
distribution, and dispensing; ship servicing, repair, and overhaul; 
ammunition transfer, assembly, destruction, and storage; aircraft 
servicing, cleaning, repair, and storage; base vehicle fleet servicing, 
cleaning, repair, overhaul, and operation; power generation; 
electricity transformation and distribution; steam generation; water 
treatment and distribution; sewage collection and treatment; hazardous 
waste storage and disposal; bitumen production; electroplating; 
corrosion protection; and weed and pest control.
  These activities, for many years not conducted in a manner protective 
of the environment, lead to substantial contamination of the air, soil, 
groundwater, sediments, and coastal waters of the bases and their 
surroundings. This was not unique to the Philippines. Military and 
industrial activities in the U.S. and around the world have had similar 
effects. Contaminants include, but are not limited to, petroleum 
hydrocarbons, aromatic hydrocarbons, chlorinated hydrocarbons, 
pesticides, PCB's metals, asbestos, acids, explosives and munitions. 
Whether or not radioactive wastes are present is uncertain.
  The Philippine Senate voted in 1991 not to renew the bases agreement 
between the two countries. In June of that same year, Mt. Pinatubo 
erupted hastening U.S. withdrawal from Clark Air Base. U.S. forces left 
Subic Naval Base in 1992, ending almost a century of occupation of 
these vast areas of Luzon. Notwithstanding initial Department of 
Defense protestations to the contrary, substantial amounts of hazardous 
materials and wastes were left behind at the time of the U.S. departure 
both on the surface and in various environmental media. According to a 
GAO report issued in 1992,

       If the United States unilaterally decided to clean up these 
     bases in accordance with U.S. standards, the costs for 
     environmental clean-up and restoration could approach 
     Superfund proportions.

  Environmental officers at both Subic Bay Naval Facility and Clark Air 
Base have proposed a variety of projects to correct environmental 
hazards and remedy situations that pose serious health and safety 
threats.'' None of these projects was undertaken prior to U.S. 
departure from the baselands. A study commissioned by the WHO in

[[Page 10714]]

1993, in order to assess potential environmental risks at Subic Bay, 
identified a number of contaminated and potentially contaminated sites 
and recommended a complete environmental assessment.
  Two study teams visited the sites in 1994, under the sponsorship of 
the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, and not only found 
evidence of environmental contamination but carefully documented the 
lack of existing capacity in the Philippines, whether in government, 
university, or private sectors, to assess and remediate this complex 
problem.
  The health and safety issues are not theoretical or contingent on 
future development of the bases. At the present time rusting and 
bulging barrels of hazardous materials are sitting uncovered at Clark. 
There are reports of exposed asbestos insulation in buildings vacated 
by departing U.S. personnel. For years waste materials from the ship 
repair facility were dumped or discharged directly into Subic Bay, 
contaminating sediments, and now residents from surrounding communities 
eat fish and shellfish harvested from this area. Thousands of evacuees 
displaced from homes destroyed by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo and lava 
flows which followed have been temporarily housed in tents and 
makeshift wooden structure on Clark Air Base at a site previously 
occupied by a motorpool. They obtain drinking and bathing water from 
groundwater wells.
  Just beyond the Dau gate, about 300 yards from this evacuation 
center, is the permanent community of Dau where many thousands of 
residents routinely use groundwater for drinking, cooking, and bathing. 
Because of complaints of gross contamination of water from some of the 
wells in the evacuation area, including visible oily sheen, foul taste, 
and gastrointestinal illness, one sample was tested at the laboratories 
of the University of the Philippines in early 1994 and found to contain 
oil and grease. Limited by laboratory capability, the analysis did not 
include the wide range of volatile and semi-volatile organic compounds, 
fuels, fuel additives, and other compounds which commonly contaminate 
groundwater in the U.S. and in other countries where similar military 
and industrial activities have taken place.
  Many of these substances have important health effects when present 
even in extremely small amounts--health effects which may take years to 
become apparent--including cancer, birth and developmental 
abnormalities, and neurological or immunological damage. Moreover, 
there are numerous instances in the U.S. where contaminated groundwater 
at military bases has migrated off-base, sometimes for a distance of 
several miles, entering the drinking water of surrounding communities 
and posing a threat to public health. This is not only possible but 
likely at Clark Air Base, only one of numerous sites of concern at both 
bases, and one which is beyond existing Philippine capacity to assess 
let alone to remediate.
  When President Clinton visited the Philippines in November 1994 both 
he and President Ramos acknowledged that the issue of base 
contamination would need to be further investigated. However, President 
Clinton stated that, ``We have no reason to believe at this time that 
there is a big problem that we left untended. We clearly are not 
mandated under treaty obligations to do more.'' He went on to say ``. . 
.we decided we should focus on finding the facts now, and when we find 
them, deal then with the facts as they are.''
  Though there may be no treaty obligation to address this issue, there 
are obvious moral and public health arguments which should compel the 
U.S. to accept responsibility for environmental assessment and 
remediation of the former bases in the Philippines. There are other 
overseas bases in, for example, Canada, Germany, Italy and Japan, where 
in response to host-country discovery and complaints of environmental 
contamination, the U.S. has provided assessment and clean-up. After 
nearly a century of occupation of these Philippine baselands, the 
obligation is no less. Meanwhile, as the political resolution of this 
issue unfolds, thousands of Filipinos, many of whom are living in 
marginal refugee conditions, and drinking and bathing in water which 
may be contaminated with hazardous substances resulting from U.S. 
military activities.
  If these circumstances were to exist in the U.S. the groundwater 
would already have been comprehensively tested for a broad spectrum of 
substances and the public's health protected, while resulting plumes of 
contamination were being mapped and remediation strategies executed. 
Until we can answer with certainty whether or not this water is safe 
for consumption, an answer which neither Philippine government, public 
health officials, nor academicians are able to provide without 
assistance, and eliminate any identified hazardous exposures, the U.S. 
may be viewed as bearing responsibility for any resulting health 
effects.


