[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 6]
[House]
[Pages 8661-8666]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  2300

                                 KOSOVO

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ose). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman) 
is recognized for 60 minutes.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) for his hard work. It did not just start 
recently. He has been building bridges between the United States 
Congress and the Russian Duma for many years. And I think he speaks 
well of the need for us to break out of this stranglehold that our 
policy is in where it seems like not

[[Page 8662]]

only are we reluctant to compromise, we may even be reluctant to take 
``yes'' for an answer.
  I would like to focus my remarks on my recent trip, along with a 
delegation from this Congress, to the Balkans. Putting it into context, 
there were three different groups from this House that went to the 
Balkans over the weekend.
  The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) reported from his group. 
A second group, a group of only one Member of this House, the gentleman 
from Illinois (Mr. Blagojevich), our colleague from Chicago, went with 
Reverend Jesse Jackson with a delegation that included Rabbi Steven 
Jacobs of my district in the San Fernando Valley in California; and 
they, as everyone knows, secured the release of the three American 
soldiers.
  The delegation that was the largest of the three visiting the Balkans 
has received the least coverage, perhaps because we were kind of the 
most establishment oriented trip. Our itinerary was put together with 
the full involvement of the administration and the Department of 
Defense. But given the importance of what is going on in Kosovo, I 
would like to take the next 40 minutes, perhaps even an hour, to report 
on my observations on that trip.
  Our delegation was led by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Armey) the 
majority leader and included, I believe, 17 or more Members of this 
House. I want to point out that this speech will not only be a 
description of what we saw in some of my observations but will also act 
as a convenient pretext for me to once again address this House about 
our policy in Kosovo and some of the steps I think that we ought to be 
taking in order to bring this conflict to a conclusion.
  Mr. Speaker, our trip began here in Washington at 6 a.m. at the 
Rayburn House Office Building just across the street from this House. 
And we proceeded to Ramstein, Germany, the site of our large Air Force 
base there, in fact, the largest group of Americans living anywhere 
outside the United States.
  There we were briefed by General John Jumper and his professional 
staff, and we were indeed impressed by every part of that plan and 
operation, from the intelligence to weather. And in fact, I came out of 
that briefing believing, as I did not believe when I went into it, that 
perhaps there is some chance that bombing alone will bring Milosevic to 
his knees.
  But we should not kid ourselves. That is still only a chance. And 
furthermore, bringing Milosevic to his knees and bringing Serbia to its 
knees, and I will talk about this a little later, is itself not a total 
victory for what we set out to do. Because this is not a war to acquire 
territory or secure strategic position. This is a war that we engaged 
in to achieve a humanitarian result. And clearly, looking at the 
carnage in the Balkans, it is hard to call this, even if it were to end 
tomorrow, a victorious humanitarian effort.
  I should point out that certainly those of us at that meeting came 
away with the belief, I think most of us did at least, that the 
interference or delay involved in NATO being involved in selecting 
targets has been reduced substantially and that our military is now 
carrying out the air war in a manner very close to the manner that they 
would carry it out if there was no political involvement or diplomatic 
involvement in their decisions at all.
  We then, after a night's sleep, proceeded that morning to Tirana, 
Albania. We landed at the international airport, the only significant 
airport in that country. But to give my colleagues an idea of how poor 
and undeveloped Albania was and is, Tirana International Airport prior 
to this war was dealing with an average of seven flights a week, one 
flight on the average day for the entire country of Albania.
  The Albanians have basically turned their country over to NATO and 
the United States both for our humanitarian efforts to provide refugee 
camps and military efforts to provide bases for us to carry the war to 
Serbia.
  I want to first focus on discussions regarding the camps. We need to 
build more. Over half the Kosovars are still inside Kosovo, and every 
day thousands stream over that border. Yet it will be months before 
that stream necessarily comes to an end, even if it continues at the 
rate of 4,000 or 5,000 or even 10,000 every day.
  Now, we will be passing from this House a supplemental appropriations 
bill, a bill which I am told by my colleague and friend the gentleman 
from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) who heads the Subcommittee on Human Rights 
of the Committee on International Relations, on which I serve, that 
that bill may very well not contain the funds we need to build two more 
camps in Albania.
  Well, we will need to build far more than two camps. And when I say, 
``we,'' I mean not only the United States but NATO and the other 
countries of goodwill. Japan has chipped in I think a modest 
insufficient amount, but even that amount will be helpful in building 
more refugee camps. And when we look at this supplemental, we should 
look forward to a conference committee which will hopefully add 
whatever funds are necessary to make a full American effort toward 
building camps now.
  Because we clearly misjudged this effort at the beginning and we did 
not expect a large number of refuges. We were behind the curve in 
preparing to absorb those refuges. There is no reason for us to be 
behind the curve still. We should be building camps as quickly as 
possible. We should not be over optimistic and assume that we will 
bring Milosevic to our terms in a few days, for it is that kind of 
optimism that has led to some of the difficulties we face now.

