[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 10583-10616]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill.
  The legislative assistant read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1059) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2000 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the staff 
members of the Committee on Armed Services appearing on the list 
appendant hereto be extended the privilege of the floor during 
consideration of S. 1059.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The list is as follows:

                     Armed Services Committee Staff

       Romie L. Brownlee, Staff Director.
       David S. Lyles, Staff Director for the Minority.
       Charles S. Abell, Professional Staff Member.
       Judith A. Ansley, Deputy Staff Director.
       John R. Barnes, Professional Staff Member.
       Stuart H. Cain, Staff Assistant.
       Christine E. Cowart, Special Assistant.
       Daniel J. Cox, Jr., Professional Staff Member.
       Madelyn R. Creedon, Minority Counsel.
       Richard D. DeBobes, Minority Counsel.
       Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, Chief Clerk.
       Keaveny A. Donovan, Staff Assistant.
       Edward H. Edens IV, Professional Staff Member.
       Shawn H. Edwards, Staff Assistant.
       Pamela L. Farrell, Professional Staff Member.
       Richard W. Fieldhouse, Professional Staff Member.
       Maria A. Finley, Staff Assistant.
       Mickie Jan Gordon, Staff Assistant.
       Creighton Greene, Professional Staff Member.
       William C. Greenwalt, Professional Staff Member.
       Joan V. Grimson, Counsel.
       Gary M. Hall, Professional Staff Member.
       Larry J. Hoag, Printing and Documents Clerk.
       Andrew W. Johnson, Professional Staff Member.
       Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, Professional Staff Member.
       George W. Lauffer, Professional Staff Member.
       Gerald J. Leeling, Minority Counsel.
       Peter K. Levine, Minority Counsel.
       Paul M. Longsworth, Professional Staff Member.
       Thomas L. MacKenzie, Professional Staff Member.
       Michael J. McCord, Professional Staff Member.
       Ann M. Mittermeyer, Assistant Counsel.
       Todd L. Payne, Special Assistant.
       Cindy Pearson, Security Manager.
       Sharen E. Reaves, Staff Assistant.
       Anita H. Rouse, Deputy Chief Clerk.
       Joseph T. Sixeas, Professional Staff Member.
       Cord A. Sterling, Professional Staff Member.
       Scott W. Stucky, General Counsel.
       Eric H. Thoemmes, Professional Staff Member.
       Michele A. Traficante, Staff Assistant.
       Roslyne D. Turner, Systems Manager.
       D. Banks Willis, Staff Assistant.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Lawrence 
Slade, a fellow on the staff of Senator McCain, be granted privileges 
of the floor during the discussion of S. 1059, the national defense 
authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, today the Senate begins consideration of 
S. 1059, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
  It is my distinct privilege as chairman to make the initial statement 
regarding this bill. I acknowledge the presence on the floor of my 
senior and most respected member, Mr. Thurmond, the former chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee. He will be speaking to the Senate just 
after the statements by the chairman and the ranking member. I thank 
Senator Levin, the ranking member. We came to the Senate together. I 
think this is our 21st year. We have collaborated on many, many special 
assignments given to us by previous chairmen and/or ranking members 
through the years. I value our professional relationship and, indeed, 
our friendship.
  I also wish to pay special acknowledgment to the subcommittee 
chairmen of the Armed Services Committee. Prior to this year, for some 
20 years, I was a subcommittee chairman. I understand the role of a 
subcommittee chairman on our committee. But I must say,

[[Page 10584]]

with great humility, I think each of the subcommittee chairmen this 
year exceeded beyond any current precedent their leadership, their hard 
work, together with their ranking member, in preparing the respective 
parts of this bill over which their subcommittees have jurisdiction.
  We have on our committee today marvelous participation by all members 
of the committee, on both sides of the aisle. I think our committee has 
historically operated and tried in every way to be nonpartisan on 
matters of defense, and we have succeeded.
  We are supported by just an extraordinary professional staff, and 
indeed other Members have their various personal staff members who work 
with the professional staff, and it is all a team together working to 
produce not only the bill but throughout the year to be responsive to 
each and every Member of the Senate with regard to their requests, or 
whatever the case may be, as they relate to the jurisdiction of our 
committee. So I thank them all at this time, as we begin this very 
important presentation to the Senate for the year 2000.
  I am extremely pleased to observe that this is the first time in 
nearly 15 years--15 consecutive years--that the defense budget before 
the Senate represents an increase in real terms, real dollars in our 
defense spending. This is a much-needed change, one that recognizes the 
problems brought on by 14 years of decline in defense spending. This 
overlaps, as the Chair will quickly recognize, both Republican and 
Democrat administrations. So this is not a political statement, 
although I do believe that the cuts under President Clinton have been 
too long and too deep. It was this year that the President, largely at 
the urging of a very courageous and fine Secretary of Defense, our 
former colleague, Secretary Cohen, and, indeed, members of the Joint 
Chiefs, gave his support to raising defense spending levels.
  Today, particularly under President Clinton, who has sent forward our 
troops into harm's way more times on more different specific missions 
than any other President in the history of this country, we are asking 
every day, every month, every year, more and more of the men and women 
of the armed services at a time when we have this very, very low level 
of manning of all branches of our services.
  At the same period, this world remains a place of ever increasing 
violence and uncertainty. As U.S. national interests are challenged 
throughout the globe, it is incumbent upon our military to be prepared 
to act when necessary, and act they have, with extraordinary commitment 
and professionalism.
  Our military forces are currently strained by ongoing day-to-day 
operations. The contingency operations in Bosnia, Iraq, and throughout 
the Balkan regions are putting a very severe strain on our overall 
manning and commitments, and the families --may I underline ``the 
families''--of these service members. In order for the military to 
respond effectively, it must receive the resources necessary to equip, 
train, and operate.
  Unfortunately, after years of declining budgets and continually 
increasing deployments overseas, the military services are showing the 
beginning signs of this overburdening. Recruiting and retention 
problems are leading to shortfalls in key skills. Insufficient 
procurement budgets have left our forces with equipment that is 
somewhat unreliable because of age and, indeed, more costly every day 
to maintain. Inadequate infrastructure funding has resulted in the 
degradation of the facilities in which our military personnel work and 
live.
  We must provide additional resources if we are to preserve this 
Nation's security and the readiness of its Armed Forces. That is why 
this bill before the Senate authorizes $288.8 billion in budget 
authority for fiscal year 2000--$8.3 billion above the President's 
request.
  I commend the majority leader of the Senate, Senator Lott, for his 
support and his leadership. It doesn't just go back a few weeks; it 
goes back well into last year. When consulting with him and, indeed, 
our distinguished chairman at that time, Senator Thurmond, the three of 
us recognized, together with other leaders in the Senate, such as 
Senator Stevens and Senator Domenici, that we have to bring about a 
reversal in this decline of defense spending. Those are the origins of 
the change of this curve.
  I want to note the extraordinary relationship that exists today 
between our committee and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. I 
particularly thank Senator Stevens and his staff director, Steve 
Cortese, for their cooperation and support throughout the process of 
putting this bill together. Hopefully, Senator Stevens will follow soon 
behind with his bill so that the Senate can have both to consider.
  At this point I wish to take a moment to give credit to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff for helping to secure the additional funding for 
defense. I think this is the first year in my 21 years that they have 
stepped forward with such absolute determination, vigor, and 
professional honesty and integrity and told the Senate--in effect, told 
the American people--of the concerns they have not only for their 
personnel but for the lack of funding needed to train the personnel, 
the research and development needed for the future, and the procurement 
decline we have experienced through these years. They came before the 
Senate committee last September and again in January, and they were 
very forthright. I don't doubt for a minute that their determination 
was the primary reason the President and the Secretary of Defense 
stepped up and began to support additional funding.
  The Secretary of Defense, of course, all along had been counseling 
the President, but I want to pay special respect to the Joint Chiefs.
  It is by necessity that I address this question of the shortfall in 
defense spending and lay it out historically over these 15 years.
  But let no one, let no nation, let no leader, let no rogue or 
terrorist think for a moment that the men and women of the Armed Forces 
of the United States, together with their equipment and their readiness 
and training, aren't prepared to turn back any threat posed against 
this Nation, or this Nation together with its allies.
  In numerous committee hearings this year, the frightening magnitude 
of some of these problems was revealed. General Shelton, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, ``Anecdotal and now measurable 
evidence indicates that our current readiness is fraying and that the 
long-term health of the Total Force is in jeopardy.'' General Shelton 
further informed the committee that our ability to execute our national 
military strategy has declined so severely that it would ``* * * take 
us more time, and that time to victory would mean that we would lose 
terrain that we subsequently would have to regain. It means that the 
casualties to the U.S. would be higher.'' Furthermore, according to the 
latest Quarterly Readiness Report: ``* * * there are currently 118 
CINC-identified readiness related deficiencies, of which 32 are 
designated category 1 deficiencies--ones which entail significant war 
fighting risk to execution of the National Military Strategy and are 
key risk drivers for the MTW, Major Theater War, scenarios.''
  During the committee's hearings on September 29, 1998 and January 5, 
1999, the Service Chiefs outlined the essential funding requirements 
necessary to maintain the readiness of the armed forces. General 
Shelton and the Chiefs identified a series of readiness and 
modernization problems that, without additional funding of 
approximately $17.5 billion per year--I repeat, Mr. President--$17.5 
billion per year--would continue to degrade our military capability.
  This figure does not include the additional funding necessary for 
contingency operations such as those we are facing in Kosovo today and 
in Bosnia and Iraq. It does not include additional funding for these 
contingency operations and increased pay and retirement benefits 
necessary to address the serious problems in recruiting and retention. 
This would cause additional requirements to exceed $20 billion per 
year.

[[Page 10585]]

  While the committee acknowledges that the administration's budget 
request contained additional money for defense--primarily because of 
the Joint Chiefs and Secretary Cohen's direct pleas to the President, 
the proposed budget request for fiscal year 2000 still falls short of 
meeting the Service Chief's minimum requirements.
  One of the noteworthy shortfalls within the budget request is the 
Administration's request to incrementally fund military construction. 
Such incremental funding would actually result in increased costs and 
delays in the construction of critical facilities. In addition, 
although the administration's fiscal year 2000 request represents an 
increase of approximately $500.0 million over the fiscal year 1999 
budget request, it does not adequately fund the quality of life needs 
of the military departments. Therefore, the bill before the Senate 
allocates an additional $3.3 billion to MILCON to fully fund the fiscal 
year 2000 military construction and family housing programs requested 
by the Administration, and to fund additional quality of life 
programs--those determined by the members of our committee to have that 
high priority.
  A focus of the committee's action this year has been to address the 
serious problems we are having with recruiting and retaining a quality 
force. In January, the committee moved quickly to report out--and the 
Senate subsequently passed--S. 4, The Soldiers', Sailors', Airmen's and 
Marines' Bill of Rights Act of 1999. The act authorized a 4.8-percent 
pay raise, reformed the military pay tables, and improved the military 
retirement system.
  The National Defense Authorization Act for 2000--this bill--includes 
pay and compensation elements of S. 4, as well as other innovative 
proposals to offer incentives to potential recruits and active-duty 
personnel.
  We believe the policies recommended in this bill will enable the 
military services to recruit and retain the number of quality personnel 
required to meet our national military strategy.
  That is the heart and soul of this bill.
  Again, I wish to commend Senator Lott and others who let this 
committee move out and have this as the first bill in the Senate to 
send the strongest message to the men and women in the Armed Forces all 
across the world that the Congress of the United States--certainly the 
Senate--stands beside them to see they are properly compensated and 
that their families receive a fair return for their services and the 
risks they take.
  There it is. It is in here. I hope it receives the strongest support 
of the Senate.
  The funding level of $288.8 billion for defense contained in the bill 
before the Senate represents a real increase of 2.2 percent over the 
fiscal year 1999 level. With the additional $8.3 billion over the 
budget request, the committee has done the following:
  Added more than $1.2 billion to primary readiness accounts, including 
ammunition, training funds, base operations, and real property 
maintenance.
  Two, authorized net increases of $509.3 million for ballistic missile 
defense programs; $218 million for military space programs and 
technologies; $111.6 million for strategic nuclear delivery vehicle 
modernization; and $55 million and a fraction for military intelligence 
programs; authorized $12.2 billion for atomic energy defense activities 
under the Department of Energy, an $187 million increase over the 1999 
funding levels. That is an area in which the Presiding Officer has 
taken a great deal of interest through the years.
  Recommended a comprehensive set of provisions to enhance safeguards, 
security and counterintelligence at DOE facilities in response to 
recent and very, very grave and serious allegations regarding lack of 
security at DOE laboratories.
  We are learning every day about this breakdown in our 
counterintelligence. Members are participating in this analyzation. It 
is very serious and requires the closest attention by every single 
Member of the Senate.
  The committee has spent a good deal of time examining the allegations 
of Chinese espionage at the DOE facilities. The initiatives contained 
in this bill, I believe, will go a long way toward fixing the problems 
that Congress continues to discover. I say ``continues,'' because more 
and more comes out every day.
  In addition to the other items contained in this package, we have put 
into statute many of the items contained in the Presidential Decision 
Directive 61. The Secretary of Energy has indicated his support for our 
legislation. That is in this bill. We passed these provisions with 
strong bipartisan support in the committee.
  We also authorized a $855 million increase to the procurement budget 
request and a $213 million increase to research, development, test, and 
evaluation for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force seapower and 
strategic lift programs. In addition, the committee authorized the 
budget requests for construction of six new ships and robust research 
and development in the future ships DD-21, CVN(X), the Virginia class 
submarines, and CVN-77.
  We added nearly $1.9 billion to procure a range of critical, unfunded 
requirements, and over $280 million of vital research and development 
activities for both air and land forces.
  We establish 17 new National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial 
Detection Teams for domestic response to terrorist attacks involving 
weapons of mass destruction.
  This is a problem that this Senator considers the most serious facing 
the United States of America. That is, terrorism, which no longer is 
beyond our shores but which could be brought to our shores by any of 
the people crossing through the ports and the airports of this great 
nation of ours. Regrettably, even someone of deranged mind here at home 
could bring about the use of weapons of mass destruction.
  Therefore, this Senator, and indeed this committee, is giving its 
strongest support to prepare ourselves, hopefully, to deter any such 
attacks. If they occur, then the resources of the Department of Defense 
stand well trained to assist other departments and agencies of this 
Government in bringing about what solutions we would be faced with in 
such a horrible situation.
  I established a new subcommittee this year called Merging Threats 
under the very capable leadership of the Senator from Kansas, Senator 
Roberts. He will have more to say today about the very valuable work of 
this subcommittee and its ranking member and other Members toward what 
I have described in meeting this particular threat here at home.
  These particular teams, each comprised of 22 full-time National Guard 
personnel specifically trained and equipped to deploy and assess 
suspected nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological events in 
support of local first responders--that is, the local police, the local 
rescue, hospitals, volunteers all across our country; that is a local 
responding--would provide greater team coverage nationwide and greatly 
increase our ability to respond quickly to terrorist attack in the 
United States of America.
  Now, I note that the National Guard is involved. Throughout this 
bill, throughout current military history, there is an ever and ever 
increasing role for the Guard and Reserve forces. They comprise the 
total force, when you calculate the military capabilities of this 
country, and as each year goes by, more and more responsibility must be 
shared by the Active Forces with the Guard and the Reserve. They have 
performed brilliantly.
  Further, we establish a Department of Defense central transfer 
account for all funds to combat terrorism both at home and abroad, 
establish an information assurance initiative to strengthen DOD's 
information assurance program, and add an additional $120 million to 
the administration's request for information assurance programs, 
projects, and activities.
  The committee also considered additional base closings. This is a 
very serious subject, and my colleague, Mr. Levin, will have more to 
say about this, as will Senator McCain. During markup, the committee 
addressed two amendments submitted by these Senators. Both were not 
voted favorably by the committee.

[[Page 10586]]

  Speaking for myself, I have historically supported BRAC as a means of 
reducing excess military infrastructure. As Secretary of the Navy, I 
remember vividly having closed the Boston Naval Shipyard, one of the 
most significant base closings since World War II. I know how difficult 
it is on the local community and the State to see one of these 
facilities close. It is not just a matter of economics, although that 
is very serious; it is a matter of pride; it is a matter of patriotism; 
it is a matter of generations of association of the men and women of 
the military forces who were trained at and operated these bases. It 
goes back into the sinews of our history.
  Today, it is quite clear that the infrastructure and our inventory 
exceeds that which is needed by the current levels of the Armed Forces. 
Much of our war-fighting capability has changed dramatically. I 
remember the first BRAC. I was coauthor of that legislation. We closed 
a number of the old cavalry outposts that were built for the sole 
reason of protecting the territories when Americans were settling the 
West.
  By the time we got around, I think, 10, 12 or 15 years ago, to 
closing these bases, they had long since outlasted their military 
contribution to the overall security of our Nation. Historically, the 
country has always been behind.
  Again, I was the coauthor of the last BRAC bill. However, this time I 
declined and voted against the BRAC legislation for reasons that I will 
state more succinctly and fully at the time the amendment is brought to 
the floor today.
  I believe the bill before the Senate is a vital first step in 
enhancing military readiness, modernizing our forces, and improving the 
quality of life of our service members and their families.
  I urge my colleagues to send a strong signal of support, a strong 
signal of support to the men and women of the Armed Forces bravely 
performing their responsibilities as their forefathers have done 
throughout the history of this great Nation, formed 209-plus years ago. 
I anticipate with this bill and the bills that will follow we will 
always keep America strong, a beacon of hope and freedom and security 
to the whole world.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee in bringing S. 1059 to the floor. This is our 
fiscal year 2000 defense authorization bill. It is the product of many 
months of hard work by the committee under the leadership of our new 
chairman, Senator Warner, who has taken the baton from Senator 
Thurmond, who had done an extraordinary job. Senator Thurmond, who is 
on the floor, was chairman of our committee for many years. This year 
he turned that responsibility over to Senator Warner, and Senator 
Warner has carried on with great strength and great commitment that is 
in keeping with the leadership Senator Thurmond showed when he was 
chairman of this committee. I commend Senator Warner for carrying on 
that tradition of Senator Thurmond and, indeed, those before Senator 
Thurmond.
  As Senator Warner has pointed out, our staffs have been instrumental 
in helping us bring this bill to the floor. We had a unanimous vote for 
this bill in committee. I think that is a real testament to the 
chairman's leadership. I commend him for it.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, it was a 
partnership between the Senator from Michigan and myself together with 
all members of our committee.
  I think in the context of talking about Senator Thurmond, in the 21 
years we have been here, he served with the chairmen before Senator 
Thurmond--Senator Nunn, Senator Tower, Senator Goldwater, Senator 
Stennis. Indeed, both you and I were well trained by these very, very 
strong and able leaders in the defense of our Nation.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, that is a view I fully share.
  The bill we bring to the floor is a sound bill that goes a long way 
to meet the priorities which have been established by Secretary Cohen 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is brought to the floor based on a 
very sound foundation because General Shelton, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, has assured us, assured the committee, assured the 
Congress, and assured the Nation our Armed Forces are fundamentally 
sound and fundamentally capable of fulfilling their role in our 
national military strategy. So we start with that sound foundation. 
Obviously, there are some places where we have to put some additional 
resources. But the foundation is a sound one and the Chairman of our 
Joint Chiefs has assured us of that.
  So, what we seek to do in this bill is build on that sound 
foundation. I believe we have done so. In accordance with the fiscal 
year 2000 budget resolution, the bill includes an $8 billion increase 
in budget authority above the level provided in the President's budget.
  Unlike some of the budget increases in the past years, the added 
money in this bill will be spent in a much more responsible way than we 
have sometimes done in the past, because the money we have added this 
year is entirely spent for programs for which the Department of Defense 
has indicated a real need. The bottom line is, this bill will improve 
the quality of life for our men and women in uniform. It will improve 
the readiness of our military. It will continue the process of 
modernizing our Armed Forces to meet the threats of the future.
  Virtually all the items for which the committee added funding were 
taken from either the Services' unfunded priority list for fiscal year 
2000 or from the outyears of the future years' defense program, the so-
called FYDP, which we deal with in the Armed Services Committee. These 
add-ons include substantial increases for the highest priority 
readiness items identified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including an 
added $554 million for real property maintenance, $420 million for base 
operations, $120 million for ammunition, $73 million for spare parts, 
$60 million for reserve component training, $40 million for depot 
maintenance. This money will significantly enhance the ability of our 
Armed Forces to carry out their full range of missions.
  These are areas where we sometimes fall short. These are not the most 
glamorous areas. They do not have a lot of people lobbying for them. 
But they are critically important areas--real property maintenance, 
base operation, spare parts, reserve component training, depot 
maintenance.
  In addition, the bill includes the triad of pay and retirement 
initiatives sought by Secretary Cohen and by the Joint Chiefs--a 4.8-
percent military pay raise for fiscal year 2000, reform of the military 
pay table to increase pay for midcareer NCOs and officers, and changes 
to the military retirement system. These changes will, hopefully, help 
address recruiting and retention problems we have in the services.
  When S. 4 was considered on the Senate floor, we indicated then we 
wanted to do everything we could to ensure the men and women in uniform 
received fair compensation for the service they provide to our country. 
At that time, I expressed concern about proceeding with the pay bill 
outside the context of the defense authorization bill and before 
Congress had passed a budget resolution. We have now revisited this 
issue in the context of the budget resolution and the authorization 
bill. I am pleased to report the changes in military pay and benefits 
proposed in this bill are all paid for.
  Unfortunately, the committee has not yet been able to find a way to 
fund one of the most important aspects of S. 4, and that aspect is 
Senator Cleland's proposals to enhance the GI bill, which is so 
important in providing educational opportunities to the men and women 
in our Armed Forces. These provisions, Senator Cleland's proposal, 
would provide substantial incentives to help address the current 
recruiting and retention problems which face the military services 
while offering our men and women in uniform an educational opportunity 
in the proudest tradition of our country. I expect Senator Cleland will 
raise this issue again as we debate the bill on the floor.

[[Page 10587]]

  I sincerely hope we will find a way to adopt these proposals. They 
are very important proposals. They are important to the retention we 
need to enhance. They would be important even if there were not a 
retention problem, in terms of opportunities we should offer to the men 
and women in our Armed Forces.
  The bill reported by the committee also provides full funding for the 
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program with Russia 
and with other countries of the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, two 
of the three companion programs at the Department of Energy received 
substantially less funding than requested by the administration. The 
bill also contains some unfortunate restrictions on the DOE Nuclear 
Cities Program, which I hope we will be able to address on the Senate 
floor.
  The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the related Department 
of Energy programs are one positive cornerstone of our relationship 
with Russia. They play a vital role in our national security by 
reducing the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
from Russia and from rogue nations with which Russia might be pressured 
to form closer ties in the absence of these programs.
  One area where I am most disappointed with the outcome of the markup 
is base closures, and our chairman has made reference to this issue.
  The case for additional rounds of base closures is overwhelming. The 
Secretary of Defense has told us that more base closures are critical 
to meeting our future national security needs. The Secretary's letter 
reads, in part, as follows:

       [N]o other reform--

  No other reform--

       even comes close to offering the potential savings afforded 
     by even a single round of BRAC.

  Which is the base closing process.

       There simply is no substitute for base closure and 
     realignment.

  He went on to say:

       The two additional rounds under consideration by the 
     Committee will ultimately save $20 billion and generate $3.6 
     billion annually. Both the Congressional Budget Office and 
     the GAO affirm the reasonableness and credibility of our 
     estimates for savings from BRAC. In exchange for property 
     that we neither want nor need, we can direct $3.6 billion on 
     an annual basis into weapons that give our troops a life-
     saving edge, into training that keeps our forces the finest 
     in the world, and into the quality of life of military 
     families.

  The Secretary concluded:

       The Department's ability to properly support America's men 
     and women in uniform today and to sustain them into the 
     future hinge in great measure on realizing the critical 
     savings that only BRAC can provide. As such, the Chairman and 
     Joint Chiefs are unanimous in their support of our 
     legislative proposals, and I most strongly solicit your 
     support and that of your colleagues.

  The Chiefs themselves--all of them, the Chairman and the other 
Chiefs--wrote to us on May 10, a very strong letter, about the 
necessity of adopting an additional round of base closings. Here is 
what they wrote to our chairman:

       Previous BRAC rounds are already producing savings--$3.9 
     billion net in 1999 and $25 billion through 2003. We believe 
     that two additional rounds of BRAC will produce even more 
     savings--an additional $3.6 billion each year after 
     implementation. This translates directly into the programs, 
     forces, and budgets that support our national military 
     strategy. Without BRAC, we will not have the maximum possible 
     resources to field and operate future forces while protecting 
     quality of life for our military members. We will also be 
     less able to provide future forces with the modern equipment 
     that is central to the plans and vision we have for 
     transforming the force.

  These are our top military officials telling us about the importance 
of additional rounds of base closings, to remove the unneeded 
infrastructure that we are now supporting, which drains resources that 
are needed for modernization, for readiness, for morale, for training.
  We cannot justify maintaining excess infrastructure that we do not 
need and, at the same time, say we have needs that must be addressed. 
We cannot have this both ways. We do have needs that must be addressed, 
and we have infrastructure we do not need which, if removed, will 
provide the resources to meet those needs.
  Our top uniformed officers tell us the following:

       BRAC is the single most effective tool available to the 
     Services to realign their infrastructure to meet the needs of 
     changing organizations and to respond to new ways of doing 
     business. No other initiative can substitute for BRAC in 
     terms of ability to reduce and reshape infrastructure. Simply 
     stated, our military judgment is that further base closures 
     are absolutely necessary.

