[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 8169-8174]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




   DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION OF YUGOSLAVIA

  The Senate resumed consideration of the joint resolution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Chair recognizes 
Senator McCain for 5 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would like to ask unanimous consent that 
Senator Dorgan be allowed to make a brief unanimous consent request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. DORGAN. I ask unanimous consent that privilege of the floor be 
granted to Anthony Blaylock, a member of my staff, during the pendency 
of S.J. Res. 20.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent for 3 
additional minutes, if necessary, for me to complete my statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank Senators Lott and Daschle for 
allowing the Senate more time for this debate than was their original 
intention. I think it has been a good debate. It was not as long as I 
would have liked but better than I had expected yesterday morning. Many 
Members on both sides, or should I say on all the multiple sides of the 
question, have had the opportunity to express themselves and most have 
done so with distinction. I also thank the cosponsors of the resolution 
for having the courage of their convictions, Senators Hagel, Biden, 
Lugar, Kerry, Dodd, Robb, and all the other cosponsors. You have made 
the case for the resolution far more persuasively than have I, and I 
commend you for fighting this good fight.
  Mr. President, the Senate is not in order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will please be in order.
  The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I want to speak plainly in the few minutes 
remaining to me. What I say now may offend some people, even some of my 
friends who support this resolution. I am sorry for that, but I say it 
because I believe it is the truth, the important truth, and it should 
be said.
  The President of the United States is prepared to lose a war rather 
than do the hard work, the politically risky work, of fighting as the 
leader of the greatest nation on Earth should fight when our interests 
and our values are imperiled.
  We all know why in a few minutes this resolution is going to lose. It 
is going to lose because the President and members of his Cabinet have 
joined with the opponents to the war and lobbied hard for the 
resolution's defeat. Do not believe administration officials when they 
tell you that the resolution would have been defeated even without 
their active opposition. Had they worked half as hard in support of it 
as they did to defeat it, the result would have been different today.
  No, it is not that they could not win; it is because they did not 
want to win that we are facing defeat this morning. That is a shame, a 
real shame.
  I have said repeatedly that the President does not need this 
resolution to use all the force he deems necessary to achieve victory 
in Kosovo. I stand by that contention. And I have the good company of 
the Constitution behind me.
  I had wanted this resolution considered in the now forlorn hope that 
the President would take courage from it and find the resolve to do his 
duty, his duty by us, the American people, by the alliance he leads, 
and by the suffering people of Kosovo who now look to America and NATO 
for their very lives.
  I was wrong, and I must accept the blame for that. The President does 
not want the power he possesses by law because the risks inherent in 
its exercise have paralyzed him.
  Let me identify for my colleagues the price paid by Kosovars for the

[[Page 8170]]