                              {time}  2310

  I should point out that one of the biggest problems as far as 
accommodating new refugees is the fact that humanitarian organizations, 
both governmental and nongovernmental, both the private charities, 
often called NGOs have a tradition in dealing with refugee camps, that 
they never pay money to rent the land on which those camps will be 
constructed. This tradition is founded on the belief that when you 
build a refugee camp that is supposed to be there for weeks, it may be 
there for decades. But Albania is a mountainous country, there is very 
little flat land. What land is there is being farmed. And it is absurd 
to think that we will slow down the process of providing even basic 
tent shelter for the refugees that are still streaming across the 
border because of some tradition of not going to this farmer or that 
farmer and renting their farm so that a camp can be constructed. I 
should also point out that it is somewhat deceptive how the initial 
refugees were dealt with and might lead us to the conclusion that we 
can go at a moderate rate at building refugee facilities.
  You see, Mr. Speaker, many of the refugees that came at the beginning 
of this conflict had close relatives to northern Albania who opened 
their homes and many of the towns in Albania took every available 
public building and opened it up to refugees. Mosques, local gymnasiums 
are now full. So every new refugee needs a place to stay that has to be 
provided through humanitarian effort. And so we need to move forward 
and recognize that we are going to have to build these camps more 
quickly than we have in the past.
  One issue that has come up that I had a chance to discuss with the 
prime minister of Albania, Mr. Majko, is the idea of resettling 
refugees in western Europe and in the United States. Our hearts go out 
to these refugees. It would take a hard-hearted Member of this House to 
criticize the administration in opening up our country to 20,000 
Albanian refugees from Kosovo. However, I do think that I should point 
out to this House my discussions with the prime minister of Albania in 
which he made it clear that he was willing to make available his 
country to provide refugee camps for all of the refugees. There is no 
shortage of land or space or political willingness to accommodate these 
refugees subject to the need to rent farmland to build the camps. 
Moreover, he actually opposed the resettling of these refugees in 
western

[[Page 8663]]