  Absolutely necessary is what the chairman and the members of the 
Joint Chiefs tell us.
  These are not words of subtlety; these are very direct words which 
come from our uniformed leadership in this country, and we should heed 
them. I hope we will do that during consideration of this bill.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the two letters to which 
I have referred, in addition to a letter from the Service Secretaries 
dated May 11, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                     Washington, DC, May 11, 1999.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Ranking Member, Armed Services Committee,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Carl: As I have on many occasions, I want to convey my 
     strong support for approval of additional rounds of Base 
     Realignment and Closure (BRAC) authority as part of the FY 
     2000 Department of Defense Authorization Bill, which the 
     Senate Armed Services Committee is marking up this week.
       As you are aware, the first three rounds of BRAC have 
     already yielded some $3.9 billion net savings in FY 1999 and 
     will generate more than $25 billion by the year 2003. These 
     savings have proven absolutely critical to sustaining ongoing 
     operations and current levels of military readiness, 
     modernization and the quality of life of our men and women in 
     uniform. Even still, the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
     points out that the Department of Defense continues to retain 
     excess infrastructure, which we estimate at roughly 23 
     percent beyond our needs.
       As you know, we are aggressively reforming the Department's 
     business operations and support infrastructure to realize 
     savings wherever possible. Nevertheless, no other reform even 
     comes close to offering the potential savings afforded by 
     even a single round of BRAC. There simply is no substitute 
     for base closure and realignment.
       The two additional rounds under consideration by the 
     Committee will ultimately save $20 billion and generate $3.6 
     billion dollars annually. Both the Congressional Budget 
     Office and the GAO affirm the reasonableness andcredibility 
     of our estimates for savings from BRAC. In exchange for 
     property that we neither want nor need, we can direct $3.6 
     billion on an annual basis into weapons that give our troops 
     a life-saving edge, into training that keeps our forces the 
     finest in the world, and into the quality of life of military 
     families.
       I well appreciate both the difficult decision you and your 
     colleagues now face, as well as the legitimate concerns of 
     bases and communities potentially affected by additional 
     rounds of BRAC. At the same time, many success stories across 
     the nation prove that base closure and realignment can 
     actually lead to increased economic growth. In fact, the GAO 
     recently noted that in most post-BRAC communities incomes are 
     actually rising faster and unemployment rates are lower than 
     the national average. Moreover, the Department continues to 
     streamline the process, making it even easier for communities 
     to dispose of base property and to create new jobs in the 
     future.
       The Department's ability to properly support America's men 
     and women in uniform today and to sustain them into the 
     future hinge in great measure on realizing the critical 
     savings that only BRAC can provide. As such, the Chairman and 
     Joint Chiefs are unanimous in their support of our 
     legislative proposals, and I most strongly solicit your 
     support and that of your colleagues.

     Bill Cohen.
                                  ____

                                                   Chairman of the


                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                     Washington, DC, May 10, 1999.
     Hon. John Warner,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: We are writing to you to express our 
     strong and unified support for authorization for additional 
     rounds of base closures when the Senate Armed Services 
     Committee marks up the FY 2000 Department of Defense 
     Authorization Bill next week.
       Previous BRAC rounds are already producing savings--$3.9 
     billion net in 1999 and $25 billion through 2003. We believe 
     that two additional rounds of BRAC will produce even more 
     savings--an additional $3.6 billion each year after 
     implementation. This translates directly into the programs, 
     forces, and budgets that support our national military 
     strategy. Without BRAC, we will not have the

[[Page 10588]]

     maximum possible resources to field and operate future forces 
     while protecting quality of life for our military members. We 
     will also be less able to provide future forces with the 
     modern equipment that is central to the plans and vision we 
     have for transforming the force.
       The Department's April 1998 report to Congress demonstrates 
     that 23 percent excess capacity exist. The Congressional 
     Budget Office agrees that our approach to estimating excess 
     capacity yields a credible estimate. The General Accounting 
     Office also agrees that DOD continues to retain excess 
     capacity.
       The importance of BRAC goes beyond savings, however. BRAC 
     is the single most effective tool available to the Services 
     to realign their infrastructure to meet the needs of changing 
     organizations and to respond to new ways of doing business. 
     No other initiative can substitute for BRAC in terms of 
     ability to reduce and reshape infrastructure. Simply stated, 
     our military judgment is that further base closures are 
     absolutely necessary.
       BRAC will enable us to better shape the quality of the 
     forces protecting America in the 21st century. As you 
     consider the 2000 budget, we ask you to support this 
     proposal.

     Gen. Henry H. Shelton, USA,
       Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
     Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, USAF,
       Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
     Gen. Dennis J. Reimer, USA,
       Chief of Staff, U.S. Army;
     Adm. Jay L. Johnson, USN,
       Chief of Naval Operations;
     Gen. Michael E. Ryan, USAF,
       Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force;
     Gen. Charles C. Krulak, USMC,
       Commandant of the Marine Corps.
                                  ____

     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Levin: This letter expresses our unqualified 
     support for legislative authority this year to conduct future 
     rounds of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).
       Each of our services needs to reshape our base 
     infrastructure to meet new mission requirements. As a 
     practical matter, BRAC is the only tool we have available to 
     divest ourselves of unneeded infrastructure, consolidate 
     missions and free funds to improve priority programs on the 
     scale that we know is required. These priority programs are 
     the readiness, modernization and quality of life programs 
     that support our people. Prudent management of our 
     infrastructure requires us to stop spending critical funds on 
     the estimated 23 percent excess base capacity we no longer 
     need, so that we can focus our investments on those bases 
     that support our 21st century missions. We must refocus to 
     provide an efficient warfighting structure and to provide the 
     quality of life that is essential to retention and 
     recruitment.
       The benefits of BRAC are real, significant and long 
     lasting. The estimated net savings through 2003, over $25 
     billion, have already allowed us to better fund priority 
     programs. The annual recurring savings of almost $6 billion, 
     which the Congressional Budget Office considers reasonable, 
     will allow us to further improve these programs well into the 
     future. Additionally, we estimate two future BRAC rounds 
     could provide almost $20 billion in savings through the 
     implementation period and over $3.6 billion thereafter in 
     annual recurring savings.
       We remain fully committed to assisting communities recover 
     economically from BRAC actions. Right now we are 
     concentrating on initiatives to accelerate property transfer 
     to further enhance economic redevelopment.
       We ask that you support legislation for future BRAC rounds 
     so we can continue readiness, modernization and quality of 
     life improvements well into the 21st century.

     Richard Danzig,
       Secretary of the Navy;
     F. Whitten Peters,
       Acting Secretary of the Air Force;
     Louis Caldera,
       Secretary of the Army.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, as our chairman indicated, the committee 
spent a great deal of time addressing security concerns at the 
Department of Energy. The revelations of Chinese espionage directed at 
the DOE nuclear weapons program underscore 20 years of failure by the 
FBI and the Department of Energy, over the course of three 
administrations, to take adequate steps to address security problems in 
the Laboratories.
  This problem has been ongoing for 20 years, through three 
administrations, and we have not seen, until a Presidential decision 
directive last year, an effort to significantly tighten security at the 
Laboratories.
  We have in that Presidential decision directive, which is called PDD-
61, a strong effort by this administration to tighten that security. 
What we do in this bill is to build on that effort, and we do so in a 
way which does not undermine the ability of the Department of Energy to 
perform its vital national security function.
  I commend our chairman for his leadership in this effort. It is 
important that we do strengthen the security at the Department of 
Energy. It is important that we take the effort which finally was made 
when this administration signed a Presidential decision directive, and 
the President did so, but that we build additional safeguards which 
need to be in law.
  Here is what we have done. We have written much of that Presidential 
decision directive into law. We have established an outside Commission 
on Safeguards, Security and Counterintelligence at the Department of 
Energy facilities. We have required a certification of the security 
aspects of the lab-to-lab and foreign visitors programs from the 
Secretary of Energy, the Director of the CIA, and the Director of the 
FBI.
  The bill reported by our committee includes many other important 
provisions which will contribute to the national security and the 
effective management of the Department of Defense. Some of these 
provisions are: a provision establishing a single account for all 
Department of Defense funds to combat terrorism, both at home and 
abroad; a series of provisions to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of health care provided to service men and women under the 
TriCare Program; a provision promoting reform of Department of Defense 
financial management systems; a series of provisions promoting more 
effective management of defense laboratories and test and evaluation 
facilities; a provision extending the Department's mentor-protege 
program for small disadvantaged businesses.
  I conclude by, again, thanking our new chairman, Senator Warner, for 
the manner in which he and his staff have handled this bill. He has 
maintained a great tradition of this committee, working with all 
members to make sure that all voices are heard in the effort which will 
always be needed to protect the Nation's security.
  I know there is going to be vigorous debate on some provisions of 
this bill. We hope that Senators will, indeed, come to the floor and 
offer their amendments so that we can complete Senate action on the 
bill in a timely manner and go to conference.
  But whatever the outcome of the debate on specific amendments or the 
vehemence of that debate, I think I can say unequivocally that our 
chairman, following in the footsteps of Senator Thurmond, has done so 
with tremendous strength and has, in doing so, enhanced the security of 
this Nation.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. I think his statement reflects the 
partnership in which we have worked and will continue to work.
  We do urge Members to bring their amendments to the floor. Currently, 
we have the following--I share with my colleague, and I think he is 
aware of this: Senator Roberts has an amendment, Senator Specter has an 
amendment, and Senator Roth has an amendment, the subject matter I am 
sure the Senator is familiar with.
  It is the desire of the majority leader, and I presume with the 
concurrence of the minority leader, that votes on these amendments will 
occur not before 5:30, but as soon thereafter as we can package them 
and have them sequentially. So that is for the information of all 
Senators.
  I now yield the floor.
  I see our distinguished former chairman, the senior Senator from 
South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for one moment?

[[Page 10589]]


  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for one moment?
  Mr. THURMOND. Certainly.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank you.
  I want to withhold comment on what the chairman just said in terms of 
sequencing votes, because we are checking with some Senators on this 
side who may wish to debate one or more of those amendments to which 
the Senator has referred. We have not seen final language on any of 
them, I do not believe, so I want to at least alert the chairman I 
would not want my silence to indicate concurrence in what he indicated 
and said until we have had a chance to review that. There is the 
possibility we would want to withhold votes on those until tomorrow, 
for instance, but we need to see the language on those amendments.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we will provide our distinguished 
colleague with those amendments. I believe at the desk now is the 
Specter-Landrieu amendment. So one is before the Senate. I am now 
working with Senator Roberts on a revision of his. I presume that the 
Roth amendment is pretty well in final form. I hope someone can inform 
the Senator from Virginia as quickly as possible as to the text of the 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Senator Warner and Senator Levin and my colleagues, as 
the Senate begins consideration of the national defense authorization 
bill for fiscal year 2000, I join my colleagues on the Armed Services 
Committee in congratulating Chairman Warner and the ranking member, 
Senator Levin, on their leadership in preparing a strong, bipartisan 
defense bill.
  As the former chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I am well 
aware of the challenges and demands they faced in the preparation of 
the bill and believe they acheived all the objectives the committee 
established at the start of the year.
  At the Armed Services Committee hearing on September 29, 1999, 
General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated:

       It is the quality of the men and women who serve that sets 
     the U.S. military apart from all potential adversaries. These 
     talented people are the ones who won the Cold War and ensured 
     our victory in Operation Desert Storm. These dedicated 
     professionals make it possible for the United States to 
     accomplish the many missions we are called on to perform 
     around the world every single day.

  The national defense authorization bill for fiscal year 2000 ensures 
that our Armed Forces can continue to carry out their global 
responsibilities by focusing on readiness, future national security 
threats, and quality of life. I am especially pleased with the focus on 
the quality of life issues. Our military personnel and their families 
are expected to make great sacrifices and they deserve adequate 
compensation. Therefore, I strongly support the 4.8 percent pay raise, 
the changes in the retirement system, and the authority for military 
personnel to participate in the Thrift Savings Plan. These are critical 
provisions, which when coupled with the additional family housing and 
barracks construction, will result in a well-earned improvement in the 
standard of living for all of our military personnel.
  During the past several years many Senators have raised the specter 
of the declining readiness of our Armed Forces. The administration had 
continually denied this assertion until last fall, when each of the 
Service Chiefs--I repeat, each of the Service Chiefs--acknowledged that 
readiness was in fact a serious problem within our Armed Forces.
  General Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff stated: ``Your Army is 
underfunded today to adequately meet all the competing demands.''
  The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Johnson, stated: ``I am deeply 
concerned that we are at the beginning of a free-fall in terms of 
readiness.''
  And General Krulak, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, put it in 
these words: ``We are ready today, but in order to maintain readiness 
and the current budgetary shortfall and those of previous years, we are 
effectively mortgaging the readiness of tomorrow's Marine Corps.''
  The defense bill before us is a significant step toward correcting 
the readiness issues identified by our Service Chiefs. It increases 
primary readiness accounts by more than $1.2 billion; it increases the 
procurement budget by more that $855 million and increases research and 
development by more than $200 million. Despite these significant 
funding increases, I must emphasize that they are but a first step 
toward reversing the readiness trends. We cannot be satisfied with 
these increases and ensure continued robust funding increases for these 
programs in future bills.
  Since the fall of the Berlin Wall our Nation has faced ever changing 
threats. Among these are the spread of nuclear and weapons of mass 
destruction, international terrorism, and the ever increasing 
sophistication of weapons in the hands of countries throughout the 
world. The bill provides the funding for the Department of Defense and 
the Department of Energy to ensure that the Nation's military forces, 
both active and reserve, are prepared to counter these threats as we 
enter the new millennium.
  As with all legislation, there are provisions in this bill that I did 
not support during the markup that I hope will be amended. 
Specifically, I am opposed to the provision that would limit the 
ability of the Federal Prison Industries to sell products to the 
Department of Defense and the provision in Title C of the bill 
regarding Tritium production. In my judgement, the Armed Services 
Committee is overstepping its jurisdiction by legislating on the 
Federal Prison Industries, which is under the purview of the Judiciary 
Committee. Regarding Tritium production, I am concerned that the 
provision has been weakened to the point where the reliability and 
viability of our Nation's nuclear weapon's stockpile may be at risk. 
Unless we have strong language to support the Secretary of Energy's 
decision to complete design for the Advanced Tritium Production source 
there is a strong possibility that those who oppose a reliable and 
effective nuclear stockpile will delay tritium production beyond the 
time we need tritium.
  I have previously congratulated the chairman and ranking member for 
their work on this bill. Before closing, I want to congratulate each of 
the subcommittee chairmen: Senator Smith, Senator Inhofe, Senator 
Snowe, Senator Santorum, Senator Roberts, and Senator Allard, and the 
ranking members for their contribution to this bill. Their leadership 
and work provided the foundation for this legislation. Finally, I 
believe it is important that we recognize Les Brownlee and David Lyles 
for their leadership of a very professional and bipartisan staff. I 
desire to thank Col. George Lauffer for his fine work.
  This national defense authorization bill is a strong and sound bill. 
I intend to support it and urge my colleagues to join me in showing our 
strong support for the bill and our men and women in uniform.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we thank our distinguished former chairman 
for that powerful statement. His firm hand and leadership are very much 
a part of the everyday activities of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. I can think of no Member of this body who has served in 
uniform longer than our distinguished colleague, who entered, in my 
recollection, through the Army Reserve. I was there at a ceremony.
  What was the year that you entered the Army Reserve, Senator? Anyway, 
way back----
  Mr. THURMOND. What was the question?
  Mr. WARNER. What was the year you entered the Army Reserve? I 
remember I was there when we recognized----
  Mr. THURMOND. I finished college in 1923 and became 21 years of age 
in December of that year.

[[Page 10590]]


  Mr. WARNER. Isn't that interesting. I remember when we gathered on 
the steps of the west front of the Capitol to recognize the Senator for 
his service. He fully understands the commitments made by men and women 
in the Armed Forces through several generations. That historical 
knowledge has been brought to bear many times on the decisionmaking 
responsibilities of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
  Mr. THURMOND. Thank you very much.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, seeing no other Senator at the moment 
seeking recognition, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Bill Adkins, 
a legislative fellow of Senator Abraham's staff, be granted floor 
privileges during the consideration of S. 1059.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBERTS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 377

(Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate regarding the legal effect 
                 of the new Strategic Concept of NATO)

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kansas [Mr. Roberts], for himself, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 377.

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       In title X, at the end of subtitle D, add the following:

     SEC. 1061. SENSE OF SENATE REGARDING LEGAL EFFECT OF THE NEW 
                   STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO.

       (a) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of 
     this Act, the President should determine and certify to the 
     Senate whether or not the new Strategic Concept of NATO 
     imposes any new commitment or obligation on the United 
     States; and
       (2) if the President certifies under paragraph (1) that the 
     new Strategic Concept of NATO imposes any new commitment or 
     obligation on the United States, the President should submit 
     the new Strategic Concept of NATO to the Senate as a treaty 
     for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification under 
     Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the 
     United States.
       (b) Definition.--For the purposes of this section, the term 
     ``new Strategic Concept of NATO'' means the document approved 
     by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
     meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., on 
     April 23 and 24, 1999.
       (c) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect on the 
     day after the date of enactment of this Act.

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.


                 Amendment No. 378 to Amendment No. 377

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for himself, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 378 to Amendment No. 377.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       (c) Report.--Together with the certification under 
     subsection (a)(1), the President should submit to the Senate 
     a report containing an analysis of the potential threats 
     facing NATO in the first decade of the next millennium, with 
     particular reference to those threats facing a member nation 
     or several member nations where the commitment of NATO forces 
     will be ``out of area'', or beyond the borders of NATO member 
     nations.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROBERTS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bunning). The Senator from Kansas is 
recognized.


                           Amendment No. 377

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, before I make remarks on behalf of the 
amendment, which pretty well dovetails the second-degree amendment 
introduced by the distinguished chairman of the committee, I would like 
to pay a deserved tribute to our distinguished chairman, the Senator 
from Virginia, for his leadership in forging a defense bill during a 
time of great, great challenge.
  During a time when our military is stressed, strained, and some of us 
believe hollow, our Nation needs those who will take a stand--a stand, 
if you will--to really try to fulfill the first obligation of our 
Federal Government, and that is to safeguard our national security.
  Our new chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in the 
tradition of Senator Thurmond, has been the right man at the right time 
for the right job. He has, without question, reaffirmed the standing of 
the influence of the committee. He has actually given the committee--in 
this case, the creation of a new Emerging Threats and Capabilities 
Subcommittee--a chance to take a look at really what our Nation faces 
in terms of our national security threat in the post-cold-war period. I 
want to thank him publicly for discussing with me the possibility of 
being the chairman of that committee and for that appointment.
  I think the thing I want to mention the most in regard to the 
chairman's leadership and also that of Senator Levin is the pay raise 
and retirement reform contained in this bill. After hearing from the 
Joint Chiefs and knowing that we have a crisis in regard to retention 
of our men and women in uniform, the chairman, actually during the 
impeachment process, sat us down to work and really hit the ground 
running.
  Despite the criticism of those who wanted a much larger bill, a more 
comprehensive bill, to address all of the problems that we face in the 
military--and, by the way, I mention that these challenges include the 
quality of life issues, the health care issues, the issue of the 
operations tempo, the issue of the personnel tempo, and then that of 
mission quality. There are those who said, we are not quite sure that 
this pay raise or this retirement reform will really address the 
retention problem. There are others who said they wanted to study it 
further. I suggest to them that if we studied it actually further, we 
would be in such a problem with retention we would be past the marrow 
of the bone.
  John Warner really took the issue by the horns and provided the 
leadership. We are sending a message to every man and woman in uniform, 
saying that we care. And we took action, as I said before, despite the 
impeachment proceedings and despite a very, very busy schedule here in 
this Congress.
  So thank you to John Warner and also to Senator Levin, whose 
expertise in regard to his oversight and his policy actually keeps the 
committee with very strong leadership. It is a privilege to serve with 
both Senators. I will make a statement at a later time in regard to the 
efforts by Senator Bingaman, who is the distinguished ranking member of 
the Emerging Threats Subcommittee, and what we think we have been able 
to achieve.
  Mr. President, I rise with the support of the chairman of the 
committee, as well as my colleague from Georgia, Senator Cleland, to 
offer an amendment to this bill, S. 1059. It is my hope that this 
amendment will reaffirm the Senate's important responsibility of either 
rejecting or consenting to fundamental changes in the letter and spirit 
of existing treaties--in particular, when those changes actually 
broaden the nature of U.S. military missions,

[[Page 10591]]

responsibilities, and obligations overseas.
  I ask my colleagues' support for a simple sense-of-the-Senate 
resolution that calls for complete transparency on the part of the 
President and Senate consideration in regard to the de facto editing of 
the original North Atlantic Treaty.
  My sense-of-the-Senate simply asks the President to certify whether 
the new strategic concept of NATO, this formalization of new and 
complicated United States military responsibilities in Europe, as 
evidenced by the war in Kosovo and the possibility of future Kosovos 
around the world, is in fact a document that obligates the United 
States in any way, shape, or form. If so, my sense-of-the-Senate 
affirms that this body be given the opportunity to debate, accept, or 
reject the new blueprint for future NATO actions. These future actions 
will undoubtedly include substantial components of our own Armed Forces 
engaged completely outside the province of the original treaty. We see 
this today in regard to the ongoing operations in Bosnia, Albania, 
Macedonia, and over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These 
deployments are dominated by U.S. forces, ostensibly because of our 
responsibilities as a NATO member.
  During the cold war, the Congress and the American people believed 
the original Nato Treaty was in our vital national security interest. I 
am not so sure we know now whether these new NATO missions meet that 
important criteria for the possibility of spilling American blood and 
treasure. There has been a transformation Mr. President, and, while yes 
the world has transformed since 1949, Congress still needs to be given 
the opportunity to formally consider and endorse what we're signing up 
for and committing to do in Europe and elsewhere around the world. 
Given this situation, I believe it is imperative the Senate ask the 
President to formally certify whether the new Strategic Concept, which 
was adopted during the 50-year anniversary here in Washington about a 
month ago, represents commitments by the United States, and, if so, 
submit the document for formal congressional scrutiny.
  Let's be honest with the American people, Mr. President. If the new 
Strategic Concept of 1999 is the particular direction we're headed in 
regards to Europe, let's give this body and the American people a 
chance to formally agree or disagree. If only for budgeting reasons, 
let's understand what we are committing to do so we can plan and budget 
for it.
  In this discussion, we must not lose sight of the fact that NATO is a 
military alliance and the new Strategic Concept of 1999 is its guide 
for the 21st century. This is a very important document the nineteen 
nations of NATO have drafted and I encourage every Senator to examine 
it closely, comparing it with the original North Atlantic Treaty. I 
believe Senators will find that the new Strategic Concept of 1999 
document is completely inconsistent with the spirit of the original 
treaty in critical areas. That means the treaty has been changed, 
albeit rather quietly, during the 50-year anniversary celebration, and 
the United States has formally committed to a new strategic direction 
in Europe.
  It's time for the Senate to stop, take notice of what is happening to 
NATO, and go on record asserting its constitutional role.
  Through the new Strategic Concept of 1999, President Clinton, along 
with the member nations of NATO, has quite possibly taken the 
commonsense notion of mutual consultation for self-defense purposes 
implicit in Article Four of the original NATO Treaty and altered 
substantially the very purpose of the NATO Alliance from one of 
collective self-defense of member territory to international crisis 
management and humanitarian relief operations. As a matter of fact, I 
think the Strategic Concept is reflective for the most part in 
reference to a speech the President gave over 2 years ago at The Hague 
outlining what he thought the Strategic Concept and the new goals of 
NATO should be.
  Additionally, I believe the new Concept document is not merely a tool 
for justifying existing extraterritorial NATO deployments of American 
military forces, but is a precedent toward formalizing as U.S. policy 
the lazy tendency of this Administration and yes, others to rely 
increasingly on the military services to solve social and political 
problems in Europe and elsewhere. Problems, I would say, Mr. President, 
for which other instruments of power are clearly better suited for 
those tasks.
  I want to assure my colleagues, Mr. President, I have decided to 
submit my amendment as a Sense of the Senate because my objective is 
not to brazenly force the President to do something he, in his 
authority as Chief Executive to represent the nation in foreign 
affairs, has decided not to do or would not do. However, I am trying to 
encourage the Administration to be clear with the Congress and the 
American people--indeed to seek our consent and the public's approval--
in regards to this national security policy divergence.
  I am sure opponents of my amendment will argue that the new Strategic 
Concept of 1999 is only that, a concept, an intellectual exercise, mere 
musings as to future security challenges in the North Atlantic region. 
I disagree. My colleagues, do not let the title fool you! The 65-point 
document states its intent is to be a ``guide that expresses NATO's 
enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks, 
identifies the central features of the new security environment, 
specifies the elements of the Alliance's broad approach to security, 
and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military 
forces.'' That is a direct quote.
  For a Congress constitutionally required to provide funding for and 
oversight to the Departments of State and Defense, those are specific 
purposes and very clear intentions.
  I am sure some opponents will also argue that regardless of the 
specificity of the new Strategic Concept, it is not a formal treaty and 
therefore should not be sent to the Senate. I really think that is 
putting the cart before the horse. First, let's get our definitions 
straight. The U.S. Department of State Circular 175, Procedures on 
Treaties, defines a treaty as ``an international agreement regardless 
of title, designation, or form whose entry into force with respect to 
the United States takes place only after the Senate has given its 
advice and consent.''
  I will certainly concede that the new Strategic Concept is not a 
treaty per se, that that is only because the Senate has not given nor 
had an opportunity to give its advice and consent. If we formally 
adopted the logic that the President should only send actual treaties 
to the Senate, the treaty clause of article II of the Constitution 
would become irrelevant, contrary to the framers' intent.
  My point is that the decision of the President to submit an 
international agreement to the Senate is largely a political decision. 
Nonetheless, when a document tacitly commits the United States to a new 
strategic direction in Europe, it should contain the Senate's stamp of 
approval. It does not have it.
  Opponents of my amendment will further argue that the new Concept is 
not even an international agreement, much less a potential treaty. I 
believe any document that contains even tacit commitment by the United 
States and other nations to engage in new types of NATO missions 
outside the domain of the original treaty, as well as the commitment to 
structure military forces accordingly, can be considered an 
international agreement.
  Incidentally, the U.S. Department of State Circular 175, Procedures 
on Treaties, also sets forth eight considerations available for 
determining whether an agreement or an accord should be submitted to 
the Senate for ratification. Among them: The extent to which the 
agreement involves commitments or risks affecting the Nation as a 
whole--if that is not a description of Kosovo, I do not know what it 
is--whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of 
subsequent legislation by the Congress; past U.S. practices as to 
similar agreements and the preference of Congress as to a particular 
type of agreement.
  In mentioning these criteria, I must note that last year Senators 
Cleland,

[[Page 10592]]

Snowe, and I attempted to clarify administration policy in the use of 
military force by attaching several consulting requirements to fiscal 
year 1999 defense spending legislation.
  My question is: In order to determine what the strategic plan is, 
what our obligations are, what we are doing in Kosovo and other areas 
of the world, does that have to be done each year? Let's get the Senate 
involved at the outset. It is the Strategic Concept that is at the 
genesis of this kind of policy.
  The first State Department consideration is the most significant for 
purposes of our discussion. I genuinely believe that the new Strategic 
Concept of 1999 and its predecessor document, without question, 
involved commitments and risks affecting the Nation as a whole. In 
fact, I could not have put it more succinctly. That is one of the 
reasons our distinguished chairman, Senator Warner, wrote to the 
administration on this issue as the recent NATO summit, the 50-year 
anniversary, approached. He knew the document's revision was very 
imminent. He wanted to have a debate here in the Congress before moving 
forward with the other 19 nations. I commend our chairman for his 
knowledge, his foresight, and his leadership on this issue.
  As for the second State Department consideration I mentioned, the new 
Concept of 1999 probably cannot be given effect without the enactment 
of subsequent legislation by the Congress--without, that is, huge 
defense appropriation and authorization acts that try to balance the 
readiness and the modernization and quality-of-life requirements which 
this bill tries to address with numerous peacekeeping enforcement 
missions.
  Members on both sides of the aisle may also argue--in good faith, I 
might add--that the Resolution of Ratification for an expanded NATO 
which passed this body last spring contained conditions for revising 
NATO's Strategic Concept which effectively constitute a Senate 
endorsement of the new Strategic Concept of NATO.
  Again, I disagree. When we compare the actual text of the new Concept 
and the Resolution of Ratification adopted only last year, not only do 
we see the complete abandonment of the original 1949 treaty, but it is 
also a document that has gone way beyond what the Senate actually 
intended.
  Section 3 of the Resolution of Ratification as passed by the Senate 
April 30 of last year contained the following conditions for the new 
Strategic Concept. Let's compare these with the Concept document. The 
Ratification Resolution stated:

       (1) The strategic concept of NATO: (A) Policy of the United 
     States toward the strategic concept of NATO--the upcoming 
     revision of that document will reflect the following 
     principles:
       (i) First and foremost a military alliance: NATO is first 
     and foremost a military alliance. NATO's success in securing 
     peace is predicated on its military strength and strategic 
     unity.
       (ii) Principal foundation for defense of security interests 
     of NATO members: NATO serves as the principal foundation for 
     collectively defending the security interests of its members 
     against external threats.

