[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 7]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 9229-9231]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



   CRISIS IN KOSOVO (ITEM NO. 2)--REMARKS BY PROFESSOR MICHAEL KLARE

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, May 11, 1999

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, on April 29, 1999, I joined with 
Representative Cynthia A McKinney and Representative Michael E. Capuano 
to host the second in a series of Congressional Teach-In sessions on 
the Crisis in Kosovo. If a peaceful resolution to this conflict is to 
be found in the coming weeks, it is essential that we cultivate a 
consciousness of peace and actively search for creative solutions. We 
must construct a foundation for peace through negotiation, mediation, 
and diplomacy.
  Part of the dynamic of peace is a willingness to engage in meaningful 
dialogue, to listen to one another openly and to share our views in a 
constructive manner. I hope that these Teach-In sessions will 
contribute to this process by providing a forum for Members of Congress 
and the public to explore alternatives to the bombing and options for a 
peaceful resolution. We will hear from a variety of speakers on 
different sides of the Kosovo situation. I will be introducing into the 
Congressional Record transcripts of their remarks and essays that shed 
light on the many dimensions of the crisis.
  This presentation is by Michael Klare, a professor of world security 
studies at Hampshire College. A noted expert on foreign policy, 
Professor Klare discusses the content of the Rambouillet plan, and 
speculated that the decision to bomb Serbia was closely related to the 
inauguration of a ``new strategic blueprint'' by NATO. He also presents 
a 5-point plan for peace in the Balkans. Following his presentation is 
his opinion piece from Newsday, April 4, 1999, entitled ``Kosovo 
Failures Show Path to Real Peace.'' I commend these well-reasoned 
documents to my colleagues.

 Presentation by Professor Michael Klare to Congressional Teach-In on 
                                 Kosovo

       First, I want to thank Representatives Kucinich, McKinney, 
     and Capuano for affording me this opportunity to address the 
     issues raised by the current conflict in the Balkans. I 
     believe that public discussion of these issues is essential 
     if Congress and the American people are to make informed 
     decisions about vital national security matters.
       As for my own views, I want to make it clear from the start 
     that I am very troubled by the strategy adopted by the United 
     States and NATO to deal with the crisis in Kosovo. Now, I 
     agree that we all share an obligation to resist genocide and 
     ethnic cleansing whenever such hideous behavior occurs. And I 
     think that we all agree that Serbian military and police 
     authorities have engaged in such behavior in Kosovo. The 
     killings and

[[Page 9230]]