President's repeated and indefensible ruling out of ground troops. Mr. 
Milosevic was so certain of the limits to our commitment that he felt 
safe enough to widely disperse his forces. Instead of massing his 
forces to meet a possible ground attack, he has deployed them in small 
units to reach more towns and villages in less time than if the 
President had remained silent on the question of ground troops. In 
other words, he has been able to displace, rape, and murder more 
Kosovars more quickly than he could have if he feared he might face the 
mightiest army on Earth. That is a fact of this war that is undeniable. 
And shame on the President for creating it.
  Now what is left to us, as our war on the cheap fails to achieve the 
objectives for which we went to war? Well, bombing pauses seem to be an 
idea in vogue. They were popular once before in another war. And I 
personally witnessed how effective they were. No, Mr. President, I do 
not have much regard for the diplomatic or military efficacy of bombing 
pauses. As a matter of fact, it was only when bombing pauses were 
finally abandoned in favor of sustained strategic bombing that almost 
600 of my comrades and I received our freedom. I daresay some of the 
years that we had lost were attributable to bombing pauses. I will not 
support a bombing pause until Milosevic surrenders and not a moment 
before.
  My father gave the order to send B-52s--planes that did not have the 
precision-guided munitions that so impress us all today--he gave the 
order to send them to bomb the city where his oldest son was held a 
prisoner of war. That is a pretty hard thing for a father to do, Mr. 
President, but he did it because it was his duty, and he would not 
shrink from it. He did it because he didn't believe America should lose 
a war, or settle for a draw or some lesser goal than it had sacrificed 
its young to achieve. He knew that leaders were expected to make hard 
choices in war. Would that the President had half that regard for the 
responsibilities of his office.
  Give peace a chance. Yes, peace is a wonderful condition. Sweeter 
than many here will ever fully appreciate. The Kosovars appreciate it. 
They are living in its absence, and it is a horrible experience. But 
the absence of freedom is worse. They know that too. They know it well. 
And if the price of peace is that we abandon them to the cruelty of 
their oppressors, then the price is too high.
  Some have suggested that we can drop our demand that NATO keep the 
peace in Kosovo. Let the U.N. command any future peacekeeping force 
instead. But a U.N. peacekeeping force led directly to the Srebrinica 
massacre in Bosnia. I think the Kosovars would rather they not have 
that kind of peace, Mr. President. And we should not impose it on them.
  Give peace a chance. If we cannot keep our word to prevail over this 
inferior power that threatens our interests and our most cherished 
ideals, then it is unlikely that we will long know a real peace. We may 
enjoy a false peace for a brief time, but that will pass. Whatever your 
views about whether we were right or wrong to get involved in this war, 
why would you think that losing will recover what we have risked in the 
Balkans. If we fail to win this war, our allies and our enemies will 
lose their respect for our resolve and our power. You may count on it, 
Mr. President. And we will soon face far greater threats than we face 
today. We will know a much more dangerous absence of peace than we are 
experiencing today.
  Mr. President, I ask my colleagues, in this late hour, to put aside 
our reservations, our past animosities, and encourage, implore, cajole, 
beg, shame this administration into doing its duty. Shame on the 
President if he persists in abdicating his responsibilities. But shame 
on us if we let him.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I will use leadership time to conclude 
this debate with a few comments of my own.
  Let me begin by commending the authors of this resolution, Senator 
McCain, Senator Biden, and others. I support their intent, and I 
appreciate the effort of all the authors in making this resolution the 
focus of our attention this morning.
