[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 6]
[House]
[Pages 8784-8790]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




               THE FAA, DOT IG, NTSB AND AVIATION SAFETY

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, on March 10, 1999, the House Appropriations 
subcommittee on Transportation held a hearing on the topic of aviation 
safety. At that hearing, Jane Garvey, administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) testified, as did Ken Mead, Department of 
Transportation inspector general (IG), and Jim Hall, chairman of the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
  Last year, domestic air carriers had an excellent safety record: no 
passengers died on U.S. commercial flights. Many worked diligently to 
make safety a priority, and in the transportation appropriations 
subcommittee we have focused our efforts on aviation safety as well as 
all transportation modes.
  In listening to the testimony prepared by each agency, it appeared 
that there was a difference of opinion in some areas with regard to the 
progress being made in aviation safety. Therefore, I requested that the 
IG and NTSB review the FAA's testimony and the FAA review the testimony 
of the IG and NTSB. In addition, I asked each to respond to the 
comments made by the others. I have provided this information for the 
Federal Register.
  In general, the oversight agencies (NTSB and IG) believe that the FAA 
could be moving more aggressively in the referenced areas of aviation 
safety. For example, the NTSB noted that the FAA should be moving more 
quickly to ensure that aircraft registered in the United States have 
new flight data recorders. Similarly, the IG points out that draft 
regulations seeking to reduce the number of runway incursions have not 
yet been published while the number of runway incursions continues to 
rise.
  Both oversight agencies suggest that the FAA should use more 
realistic measures of aviation safety. For example, the IG notes that

[[Page 8785]]

a good measure of airport security is not the number of new explosive 
detection machines purchased and distributed, but the number of bags 
screened by the machines. After all, it's one thing to purchase and 
place explosive detection machines and it is quite another to put them 
into service and screen bags.
  For its part, the FAA agrees that more should be done in the areas of 
runway incursions, airport security and project oversight.
  Mr. Speaker, it is my hope that the FAA will continue to work with 
the IG, NTSB and the aviation industry to fund and implement additional 
safety initiatives. The safety record of the industry last year was 
good, but we must remain vigilant in our efforts to improve the safety 
of the traveling public. As chairman of the House Appropriations 
subcommittee, I am committed, as I know all members of the subcommittee 
are, to do what we can to make sure that transportation safety remains 
a priority.

                    OIG Comments on FAA's Statement

       We have the following comments on FAA's statement before 
     the Subcommittee on Transportation, Committee on 
     Appropriations.


                  I. Air Traffic Control Modernization

       FAA's statement gives the impression that final deployment 
     of the HOST and Oceanic Computer System Replacement for Phase 
     1 hardware has been completed. However, final deployment has 
     not yet occurred and is currently planned to be complete by 
     October 1999.


                              II. Security

       FAA's testimony on deploying explosives detection systems 
     state that FAA has been very effective in getting advance 
     explosives detection systems up and running. FAA's statement 
     cites the fact that security equipment for checked baggage 
     has been installed at over 30 airports, and that trace 
     explosive detection devices for carry-on bags are being used 
     at more than 50 airports.
       The issue is not whether security equipment has been 
     installed at more than 30 airports or whether the equipment 
     has been ``procured'', ``installed'' or is ``operational.'' 
     In our opinion, the true measure of effectiveness is the 
     number of fully operational, FAA-certified bulk explosives 
     detection machines in use at Category X and I airports that 
     are screening at or near the demonstrated mean capacity of 
     125 bags per hour per machine. In our opinion, this usage 
     rate is reasonable as it includes time to resolve alarms and 
     is just more than half of the certified rate of 225 bags per 
     hour.
       Accordingly, our message to Congress in the past 2 years 
     has focused on the underutilization of explosives detection 
     equipment at this country's largest airports. In our opinion, 
     it is ultimately the number of bags screened that makes the 
     difference in aviation security, not the number of explosives 
     detection machines installed.
       FAA also stated that it continues to expand the use of 
     realistic operational testing of the aviation security 
     system. While FAA may be expanding the use of realistic 
     operational testing, much of the testing to date has not been 
     ``realistic.''
       In our recneltly completed audit of Secretary of Checked 
     Baggage, we found that checked baggage security testing by 
     over 300 FAA security field agents assigned to FAA regions 
     was limited to air carrier compliance with manual profiling 
     and positive passenger bag marching requirements. Also, at 
     the time of our audit, only a few ``red team'' \1\ security 
     agents assigned to FAA Headquarters were testing the new 
     automated passenger profiling systems, explosives detection 
     equipment, and equipment operators. Therefore, red team 
     testing of the new checked baggage security requirements has 
     been infrequent, limited to specific testing criteria, and 
     applied to only a few air carriers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ Red team refers to a group of security agents assigned to 
     FAA's Civil Aviation Security Special Activities Office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       In prior audits, we found similar conditions. For example, 
     in 1993 and 1996, we reported that FAA testing of airport 
     access control was ineffective (not realistic or aggressive) 
     and, in 1998, we reported that FAA testing of air carrier 
     compliance with cargo security requirements was not 
     comprehensive. We ntoed certain compliance requirements were 
     omitted from the test plans.
       Current OIG efforts indicate little improvement. For 
     example, in our current audit of airport Access Control, we 
     found FAAs airport access control assessments were limited in 
     scope, included little testing of controls, and were 
     conducted without using a standard testing protocol.
       Our test results confirm the importance of a standard test 
     protocol that includes realistic and aggressive testing 
     procedures. In a majority of our tests involving airport 
     access control, we successfully penetrated secure areas and 
     boarded a large number of passenger and cargo aircraft. The 
     majority of individiuals we encountered failed to challenge 
     us for unauthorized access. FAA recognizes that improvements 
     are needed and, on March 3, 1999, issued a letter to Airport 
     Security Consortiums to take immediate action to fix the 
     problems.