     other atrocities that have occurred there represent an 
     assault on the human community as a whole, and must be 
     vigorously opposed.
       But this does not mean that we cannot be critical of the 
     means adopted by the United States and NATO to counter this 
     behavior, if we find them lacking. Indeed, our very concern 
     for the lives of the Albanian Kosovars requires that we 
     agonize over every strategic decision and reject any move 
     that could conceivably jeopardize the safety of the people 
     most at risk.
       Unfortunately, I do not believe that U.S. and NATO leaders 
     adequately subjected their proposed strategies to this 
     demanding standard. In saying this, I do not mean to question 
     the sincerity of their concern for the people of Kosovo. But 
     I do believe that they rushed to adopt a strategy that was 
     not optimally designed to protect the lives of those at risk.
       The haste of which I speak was most evident at the so-
     called peace negotiations at Rambouillet in France. I say 
     ``so-called,'' because it is now apparent that the United 
     States and NATO did not really engage in the give and take of 
     true negotiations, but rather presented the Serbian 
     leadership with an ultimatum that they were almost certain to 
     reject. This ultimatum called for the virtual separation of 
     Kosovo from Serbia (if not right away, then in three years' 
     time), the occupation of Kosovo by an armed NATO force, and 
     the use of Serbian territory as a staging area for NATO 
     forces in Kosovo--a drastic infringement on Serbian 
     sovereignty that no Serbian leader could agree to, and still 
     expect to remain in office.
       Moreover, NATO representatives in Rambouillet evidently did 
     not consider any other scenarios for settlement of the 
     crisis, for example a compromise solution that might have 
     averted the tragedy of the past few weeks. Such a compromise 
     would have entailed a high degree of autonomy for Kosovo 
     within Serbia (as was the case during the Tito period), 
     with U.N. rather than NATO forces providing the necessary 
     security for returning Albanian Kosovars.
       Perhaps such a compromise was not really possible at 
     Rambouillet, but we will never know, because NATO 
     representatives gave Milosevic a take-it-or-leave-it package, 
     and he predictably said no. As soon as the OSCE observers 
     were pulled out of Kosovo, the Serbians began their attacks 
     on the Albanian Kosovars. And the NATO air war, when it began 
     a few days later, has proved to have little practical effect 
     on the situation on the ground.
       Now, some analysts may argue that haste was necessary at 
     that point, to forestall the actions long planned by the 
     Milosevic regime. But this does not make sense. If Milosevic 
     had initiated full-scale ethnic cleansing while negotiations 
     were under way in Rambouillet and the OSCE observers were 
     still in Kosovo, he would have been exposed to the world as a 
     vicious tyrant and could not have prevented a U.N. Security 
     Council resolution authorizing the use of force against him 
     under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. It is very unlikely that 
     he would have chosen this outcome, as it probably would have 
     forced Russia to side with NATO against him. As it happened, 
     NATO began the air war without a supporting U.N. resolution, 
     and Milosevic was able to conceal the atrocities in Kosovo 
     from international observation.
       Why, then, did NATO rush to begin military operations 
     against Serbia? I believe that the decision to terminate the 
     negotiations at Rambouillet and commence the air war was 
     driven in part by extraneous factors that were not directly 
     connected to developments in Kosovo proper. In particular, I 
     believe that President Clinton was influenced in part by the 
     timing of NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit meeting in 
     Washington. As we know, the crisis in Kosovo was reaching the 
     boiling point only two months before the NATO Summit, which 
     of course was scheduled for April 23-25. The White House had 
     been planning since 1998 to use this occasion to unveil a new 
     strategic blueprint for NATO--one that called for Alliance to 
     transform itself from a collective defense organization into 
     a regional police force with jurisdiction extending far 
     beyond the organization's traditional defense lines. Under 
     this new strategy, NATO would be primed to engage in ``crisis 
     response'' operations whenever stability was threatened on 
     the periphery of NATO territory. (Such operations are also 
     referred to in NATO documents as ``non-Article 5 
     operations,'' meaning military actions not prompted by an 
     attack on one of NATO's members, such as those envisioned in 
     the collective defense provisions of Article 5 of the NATO 
     Treaty.)
       I believe that Mr. Clinton must have concluded that a 
     failure to take vigorous action against Milosevic in March 
     would have cast doubt on the credibility of the new NATO 
     strategy (on which the air campaign against Serbia is based), 