Europe and the United States, pointing out that as long as the Kosovars 
live close to Kosovo, the pressure will continue and the likelihood 
will continue that they will return to Kosovo. In contrast, we only 
have to look at Bosnia, where after years of terrible struggle, peace 
has been restored and the Bosnian Muslims can now live in security. But 
70 percent of those Bosnian Muslims who left Bosnia have not returned, 
even though security has been provided, even though it is possible to 
live and to make a living, they have not returned and show no 
likelihood of returning. And so any Albanian nationalist, and the prime 
minister of Albania certainly fits in this category, would want to keep 
the Albanian Kosovars in the Balkans, a few miles or at least 50 or 100 
miles from Kosovo rather than see these people relocated to far distant 
areas. Keep in mind that Milosevic's objective is to cleanse the 
Balkans of Albania or at least of the Kosovars and perhaps we make that 
easier if we absorb refugees or urge our western European allies to do 
likewise.
  As far as the logistics, I think that if we put the same effort into 
building camps that we are going to have to put into absorbing refugees 
from other countries, that we could build the camps necessary. But 
whether we absorb another 20,000 refugees to the United States or not 
is a drop from one bucket into another bucket. For 20,000 Kosovars is 
but 1 percent of those who may become refugees if this matter continues 
as it has. And 20,000 refugees to the United States is but a small 
portion, perhaps only 20 percent of the refugees that we will absorb 
every year, not to mention that it is an infinitesimal fraction of our 
great country's population. So whether 20,000 Kosovars come here or not 
is but 1 percent of the Kosovars, and we have to focus on the other 99 
percent.
  While I am mentioning my discussions with the Albanian prime 
minister, I should mention one very interesting idea, and this is one 
idea to solve two problems. The first problem is that as winter 
arrives, it is possible that the Kosovars will still be refugees. If 
this is the case, we need more than simple tents to provide shelter. In 
addition, we would hope that perhaps before this winter, the Kosovars 
returned to Kosovo, where they will find decimated and burned-out 
villages and perhaps no place to stay. What the ambassador of Albania 
suggested, and this is a matter that I look forward to discussing with 
the Manufactured Housing Institute and other experts, is that we 
acquire portable housing, something more solid than a tent, that we 
erect it in Albania for the refugees, and that it be designed so that 
when peace comes to Kosovo or even part of Kosovo, that we can tear 
this housing down and reassemble it so the Kosovars will have a place 
to live even if their particular village has been burned to the ground 
during this ethnic cleansing.
  After our meeting with the Albanian prime minister, we went to visit 
the American Apache helicopters and more importantly the men and women 
of the United States who are there to man those helicopters. I was very 
much impressed with the quality of our military forces. The generals, 
the officers and even the enlisted men are well aware of their mission 
and of the complexities. Walking the streets of America, you hear 
people say, ``Well, let's just get it over with right away.'' Or, 
``Let's pull out right away.'' Or, ``What are we doing somewhere unless 
we can get our way all the way?''
  These military men and women that I talk to understand the complexity 
of the world and understand the complexity of their mission. They 
recognize that whether it is the Balkans or perhaps some other crisis 
at some other time, they may be called upon to provide modulated levels 
of force, peacekeeping, warmaking, retaliatory strikes or humanitarian 
efforts as necessary to achieve our diplomatic and humanitarian 
purposes. And they do not insist that the world be made simple, for 
they recognize how complex it is.
  We were briefed by Lieutenant General Hendrix and we learned some 
very interesting facts. The first is about the mountains that separate 
northern Albania from Kosovo. The general assured us that the Apache 
helicopters under his command could go over those mountains, many of 
them over 9,000 feet high, and into Kosovo, and that he thought it was 
important that they be trained, that they go through some ground 
exercises before they were deployed. We questioned the general because 
there was some concern that in order to get these Apache helicopters 
into Kosovo, that they would need to fly through the two or three 
passes that are in these mountains that separate Albania from Kosovo.