                              III. Safety

       FAA's testimony states that Runway Incursion Action Teams 
     have helped Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport reduce 
     its incursion rate to an all-time low. However, data provided 
     by FAA staff in the Runway Safety Office indicate that the 
     incursion rate at the airport is not at its all time low. In 
     1995, the runway incursion rate at the Cleveland airport was 
     0.375 per 100,000 operations. The rate climbed in 1996 and 
     has remained steady over the last three years at just over 
     1.9 per 100,000 operations. The number of runway incursions 
     (six occurrences) has also remained steady in the past 3 
     years.


                              IV Financing

       FAA's statement suggests that the proposed performance-
     based organization (PBO) for air traffic control will be 
     funded in FY 2000, in part, by $1.5 billion in new, cost-
     based user fees. This estimate is highly optimistic because 
     the proposed user fee system will require FAA's cost 
     accounting system to be in place and operating. Although FAA 
     plans to being implementing its cost accounting system this 
     summer in the oceanic and enroute environment to support 
     overflight fees, other types of air traffic under fees will 
     require further deployment of the cost accounting system and 
     concurrence of both Congress and users.
       FAA's statement also suggests that the proposed PBO will 
     make air traffic control more accountable for good 
     performance. Accountability for performance was also a main 
     tenet of personnel reform and part of the impetus behind 
     exempting the agency from most Federal personnel rules in 
     1996. In our September 30, 1998, report on the status of 
     FAA's personnel reform, we found that even with the new 
     flexibilities provided by reform, accountability for 
     performance had not been uniformly instilled throughout the 
     agency. Accordingly, in our opinion, there is no guarantee 
     that reorganizing air traffic control into a PBO will provide 
     the necessary catalyst to ensure greater accountability for 
     performance within that organization.

 FAA's Response to the Inspector General's Comments on FAA's Testimony


                           nas modernization

     HOST and Oceanic System Replacement (HOCSR):
       The FAA did not mean to imply that final deployment of the 
     HOCSR hardware is complete. We are on schedule and anticipate 
     final deployment to be complete by October, 1999.


                           aviation security

     Explosive Detection Equipment:
       We agree with the IG that the utilization rates should be 
     significantly higher and we are working with air carriers to 
     do that. Recent data indicates an upward trend.
     Airport Access Control:
       We agree that airport access control needs improvement in 
     many areas. We have initiated an aggressive plan with our 
     industry partners at 78 of the Nation's largest airports. 
     Over the next 6 weeks, we will conduct inspections and tests 
     to identify vulnerabilities systematically. We will use the 
     information to direct appropriate corrective action. The FAA 
     issued a letter, on March 3, 1999, to Airport Security 
     Consortiums to take immediate action to fix the problems.


                            aviation safety

     Runway Incursions:
       Specific reference by FAA that Cleveland runway incursions 
     ``dropped to an all-time low'' is, regrettably, incorrect 
     information.


                               Financing

       We agree with the IG that the estimated $1.5 billion in 
     new, cost based user fees for FY 2000 is optimistic. However, 
     we believe that ultimately moving to a cost based system is 
     essential to the development of a more independent, more 
     businesslike and more efficient air traffic service.

          FAA's Response to the Inspector General's Testimony

       At the FY 2000 House Appropriation hearing on March 10, 
     Chairman Wolf asked the FAA to respond to testimony from the 
     Department of Transportation's Inspector General (IG) and the 
     Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). 
     This is the FAA's response to the IG testimony on NAS 
     Modernization, Security, Safety and Financing.


                           nas modernization

     Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS):
       The Inspector General recommends that FAA defer decisions 
     on the full range of software development needed for human 
     factors on full STARS until testing on the DOD system is 
     completed.
       Although we understand the IG's concern about software 
     development, we disagree with their recommendation. We have 
     worked very closely with NATCA to identify and find mutually 
     agreeable solutions to the human factors issues for the Early 
     Display Configuration. These changes will be incorporated 
     into the Initial System Capability (ISC), or full STARS. We 
     believe that NATCA is fully committed to STARS as the system 
     for the future and wants to work

[[Page 8786]]

     with FAA to successfully field a STARS product with minimally 
     agreed to human factors additions as soon as possible.
     Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS):
       The Inspector General indicates that the program continues 
     to experience schedule slippage.
       The FAA was under pressure several years ago to accelerate 
     the WAAS schedule. Considering the many uncertainties and 
     unknowns with this type of cutting edge technology, we knew 
     there was a great deal of risk with such a compressed, 
     aggressive schedule. We would like to point out that even 
     with the 14-month schedule slip that we now project, the WAAS 
     program is well within the initial (pre-accelerated) 
     schedule. What caused the 14-month delay was a greater than 
     expected challenge in developing a critical software package 
     that monitors the performance and safety of the WAAS. All the 
     other major software modules have been completed, the ground-
     based master and reference stations are in place, and the two 
     leased geostationary satellites are in orbit providing 
     service.
       With regard to the Hopkins risk assessment study, the 
     Inspector General discusses several issues that are 
     unresolved and that considerable work remains to be done.
       The Inspector General may have left the impression that 
     nothing is being done by way of follow-up to the Hopkins 
     study. In fact, the FAA is addressing the various items in 
     the Hopkins study and will have a plan completed by this 
     summer. The FAA is working on a ``Satellite Navigation 
     Investment Analysis Plan,'' also due out this summer. This 
     will include an analysis of the alternatives of backups to 
     WAAS. The FAA discussed these alternatives in a public 
     Satellite Navigation User Forum here in Washington, the first 
     of three such forums to get user input in the investment/
     alternatives analysis process.
     HOST and Oceanic System Replacement (HOCSR):
       The Inspector General's comments suggest that meeting the 
     HOCSR deadline was a relatively modest accomplishment.
       The Inspector General testimony from a year ago before the 
     House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, said 
     with regard to HOCSR, ``the FAA faces significant challenges 
     and risks.'' The testimony also said ``Rehosting in less than 
     2 years at all centers is extremely optimistic. It is 
     unlikely that FAA can completely replace the HOST hardware at 
     all 20 enroute centers in less than 2 years.''
       HOCSR phase 1, while being a hardware replacement only, is 
     not simple. Host is connected to almost everything else in 
     the NAS and the transition strategy [akin to changing a tire 
     on a moving car] is fairly involved. Complex networks of 
     cables and switches were installed, tested and connected to 
     the existing NAS with no disruption of service. Centers were 
     able to switch back and forth between old and new systems 
     seamlessly. This was a major accomplishment, and we are 
     within cost and on schedule.
     Display System Replacement (DSR):
       The Inspector General's testimony minimizes the DSR 
     accomplishment because it did not involve large-scale 
     development of software.
       DSR should fit the definition of a software-intensive 
     system. DSR required development, integration and test of 
     almost 800,000 lines of operational software and also 
     required integration of over 70 commercial, off-the-shelf 
     software packages as part of the support system.
     Data Link:
       The Inspector General raised concerns about a prolonged 
     transition and the associated impact on cost, schedule, and 
     human factors.
       We believe that our current plans adequately address the 
     Inspector General's concerns. Rather than a transition to 
     data link, the FAA will be conducting an insertion of data 
     link technology into the NAS. Benefits will be realized 
     immediately, both by data link and non-data link users, 
     because of a reduction of frequency congestion on 
     conventional voice frequencies. Data link will never 
     completely replace voice communications especially in 
     conditions of aircraft or system emergencies, rapidly 
     changing severe weather, and similar high communications 
     workload environments. From the standpoint of cost, only 
     those users who derive a supportive cost/benefit analysis 
     will equip; those that don't will derive the operational 
     benefit of greater access to conventional communications 
     frequencies. FAA costs are offset as data link provides a 
     solution for current and future bandwidth problems. Those 
     users that will equip will do so as the business case 
     dictates. Human factors suggests that data link be used for 
     routine messages; voice messages will still be available for 
     time critical communications, and, because of the use of data 
     link in routine traffic, a higher level of safety and 
     efficiency will be maintained through reduced frequency 
     congestion.