  However, Senators, I urge you to read this--this document is on your 
desks--in the Strategic Concept adopted at the 50th anniversary 
celebration in Washington last month:

       Strategic Concept point #24: Any armed attack on the 
     territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be 
     covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. 
     However, Alliance security must also take account of the 
     global context [emphasize the word ``global'']. Alliance 
     security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider 
     nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage, organized 
     crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. 
     The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, 
     particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also 
     pose problems for security and stability affecting the 
     Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for 
     consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the 
     Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of 
     their efforts including their responses to risks of this 
     kind.

  I must point out, that last phrase is completely original. There is 
nothing in article 4 of the original NATO treaty even remotely similar 
to the term ``the coordination of their efforts including their 
responses to risks of this kind.'' It is just not there. I cannot 
imagine more substantive change to the NATO treaty than adding a 
collective response obligation for the United States to respond to 
terrorism and other asymmetrical threats not only in Europe but all 
around the globe.
  The Resolution of Ratification continues--again, that was the 
expansion treaty that was passed as of last year:

       (iii) Promotion and protection of United States vital 
     national security interests: Strong United States leadership 
     of NATO actually promotes and protects United States vital 
     national security interests.
       (iv) United States leadership role: [Now, this is in last 
     year's language in regard to the ratification of the 
     expansion.] The United States maintains its leadership role 
     in NATO through the stationing of United States combat forces 
     in Europe, providing military commanders for key NATO 
     commands, and through the presence of United States nuclear 
     forces on the territory of Europe.

  However, 1 year later in the Strategic Concept, point No. 18 --and I 
urge Senators to pay attention to it:

       As stated in the 1994 Summit declaration and reaffirmed in 
     Berlin in 1996, the Alliance fully supports the development 
     of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within 
     the Alliance by making available its assets and capabilities 
     for Western European Union (WEU)-led operations. To this end, 
     the Alliance and WEI have developed a close relationship and 
     put into place key elements of the ESDI as agreed in Berlin. 
     In order to enhance peace and stability in Europe and more 
     widely, the European Allies are strengthening their capacity 
     for action, including by increasing their military 
     capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and 
     capacities of the European Allies with respect to security 
     and defense enhances the security of the environment of the 
     Alliance.

  Now, Mr. President, the WEU will be using NATO military equipment 
paid for by the taxpayers of the United States. That may be proper, 
that may be a role for NATO, but I think we need to review that 
proposal.
  The Resolution of Ratification of last year does continue:

       (v) Common threats: NATO members will face common threats 
     to their security in the post-Cold War environment 
     including--
       (I) the potential for the re-emergence of a hegemonic power 
     confronting Europe;
       (II) rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, 
     biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver 
     these weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles, or other 
     unconventional delivery means;
       (III) threats after wider nature, including the disruption 
     of the flow of vital resources, and other possible 
     transnational threats; and
       (IV), conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from 
     ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic 
     disputes, and the actions of undemocratic leaders.

  All that was contained in the language when we ratified the expansion 
in regard to that treaty last year, 1 year later.

       Strategic Concept point #20: The security of the Alliance 
     remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-
     military risks which are multi-directional and often [very] 
     difficult to predict. These risks include social and 
     political difficulties, ethnic and religious rivalries, 
     territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, 
     the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can 
     lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting 
     tensions could lead to [the] crises affecting [the] Euro-
     Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed 
     conflicts.

  Nonmilitary risks, Mr. President? Inadequate or failed efforts at 
reform? What are we talking about? I do not recall those phrases in the 
Resolution of Ratification. Why would a military alliance such as NATO 
care about a nonmilitary risk? What is a nonmilitary risk anyway?
  The Resolution of Ratification continues, as of last year:

       (vi) Core mission of NATO: Defense planning will affirm a 
     commitment by NATO members to a credible capability for 
     collective self-defense, which remains the core mission of 
     NATO. All NATO members will contribute to this core mission.

  No argument there. That is the historical purpose of NATO and that is 
collective security.
  One year later, with the Strategic Concept, while they were popping 
champaign corks in regard to NATO being 50 years old:

       Strategic Concept point #10: To achieve its essential 
     purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the 
     Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the 
     Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:
       Deterrence and defense: To deter and defend against any 
     threat of aggression against

[[Page 10593]]

     any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of 
     the Washington Treaty.
       Crisis management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by 
     consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington 
     Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to 
     engage actively in crisis management, including crisis 
     response operations.

  I am glad to see that deterrence and defense is still there. But, 
again, this emphasis on conflict prevention and crisis management is 
extremely disconcerting and not consistent with the Resolution of 
Ratification that was passed in the Senate as of last year.
  The Resolution of Ratification continues--we are talking about 
section 7:

       (vii) Capacity to respond to common threats: NATO's 
     continued success requires a credible military capability to 
     deter and respond to common threats. Building on its core 
     capabilities for collective self-defense of its members, NATO 
     will ensure that its military force structure, defense 
     planning, command structures, and force goals promote NATO's 
     capacity to project power when the security of a NATO member 
     is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of 
     willing partners among NATO members. This will require that 
     NATO members possess national military capabilities to 
     rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations 
     for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the 
     United States in high intensity conflicts.

  However, 1 year later, in the Strategic Concept point No. 49:

       In contributing to the management of crises through 
     military operations, the Alliance's forces will have to deal 
     with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations 
     and demands, including humanitarian emergencies. Some non-
     Article 5 crisis response operations may be as demanding as 
     some collective defense missions. Well-trained and well-
     equipped forces at adequate levels of readiness and in 
     sufficient strength to meet the full range of contingencies 
     as well as the appropriate support structures, planning tools 
     and command and control capabilities are essential in 
     providing efficient military contributions.

  I do not know how this Nation is to fund, structure, and train U.S. 
military forces to manage parochial crises in Europe, no matter how 
small, through military operations. Nor do I think that is the best use 
of our forces, if you consider already we must meet the two major 
regional conflict response thresholds within serious budget 
constraints.
  Again, I do not see this use of military forces endorsed in the 
Resolution of Ratification that the Senate passed last year. The 
Resolution of Ratification does continue:

       The fundamental importance of collective defense:

  This was last year.

       The Senate declares that--
       (i) in order for NATO to serve the security interests of 
     the United States, the core purpose of NATO must continue to 
     be the collective defense of the territory of all NATO 
     members; and
       (ii) NATO may also, pursuant to Article 4 of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty, on a case-by-case basis, engage in other 
     missions where there is a consensus among its members that 
     there is a threat to the security and interests of NATO 
     members.

  However, once again, in the Strategic Concept, 1 year later, at the 
celebration, the 50-year celebration, No. 48:

       The maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-
     Atlantic area is of key importance. An important aim of the 
     Alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a distance by 
     dealing with potential crises at an early age. In the event 
     of crises which jeopardize Euro-Atlantic stability and could 
     affect the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's 
     military forces may be called upon to conduct crisis response 
     operations. They may also be called upon to contribute to the 
     preservation of international peace and security by 
     conducting operations in support of other international 
     organizations, complementing and reinforcing political 
     actions within a broad approach to security.

  What do we mean by this--``keep risks at a distance by dealing with 
potential crises at an early stage''? Isn't that the job of diplomacy? 
Anyway, the list of inconsistencies between the Resolution of 
Ratification and the new Strategic Concept of 1999 goes on and on and 
on.
  I have taken a great deal of time of the Senate and my colleagues to 
be specific about this. Even if they were more consistent, it does not 
change the fact that the Strategic Concept of 1999 fundamentally alters 
the nature and the domain of the original treaty that this Senate 
ratified just a year ago.
  So, in closing, I think my bipartisan amendment, warrants support 
because it is time to go on record that the Senate insists that changes 
to the original scope and purpose of the alliance go through proper 
channels, specifically article II, section 2, clause 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this amendment, which the Senator and I 
refer to as the Roberts-Warner amendment, is one which obviously I 
strongly support.
  I first ask unanimous consent that correspondence the Senator from 
Virginia had with the President of the United States be printed in the 
Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WARNER. I commend the Senator. We have been working on parallel 
tracks on this issue for some months now. I cannot think of a more 
important amendment that will be added to this bill than the one of 
which my distinguished colleague from Kansas is the principal sponsor. 
At this very moment, well over half of the tactical aircraft are being 
operated by U.S. air men and women; well over 70 percent of the support 
aircraft, the tankers, the intelligence aircraft and all of those, the 
spotters and the like, are being operated by U.S. airpersons.
  It is the Strategic Airlift Command which is heroically--together 
with the Air Guard, I add, which, of course, is part of that command--
carrying out the vast preponderance of the missions associated with 
airlift in this operation in Kosovo.
  If there is one thing this operation tells us, it is that future 
conflicts are becoming more and more dependent on modern technology. 
The weapons being employed in this air-only campaign are guided 
missiles, again predominantly provided by the United States.
  The other nations of NATO, for whatever reasons, simply have not 
equipped themselves or trained their personnel in sufficient numbers to 
conduct an operation of this magnitude. That is not in any way to 
detract from their courage in flying their missions, and approximately 
eight other nations are joining in this air operation. Whether they are 
single aircraft, or two aircraft or one mission a day--whatever it is--
they are an integral part. I salute them, and I respect them, but 
statistically, it is the taxpayers of the United States and it is the 
young men and women wearing the uniform of the United States who are 
carrying the brunt of this operation.
  The Senator brings to the attention of the Senate that at this 50th 
anniversary summit conference, this document, to which he has referred 
several times, was adopted. In any reading of this document by this 
Senator, and I think any other Senator, it will clearly show that it is 
the intention of the summit to push beyond the horizon of the original 
NATO of 1949, to push beyond the horizon of the 1991 Strategic Concept 
the potential missions of this historic organization.
  It is the absolute fundamental right of the Senate, under the treaty 
clause of the Constitution, to review in detail, and I say carefully, 
what is proposed--I repeat, proposed--by the 50th anniversary summit.
  The Senate Armed Services Committee will conduct a series of hearings 
once the hostilities and the risk of NATO forces is in one way or 
another--I hesitate to use the word ``terminated'' because I am not 
certain if that word is applicable to this situation which in itself is 
so filled with uncertainty, but whenever the hostilities are contained 
to the point where the Armed Services Committee can begin to look at 
what went right and what went wrong in the conduct of the military 
operations and, most particularly--most particularly--this consensus by 
the 19-nation doctrine by which this operation has been, is, and will 
be conducted for an indefinite period of time.
  I first became concerned about this new doctrine early this spring. I 
wrote to the President on April 7 urging him not to allow the summit to 
``finalize''--that is the word I used--or write in

[[Page 10594]]

stone, I said at that time, a new Strategic Concept. Why not just wait 
until the Kosovo operation gets to that point where hopefully 
hostilities have subsided and you sit down and study that operation, 
and from that study you would be better able to devise what NATO should 
do in the future regarding comparable operations.
  I said:

       The intent of this letter is to give you my personal view 
     that a final decision by NATO on the Strategic Concept should 
     not be taken--risked--against the uncertainties emanating 
     from the Kosovo situation. The United States and our allies 
     will have many lessons learned to assess as a pivotal part of 
     the future Strategic Concept. Bosnia and Kosovo have been 
     NATO's first forays into aggressive military operations. As 
     of this writing----

  That is April 7--

     the Kosovo situation is having a destabilizing effect on the 
     few gains made to date in Bosnia. This combined situation 
     must be carefully assessed and evaluated before the United 
     States and our allies sign on to a new Strategic Concept for 
     the next decade of NATO.

  Unfortunately, the President disagreed with my assessment, and on 
April 24, NATO went on to finalize a new Strategic Concept, and that 
document has been discussed in length by my colleague.
  The main difference in the security tasks identified in the 1991--Mr. 
President, about every decade, NATO seems to get down to revising its 
future missions, and the 1991 document was clearly out of date. It 
still referred to the threat from the Soviet Union. So time had come, 
of course, to revise it. All I said is let's just wait a reasonable 
period of time and assess the lessons learned and let the American 
people give direction to the President and give direction to the 
Congress if, in fact, they want to be part of a military alliance where 
certainly in this operation well over half of it is being conducted by 
their own sons and daughters, and the price to be paid is still 
unknown. It will be heavy and it will be paid by the American 
taxpayers.
  I recently had a very distinguished former Secretary of Defense write 
and tell me: Assess the costs being borne by the United States and the 
other NATO nations and that will be, I say to my former friend, the 
Secretary of Defense many years ago, that will be a central focal point 
of the hearings by this committee in the future.
  But those costs are going to be enormous to the American taxpayers. 
We first have the risk to the men and women of our country, the 
disproportionate contribution by our military assets, and the costs 
that will be allocated to the American taxpayer.
  Back to my letter to the President. I said that we can wait another 2 
or 3 months. We have waited since 1991. Why do we have to rush into 
another one? But the President, in his letter, declined to do it.
  The main difference in the security tasks identified in the 1991 
Strategic Concept and the document adopted this April is the addition 
of a ``crisis management'' task, and an emphasis on non-article 5 
crisis operations. Non-article 5 operations were not even mentioned in 
the 1991 Strategic Concept.
  I say to my colleague from Kansas, they were not even mentioned, but 
they are written throughout this new one which was promulgated this 
April. I will read one paragraph:

       The security of all allies is indivisible. An attack on one 
     is an attack on all. With respect to collective defense under 
     article 5 of the Washington Treaty--

  Of course, that is the 1949 treaty--

     the combined military forces of the alliance must be capable 
     of deterring any potential aggression against it, of stopping 
     an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible should an 
     attack nevertheless occur and assuring the political 
     independence and territorial integrity of its member states.

  Here is the key sentence:

       They must also be prepared to contribute to conflict 
     prevention and to conduct a non-article 5 crisis response 
     operation.

  That means going beyond the territorial boundary of the 19 nations.
  The vote of the American people through its elected Members of the 
Senate is absolutely essential before we sign on to such a mission. I 
commend my colleague for bringing that to the attention of the Senate 
in the form of this amendment.
  According to the new Strategic Concept, the alliance is tasked ``to 
stand ready, case-by-case by consensus . . . to contribute to effective 
conflict prevention, and to engage actively in crisis management, 
including crisis response operations.
  Kosovo is an example of a non-article 5 crisis response operation.

                               Exhibit 1


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                    Washington, DC, April 7, 1999.
     The President,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: The Administration, in consultation 
     with our NATO allies, is now finalizing various documents to 
     be submitted to the Heads of State for ratification at the 
     upcoming 50th anniversary NATO Summit to be held in 
     Washington later this month. A key decision, in my view the 
     most important one, is the revision of the Strategic Concept 
     for the future--perhaps a decade--that will guide NATO in its 
     decision making process regarding the deployment of military 
     forces.
       I am recommending, Mr. President, that a draft form of this 
     document be reviewed by the principals, but not finalized, at 
     this 50th anniversary Summit. Given the events in Kosovo, a 
     new Strategic Concept for NATO--the document that spells out 
     the future strategy and mission of the Alliance--should not 
     be written `in stone' at this time. Instead, NATO leaders 
     should issue a draft Strategic Concept at the Summit, which 
     would be subject to further comment and study for a period of 
     approximately six months. Thereafter, a final document should 
     be adopted.
       NATO is by far the most successful military alliance in 
     contemporary history. It was the deciding factor in avoiding 
     widespread conflict in Europe throughout the Cold War. 
     Subsequent to that tense period of history, NATO was, again, 
     the deciding factor in bringing about an end to hostilities 
     in Bosnia, and thereafter providing the security essential to 
     allow Bosnia to achieve the modest gains we have seen in the 
     reconstruction of the economic, political and security base 
     of that nation.
       Now NATO is engaged in combating the widespread evils of 
     Milosevic and his Serbian followers in Kosovo.
       I visited Kosovo and Macedonia last September and witnessed 
     Milosevic's repression of the Kosovar Albanians. Thereafter, 
     I spoke in the Senate on the essential need for a stabilizing 
     military force in Kosovo to allow the various international 
     humanitarian organizations to assist the people of Kosovo--
     many then refugees in their own land, forced into the hills 
     and mountains by brutal Serb attacks. Since then, I have 
     consistently been supportive of NATO military action against 
     Milosevic.
       Unfortunately, it is now likely that the NATO Summit will 
     take place against the background of continuing, unfolding 
     events relating to Kosovo. At this time, no predictions can 
     be made as to a resolution.
       We are just beginning to learn important lessons from the 
     Kosovo conflict. Each day is a new chapter. For example, NATO 
     planners and many in the Administration, and in Congress, 
     have long been aware of the disparities in military 
     capabilities and equipment between the United States and our 
     allies. Now, the military operation against Yugoslavia has 
     made the American people equally aware and concerned about 
     these disparities. The U.S. has been providing the greatest 
     proportion of attack aircraft capable of delivering 
     precision-guided munitions. Further, the United States is 
     providing the preponderance of airlift to deliver both 
     military assets (such as the critically needed Apache 
     helicopters and support equipment) and humanitarian relief 
     supplies, the delivery of which are now in competition with 
     each other.
       Until other NATO nations acquire, or at least have in place 
     firm commitments to acquire, comparable military 
     capabilities, the United States will continually be called on 
     to carry the greatest share of the military responsibilities 
     for such `out of area' operations in the future. This issue 
     must be addressed, and the Congress consulted and the 
     American people informed.
       It is my understanding that the draft Strategic Concept 
     currently under consideration by NATO specifically addresses 
     NATO strategy for non-Article 5, `out of area' threats to our 
     common interests--threats such as Bosnia and Kosovo. 
     According to Secretary Albright in a December 8, 1998 
     statement to the North Atlantic Council, `The new Strategic 
     Concept must find the right balance between affirming the 
     centrality of Article V collective defense missions and 
     ensuring that the fundamental tasks of the Alliance are 
     intimately related to the broader defense of our common 
     interests.' Is this the type of broad commitment to be 
     accepted in final form, just weeks away at the 50th 
     anniversary Summit?
       During the Senate's debate on the Resolution of 
     Ratification regarding NATO expansion, the Senate addressed 
     this issue by adopting a very important amendment put forth 
     by Senator Kyl. But this was before the events in Kosovo. The 
     lessons of Kosovo could even change this position.

[[Page 10595]]

       The intent of this letter is to give you my personal view 
     that a `final' decision by NATO on the Strategic concept 
     should not be taken--risked--against the uncertainties 
     emanating from the Kosovo situation.
       The U.S. and our allies will have many ``lessons learned'' 
     to assess as a pivotal part of the future Strategic Concept. 
     Bosnia and Kosovo have been NATO's first forays into 
     aggressive military operations. As of this writing, the 
     Kosovo situation is having a destabilizing effect of the few 
     gains made to date in Bosnia. This combined situation must be 
     carefully assessed and evaluated before the U.S. and our 
     allies sign on a new Strategic Concept for the next decade of 
     NATO.
       A brief period for study and reflection by ourselves as 
     well as our Allies would be prudent. NATO is too vital for 
     the future of Europe and American leadership.
       With kind regards, I am
           Respectfully,
                                                      John Warner,
     Chairman.
                                  ____



                                              The White House,

                                   Washington, DC, April 14, 1999.
     Hon. John W. Warner,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your thoughtful letter on 
     the upcoming NATO summit and the revised Strategic Concept. I 
     appreciate your attention to these important issues, and I 
     agree strongly with your view that NATO's continued vitality 
     is essential to a safeguarding American and European 
     security.
       I have thought carefully about your proposal to delay 
     agreement on the revised Strategic Concept in light of NATO's 
     military operations in Kosovo. While I share your deep 
     concern about the situation in Kosovo and the devastating 
     effects of Serb atrocities, I am convinced that the right 
     course is to proceed with a revised Strategic Concept that 
     will make NATO even more effective in addressing regional and 
     ethnic conflict of this very sort. Our operations in Kosovo 
     have demonstrated the crucial importance of NATO being 
     prepared for the full spectrum of military operations--a 
     preparedness the revised Strategic Concept will help ensure.
       The Strategic Concept will reaffirm NATO's core mission of 
     collective defense, while also making the adaptations needed 
     to deal with threats such as the regional conflicts we have 
     seen in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the evolving risks posed 
     by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It will 
     also help ensure greater interoperability among allied forces 
     and an increased European contribution to our shared 
     security. The Strategic Concept will not contain new 
     commitments or obligations for the United States but rather 
     will underscore NATO's enduring purposes outlined in the 1940 
     North Atlantic Treaty. It will also recognize the need for 
     adapted capabilities in the face of changed circumstances. 
     This approach is fully consistent with the Kyl Amendment, 
     which called for a strong reaffirmation of collective defense 
     as well as a recognition of new security challenges.
       The upcoming summit offers a historic opportunity to 
     strengthen the NATO Alliance and ensure that it remains as 
     effective in the future as it has been over the past fifty 
     years. While the situation in Kosovo has presented difficult 
     challenges, I am confident that NATO resolve in the face of 
     this tyranny will bring a successful conclusion.
       Your support for the NATO Alliance and for our policy in 
     Kosovo has been indispensable. I look forward to working 
     closely with you in the coming days to ensure that the summit 
     is an overwhelming success.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.

  Mr. WARNER. I assure the Senate that we will deliberate this 
amendment tomorrow again, I say to the Senator. We are not able to 
complete it today due to the absence of several colleagues and the fact 
that right now the Nation's capital is engulfed in a series of storms 
preventing a number of our Members from returning. Also, I think it is 
important that every Member of the Senate hear the words of the Senator 
from Kansas and others about this very important amendment.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Would the distinguished chairman yield for several 
questions?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the distinguished chairman for his very kind 
comments.
  Would it be helpful, I ask the distinguished chairman, if Members of 
this body would know that the same basic feeling exists in regards to 
the British Parliament in the House of Lords?
  Mr. WARNER. I think that is a very important point.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I have a statement here by a member of the Parliament. 
Menzies Campbell says:

       . . .''It is a matter of considerable regret that the House 
     of Commons has never debated properly the issues surrounding 
     the NATO Strategic Concept.'' He argued that, ``Parliament 
     should have had the opportunity to consider matters such as 
     NATO's right of independent action without Security Council 
     authority and further expansion of the alliance and its 
     consequences.''

  He said that:

       Foreign and security policy is the responsibility of the 
     government, but the legislature is surely entitled to express 
     its views.

  This was also true in regards to the statement by Lord Wallace of 
Great Britain in the House of Lords.

       . . .''no intelligent debate''. . .it is ``quite 
     astonishing that we allow British defence strategy to be 
     structured by an international organisation without any form 
     of input and debate by our Parliament.''

  Then he went on to say, in drawing the example here in the Senate:

       Both Republicans and Democrats. . .argue that the. . . 
     [overemphasis on] the enlargement issue in the run-up to 
     NATO's 50th anniversary celebration. . .came at the expense 
     of any meaningful debate over the evolution of NATO and the 
     role that the. . .Alliance will play in the 21st century.