  There ought to be three rules this country should always adhere to in 
an addressing an international conflict. The first rule is that every 
effort should be made to resolve the matter diplomatically. I believe 
this is being done in the case of the conflict in Kosovo. In this 
struggle, there is no end to the lengths the United States and NATO 
have gone in an effort to resolve this matter diplomatically. As we 
speak, diplomatic efforts are underway. There will continue to be 
negotiations, discussions, and communications to resolve this matter 
diplomatically. Up to now all these efforts have failed.
  Secondly, should diplomacy fail and U.S. forces be needed, we must 
not tie the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. We must provide whatever 
support is requested. That is what this resolution says: that the 
President is authorized to use all necessary force. I understand and 
support that concept.
  Thirdly, we must support our troops when they come home--something we 
haven't always done. We didn't in Vietnam when they were suffering from 
the effects of exposure to Agent Orange; we didn't in the Persian Gulf 
when they were hit by Persian Gulf Syndrome. We have not always 
supported our troops when they come home. Veterans and the Veterans' 
Administration oftentimes are neglected in times of peace.
  There is a caveat, an obvious caveat, to these three rules. When 
deploying force, there must be a clear indication of need. Only in the 
rarest of circumstances when it comes to executing a war, a military 
effort, should the Congress get ahead of the Commander in Chief and his 
military advisers. That is especially true when the United States is 
involved, as it is today in Yugoslavia, with other nations. They are 
the ones--the military, the Commander in Chief--who must decide what 
kind of forces are to be used, what kind of war is to be waged, what 
facts must be considered in waging it successfully.
  The distinguished Senator from Arizona made some comments about the 
President's unwillingness to use ground troops. It isn't just the 
President. It is all of his Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is everybody in 
the Pentagon who advises the President who has said, This is not the 
time; we do not want to commit ground troops at this point, Mr. 
President; don't request them. And he has not.
  It is for this reason, Mr. President, that I reluctantly join in 
tabling this resolution today. I do so for three reasons. First, as I 
have just noted, the President has not asked for this authority, nor 
have his military advisers. They have indicated they don't support the 
inclusion of ground troops at this time. Why? Because the air campaign 
is working. That is not what some of the media want you to hear, but it 
is the case that the air campaign is working. The resolve on the part 
of Yugoslavia is being tested. And, I must say, there is increasing 
evidence that their resolve is weakening. There is increasing evidence 
that, regardless of what criteria one uses to evaluate the success of 
the air campaign, it is working.
  Until we have given every opportunity for the air campaign to work, 
moving to a new strategy is premature. The time involved, the logistics 
involved, the questions involved in moving forces into Yugoslavia all 
have to be considered, but not now. This is not the time. Will there 
come a time? Perhaps. But it is not now. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
unanimously endorse that position--not now. What is the Commander in 
Chief supposed to do? He listens to his military advisers and they say, 
``Not now.'' He listens to his national security people and they say, 
``Not now.''
  This isn't a matter of courage, this isn't a matter of a lack of 
resolve on the part of the President. Instead, it is a matter of the 
President working with all the people in this administration to pick 
the best course of action. I believe he has done so.
  Secondly, we must keep one thing in mind about this effort. This is 
not unilateral. We are involved with 18 other nations, most of whom 
oppose changing NATO's current air campaign strategy. If all necessary 
force implies using