                           aviation security

     Explosive Detection Equipment:
       The Inspector General raises concerns about the 
     underutilization of explosive detection equipment and 
     recommends that the machines be used more aggressively. The 
     Inspector General indicates that FAA's goal is to have air 
     carriers ultimately screen all checked baggage.
       We want to emphasize that the long-term goal to screen all 
     checked baggage is very long term. With the technology that 
     exists today, we have more confidence in the process of 
     screening CAPS selectee bags rather than trying to screen as 
     many bags as possible.


                            aviation safety

     Runway Incursions:
       The Inspector General stated that the FAA has made limited 
     progress in implementing the Runway Incursion Plan.
       The FAA has made significant progress but we realize there 
     is much more to do. We are finalizing the program 
     implementation plan, which establishes tasks, schedules and 
     funding required to accomplish prevention strategies. We 
     expect to publish this plan in April, 1999. We are well aware 
     that we must provide appropriate funds for these priority 
     initiatives.
       We have on-site evaluations underway. Runway incursion 
     action teams are focusing on airports experiencing an 
     unusually high rate of incidents. We have completed 6 and 
     plan to complete at least 14 additional evaluations by 
     September 30, 1999.
       The FAA is currently in the final stages of investment 
     analysis that is addressing the validity of a wide range of 
     technical and non-technical solutions, such as: improved 
     controller, pilot, vehicle operator education and training; 
     procedural changes; and improvements in airport signs, 
     lighting, surface marking and other equipment (such as low 
     cost ASDE, loop technology).
       The FAA is focusing on immediate initiatives to reduce 
     runway incursions and prevent surface accidents. We are in 
     the process of implementing 18 separate actions, which are 
     all funded. Some examples follow:
       ``Awareness blitz'' targeted for operators and users.
       Monthly Air Traffic/Airport Operator/User meetings at top 
     20 runway incursion airports.
       Develop and distribute videos to address controller and 
     pilot awareness.
       Develop and safety related brochures and materials to 
     aviation organizations.
       The FAA's Safer Skies also identifies runway incursions as 
     one of the focus areas for commercial and general aviation. A 
     commercial and general aviation analysis team that includes 
     FAA, NASA, industry and aviation union representatives [the 
     Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT)] was chartered and met on 
     February 11-12, 1998. A schedule over the next 6-month period 
     was established to analyze commercial and general aviation 
     runway incursions and develop intervention strategies based 
     on this data analysis. This effort is fully coordinated with 
     and complements the efforts in the Runway Incursion Program 
     plan.
       The Inspector General indicates that FAA has completed only 
     two of the eight recommendations included in the February, 
     1998 OIG report.
       We continue to work towards completion of all of the 1998 
     recommendations from the IG. With regard to the IG's emphasis 
     on completing the AA/AOPA education project, we would like to 
     point out that the final part of the project is underway--the 
     distribution of educational materials (videos, posters and 
     brochures).
       Clarification on Runway Incursion Data included in the 
     Inspector General's Statement:
       With regard to the chart on page 5 of the Inspector 
     General's statement, the data is accurate. This data was 
     obtained from FAA through the National Airspace Information 
     Monitoring System.
       Specific reference by FAA that Cleveland runway incursions 
     ``dropped to an all-time low'' is, regrettably, incorrect 
     information.
     Flight Operations Quality Assurance:
       The Inspector General raised concerns about the status of 
     rulemaking to obtain air carrier safety data that would be 
     used to proactively identify risks. The statement discusses 
     the protection of safety data and the ability of FAA to move 
     forward with FOQA.
       The FAA is addressing the safety data protection concerns 
     in a separate notice of proposed rulemaking which we hope to 
     release for public comment in the near future.
       The Inspector General suggests that an option for gaining 
     industry and Government acceptance of FOQA would be to 
     include a ``sunset provision'' in the final rule.
       The FAA disagrees. The FAA has already gathered ample 
     documentation of the value-added safety benefits that FOQA 
     will provide, including improvements to air traffic 
     procedures, pilot training, and airport equipage. The FAA 
     wants accelerated industry-wide implementation of FOQA in the 
     interest of public safety. Given the investment required by 
     both the airlines and the FAA to achieve that goal, a 
     ``sunset provision,'' which automatically terminates the 
     program by a set date seems inappropriate.
     Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS):
       The Inspector General raises concerns about budget 
     reduction and the impact on ATOS.
       The FAA has made difficult choices this year in order to 
     manage within a very constrained budget. We have deferred 
     hiring