                           Amendment No. 382

  Mr. WARNER. Having done that, we will now proceed to amendment No. 
382, on which the Senator will address the Senate pursuant to the 
standing order, and then at a time later we will schedule the vote.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I will be ready to go, if I could have 
just 30 seconds to also say on the floor of Senate, when I say ``we,'' 
I don't mean as in me. I mean the collective us. This is for both 
Senator Levin and Senator Warner. You also, in a bipartisan way, 
through your efforts, were able to put an amendment into this bill that 
deals with family violence. I thank you. I think this is an extremely 
important amendment.
  The problem was that all too often, when a spouse usually a woman--
would report violence, there was no real right of guarantee of 
confidentiality, which we needed. In other words, a woman could go to a 
doctor and then her report to a doctor could get out publicly. This 
really will enable women who are the victims of this violence to be 
able to go to someone and receive some support and help. It is 
extremely important. Both of you have supported this. I think there is 
similar language over in the House side. I thank the two of you. This 
is an amendment I am really proud of. I thank you.
  Mr. WARNER. Once again, Mr. President, I am advised that the vote on 
No. 382, the amendment the Senator is about to debate in the Senate 
under the standing agreement, can be voted as the third vote in 
sequence this afternoon.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. That is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. All right.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. WARNER. Have the yeas and nays been ordered on that amendment?
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wonder if it would be in order, if there 
would be any objection, to ask unanimous consent that no further 
business be held between now and the recess so that people know there 
is not going to be any additional----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am not objecting, but I think we should 
just simply say that at 1, at which time the 30 minutes expires, the 
Senate will stand in recess until the first vote, which is scheduled 
for 2:15.
  Mr. LEVIN. But for some of us who planned to actually leave here at 
12:30, I think it is important, if there is an understanding to this 
effect, that there be no further amendments offered or any other 
business carried on between now and the time that we recess for the 
luncheons. Is that agreeable?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have no agreement, but let's make it 
very clear that we will now begin to address amendment No. 382. As soon 
as that debate is concluded, the Senate will stand in recess until the 
hour of 2:15, when the first vote is to take place, and there would be 
no intervening business transacted.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, just to clarify, I don't have any 
objection to that unanimous consent request, but I