                              {time}  2320

  Mr. Speaker, I think we all recognized that any force going through 
the passes is going to have a tough time since that is the easiest 
place for the Serbs to set up defense. He assured us that those Apache 
helicopters could indeed either go through the passes, if that was 
visible, or instead go over the mountains.
  But keep in mind that just 2 days after we left, after we had a 
chance to talk to the brave men and women who pilot those helicopters 
and who serve the United States by operating those helicopters, that 
one of those helicopters crashed and two of them lost their lives, and 
when I began, right as of the time I began trying to put together my 
thoughts for this speech, the names of those two first casualties had 
not yet been released, and so I do not know whether it was one of the 
young men that I spoke to who lost their lives and taught us what the 
ultimate, showed us what the ultimate sacrifice was and also showed us 
that this is not a casualty-free war.
  Now it is true that this helicopter was not lost in combat, but it 
was lost in a training mission done on an accelerated basis under 
hazardous conditions, hazardous conditions that were necessary in order 
to prepare for imminent combat. These two soldiers are the first 
casualties of this war.
  As I mentioned, there are mountains that we had a chance to see, 
albeit from a distance, on the Albania-Kosovo border. Now that is 
particularly important when we think of the possibility of deploying 
ground forces.
  It is true that the KLA lightly-armed guerrilla fighters are slipping 
over that border now and carrying on operations, but we did not win 
Desert Storm by sending a few lightly-armed guerrilla fighters up 
against Saddam Hussein's Army. Even after that Army was subject to a 
level of bombardment that may be impossible in the terrain of the 
Balkans we sent in a very heavily armed armored force.
  And those who talk about starting a ground war must explain to this 
Congress how that ground operation will operate.
  Will it be airborne?
  And what are the casualties of parachuting into hostile territory?
  Will it be some lightly-armed force, and what are the casualties of 
sending a lightly-armed force against a heavily-armed adversary?
  Will we be trying to put heavy armor through mountain passes, and if 
so, how easy will it be for the Serbs to set up defenses to that armor?
  Or finally, is it possible that we will convince some country other 
than Albania to be the jumping-off point for any ground action?
  As to that last point, as I said, Albania has turned its territory 
over to NATO, both for military and humanitarian operations, but I do 
not expect any other country that borders Yugoslavia to do the same 
thing. For no other country has all without complaint even accepted 
refugees. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has accepted 
refugees but has made it very clear that after accepting almost 200,000 
they are not necessarily willing to accept more, and I think those who 
observe diplomatic affairs in the Balkans would have great doubts that 
American soldiers or NATO soldiers based in that republic or based in 
Hungary or Romania would ever be allowed to assemble and attack Serbia 
from those countries.
  Mr. Speaker, I should point out that I put this speech together 
because I thought it was important to report on our trip, how that 
report would still be

[[Page 8664]]

current and worthy of the attention of our colleagues. I have not had 
the time I would have liked to make this speech as concise as possible.
  But continuing with the description of our trip, we then, after 
visiting with General Hendrix and his men and women, we then went on to 
be briefed by Colonel Bray of Task Force Hope. Both of these generals 
and their forces are deployed there at Tirana International Airport 
where the first thing they have to do is provide security around the 
perimeter lest some sapper or commando or terrorist force seek to 
destroy them on the ground.
  In any case Task Force Hope is America at its best using our 
helicopter and other logistical efforts to take humanitarian supplies 
from Tirana in central Albania to northern Albania where most of the 
refugees unfortunately still are, the part of Albania that borders 
Kosovo, and so the part that initially receives the refugees.
  What was driven home to us by this Operation Task Force Hope, Mr. 
Speaker, is that this is a humanitarian effort. If you are waging a war 
against a country because of some strategic reason that if you beat the 
country and achieve your strategic objective you could call it a 
complete victory. If you are waging war for money and gold, then if you 
capture the money and gold you can call it a victory.
  This war is not part of the Cold War or not fighting for some 
strategic advantage over a larger adversary. This war is not a war of 
imperialism. This war is a humanitarian effort, and that is why it is 
so important to end it as soon as possible.
  An even total victory 3 months from now is less important than a 
reasonable outcome reached today because every day Kosovars are killed, 
every day they die of exposure before they are able to reach refuge on 
the other side of the border, and while the Serbs are our adversaries 
in this conflict, humanitarianism is not served by their destruction.
  We are unfortunately treated to the videos of the collateral damage, 
and I will discuss later whether we can believe all those videos, but 
clearly there are civilian Serbs being killed every day by our bombing, 
and if not every day, then every second or every third day.
  And over $100 billion is the estimate of the damage that we have done 
to Serbia, and clearly that country's ability to provide for its people 
and to cure its sick will be diminished and lives will be lost as a 
result of the huge scale of the economic destruction.
  Mr. Speaker, that was our visit to Albania. We then boarded military 
transport for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with its 
capital at Skopje. When we landed at Skopje Airport, it became apparent 
immediately that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or FYRO 
Macedonia, was a much more developed country than Albania with, for 
example, a much larger airport.