[[Page 8787]]

     ATOS data analysts his year. However, in order to keep the 
     program on track with Phase I, we have reprioritized work 
     plans to support ATOS until additional analysts can be hired.
       We have fully funded the ATOS baseline training. This 
     includes initial indoctrination training and travel for air 
     carrier specific training needed by the certificate 
     management team (CMT). Some of the flight training and air 
     carrier systems training needed by team members has been 
     deferred.
       Regardless of the budget situation, we believe that a 
     slower approach to ATOS is prudent. It is important to note 
     that we will evaluate ATOS Phase I before a decision is made 
     to expand the program.
       The IG indicates that the FAA will complete an evaluation 
     of ATOS implementation by June 30, 1999. FAA will begin an 
     evaluation of ATOS Phase I implementation by June 30, 1999, 
     and we expect to complete this activity September 30, 1999.
     Air Tour Operations:
       The Inspector General urges the FAA to issue rulemaking to 
     extend more stringent safety and oversight of air tour 
     operators.
       FAA has developed a notice of proposed rule making (NPRM) 
     that will establish a set of national safety standards for 
     those operators. The rule will require that each operator 
     obtain an air carrier certificate and associated operations 
     specifications. The rule would also make operational 
     information on air tour operators more readily available.
       Both the IG and NTSB have insisted on the need for a data 
     base on air tour operators. They have provided no rationale 
     as to how a data base will improve safety. The FAA disagrees 
     and believes establishment of such a data base is costly and 
     unnecessary and would provide no safety benefit. Once all air 
     operators are certificated, FAA will have sufficient 
     information in its operation specifications data base to 
     provide safety oversight.


                       financing and cost control

     Rising Operations Costs:
       The Inspector General indicates that FAA will need to 
     contain increases in Operations costs in order to fund other 
     critical functions.
       FAA is also concerned about rising Operations costs because 
     our ability to actually control payroll-related increases in 
     extremely limited. Approximately 75% of the Operations 
     account is payroll related. Payroll cost increases are based 
     on mandatory pay raises as well as increases in government 
     contribution rates for retirement, social security, health 
     insurance and medicare.
       The recent NATCA agreement does cost more than we budgeted 
     for but represents less than 25% of our total mandatory 
     increases this year.
       The best way the FAA can control payroll costs is through 
     staffing reductions. We have made significant staffing 
     reductions since 1993. Even though the safety workforce has 
     grown in recent years, the staffing levels in Operations are 
     4,500 lower than in 1993. These reductions have resulted in 
     annual cost avoidance of $250 million and cumulative cost 
     avoidance of over $2 billion. We have also reduced our costs 
     by contracting out low level air traffic control facilities 
     and realigning the Airway Facilities field organizations.
       In the context of rising Operations costs, the Inspector 
     General questions an FAA funding policy that has been in 
     place for over six years.
       We do not consider first year maintenance costs of a new 
     system to be a ``mask'' for rising Operations costs. The use 
     of F&E funds to pay for maintenance for up to one year 
     following commissioning new systems can be compared to a 
     service contract for a newly acquired product, or a warranty 
     period. These are appropriately considered part of the cost 
     of fielding new systems. This policy was coordinated with and 
     approved by the House and Senate Appropriation Committees.
     Cost Accounting:
       The Inspector General points out schedule slippages in 
     implementation of cost accounting.
       While the IG is correct in noting there have been schedule 
     slippages, we have made significant changes in how the agency 
     approaches this critical initiative. The revised plan calls 
     for an incremental approach to cost accounting that allows us 
     to build on success as each piece is implemented.
       For example, in the first phase, FAA will have the initial 
     cost information available this summer for the Oceanic and En 
     Route portions of Air Traffic Services. Once this is 
     completed, other parts of Air Traffic Services and then other 
     Lines of Business will be brought into the System.
       We anticipate having the entire agency covered by the cost 
     accounting system by the end of FY 2001.
       When compared to private sector entities that have built 
     similar cost accounting systems, FAA's new time schedule and 
     cost estimates compare favorably with best business 
     practices.

                             [Enclosure 2]

              Response to FAA's Comments on Our Statements

       We have the following response to FAA's comments on our 
     statements.


                  I. Air Traffic Control Modernization

       FAA disagrees with our recommendation that FAA defer 
     decisions on the full range of software development needed 
     for human factors on full STARS until the testing on the 
     Department of Defense system in completed. FAA states that it 
     has worked closely with the National Air Traffic Controllers 
     Association to resolve the human factors issues with the 
     Early Display Configuration. These human factors changes will 
     be incorporated in full STARS.
       We agree that the human factors issues identified for the 
     Early Display Configuration should be incorporated in full 
     STARS. Our recommendation was intended to address the 
     remaining human factors work that will be needed beyond those 
     identified for the Early Display Configuration. Full STARS 
     will completely replace ARTS with independent primary and 
     back-up systems and includes functions not contained in the 
     Early Display Configuration.
       FAA argues that we minimize the accomplishments to date 
     with the Display System Replacement (DSR), and the agency 
     points out that DSR was a software intensive acquisition. DSR 
     was indeed a software intensive acquisition. However, it is 
     important to recognize that considerable software development 
     for DSR was done as part of the Advanced Automation System, 
     which was contracted for in 1988 and dramatically 
     restructured in 1994. Therefore the success with DSR is 
     directly related to software development work done during 
     that six-year period.
       FAA notes that current agency plans adequately address our 
     concerns about Data Link. However, we issued a report on 
     February 24, 1999, that made a number of recommendations 
     aimed at improving planning for Data Link systems. We 
     continue to believe that a comprehensive plan is needed to 
     guide industry and government efforts to transition to Data 
     Link over the next decade.