  If I could ask my distinguished chairman, would he recall the many 
times that we have had briefings in regards to the situation in Kosovo 
and the question over and over again that was posed prior to the 
bombing: Would this be in our vital national security interest?
  I know the Senator asked that question many times. I know that the 
distinguished Senator from Utah, Mr. Bennett, who made a very eloquent 
speech in this Chamber this morning, asked that question. I tried to 
ask the question in regards to an amendment to the defense 
appropriations bill last year. I said: Before we would actually commit 
any troops under this ever-changing concept in that part of the world, 
would the administration please answer eight questions--as to cost, 
purpose, exit strategy, end game, and et cetera, et cetera?
  That public law requirement was not addressed for 6 months. I am 
worried about the future of NATO, I would say to my distinguished 
friend. I know the chairman is. I think that Kosovo is a rock that has 
hit the NATO windshield, and it has been like shattered glass. It does 
not matter if you feel that involvement is a fine mess we have gotten 
into or whether or not we think that this policy is the right policy.
  I am sure the distinguished chairman--I have talked with him about 
it--will have the full committee or perhaps my subcommittee look at the 
tactics that have been used, the stress and strain on others, on other 
services in other parts of the world.
  I am sure we have talked about the ethics of conducting a war above 
15,000 feet; immaculate coercion, where no allied NATO soldier has 
suffered any casualty as opposed to the people we are trying to help.
  I know that we have talked, Mr. Chairman, about the law of unintended 
effects; what is happening today in regard to Russia, China, India, 
Pakistan, South America, and Central America. President Zedillo of 
Mexico wondered aloud in the international press: Will NATO now come to 
enforce human rights within the sovereign territory of Mexico in 
regards to the Chippewa Indian situation? How about East Timor, 
Chechnya, Turkey, and the Kurds, et cetera, et cetera? Rwanda, that 
situation is far more difficult.
  I don't know, Mr. Chairman. I just think there are a lot of real 
questions that Members have. If you go back to the basic genesis as to 
why we are there, it comes right back to the President's speech at the 
Hague over 2 years ago, reflected in the Strategic Concept of NATO.
  I thank the distinguished chairman.
  Mr. WARNER. I say to my colleague, you are right on.
  Indeed, go back before Kosovo to Bosnia. How many debates took place 
on this floor where the central question was: Was it in the vital U.S. 
interest to make our commitments there? Time and time again, the 
administration dropped the word ``vital,'' and then talked about how it 
was in our interest.
  But when we put life and limb of the American person on the line, 
whether it is in the cockpits or on the ground or on the sea, I really 
believe it should be

[[Page 10596]]

in the vital interest of the United States of America for our families 
to be asked to make those commitments of life and limb. That is central 
to this question, as you pointed out, I think very carefully.
  If I might, because I think it bears worth repeating: ``The NATO 
charter requires the use of force in only one instance''--now this is 
the 1949 treaty, under article 5--``to respond to an armed attack 
against one or more of the member nations.'' Strike one, strike all. 
There is nothing in that charter that calls for the use of force to 
protect common interests.
  This is being created out of whole cloth, this non-article 5 combat. 
It is as if we are writing a new article to the original treaty. It is 
for that reason that we should bring this before the Senate. Because 
through the guise of calling it a strategic concept through the panoply 
of the 50th anniversary, what they have done here, in my judgment, is 
create a new article to the fundamental treaty of 1949, and that they 
cannot do without the advice and consent of the Senate.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Would my distinguished chairman yield for one additional 
question?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I am worried about the future of NATO. If in fact our 
involvement in Kosovo was at one time not in our vital national 
interest, there is, I think, a good argument that can be made--has been 
made by the national security team and the President--that since NATO's 
credibility or the future of NATO is now on the line, it is in our 
vital national security interest.
  Having said that, and having looked at the war in Kosovo and the 
tactics used, and the result, and all six of the goals, as outlined by 
the distinguished Secretary of State in our briefings, being turned on 
their head as a result of the tactics that have been used in the 
military strategy, and the law of unintended effects, can you imagine a 
situation under this Strategic Concept that all 19 nations will ever 
agree to ever bomb anybody again? On a proactive basis? Where we are 
going outside of the NATO territory, ignoring the U.N.? I doubt it.
  Eight nations, right now as I speak, more especially three, want the 
bombing ended. Many others in this Chamber--not this Senator, for 
reasons that I could go into, but I will not--did not want to start the 
bombing campaign. Others wanted to start it. Others wanted to use the 
ground forces. That debate is going on right now.
  We are negotiating within the NATO--within the NATO--alliance as 
opposed to trying to negotiate, as we are trying to do, with Mr. 
Milosevic, who, by the way, is a thug and an international terrorist 
and all the things people say about him. That does not enter into this. 
But can you imagine, Mr. Chairman, under what circumstance, after 
Kosovo, that NATO would bomb again, or for that matter ever use ground 
troops?
  What kind of message does that send to the bad guys and the hard 
targets and the real people that we should be worrying about all around 
the world? I think we have decimated--well, there is a stronger word 
for it, but I will not use it--in regards to NATO. I think under this 
Strategic Concept we have wandered so far afield and into a dangerous 
pasture that we are endangering the true mission of NATO, which is 
collective security, not to mention all the rest of these things that 
are in this concept.
  That is what worries me.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my good friend, in my judgment, 
predicated on a lot of study in the lifetime of this Senator of the 
NATO treaty, the doctrine of consensus was predicated on keeping the 
operations within the borders.
  And now, under this proposed 1999 Strategic Concept, to take it 
beyond the borders, I question whether or not the doctrine of consensus 
will work.
  What a tragedy it would be if we took this magnificent NATO 
organization, which fulfilled beyond the dreams of all its mission, as 
laid down in 1949, which kept the peace in Europe for that half 
century, and allow it to be pulled apart by a doctrine such as this new 
Strategic Concept. I think the Senator is quite right. We are in this 
conflict, in all probability, not because of our national vital 
security interests but because of NATO. It is because of NATO that we 
cannot allow our military commanders to promulgate the actions which 
are necessary to go ahead and win it.
  I often think, I say to my good friend, as over 50 percent of the 
airmen are flying tactical missions and over 70 percent of the support 
missions and the airlift, are we unfairly asking those young aviators 
to bear the brunt of war disproportionately because NATO did not devise 
and put in place, concurrently with the air operations, starting a 
ground operation? Because a ground operation would have transformed 
this conflict considerably. It might well, in my judgment, have brought 
about a far earlier conclusion of this conflict and saved the prolonged 
risk to airmen which is going on today and tomorrow and for the 
indefinite future, given the absence of bringing together all the force 
capable of the 19 nations to bear.
  Indeed, the other nations that do not have the air power, as we have 
it, could have been the primary components of the ground action, 
leaving to the American airmen the operations in the sky but they 
undertake the operations on the ground. It would have forced Milosevic 
to put in place, making in all probability his ground assets a better 
target than they are today, widely dispersed and hidden in the villages 
and towns throughout Kosovo and elsewhere.
  I think the whole dynamics of this conflict would have been changed 
had we not limited solely to air but done a ground-air combination, for 
which our forces have trained these 50 years in NATO, as well as the 
other NATO nations, for a ground-air coordinated defense.
  I point out, NATO was always to be a defense treaty.
  Mr. ROBERTS. If I may ask my distinguished friend, the chairman, one 
other question; that is, I do not think there is any question in the 
minds of many that to state that you are not going to use grounds 
forces before you decide to use force was a mistake. There is no 
question about that.
  I am not sure I could still support or still support--I never did 
support--the use of ground troops, unless I know what their specific 
mission is: What do we expect them to do. And then, if you ``win,'' if 
we could ever define ``winning,'' what is it that we have won.
  So from the standpoint of tactics, I say again to the chairman, I am 
very hopeful, once this war is over, we hope and pray that all of this 
talk that has been rather critical will be secondary, and, if Milosevic 
would agree to some of the negotiating principles that have been 
offered, we shall see. I see where one NATO general indicated it is 
going to take another 2 months. I hope that is not the case.
  I hope the Senate Armed Services Committee--and I ask the chairman, 
would it be his intent to take a hard look. I have a subcommittee that 
looks at low-intensity conflicts--this became a high-intensity 
conflict--and military tactics and strategy. I hope we can take a look 
at this, especially with the asymmetrical threat that Mr. Milosevic has 
used so well against us. He basically took one look at our tactics and 
acted accordingly and played rope-a-dope. He has achieved most of his 
objectives. That seems to me to be a real problem here. I hope we have 
those hearings.
  Again, I go back to the genesis of this whole business, and that is a 
Strategic Concept that puts us in far different pastures. I know there 
will be some of my colleagues who say this is not a treaty. The fact 
that we are having this debate today, I think, is encouraging. We had a 
debate on ratification of NATO expansion last year. To my knowledge, we 
have not had any debate, or very little discussion, of this Strategic 
Concept and what it means.
  So the Senator's cosponsorship of this amendment is much appreciated. 
If, in fact it is not a treaty, it has the effect of a treaty.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are going to have that series of 
hearings. I do not want to have a hearing or a series of hearings on 
the Armed Services

[[Page 10597]]

Committee until the men and women of the NATO forces are, hopefully, in 
a very limited situation with regard to personal risk.
  Mr. ROBERTS. If the chairman will, I heartily agree. The war must be 
over.
  Mr. WARNER. Let me just bring up a final concluding point to my good 
friend here. I know others want to speak to this. Then we will have to 
lay it aside.
  I point out that during the 1994 debate on modifications to the ABM 
Treaty, the Armed Services Committee included a provision, and I was a 
cosponsor of that effort in the 1995 DOD authorization act--I ask my 
colleague to listen carefully--which required the President to submit 
to the Senate for advice and consent any international agreement which 
would ``substantially modify the ABM Treaty.''
  I think that is a direct parallel and an exact precedent for what the 
Roberts-Warner amendment seeks.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first I commend our good friend from Kansas 
for the energy he has put into a very significant issue which has to do 
with the new Strategic Concept of NATO.
  This is not a new issue. The question of NATO's role since the fall 
of the Soviet Union has been an issue of a number of new Strategic 
Concepts. Listen to what NATO said in 1990. We have heard a lot about 
1999 in Washington, but just listen to the heads of state in July 1990, 
speaking in London. Here is what the heads of state said: While 
reaffirming the basic principles on which the alliance has rested since 
its inception, they recognized the developments taking place in Europe 
would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be 
met in the future and the need for a fundamental strategic review, 
fundamental strategic review.
  And what came out of that strategic review in 1991, fundamental 
strategic review for NATO? They have listed many new security 
challenges and risks in 1991. Listen to risk No. 9, language very 
similar to what was adopted in Washington this year:

       Risks to allied security less likely to result from 
     calculated aggression against a territory of the allies but, 
     rather, from adverse consequences of instabilities that may 
     arise from the serious economic, social and political 
     difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial 
     disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and 
     eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as 
     they remain limited, should not directly threaten the 
     security and territorial integrity of the members of the 
     alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to 
     European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could 
     involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, 
     having a direct effect on the security of the alliance.

  Does it sound familiar? It sure does to me. It sounds like 1999 to 
me.

       Risks to allied security are less likely to result from 
     calculated aggression against a territory of allies but, 
     rather, from the adverse consequences of instabilities that 
     may arise from the serious economic, social and political 
     difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial 
     disputes. . . .

  I didn't hear too many calls then for a submission of amendments to 
the NATO treaty. I don't think we heard any calls then, although the 
risks changed. They changed in a significant way: No longer likely to 
come from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies but 
from adverse consequences of instabilities.
  I don't think there was a change to the NATO treaty then, and I don't 
think there is a change to the NATO treaty now. There were no new 
commitments or obligations for the United States then, in 1991, nor do 
I believe there are any now.
  Are there different challenges? Yes. Is there a different strategic 
concept? Yes. Are there different risks? Yes. But is there a change to 
the treaty, new commitments or obligations for the United States now? I 
don't think so. Were there in 1991 when all the allies signed a new 
strategic concept? No. Even though the Soviet military capability still 
was constituting the most significant factor, all of a sudden because 
of the decline and fall of the Soviet Union, we now had new risks. 
Listen to these words in paragraph 12. This is the 1991 Strategic 
Concept, paragraph 12:

       Alliance security must also take account of the global 
     context.

  Wow. You talk about a different challenge and you talk about a new 
strategic concept. In 1991, the NATO allies suddenly say that alliance 
security must take account of the global context. Those are pretty 
broad words. But I didn't hear any suggestion back in 1991 that it was 
an amendment to the NATO treaty that required submission to the 
Senate--and for a good reason. There were no commitments or obligations 
undertaken in 1991, and there are no strategic concepts which contain 
new commitments or obligations in 1999. In 1999, the allies said that 
alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider 
nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
disruption of the flow of vital resources, and actions of terrorism and 
sabotage. That is a lot different from an attack on the territory of 
the allies. But nobody suggested in 1991 that was an amendment to the 
NATO treaty, to the Washington Treaty.
  Why didn't anyone suggest that in 1991? Because that did not 
constitute the undertaking of new commitments or obligations for the 
United States, even though we all agreed that alliance security must 
take into account the global context--and that is a lot beyond Europe. 
In 1991, everyone agreed to that. I don't remember one amendment, not 
one amendment, not one proposal that suggested that the new Strategic 
Concept constituted a commitment or obligation binding upon the United 
States which would require a change in the NATO treaty. It wasn't 
suggested in 1991 because there was no new commitment or undertaking 
binding upon us, because there was simply a new strategic concept. The 
1999 Strategic Concept does not constitute a new commitment or 
obligation, either. The same principle applies now as applied then.
  So the amendment of the Senator, which says if there are new 
undertakings, whether or not the new Strategic Concept imposes any new 
commitments or obligations on the United States, it seems to me is a 
requirement on the President that is perfectly appropriate. I have no 
difficulty whatsoever in asking the President to tell us whether or not 
the 1999 Strategic Concept represents new commitments or undertakings. 
It is perfectly appropriate--as this resolution does--to call on the 
President to inform us as to whether or not there are new commitments 
or undertakings.
  As a matter of fact, the President has already informed us of exactly 
what this resolution says he should inform us. The President wrote 
Senator Warner on April 14 that ``the Strategic Concept will not 
contain new commitments or obligations for the United States.'' Those 
are the President's words.
  So what this resolution does is say: Does it? The President said, in 
April, that it won't. I have no doubt that the President will reaffirm 
that it didn't. But I must say I don't have a difficulty with what 
Senator Roberts is doing because it is perfectly appropriate to ask the 
President: Is there anything in this new Strategic Concept which 
imposes on us a new obligation for commitment? If so, submit it to us 
as a treaty amendment.
  This is very different from some earlier language that was circulated 
in the Armed Services Committee. This doesn't make a finding that there 
are new commitments or obligations in this agreement in Washington in 
1999. The language before us doesn't make any such finding. The 
language before us in the Senator's resolution, which I find to be 
appropriate, requires the President to determine and certify whether or 
not the Strategic Concept imposes any new commitment or obligations on 
the United States--whether or not.
  And so as I read this resolution, I think the language is appropriate 
in this resolution, that the President reaffirm what he told us on 
April 14, tell us if there is any change in his thinking on that. 
Again, as he wrote Senator Warner on April 14--and this letter has been 
made part of the Record now, I believe--the President said:


[[Page 10598]]

       The Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or 
     obligations for the United States, but rather will underscore 
     NATO's enduring purposes, outlined in the 1949 North Atlantic 
     Treaty.

  There has been reference here to the significance of changes in 
strategic concepts, and I think it is important that the Senate spend 
some time doing what Senator Roberts and others have done, both on the 
committee and off, in focusing on this Strategic Concept. It is 
important that we understand what these new threats and risks are. It 
is important, in my judgment, that we make a determination as to 
whether or not we do have new legal commitments and obligations.
  I don't believe the 1999 Strategic Concept creates any new binding 
obligations or commitments any more than I did that the 1991 Strategic 
Concept created any new binding commitments and obligations. But our 
committees of jurisdiction surely should focus on that resolution.
  Senator Warner has indicated in the last few minutes that the Armed 
Services Committee will, indeed, be holding a series of hearings on 
this subject. As he stated it, if I heard him correctly, those hearings 
will occur after the events in Kosovo are resolved. But as of this 
time, we have not yet had such hearings. I am not certain of this. But 
I don't believe that the Foreign Relations Committee has either, at 
least after the Washington agreement was signed. There may have been a 
hearing before the Washington agreement. But I don't believe there has 
been one since it was signed. The agreement has some very significant 
provisions in it relative to a European commitment to take on greater 
responsibility for European defense.
  Senator Warner made reference to the European Security and Defense 
Initiative, a very significant change--a very significant initiative in 
terms of what Europe will do. It is something that I have believed for 
some time that Europe should do. The reference is very specific inside 
of the Washington agreement.
  Two, the European allies taking on--in the words of the agreement--
``assuming greater responsibility in the security and defense field in 
order to enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, 
and, thus, the security of all allies.''
  Then it goes on to say: ``On the basis of decisions taken by the 
Alliance in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the European Security and 
Defense Initiative will continue to be developed within NATO.''
  I think it is a very significant change. It is something which we in 
the United States should welcome. It means that the Europeans will be 
taking on greater responsibility for the defense of Europe against 
threats, old and new.
  We ought to welcome as well the reference or the discussion of a new 
initiative where European countries will have greater defense 
capability; capabilities to address appropriately and effectively the 
risks that are associated with weapons of mass destruction; new 
capabilities so that they can deploy more readily greater mobility, 
greater survivability of forces, greater infrastructure and 
sustainability. These are initiatives inside of the new strategic 
doctrine which will make it possible for Europe to take greater 
responsibility for the defense of Europe. We should welcome this.
  I don't think there has been very much emphasis in the United States 
on what Europe has agreed to do in the new Strategic Concept--what they 
have, in effect, put into black and white, the commitment to greater 
European resources being used for the European defense.
  As I said a few moments ago, this resolution which is before us says 
that if there are new commitments and obligations--if--then the 
President should so certify to the Senate. And I believe there is none.
  Indeed, the Senator from Virginia has been assured by the President 
in the letter which he put in the Record that the Strategic Concept 
will not contain new commitments or obligations. I believe there is 
none in this 1999 Strategic Concept, and I believe there was none in 
the 1991 Strategic Concept. There was none in 1991.
  Even though the language is very similar--again, my good friend from 
Virginia being here--I just want to read some of the language in the 
1991 Strategic Concept again. I will be very brief. But article 12 of 
the 1991 Strategic Concept said that ``alliance security must also take 
account the global concepts''--``global concepts.'' ``Alliance security 
interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of 
vital resources and actions of terrorists and sabotage.''
  That was in 1991. That is just one part of a Strategic Concept which 
we all agreed to.
  Did that represent changes in the North Atlantic Treaty? No, it did 
not, in my judgment. Nobody suggests that it did back then. No one 
suggested that the President back then, President Bush, submit that 
kind of change in strategic concept to the Senate as a change in the 
treaty, for a very good reason: It did not constitute a legal 
obligation or commitment which represented a change in the North 
Atlantic Treaty. That is why nobody proposed back then that we have to 
ratify this.
  Those are broad words in here, section 9 of the 1991 new Strategic 
Concept--it was called new Strategic Concept 1991:

       Risks to allied security are less likely to result from 
     calculated aggression against the territory of the allies but 
     rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that 
     may arise in serious economic, social and political 
     difficulties--

  Listen to this--

     including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes which are 
     faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

  They could lead to crises in European stability.
  Did that create legally binding obligations and commitments on the 
United States in 1991? No, it didn't. And nobody suggested that the 
President should submit that language, because there is no legally 
binding obligation or commitment from that kind of language, although 
in the words of the Strategic Concept in 1991 they recognized--this is 
what our leaders said in all of the NATO nations--``that the 
developments they can place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact 
on the way in which NATO's aims would be met in the future.''
  ``Far-reaching impacts,'' 1991.
  I commend--and I had an opportunity to do this a few minutes ago--the 
efforts of the Senator from Kansas, the Senator from Virginia, and the 
Senator from Maine, and others to bring to our attention what this new 
Strategic Concept is, so that we as a Senate can understand what it is 
that NATO is looking at in terms of a strategic concept. It is very 
important that those hearings the Senator from Virginia made reference 
to take place. In my own opinion, if the Foreign Relations Committee 
has not already done so--and I don't believe they have, but I may be 
wrong--it is important that the Foreign Relations Committee have 
hearings on this Strategic Concept.
  Again, I don't have any difficulty with the language in this 
resolution, because I think it is appropriate that the President tell 
us whether or not we have undertaken in this language any new 
obligations or commitments. The President wrote my good friend from 
Virginia on April 14 that the Strategic Concept will not contain new 
commitments or obligations for the United States. I assume that he will 
reaffirm that in fact there are no new commitments or obligations when 
he gives us the certification which is required in this resolution.
  I just want to summarize by saying that I have no difficulty with 
this language, because I think it is appropriate we have that 
assurance, because if there are new commitments or obligations--it 
seems to me there should be--then it would be presumably an amendment 
to a treaty which should be submitted to the Senate. But, again, just 
as there was none in 1991 when that new Strategic Concept which I just 
read was adopted by NATO, I don't believe there are more important--my 
belief is that the President has written

[[Page 10599]]

the good Senator from Virginia that in fact there are no new 
commitments or obligations contained in this new Strategic Concept in 
1999.
  Again, I want to commend the Senators who have focused on this. I 
think we must address the new kind of environment we face in this 
world, and that it is important that NATO, which is going to play such 
a critical role in the stability of Europe and the new kinds of threats 
which we and Europe face, address those threats, that we do so in the 
context of the most successful alliance in the history of mankind, an 
alliance which is now growing, an alliance which when we added three 
new countries in this Senate, on this floor--we adopted the Kyl 
amendment that, as I remember it, contained 10 provisions--very similar 
to what is in this 1999 Strategic Concept.
  I won't take the time to read more than just one section of the 10 
principles in the Kyl amendment.
  The Senate understands that the policy of the United States is that 
the core concepts contained in the 1991 Strategic Concept of NATO, 
which adapted NATO's strategic strategy of the post-cold-war 
environment, remain valid today in that the upcoming revision of that 
document will reflect the following provisions, and there are many.
  One is:

       (IV) conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from 
     ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic 
     disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders.

  That is one of the principles of the Kyl amendment in which we 
confirmed three nations would be added to the NATO alliance.
  I yield for a question.
  Mr. WARNER. I want to engage in a few more minutes of colloquy. Other 
Senators are waiting and we have momentum under this bill. One Senator 
desires to lay down some additional amendments. I cannot let this 
opportunity go by.
  Article 5 of the 1949 treaty laid out in very clear language exactly 
the reasons for which NATO was established. It could be understood by 
anyone, whether he or she wears four stars or is a private. It simply 
says:

       The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more 
     of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an 
     attack against them all.

  The word ``attack'' goes all the way through article 5.

       We will assist the parties so attacked.
       It was a defensive treaty, whether it was armed aggression 
     across the border against a member nation. That is the only 
     reason that NATO was founded.

  Now in the Bosnia and Kosovo operation, there wasn't any attack on a 
member nation but it was unsettling to the security of Europe. There 
was no attack.
  They decided it was a non-article 5 military operation. There is no 
non-article 5 in here. You have to go to a preamble. You have to work a 
strain for the basis on which we are in Bosnia and in Kosovo.
  We are there; we are committed as a nation. If in the next decade we 
want to do something beyond article 5, then let's put it down as a new 
article. Let's write it as a new article, article 15, and put it down 
in very clear language so that everybody can understand what it is we 
want to do, rather than going back and getting a strange interpretation 
of a preamble to begin to justify putting men and women of the Armed 
Forces of the United States in harm's way.
  The burdensharing concept: The financial relationship between the 
United States, which pays 25 percent of the costs of NATO--eventually 
our committee will get all those costs and spread them out. I think we 
ought to, plain and simple, start a new article if we want to do 
something different than article 5 and not go back within the confines 
of this magnificent document and try to get some strained, whatever it 
is, to justify military action beyond the borders.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in 1991 this is what the NATO new Strategic 
Concept said:

       Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from 
     calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, 
     but rather from the adverse consequences of instability that 
     may arise from the serious economic, social, and political 
     difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial 
     disputes which are faced by many countries in central and 
     eastern Europe.
       They could . . . lead to crises inimical to European 
     stability and to armed conflicts.

  That is section 9.
  Then they say, in addition to article 5, article 6 which they made 
reference to, an armed attack of the territory of the allies from 
whatever direction. In 1991, this new Strategic Concept said, 
``However, alliance security must also take account of the global 
context.'' That is 1991--``Global context.''
  Mr. WARNER. I suggest my good friend is making my argument.
  What I am saying is this is likened to statute law. What the Senator 
is reading are regulations. How often in the history of our country 
have regulations just about emasculated the statute?
  Mr. LEVIN. My only point in response to the Senator from Virginia, is 
that nobody suggested in 1991 that those words created a new binding 
obligation or commitment on the United States. I didn't hear it in 
1991; I didn't hear it in 1992; I didn't hear it in 1993; I didn't hear 
it in 1994.
  ``Global context'' alliance security must take account.
  Why didn't anybody make that argument in the 8 years since 1991? The 
answer is, because it didn't create any commitment or obligation, or 
else I assume somebody on this floor would have argued there was a new 
commitment or argument--the very similar language.
  In 1990, NATO got together and said the Soviet Union has fallen 
apart, and developments taking place in Europe have a far-reaching 
impact. This is a fundamental strategic review.
  The only point I am making is I have no difficulty with the language 
in the good Senator's amendment, because I think we should have the 
assurance that there is no binding obligation or commitment represented 
by these new strategic concepts that NATO adopts. I happen to think 
that is very important.
  I repeat that the Senator has received that assurance from the 
President of the United States.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I may procedurally address what I 
believe is about to take place. The good Senator from Pennsylvania and 
the good Senator from Louisiana have an amendment which will soon be 
presented to the Senate and become the pending business. However, 
before, as I understand it, the Senator from Minnesota will lay down 
three amendments and we will immediately lay them aside; then our 
distinguished colleague and member of the committee will address the 
Senate with regard to the bill for about 10 minutes.
  Mr. SPECTER. I have worked out with the Senator from Maine that I 
will speak first and then yield to the Senator from Maine and the 
Senator from Louisiana who will speak at somewhat greater length.
  Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor.


                Amendments Nos. 380 Through 382, En Bloc

  Mr. WELLSTONE. I ask unanimous consent to send three amendments to 
the desk and then have them temporarily laid aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] proposes 
     amendments Nos. 380 through 382, en bloc.

  Mr. WELLSTONE. I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendments be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments en bloc are as follows:


                           amendment No. 380

    (Purpose: To expand the list of diseases presumed to be service-
               connected for radiation-exposed veterans)

       On page 387, below line 24, add the following:

     SEC. 1061. EXPANSION OF LIST OF DISEASES PRESUMED TO BE 
                   SERVICE-CONNECTED FOR RADIATION-EXPOSED 
                   VETERANS.

       Section 1112(c)(2) of title 38, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(P) Lung cancer.

[[Page 10600]]

       ``(Q) Colon cancer.
       ``(R) Tumors of the brain and central nervous system.''.
                                  ____



                           amendment no. 381

 (Purpose: To require the Secretary of Defense to provide information 
      and technical guidance to certain foreign nations regarding 
  environmental contamination at United States military installation 
                closed or being closed in such nations)

       On page 83, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:

     SEC. 329. PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL GUIDANCE TO 
                   CERTAIN FOREIGN NATIONS REGARDING ENVIRONMENTAL 
                   CONTAMINATION AT UNITED STATES MILITARY 
                   INSTALLATIONS CLOSED OR BEING CLOSED IN SUCH 
                   NATIONS.

       (a) Requirement To Provide Information and Guidance.--The 
     Secretary of Defense shall provide to each foreign nation 
     that is a strategic partner of the United States the 
     following:
       (1) Such information meeting the standards and practices of 
     the United States environmental industry as is necessary to 
     assist the foreign nation in determining the nature and 
     extent of environmental contamination at--
       (A) each United States military installation located in the 
     foreign nation that is being closed; and
       (B) each site in the foreign nation of a United States 
     military installation that has been closed.
       (2) Such technical guidance and other cooperation as is 
     necessary to permit the foreign nation to utilize the 
     information provided under paragraph (1) for purposes of 
     environmental baseline studies.
       (b) Limitation.--The requirement to provide information and 
     technical guidance under subsection (a) may not be construed 
     to establish on the part of the United States any liability 
     or obligation for the costs of environmental restoration or 
     remediation at any installation or site referred to in 
     paragraph (1) of that subsection.
       (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``foreign nation 
     that is a strategic partner of the United States'' means any 
     nation which cooperates with the United States on military 
     matters, whether by treaty alliance or informal arrangement.
                                  ____



                           amendment no. 382

  (Purpose: To require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
 provide Congress with information to evaluate the outcome of welfare 
                                reform)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. EVALUATION OF THE OUTCOME OF WELFARE REFORM.

       Section 411(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
     611(b)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period and inserting 
     ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(5) for each State program funded under this part, data 
     regarding the rate of employment, job retention, earnings 
     characteristics, health insurance status, and child care 
     access and cost for former recipients of assistance under the 
     State program during, with respect to each such recipient, 
     the first 24 months occurring after the date that the 
     recipient ceases to receive such assistance.''.