                              {time}  2330

  We visit almost immediately from that airport, we went by bus just a 
few miles and after that trip we were a few miles away from the Kosovo 
border, which gives you an idea how close that airport and the capital 
of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is to the Serbian border, 
just a few miles away.
  When the buses stopped, they took us to the Stenkovec refugee camp, 
Stenkovec 1, and that is a camp that is visited by many of those 
dignitaries or visitors who visit refugee camps. In fact, just 2 days 
after we left, Tony Blair was at the same camp.
  What we saw at that refugee camp was, if anything, heartening. We 
went there expecting to see the worst. We saw, I think, the best we 
could have expected. The people there were well fed and there was a 
huge store of food visible for future consumption. There were smiles on 
the faces of almost everyone I talked to. Think of that. These people 
have lost everything and they smile and they joke, and there was even a 
little entertainment off to the side of the camp, not for our benefit 
but for theirs, where they sung, singing and smiling.
  I have friends, I myself feel this way, the market goes down by 50 
points and we are in a bad mood. These people have lost everything and 
they smile.
  Perhaps the best symbolic moment was I visited one tent. They invited 
me in for some refreshment. This is a refugee camp where people have 
genuinely found refuge, but it is getting warm. They live in tents. 
They have been there for a month. There are more on the way. We have to 
recognize that while there may be smiles today, there could be the 
natural trouble of too many people and too little space with too little 
sanitation and too much heat in the coming weeks and months.
  That is why, as I will say it again, we must go forward and build 
more camps as quickly as possible to prevent the current camps from 
becoming overcrowded.
  Many of the families I visited, they had over 6, 7, sometimes 10 
people in a single tent, 12 feet by 12 feet. The fact that this camp 
remains calm and the people smile is a testament to the goodwill of the 
Kosovars and to a level of resilience that is remarkable.
  I could go on about the camp, but there is one other thing I want to 
mention and that is I went there looking for verification of the 
stories of atrocities. I spent two hours at that camp. My colleagues, 
about 18 of them, spread out throughout the camp. Each was assigned our 
own translator, and I would say one out of 20 or 1 out of 40 or 50 of 
the residents of the camp spoke English at a sufficient level to 
communicate.
  So I went around the camp asking whether they could put me in touch 
or introduce me to a refugee who had personally seen rape or murder. We 
were not able to find, at least I was unable to find, a refugee with 
such a story, either one who spoke English or one who could speak to me 
through the translator.
  The story we heard instead, again and again and again, was that Serb 
paramilitary told people in this or that town or this or that 
neighborhood to get out and get out quickly, often on as little as 20 
minutes notice, and the people decided to leave. Clearly, the stories 
of rape and murder from other towns and villages inspired such 
immediate compliance with such an outrageous order.
  I should point out that the refugees we met came chiefly from eastern 
Kosovo, and it is quite possible that in the more rural parts of 
western Kosovo, where naturally rural people are even more tied to the 
land, more reluctant to accept an order to evacuate not just their 
homes but the farms, the soil that they have lived on for generations 
and centuries, perhaps in those areas there are greater levels of 
atrocity.
  We then left Skopje for Aviano Air Force base in Italy, the most 
active base for our planes and other NATO planes to conduct this air 
campaign. There, we talked to more than one staff or general officer 
about the stories of collateral damage for just, I believe it was, 2 
days ago a bus had allegedly been hit by U.S. bombs and scores of 
people, or a score of people, were killed allegedly.
  I use the word allegedly. We never hear the word allegedly on CNN or 
on any of the news networks, because what the Serbs do is they take 
western reporters out to a site, there is a crater, there is a 
destroyed vehicle, there are dead individuals in civilian clothing. It 
is reported as uncontroverted fact that that crater was created by a 
NATO bomb, that that vehicle was destroyed by that particular bomb and 
that those bodies are people who were in the vehicle at the time when 
it was hit by such a bomb, none of which is verified by forensic 
experts. I will say that our people in the military are justifiably 
skeptical of the Serb propaganda effort.
  While we are talking about a propaganda effort, I should say that we 
have been remiss in our own propaganda effort, and here I am simply 
echoing the views of my colleague and friend, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Royce) who came with us on this trip. For years, the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) has been trying to get Radio Free 
Europe and similar outlets controlled by the U.S. Government to 
broadcast in Serb into Serbia.