                              II. Security

       FAA said that the goal to screen all checked baggage is 
     very long-term (not obtainable in the near future).
       We agree that screening all checked bags is a long-term 
     goal. However, FAA needs to begin to move forward in 
     achieving that goal. Utilization can be increased for several 
     reasons. First, the machines currently deployed at the 
     nation's busiest airports are clearly capable of screening 
     significantly more bags than the bags of selectees only. This 
     is currently being demonstrated by a few machines deployed at 
     some airports. Second, it offers a high potential for 
     improving aviation security. The equipment's ability to 
     detect explosive material does not depend exclusively on 
     human skill, vigilance, or judgment. Third, it represents a 
     significant outlay of funds. FAA estimates average costs of 
     $1.3 million to purchase and install each CTX 5000 SP. 
     Fourth, based on an FAA study, continued low use may affect 
     operator proficiency and prevent FAA from effectively 
     measuring how dependable the equipment is in actual 
     operations.


                              III. Safety

     Runway Incursions
       FAA stated that it has made significant progress in 
     implementing the Runway Incursion Plan. We acknowledge that 
     FAA has made some progress in implementing the Runway 
     Incursion Plan, which is a very sound foundation for 
     effectively reducing runway incursions. However, only 18 of 
     the 51 actions indicated in their plan have been initiated. 
     Additionally, we found that some deadlines have slipped and 
     may slip further unless funding is set aside to implement all 
     actions in the plan. While FAA plans to identify all funding 
     requirements for its Runway Incursion Plan through an 
     investment analysis, it does not expect to complete this 
     process before September 1999. Further, this analysis only 
     pertains to future funding beginning in FY 2001 and does not 
     address current funding requirements.
       Runway incursions include operational errors, pilot 
     deviations, and vehicle/pedestrian deviations. FAA states 
     that surface operational error were down by 9 percent. 
     However, data we received from the Air Traffic Resource 
     Management Program Office indicates surface operational 
     errors were up by 5 percent. The only decrease noted in the 
     data was a 30 percent decrease in vehicle/pedestrian 
     deviations.
     Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA)
       FAA disagreed with our suggestion that an option for 
     gaining industry and Government acceptance of FOQA would be 
     to include a ``sunset provision'' in the final rule. FAA 
     stated that it has already gathered ample documentation of 
     the value-added safety benefits that FOQA will provide, 
     including improvements to air traffic procedures, pilot 
     training, and airport equipage. FAA wants accelerated 
     industry-wide implementation acceptance of FOQA in the 
     interest of public safety. According to FAA, given the 
     investment required by both the airlines and FAA to achieve 
     that goal, a ``sunset provision,'' which automatically 
     terminates the program by a set date seems inappropriate.
       We agree that access to FOQA data has been accepted as a 
     value-added safety beneficial program. However, to gain 
     acceptance of the program, FAA should include enticements in 
     the final rule to satisfy the many

[[Page 8788]]

     reservations expressed by government agencies. In our 
     opinion, one enticement would be a provision in the final 
     rule that would sunset the program at a specific time. A 
     sunset provision would allow FAA, air carriers, and 
     government agencies to assess any concerns experienced before 
     the FOQA programs were extended.
     Air Tour
       FAA stated that both the IG and NTSB have insisted on the 
     need for a database on air tour operators but provided no 
     rationale as to how a database will improve safety. FAA 
     disagrees and believes establishment of such a database is 
     costly and unnecessary and would provide no safety benefit. 
     FAA stated that once all air tour operators are certificated, 
     FAA will have sufficient information in its operation 
     specifications database to provide safety oversight.
       We agree with NTSB that FAA needs to know who air tour 
     operators are and where they are flying to provide proper 
     oversight. The NTSB stated in findings to its June 1995 
     report that:
       ``The lack of a national database for air tour operations 
     precludes effective evaluation of the accident rate of air 
     tour operators on the traditional basis of flight hours, 
     cycles, and passengers carried. Also, the adequacy of 
     staffing levels of FSDOs [FAA Flight Standards District 
     Offices] to oversee air tour operators is difficult to 
     evaluate because of the lack of national standards and a 
     database to establish the magnitude of this portion of 
     commercial aviation.''
       Even though originally recommended by NTSB in 1993, there 
     is no comprehensive air tour database or survey data. 
     Currently the Department and FAA are proposing to act on this 
     recommendation 2 years after the draft rulemaking is 
     complete. The draft rule has not yet been published for 
     comment. A required comment period and the possibility of 
     changes based on the comments received, could mean a final 
     rule is still months away. FAA should not continue to delay 
     taking action on this recommendation.


                             IV. Financing

       FAA stated that payroll cost increases are based on 
     mandatory pay raises as well as increases in government 
     contribution rates for retirement, social security, health 
     insurance and medicare--all of which are outside the control 
     of the agency. While we are mindful that some cost increases 
     associated with FAA's Operations account are outside the 
     control of the agency, other factors are within the agency's 
     control. For example, the new pay system for air traffic 
     controllers was the result of negotiations between FAA and 
     the National Air Traffic Controllers Association and not the 
     result of mandatory pay raises or increase in government 
     contribution rates for employee benefits.
       FAA also stated that it does not consider first year 
     maintenance costs of a new system to be a ``mask'' for rising 
     Operations costs and that the policy was coordinated with and 
     approved by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. 
     We did not question the practice used by FAA of funding 
     certain activities using F&E budgets. As we stated in our 
     testimony, FAA's procedures permit this method of accounting. 
     However, our statement was to demonstrate that Operations 
     costs may be even greater than reported because F&E funds are 
     used, in some cases, to finance activities normally related 
     to operations, such as maintenance, salaries, and travel 
     costs.

  FAA's Response to the National Transportation Safety Board Testimony

       At the FY 2000 House Appropriation hearing on March 10, 
     Chairman Wolf asked the FAA to respond to testimony from the 
     Department of Transportation's Inspector General (IG) and the 
     Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). 
     This is the FAA's response to the NTSB testimony on Safety.