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.


                           Amendment No. 383

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, after conferring with the distinguished 
manager, I, too, wish to send an amendment to the desk and ask it be 
laid aside after it has been read.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 383.

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place add the following new section:
       Sec.   . Directing the President, pursuant to the United 
     States Constitution and the War Powers Resolution, to seek 
     approval from Congress prior to the introduction of ground 
     troops from the United States Armed Forces in connection with 
     the present operations against the Federal Republic of 
     Yugoslavia or funding for that operation will not be 
     authorized.
       None of the funds authorized or otherwise available to the 
     Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the 
     deployment of ground troops from the United States Armed 
     Forces in Kosovo, except for peacekeeping personnel, unless 
     authorized by a declaration of war or a joint resolution 
     authorizing the use of military force.

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I can describe this very briefly. It 
provides that none of the funds authorized or otherwise available to 
the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the 
deployment of ground troops for the United States Armed Forces in 
Kosovo except for peacekeeping personnel unless authorized by 
declaration of war or joint resolution authorizing the use of military 
force. I have asked that it be laid aside to be taken up at a later 
time.
  The purpose, in a nutshell, is to preserve the congressional 
authority to declare war or have the United States engage in war.


                           Amendment No. 384

  Mr. SPECTER. Now, on behalf of Senator Landrieu and myself, I send a 
sense-of-the-Senate amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter], for Ms. 
     Landrieu, for herself and Mr. Specter, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 384.

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title 10 add the following:
       The Senate finds that:
       The United Nations Security Council created the 
     International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (in 
     this concurrent resolution referred to as the ``ICTY'') by 
     resolution on May 25, 1993;
       Although the ICTY has indicted 84 people since its 
     creation, these indictments have only resulted in the trial 
     and conviction of 8 criminals;
       The ICTY has jurisdiction to investigate: grave breaches of 
     the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Article 2), violations of the 
     laws or customs of war (Article 3), genocide (Article 4), and 
     crimes against humanity (Article 5);
       The Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Justice Louise Arbour, 
     stated on July 7, 1998, to the Contact Group for the former 
     Yugoslavia that ``[t]he Prosecutor believes that the nature 
     and scale of the fighting indicate that an `armed conflict', 
     within the meaning of international law, exists in Kosovo. As 
     a consequence, she intends to bring charges for crimes 
     against humanity or war crimes, if evidence of such crimes is 
     established'';
       Reports from Kosovar Albanian refugees provide detailed 
     accounts of systematic efforts to displace the entire Muslim 
     population of Kosovo;
       In furtherance of this plan, Serbian troops, police, and 
     paramilitary forces have engaged in detention and summary 
     execution of men of all ages, wanton destruction of civilian 
     housing, forcible expulsions, mass executions in at least 60 
     villages and towns, as well as widespread organized rape of 
     women and young girls;
       These reports of atrocities provide prima facie evidence of 
     war crimes, crimes against humanity, as well as genocide;
       Any criminal investigation is best served by the 
     depositions and interviews of witnesses as soon after the 
     commission of the crime as possible;
       The indictment, arrest, and trial of war criminals would 
     provide a significant deterrent to further atrocities;
       The ICTY has issued 14 international warrants for war 
     crimes suspects that have yet to be served, despite knowledge 
     of the suspects' whereabouts;
       Vigorous prosecution of war crimes after the conflict in 
     Bosnia may have prevented the ongoing atrocities in Kosovo; 
     and
       Investigative reporters have identified specific 
     documentary evidence implicating the Serbian leadership in 
     the commission of war crimes.
       Sec. 2. It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United States, in coordination with other United 
     Nations contributors, should provide sufficient resources for 
     an expeditious and thorough investigation of allegations of 
     the atrocities and war crimes committed in Kosovo;
       (2) the United States, through its intelligence services, 
     should provide all possible cooperation in the gathering of 
     evidence of sufficient specificity and credibility to secure 
     the indictment of those responsible for the commission of war 
     crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in the former 
     Yugoslavia;
       (3) where evidence warrants, indictments for war crimes, 
     crimes against humanity, and genocide should be issued 
     against suspects regardless of their position within the 
     Serbian leadership;
       (4) the United States and all nations have an obligation to 
     honor arrest warrants issued by the ICTY, and the United 
     States should use all appropriate means to apprehend war 
     criminals already under indictment; and

[[Page 10601]]

       (5) NATO should not accept any diplomatic resolution to the 
     conflict in Kosovo that would bar the indictment, 
     apprehension, or prosecution of war criminals for crimes 
     conmitted during operations in Kosovo.

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, as stated very briefly before, I intend 
to speak for about 10 minutes. Then we have worked out an arrangement 
where the Senator from Maine will speak for about 10 minutes. We will 
be preceding Senator Landrieu, because she intends to talk for about 30 
minutes. That is the speaking order which we have arranged among 
ourselves.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is that in the form of a unanimous consent 
request?
  Mr. SPECTER. It is.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the sense-of-the-Senate resolution which 
has been submitted provides for the prosecution of war criminals in 
Kosovo, arising out of the atrocities and war crimes which have been so 
blatantly committed in Kosovo.
  The somewhat polite term of ``ethnic cleansing'' has been used to 
describe these atrocities. But they are, in effect, mass murders and 
executions committed by the Serbian forces against the people of 
Kosovo. We have, to the credit of the civilized world, established a 
War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague. The establishment of this War Crimes 
Tribunal to prosecute crimes in the former Yugoslavia has already 
returned 84 indictments and the resulting conviction of some 8 
criminals there.
  The importance of establishing the rule of law is something that may 
be the most important legacy that will come out of the Bosnian war and 
the war in Kosovo, and hopefully will be embodied in a permanent 
international criminal court--which will remain for another day. Those 
resolutions have been introduced and pressed by a number of Senators, 
including Senator Dodd and myself and others. But in Bosnia, we saw the 
war crimes and we have seen very strenuous activity by the War Crimes 
Tribunal in the 84 indictments and in the 8 convictions.
  Now we have seen ethnic cleansing at a high level. We have seen acts 
of violence which go to the very top of the Serbian-Yugoslavian 
Government, right to the doorstep of President Milosevic himself. 
Although he is not named in this sense-of-the-Senate resolution, it is 
plain that the kind of atrocities which have been carried out could 
only be carried out by his order, at least with his knowledge and, at 
the very minimum, with his acquiescence--any of which is sufficient to 
establish criminal culpability for those war crimes.
  Recently, Justice Louise Arbour visited the United States. On April 
30, she met with Senator Landrieu, other Senators, and myself, and 
expressed the need for adequate financing for the investigations. The 
administration had requested funding of some $5 million. On the 
emergency supplemental which passed both Houses of Congress last week, 
up to an additional $13 million was added, for a total of $18 million, 
which was the sum requested by Justice Arbour.
  At that time, she made a plea that the NATO forces or the IFOR forces 
undertake activity to arrest high-level indictees who are at large, 
referring specifically to Karadzic, whose whereabouts has been 
identified in the French Quarter, and who could be taken into custody.
  Mladic, the other principal indictee, is said to be in Belgrade and 
it might require an invasion to apprehend and take him into custody. 
But at least as to the arrest of Karadzic, that could be accomplished.
  Justice Arbour also stated there were other high-ranking officials 
for whom sealed indictments had been obtained. Those sealed indictments 
were in the hands of military authorities, and those individuals, too, 
could be taken into custody.
  Justice Arbour expressed the judgment that if these war criminals, 
alleged war criminals--these individuals indicted on charges of war 
crimes, to be specific--were taken into custody, then she believed it 
could have a profound effect on the subordinates, on perhaps Milosevic 
himself or certainly on the subordinates immediately under Milosevic.
  It is our hope this sense-of-the-Senate resolution will impel the 
authorities to apprehend those individuals.
  I shall not go through the whereas clauses, setting forth the 
foundation for the U.N. action on establishing the War Crimes Tribunal 
or the atrocities themselves, but focusing for just a minute on the 
five clauses following the resolution:
  First, that the United States, in coordination with the United 
Nations, supply sufficient funds for the investigation of the 
allegations of the atrocities and war crimes committed in Kosovo.
  That can be accomplished with the $18 million appropriated by the 
United States and appropriations by other responsible nations.
  Second, that the United States, through its intelligence services, 
should provide all cooperation in the gathering of evidence to secure 
the indictments of those responsible for war crimes.
  Third, that where the evidence warrants indictment, those indictments 
will be brought for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, 
regardless of the position of the indictees within the Serbian 
leadership.
  This is directed at President Milosevic himself.
  Fourth, that the United Nations and all nations have an obligation to 
honor the warrants issued by the War Crimes Tribunal, and the United 
States and other responsible nations should use all appropriate means 
to apprehend the war criminals already under indictments.
  That refers to Karadzic, Mladic, and the others under sealed 
indictments as previously mentioned, having been identified by Justice 
Arbour.
  Fifth, NATO should not accept any diplomatic resolution to the 
conflict in Kosovo that would bar the indictment, apprehension, or 
prosecution of war criminals for crimes committed during operations in 
Kosovo.
  If there is any inclination, as part of a plea bargain on any of the 
negotiations, to spare President Milosevic or other high-ranking 
officials, that should be rejected as part of the diplomatic resolution 
of the conflict in Kosovo if such a diplomatic resolution should be 
obtained.
  Last Thursday, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified before 
the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of Appropriations, a committee of 
which I am a member. She was questioned at that time and stated that 
the United States was not negotiating with Milosevic.
  Well, in effect, an indirect negotiation is not a whole lot 
different. But it may be--and I made this statement at the time of the 
hearing--that the line could be drawn so that the United States would 
maintain its position that it would not be a party to any settlement 
which, by way of a plea bargain, gave immunity or absolved Milosevic or 
any other high-ranking diplomatic official or anyone from 
responsibility for the war crimes warranted by indictments and 
warranted by the evidence.
  I commend Senator Landrieu for her leadership on this important 
resolution, and I yield the floor.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise to cosponsor the amendment 
offered by my colleagues from Pennsylvania and Louisiana expressing the 
sense of Congress regarding the need for vigorous prosecution of war 
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity in the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia.
  This amendment expresses the Sense of Congress that:
  The United States should provide sufficient resources for an 
expeditious investigation of the allegations of war crimes committed in 
Kosovo;
  The United States should provide all possible cooperation to the 
Tribunal in the gathering of evidence;
  Where evidence warrants, indictments should be issued for war crimes 
and that the United States and all nations have an obligation to honor 
arrest warrants; and,
  NATO should not accept a settlement in Kosovo that would bar the 
indictment, apprehension, or prosecution of war criminals.

[[Page 10602]]

  During the past two months, Kosovo has witnessed carnage and 
bloodshed unseen in Europe for almost fifty years. These events are the 
culmination of a decade-long campaign of terror and bloodshed in the 
Balkans engineered by Mr. Milosevic.
  Over 1.2 million Kosovar Albanians are now displaced, having been 
forced to flee their homes. Over 700,000 Kosovars are now refugees, 
most in Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Others have been forced to 
hide in the forests and mountains.
  The United States now has hard evidence that war crimes have been 
committed. A report issued by the State Department earlier this month 
entitled ``Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo'' argued that: 
``At this writing, the forces of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic 
continue to burn, loot, rape, shell, and de-populate Kosovo, and 
thousands of refugees continue to flee into neighboring Albania and 
Macedonia. The refugees coming out of Kosovo are only now beginning to 
tell their stories. Yet even these fragmented accounts portray a 
systematic policy of ethnic cleansing.''
  This report alleges that:
  Serbian forces have made Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, a ghost 
town. Serbian military, police, and paramilitary forces expelled 
between 100,000 to 120,000 persons from Pristina in only four days. 
Kosovars in Macedonia indicate that only 100 ethnic Albanians remain in 
Pristina. Serbian forces are stealing and ``confiscating'' furniture 
from abandoned homes.
  In Pec, Serbian forces herded young Albanian women to the Hotel 
Karagac [Kara-jack], and raped them repeatedly. The commander of the 
local base used a roster of soldiers' names to allow his troops to 
visit the hotel on a rotating basis.
  Violence in western Kosovo is stronger than in any other region of 
the province. Pec was emptied of ethnic Albanians in 24 hours. In 
Djakovica's [Jack-o-vika] old city, Serbian forces burned 200 to 600 
homes the day after NATO airstrikes began. By the next day, the rest of 
the old city had been torched.
  The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees stated that the Djakovica 
region, and I quote, ``undoubtedly has been one of the most violent and 
cruel in the whole of Kosovo, turning it at times into a virtual 
killing field.''
  In fact, the bulk of these crimes are being committed by the Serb 
paramilitary units, such as the ``White Eagles'' and ``Tigers'' under 
the direct control of the Ministry of the Interior, and, in turn, 
accountable to Mr. Milosevic.
  Indeed, the campaign waged by Mr. Milosevic in Kosovo is a virtual 
catalog of systematic crimes which I believe merit investigation by the 
International War Crimes Tribunal. The crimes, to summarize, are:
  Forced expulsions: Over one million people have been forced from 
their homes;
  Looting and Burning: Some 500 residential areas have been burned 
since late March, including over 300 villages burned since April 4;
  Detentions: Consistent refugee reports that Serbian forces are 
separating military-aged men from their families in a systematic 
pattern. Some analysts estimate that the total number of missing men is 
as high as 100,000. Their fate is unknown;
  Summary Execution: Refugees have provided accounts of summary 
executions in at least 70 towns and villages throughout Kosovo;
  Rape: Ethnic Albanian women are reportedly being raped in increasing 
numbers. Refugee accounts indicate systematic and organized mass rapes 
in Djakovica and Pec;
  Identity Cleansing: Refugees report that Serbian authorities have 
confiscated passports and other identity papers, systematically 
destroyed voter registers and other aspects of Kosovo's civil registry, 
and even removed license plates from departing vehicles as part of a 
policy to prevent returns to Kosovo.
  The civilized world must send a strong and unambiguous message that 
ethnic cleansing, genocide, and mass rape are not acceptable, and will 
not be tolerated.
  I will never forget, about 4 years ago, I picked up a copy of the New 
York Times and opened it. There was a rather large picture of a young 
girl about 15 years old. She had sort of a Dutch cut, bangs hanging 
over her forehead. She had on a school uniform. But there was something 
very wrong with the picture: She was hanging from a tree. Dead in 
Srebrenica.
  And then it came out that there was a major massacre of thousands of 
people in that supposedly protected enclave by the Serbian military. 
And to this day, 5,000 to 7,000 Muslim men and boys are simply missing. 
A few have been found in mass graves, but the most still remain 
missing.
  This crime, too, was committed by those who followed Mr. Milosevic's 
orders.
  I would say that when any nation on earth permits their military 
police to wear hoods and cover their face while they are carrying out 
their official duties, then you know that what they are doing is not 
legal.
  And there can be little doubt that those who conduct these activities 
in Kosovo--be they in the Yugoslav military or in paramilitary outfits 
such as the ``White Eagles'' or the ``Tigers'' --that they are acting 
on orders which come from Mr. Milosevic.
  And now there are reports that Yugoslav authorities have begun to dig 
up the mass graves in Kosovo in an effort to destroy evidence that 
could be used against them in war crimes trials.
  Try as they might to hide their crimes, the world now knows what has 
happened in Kosovo. The regime of Mr. Milosevic has been waging war on 
the people of the Balkans for close to ten years now. The international 
community must stand up to this, or we will set the stage for further 
bloodshed and tragedy in Asia, in Africa, and elsewhere in Europe. Mr. 
Milosevic must be held accountable for the orders which he has given, 
and the crimes which he has ordered committed.
  I urge my colleagues to join me and the distinguished Senators from 
Pennsylvania and Louisiana and support this amendment. It sends a clear 
message to Mr. Milosevic and others who commit crimes against humanity: 
You will be held accountable, and you will be brought to justice.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Maine is recognized for 10 minutes.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the Fiscal Year 
2000 National Defense Authorization Act. This critical legislation 
brings the military to the threshold of a new century posing new 
challenges to the U.S. national security. Under the superb leadership 
of our distinguished chairman, the senior Senator from Virginia, the 
Armed Services Committee has reported a bill that shapes a more 
flexible, mobile, and precision Total Force required for the future.
  This bill takes a proven and fundamental approach to enhancing our 
national defense by devoting more resources to readiness and 
modernization accounts and improving the quality of life for military 
families. The total authorized funding of $288 billion in the 
legislation increases the administration's request by $8 billion and 
represents a 2.2-percent increase in real terms over the fiscal year 
1999 level.
  These responsible funding levels try to rescue a defense budget that, 
as a percentage of the Nation's GDP, has reached its lowest points in 
50 years. In modernization programs--those for weapons procurement--
funding has fallen by 67 percent since 1985.
  At the height of the Reagan buildup, the Pentagon obligated $138 
billion for procurement. Since then, the spending fell to a low point 
of $44 billion in 1997. The fiscal year 2000 budget increases the 
account to $56 billion, and I commend Secretary Cohen for planning the 
first budget of this administration that brings procurement back to a 
threshold of $60 billion, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
starting in the year 2001.
  The major weapons and systems authorized by this bill, particularly 
service combatants, strategic and tactical aircraft, and high-speed 
armored vehicles, will give the armed services more endurance and 
firepower at lower life cycle costs. Smooth construction materials will 
deceive the enemy radars

[[Page 10603]]

that can detect the hard angles of older platforms. Information 
technologies will give ships, tanks, and aircraft battlespace data that 
shows potential enemy movements before they occur. A new series of 
rapid transporters will bring forces to the shorelines of instability. 
And from safe distances in the air or at sea, smaller crews will 
program missiles for strategic inland targets.
  As chair of the Seapower Subcommittee, I had the honor of witnessing 
firsthand the revolution in capabilities by traveling to the Persian 
Gulf to visit the sailors of the carrier Enterprise and the guided-
missile cruiser U.S.S. Gettysburg and the minesweeper U.S.S. Ardent 
during the Easter recess. Without exception, the men and women of these 
ships, forward deployed between Iran and Iraq, demonstrated a solid 
commitment to defending the interests of their nation in some of the 
most dangerous waters on the planet.
  I listened and talked with dozens of sailors and returned to 
Washington with a fresh understanding of the human dimension of 
readiness. Only dedicated people can deliver the capabilities needed to 
project our military power. Far removed from their families and the 
luxuries of life ashore, the crews of the Enterprise, the Ardent, and 
the Gettysburg admirably performed their missions of containing the 
Iraqi military and ensuring the freedom of commerce.
  The diligence of the crews of these ships makes a visitor forget 
their youth. From galleys and control rooms to flight decks and 
bridges, sailors cooperated with professionalism to ensure that our 
maritime power upheld peace and stability.
  They reminded me that patriotism hinges on sacrifice, and that 
Congress can perform no greater service in defense policy than to 
improve the quality of life for military families.
  Therefore, I think the legislation before us reinforces the wisdom of 
additional personnel provisions in both this authorization bill, as 
well as the legislation that was passed by the Senate that would 
increase the retirement and the pay for the members of our Armed 
Forces. The Bill of Rights Act, the pending legislation, as well as the 
fiscal year 1999 supplemental, will move closer to this goal by 
authorizing a universal active-duty pay increase of 4.8 percent, the 
largest since 1982, and giving troops enrolled in the retirement plan 
the option of drawing pension benefits calculated under the same 
formula as other personnel who served for at least 20 years.
  I believe this certainly reinforces the conversations that I have had 
with a group of senior noncommissioned officers aboard the Enterprise 
who stressed the need for equity in the Pentagon's compensation and 
retirement systems. I repeatedly heard that uniformed personnel could 
not obtain timely care for their families and waited months on end for 
reimbursement.
  As a result, I sponsored a provision in this bill permitting TriCare 
beneficiaries to receive treatments at qualified medical offices if 
they live more than 50 miles from a DOD health installation. This 
initiative, coupled with the Bill of Rights Act, directs to the Defense 
Department to rely on more efficient claims processing procedures to 
tackle the issue of access to quality treatment that several sailors 
raised in their encounters with me.
  I also include a provision in this legislation--of course, it was 
authored with Senator Kennedy--that would create a Defense Department 
task force on domestic violence. This is another issue that has become 
a serious concern within our Armed Forces.
  This task force will consist of military representatives, family 
advocacy program experts, and civilian domestic violence professionals 
to develop guidelines for a coordinated response to this tragic problem 
that has grown from 14 reported cases per 1,000 families in 1990 to 22 
per 1,000 families by 1998.
  The second major provision of the Kennedy-Snowe amendment mandates 
creation of a central departmentwide database to receive information on 
reported domestic violence cases in the Armed Forces.
  No military family should endure the trauma, fear, and alienation 
that flows from acts of domestic violence. I am hopeful that the 
Kennedy-Snowe amendment will represent a crucial beginning in the 
process of setting standards and imposing penalties to deter spousal 
and child abuse in the armed services.
  I want to highlight a few provisions under this legislation which 
were within the jurisdiction of my Seapower Subcommittee. I thank 
Senator Kennedy, the ranking Democrat of the subcommittee, along with 
the panel's other members, for their diligent work on this year's 
legislation.
  The Seapower Subcommittee held five hearings in our review of the 
fiscal year 2000 budget request. Our hearings focused on the 
overarching question of how the Pentagon can sharpen its ability to 
reinforce U.S. political and economic objectives overseas with an agile 
maritime fleet.
  Towards this end, we explored programs designed to maintain the sea 
lanes vital to international trade. The subcommittee also summoned Navy 
and Marine Corps witnesses to discuss strategic air and sealift in 
support of regional commanders in chief, littoral force projection and 
protection, evolving submarine requirements, and priorities in the 
realms of research and acquisition.
  Witnesses before the Seapower Subcommittee testified that the 
proliferation of weapons and advanced technology caused by the 
willingness of countries to sell expertise, hardware, and technology 
present a challenge for the United States to predict potential 
adversary threats. This trend of proliferation shortens the timeline 
for an enemy to field an offensive weapon that can disable our forces 
in any region of concern.
  For these reasons, research and development in systems designed to 
counter enemy air, land, and sea-launched missiles, in addition to 
antiship torpedoes and mines, will enhance the Navy's capacity to deter 
conflict throughout the littoral areas of the globe. These coastal 
zones, within 200 miles of any sea, contain three-quarters of the 
world's population, 80 percent of the capital cities, and the major 
corridors of commerce.
  Subcommittee witnesses expressed concern that traditional threats, as 
well as nontraditional threats, from hostile countries and 
international terrorists would attempt to disrupt seagoing trade and 
military operations. They pointed out that over 50 countries possessed 
over 150 types of naval mines; over 60 countries have inventories of 
more than 60 types of torpedoes; over 75 countries have more than 90 
types of antiship cruise missiles; and by 2016, 40 to 50 countries will 
deploy at least one theater ballistic missile.
  Navy and Marine Corps witnesses testified that their services will 
function as the force of choice in the 21st century. They based this 
assessment on compelling demographic facts. Water covers 70 percent of 
the world's surface, and by the year 2010, over 70 percent of the 
world's population will live in urban areas within 300 miles of a 
coastline.
  An ever-increasing world population--to top 7.5 billion by the year 
2015--will only intensify this surge of urbanization and leave new 
environmental, housing, and health care problems in its wake.
  Competition among ethnic and religious populations will furthermore 
make the urbanized littorals ripe for conflict in the 21st century. The 
Navy and Marine Corps can, therefore, use the sea area as an operating 
base and a maneuver space without permission from a foreign country. In 
this context, maritime forces can serve as a first echelon of U.S. 
military power projection.
  Force modernization must subsequently remain on schedule since 
America needs high-technology fleet able to steam at a moment's notice 
to any point on the planet. Our witnesses, however, cited a number of 
budgetary and operating tempo developments that compete with core 
modernization requirements.
  From 1988 to 1998, the Navy's total obligational authority, in 
constant 1998 dollars, decreased by 40 percent. Coincident with this 
decrease, the Navy and

[[Page 10604]]