[[Page 8665]]

  Finally, finally, they have started broadcasting on radio only, but 
keep in mind over half the Serbs have television satellite dishes. We 
could, should, have not, and must listen to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Royce) when he says that we need to be broadcasting our 
message on television, because this war is a war fought in the air but 
not just by military airplanes but also by television broadcast. This 
war may be decided by propaganda as much as it is decided by bombs.
  Then having been in four countries already that day, we flew at the 
end of Saturday to Brussels, Belgium, where we stayed overnight. We 
then proceeded to NATO headquarters, where we heard from General Clark, 
who is NATO's chief commander, and Secretary General Javier Solano, who 
is the chief officer, in a way the President, of NATO.

                              {time}  2340

  There, every effort was made to convince us of three things:
  First, that we are winning, and I remain unconvinced. The most I am 
convinced of is that there is a possibility that after more bombing we 
will eventually achieve our stated goals, though this is hardly a 
humanitarian victory, and that there is even a greater likelihood that 
we cannot achieve NATO's stated goals through bombing alone.
  Second, each of the speakers tried to convince us that the European 
allies of NATO were doing their fair share. This is hardly the case. 
Eighty-five percent of the airplane flights, the sorties being put 
forward in this air war, are American.
  If we stretch the numbers as hard as we can, and being a CPA I have 
seen them stretched, but I am almost willing to give an honorary CPA 
certificate to those in NATO who have worked these numbers over very 
hard, we can argue that 50 percent of the total effort, refugee, 
military plane strikes and support military effort, that somehow maybe 
50 percent is being borne by the Europeans. Even that is an 
outrageously small percentage.
  General Clark argued to us that, well, 50 percent of NATO's GDP is 
found in the United States, and 50 percent of the wealth of NATO is 
found in the other countries, the European countries of NATO. So if 
America is half of the economic strength of NATO, why should America do 
anything less than 50 percent of the total refugee and military effort?
  By this logic, America, with an equal GDP to Europe, or at least the 
European members of NATO, should do half of all of what needs to be 
done in Europe; ninety-nine percent of everything that needs to be done 
in the Americas, like taking out General Noriega out of Panama. We 
should do the overwhelming work of what is necessary in Asia, the vast 
majority of the work necessary in Africa, and bear virtually all the 
burden in the Middle East.
  For us to do half of what needs to be done in Europe is absurd unless 
the Europeans are willing to do half of what needs to be done outside 
of Europe. But the ability of Europe to do its fair share is limited, 
limited by small defense budgets, in which America has acquiesced, or 
rather, our State Department has acquiesced; furthermore limited by how 
those budgets are spent.
  In order to ensure that they have a large trade surplus with the 
United States, not as large as Japan and China, but a large one, 
nevertheless, European countries insist on not buying American military 
planes, not buying American electronic military technology, but 
building it in Europe, no matter how poorly it performs, no matter how 
little they will be able to do to defend our values, our shared values 
in Europe.
  So a desire to spend less and to spend it less efficiently has 
hobbled Europe's ability to participate in this war, a war that we are 
carrying on to end ethnic cleansing in Europe.
  Finally, at NATO they insisted upon reviewing again and again the 
five NATO points of negotiation. Basically, those points require the 
Serbs to completely surrender all of Kosovo to NATO. I think this is 
not exactly a compromise position.