[[Page 8171]]

ground troops, they oppose taking a different course of action. This is 
a test for NATO. We should all recognize that. If we truly want NATO to 
succeed, we have no choice, no choice but to make all decisions 
involving strategy in concert with our NATO allies.
  For Members today to say we are going to assert that our position 
calls for a change in strategy, that the air war alone is not working, 
sends a clear message to all the other NATO countries that we are the 
ones in charge, we are the only ones making this decision; we don't 
care what you think, we are not going to resolve this matter in concert 
with you; it is going to be us; we will call the shots.
  We are not prepared to do that today, Mr. President.
  Thirdly, because this authority has not been requested either by the 
President or his military advisers or by NATO, we have no clear idea 
what it is we are authorizing with this resolution. Because the 
President hasn't made a specific proposal, are we voting to use 
tactical nuclear weapons? Are we committing 500,000 troops for 5 years? 
Are we committing ourselves to an invasion of neighboring countries, 
should that be necessary? The answer to these questions, of course, is 
no. They are extreme options which no one would dare suggest. But what 
are we authorizing with this resolution? Without a specific proposal 
from the President, we can only guess. By guessing, we do a disservice 
to our mission. By guessing, we relegate too much discretion to others.
  Mr. President, an up-or-down vote on this resolution is premature. 
There may be a time when it will be required. That time must be 
determined by the Commander in Chief and our NATO allies. If or when 
that time comes, it is the responsibility of the Congress to do what we 
must do and what we have done on many occasions in the past: We must 
debate it and we must vote on a resolution of approval. Until then, the 
Senate has spoken on this conflict. On a bipartisan vote, we have given 
our approval to the air campaign. We have no need to do so again.
  So I ask my colleagues, let us be patient. Let us support our 
military as they fight so valiantly and successfully in the air 
mission. Let us send a clear message to the leaders in Yugoslavia, and 
to NATO: We will not terminate the air war until we are successful.
  I might note another bit of evidence of our success occurred just 
this morning. There are reports that a NATO F-16 fighter jet shot down 
a Serb Mig29. The air war is working. We will keep the pressure on. We 
will not look the other way when victims of ethnic cleansing look to 
us.
  A vote on this motion to table this resolution is a vote to postpone 
the decision to alter our military course in Yugoslavia. It is a vote 
to support our military in their efforts to bring peace to this region. 
I urge our colleagues to support it.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, there are few people in the United States 
Congress who are as familiar with war as is the sponsor of this joint 
resolution, my esteemed colleague from Arizona, Senator John McCain. I 
agree with the principles behind his resolution; that this Nation 
should not fight wars to a stalemate, it should fight them to win or 
not fight them at all.
  Mr. President, for the past 6 weeks, American military forces have 
been participating in a NATO-led aerial campaign in the Balkans. In 
March, I voted to support the use of air power in this operation. It 
was my view then that the administration had already committed our 
forces to action. A vote against the President, when bombing was 
imminent, would have undercut our troops at the front. However, that is 
not the case with the resolution before us today. As a nation we have a 
choice to make. The choice should be an informed one. Our intentions in 
this operation have been noble and just. However, the boundaries of 
this conflict are not apparent to many in this body nor it seems to a 
majority of the American people. Before we give a blank check to the 
administration, I believe that the President should clearly articulate 
to both Congress and the American people the objectives and the 
national interest which require a resolution authorizing full scale 
war. To date he has not done so.
  As have many of my colleagues, I have traveled to the region. I have 
been briefed by General Clark, spoken to troops in the field and 
visited refugee camps in Albania. There is no question that our 
military personnel are the best in the world and are doing an 
outstanding job under extremely difficult circumstances. However, I 
have grave concerns over NATO's ability to salvage the humanitarian 
situation through aerial bombardment and its policy of war by 
committee. I know that Senator McCain shares this latter concern. The 
United States led a coalition force during the Persian Gulf war. Yet in 
that war it was our military leaders and not politicians in Brussels 
who called the shots. Mr. President, we won the Persian Gulf war; we 
are not winning this war. My fear is that if we adopt this resolution 
now, it will be viewed as tacit approval of an overly bureaucratic and 
ineffective NATO command structure. The Senate can pass this resolution 
and authorize the President's ``. . . use of all necessary force and 
other means . . .'' but I fear the effect will be mitigated by the 
current command structure. It is a prerequisite that prior to any 
escalation of our involvement in this conflict, that NATO streamline 
its command structure and put professional soldiers back in charge.
  A greater concern to me is the effect that this operation is having 
on the readiness of our military forces worldwide. Can we adequately 
defend South Korea, Taiwan, and Kuwait while waging a full scale war 
against Serbia? Some of the facts are alarming. We have no carrier 
battle group in the Western Pacific. The Air Force has committed one-
third of its combat aircraft to the Balkans. The President has 
authorized the activation of over 33,000 reservists, including many Air 
National Guard tanker pilots from Birmingham, Alabama. The United 
States is still involved in an undeclared shooting war with Iraq. Last 
week, the administration informed the Appropriations Committee that the 
Nation's stated ability to simultaneously fight and win two major 
regional conflicts is tenuous at best. And finally, our intelligence 
resources are being stretched thin due to this crisis. In short, we are 
pushing the envelope of our military capabilities. It begs the 
question: Is there a vital national interest in the Balkans which 
necessitates a commitment of the bulk of our limited military assets 
and endangers longstanding strategic interests? I don't have the answer 
to that question. The answer must come from the President. He must make 
his case for war to the Congress and American people prior to the 
passage of any resolution authorizing full scale war. I urge him to do 
so. It is his duty as the Commander in Chief. The stakes are very high.
  I close with a reaffirmation of my support for our military forces 
throughout the world, especially those personnel fighting in the 
Balkans. Like their predecessors throughout history, the Americans who 
today go in harm's way wearing the uniform of their country lead a 
noble pursuit. Their service is not just another job as some would have 
us believe. Regardless of the outcome of this vote, I pledge my 
continued support to those soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and 
Coast Guardsmen who are in the field as I speak today.
  This resolution authorizes the President to, ``. . . use all 
necessary force and other means, in concert with United States allies, 
to accomplish United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.'' I have no doubt 
that Senator McCain knows what it takes to succeed in a military 
campaign. I am confident that our military leaders know what it takes 
to succeed in a military campaign. However, as of today, this 
administration has demonstrated neither the vital necessity for, nor 
the capacity to successfully prosecute, a full scale war in the 
Balkans. I urge the Commander in Chief to execute the duties of his 
office and make that case before Congress and the American people. 
Until he does so, I cannot in good conscience vote to support Joint 
Resolution 20.

[[Page 8172]]