                          International Issues

       The NTSB indicates that their involvement in international 
     accident investigations has increased because more and more 
     U.S. airlines are entering into code-share arrangements with 
     foreign airlines. He points out that FAA oversight 
     responsibilities for foreign carriers is limited.
       FAA has actively pursued new bilateral agreements that 
     define specific obligations for both parties for 
     airworthiness acceptance, repairs and maintenance. These new 
     agreements, called Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements, 
     offer the FAA greater flexibility in dealing with the 
     international oversight issues. Prior to implementing such 
     agreements, the FAA conducts a detailed assessment of a 
     partner country's aviation system and concludes 
     implementation procedures that outline how each authority 
     will interact. FAA's vision is that a network of competent 
     aviation authorities will share responsibility for safety 
     oversight and we are continuously working towards building 
     this network.
       The NTSB references a domestic situation similar to the 
     international oversight issue that arose several years ago 
     when large U.S. carriers began code-share arrangements with 
     commuter airlines that did not have the same stringent safety 
     requirements. Chairman Hall stated, ``Consequently, the 
     traveling public was receiving in effect two levels of 
     safety, until December 1995 when the FAA acted on NTSB 
     recommendations and issued its final rule.''
       The one level of safety initiative came from Secretary 
     Pena's January 1995 Safety Summit and the considerable 
     efforts of industry. The NTSB was involved, however, the rule 
     was not specifically in response to a NTSB recommendation.


                 Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)

       The NTSB indicates a significant area of concern in foreign 
     accidents is CFIT.
       CFIT and approach and landing accidents are major safety 
     items in the Administrator's Safety Agenda. The FAA and 
     industry have extensive efforts underway to address these 
     accident causal factors, yet no mention of the FAA/industry 
     program is made by the NTSB.
       FAA's short term efforts are directed toward (1) 
     implementing the Terrain Awareness Warning System rule while 
     encouraging voluntary compliance, (2) re-emphasizing current 
     ATC CFIT training procedures and enhancing them where 
     necessary, (3) establishing standards for FMS equipped 
     aircraft to enable precision-like approaches to all airports, 
     (4) emphasizing training on approach and missed approach 
     procedures, (5) installing MSAW capabilities worldwide with 
     an emphasis of high risk airports, and (6) implementing the 
     FOQA rule to better identify safety-related issues and 
     corrective actions. FAA will continue to work with industry 
     to identify the most effective mid and long range 
     interventions to reduce CFIT accidents.
       The NTSB lumped CFIT and approach and landing accidents in 
     one group. We believe the two categories should not be mixed. 
     However, we recognize the need to address both CFIT and 
     approach and landing issues.


                Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System

       Chairman Hall states that ``during the investigation for 
     the (1997) Korean Air accident, it was revealed that the 
     installation of EGPWS would have provided the flightcrew 
     significant warning of the impending ground collision. 
     However, at that time, the system was not certified for that 
     model aircraft.''
       The Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 was equipped with a GPWS 
     that provided appropriate and timely terrain warnings to the 
     flightcrew. For whatever reason, the flightcrew did not heed 
     the GPWS warnings.
       At the time of the Guam accident, EGPWS was not only not 
     certified for the B747, it was also not available from the 
     manufacturer. Chairman Hall's statement could lead one to 
     believe that the only reason EGPWS wasn't on the KAL B747 was 
     a lack of effort by the FAA.


                           Airplane Recorders

       Chairman Hall states that ``the Safety Board and this 
     Subcommittee have for many years prodded the FAA to require 
     upgraded recorders on transport category aircraft, but sadly, 
     most of the fleet is still equipped with outmoded 
     recorders.''
       On July 17, the FAA revised Digital Flight Data Recorder 
     (DFDR) rules. The revision specified the required increase in 
     recorded parameters and compliance times for four categories 
     of aircraft. To date, the FAA believes that close to 30 
     percent of the affected U.S.-registered fleet (aircraft with 
     10 or more seats) is in compliance with the new requirements. 
     In addition, the FAA has data indicating that 95 percent of 
     the U.S. B-737 fleet is either in compliance or in the 
     progress of complying with the rule. We believe progress has 
     been made but we also recognize that there is much more to be 
     done. Administrator Garvey is working with the Air Transport 
     Association and the individual carrier's CEOs to ensure early 
     compliance for a major portion of the air carrier fleet.
       The FAA is initiating an accelerated rulemaking effort to 
     mandate increased recording time (2 hours) and the provision 
     of a 10-minute independent power source for Cockpit Voice 
     Records (CVRs). Since January 1998, practically all transport 
     category aircraft have left the production line with a 2-hour 
     recorder installed as original equipment. This same 
     rulemaking project will also require CVR retrofits on all in-
     service aircraft and mandate dual-recorder equipage for new 
     aircraft. Finally, the rulemaking project will amend Part 25 
     to require that CVRs, FDRs and redundant combination flight 
     recorders be powered from separate generators with the 
     highest reliability.


                       airframe structural icing

       Chairman hall discusses a history of NTSB recommendations 
     on icing and a lack of acceptable response from the FAA. The 
     NTSB is hopeful that the FAA's response to the most recent 
     series of icing recommendations will be more acceptable.
       The NTSB comments may leave the impression that the FAA has 
     done very little to respond to airframe icing safety.
       The FAA initiatives to improve safety when operating in 
     icing conditions are outlined in the comprehensive FAA 
     Inflight Icing Plan issues in April 1997. The Plan describes 
     rulemaking, advisory material, research programs, and other 
     initiatives either underway or to be initiated to achieve 
     safety in icing conditions.
       With regard to FAA responsiveness to NTSB icing 
     recommendations, the NTSB testimony is silent with respect to 
     the numerous Roselawn safety recommendations. In fact, there 
     are 11 icing recommendations from the Roselawn accident, and 
     all have been classified by the Safety Board in an Acceptable 
     status. Three are Closed Acceptable and 8 are Open 
     Acceptable.