  But I will point out that the prime minister of Great Britain, Tony 
Blair, has made comments that can be interpreted as setting forth an 
even more extreme objective, as he has called, somewhat obliquely, for 
the arrest and trial of Milosevic. Now, if that could be done with the 
wave of a wand, I would wave that wand immediately. No one, very few 
people on this planet, deserve a trial for war crimes more than Mr. 
Milosevic.
  The rhetoric gets so extreme that people say, how can we live in a 
world where murderers rule countries? It is time for America to get 
realistic in its rhetoric. Half the world is run by murderers. Let us 
recount just a few.
  The government of Sudan, which has killed 1.9 million of its own 
people, and has probably killed more people in a genocidal war against 
its own citizens in southern Sudan than all of the Kosovars total, 1.9 
million; not to mention the well-known genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda; 
the recent killings on Borneo.
  But perhaps the best example of the fact that murderers run countries 
is the fact that we welcomed with open arms, not just as a negotiating 
partner but I think the administration called him a strategic partner, 
the prime minister of the People's Republic of China, pretending that 
that government does not include some old men still in power who played 
a role in the cultural revolution that killed millions; who were there 
to order the deaths and executions at Tiananmen Square; who were 
ordering the continued oppression and were there to order the death of 
millions of people in Tibet.
  The fact of the matter is that we are not powerful enough, and I do 
not have a magic wand, we are not powerful enough to arrest and try all 
of the murderers that run countries, so it is interesting to talk about 
some rambo-style effort to arrest Milosevic.
  But in reality, arresting him would require deploying NATO troops and 
fighting all the way to Belgrade, and then fighting to whatever 
mountain hideout Milosevic sought shelter in. We are talking at that 
point of thousands and thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of dead 
and wounded American and NATO troops.
  Those who talk glibly of arresting Milosevic should reflect on what 
is involved in that level of defeat, a level of defeat that we did not 
inflict upon Saddam Hussein.
  We, instead of trying to increase our objectives in this war, should 
seek the minimum objectives consistent with the real reason we are 
there: to stop the killing of the Kosovars, and to make sure that 
Kosovars have a place in Kosovo to live in security where they can 
build lives. We should demand no more and we should demand no less.
  This does not mean that Serbia has to surrender all of Kosovo to 
NATO. It does not mean that Milosevic must be turned over for trial, 
because, as wondrous as those results would be, the additional deaths 
not only of NATO troops, but every day this war goes on more people are 
killed, not in the refugee camps, where they are well taken care of, 
but in Kosovo itself.
  We have to stop the killing and reach a peace agreement, consistent 
with the real objectives of this campaign, as quickly as possible.
  In fact, the two sides' stated positions are not that far apart. We 
heard just before I began this long speech, and I apologize for its 
length, from our colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Curt 
Weldon), who described a possible settlement to which Russian Duma 
members agreed and which we have reason to believe Milosevic will 
agree.
  That agreement calls for a multilateral force that will be there to 
protect the Kosovars. We should explore that opening instead of saying 
no, no matter what Milosevic proposes; that he has to accept our five 
points unilaterally, unconditionally, or we keep the bombing 
continuing.

                              {time}  2350

  We ought to explore the possibility that there would be two separate 
peacekeeping forces. And I say that because the biggest sticking point 
between the parties is about who is going

