[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 8083-8119]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




   DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN 
                               YUGOSLAVIA

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the resolution.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield 30 minutes to the Senator from 
Delaware, Senator Biden.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, may I make a parliamentary inquiry? Is 
Senator Durbin next on the list after me? The reason I ask is, Senator 
Durbin apparently agreed to switch spots with Senator Kerry.
  Mr. McCAIN. After Senator Biden is Senator Kerry, Senator Warner, 
Senator Nickles, Senator Durbin, then Senator Dorgan, Senator 
Lieberman, Senator Cleland, Senator Levin, Senator Hollings, and 
Senator Brownback.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator. I know the Senator has a very 
important appointment he has to make. I am prepared, if it is all right 
with the Senator from Arizona, to switch with him and follow him. In 
other words, then the Senator from Massachusetts will be next and then 
I will speak.
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from 
Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry, be recognized for 15 minutes, followed by 
Senator Biden for 30 minutes, and the Record will show the incredible 
generosity of the Senator from Delaware, Mr. Biden, having allowed 
two--not one, but two--Senators to precede him.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask that Senator Kerry be recognized for 
up to 30 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair, and I particularly thank Senator Biden 
for his courtesy. I appreciate this enormously. I also thank Senator 
Durbin, who is not here, but will be here shortly, for his courtesy.
  Mr. President, I join with the Senator from Arizona, the Senator from 
Connecticut, Senator Dodd, Senator Biden and others in support of this 
resolution. I understand the sensitivities of a great many of our 
colleagues and the administration to where we find ourselves. But I 
think that a fair analysis of what the Senate has before it and what 
the country has before it really mandates that the Senate be prepared 
to back up its own steps, the steps that we took when we supported the 
bombing itself.
  I heard a number of my colleagues in the course of the debate over 
this afternoon, most recently the Senator from New Mexico, say, ``Well, 
we need to recognize that the President made a decision and the 
President, having made a decision, we now need to know from the 
President what the strategy is; we need to know from the President what 
the exit strategy is; we need to know from the President what is called 
for.''
  Frankly, I say to my colleagues, there is not a small measure of 
contradiction in those statements today. There may even be some 
measure, I think, of confusion about the road that we have traveled.
  The fact is that the President made it clear to us at the outset what 
our goal was. The goal has always been the capacity of the Kosovars to 
live in peace within Kosovo. The goal has been a return to the status 
quo before Mr. Milosevic withdrew autonomy which had been enjoyed by 
the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo for years, in the wake of his sudden 
discovery that playing the nationalist card, in fact, was a road to 
power, as it was also the road to some four wars and to an 
extraordinary amount of killing in Bosnia, in Slovenia, Herzegovina and 
Croatia.
  Now, Mr. President, we find ourselves in the situation where the 
Senator from Arizona and some of us are suggesting that the course that 
we chose in the beginning is, in fact, a correct course, and the course 
that we ought to follow. The truth is that it was not just the 
President of the United States who made a decision. So did the Senate 
of the United States. A majority of the Senators in this body voted to 
approve the bombing, and having approved the bombing and having decided 
to send American forces into harm's way, they embraced the goals that 
were then stated.
  One component of those goals did change, obviously, dramatically. The 
effort initially was to prevent the ethnic cleansing from taking place 
and to hope we could sufficiently degrade the military machine to 
prevent that from happening. That, obviously, did not occur, and the 
ethnic cleansing continued. We now find ourselves with more than half 
the population dislocated outside of Kosovo, a significant portion 
displaced within Kosovo, and as to how many that may be is imprecise.
  It seems to me that this is not a time for the Senate to engage in 
covering its own posterior, not a time for the Senate to engage in a 
wholesale set of contradictions. It is rather the time for the Senate 
to declare, as unequivocally as it declared 40 days ago, that we are 
prepared to move forward with the bombing, that the same goals and the 
same objectives are viable today.
  It is interesting. I know that some have hearkened back to the Tonkin 
Gulf resolution and have hearkened back to some of the lessons of the 
Vietnam war. There is no small irony, however, in the fact that we are 
beyond, in a way, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. There was a time for 
people to question why we were bombing, what the motives were of 
bombing, what we hoped to achieve through the bombing and whether or 
not it was appropriate to start bombing and then suddenly stop, short 
of achieving those objectives. That, I think, would have been 
appropriate.
  Having decided that you were going to bomb, I think most people 
accepted the notion that the reason for bombing was legitimate enough, 
that the reason for putting American forces in harm's way was 
legitimate enough, that the goals that we were trying to achieve were 
legitimate enough, and that if you were prepared to take the risks of 
putting those people in harm's way, you were also accepting the 
responsibility for achieving the goal that was set out.
  Back in the 1960s, when the Gulf of Tonkin resolution came to the 
floor,