[[Page 10715]]

want to make some general remarks in regard to the total bill. I just 
wanted to try----
  Mr. WARNER. I am prepared to accommodate the Senator. What about the 
hour of 4 today? You have 30 minutes.
  Mr. ALLARD. That would be fine. I appreciate that. I think if we set 
aside 20 minutes, that would be fine. I appreciate that.
  Mr. WARNER. We would be glad to do that and make it a part of the 
unanimous consent request which we are jointly propounding, Mr. Levin 
and myself. Is that agreeable?
  Mr. LEVIN. I apologize.
  Mr. WARNER. We just added, 4 to 4:20, this colleague may speak on the 
bill.
  Mr. President, I am happy to restate it, but I think the Chair is----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, this amendment speaks to the priorities 
of the Senate or lack of priorities of the Senate.
  We have here a bill that really talks about authorization, leading to 
appropriation of hundreds of billions of dollars for defense, for the 
Pentagon.
  I will talk about the priorities of some low-income families in our 
country. Their priorities are how to keep a roof over their children's 
heads. Their priorities are how to get food in their children's 
stomachs. Their priorities are how to earn a wage that pays their 
bills.
  And their priorities are how to obtain medical assistance when they 
are sick or when their children are sick.
  Mr. President, 2 years ago we passed a welfare bill, and as we start 
to see more and more families slide deeper and deeper into poverty, and 
as we see around the country some of these families losing their 
benefits, I have not heard so much as a whisper of concern, let alone a 
shout of outrage, from the Senate.
  So I rise to propose an amendment. It is an amendment that I hope 
will receive the support of every Senator, Democrat and Republican 
alike. It is simple and it is straightforward.
  Current law requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
provide an annual report to Congress. My amendment requires the 
Secretary to include information about families who have moved off the 
welfare rolls. What kind of jobs do they have? What is their employment 
status? What kind of wages are they making? Is it a living wage? What 
is the child care situation with their children? Have they been dropped 
from medical assistance? Do they have any health insurance coverage at 
all?
  Mr. President, like my colleagues, I had hoped that the welfare 
reform bill--though I voted against it because I had real reservations 
about how it would really take shape and form throughout the country--
would work. But I have my doubts. On the basis of some of the evidence 
I present here today, I believe we need to find out with certainty what 
is happening to families, mainly women and children, when they no 
longer receive welfare assistance in our country.
  Since August of 1996, 1.3 million families have left welfare. They 
are no longer receiving welfare assistance. That is 4.5 million 
recipients, and they are mainly women and children. The vast majority 
of these 4.5 million citizens are children. On the basis of these 
numbers, too many people have deemed welfare reform a success.
  But to see the welfare rolls reduced dramatically does not mean 
necessarily that we have reduced poverty in this country. It doesn't 
mean these families have moved from welfare to self-sufficiency. It 
doesn't mean these families have moved from welfare to economic self-
sufficiency. These statistics, the drop in the welfare caseload, which 
has been so loudly talked about as evidence of success by Republicans, 
Democrats, and by this Democratic administration, doesn't tell us what 
is really happening. It doesn't tell us anything about how these women 
and children are doing. It doesn't tell us whether or not these 
families are better off now that they are no longer receiving welfare 
assistance, or whether they have fallen further into poverty. It 
doesn't tell us if the mothers can find work. It doesn't tell us if 
they are making enough of an income to lift themselves and their 
children out of poverty. It doesn't tell us whether these mothers have 
adequate access to affordable child care, and it doesn't tell us 
whether or not these mothers and these children have any health care 
coverage at all.
  No one seems to know what has happened to these families. Yet, we 
keep trumpeting the ``victory'' of welfare reform. The declining 
caseloads tell us nothing at all about how families are faring once 
they no longer receive assistance. I am worried that they are just 
disappearing and this amendment is all about a new class of citizens in 
our country. I call them The Disappeared.
  Let me give you some examples. We are hearing a lot about the plunge 
in food stamp participation. Over the last 4 years, the number of 
people using food stamps dropped by almost one-third--from 28 million 
to 19 million people. Some people want to interpret this as evidence of 
diminished need. But just like the decline in the welfare rolls, there 
are important questions left unanswered. I hope this drop in food stamp 
assistance means that fewer people are going hungry, but I have my 
doubts. If people are no longer needy, then how can we account for the 
fact that 78 percent of the cities surveyed by the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors for its ``Report on Hunger'' reported increases in requests for 
emergency food in 1998? This January, a survey conducted by Catholic 
Charities U.S.A. reported that 73 percent of the diocese had an 
increase by as much as 145 percent in requests for emergency food 
assistance from the year before.
  How can we account for such findings without questioning whether or 
not the reformers' claim of success are premature?
  What is going on here? What is happening to these women and children? 
Should we not know? The esteemed Gunnar Myrdal said, ``Ignorance is 
never random.'' Sometimes we don't know what we don't want to know.
  This amendment says we ought to do an honest evaluation and have the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services provide a report to us as to 
exactly what is happening with these women and children.
  A story Friday from the New York Times suggests one explanation. One 
welfare recipient was told incorrectly that she could not get food 
stamps without welfare. Though she is scraping by, raising a family of 
five children and sometimes goes hungry, she has not applied for food 
stamps. ``They referred me to the food pantry,'' she said. ``They don't 
tell you what you really need to know; they tell you what they want you 
to know.''
  The truth of the matter is that there is an information vacuum at the 
national level with regard to welfare reform. What has happened to the 
mothers and children who no longer receive any assistance? In a moment, 
I am going to talk about some findings from NETWORK, a national 
Catholic social justice organization--findings that should disturb each 
and every Senator. At the outset, let me read a brief excerpt from the 
report that outlines the problem:

       Even though government officials are quick to point out 
     that national welfare caseloads are at their lowest point in 
     30 years, they are unable to tell us for the most part what 
     is happening to people after they leave the welfare rolls--
     and what is happening to people living in poverty who never 
     received assistance in the first place.

  I am especially concerned because the evidence we do have suggests 
that the goals of welfare reform are not being achieved. People are 
continuing to suffer and continuing to struggle to meet their basic 
needs, and I am talking primarily about women and children. I challenge 
the Senate today with this amendment. At the very minimum, we should 
call on the Secretary of Health and Human Services to give us a report 
on the status of those women and those children who no longer receive 
any welfare assistance.

[[Page 10716]]

Should we not at least know what is happening to these families?
  I have already mentioned the dramatic decline in welfare caseloads. 
We must recognize that it is naive to assume that all of the 1.3 
million of these families have found jobs and are moving toward a life 
of economic self-sufficiency. After all, the caseload decline has not 
been matched by a similar decline in poverty indicators. Moreover, 
since 1995, colleagues, what we have seen is an increase among the 
severest and harshest poverty. This is when income is less than one-
half of what the official definition of poverty is. We have found an 
increase of 400,000 children living among the ranks of the poorest of 
poor families in America. Could this have something to do with these 
families being cut off welfare assistance? We ought to at least know.
  I have already mentioned the NETWORK report. What this group did was 
collect data on people who visited Catholic social services facilities 
in 10 States with large numbers of people eligible for aid, and I will 
summarize these very dramatic findings.
  Nearly half of the respondents report that their health is only fair 
or poor; 43 percent eat fewer meals or less food per meal because of 
the cost; they can't afford it. And 52 percent of soup kitchen patrons 
are unable to provide sufficient food for their children, and even the 
working poor are suffering as 41 percent of those with jobs experience 
hunger. The people who are working work almost 52 weeks a year, 40 
hours a week, and they are still so poor that they can't afford to buy 
the food for their children. I am presenting this evidence today 
because I want us to have the evidence.
  In another study, seven local agencies and community welfare 
monitoring coalitions in six States compared people currently receiving 
welfare to those who stopped getting welfare in the last few months.
  The data show that people who stopped getting welfare were less 
likely to get food stamps, less likely to get Medicaid, more likely to 
go without food for a day or more, more likely to move because they 
couldn't pay rent, more likely to have a child who lived away or was in 
foster care, more likely to have difficulty paying for and getting 
child care, more likely to say ``my life is worse'' compared to 6 
months ago.
  Is that what we intended with this welfare reform bill?
  The National Conference of State Legislatures did its own assessment 
of 14 studies with good information about families leaving welfare. It 
found that:

       Most of the jobs [that former recipients get] pay between 
     $5.50 and $7 an hour, higher than minimum wage but not enough 
     to raise a family out of poverty. So far, few families who 
     leave welfare have been able to escape poverty.

  Just this month, Families USA released a very troubling study. It 
finds that:

       Over two-thirds of a million low-income people--
     approximately 675,000--lost Medicaid coverage and became 
     uninsured as of 1997 due to welfare reform. The majority (62 
     percent) of those who became uninsured due to welfare reform 
     were children, and most of those children were, in all 
     likelihood, still eligible for coverage under Medicaid. 
     Moreover, the number of people who lose health coverage due 
     to welfare reform is certain to grow rather substantially in 
     the years ahead.