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to be in the peacekeeping force. The Serbs propose that it be under a 
U.N. flag. America has indicated maybe the U.N. flag is acceptable.
  Both sides have agreed that the killing should stop. Both sides have 
even said the Kosovars should go home. The disagreement is over the 
makeup of the force. The Serbs want to see a lightly armed force of 
Russians, Greeks and others who have not waged war against them 
recently, and America and NATO insist on a NATO-led force that is 
heavily armed.
  One possibility is to have two peacekeeping forces patrolling two 
different separate peacekeeping regions within Kosovo. One region could 
be patrolled by Russians, Greeks, and others acceptable to the Serbs. 
And it could be said that the Kosovars would be reluctant to return to 
that region, and I will get to that in a bit, but that first region 
could include the areas of Kosovo which are most sacred to the Serbs 
and are the reason or the stated reason they are fighting so hard to 
retain that territory.
  That area, which I would think would be maybe 20 percent of Kosovo, 
could include the famous monasteries, or at least the most important 
famous monasteries. The City of Pec, where the Serbian Orthodox church 
began, could be included. We could negotiate, others could decide, 
whether the mines in northern Kosovo would be included, and of course 
the battlefield at Kosovo Polje, the famous battlefield where the Serbs 
were defeated by the Turks in the 14th Century, could all be included 
in an area where Serbs would feel they had not given up their rights, 
where the territory would be patrolled only by friends, or at least 
countries with whom they continue to have cordial relations.
  The other 80 percent of Kosovo should be patrolled by heavily armed, 
NATO-led, perhaps U.N.-flag-flying troops where Kosovars could feel 
very safe. This would allow them to return to Kosovo and, with some 
American and European economic aid, to rebuild their lives.
  If we insist on totally crushing all Serb claims to Kosovo, we insist 
that this war will go on until they are forced to give up. And I am not 
sure that is even 2 or 3 months away, and I am not sure that that does 
not involve ground troops over those Almadian mountains, and I am not 
sure that it can be done at a level of casualties that are acceptable 
to the NATO countries involved.
  Because keep in mind, if a multilateral NATO military ground force is 
deployed, perhaps a British unit suffers casualties or a German unit or 
an Italian unit or an American unit, and the country that sent those 
particular soldiers demands an end to hostilities, then we will have 
the domino effect as each NATO nation says, well, if one NATO nation is 
pulling out, the others must. So it is important that we try to set our 
objectives consistent with the real humanitarian reason for our being 
involved in the Balkans.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, I would like to address an issue that has been 
addressed on this floor several times, and that is the role that 
Congress should play in making our foreign policy.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, our constitution clearly provides that it is 
Congress that can declare war. And I believe that once and if we 
declare war, at that point all Americans should support that war, and 
Congress at that point has signed the blank check and should butt out 
and let the Commander in Chief proceed. But unless that happens, we 
have a decision-making process. If we are not at war, if we have not 
declared war, if it is not an all-out war, then there is a decision-
making process as to what level of hostilities should exist and what we 
should demand for peace.
  Mr. Speaker, I am told that dictatorship is efficient; that 
dictatorship is silent and secret and does not show its enemies what it 
is thinking. But, Mr. Speaker, that is not our government. Even 
decisions within the administration are subject to public input, public 
discussion and a press leak every day. But our Constitution does not 
vest all power in the administration. And contrary to popular belief, 
virtually every U.S. Supreme Court decision says that it is Congress, 
not the President, that has the primary role of determining what our 
foreign policy is, though not, of course, of determining how our troops 
should be deployed.
  So, Mr. Speaker, I know that there are those who have come to this 
floor and said that our enemies would tremble in fear if they thought 
that one man could deploy 100,000 American soldiers without the consent 
of this Congress. But, Mr. Speaker, I would tremble in fear, the 
founders of this Republic would tremble in fear, if they thought that 
one man could send 100,000 or more men and women into battle without 
the approval of the United States Congress.
  I call upon the President to modify his equivocal letter. There was a 
letter addressed to the Congress just a couple weeks ago saying, in 
essence, that ground troops would not be deployed without congressional 
approval. But those of us who looked very carefully at that letter 
realized that it did not say what it seemed to say at first reading, 
and that in fact the President had not promised what he should promise, 
and that is that before deploying American troops in a battle that may 
cost hundreds or thousands of lives, that he should come to this 
Congress and ask for approval.
  Mr. Speaker, believe it or not, I have even other observations from 
my trip. This issue deserves a full debate. There is, believe it or 
not, even more to be said, but I notice that it is nearly midnight, it 
is time for this House to adjourn, and so I will yield back.

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