[[Page 8084]]

there were two Senators who stood up and, as a matter of conscience, 
said: I disagree with this, and voted against. One was Wayne Morse; the 
other was Ernest Gruening. It took a long time for history to prove 
those lone Senators correct. It may well be that those Senators who 
voted against the resolution supporting air strikes against Yugoslavia 
and who might choose to vote against those things necessary to achieve 
the goals may be proven correct by history. I do not know. At least 
that opposition is consistent, and at least that opposition is devoid 
of the disingenuity that we seem to see in those who voted to start 
bombing, those who have been saying for a year and a half or 2 years or 
more, you have to stop Mr. Milosevic, those who were crying for the 
United States to take a stand only a year ago, and then once the 
President does take a stand--the only stand that most people in the 
world thought he could take--all of a sudden they begin to vanish and 
run for the sidelines and take cover. I find that rather extraordinary, 
not to mention that it is, in fact, a contradiction of enormous 
proportions.
  I understand how some in this Chamber have reservations about 
bombing. I understand full well about how some, given the history of 
the Balkans, may have inherent reservations about the United States, 
through NATO, even being involved there. Some of those people reflected 
those deep-rooted beliefs and fears in their original vote.
  But the majority of the Senate voted by a greater margin than the 
majority who sent this Nation to war in Desert Storm--a greater 
majority. After Desert Storm, all those who had voted against it came 
together to suggest that the stated goals of the United States were 
such that we ought to guarantee the outcome. And we were committed to 
do what was necessary in order to achieve that, and we would support 
any efforts in order to achieve that.
  Mr. President, I think one of the great lessons of the Vietnam 
period--and I think Senator Hagel feels it very strongly, Senator 
McCain feels it very strongly, Senator Robb, myself, and others--is 
that if you are going to commit American forces, you make the decisions 
at the outset about what you are trying to achieve, and you make 
decisions at the outset that if you are going to send those soldiers--
airmen, seamen, all of them--into battle, you do so with the 
understanding that you are committed to achieving the goals that you 
have set out.
  I think it would be astonishing, in the face of the reality that the 
goals are achievable here, that this is so distinctly different from a 
Vietnam or even a Desert Storm in some ways--that we should ourselves 
provide these ingredients of doubt and reservation that seem to back 
off the original commitment that we made.
  I have heard many people questioning, not only today, some of the 
rationale for why we are there or how the war is proceeding. But some 
seek a reservation in the notion that the President has not asked for 
this authorization of force or the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not asked 
for it. But those same people are always quick to come to the floor and 
assert the powers and prerogatives of the U.S. Congress in the conduct 
of foreign policy.
  They are often the first to come to the floor to suggest some 
alternative policy to the President. They have often come to the floor 
with amendments to change Presidential policy in foreign policy, to 
amend it, to strengthen it. I think there is an irony that all of a 
sudden they are suggesting so much power to the President, so much 
prerogative away from the Congress, when they have spent an awful long 
time here asserting the very opposite.
  In addition to that, I have heard colleagues deeply disturbed--as 
anybody should be appropriately--about collateral damage and what 
happens in the bombing. I do not think there is an American, in good 
conscience, who does not feel pangs or deep reservations about any 
errant missile or errant bomb and what the effects are. But there is no 
moral equivalency whatsoever between those errant impacts and what we 
are trying to achieve and what Mr. Milosevic has been achieving. There 
is simply no moral equivalency.
  Let us not get confused between collateral damage and the murder, 
rape, organized rape, pillage, plunder, decimation of ethnicity, 
robbing of identities, the wholesale destruction of villages, the 
killing of teachers and parents in front of their children, the 
remarkable--remarkable--dismemberment of the people that Mr. Milosevic 
is engaged in and not for the first time. Having seen the record of 
what he did in Bosnia, to allow that kind of moral equivocation to 
enter into our thinking in this is, to me, to miss the point 
altogether.
  The fact is that Senator Dodd from Connecticut pointed out, and 
others have pointed out, that what we do here can have a profound, 
long-lasting, deep impact on our capacity to negotiate, to pressure, 
and to speak about and stand for morality and for a standard of 
behavior that is different from the kind of killing and marauding that 
has governed so much of this century.
  Now, some will say, ``Well, the Balkans are different.'' Some will 
say, ``Well, we can't always affect the outcome of these things.'' The 
fact is, we can affect this outcome. We can affect this result. We do 
have the power and the ability to be able to do this.
  I have heard some of my colleagues come to the floor and say this is 
going to affect our capacity to fight some other war somewhere. What 
war? Where? What are they talking about? I mean, are we planning 
suddenly some other war of which we are not aware?
  This is staring us in the face. It is here. It is now. We are at war. 
The question we must ask ourselves is whether or not we are prepared to 
win or whether we are going to put obstacle after obstacle in front of 
ourselves to deprive ourselves of the capacity to achieve the goals 
that are achievable.
  I hear some refer to Vietnam a lot, but other kinds of conflicts as 
well. I suggest that this is not a Vietnam--unless we make it a 
Vietnam, unless it is our own lack of resolve and pursuit.
  Some have said, well, if it is a mistake in the first place, you do 
not want to go down the road pursuing a mistake. I support that notion. 
I recall coming back from Vietnam and saying, ``it is pretty hard to 
ask somebody to be the person to die for a mistake or especially the 
last person to die for it.''
  I am sensitive to that. But the original question is, Is this a 
mistake? When 58 of us voted on the floor of the Senate to send people 
into harm's way in order to achieve our stated goals, we were making a 
judgment about whether or not we thought it was a mistake to intervene. 
And now that we have decided to intervene, let us at least have the 
courage to persevere.
  Why did we intervene? Well, I believe that the imperatives of 
intervention outweigh the alternatives so far that it is hard to really 
measure the counterarguments. Any one of us in the Senate can hear this 
well of the Senate ringing out with the voices of those who would have 
come to the floor if the images of CNN night after night had been of 
Milosevic running unstopped over the people of Kosovo, unstopped, and 
no effort whatsoever to try to prevent him. I could hear people coming 
to the floor and saying, ``Where is a President with the courage of 
Ronald Reagan or George Bush who's willing to draw the line as they 
did?'' You can hear those speeches now. They would have been spoken.
  President George Bush, in fact, had the same policy that President 
Clinton has. George Bush, before he left office, said we would draw the 
line in Kosovo and told Mr. Milosevic, in no uncertain terms, ``Don't 
monkey around with this one.'' And because he had the credibility of 
what he had done in Kuwait, you can bet that that made a difference.
  That is why we are here on the floor with this resolution, to give 
our effort the kind of credibility that it deserves, to back up our 
soldiers who are running those risks on a daily basis, with the 
understanding that there is a rationale for our having asked them to do 
what they are doing. I do not, by any sense of the imagination, believe 
that we have exhausted the air campaign in this.
  It astonishes me, in some ways, that so many people are so 
questioning of