Marine Corps have experienced a dramatic increase in forward presence 
and contingency operations.
  In the past 50 years, naval expeditionary forces have responded to 
over 250 crises worldwide. Since 1992 alone, as this ``Commander-in-
Chief Requirements'' chart illustrates, naval forces have responded to 
77 different contingency operations or threats around the world--that 
is between 1992 and 1998--while between the years of 1988 and 1991, 
they only responded to 27 different threats worldwide. So it shows the 
disparity in the threats between this decade and the previous decade, 
to show the tremendous pressures that are being placed on our naval and 
our marine forces.
  During the cold war, Marines were called upon to respond to a threat 
on average of once every 15 weeks. Since 1990, the Marines have been 
responding to a threat once every 5 weeks. That is a threefold 
increase. So as a result of the naval force structures, as one witness 
said during the Seapower Subcommittee's first hearing, there is ``no 
shock absorbency left'' when it comes to our force structures and the 
demands they are placing on our naval and marine forces.
  Again, as this chart will illustrate in terms of where we are today 
on the 300-ship Navy, we are going to have to build, on an annual rate, 
8 to 10 ships a year in order to sustain a 300-ship Navy. We are going 
to decline pretty rapidly. As we are in 1999, we have 315 ships; for 
the year 2000, 314; by the year 2005, we will be down to 305 ships. In 
order to sustain 300 ships, we will have to increase the number of 
ships we are building to 8 to 10 a year from the 6 we are building 
currently.
  Based on the testimony, and also my visits to the deployed fleet 
units, and discussions with the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Army and 
Air Force officials, the subcommittee reached the following 
conclusions:
  First, the Navy and Marine Corps capabilities must remain ahead of 
the threats designed to disrupt or deny maritime operations on the high 
seas and in the littorals. To respond to this conclusion, the Seapower 
portion of this bill adds $213 million to the budget request for 
research, development, testing, and evaluation.
  Second, the Navy and Marine Corps future readiness will decline if 
recapitalization and modernization are deferred. I think again these 
charts illustrate the problem. So to respond to this challenge, the 
Seapower portion of this bill adds $1.068 billion to the budget request 
for procurement.
  Third, strategic sea and airlift are required to support daily 
operations overseas, emergent requirements, and sustained military 
campaigns of a major theater war. The force deployment goals of the 
1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update established 
the strategic lift requirements as those required for one major theater 
war and, later, to swing that lift to support the second nearly 
simultaneous MTW.
  So to respond to this challenge, the bill adds $40 million to the 
budget request for national defense features in ships.
  In addition, the full committee approved the budget request for $3 
billion for procurement of 15 C-17 aircraft, $70 million for 
modifications to the C-5 aircraft, $170 million for the C-17 research 
and development, and $63 million for the C-5 research and development.
  Fourth, the Navy must build no fewer than 8 ships per year to 
maintain a force structure of approximately 300 vessels, as I mentioned 
earlier. Ship designs and technologies must respond to these challenges 
of both the littorals and the open ocean warfare.
  Quantity has a quality of its own, especially when naval operations 
occur at the same time in different geographic regions. The Seapower 
portion of the bill therefore adds $375 million advanced procurement 
for the LHD-8 and extends the DDG-51 multiyear procurement authority to 
include the fiscal years 2002 and 2003 ships.
  The committee, however, remains concerned with the overall 
shipbuilding rate included in the administration's budget requests. The 
topic of ship force structure was discussed more than any other issue 
in the Seapower hearings.
  Witnesses stated repeatedly that the current force structure of 324 
ships already strains worldwide operations. This problem will only 
grow, since the projected size of the fleet, as I said, will decrease 
to 305 platforms in the next 5 years.
  Unfortunately, the Department of Defense has provided few specifics 
on the planned size of the Navy force structure beyond the calendar 
year 2015 and how it intends to address the impending ship shortfall 
problem beyond lowering acquisition costs and reducing the size of 
ships' crews.
  The time has come for the administration to demonstrate an 
understanding of the ship acquisition problem and to share with 
Congress a systematic plan to address this serious national security 
concern.
  The report accompanying this bill requires the Secretary of Defense 
to submit, with the fiscal year 2001 budget request, a report that 
details the Department's long-range shipbuilding plan through fiscal 
year 2030 and describes the annual funding required to procure 8 to 10 
ships a year between fiscal years 2001 and 2020.
  Finally, attack submarines have reached the limits of sustainable 
operations. The submarines of the 21st century will generate key 
strategic and tactical intelligence, deploy surveillance and 
reconnaissance teams, and enhance the firepower of carrier battle 
groups. In recognition of these facts, the bill approves the request of 
$116 million for submarine advanced technology and adds $22 million for 
the Advanced Deployable System.
  Finally, the key to reducing the operating costs of ships lies in 
research and development to design future ships that can operate 
effectively with smaller crews. Our bill approves well-funded research 
and development programs for developing new ship designs to reduce 
overall life-cycle costs.
  All of these naval programs, as well as the major systems of the 
other three Services, will require an adequate domestic basing 
structure for maintenance and deployment. This factor, along with the 
changing mix of threats to our national security, triggered the two 
bipartisan Armed Services Committee votes this year against amendments 
authorizing additional base realignment and closure rounds.
  The committee first rejected the BRAC amendments because no base 
closure round yet has yielded the taxpayers any clear or proven 
savings. To appreciate this point, one only need to consider the 
conclusion of the leading advocate of BRAC, the Department of Defense. 
DOD's April 1998 base closure report to Congress stated explicitly that 
``no audit trail, single document, or budget account exists for 
tracking the end use of each dollar saved through BRAC.''
  Furthermore, the conflict in Kosovo illustrates how hostilities can 
strain our ability to project military power in unstable areas of the 
world. Since this war began in March, the United States has diverted 
its only aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific, near North Korea, to 
Serbia's Adriatic Sea basin. We have more than 400 aircraft from 
airfields across the country now engaged over Kosovo.
  In the meantime, the Department of Defense has almost depleted the 
Nation's air-launch precision missile stocks, strained our aerial 
tanker fleet, and called up 33,000 reservists. Congress and the 
administration should therefore consider how to improve, rather than 
phase out, the shore- and land-based systems that sustain our deployed 
forces.
  We cannot forget that America's overseas basing infrastructure has 
declined by more than 40 percent since the end of the cold war. The 
four previous BRAC rounds have eliminated about 25 percent of domestic 
military installations.
  The key challenge of the 21st century force will focus on long-range 
deployments from American territory to protect interests and allies on 
short notice. We need a master base plan, still undeveloped, that 
identifies categories of ports, staging grounds, airfields, depots, and 
maintenance facilities to

[[Page 10605]]

meet these strategic requirements. The administration cannot ask 
Congress to approve more closure commissions in a vacuum about what 
physical support assets at home the troops of tomorrow will need to 
complete their missions abroad.
  This authorization bill advances the goals of shaping the modernized 
Armed Forces on which Americans will rely to safeguard their interests 
in a changing and volatile world.
  I again thank the committee chairman, Senator Warner, for his 
leadership, and the ranking member, Senator Levin, for his leadership 
as well in crafting this significant bipartisan legislation. I urge all 
Senators to support it.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Laurell Brault, my 
military fellow, be given floor privileges during the Senate 
consideration of S. 1059.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hutchison). The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, first I thank our distinguished 
colleague from Maine. She comes from a great State which has a maritime 
tradition that really predates the United States of America. Am I not 
correct in that?
  Ms. SNOWE. That is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. How fortunate we are in the Senate to have one with that 
traditional background as now head of the Seapower Subcommittee of the 
Armed Services Committee of the Senate. You share that with another 
distinguished colleague in the next-door State of Massachusetts, 
Senator Kennedy, who is the ranking member. We are well represented on 
this committee.
  I commend you for your report and bring to the attention of the 
Senate and the American people the underlying theme of our pay bill, 
how many times our men and women of the Armed Forces are required now 
in missions beyond our shores. That is very important. Of course, as to 
the 300-ship Navy--a famous figure--I hope that you and I and others 
can hold the line, because we are a maritime Nation. Our entire 
economic strategy is dependent on the security of our overseas markets 
and the ability to get our products out. Our entire defense strategy is 
dependent on what we call forward deployment. The ships of the Navy are 
a lifeline protection for both our economic as well as our national 
security responsibilities in this country. I commend the Senator.
  Ms. SNOWE. I thank the chairman for his comments. I certainly feel 
privileged to chair the Seapower Subcommittee and to focus on some of 
the critical challenges facing our naval forces in the future. Having 
had the opportunity to visit our personnel on the U.S.S. Enterprise, 
the U.S.S. Gettysburg, and the U.S.S. Ardent, I had a firsthand 
appreciation of the pressures placed on the men and women in our Armed 
Forces and the more we need to support them in every way possible. That 
is why I think the pay and retirement provisions are all necessary, 
given the demands that are being placed on our naval forces overseas. 
The deployments are longer and they are more rigorous. It is becoming 
far more difficult for them when they return to home port because they 
have to begin retraining. So there is very little time for them to 
prepare for the future and also the demands that these challenges 
present in keeping them from their families. We have to recognize that. 
I think the administration has to recognize that in terms of the number 
of contingency operations, that, ultimately, is really putting a 
tremendous strain on all of our armed services.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank our distinguished colleague. I 
dare say that she will establish a record far superior to that of her 
predecessor; namely, the Senator from Virginia, as chairman of the 
Seapower Subcommittee.
  I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Maine be 
added as a cosponsor to the Roberts-Warner amendment now pending at the 
desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I understand the order is our 
distinguished colleague, also a new member of our committee and one who 
has certainly pulled her weight by a margin of two in her service on 
the committee.


                           Amendment No. 384

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under a previous unanimous consent order, the 
Senator from Louisiana is recognized for 30 minutes.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. I thank the Chair.
  Madam President, I thank our chairman for the fine work that he has 
done in bringing this very important bill to the floor and to 
acknowledge the work of my colleague from Maine. As a Senator who 
represents another State with a great maritime tradition, I most 
certainly appreciate the hard work and the intensity to which she 
brings to bear in making sure we maintain adequate naval power to 
support all of our missions around the world. Her leadership has been 
tremendous. I look forward to working with her, along with our 
chairman, in the years to come.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, could I interrupt the Senator. I ask 
unanimous consent that at 5:30 today--I beg the forgiveness of the 
Chair and our distinguished colleague.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. On an equally important note, I rise to support the 
sense-of-the-Senate resolution, now in amendment form, offered by the 
distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania and myself. We feel very 
strongly about presenting it to the whole chamber, and we hope to get a 
very strong bipartisan vote, in just a few minutes, on this resolution.
  Madam President, at the close of World War II, Europe was devastated. 
The allied armies, in liberating Eastern Europe, had uncovered a horror 
beyond imagination--6 million Jews, men, women, and innocent children, 
had been massacred, and millions of other civilians and soldiers had 
been killed on all sides by fruitless wars of aggression.
  Once Germany itself had been occupied, the documentary evidence of 
these atrocities came to light. Along with victory came the eventual 
capture of the Nazi leadership, and slowly but surely, the German war 
leaders who did not kill themselves outright, fell into allied hands. 
At that time there were two competing ideas on how to deal with these 
prisoners. The English and the Russians simply wanted to take the 
leaders of Nazi regime outside and shoot them. After all, it was the 
way victors had treated the vanquished in Europe for hundreds of years, 
particularly when the vanquished had been so merciless themselves.
  However, the American Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, proposed a 
very different, and actually, radical solution. He wanted to use the 
atrocities perpetrated by Nazi Germany to make real the notion of 
international law. In retrospect, it seems very strange, indeed, that a 
Secretary of War would be the primary advocate for holding a legal 
proceeding. But Secretary Stimson was wise. He understood something 
very fundamental: America had not joined World War II to prop up the 
same, tired cycle of war and revenge that had made Europe the bloodiest 
continent on Earth during the 20th century. We entered the war to 
create a fair and lasting peace. We had no territorial demands. We 
asked for no war reparations, and we did not come to loot and rob 
Germany of its treasures. All we wanted in exchange for the great 
sacrifice that we made as a people was the assurance that after the 
war, peace, democracy and freedom would prevail.
  The Nuremberg trials were one of the central steps in fulfilling this 
objective. Instead of revenge, the trials stood for justice. Instead of 
collective blame, these trials stood for individual accountability. 
Instead of Europe's bloody past, the Nuremberg trials held the promise 
that we could break the cycle of violence.
  Over 50 years since the conclusion of those trials, the Nuremberg 
principles are being called into question. I believe we reached the 
right conclusions at those trials. We hit upon some universal truths 
about what needs to be

[[Page 10606]]

done to bring true peace to a region wracked by war. We determined it 
was necessary to establish justice, to hold individuals accountable for 
their acts, and to try to stop future wars of revenge. Those principles 
ring true even today.
  Ironically, as this map shows and as we are well aware, another 
conflict in Europe now puts the lessons of the Nuremberg Trials to the 
test. We began strongly enough. In May of 1993, the United Nations 
Security Council created the first international war crimes court since 
the Second World War, since the Nuremberg trials. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia was formed to investigate and 
try war crime cases resulting from the war in Bosnia. It was hailed 
then as the first step towards reconciliation of the warring factions.
  If the international community could bring justice to Bosnia, if they 
could expose the wanton destruction of human life by the Bosnian Serbs, 
there might be a real chance for the same collective soul searching 
that occurred in Germany at the end of World War II. That reflection 
and acknowledgment of wrongdoing has generated a peace between the 
great powers of Western Europe that was simply unthinkable at the 
beginning of this century. If it can happen between the Germans and the 
French, why not between the Croats and the Serbs?
  For a number of reasons, mostly political, the international 
community has simply not grasped the opportunity that this 
international tribunal has offered to us.
  In the 6 years since its formation, the Tribunal has indicted 84 
people. However, of those 84 indicted, it has completed only 6 trials. 
Twenty-five others are now in custody, either awaiting trial, or 
involved in proceedings. But six convictions in 6 years is a very 
mediocre showing for a conflict that was marked by intense brutality on 
all sides. Furthermore, the most significant war criminals remain at 
large. We are aware of where they are, but they continue operating 
unmolested. The reality is that while the vast majority of war crime 
indictments were against Bosnian Serbs, the Croatian and Muslim 
indictees are far more frequently held in custody because their 
governments have been cooperating with the Tribunal.
  Unfortunately, the moment for effective action has passed and the 
results are clear. When we do not uphold the principles established at 
Nuremberg, it gives license to thugs and dictators to pursue their aims 
by brutality and illegal means. We can only wonder if there would have 
been different headlines today had we been more insistent that the 
perpetrators of war crimes in Bosnia stand before the bar of justice.
  I am joined by my colleague, the senior Senator from Pennsylvania, in 
introducing this amendment that seeks to prevent a repeat of our 
mistakes. Let us make the Tribunal truly effective. That is what this 
amendment offers. The chief prosecutor, Justice Arbor, has made clear 
that the Tribunal's jurisdiction does extend to Kosovo. We need to 
ensure that when this war is over--and one day, hopefully soon, it will 
be--the parties responsible for these crimes will be made to answer 
personally. Our amendment addresses a number of the obstacles currently 
facing the tribunal.
  First, the amendment asks that the United States, in coordination 
with other United Nations contributors, provide the resources necessary 
for a rigorous investigation of the war crimes committed in Kosovo. I 
am happy to report, as was mentioned by my friend from Pennsylvania, 
that an additional $18 million has already been passed by this Senate 
in the supplemental appropriations bill for this specific purpose. At 
present, the Tribunal has a mere 70 investigators at its disposal. This 
number covers not only the 600,000 refugees from Kosovo, but all of the 
ongoing investigations of Bosnian war crimes. Clearly, the Tribunal is 
undermanned to undertake a project of the enormity presented by Kosovo.
  Secondly, the resolution calls on our Government, through our 
intelligence services, to provide all possible cooperation in the 
gathering of evidence necessary to prosecute war crimes. While 
testimonial evidence is sufficient to bring charges against those 
responsible for the mass execution, the rapes, gang rapes and arson, 
but such evidence rarely addresses the crimes of a country's 
leadership. Such is the case in Kosovo. Milosevic is not out in the 
field shooting civilians himself, but the situation certainly looks as 
if he is issuing the orders--proving that connection requires 
intelligence sources that only we and our NATO allies can provide. And 
we should do it forthwith.
  Additionally, we cannot be afraid of where the war crimes evidence 
leads. This resolution will make it clear that no one--no one--will be 
exempt. We shall not compromise long-term peace prospects for short-
term political expediency. Wherever the evidence leads, indictments 
will follow.
  Equally important, this resolution reflects the fact that all nations 
have an obligation to honor arrest warrants issued by the International 
Criminal Tribunal. Many of those already indicted are living normal 
lives while their whereabouts are well known. Such selective 
prosecution and inaction breeds cynicism and creates an atmosphere that 
supports the sort of thugs now operating in Serbia. It undermines our 
effort and it should not be tolerated. This must stop.
  The resolution we introduce today calls on the United States to use 
all appropriate means to apprehend war criminals already under 
indictment.
  Lastly, and most critically, this resolution insists that NATO should 
not accept any diplomatic resolution to the war in Kosovo that would 
bar the indictment, apprehension, or prosecution of war criminals. The 
proper resolution of this conflict may be our last opportunity to bring 
a lasting peace to this region. It cannot be done if those responsible 
for the war are not punished for their actions.
  It is often easier to exclude tyrants from justice to secure a 
temporary lull in the fighting than to support a thorough and complete 
peace. If we go for easy answers, we will doom the people of that 
region to repeat these same horrors again and again. As historians have 
often noted, one war frequently sows seeds for the next. This is 
particularly true of the kind of incessant ethnic warfare going on in 
the Balkans. The only way to change this reality is to insist that 
individuals be held accountable for their barbaric actions and be 
brought to justice.
  People must understand that there are international standards of 
behavior and they will be held accountable. It makes a huge difference 
in the way they interact with their neighbors. In short, we must 
demonstrate that might does not make right and that no one can benefit 
from the misery of their neighbors.
  Our State Department recently issued a report entitled ``Erasing 
History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo.'' This is one of a hundred 
pictures that have been taken, showing the horrors of mass executions 
and murder of innocent men, women and children. That report details 
much of what is already known--700,000 refugees forced to flee their 
homes; 500 villages looted and burned; at least 70 instances of summary 
executions; the systematic rape of women and young girls, and the list 
goes on.
  What is odd about ethnic cleansing is that while it tries to erase 
history, it actually has the opposite effect. It brands indelibly into 
people's minds the memories of the fire, torture, the shooting, the 
rape, the running, the horrors of the night and the morning. The entire 
history of the Balkans reads like one giant tragedy where the past 
motivates evil in the present. Instead of erasing history, Yugoslavia 
must move beyond it, and NATO needs to continue to press them in that 
direction to achieve those ends. Justice, provided impartially and 
equally, is the most effective means for doing that, and we can do that 
through a strong, well-financed, determined War Crimes Tribunal.
  There may be no clean hands in the Balkans, but there can be new 
beginnings. I believe this resolution will anchor the United States 
policy to creating one.

[[Page 10607]]

  I would like to put up another chart of something that shows a video 
capture from a tape recently smuggled out of Yugoslavia.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, will the Senator allow me to interrupt 
to make a unanimous-consent request?
  Ms. LANDRIEU. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at 5:30 
today, which is just minutes away, the Senate proceed to vote on or in 
relation to the Specter-Landrieu amendment No. 384 with no amendments 
in order to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I now ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if I might draw the Senate's attention 
to the last paragraph, which is section 5, can the Senator read that?
  It says: ``NATO should not accept any diplomatic resolution to the 
conflict in Kosovo that would bar''--and then, my first question is, Is 
it conceivable that the United Nations should likewise not accept any? 
I mean in the final analysis, it is difficult to predict now. Certainly 
NATO will have a voice in the matter. But it could be that this thing 
would be involved before the United Nations. Is the spirit of this to 
include the United Nations, so to speak?
  Ms. LANDRIEU. Yes. I would say so. The spirit of this resolution is 
clear that no diplomatic end to this war should allow any immunity for 
those who are guilty of war crimes.
  I would have no objection. I would want to talk with Senator Specter 
about adding reference to the United Nations. Clearly though, it is a 
NATO conflict.
  Mr. WARNER. Let me proceed to another item.
  The Senator used the key phrase, she doesn't want any amnesty or 
anything to prohibit the prosecution, and I think the Senator said ``of 
those who are guilty.'' But who has to establish guilt in terms of who 
is and who is not guilty? It seems to me if this were to read that it 
would ``bar the indictment, apprehension, or prosecution of persons 
alleged to have committed,'' because the Senator said ``war 
criminals,'' that could be interpreted as saying somebody is already 
designated one, two, three, and four as a war criminal and, therefore, 
you cannot give them amnesty, but there are some, I would presume, in 
this conflict who have not been designated ``war criminals'' but there 
are allegations to that effect, and they would have to proceed through 
the indictment process. But as this is written, the date of the 
agreement might cut off a class of individuals who are guilty but have 
not been as yet designated ``war criminals.''
  Do I make myself clear?
  Ms. LANDRIEU. I understand, I believe, what the Senator from Virginia 
is asking me. But I think the language of this amendment covers his 
concerns. We have not been allowed into Kosovo 1 day, but when we are, 
it will reveal atrocities and evidence of those responsible. It will 
happen in the same way as when we entered into Central Europe to find 
the concentration camps. This resolution simply states that no 
resolution of this conflict should give immunity in advance to anyone 
who could be charged and then later convicted of war crimes.
  I think the language is clear on that intent.
  Mr. WARNER. Let's hope this colloquy has cleared up any other 
questions. Before we started the debate, I talked with the Senator, and 
I thought she was very candid in her private comments to me.
  Supposing that this frightful conflict drags on and the only basis on 
which anyone can reach any resolution is the question of amnesty, do I 
understand the Senator's position to be that under no circumstances 
should the sole remaining provision to stop this conflict be waived by 
those negotiating and those who eventually have to accept the 
resolution? Is that your position?
  Ms. LANDRIEU. Absolutely. It is quite a serious point of this 
resolution, and I recognize that it may take a tool off the table, but 
it is purposefully done that way. I happen to believe it would be a 
great mistake for this Nation and our NATO allies to enter into any 
agreements that give immunity to people who are charged with war 
crimes, with the brutality of gang rapes, and torture. And there are 
hundreds of examples that we have had now from eyewitness accounts that 
we hope to prosecute.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I don't intend to take the Senator's 
time. I intend to support the resolution. I thought a colloquy would 
bring out questions that others might have in mind and would clarify 
any doubts.
  Madam President, thank you.
  Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield further while she is being 
interrupted, I want to commend the good Senator from Louisiana for her 
steadfastness, and for the sponsors' steadfastness on that very point. 
There was no provision for amnesty in Dayton. There was no provision 
for amnesty at Rambouillet. There should be no such provision, nor 
should the door be opened a crack to any such possibility. People must 
be held accountable for war crimes. I do not think for 1 minute that 
there is room for negotiation on that issue, or else we will see an 
endless repetition of the kind of cleansing of ethnic groups that we 
have seen in the Balkans.
  I commend the sponsors, and particularly the Senator from Louisiana 
for her strength and support.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I likewise commend the esteemed 
colleague and Senator from Louisiana for an important amendment which 
will send a signal at this time. It is very timely.
  I wish to commend my distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania. It is 
a very interesting combination of two Senators coming to the floor on 
an important point.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. I thank the Senator. The Senator from Pennsylvania 
surely brings a tremendous amount of expertise, having been a 
prosecutor and having dealt with these issues on a domestic basis and 
an international basis.
  Let me just conclude by pointing out and explaining what this picture 
is. This looks like a picture of people burying bodies. But actually, 
because this is part of a 20-minute video, this is a snapshot, of 
people exhuming bodies, digging up a mass grave, to try to hide or 
relocate these victims. The State Department believes that the Serbs 
are placing the bodies around bomb sites to mislead the Yugoslavian 
people and the international community.
  This is an important part of the world. If I can close by putting up 
a map of Yugoslavia--this is not a small, insignificant area--
Yugoslavia lays in the heart of Europe on the Mediterranean Sea where 
civilizations have lasted for thousands and thousands of years. We have 
fought wars and millions of soldiers have died. Americans have spent 
fortunes and generations of blood helping Europe to achieve peace. In 
large part we have succeeded. With this one important exception. 
Establishing law and order through the Tribunal is the first step on a 
long road of recovery. That is the point of this resolution.
  I hope we will be successful today, and that it will give us the 
strength to maintain our resolve to bring justice to people who are 
depending on us.
  Thank you, Madam President. I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be added 
as a cosponsor to the amendment.
  One of the points raised by the Senator from Virginia is a technical 
drafting issue, which I think is a relevant one. I believe we can 
correct it in conference. I think its importance was pointed out.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The hour of 5:30 having arrived, the question 
is on agreeing to Amendment No. 384.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Alaska (Mr. Murkowski), 
the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain), and the Senator from Arkansas 
(Mr. Hutchinson) are necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Arkansas (Mr. Hutchinson) would vote ``yea.''

[[Page 10608]]


  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden), the 
Senator from Georgia (Mr. Cleland), the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. 
Feingold), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy), the Senator 
from Connecticut (Mr. Lieberman), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. 
Reed), and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Torricelli) are necessarily 
absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Rhode Island (Mr. Reed) and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. 
Lieberman) would each vote ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Fitzgerald). Are there any other Senators 
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 90, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 141 Leg.]

                                YEAS--90

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Biden
     Cleland
     Feingold
     Hutchinson
     Kennedy
     Lieberman
     McCain
     Murkowski
     Reed
     Torricelli
  The amendment (No. 384) was agreed to.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, Senator Murkowski was unable to cast a 
vote on this amendment because of unavoidable flight cancellations back 
to Washington.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time on behalf of the 
distinguished majority leader, I ask unanimous consent that at 9:30 on 
Tuesday, tomorrow, the Senate resume the DOD authorization bill and 
Senator Smith of New Hampshire be recognized for up to 20 minutes on a 
matter regarding the historic connection of the U.S.S. Indianapolis to 
the history of our Nation, to be immediately followed by 30 minutes for 
debate, equally divided, with an additional 10 minutes under the 
control of Senator Gramm relative to Senator Roth's amendment regarding 
Admiral Kimmell and General Short.
  I further ask consent that following that debate, the amendment be 
temporarily set aside and there then be 1 hour for debate equally 
divided relative to the Roberts-Warner amendment No. 377.
  I further ask that following that debate, the amendment be laid aside 
and then there be up to 1 hour equally divided relative to the 
Wellstone amendment No. 382.
  I finally ask consent that at 2:15 on Tuesday, the Senate proceed to 
a vote on or in relation to the Roth amendment and, following that 
vote, the Roberts-Warner amendment No. 378 be agreed to and the Senate 
immediately proceed to a vote on amendment No. 377, as amended, to be 
followed by a vote on or in relation to amendment No. 382, with 2 
minutes for explanation prior to each vote.
  For the information of all Senators----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President--no 
objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
  For the information of all Senators, the next votes will occur at 
2:15 p.m. on Tuesday. It is the hope of leadership that passage could 
occur by close of business Tuesday night or Wednesday morning. On 
behalf of the majority leader and, I am sure, the minority leader, we 
urge our colleagues to do everything they can to make this possible.
  The distinguished whip.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I don't know of two more able managers of a 
bill than the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Michigan. But 
on behalf of the minority, I say that it would break all records of the 
Senate to finish this bill tomorrow night. It simply is not possible to 
do.
  We in the minority are going to cooperate in every way we can. The 
fact that we have these two fine managers doesn't mean we can perform a 
miracle.
  Additionally compounding the issue, I have been told that there has 
been an amendment filed dealing with the Kosovo situation that could 
take days of debate, not hours of debate.
  We are willing to cooperate. There is no one on this side who wants 
to hold up this bill for any purpose other than the fact that we want 
to have a good bill. In short, we have shown in the past few months 
since this Congress has been in session that we have cooperated every 
way we can, as indicated by the work that was done in reducing 91 
Democratic amendments on the juvenile justice bill to a mere handful of 
amendments so we could get that passed by Thursday evening.
  In short, we want to help. We want to cooperate in any way we can. 
But we cannot be part of this miracle, because it won't happen.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, let me thank the Senator from Nevada for 
not only all of his help in getting bills passed but also in 
realistically assessing situations, which is part of his job.
  I must say, given the amendments we already know of, while I am 
hopeful, too, of completing action on this bill at some point this 
week, I do not see how the hopes, as expressed here, can come to 
reality, given the substance of some of these amendments.
  Again, the Kosovo amendment alone, I think, would precipitate a 
significant, lengthy debate on this floor, given all of the 
circumstances and the length of time which that subject has already 
required for debate, and the fact that we are in the middle of a 
conflict right now, and the ramifications for that conflict and the 
signals which would be sent to the prime creator of that conflict, Mr. 
Milosevic. It would be a lengthy debate, I think. I would like to 
finish this bill by Wednesday, too, but I just can't see, given that 
amendment and other amendments which are significant, that that is a 
realistic assessment.
  Mr. REID. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to.
  Mr. REID. It is not a member of the minority who filed that 
amendment. It is a member of the majority who has filed that amendment; 
is that true?
  Mr. LEVIN. That is correct.
  Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  (The remarks of Mr. Domenici pertaining to the submission of S. Res. 
106 are printed in today's Record under ``Submission of Concurrent and 
Senate Resolutions.'')