[[Page 8789]]

       The FAA has completed numerous actions which directly 
     respond to airframe icing safety:
       May 1995: issued AD to require modification of the deicing 
     boots on the Aerospatiale ATR-42 and -72.
       April 1996 and February 1998: issued 42 AD's requiring 
     aircraft with unpowered roll controls and pneumatic deicing 
     boots to exit icing conditions when specific visual icing 
     cues are observed.
       May 1996: FAA sponsored International Conference on 
     Aircraft Inflight Icing.
       April 1997: FAA Inflight Icing Plan issued.
       July 1997: issued guidance on newly designed or derivative 
     aircraft.
       December 1997: issued AD requiring installation of an ice 
     detector system on the EMBRAER EMB-120.
       December 1998: held a mixed-phase and glaciated icing 
     conditions workshop.
       February 1999: sponsored an International conference on 
     inflight operations in icing conditions.
       February 1999: provided an analysis of supercooled large 
     droplet (SLD) data to Rulemaking Advisory Committee for 
     discussion on certification issues.
       Additional AD's related to the operation of ice protection 
     systems and minimum speeds in icing conditions are planned as 
     a result of the February 1999 Icing Conference.
       The NTSB testimony states, ``The original recommendations 
     that stemmed from our 1981 safety study . . . were eventually 
     closed as unacceptable or superseded, but the recommendations 
     remained in an ``Open--Unacceptable Response status for 15 
     years''.
       The original recommendations were superseded with a new 
     recommendation A-96-54 which is classified as ``Open 
     Acceptable.''


                           runway incursions

       The NTSB is critical of the FAA's response to the rising 
     number of runway incursions. Specifically, he says ``the FAA 
     has studied this issue for years and has developed several 
     action plans. Just last year, the FAA announced that reducing 
     runway incursions was one of its top priorities and issued 
     the Airport Surface Operation Safety Action Plan. However, 
     implementation of that plan has not been finalized.''
       The FAA has made significant progress but we realize there 
     is much more to do. We are finalizing the program 
     implementation plan, which establishes tasks, schedules and 
     funding required to accomplish prevention strategies. We 
     expect to publish this plan in April, 1999. We are well aware 
     that we must provide appropriate funds for these priority 
     initiatives.
       We have on-site evaluations underway. Runway incursion 
     action teams are focusing on airports experiencing an 
     unusually high rate of incidents. We have completed 6 and 
     plan to complete at least 14 additional evaluations by 
     September 30, 1999.
       The FAA is currently in the final stages of investment 
     analysis that is addressing the validity of a wide range of 
     technical and non-technical solutions, such as: improved 
     controller, pilot, vehicle operator education and training; 
     procedural changes; and improvements in airport signs, 
     lighting, surface marking and other equipment (such as low 
     cost ASDE, loop technology).
       The FAA is focusing on immediate initiatives to reduce 
     runway incursions and prevent surface accidents. We are in 
     the process of implementing 18 separate actions. Some 
     examples follow:
       ``Awareness blitz'' targeted for operators and users.
       Monthly Air Traffic/Airport Operator/User meetings at top 
     20 runway incursion airports.
       Develop and distribute videos to address controller and 
     pilot awareness.
       Develop and safety related brochures and materials to 
     aviation organizations.
       The FAA's Safer Skies also identifies runway incursions as 
     one of the focus areas for commercial and general aviation. A 
     commercial and general aviation analysis team that includes 
     FAA, NASA, industry and aviation union representatives [the 
     Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT)] was chartered and met on 
     February 11-12, 1998. A schedule over the next 6-month period 
     was established to analyze commercial and general aviation 
     runway incursions and develop intervention strategies based 
     on this data analysis. This effort is fully coordinated with 
     and complements the efforts in the Runway Incursion Program 
     plan.

 Review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) comments of testimony 
presented by the National Transportation Safety Board on March 10, 1999


  international issues: code-sharing arrangements/one level of safety

       The FAA stated ``The one level of safety initiative came 
     from Secretary Pena's January 1995 Safety Summit and the 
     considerable efforts of industry. The . . . rule was not 
     specifically in response to a NTSB recommendation.''
       Comment.--The impetus for the one level of safety 
     initiative and the issue of code-sharing can be found in the 
     Safety Board's 1994 safety study on commuter airline safety, 
     in which the Board recommended that the FAA:
       Revise the Federal Aviation Regulations such that:
       All scheduled passenger service conducted in aircraft with 
     20 or more passenger seats be conducted in accordance with 
     the provisions of 14 CFR Part 121. (Class II, Priority 
     Action) (A-94-191)
       All scheduled passenger service conducted in aircraft with 
     10 to 19 passenger seats be conducted in accordance with 14 
     CFR Part 121, or its functional equivalent, wherever 
     possible. (Class II, Priority Act) (A-94-192)
       These recommendations and the recommendations on pilot 
     training (A-94-195 and A-94-196) were classified ``Closed--
     Acceptable Action'' when the FAA issued its final rule on 
     commuter airlines on December 20, 1995. These 
     recommendations, and subsequent Safety Board Congressional 
     testimony regarding commuter airline safety, predate 
     Secretary Pena's 1995 Safety Summit. To say that that rule 
     was not in response to Safety Board recommendations is not 
     accurate.
       In that study, the Safety Board also recommended that the 
     U.S. Department of Transportation:
       Require U.S. domestic air carriers certificated under 14 
     CFR Part 121, when involved in a code-sharing arrangement 
     with a commuter airline, to establish a program of 
     operational oversight that (a) includes periodic safety 
     audits of flight operations, training programs, and 
     maintenance and inspection; and (b) emphasizes the exchange 
     of information and resources that will enhance the safety of 
     flight operations. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-94-205)
       Based on the safety recommendation database, that 
     recommendation is still in an open--acceptable action status. 
     While we were pleased with the initiatives outlined at the 
     Safety Summit (and we should point out that we participated 
     in the Summit), the full intent of the above recommendations 
     has yet to be met.
       The Board recognizes that some of the concerns it had with 
     code-sharing arrangements between U.S. carriers can also 
     exist in code-sharing arrangements between foreign-based 
     carriers and U.S. carriers. The Board will thoroughly 
     consider such issues should they arise in the Board's 
     investigations and we will issue recommendations should they 
     be warranted.


                 controlled flight into terrain (cfit)

       The FAA stated that ``CFIT and approach and landing 
     accidents are major safety items. . . .''
       Comment.--From the time that EGPWS was first certified 
     (Oct. 1996), it took FAA an additional 2 years to issue the 
     NPRM. We are not aware that a final rule has been issued.


               enhanced ground proximity warning systems

       The FAA stated ``The Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 was 
     equipped with a GPWS that provided appropriate and timely 
     terrain warnings to the flight-crew.''
       Comment.--This statement is not correct. The KAL Boeing 747 
     GPWS did not provide any terrain warnings to the flightcrew 
     because the airplane was in landing configuration. Only radio 
     altitude call were given by the GPWS during the accident 
     flight.
       The FAA stated ``At the time of the Guam accident, the 
     EGPWS was not only not certified for the B747, it was also 
     not available from the manufacturer.''
       Chairman Hall stated that at the time of the accident EGPWS 
     was ``not certified for that model aircraft'' (referring to 
     the KAL 747-300). Chairman Hall merely stated a fact and was 
     not implying that FAA inaction was to blame for the lack of 
     an EGPWS on the accident airplane.