  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, Winston Churchill observed that the 
``Balkans have produced more history than we can absorb locally.'' With 
that in mind, let's realize certain history necessary to judgment.
  This was a civil war in a sovereign country. Last Spring it was 
escalating. The shooting of a Serb policeman on the corner and the 
resulting burning of Albanian homes on the block had mushroomed to 
three thousand KLA fighting for independence versus ten thousand 
Serbian troops massing on the Kosovo border. By Fall it had grown to 
ten thousand KLA versus forty thousand Serbs.
  In walks Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Rambouillet, 
announcing to Milosevic and the Kosovars that killing would have to 
stop; that there be a cooling off period for three years, then one man 
one vote. The intent was noble--to defend human rights. The dreadful 
massacre at the hands of the Serbs was met with equally savage conduct 
by the Albanians. The agreement instrument was intentionally vague to 
be interpreted by the Kosovars as a vote for independence. The 
important thing to remember is that Serbia-Montenegro is a sovereign 
country. Milosevic was selected as its head by its Parliament. In this 
civil war there was no good side. Today in total war there is no good 
side.
  Another important point is that the proposed agreement was a non-
starter--Milosevic could not agree any more to relinquishing Kosovo 
than Lincoln could the South--a so called free election in three years 
was a given in an area ninety percent Albanian and ten percent Serb.
  According to the Carter Center in Atlanta there are twenty-two wars 
the world around--all civil. And over half more violent than Kosovo. 
The United States is a world power. To continue as a world power with 
sufficient credibility to extend our influence for freedom and 
individual rights we cannot venture into every human rights conflict. 
The American people will not support it--as evidenced by the vote in 
the Congress. And living in the real world we need to husband our 
integrity for the world concerns of Russia and its missiles, North 
Korea, peace in the Middle East and the like.
  There is no national security threat to the United States in Kosovo. 
We have yet to have a national debate to determine that GIs are to be 
sacrificed for human rights.
  The demand that Milosevic agree or be bombed into agreement was 
diplomacy at its worst. The Congress, the country and most of all the 
military were totally unprepared to pursue this threat. More 
importantly, as I learned in the artillery no matter how good the aim 
if the recoil is going to kill the gun crew, don't fire!
  The following is the recoil: (A) A civil war has turned into one of 
national defense for Milosevic. When the U.S. went to national defense 
upon the attack on Pearl Harbor, the first order of business was to 
clear the west coast of all who were thought to be the enemy or 
sympathetic to the enemy. Over 110,000 Nisei, sixty-four percent of 
whom were U.S. citizens, were forced from their homes into internment 
camps. When NATO attacked, Milosevic's ethnic cleansing became enemy 
cleansing; 700,000 in three weeks. Milosevic never would have attempted 
this on his own save the NATO attack on his country. We have made 
Milosevic popular in his country.
  (B) Unprepared to pursue a ground war, NATO has strengthened 
Milosevic's military control of Kosovo.
  (C) In contrast, the KLA assumes NATO has taken its side in the civil 
war and now will want revenge no matter what happens. We have ignited 
further the historic flames of enmity.
  (D) With no national security interest at stake, the overwhelming air 
invasion of the U.S. into a small European country appears arrogant and 
threatening to much of Europe. Russia, no longer a strategic threat in 
Europe, is now being revitalized into a strategic threat.
  (E) A country half the size of South Carolina with half the 
population is being hit with forty bombardments a day. Like Viet Nam, 
we are destroying it in order to save it.
  It appears to me the recoil is killing the gun crew. Once again we 