  Let me just translate this into personal terms.
  Here is the story of one family that one of the sisters in the 
NETWORK study worked with:

       Martha and her seven-year-old child, David, live in 
     Chicago. She recently began working, but her 37-hour a week 
     job pays only $6.00 an hour. In order to work, Martha must 
     have childcare for David.

  That is the name of my oldest son, David.

       Since he goes to school, she found a sitter who would 
     receive him at 7 a.m. and take him to school. This sitter 
     provided after school care as well. When Sister Joan sat down 
     with Martha to talk about her finances, they discovered that 
     her salary does not even cover the sitter's costs.

  By the way, as long as we are talking about afterschool care, let me 
just mention to you that I remember a poignant conversation I had in 
East L.A. I was at a Head Start center, and I was talking to a mother. 
She was telling me that she was working. She didn't make much by way of 
wages, but she was off welfare, and she wanted to work. As we were 
talking and she was talking about working, all of a sudden she started 
to cry. I was puzzled. I felt like maybe I had said something that had 
upset her. I said: Can I ask you why you are crying?
  She said: I am crying because one of the things that has happened is 
that my first grader--I used to, when I was at home, take her to 
school, and I also could pick her up after school.
  She lived in a housing project. It is a pretty dangerous 
neighborhood.
  She said: Now, every day when my daughter, my first grader, finishes 
up in school, I am terrified. I don't know what is going to happen to 
her. There is no care for her, and she goes home, and I tell her to 
lock the door and take no phone calls.
  Colleagues, this amendment asks us to do a study of what is going on 
with these children. How many children don't play outside even when the 
weather is nice because there is nobody there to take care of them?
  Let me talk about an even scarier situation--families that neither 
receive government assistance nor have a parent with a job. We don't 
know for certain how large this population is, but in the NETWORK study 
79 percent of the people were unemployed and not receiving welfare 
benefits. Of course this study was focused on the hardest hit.
  Let me just say that in some of the earlier State studies, what we 
are seeing is that as many as 50 percent of the families who lost 
welfare benefits do not have jobs.
  Can I repeat that?
  Close to 50 percent perhaps--that is what we want to study--of the 
families who have been cut off welfare assistance do not have jobs, 
much less the number of families where the parents--usually a woman--
has a job, but it is $6 an hour and she can't afford child care and her 
children don't have the necessary child care. Now her medical 
assistance is gone and she is worse off and her children are worse off. 
They are plunged into deeper poverty than before we passed this bill.
  Don't we want to know what is happening in the country?
  How are these families surviving? I am deeply concerned and worried 
about them. They are no longer receiving assistance. And they don't 
have jobs. They are literally falling between the cracks and they are 
disappearing. I want us to focus on the disappeared Americans.
  What do we do about this? I want to have bipartisan support.
  I was a political science teacher before becoming a Senator. In 
public policy classes, I used to talk about evaluation all the time. 
That is one of the key ingredients of good public policy. That is what 
I am saying today. We want to have some really good, thorough 
evaluation. We have some States that are doing some studies. But the 
problem is there are different methodologies and different studies that 
are not comprehensive.
  Before we passed this bill, when we were giving States waivers--
Minnesota was one example--43 of 50 States have been granted waivers. 
They were all required to hire an outside contractor to evaluate the 
impact of the program.
  After this legislation passed, we didn't require this any longer of 
States. Now we are only getting very fragmentary evidence. As a result, 
we do not really know what is happening to these women. We don't know 
what is happening to these children. The money that we have earmarked 
is Labor-HHS appropriations, for Health and Human Services--$15 million 
to provide some money for some careful evaluation. That is what we 
need, policy evaluation. But the money has been rescinded.
  What I am saying--I am skipping over some of the data--is at the very 
least, what we want to do is to make sure that we do some decent 
tracking and that we know in fact what is really going on here.
  Let me just give you some examples that I think would be important 
just to consider as I go along. Let me read from some work that has 
been done by the Children's Defense Fund.