                           airplane recorders

       The FAA stated ``To date, the FAA believes that close to 30 
     percent of the affected U.S.-registered fleet (aircraft with 
     10 or more seats) is in compliance with new requirements.''
       Comment.--Thirty percent is considered a modest 
     accomplishment when it is noted that most newly manufactured 
     airplanes delivered since 1998 meet or exceed the new 
     parameter requirements, and that 226 Boeing 737s were 
     retrofitted by one airline, namely Southwest, accounting for 
     most of the retrofits. Therefore, the bulk of this 30 percent 
     figure can be attributed to newly manufactured airplanes and 
     one airline's aggressive retrofit program.
       The FAA stated ``. . . 95% of the U.S. B-737 fleet is 
     either in compliance or in the progress of complying with the 
     rule.''
       Comment.--At this late date, the Boeing 737 operators 
     should be in the process of complying with the new FDR 
     requirements. It is the Board's understanding that ``being in 
     the progress'' can mean that an aircraft is simply scheduled 
     for a retrofit as much as two years in the future.
       The FAA stated ``Administrator Garvey is working with the 
     Air Transport Association and the individual carrier's CEOs 
     to ensure early compliance for a major portion of the carrier 
     fleet.''
       Comment.--The Metrojet Boeing 737 that experienced a rudder 
     incident near Baltimore--Washington International Airport was 
     scheduled to have a C-check in March 1999, but was not 
     scheduled to have the FDR up-grade until 2001. This does not 
     reflect early compliance.
       The FAA stated ``FAA is initiating an accelerated 
     rulemaking effort to mandate increased recording time (2 
     hours). . . .''
       Comment.--This statement is accurate. A Rulemaking project 
     has been initiated and FAA staff assigned. NTSB staff has 
     been invited to participate in the rulemaking effort,

[[Page 8790]]

     and thus far, Safety Board staff have had four meetings with 
     FAA staff on this subject.
       The FAA stated ``Since January 1998, practically all 
     transport category aircraft have left the production line 
     with a 2-hour recorder installed as original equipment.''
       Comment.--While this statement is generally true, we are 
     aware of at least one airline's labor agreement with its 
     pilots required them to remove the 2-hour CVRs and replace 
     them with the solid-state 30-minute CVRs.


                       Airframe Structural Icing

       The FAA stated ``The NTSB comments may leave the impression 
     that the FAA has done very little to respond to airframe 
     icing safety.''
       The Safety Board does believe that the FAA did very little 
     to address airframe structural icing until after the ATR-72 
     accident at Roselawn, Indiana in 1994. Since then, the FAA 
     has worked with industry, primarily through the ARAC process, 
     to initiate several important efforts that will eventually 
     reduce the risk of flight in icing conditions. Chairman Hall 
     acknowledged these recent ARAC efforts in the Board's 
     testimony.
       ``With regard to FAA responsiveness to NTSB icing 
     recommendations, Chairman Hall in silent with respect to the 
     numerous Roselawn safety recommendations.''
       Comment.--Chairman Hall mentioned both the Comair and the 
     Roselawn accident recommendations in his testimony, and 
     acknowledged that the FAA's ARAC efforts and icing 
     conferences are ``in response to those recommendations.''
       The FAA stated ``The FAA has completed numerous actions 
     which directly respond to airfame icing safety.''
       Comment.--The Safety Board acknowledges the FAA actions 
     cited in Administrator Garvey's response.
       The FAA stated ``The original recommendations were 
     superseded with a new recommendation A-96-54 which is 
     classified as `Open Acceptable'.''
       Comment.--Chairman Hall's testimony correctly states that 
     the original 1981 safety study recommendations remained in an 
     open-unacceptable status for 15 years. It is also correct 
     that the original recommendations were superseded with a new 
     recommendation, A-96-54, which is classified as Open-
     Acceptable. The 1981 recommendation was superseded with a new 
     safety recommendation because acceptable action had not been 
     taken by FAA.


                           runway incursions

       The Safety Board's concerns about runway incursions are 
     heightened by adverse trends in recent years. Although there 
     was a slight downward trend in runway incursions from 1990 to 
     1993, the trend has been moving upward since then. In 1997, 
     there were 300 incursions, up from 275 the previous year. In 
     1998, there were 326 incursions. According to the FAA, the 
     monthly rate in September 1998--0.73 incursions per 100,000 
     operations--was the highest monthly rate in 11 years.
       The FAA stated, ``We are finalizing the program 
     implementation plan . . . we expect to publish the plan in 
     April 1999 . . . we are well aware that were must provide 
     appropriate funds . . .
       Comment.--The Safety Board has expressed its disappointment 
     that the FAA failed to fund its program office for runway 
     incursions for more than two years. This safety issue needs 
     coordination and overall direction by the FAA, which had been 
     the function of the program office. The Board is pleased that 
     the FAA is now committing itself to the necessary 
     coordination and funding, and will review the FAA's plans and 
     budgets when they are provided. The Board hopes that the FAA 
     will meet its target date of April 1999.
       The FAA stated, ``We have on-site evaluations underway.''
       Comment.--The Safety Board is aware that several 
     initiatives have been started and tested by the FAA, but too 
     few of these have been completed. The Board will continue to 
     evaluate the FAA's runway incursion program based on 
     completed programs and equipment that is placed in operation. 
     For example, the Safety Board notes that several AMASS units 
     may be ``fielded'' or ``deployed,'' but the Board further 
     notes that none are currently operational and the FAA has not 
     projected an operational date.

                          ____________________