are told that bombing will soon cause the people of Serbia-Montenegro 
to arise and throw the rascals out. In 1944 while preparing to cross 
the Rhine I heard this about Hitler; then in Viet Nam about Ho Chi Min; 
then for the past seven years about Saddam. When will the State 
Department learn? When will we all learn that there is no ``win'' in 
Kosovo? At the moment we are not only losing the war, we are losing our 
integrity as a world power. This mistake must be brought to a close. 
While under orders, we all support our troops. But this is not the 
issue before us. Unfortunately, the policy in Kosovo is a split 
decision between the House and the Senate. We still debate to determine 
that policy. This is sad, but it's the reality. Under no circumstance 
should we sacrifice a single GI for this mistake and indecision.
  I shall vote to table.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise in support of the motion to 
table the resolution authorizing the President to use whatever force 
and means necessary to carry the military campaign against Yugoslavia 
to a successful conclusion. As written, this resolution would provide 
the President with blanket authority to wage this war, including the 
right to deploy ground troops in the Balkans. There are too many 
unanswered, if not ignored questions about this war. If the Senate were 
to give the President this blanket authorization, we would abrogate our 
responsibility to our troops and to the American people to get real 
answers to these questions.
  First of all, what would constitute a ``successful conclusion'' to 
this war? Would it be the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic and his 
government? Perhaps the removal of all Serbian troops from Kosovo and 
the subsequent return of all refugees to their homeland? Or would a 
successful conclusion to the war simply be forcing Milosevic to agree 
to the terms of the peace agreement which failed at Rambouillet? I, for 
one, do not feel this question has been sufficiently addressed, and I 
have a hunch that most, if not all of my colleagues would agree with 
this assessment.
  Mr. President, even if we can agree to what would constitute a 
``successful conclusion'' to the war, what else are we agreeing to? 
Surely the use of ground troops. But how many are we talking? 50,000? 
100,000? 200,000? more? We have already committed our pilots to the 
conflict. But as to ground troops--I think this is an issue which 
mandates a separate Senate debate specifically on this issue. We owe it 
to the American people, and we surely owe this to the troops whose 
lives lay in the balance of this decision.
  What about the costs of this operation? I do not think we have a clue 
what this will cost--in lives or in dollars. We know that the President 
has requested somewhere in the realm of $6 billion, but the actual 
floor debate hasn't even begun and the figure is already fluctuating 
between $8 and 13 billion.
  There is another matter about this resolution, and about this war, 
which troubles me greatly. When the military completed its Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR), we were assured that our readiness state would 
allow us to successfully respond to two full scale wars at the same 
time. This would mean that although we are engaged in the air, and 
perhaps on the ground, in Kosovo, we would be ready to fight a full 
scale operation at the same time in another theater--the Korean 
Peninsula and Iraq come to mind as real possibilities.
  Prior to the Kosovo operation, the Department of Defense assessed the 
risks associated with responding to a second major theater war as 
``high.'' But now, because of our large commitment in the Balkans, and 
the fact that we are running dangerously low on cruise missiles and 
other munitions, our same military planners have changed this 
assessment to ``very high.'' If I understand this correctly, and I 
think I do, some of our own military strategists are concerned that our 
readiness is insufficient at this time to take on Milosevic and Saddam 
Hussein (Iraq) or Kim Jung-il (North Korea) at the same time.