     while a quick success would no doubt have helped build 
     support for its ratification. In arriving at this conclusion, 
     Mr. Clinton was also influenced (according to a report in The 
     New York Times of April 18, 1999) by intelligence reports 
     suggesting that Milosevic would give in to NATO demands after 
     a relatively short period of bombing.
       And so the United States and NATO rushed into an air 
     campaign against Serbia before it had exhausted all of the 
     potential for a negotiated settlement with Belgrade. And I 
     would argue that this very haste has damaged the 
     effectiveness of NATO action. For one thing, it did not allow 
     NATO officials sufficient time to prepare for the refugee 
     crisis provoked by Serbian action in Kosovo, resulting in the 
     massive chaos witnessed at border regions in Albania and 
     Macedonia. In addition, precipitous NATO action has allowed 
     Milosevic to conceal the atrocities in Kosovo from his own 
     people, and to blame the suffering there on NATO bombs rather 
     than Serbian violence. As well, such haste gives the 
     appearance that NATO is acting without proper U.N. Security 
     Council authorization, and thus is in violation of 
     international law. Finally, it has alienated Russia, which 
     sees the air war as a one-sided attack on a friendly Slavic 
     state.
       NATO itself has also suffered from this haste, in that the 
     parliaments and publics of the NATO member states were not 
     given an adequate opportunity to debate the merits of the air 
     war and the new strategic blueprint upon which it is based. 
     Given the fact that NATO is an alliance of democracies, in 
     which key decisions are supposedly arrived at only after full 
     consultation with the people and their elected 
     representatives, this lack of consultation runs the risk of 
     discrediting NATO over the long run. Given the magnitude and 
     significance of the strategic transportation now under way, 
     entailing the possible initiation of NATO military operations 
     in areas outside of NATO's traditional defense lines, it is 
     essential that the U.S. Congress and the parliaments of the 
     NATO member states now open up debate on the new strategy, as 
     articulated in paragraphs 31, 41, 48, and 49 of the 
     Alliance's ``New Strategic Concept,'' adopted on April 24, 
     1999.
       This having been said, it is necessary to return to the 
     problem at hand: the evident failure of the existing NATO 
     strategy to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and to force 
     Milosevic into submission to NATO's demands. As indicated, I 
     believe that this strategy was adopted in haste, and that the 
     consequences of haste was an imperfect strategy. It is now 
     time to reconsider NATO's strategy, and devise a more 
     realistic and effective alternative. Our goal must be to 
     convince Serbian authorities to accept a less harsh version 
     of the Rambouillet proposal--one that gives Albanian Kosovars 
     local self-government and effective protection against 
     Serbian aggression (guaranteed by an armed international 
     presence), but without separating Kosovo from Serbia 
     altogether. To get to this point, I propose a five-point 
     strategy composed of the following:
       (1) An unconditional halt in the bombing of Serbia proper. 
     This would deprive Milosevic use of the air war as a tool for 
     mobilizing Serbian nationalism on his behalf. (2) The 
     establishment of a no-fly, no-tank, no-troop-movement zone 
     covering all Serbian forces in Kosovo, and enforced by NATO 
     aircraft. Serbian forces would be told that they will not be 
     attacked if they remain in their barracks, but will come 
     under attack if they engage in military action against 
     Kosovar civilians. Such attacks, when initiated, would be 
     directed solely against those forces directly involved in 
     armed violence against civilians. (3) The imposition and 
     enforcement by NATO of a total economic blockade against 
     Serbia, excluding only food and medical supplies. (4) The 
     restarting of NATO-Serbia negotiations over the future of 
     Kosovo, with assistance provided by Russia and other third 
     parties. No preconditions should be set regarding the 
     identity of any armed international force deployed in Kosovo 
     to protect the Kosovars, but it should be made clear that 
     Serbia will have to accept some armed international presence. 
     (5) A promise that economic sanctions will be lifted as soon 
     as Serbia agrees to a just and enforceable settlement in 
     Kosovo, allowing the Albanian Kosovars to return under armed 
     international protection. Also, a promise that Serbia would 
     be able to benefit from future regional reconstruction and 
     redevelopment programs supported by the EU and other such 
     bodies.
       Such a strategy, I believe, would deprive Milosevic of any 
     further propaganda victories while affording full protection 
     to the remaining Albanian civilians in Kosovo. It is also 
     likely to receive strong international support and increase 
     the pressures (and incentives) for Serbia to agree to a just 
     and peaceful resolution of the crisis in Kosovo.