[[Page 10717]]

  Alabama: Applying for cash assistance has become difficult in many 
places. In one Alabama county, a professor found workers gave public 
assistance applications to only 6 out of 27 undergraduate students who 
requested them despite State policy that says anyone who asks for an 
application should get one.
  In other words, I know what was going on. This professor was saying 
to students, go out there as welfare mothers and apply and see what 
happens. They did. What they found out is that very few of them were 
even given applications.
  Arizona: 60 percent of former recipients were taken off welfare 
because they did not appear for a welfare interview.
  We are talking about sanctions.
  After holding fairly steady from 1990 to 1993, the number of meals 
distributed to Arizona statewide, Food Charity Networks, has since 
risen to 30 percent, and a 1997 study found that 41 percent of 
Networks' families had at least one person with a job.
  Quite often what happens is the people who are off the rolls aren't 
off the rolls because they found a job, but because they have been 
sanctioned. The question is, Why have they been sanctioned? The 
question is, What happened to them? What has happened to their 
children?
  California: Tens of thousands of welfare beneficiaries in California 
and Illinois are dropped each month as punishment. In total, half of 
those leaving welfare in these States are doing so because they did not 
follow the rules.
  This was from an AP 50-State survey. It was also cited in the 
Salvation Army Fourth Interim Report.
  In an L.A. family shelter, 12 percent of homeless families said they 
had experienced benefit reductions or cuts that led directly to their 
homelessness.
  One of the questions, colleagues, is this rise of homelessness and 
this rise of the use of food pantry shelves. Does it have something to 
do with the fact that many of these women have found jobs but they 
don't pay a living wage, or they haven't found work but the families 
have been cut off assistance?
  Florida: More than 15,000 families left welfare during a typical 
month last year. About 3,600 reported finding work, but nearly 4,200 
left because they were punished. The State does not know what happened 
to almost 7,500 others.
  Iowa: 47 percent of those who left welfare did so because they did 
not comply with requirements such as going to job interviews or 
providing paperwork.
  Kentucky: 58 percent of the people who leave welfare are removed for 
not following the rules.
  Minnesota: In Minnesota, case managers found that penalized families 
were twice as likely to have serious mental health problems, three 
times as likely to have low intellectual ability, and five times more 
likely to have family violence problems compared with other recipients.
  Mississippi Delta region: Workfare recipients gather at 4 a.m. to 
travel by bus for 2 hours to their assigned workplaces, work their full 
days, and then return another 2 hours home each night. They are having 
trouble finding child care during these nontraditional hours and for 
such extended days.
  I could give other reports of other States. Let me just say to every 
single Senator here, Democrat and Republican alike, you may have a 
different sense of what is going on with the welfare bill. That is 
fine. But what I am saying here is if you look at the NETWORK study, if 
you look at the Conference of Mayors study, if you look at the 
Conference of State Legislatures study, if you look at the Children's 
Defense Fund study, and if you just travel --I am likely to do quite a 
bit of travel in the country over the next couple of years to really 
take a look at what is happening--but if you just travel and talk to 
people, you have reason to be concerned. Right now we do not know and 
we cannot remain deliberately ignorant. We cannot do that.
  Policy evaluation is important. So I challenge each and every Senator 
to please support this amendment which calls for nothing more than 
this, that every year when we get a report from the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services we get a report on what has happened to these women 
and children--that is mainly the population we are talking about--who 
no longer receive welfare assistance. Where are they? What kind of jobs 
do they have? Are they living-wage jobs? Is there decent child care for 
the children? Do they have health care coverage? That is what we want 
to know.
  I remember in the conference committee last year, and I will not use 
names because no one is here to debate me, I remember in a conference 
committee meeting last year we got into a debate. I wanted mothers to 
at least have 2 years of higher education and have that not counted 
against them. I was pushing that amendment. I remember, it was quite 
dramatic. In this committee, there were any number of different 
Representatives from the House, and some Senators, who said: You are 
trying to reopen the whole welfare reform debate and you are trying to 
change welfare policy. This has been hallmark legislation, the most 
important legislation we passed since Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 
legislation.
  I said to them: Let me ask you a question. Can any of you give me any 
data from your States? I know the rolls have been cut substantially.
  I hear my own President, President Clinton, talking about this. But, 
President Clinton, you have not provided one bit of evidence that 
reducing the welfare rolls has led to reduction of poverty. The real 
question is not whether or not people are off the rolls; the real 
question is, Are they better off? I thought the point of welfare reform 
was to move families, mainly women and children, from welfare to 
economic self-sufficiency, from welfare to a better life. I thought all 
Senators think it is important that people work, but if they work, they 
ought not to be poor in America.
  We can no longer turn our gaze away from at least being willing to do 
an honest evaluation of what is happening. This amendment calls for 
that. I cannot see how any Senator will vote against this. I tried to 
bring this amendment to the juvenile justice bill. It would have been a 
good thing to do, because, frankly, there is a very strong correlation 
between poverty and kids getting into trouble and which kids get 
incarcerated. I think this piece of legislation is creating a whole new 