[[Page 8173]]

  Given this Administration's track record in dealing with Iraq and 
North Korea, I think we have a real problem on our hands. This is a 
catastrophe of virtually untellable proportions waiting to happen.
  President Clinton has not asked the Congress for this blanket 
authorization on this war--and he continues to oppose the use of ground 
troops. While I strongly believe that it would be wrong for him to 
deploy ground troops absent clear Congressional authorization, I also 
do not believe that we should grant him this authority before he makes 
the request and the case for this authority.
  On a final note, I want to congratulate Reverend Jesse Jackson for 
his efforts this past weekend, and convey my deep relief and pleasure 
that the three American soldiers were released and are now reunited 
with their families.
  Mr. President, I support the motion to table, and urge my colleagues 
to do the same.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today to state my strong opposition 
to the McCain-Biden resolution currently pending before the Senate. I 
intend to vote to table this resolution.
  I continue to have concerns about both the failure of diplomacy that 
led to the use of force in Kosovo and the current military strategy 
being employed. But now that U.S. Armed Forces are engaged, we should 
send a strong message of unity and determination to see the mission 
through. President Milosevic should know both the U.S. Senate and the 
American people remain committed to achieving our objectives.
  I will vote to table S.J. Res. 20 for three reasons. First, the 
language contained in the resolution is too broad. I respect what 
Senators McCain and Biden are trying to accomplish with this 
resolution; they are trying to increase the chance of success of our 
military operation. However, I do not support giving the President of 
the United States the authority to ``use all necessary force'' to 
accomplish our goals in Kosovo. I find it disturbing that the United 
States Senate is considering a resolution that would give the President 
more authority to exercise military force than he has requested. 
Passage of this resolution would be the equivalent of giving the 
President a blank check to operate militarily in Yugoslavia.
  Secondly, passage of the resolution would abrogate Congressional 
responsibility for the conduct of this war. The Constitution provides 
the Congress with a clear role in the use of military force. While the 
President has consistently stated his belief that ground forces will 
not be used in a non-permissive environment, passage of this resolution 
would allow the President to reverse his position without prior 
Congressional authorization. To be clear, Mr. President, if this 
resolution were to pass, the President would be able to commit the full 
might of the U.S. military in Kosovo without first coming to the 
Congress and explaining the mission, without explaining the military 
objectives, without explaining the exit strategy, and without 
explaining how such a deployment would affect our military commitments 
around the world. Mr. President, the American people should expect more 
from their elected representatives; Congress should not surrender its 
Constitutional responsibilities in this matter.
  Finally, I oppose the McCain-Biden resolution because it is the wrong 
legislative statement at the wrong time. While I recognize S.J. Res. 20 
is before the Senate due to the parliamentary intricacies of the War 
Powers Act, it does not provide an appropriate starting point for a 
Senate debate. The truth is, the Senate is long-overdue in conducting a 
real debate over our role in Kosovo. What are our objectives? What are 
our long-term strategic interests in the Balkans? How do our military 
actions Kosovo affect our commitments to peace and stability throughout 
the world? These are the sort of fundamental questions we should be 
debating on the floor today. Rather than providing a starting point for 
discussing our policy options, the McCain-Biden resolution merely 
provides the final answer: the President knows best. This is not the 
statement I want to provide to the people of Nebraska.
  I remain hopeful that the current air campaign will bring about a 
return to diplomacy. President Milosevic must realize that NATO's 
objectives--to stop the humanitarian tragedy in Kosovo, return the 
Kosovar people to their homes, and re-establish Kosovar autonomy--will 
be achieved. The only hope for the Serbian people is a negotiated 
settlement. In the mean time, the United States and our NATO allies 
should continue to apply pressure on the Serbian government while 
working with nations like Russia to establish the basis for a 
settlement. In the long-run, the United States and Europe are going to 
have to address the issues of peace and stability in the Balkans in a 
larger context of economic development and ethnic security.
  Mr. President, Congress does have a role to play, both in the short-
term discussion of our current military actions and in the long-term 
discussion of our broader policy in the Balkans. We must begin to talk 
about these issues in a serious manner or continue to face the prospect 
of having our decisions made for us as events pass us by. Mr. 
President, let's table the McCain-Biden resolution and begin a real 
debate on Kosovo and our national security interests.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, Douglas MacArthur, one of this country's 
greatest military minds, stated ``it is fatal to enter any war without 
the will to win it.'' I believe that we are faced with that question 
today. Does this country have the will to win the war in Kosovo, or 
will the Atlantic Alliance become another fatality of Serbian 
aggression? We must pose this question to the Senate now because of a 
mistake. As NATO policy in Kosovo evolved, we made the mistake of 
taking a critical capability off the table. From the very start, the 
President and NATO leadership stated that this would be an air 
campaign, and an air campaign only. They went to great lengths to make 
this point to the press and to the public. Unfortunately, other ears 
were also listening. Slobodan Milosevic heard loud and clear that this 
would be a limited NATO effort. By doing so, we gave Milosevic every 
reason to doubt that NATO had the will to win.
  Furthermore, we gave Mr. Milosevic a vital piece of intelligence on 
how we would fight this war. In doing so, we have inadvertently given 
him an advantage more valuable than divisions of soldiers, or batteries 
of antiaircraft guns. This information has allowed Milosevic to 
disperse his forces and dig in. He knows he has only to wait out the 
air campaign to win this war.
  It is axiomatic that you cannot win a war by air power alone. We 
tried in Vietnam. We tried in Iraq, but when meeting an enemy 
determined to resist, airpower can only succeed with the use of ground 
troops. However, at the start of this war, we told Milosevic that he 
did not have to worry about ground troops. That is why he is so certain 
that this country and NATO do not have the will to win. Ask yourselves, 
how much more accommodating to NATO demands would Serbia be, if they 
knew we were preparing an invasion? Yesterday, Milosevic announced that 
he has over 100,000 troops in Kosovo. This is most likely a lie, but 
nevertheless, could Milosevic afford to have so many troops rounding up 
Kosovars if he knew NATO might invade? Of course not. One of the 
reasons that this man has been able to continue to perpetrate war 
crimes in Kosovo, is precisely because he has always known that he need 
not fear a ground war.
  Mr. President, I believe it is high time that we rectify our mistake. 
Mr. Milosevic has underestimated the resolve of the United States and 
the resolve of NATO. We will see this war through to victory. The first 
step to victory is a very simple one. Mr. Milosevic must understand 
that this country will use all of its resources to prevail. No one 
doubts that we have the means to win the war in Kosovo, this resolution 
will also demonstrate that we have the will. It does not commit the 
United States to a ground war, but it does state that if a ground war 
is necessary for NATO to meet its objectives, we will fight a ground 
war. In