     
                                  ____
                      [From Newsday, Apr. 4, 1999]

                Kosovo Failures Show Path to Real Peace

                           (By Michael Klare)

       The time has come to acknowledge that the current U.S.-NATO 
     strategy in Yugoslavia is a failure. Not one of the air war's 
     objectives--the cessation of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, the 
     weakening of Slobodan Milosevic or the prevention of a wider 
     conflict--has been achieved. Instead, the atrocities are 
     getting worse, Milosevic is stronger than ever, and the war 
     is spreading. Nor is there any indication that an expanded 
     air campaign will prove more successful. We must look for 
     other options.
       Without alternatives, we could be doomed to involvement in 
     a conflict lacking any discernible conclusion. The United 
     States and NATO launched the air war under the naive

[[Page 9231]]

     assumption that Milosevic would quickly succumb to a dramatic 
     (and relatively cost-free) show of force. Evidently, no 
     thought was given to the possibility that he would not. Now, 
     it seems that the alliance's only option is to extend the 
     bombing to an ever-widening array of targets in Serbia. Such 
     attacks are not, however, likely to end the fighting, ensure 
     the safety of the Albanians in Kosovo, or produce a lasting 
     and stable peace in the Balkans. Unless Milosevic loses his 
     nerve--something for which he has shown no prior 
     inclination--the attacks will simply grind on with no visible 
     end in sight. Meanwhile, the unity heretofore shown by the 
     NATO countries is likely to crumble and the prospects for a 
     Dayton-like peace accord are likely to vanish.
       That is strategy based solely on air strikes would achieve 
     all of NATO's objectives was a dubious proposition from the 
     start. By bombing Serbia, we provided a pretext for Milosevic 
     to silence his opposition at home and to escalate the killing 
     in Kosovo--an outcome that should have been obvious to NATO 
     war planners. It should also have been obvious that the 
     Serbian population--highly nationalistic to begin with--would 
     respond to the bombing by rallying around its leadership.
       Many analysts have spoken of the practical obstacles to an 
     effective air campaign in Yugoslavia: the difficult terrain, 
     the bad weather, the interspersing of military and civilian 
     installations and so on. Certainly, these are important 
     factors. But it was NATO's failure to calculate the political 
     outcome of the campaign that has proved most calamitous: The 
     more we have bombed, the stronger--not weaker--Milosevic has 
     become.
       NATO officials now contend that the way to alter this 
     equation is by increasing the level of pain being inflicted 
     on Serbia from the air. This will be done by attacking 
     government buildings in downtown Belgrade and civilian 
     installations--such as bridges and factories--throughout the 
     country.
       Supposedly, this will erode public support for Milosevic 
     and persuade elements of the Yugoslav Army to seek peace with 
     NATO. But it could easily produce the opposite effect: 
     intensifying Serbian hostility to the West and provoking 
     Serbian military incursions into neighboring countries. We 
     see the start of this already, with the shelling of Albania 
     and the seizure of U.S. soldiers in Macedonia.
       NATO could also alter the equation by sending ground troops 
     into Kosovo. This would permit allied forces to engage those 
     Serbian units most directly involved in the slaughter of 
     ethnic Albanians. It is doubtful, however, that NATO forces 
     could get there soon enough and in sufficient strength to 
     make a difference. Once troops are deployed there, moreover, 
     it may prove impossible to bring them back. Given the Serbs' 
     growing hostility to the West, any hope of achieving a 
     lasting peace in the region--one that does not require the 
     presence of a large, permanent NATO force to police it--has 
     all but disappeared.
       One lesson we should all draw from this is that military 
     force--and particularly the frequently unanticipated 
     political fallout from such force--is very difficult to 
     control. Once Clinton gave the go-ahead for air strikes, he 
     set in motion forces that are not subject to easy 
     manipulation. If Washington backs down now, the credibility 
     of NATO will be seriously impaired--hence the temptation to 
     escalate the conflict rather than to admit failure. With each 
     new escalation, however, the stakes grow higher and it 
     becomes even more difficult to extricate ourselves from the 
     spiral of conflict. This is, of course, precisely how the 
     United States became so deeply ensnared in Vietnam.
       There is also the issue of casualties--American, allied, 
     Kosovar and Serbian. It is hard to conceive of any type of 
     escalation, whether in the air or on the ground, that will 
     not produce a higher rate of casualties. It may be, as some 
     pundits have argued, that we have to risk higher casualties 
     in order to produce a desirable outcome. But it would be an 
     unforgivable mistake to incur higher casualties simply in 
     order to rescue a strategy that is flawed to begin with.
       Rather than think about escalating the conflict, therefore, 
     we have to find ways of de-escalating it--of reducing the 
     level of violence while providing real protection to the 
     remaining Albanians in Kosovo.
       Is this a realistic option? There are still grounds to 
     think so. The key to a lasting peace in the Balkans is 
     persuading the Serbs that they have more to gain from 
     participating in the stability and prosperity of the West 
     than from continued defiance and penury.
       The way to do this, I believe, is to stop the bombing of 
     Serbia proper while deploying a NATO air umbrella over Kosovo 
     and adjacent areas of Serbia. NATO should resolve to allow 
     safe passage to all Yugoslav military units in Kosovo that 
     elect to return to their bases in Serbia. But any such forces 
     that continue fighting in Kosovo, or that seek to enter the 
     region from Serbia, will be attached on sight.
       Likewise, any Serbian military aircraft that enter Kosovar 
     airspace, or that interfere with the operation of the NATO 
     air umbrella, would be shot down--as with the existing ``no-
     fly zone'' over southern Iraq.
       To give this strategy some added teeth, NATO could 
     infiltrate special commandos equipped with air/ground 
     communications systems and laser target-designators. These 
     units would avoid battle themselves, but could pinpoint the 
     exact location of any Serbian forces still engaged in ethnic 
     cleansing for instant attack from the air. The ultimate goal 
     should be a regime of zero tolerance for Serbian assaults on 
     civilians in Kosovo. This is precisely the sort of operation 
     at which the special units involved in the recent rescue of 
     the downed American F-117 fighter pilot are especially 
     proficient.
       At the same time, Serbia itself should be placed under a 
     draconian trade embargo, similar to that imposed on Iraq--
     allowing in nothing but food and medical supplies. All roads 
     and rail lines leading into Serbia would be closely 
     monitored, and any attempts to circumvent the embargo would 
     provoke a harsh response from NATO. Then we could offer the 
     option of negotiations. The choices for Belgrade should be 
     framed as follows: If you agree to a just settlement in 
     Kosovo, the sanctions will be lifted and Serbia will be 
     allowed to rejoin Europe and benefit from its prosperity; if 
     not, you will be spared from further bombing, but you will 
     live in perpetual isolation and poverty. Such an approach 
     would deprive Milosevic of the political advantage he now 
     enjoys from the NATO bombings, while increasing the 
     attraction of a permanent peace accord.
       The lesson of recent international peace negotiations--
     including the Oslo accords on Israel and Palestine and the 
     settlement in Northern Ireland--is that agreement is reached 
     most easily when all parties involved perceive a mutual 
     advantage in reaching accommodation. Merely threatening pain 
     is not enough: The Serbs must believe they will enjoy genuine 
     benefits from granting independence or autonomy to the 
     Albanian Kosovars.
       A strategy of this sort, resting on the de-escalation of 
     violence, will be much easier to sustain--and far more 
     effective--than the present policy of escalation. It can be 
     implemented immediately, without exposing the Albanian 
     Kosovars to increased danger. Most of all, it would allow the 
     United States and NATO to articulate a lasting outcome to the 
     crisis that we can live with in good conscience.

     

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