                           Amendment No. 388

  (Purpose: To request the President to advance the late Rear Admiral 
  (retired) Husband E. Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy to the 
 highest grade held as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, during 
World War II, and to advance the late Major General (retired) Walter C. 
  Short on the retired list of the Army to the highest grade held as 
 Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, during World War II, as was 
   done under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 for all other senior 
    officers who served in positions of command during World War II)

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the previous amendments 
will be set aside, and the clerk will report.

[[Page 10609]]

  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Roth], for himself, Mr. 
     Biden, Mr. Thurmond, and Mr. Kennedy, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 388.

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The text of the amendment (No. 388) is printed in today's Record 
under ``Amendments Submitted.'')
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise today on behalf of my colleague from 
Delaware, Senator Biden, and on behalf of Senator Thurmond and Senator 
Kennedy to introduce an amendment whose intent is to redress a grave 
injustice that haunts us from the tribulations of World War II.
  Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short were the two senior 
commanders of U.S. forces deployed in the Pacific at the time of the 
disastrous surprise December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. In the 
immediate aftermath of the attack, they were unfairly and publicly 
charged with dereliction of duty and blamed as singularly responsible 
for the success of that attack.
  Less than 6 weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, in a hastily 
prepared report to the President, the Roberts Commission--perhaps the 
most flawed and unfortunately most influential investigation of the 
disaster--levelled the dereliction of duty charge against Kimmel and 
Short--a charge that was immediately and highly publicized.
  Admiral William Harrison Standley, who served as a member of this 
Commission, later disavowed its report, stating that these two officers 
were ``martyred'' and ``if they had been brought to trial, they would 
have been cleared of the charge.''
  Later, Admiral J.O. Richardson, who was Admiral Kimmel's predecessor 
as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, wrote:

       In the impression that the Roberts Commission created in 
     the minds of the American people, and in the way it was drawn 
     up for that specific purpose, I believe that the report of 
     the Roberts Commission was the most unfair, unjust, and 
     deceptively dishonest document ever printed by the Government 
     Printing Office.

  After the end of World War II, this scapegoating was given a 
painfully enduring veneer when Admiral Kimmel and General Short were 
not advanced on the retired lists to their highest ranks of war-time 
command--an honor that was given to every other senior commander who 
served in war-time positions above his regular grade.
  Admiral Kimmel, a two star admiral, served in a four star command. 
General Short, a two star general, served in a three star command. Let 
me repeat, advancement on the retired lists was granted to every other 
flag rank officer who served in World War II in a post above their 
grade.
  That decision against Kimmel and Short was made despite the fact that 
war-time investigations had exonerated these commanders of the 
dereliction of duty charge and criticized their higher commands for 
significant failings that contributed to the success of the attack on 
Pearl Harbor. More than six studies and investigations conducted after 
the war, including one Department of Defense report completed in 1995 
at Senator Thurmond's request, reconfirmed these findings.
  Our amendment is a rewrite of Senate Joint Resolution 19, the Kimmel-
Short Resolution, that I, Senator Biden, Senator Thurmond, Senator 
Helms, Senator Stevens, Senator Cochran, Senator Kennedy, Senator 
Domenici, Senator Specter, Senator Enzi, Senator Murkowski, Senator 
Abraham, Senator Craig, Senator Durbin, Senator John Kerry, Senator 
Kyl, Senator Hollings, Senator Bob Smith, Senator Collins, Senator 
Landrieu, Senator Voinovich, Senator DeWine, and Senator Feinstein--a 
total of 23 cosponsors--introduced last month.
  The amendment calls upon the President of the United States to 
advance posthumously on the retirement lists Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short to the grades of their highest war-time commands. Its passage 
would communicate the Senate's recognition of the injustice done to 
them and call upon the President to take corrective action.
  Such a statement by the Senate would do much to remove the stigma of 
blame that so unfairly burdens the reputations of these two officers. 
It is a correction consistent with our military's tradition of honor.
  Mr. President, the investigations providing clear evidence that 
Admiral Kimmel and General Short were unfairly singled out for blame 
include a 1944 Navy Court of Inquiry, the 1944 Army Pearl Harbor Board 
of Investigation, a 1946 Joint Congressional Committee, and a 1991 Army 
Board for the Correction of Military Records.
  To give you the sense of the thoroughness of these investigations, I 
have before me the volumes that constitute the Joint Congressional 
Committee's final report that compiles many of these studies.
  I think they demonstrate, beyond question, the thoroughness with 
which the investigation had proceeded.
  The findings of these official reports can be summarized as four 
principal points.
  First, there is ample evidence that the Hawaiian commanders were not 
provided vital intelligence that they needed, and that was available in 
Washington prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
  Second, the disposition of forces in Hawaii were proper and 
consistent with the information made available to Admiral Kimmel and 
General Short.
  In my review of this fundamental point, I was most struck by the 
honor and integrity demonstrated by General George Marshall who was 
Army Chief of Staff at the time of the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl 
Harbor.
  On November 27 of that year, General Short interpreted a vaguely 
written war warning message sent from the high command in Washington as 
suggesting the need to defend against sabotage. Consequently, he 
concentrated his aircraft away from perimeter roads to protect them, 
thus inadvertently increasing their vulnerability to air attack. When 
he reported his preparations to the General Staff in Washington, the 
General Staff took no steps to clarify the reality of the situation.
  In 1946, before a Joint Congressional Committee on the Pearl Harbor 
disaster, General Marshall testified that he was responsible for 
ensuring the proper disposition of General Short's forces. He 
acknowledged that he must have received General Short's report, which 
would have been his opportunity to issue a corrective message, and that 
he failed to do so.
  Mr. President, General Marshall's integrity and sense of 
responsibility is a model for all of us. I only wish it had been able 
to have greater influence over the case of Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short.
  A third theme of these investigations concerned the failure of the 
Department of War and the Department of the Navy to properly manage the 
flow of intelligence. The 1995 Department of Defense report stated that 
the handling of intelligence in Washington during the time leading up 
to the attack on Pearl Harbor was characterized by, among other faults, 
ineptitude, limited coordination, ambiguous language, and lack of 
clarification and follow-up.
  The fourth and most important theme that permeates the aforementioned 
reports is that blame for the disaster at Pearl Harbor cannot be placed 
only upon the Hawaiian commanders. They all underscored significant 
failures and shortcomings of the senior authorities in Washington that 
contributed significantly--if not predominantly--to the success of the 
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
  The 1995 Department of Defense report put it best, stating that 
``responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely 
on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be 
broadly shared.''
  This is an important quote. It shows that the Department of Defense 
recognizes that these two commanders should not be singled out for 
blame. Yet, still today on this issue, our government's words do not 
match its actions.
  Kimmel and Short remain the only two officials who have been forced 
to

[[Page 10610]]

pay a price for the disaster at Pearl Harbor.
  Let me add one poignant fact about the two wartime investigations. 
Their conclusions--that Kimmel's and Short's forces had been properly 
disposed according to the information available to them and that their 
superiors had failed to share important intelligence--were kept secret 
on the grounds that making them public would have been detrimental to 
the war effort.
  Be that as it may, there is no longer any reason to perpetuate the 
cruel myth that Kimmel and Short were singularly responsible for the 
disaster at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Spruance, one of our great naval 
commanders of World War II, shares this view. He put it this way:
  ``I have always felt that Kimmel and Short were held responsible for 
Pearl Harbor in order that the American people might have no reason to 
lose confidence in their government in Washington. This was probably 
justifiable under the circumstances at that time, but it does not 
justify forever damning those two fine officers.''
  Mr. President, to do so is not only unfair, it tarnishes our nation's 
military honor.
  Mr. President, this sense of the Senate has been endorsed by 
countless military officers, including those who have served at the 
highest levels of command. These include former Chairmen of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H. Moorer and Admiral William J. Crowe, 
and former Chiefs of Naval Operations Admiral J.L. Holloway III, 
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt and Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost.
  Moreover a number of public organizations have called for posthumous 
advancement of Kimmel and Short. Last August, the VFW passed a 
resolution calling for the advancement of Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short.
  Let me add that Senator Robert Dole, one of our most distinguished 
colleagues and a veteran who served heroically in World Warr II, has 
also endorsed this sense of the Senate resolution.
  This resolution now in amendment form is about justice, equity, and 
honor. Its purpose is to redress an historic wrong, to ensure that 
Admiral Kimmel and General Short are treated with the dignity and honor 
they deserve, and to ensure that justice and fairness fully permeate 
the memory and lessons learned from the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor.
  As we approach Memorial Day and prepare to honor those who served to 
protect our great nation, it is a most appropriate time to redress this 
injustice. After 58 years, this correction is long overdue. I urge my 
colleagues to support this joint resolution.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a number of exhibits be 
printed in the Record, including a statement from the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars, including a resolution adopted by the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars, a letter from several distinguished admirals of the U.S. Navy who 
are alive and sent this to us comparatively recently, likewise a letter 
from the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, Inc., and finally a copy 
of the letter from Senator Bob Dole to myself.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

     To: All Members of the United States Senate 105th U.S. 
         Congress
     From: Thomas A. Pouliot, Commander-in-Chief Veterans of 
         Foreign Wars of the United States
     Date: 28 September 1998.
       On August 31, 1998, the delegates to 99th National 
     Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United 
     States unanimously approved Resolution Number 441, ``Restore 
     Pre-Attack Ranks to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General 
     Walter C. Short.'' A copy of VFW Resolution Number 441 is 
     attached for your review.
       Based on our resolution and a review of S.J. Res. 55, we 
     believe the goals of both the Senate and VFW resolutions are 
     similar and consistent.
       Therefore, we strongly endorse this bill and ask that the 
     Senate remove the burden of guilt for the attack on Pearl 
     Harbor from the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General 
     Short.
           Respectfully,
                                                Thomas A. Pouliot,
     Commander-in-Chief.
                                  ____

                                   Veterans of Foreign Wars of the


                                                United States,

                                    Washington, DC, June 25, 1998.
     Hon. William S. Cohen,
     The Secretary of Defense,
     The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: Last month, Senators Joe Biden and 
     William Roth of Delaware sent a letter urging you to 
     recommend to the President that Admiral Husband Kimmel and 
     General Walter Short be advanced posthumously to their 
     wartime ranks of four star Admiral and Lieutenant General 
     respectively.
       The Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States supports 
     the recommendation of Senators Biden and Roth, and asks that 
     you consider their request.
       Thank you for your consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                     John E. Moon,
     Commander-in-Chief.
                                  ____


  Resolution No. 441--Restore Pre-Attack Ranks to Admiral Husband E. 
                   Kimmel and General Walter C. Short

       Whereas, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C. 
     Short were the Commanders of Record for the Navy and Army 
     Forces at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, when the 
     Japanese Imperial Navy launched its attack; and
       Whereas, following the attack, President Franklin D. 
     Roosevelt appointed Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts to 
     a commission to investigate such incident to determine if 
     there had been any dereliction to duty; and
       Whereas, the Roberts Commission conducted a rushed 
     investigation in only five weeks. It charged Admiral Kimmel 
     and General Short with dereliction of their duty. The 
     findings were made public to the world; and
       Whereas, the dereliction of duty charge destroyed the honor 
     and reputations of both Admiral Kimmel and General Short, and 
     due to the urgency neither man was given the opportunity to 
     defend himself against the accusation of dereliction of duty; 
     and
       Whereas, other investigations showed that there was no 
     basis for the dereliction of duty charges, and a 
     Congressional investigation in 1946 made specific findings 
     that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short had been 
     ``derelict in his duty'' at the time of the bombing of Pearl 
     Harbor; and
       Whereas, it has been documented that the United States 
     military had broken the Japanese codes in 1941. With the use 
     of a cryptic machine known as ``Magic,'' the military was 
     able to decipher the Japanese diplomatic code known as 
     ``Purple'' and the military code known as JN-25. The final 
     part of the diplomatic message that told of the attack on 
     Pearl Harbor was received on December 6, 1941. With this 
     vital information in hand, no warning was dispatched to 
     Admiral Kimmel or General Short to provide sufficient time to 
     defend Pearl Harbor in the proper manner; and
       Whereas, it was not until after the tenth investigation of 
     the attack on Pearl Harbor was completed in December of 1995 
     that the United States Government acknowledge in the report 
     of Under Secretary of Defense Edwin S. Dorn that Admiral 
     Kimmel and General Short were not solely responsible for the 
     disaster, but that responsibility must be broadly shared; and
       Whereas, at this time the American public has been deceived 
     for the past fifty-six years regarding the unfound charge of 
     dereliction of duty against two fine military officers whose 
     reputations and honor have been tarnished; now, therefore
       Be It Resolved, by the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the 
     United States, that we urge the President of the United 
     States to restore the honor and reputations of Admiral 
     Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C. Short.

                           *   *   *   *   *

                                  ____

     To: Honorable Members of the United States Senate.
     From: Thomas H. Moorer, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Former 
         Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Former Chief of Naval 
         Operations; J.L. Holloway III, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), 
         Former Chief of Naval Operations; William J. Crowe, 
         Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
         of Staff; Elmo R. Zumwalt, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), 
         Former Chief of Naval Operations; Carlisle A.H. Trost, 
         Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Former Chief of Naval 
         Operations.
     Re: The Honor and Reputations of Admiral Husband Kimmel and 
         General Walter Short.
       Dear Senator: We ask that the honor and reputations of two 
     fine officers who dedicated themselves to the service of 
     their country be restored. Admiral Husband Kimmel and General 
     Walter Short were singularly scapegoated as responsible for 
     the success of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor December 
     7, 1941. The time is long overdue to reverse this inequity 
     and treat Admiral Kimmel and General Short fairly and justly. 
     The appropriate vehicle for that is the current Roth-Biden 
     Resolution.
       The Resolution calls for the posthumous advancement on the 
     retired list of Admiral Kimmel and General Short to their 
     highest WWII wartime ranks of four-star admiral

[[Page 10611]]

     and three-star general as provided by the Officer Personnel 
     Act of 1947. They are the only two eligible officers who have 
     been singled out for exclusion from that privilege; all other 
     eligible officers have been so privileged.
       We urge you to support this Resolution.
       We are career military officers who have served over a 
     period of several decades and through several wartime eras in 
     the capacities of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or 
     Chief of Naval Operations. Each of us is familiar with the 
     circumstances leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
       We are unanimous in our conviction that Admiral Husband 
     Kimmel and General Walter Short were not responsible for the 
     success of that attack, and that the fault lay with the 
     command structure at the seat of government in Washington. 
     The Roth-Biden Resolution details specifics of this case and 
     requests the President of the United States to nominate 
     Kimmel and Short for appropriate advancement in rank.
       As many of you know, Admiral Kimmel and General Short were 
     the Hawaiian Commanders in charge of naval and ground forces 
     on Hawaii at the time of the Japanese attack. After a hurried 
     investigation in January, 1942 they were charged with having 
     been ``derelict in their duty'' and given no opportunity to 
     refute that charge which was publicized throughout the 
     country.
       As a result, many today believe the ``dereliction'' charge 
     to be true despite the fact that a Naval Court of Inquiry 
     exonerated Admiral Kimmel of blame; a Joint Congressional 
     Committee specifically found that neither had been derelict 
     in his duty; a four-to-one majority of the members of a Board 
     for the Correction of Military Records in the Department of 
     the Army found that General Short had been ``unjustly held 
     responsible'' and recommended his advancement to the rank of 
     lieutenant general on the retired list.
       This injustice has been perpetuated for more than half a 
     century by their sole exclusion from the privilege of the Act 
     mentioned above.
       As professional military officers we support in the 
     strongest terms the concept of holding commanders accountable 
     for the performance of their forces. We are equally strong in 
     our belief in the fundamental American principle of justice 
     for all Americans, regardless of creed, color, status or 
     rank. In other words, we believe strongly in fairness.
       These two principles must be applied to the specific facts 
     of a given situation. History as well as innumerable 
     investigations have proven beyond any question that Admiral 
     Kimmel and General Short were not responsible for the Pearl 
     Harbor disaster. And we submit that where there is no 
     responsibility there can be no accountability.
       But as a military principle--both practical and moral--the 
     dynamic of accountability works in both directions along the 
     vertical line known as the chain of command. In view of the 
     facts presented in the Roth-Biden Resolution and below--with 
     special reference to the fact that essential and critical 
     intelligence information was withheld from the Hawaiian 
     Commanders despite the commitment of the command structure to 
     provide that information to them--we submit that while the 
     Hawaiian commanders were as responsible and accountable as 
     anyone could have been given the circumstances, their 
     superiors in Washington were sadly and tragically lacking in 
     both of these leadership commitments.
       A review of the historical facts available on the subject 
     of the attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrates that these 
     officers were not treated fairly.
       1. They accomplished all that anyone could have with the 
     support provided by their superiors in terms of operating 
     forces (ships and aircraft) and information (instructions and 
     intelligence). Their disposition of forces, in view of the 
     information made available to them by the command structure 
     in Washington, was reasonable and appropriate.
       2. Admiral Kimmel was told of the capabilities of U.S. 
     intelligence (MAGIC, the code-breaking capability of PURPLE 
     and other Japanese codes) and he was promised he could rely 
     on adequate warning of any attack based on this special 
     intelligence capability. Both Commanders rightfully operated 
     under the impression, and with the assurance, that they were 
     receiving the necessary intelligence information to fulfill 
     their responsibilities.
       3. Historical information now available in the public 
     domain through declassified files, and post-war statements of 
     many officers involved, clearly demonstrate that vital 
     information was routinely withheld from both commanders. For 
     example, the ``Bomb Plot'' message and subsequent reporting 
     orders from Tokyo to Japanese agents in Hawaii as to 
     location, types and number of warships, and their replies to 
     Tokyo.
       4. The code-breaking intelligence of PURPLE did provide 
     warning of an attack on Pearl Harbor, but the Hawaiian 
     Commanders were not informed. Whether deliberate or for some 
     other reason should make no difference, have no bearing. 
     These officers did not get the support and warnings they were 
     promised.
       5. The fault was not theirs. It lay in Washington.
       We urge you, as Members of the United States Senate, to 
     take a leadership role in assuring justice for two military 
     careerists who were willing to fight and die for their 
     country, but not to be humiliated by its government. We 
     believe that the American people--with their national 
     characteristic of fair play--would want the record set 
     straight. Thank you.
           Respectfully,
     Adm. Thomas H. Moorer.
     Adm. William J. Crowe.
     Adm. J.L. Holloway III.
     Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt.
     Adm. Carlisle A.H. Trost.
                                  ____

                                            Pearl Harbor Survivors


                                             Association, Inc.

                                  Lancaster, CA, January 14, 1991.
     Re: Resolution No. 6.

     Edward R. Kimmel,
     Wilmington, DE.
       Dear Mr. Kimmel: I am writing to you in regards to the 
     resolution that we of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, 
     Inc. passed at our National Convention in Albuquerque, NM. 
     this past December 6, 1990.
       Subject: A resolution to restore the full wartime rank of 
     Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short, (posthumously).
       Whereas: Following the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl 
     Harbor December 7, 1941 the two officers in command of U.S. 
     armed forces at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel 
     (Pacific Fleet Commander) and Lieutenant General Walter C. 
     Short (Hawaii Army Commander) were retired in ``permanent 
     grade'' from their respective branches of the armed forces.
       Whereas: At the time of the attack Admiral Kimmel was 
     serving in a temporary appointment as full Admiral (four 
     stars) but was retired as Rear Admiral (two stars), his 
     permanent grade.
       Whereas: At the time of the attack, Lieutenant General 
     Short was serving in a temporary appointment as Lieutenant 
     General (three stars) but was retired as a Major General (two 
     stars), his permanent grade.
       Whereas: In 1947 provisions were enacted in the laws 
     governing retirement from the armed forces which permitted 
     officers who had temporarily served in a higher rank to be 
     advanced on the retired list to that higher rank, without 
     benefit of higher pay, when recommended for such advancement 
     by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President of 
     the United States and concurred in by the Senate.
       Whereas: Recently published historical writings and film 
     documentaries established that Admiral Kimmel and General 
     Short were unjustly made scapegoats for the success of the 
     surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and other military 
     installations on Oahu on December 7, 1941.
       Whereas: At its National Convention in December 1984 at 
     Grossingers Resort in New York State, the Pearl Harbor 
     Survivors Association, Inc. representing voices of the time, 
     unanimously passed a resolution honoring the memory of 
     Admiral Kimmel and General Short and praising them for having 
     single-handedly shouldered the full blame for the disaster at 
     Pearl Harbor when, in fact, others, and the whole nation 
     should have shared the burden.
       Whereas: The terms of the 1984 resolution were fulfilled at 
     the PHSA 45th reunion in Hawaii in December, 1986 when these 
     officers' nearest living next-of-kin were presented 
     beautifully inscribed plaques honoring Admiral Kimmel and 
     General Short with an expression of admiration and respect.
       Resolved: (1) That the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association 
     urges the Secretary of Defense to recommend to the President 
     of the United States that he nominate Rear Admiral Husband E. 
     Kimmel (Retired) (Deceased) for posthumous promotion to the 
     rank of full Admiral on the list of retired naval officers 
     and Major General Walter C. Short (Retired) (Deceased) for 
     posthumous promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General on the 
     list of retired army officers, these ranks being the highest 
     in which these officers served while on active duty in the 
     armed forces of the United States in 1941.
       Resolved further: (2) That the Pearl Harbor Survivors 
     Association urges the President of the United States to make 
     the aforedescribed nominations and send them to the Senate of 
     the United States for its advice and consent with the 
     recommendation that they be favorably acted upon by that 
     body.
       Resolved further: (3) That the Pearl Harbor Survivors 
     Association, Inc. urges the Senate of the United States to 
     give its advice and consent to the aforementioned 
     nominations.
       Resolved further: (4) That the Secretary of the Pearl 
     Harbor Survivors Association, Inc. forward copies of these 
     resolutions to the Secretary of Defense, the President of the 
     United States, the Secretary of the U.S. Senate, and to the 
     Chairman and each member of the Senate Armed Forces 
     Committee.
       Submitted by Alex D. Cobb, Jr.
       We the officers of the Association are now in the process 
     of complying with the above resolution and hopefully will 
     have it in place for the 50th Anniversary of Pearl Harbor.
       If I can be of further help please feel free to contact me.
           Sincerely,
                                                Kenneth R. Creese,
                                               National Secretary.

[[Page 10612]]

     
                                  ____
                                              Senator Bob Dole

                                   Washington, DC, March 11, 1999.
     Hon. William V. Roth, Jr.,
     Hart Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Bill: I will join my voice with yours in support of 
     the Kimmel-Short Resolution of 1999.
       The responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should be 
     shared by many. In light of the more recent disclosures of 
     withheld information Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General 
     Short should have had, I agree these two commanders have been 
     unjustly stigmatized.
       Please keep me informed of the progress of this resolution.
           Sincerely,
                                                         Bob Dole.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The senior Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment 
sponsored by my friends from Delaware--Senators Roth and Biden.
  Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C. Short were both 
unfairly maligned for their roles during the invasion of Pearl Harbor. 
They were blamed for not anticipating nor being prepared for the 
attack. Admiral Kimmel was commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, and 
General Short was commander of U.S. Army forces. The overwhelming 
consensus of the academic community and retired flag officers, most 
notably naval officers, concur that history must be set straight in 
this matter.
  Admiral Kimmel and General Short are, in my opinion, the two final 
victims of Pearl Harbor. Both officers were relieved of their commands, 
their careers and reputations destroyed after being blamed for 
negligence and dereliction of duty. These men were doing their duty to 
the best of their ability, and without full cooperation from superiors 
in their chain-of-command. Despite the fact that the charge of 
dereliction of duty was never proved, that charge still exists in the 
minds of many people.
  Surprisingly, almost everyone above these two officers escaped 
censure. Yet, we know now that civilian and military officials in 
Washington withheld vital intelligence information which could have 
more fully alerted the field commanders to their imminent peril.
  In judging Admiral Kimmel and General Short, the following facts have 
been repeatedly substantiated, but wrongfully and continually ignored:
  The intelligence made available to the Pearl Harbor commanders was 
not sufficient to justify a higher level of vigilance than was 
maintained prior to the attack.
  Neither officer knew of the decoded intelligence in Washington 
indicating the Japanese had identified the United States as an enemy.
  Both commanders were assured by their superiors they were getting the 
best intelligence available at the time.
  There were no prudent defensive options available for the officers 
that would have significantly affected the outcome of the attack.
  Military, governmental and congressional investigations have provided 
clear evidence that these two commanders were singled out for blame 
that should have been widely shared.
  In 1995, I held an in-depth meeting to review this matter which 
included the officers' families, historians, experts and retired high-
ranking military officers, who all testified in favor of the two 
commanders.
  In response to this review, Under Defense Secretary Edwin Dorn's 
subsequent report disclosed officially--for the first time--that blame 
should be ``broadly shared.'' The Dorn Report stated members of the 
high command in Washington were privy to intercepted Japanese messages 
that in their totality ``. . . pointed strongly toward an attack on 
Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December, 1941 . . .'' and that this 
intelligence was never sent to the Hawaiian commanders.
  The Dorn Report went so far as to characterize the handling of 
critically important decoded Japanese messages in Washington as 
revealing ``ineptitude . . . unwarranted assumptions and misestimates, 
limited coordination, ambiguous language, and lack of clarification and 
follow-up at higher levels.''
  They are eligible for this advancement in rank by token of the 
Officer Personnel Act of 1947, which authorizes retirement at highest 
wartime rank. All eligible officers have benefitted. All except for 
two: Admiral Kimmel and General Short. This advancement in rank would 
officially vindicate them. No retroactive pay would be involved.
  The posthumous promotion of Admiral Kimmel and General Short will be 
a small step in restoring honor to these men.
  It is time for Congress and the Administration to step forward and do 
the right thing.
  I urge adoption of the amendment and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, with great reluctance, I oppose this 
amendment. I do so based on some independent study that I have made, 
and indeed, I guess, throughout my lifetime. I had a very, very modest 
period of active service at the end of World War II in 1945 for a 
period of about 15 or 18 months. I can't remember now.
  Anyway, I lived my lifetime through this period of history. 
Therefore, all of my active service in that period was here in the 
United States, preparing to join others of my generation for the 
invasion of Japan, which I thank the Dear Lord did not take place.
  I have gone through enough of this material to satisfy me that what 
we are faced with here is one generation trying to provide revisionist 
history upon another. That is, in my judgment, unwise, and it could 
well promote many other meritorious cases during that period of 
history--and who knows, going way back in history--to be brought to 
this Congress for similar rectification or whatever the petition may 
say.
  The records show that the request by my two distinguished esteemed 
colleagues initiated correspondence beginning in 1994--that is roughly 
5 years ago. Secretary Perry on 7, September, 1994; again on 22 
November, 1994; President Reagan, 1, December, 1994; Deputy Secretary 
John Deutch, 10, December, 1994; Perry, 5 March, 1995; Deutch, 24 March 
of 1995; the Dorn Report on 6, October, 1995; Deputy Secretary Defense 
John White, December of 1995; Secretary Cohen here in 18, November, 
1997; and P&R de Leon, on 20, July, 1998.
  In other words, for 5 years the Department of Defense has devoted a 
good deal of time and effort to try--I presume and I certainly assume--
to make an objective analysis of all of these letters, and have turned 
down the various requests from my two senior colleagues.
  First, I ask my distinguished colleague from Delaware, because I look 
at this very imposing collection of documents and I reflect on the 
number of inquiries that have been held throughout history, these are 
the inquiries that have been held regarding these two officers and 
their association with the tragic losses of men, women, and assets of 
the United States on December 7, 1941.
  We start with the Knox Investigation, December 9 through 14, in 1941. 
That was followed by the Roberts Commission, December 18 through 
January 23, 1942; the Hart Investigation, February 12 through June 15 
of 1944; the Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 through October 20, 1944; 
Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 through October 19, 1944; the Clark 
Investigation, August 4 through September 20, 1944; the Hewitt Inquiry, 
May 14 through July 11, 1945; the Clausen Investigation, January 24 
through September 12, 1945; the Joint Congressional Committee, November 
15 through May 23, 1945.
  Based on the results of all those investigations, Secretary of 
Defense Cohen wrote to Senator Thurmond and presumably Senator Roth. He 
said:

       Dear Mr. Chairman:  Thank you for your interest in 
     exonerating the names of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In 
     the years since the fateful events at Pearl Harbor there have 
     been numerous formal investigations of the events leading up 
     to the attack, including sharp debate over our state of 
     readiness at the time.
       While Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
     Readiness, Mr. Edwin Dorn conduced a thorough review of this 
     issue in 1995. He carefully considered the information 
     contained in nine previous formal investigations, visited 
     Pearl Harbor and personally

[[Page 10613]]

     met with the Kimmel and Short families. His conclusion was 
     that responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster must be 
     broadly shared, but that the record does not show that 
     advancement of Admiral Kimmel and General Short on the 
     retired list is warranted.
       I appreciate the fact that the overwhelming consensus of 
     the organizations and personnel mentioned in your letter 
     recommend exoneration of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. 
     Absent significant new information, however, I do not believe 
     it is appropriate to order another review of this matter.
       Ed Dorn and I both agree that responsibility for this 
     tragic event in American history must be broadly shared, yet 
     I remain confident in the findings that Admiral Kimmel and 
     General Short remain accountable in their positions as 
     leaders.