class of people--disappeared Americans. Many of them are children. That 
is my own view.
  But as that bill went along, I agreed I would not do it if I could 
introduce this amendment to the next piece of legislation, which is the 
DOD legislation right now. I hope there will be an up-or-down vote. I 
hope there will be strong support for it.
  If colleagues want to vote against it--I do not know how you can. We 
ought to be willing to do an honest evaluation. I tell my colleagues, 
if you travel the country, you are going to see some pretty harsh 
circumstances. You are going to see some real harsh circumstances. I do 
not remember exactly, and I need to say it this way because if I am 
wrong I will have to correct the record, but I think in some States 
like Wisconsin that have been touted as great welfare reform States, 
and I talked to my colleague, Senator Feingold, about this, and there 
is low unemployment so it should work well--I think, roughly speaking, 
two-thirds of the mothers and children now have less income than they 
did before the welfare bill was passed. That is not success. That is 
not success.
  Do you all know that in every single State all across the country--
and it depends upon which year, it is up to the State--there is a drop-
dead date certain where families are going to be eliminated from all 
assistance? Shouldn't we know, before we do that, before we just toss 
people over the cliff--shouldn't we know what is going on? Shouldn't we 
have some understanding of whether or not these mothers are able to 
find jobs? Shouldn't we know what is going on with their children? 
Shouldn't we know whether there are problems with substance abuse or 
violence in the homes? Shouldn't we make sure we do that before we 
eliminate all assistance and

[[Page 10718]]

create a new class of the disappeared, of the poorest of the poor--of 
the poor who are mainly children?
  I have brought this amendment to the floor before, but this time 
around I do not want a voice vote. I want a recorded vote. If Senators 
are going to vote against this, I want that on the record. If they are 
going to vote for it, I will thank each and every one of them. Then, if 
there is an effort to drop this in conference committee because it is 
on the DOD bill, do you know what. Here is what I say: At least the 
Senate has gone on the record saying we are going to be intellectually 
honest and have an honest policy evaluation. That is all I want. That 
is all I want to see happen. If it gets dropped, I will be back with 
the amendment again, and again, and again and again--until we have this 
study. Until we are honest about being willing--I am sorry--until we 
are willing to be honest about what is now happening in the country and 
at least collect the data so we can then know.
  I feel very strongly about this, colleagues, very strongly about 
this. I am going to speak on the floor of the Senate about this. I am 
going to do some traveling in the country. I am going to try to focus 
on what I consider to be really some very harsh conditions and some 
very harsh things that are happening to too many women and to too many 
children.
  I also speak with some indignation. I can do this in a bipartisan 
way. I want us to have this evaluation. I say to the White House, to 
the administration--I ask unanimous consent I have 1 more minute. I 
actually started at 12:30, so I do not know how I could be out of time. 
I had a half hour.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The official clock up here shows time expired, 
but without objection, 1 minute.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair. I don't want to get into a big 
argument with the Chair. I can do it in 1 minute.
  I think I have heard the administration, Democratic administration, I 
have heard the President and Vice President talk about how we have 
dramatically reduced the welfare rolls with huge success. Has the 
dramatic reduction in the welfare rolls led to a dramatic reduction in 
poverty? Are these women and children more economically self-
sufficient? Are they better off or are they worse off? That is what I 
want to know. I say that to Democrats. I say that to Republicans. We 
ought to have the courage to call upon the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to provide us with this data. As policymakers, we need 
this information.
  Please, Senators, support this amendment.
  I yield the floor.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Daniel J. 
Stewart, a fellow in my office, be granted the privilege of the floor 
during the debate on the defense authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________