[[Page 8174]]

short, we will fight anywhere and anytime to accomplish this mission.
  This country has faced dark days in Europe before. I think few people 
expressed the significance of that time better than Winston Churchill. 
When asked what were his goals for the war with Germany he said simply 
``victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however 
long and hard the road may be; for without victory there is no 
survival.''
  I believe that if this Nation has learned any lesson from the 
twentieth century, it is that you do not win wars by half measures. 
Winston Churchill understood this. So do the American people. I hope 
that the Senate will demonstrate that it too understands this lesson, 
and will oppose tabling the McCain resolution today.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized to move to 
table.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I want to use my leader time to make a brief 
statement also.
  Mr. President, I should begin by saying I understand the feeling of 
the sponsors of this resolution and I commend them for their dedication 
and their untiring efforts. But I would today, in dealing with this 
resolution, quote an ancient Greek historian who once said, ``Observe 
due measure, for right timing is in all things the most important 
factor.''
  This resolution is out of sync with current events. There is no 
request for this action. NATO is not seeking additional authority. The 
President is not seeking additional authority. The Senate has already 
acted and expressed its support for the bombing campaign.
  I have had my reservations about the President's policy from the 
beginning and I so voted; but it appears that perhaps the 
Administration has stopped deciding on targets by committee and that 
they are actually attacking targets that have greater value. We should 
allow that campaign to continue to work. This is the wrong language and 
it is at the wrong time. Currently, there seem to be some effort to 
find a negotiated settlement. We should encourage that.
  But this language would go too far, beyond what I think the Senate is 
prepared to do and what is necessary and what has been requested. It 
authorizes the use of all necessary force and other means to prosecute 
this fight. That does include ground troops. I think the Senate would 
want to have a longer debate and want to discuss other options. For 
instance, when we were considering the timing of this resolution last 
week, we were exchanging language between the majority leader and the 
Democratic leader, to see if we could find language that would have 
broad, bipartisan support. That was interrupted by this resolution.
  Let me review how we got here. This resolution was introduced weeks 
ago. And under the War Powers Act, it was the pending business as of 
last Friday. We cannot go to another matter, under the War Powers Act, 
once the Parliamentarian ruled that this language kicked into action 
the War Powers Act. So we had to either act on it or get an agreement 
to postpone it. I agreed and urged that we postpone it for a week or 10 
days until we had some bipartisan language we could agree on. Senator 
McCain agreed to that postponement. Senator Daschle indicated that he 
thought he could support that.
  But, along the way, as Senators are entitled to do, there were 
objections to postponing it by unanimous consent. So we had to deal 
with this issue. My suggestion at that time was that we not get into a 
substantive debate, that we offer a procedural motion to set it aside 
until another time when we can better determine what is needed--if 
something different is required than what is already on the books, if 
something more is asked for by the President, or if we are ready to go 
forward with the War Powers Act or even a declaration of war. But I 
don't think we are there at this moment.
  So we are forced to have this vote today. I would like to describe it 
as a procedural vote because I think it is. It is to table this 
resolution and to reserve the opportunity at some future date to have a 
vote on whether or not we want to give the President authority to 
prosecute this matter with all necessary force. I do not think that is 
where we are today. But I do want to say emphatically that I think the 
language is substantively excessive, not necessary, and uncalled for.
  So, Mr. President, I urge our colleagues to support the motion to 
table and I so move to table the resolution. I ask for the yeas and 
nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of 
the majority leader. The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced, yeas 78, nays 22, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 98 Leg.]

                                YEAS--78

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Levin
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Mikulski
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--22

     Bayh
     Biden
     Bryan
     Cleland
     Cochran
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Graham
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Inouye
     Kerry
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Lieberman
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Robb
     Smith (OR)
  The motion to lay on the table the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 20) 
was agreed to.

                          ____________________