  The first question to my distinguished colleague, this amendment 
would have the effect of no longer holding them accountable for this 
tragedy. If that be the case, who is to be held accountable for this 
tragedy?
  Mr. ROTH. I point out to my distinguished colleague that first of 
all, the Dorn Report makes the very clear finding that responsibility 
for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders 
of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. It should be broadly shared.
  When it says it should be broadly shared, it seems to me it is saying 
in effect that all of those who had any responsibility for the act 
should be treated the same. That is basically what we are saying here. 
These two distinguished gentlemen gave a lifetime of service to their 
country with distinction. There are many factors that were shown in the 
other investigations: That they did not have the intelligence, they did 
not have the information that they were entitled to if they were going 
to properly discharge their responsibility.
  We are not saying here that they were not partly responsible, but 
they were no more responsible than other leaders in Washington. To me, 
it is unfair, inequitable and not in the tradition of the military to 
treat two individuals differently from others.
  This is not an effort of a younger generation trying to correct what 
we think is an unfair situation. I, like the distinguished chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee, served in World War II with the military. 
I just think it is only right, it is only just that we treat them 
exactly the same and let them be promoted to their higher wartime 
ranks.
  There is a responsibility, accountability, among many. Any number of 
these studies clearly showed that a large part of that responsibility 
was in Washington.
  All we are asking is, let's treat all these people alike--fair and 
with justice.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think the Senator has raised a very key 
point. That is, equality of treatment.
  First, the Dorn Report specifically said that they--Kimmel and 
Short--do bear part of the responsibility. We are in agreement on that.
  Mr. ROTH. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. Can the Senator point to any of the investigations that I 
recited, beginning back in 1941, which in any way, totally or 
otherwise, exonerated Kimmel or Short?
  Mr. ROTH. There were some findings that because of the lack of 
intelligence, they were not advised of the most up-to-date information 
that Washington had; they were not at fault.
  As a matter of fact, the finding was made that their disposition 
based on the information they had was appropriate and proper.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before we leave that point, if none of 
these reports that I recited--some nine in number which had before them 
live witnesses, clarity of mind and clarity of recollection--did not 
exonerate these officers, then why should we now at this late date in 
history try to make a different finding? There could have been other 
officers who possibly were not advanced in rank. You cite they should 
be treated equally. How do I know there are not other officers, Army 
and Navy, who were not advanced in rank because they bore part of the 
responsibility for this tragedy? So, when you ask for equality, it 
would seem to me you would have to come forth with all the cases of all 
those who bore part of the responsibility and show that they were 
treated differently than Kimmel and Short.
  Mr. ROTH. With all due deference to my colleague, that is 
hypothetical. It is possible that somewhere someone was mistreated. But 
those facts are not before us. I am not aware of any such charges.
  But here we have two individuals about whom many different people 
agree, from those like Bob Dole, who served with great distinction, 
from the admirals who were in command, both of the Navy and our 
military forces, all coming forward with the recommendation that, to be 
fair, these two individuals should be advanced to their highest wartime 
rank.
  The point the Senator is making is true in life. Many times lawsuits 
are brought but you cannot, in settling that lawsuit, with the 
individuals before you--you are not going to solve all the problems of 
mankind because you only have the facts of those you are considering. 
Our resolution is a followthrough for two individuals, about whom, time 
and time again, it was said they served with distinction.
  Mr. WARNER. But the Senator said let's treat these two individuals 
equally with others who bear part of the responsibility--a reasonable 
request. But I would want to know beforehand, who are the others? How 
were they treated? Was their treatment commensurate with what the 
Senator asked for tonight?
  Mr. ROTH. No one of whom I am aware, who served in World War II at 
the time of Pearl Harbor and had any responsibility in Washington, was 
held accountable and given less rank.
  General George Marshall admitted that he had a responsibility, but I 
do not think anyone suggested, or would want to suggest, that he should 
have been penalized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am primarily concerned with the junior 
officers in the command of the Army in Hawaii, the command of the Navy 
in Hawaii. There may have been a number of officers and, indeed, 
enlisted men--say an intelligence officer. There was a good deal of 
intelligence out there that the situation was getting very serious, and 
I will refer to that momentarily. But how do I know their careers were 
not impeded? They may not have been general officers or flag officers 
of the U.S. Navy. But whether they were lieutenants or commanders, 
their careers may well have been blocked. There may be relatives out 
here and descendants of those officers who feel just as strongly as to 
the punishment that was meted out to their grandparents or whatever the 
case may be.
  If you are going to open up a case like this, it seems to me it is in 
the nature of a class action: Let everybody come forward.
  Mr. ROTH. I say to the good chairman, the others have not presented 
the case. These individuals, their families, have tried to correct what 
I think is a serious wrong. Again, all I can say is that rare is it 
that by one stroke of action you correct all inequities, all 
injustices. But here we have two individuals who were scapegoated. 
Let's face it. They needed to blame somebody. I think as a matter of 
fact the Roberts investigation was not known for the legal 
jurisprudence with which it was conducted.
  I believe, in fairness to these individuals, the record ought to be 
set straight. They served their country with great distinction through 
the years. Disaster occurred at Pearl Harbor, but they alone cannot be 
held responsible. Most of these reports will admit that. The others 
were permitted to rise to their highest rank, and I just say as a 
matter of justice----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we do not know. You make an assumption 
that others were allowed to rise to their highest rank. I do not know 
that. There is no evidence before the Senate tonight.
  This is but one of, what? How many volumes here? The hearings before 
the Joint Committee on the Investigation of Pearl Harbor, U.S. 
Congress, 1945, I count, what, 15 volumes here? To me, that is 
thoroughness of an investigation. I mean, document after document, page 
after page in which--let's

[[Page 10614]]

see, how many Members of Congress, if they list the committee here? I 
do not see on this volume, but perhaps it is in others, how many 
Members of Congress were involved. Usually they list them.
  How many Members were involved, does the Senator know?
  Mr. ROTH. Let me say this. What I do know, as far as the record 
shows, only two officers were penalized, were punished.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, what record does the Senator speak of, 
that shows only two? Is there any record that shows only two officers 
in the U.S. military were ever penalized?
  Mr. ROTH. No. But to me it is the same sort of thing. You are in a 
law case. Can you talk about the others who may be involved in the same 
kind of a problem? We are only trying to correct what I think are two 
serious cases.
  Let me point out any number of distinguished groups and organizations 
who have come out in support.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator has recited them. Certainly, I accept that 
for the record. I also commend your able assistant, Mr. Brzezinski 
here, who has worked tirelessly on this for several years and done the 
research. But let me ask you this question. We are both lawyers; we 
spent years in courtrooms. What new evidence do you bring before the 
Senate tonight to ask for a reversal of some nine different boards and 
commissions that have reviewed this over a period of these many years? 
What new evidence do you bring in support of your petition?
  Mr. ROTH. It really is not a question, I say to my colleague, of new 
evidence. The evidence has been there for many years, since 1944, when 
investigations were made both by the Army and Navy. Time and again, it 
has been found that these two individuals were not the only ones 
responsible. Admittedly, they share blame with others. But everybody 
else in the Service was permitted to keep their rank or raised to their 
highest.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we do not know that as a fact. The Senator 
keeps repeating everyone else was allowed to advance. I do not see 
anything before me.
  Mr. ROTH. I say, to the contrary, what is the evidence that there are 
others? Theoretically, you keep saying there are others. Who are they?
  Mr. WARNER. Look at the Dorn report. I would like to refer to that at 
some point here. Let's just go over the Dorn report. This is a very 
comprehensive analysis by the Department of Defense over a considerable 
period of months. I would like to refer to some of their findings.
  First, that these officers did receive warning messages on November 
27, stating that Japan might take hostile action at any moment. Kimmel 
and Short concluded the attack would occur in the western Pacific and 
not Hawaii.
  That was apparently their independent judgment.
  The Army and Navy were separate departments reporting directly to the 
President. There is a question about the collaboration of these two 
senior officers on the islands of Hawaii.
  Lack of mission discussion between Kimmel and Short on defense plans 
for Hawaii and long-range air patrols--in other words, they had not 
collaborated to coordinate the assets of the United States as a 
deterrent, or indeed a defense against any attack on which they had 
warning on November 27. Kimmel and Short did not share their internal 
intelligence with each other. That, to me, is a very troubling fact.
  Just to say, as this report does, that responsibility is broadly 
shared does not absolve Kimmel and Short of accountability for this 
action to some degree. For example, the commander has plenary, that is, 
full, complete, and absolute, responsibility for the welfare of the 
people under his command and is directly accountable for everything the 
unit does or fails to do. That is legendary in military history.
  Even in the Navy, there are cases where the captain was in his 
quarters, properly, perhaps, taking a rest and arose with the ship, and 
there are hundreds of cases where he is held accountable, even though 
he was not on the bridge at the time.
  Three- and four-star positions are listed as positions of importance 
and responsibility. Both commanders made errors in judgment. The most 
serious ones were failure to establish a state of readiness in light of 
warnings received and to liaison between the two commands, i.e., Army 
and Navy, and to coordinate defensive measures and to maintain 
effective reconnaissance. Intelligence available to Kimmel and Short 
was sufficient to justify a higher level of vigilance than was 
maintained. An officer may be relieved of command if a superior decides 
the officer has failed to exercise sound judgment. And that is 
precisely what was done in this case.
  The Senator points out that history does show, facts and mitigation, 
that responsibility was shared in Washington for failure to communicate 
on a timely basis some intelligence, but it does not absolve them from 
taking prudent actions as field commanders at a time of very high 
tension. That is the point I make. Indeed, those facts may have been 
the mitigating facts that these men were not actually court-martialed 
and incarcerated for this tragedy. This was an absolute, at the time, 
frightful blow against the United States of America. All of us have 
seen the pictures, and we know the history well. That is why it 
concerns me to try this revisionist action at this late date.
  Relief does not require a finding of misconduct or unsatisfactory 
performance, merely a loss of confidence with regard to the specific 
command in question. There is a vast difference between a degree of 
fault which warrants court-martial action and a level of performance 
which warrants removal of command.
  Promotion is based on potential and not past performance. That is, 
promotion is based on expectation of performance to the level at which 
the individual is being considered for promotion. Posthumous 
advancement in rank would be based on the judgment that, at a minimum, 
they had served satisfactorily at the three- and four-star level. Their 
superiors at the time decided they had not, and there is no compelling 
basis to contradict this earlier decision, made at a time when there 
were live witnesses and clarity of memory in the minds of many.
  There may be a debate as to fairness and justice, but there can be no 
argument about the legitimacy of those who exercised their power for 
relief in retirement. The official treatment--this report goes on--of 
Kimmel and Short was subsequently temperate and procedurally proper; 
mention of court-martial but no charges brought; some allegations that 
there was no court-martial because the Government feared bringing 
charges would implicate other senior military and civilian leaders; 
could also be there were sufficient grounds for successful court-
martial prosecution.
  Mr. President, there is no new evidence before the Senate tonight. I 
would like to go on. I am going to put this in the Record. Is there 
some other point the Senator wishes to make? If I understand--you have 
been very forthright--there has been no new evidence. So what we are 
really doing is trying to exercise fair and impartial judgment by 
giving our own independent assessment of facts that were deduced in a 
timely manner in the period of 1941 to, say, 1946. That is the 
conclusion of this congressional review.
  Now we are determining from those facts which were deduced at the 
time of clarity of memory and presumably many witnesses who testified 
before the Congress. We are now asked to make this important decision 
which is tantamount, in the minds of many Americans, to exonerating 
totally these two officers from any misconduct or dereliction of duty 
at the time of Pearl Harbor. I just simply cannot go along with that, I 
say to the Senator.
  First, again, there are no new facts. We are agreed on that.
  Mr. ROTH. The issue is not the question of new facts. The issue is 
the question of fairness. I believe that is as critically important 
today as it was at the time it occurred. The record is clear that these 
individuals, General Short and Admiral Kimmel, did not have the 
intelligence information available at the time that would have

[[Page 10615]]

enabled them to better address the challenge from the Japanese.
  Mr. WARNER. May I ask, is that fact not borne out in many of these 
hearings that were held in the period of 1941 to 1946? My recollection 
is that that was always presented at that time, or at least certainly 
in the congressional one when the war was over.
  Mr. ROTH. To me, it is just a difference, I guess, in approach. If 
you take the position that it happened in the past and it should not be 
changed, I think that is wrong. I think there is a strong case that 
these individuals were not treated fairly. The President was given 
authority under the 1947 act to raise any retired flag officer to the 
rank----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I remember it well. The Senator will 
recall we referred to it, those of us down in the ranks, as the 
tombstone promotion; am I not correct?
  Mr. ROTH. That is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. That shows our vintage.
  Mr. ROTH. I just think it is not fair to these individuals, to their 
reputation. Admittedly, even the Dorn report makes all kinds of 
conclusions that they did not have the information to which they were 
entitled, that others shared in the responsibility for what happened.
  In this country, in the tradition of the military--and I am not a 
professional soldier, although I did have the pleasure of serving 
several years in the military----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I might say, with distinction; a fine 
officer.
  Mr. ROTH. I appreciate that. I think the important thing is to show 
that in our country, individuals who were not treated equitably, the 
record can be set straight.
  Mr. WARNER. On that point, so the Senator's argument tonight is one 
of fairness. But I say to him, if the Senate were to go along with him, 
implicitly it would say that all of these reports involving hundreds of 
conscientious men and perhaps women who were on these boards, some 
seven or eight boards, were unfair.
  Mr. ROTH. I go back to the fact, it was the President who decided in 
the 1947 act not to raise them to their wartime ranks. I think it is a 
rank injustice. I think it is a blot on the history of World War II. 
There are many people one can probably point out who said this, that, 
or the other.
  Here were two gentlemen, one an admiral who had been in command, a 
naval CO, who was in charge in Hawaii. General Short was in command of 
the Army Hawaiian department. They did not have the intelligence.
  One has to remember, in a time of war and stress, one of the concerns 
was that the country was so shocked by what took place in Hawaii that 
there was concern over what would be the reaction of the American 
people. Even though they were found innocent of dereliction of duty, 
that did not become public information, for the simple reason they 
wanted to make certain that the American people supported the efforts 
of this country and more. That was kept secret indefinitely, until 
1947, at which time it came out.
  But I know the chairman is a fair man. I admire him greatly. I know 
there are those in the military saying: Well, don't go back and change 
now. Let history judge. I just think it is unfair to these individuals 
who did serve with excellence, who did serve with distinction, to be 
penalized when they were the only two.
  Mr. WARNER. But, Senator, what do you say to all of these people--I 
wish we had a volume here that showed how many Members of Congress 
participated? Perhaps you can provide that. I do not know how many sat 
on all the boards that Frank Knox had. I recited all of them here, but 
I did serve in the Department of Navy as an Under Secretary for 5-plus 
years.
  Mr. ROTH. With great distinction.
  Mr. WARNER. I am not so sure, but you are nice to say it. It was a 
challenge. I was privileged and humbled to do so.
  But my point is, a naval court of inquiry, that is usually about 9 or 
10 officers certainly for a matter of this importance. All of these 
investigations involved, I think, at a minimum 10 or 12 people, not to 
mention all the staffs on both sides. I am sure they had the 
opportunity for these two officers to make known their own views and to 
turn over all of the investigations and say that they did not act 
fairly towards these two men.
  Here we are, here in May of 1999, with no new evidence. I do not have 
the records of all these boards. I suppose somebody has gone through 
them. And Mr. Brzezinski maybe has.
  Could I ask, have you got an estimate of how many persons were 
involved in all these boards which rendered a judgment that these two 
men must be held accountable for this tragedy at Pearl Harbor? Does 
anyone have an estimate of how many Members of Congress?
  Mr. ROTH. I think the point is that in these investigations, the 
purpose of them was not to determine who was accountable but, rather, 
it was a statement of fact. But, again, let me underscore. You keep 
coming back and saying: Why should we be looking at it today?
  I think that is what makes this country different. If there is a 
wrong, an error, it is never too late to correct it.
  Here we have a case where these individuals were found not to be 
solely responsible for the attack on Pearl Harbor. As a matter of fact, 
there were findings in agreement that many in Washington played a key 
role. Most persuasive to me is the fact that the intelligence they 
needed to address the attack was not made available to them, yet they 
are the ones who were denied promotion. The only two.
  Mr. WARNER. But you don't know that. I don't know that. There is no 
record before us to show that these were the only two men who were 
treated unfairly. You come back to that.
  Mr. ROTH. We do know----
  Mr. WARNER. I reject that argument.
  Mr. ROTH. You reject the argument, but you give me no names. Who else 
was involved? These are the two who many distinguished former officers 
of the service, of the Navy, of the Army, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, 
find this is unfairly treating these individuals. I am merely trying to 
correct a wrong. I recognize different people--I think we are both fair 
minded, to be honest. We just happen to disagree.
  Mr. WARNER. All right. You want to correct. On what basis do you 
correct other than the palpitations of your heart?
  Mr. ROTH. Because of the fact that----
  Mr. WARNER. Where is the evidence?
  Mr. ROTH. There were findings that these individuals did not have the 
intelligence to which they were entitled. In Washington, it was known 
that war was imminent. If you had the full information, it was fairly 
clear that there could be an attack on Pearl Harbor. There was a so-
called bomb, 14-part message, all of which indicated that attack was an 
immediate threat.
  That information was denied the two individuals with the key critical 
responsibility in Hawaii. I just think that to hold them responsible 
and not to give them the lifetime is unfair.
  Mr. WARNER. If I could again refer to the Dorn Report:

       The failure of Kimmel and Short to make adequate 
     preparations in light of the information they did have.

  That was a major finding.

       They knew their primary mission, arguable their only 
     mission, was to prepare for war.
       They knew that war with Japan was highly likely.
       They knew that a surprise attack probably would precede a 
     declaration of war.
       They knew Japan, not the US, would strike the first blow.
       They knew the initial Japanese attack would fall on Pearl 
     Harbor.
       They knew that an attack on Pearl Harbor could come from 
     aircraft carriers.
       They knew from their own staffs of the danger of a surprise 
     air attack.
       They knew from recent events that the idea of a carrier air 
     attack on Pearl Harbor was not new.
       They made statements prior to December 7 that acknowledged 
     the possibility of an air attack on their forces.

  Now, that was the finding of the Dorn group here just in 1995. I have 
it here, some numerous pages of this report.

[[Page 10616]]


  Mr. ROTH. Let me make--I do not want to interrupt.
  Mr. WARNER. No. Please go ahead.
  Mr. ROTH. Let me point out those findings were general findings. But 
the fact is, the up-to-date intelligence that Washington had in the 
days immediately before Pearl Harbor was not made available to General 
Short or Admiral Kimmel.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that sum portion of intelligence, I think 
that all throughout history has been conceded. And these tribunals, 
particularly the Congress, had that before it. It is for that reason 
maybe they were not court-martialed and incarcerated, if found guilty.
  Mr. ROTH. Yes, you knew an air carrier attack was possible. But to 
know, for example, as they knew in Washington in the days right before 
the attack that the Japanese wanted to know where the warships were 
located, it was this kind of information that gave immediacy to the 
threat. To me, that was critical.
  You talk about the Dorn Report. Let me just say, as part of the Dorn 
Report, they sort of are all over the map in their finding. They say:

       It is clear today, as should have been clear since 1946 to 
     any serious reader of the JCC hearing record, that Admiral 
     Kimmel and General Short were not solely responsible for the 
     defeat at Pearl Harbor.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       * * * more information was available in Washington but not 
     forwarded to them. Army and Navy officials in Washington were 
     privy to intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications 
     (notably the ``bomb plot'', ``winds'', ``pilot'', and 
     ``fourteen-part'' messages) which provided crucial--

  Now, this is the Dorn report--

     which provided crucial confirmation of the imminence of war. 
     Read together and with the leisure, focus, and clarity of 
     hindsight, these messages point strongly towards an attack on 
     Pearl Harbor at dawn on the 7th.

  That is the Dorn Report:

       The immediacy of an attack on Pearl Harbor at dawn on the 
     7th.
       The evidence of the handling of these messages in 
     Washington reveals some ineptitude, some unwarranted 
     assumptions and misstatements, limited coordination, 
     ambiguous language and lack of clarification and followup at 
     higher levels.

  I could go on.

       A careful reading of the proceedings and reports of those 
     panels suggests clear recognition of the faults at all 
     levels. Yet these two gentlemen were singled out and were not 
     given advance to their wartime rating.

  I think it was inequitable. I think it was not fair, and it seems to 
me the greatness of this country is that we can go back and make 
changes where warranted.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have just located, I think, a document 
that interests me a great deal. It is entitled, ``Investigation of the 
Pearl Harbor Attack: Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation 
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,'' pursuant to a resolution of Congress, S. 
Res. 27. And it was reported on July 5, 1946.
  Just listen to those Senators who were on this commission: Alben 
Barkley, you remember him. What an extraordinary man; Walter George, 
George was considered one of the great, great internationalists; Scott 
Lucas of Illinois, one of the most senior Senators from the State of 
Illinois, the Presiding Officer's State; Owen Brewster from Maine; 
Homer Ferguson from Michigan.
  I say to my good friend, those names still reverberate with absolute 
distinction and credibility in this Chamber today. They made the 
findings which left history intact. And we here, just the two of us, 
really, on the floor tonight, are to urge our colleagues tomorrow to 
reverse that history?
  With all due respect, there is not the foundation, in my judgment, 
for the Senate to so act and overrule the findings of these men.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, as the Senator knows, I have the greatest 
respect for his soundness of judgment, for his honesty and integrity. I 
have the same for the Senators named. But the fact remains, honorable 
men and women often disagree. Here we do disagree.
  I am just trying to join my colleagues--there are 23 of us --in 
seeking to correct what we think was unfair treatment to two 
individuals who devoted a lifetime of service to this country. Yes, 
there are differences of opinion on this matter, but nothing seems to 
me more important than to try to correct a record which I think, on the 
basis of the studies I have seen, results in unfairness. We are trying 
to correct that.
  I understand you disagree with the basis of our proposal, but I think 
both of us want the same thing, and that is fairness.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, there is no one in this body for whom I 
have greater respect than my dear friend and colleague, Senator Roth. 
He has put a lot of work, together with his able staff, into this case. 
But it seems to me that we stand in a momentous hour in the history of 
this country. We are asking our colleagues to trust in our own 
judgments and our findings as to whether or not one of the most 
remarkable and tragic chapters in the history of this Nation, in 
effect, should have this significant reversal these many years hence, 
based on no new evidence, based on the fervent plea of my colleagues, 
Senator Roth and Senator Thurmond.
  I shall take the floor tomorrow and most vigorously oppose this. I 
think for the night we have pretty well concluded this debate. I have 
to tell the Senator, it is an interesting one for me and not altogether 
without some implications in my own life, thinking back in that period 
of history. I will never forget Pearl Harbor.
  If I could just reminisce for a moment, it is hard to believe that 
shortly thereafter this city, the Nation's Capital, endured periods of 
blackout. I remember it very well, as a small--well, I wasn't so small. 
I remember my father was a physician and he was able to drive at night 
only with a slit on the headlights to get to the hospital. I remember 
very well our home was equipped with blackout curtains. All the 
streetlights went out. We were fearful of an attack here in Washington, 
DC, and, indeed, other east coast cities. There were Nazi submarines 
patrolling off the east coast of the United States, sinking ships.
  How well I recall on the beaches of Virginia there was washed up 
debris from sunken ships. The people on the west coast lived in 
constant fear that there would be an invasion. These were serious and 
strenuous times, calling on the men and women of the Armed Forces for a 
duty and a commitment and an assumption of risk without parallel, 
because this Nation in many respects was unprepared. How well we recall 
the pictures of the Army practicing maneuvers with broomsticks rather 
than rifles.
  When I think of the tragic death, loss of life and property, indeed, 
if we were to follow your logic--President Roosevelt had that 
intelligence--we could go back and judge the record of many others. It 
seems to me that what is before the Senate tonight is clear facts that 
men and women of clear conscience, with the ability to assess fresh 
information, have painstakingly gone through it, reached their 
conclusion year after year, and then a President, Harry Truman, is my 
recollection, am I correct, made the decision that he did with respect 
to these two officers.
  I just do not believe that the Senate at this time should reverse 
that history.

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