[[Page 8085]]

an air campaign that--knock on wood--has not yet cost us the life of 
one of those pilots. I am astonished, as a former serviceperson, at the 
quality and care with which this has been prosecuted. We lose more 
people every week in the military of this country in normal training 
exercises and operations. The fact that this has been carried on now 
for 40 days, melding Dutch, British, Germans, Americans, French, 
Greeks, 19 different countries together, melding all of these airplanes 
and those multiple sorties, and bringing that together, is really a 
remarkable accomplishment.
  At the same time, day by day by day, albeit some Members of the 
Yugoslav Army may feel better and think, gee, we have been given a 
purpose in life, the fact is that on a daily basis their capacity to 
wage the war is being stripped away. Who in their right mind would 
choose Mr. Milosevic's hand to play in this versus the hand of NATO?
  The question before the Senate and this country is, Will we have the 
capacity to stay and play out the hand that we have?
  This is not Vietnam. This is not a country that stretches from the 
equivalent of New England all the way down to the tip of Florida with a 
Laos and a Cambodia on its borders, with a superpower, the former 
Soviet Union, and China sitting in the background supplying, pushing 
down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, ready to come in when we threaten to use 
whatever force may be available to us. This is not the United States 
essentially acting alone.
  Taken together, Serbia and Montenegro are slightly smaller than 
Kentucky and are essentially surrounded by friendly people. Kosovo is 
approximately the size of Los Angeles county. Unlike North Vietnam and 
South Vietnam at the time, unlike that country, where we became 
involved on the side of one of the combatants, where we chose to carry 
on years of colonial effort that had been misconstrued by the 
population and outright opposed and reviled for years, unlike the 
inadvisability of having been embroiled, we have been very careful here 
to suggest we are not for independence for Kosovo, we are not for the 
KLA ravaging their countryside any more than we are for Mr. Milosevic 
and the Serbs doing so.
  We are fighting for the standards of internationally accepted, 
universally accepted behavior that country after country has signed on 
to through United Nations conventions and other instruments of 
international law and through their own standards of behavior.
  I can't think of anything more right than taking a position against 
this kind of thuggery and this kind of effrontery to those standards as 
we leave the end of this century.
  Some people say to me, ``well, Senator, we are going to have some 
people there for a long time.'' My answer is, So what? If that is what 
it takes in order to try to begin to establish a principle that is more 
long lasting, so be it.
  What is the difference between 4,000 troops who have been asked to be 
part of a peaceful effort to change the standards of behavior in Kosovo 
as part of southern Europe--what is the difference between that and the 
500,000 troops we had at a high point in Europe after World War II? 
Don't forget the way in which most Americans were skeptical of Harry 
Truman and the Marshall plan. How on Earth could the United States of 
America, having fought the Germans, turn around and put money back into 
their country? How on Earth could we try to bring the Germans into 
NATO?
  Well, where are we today? A united Germany, the Berlin Wall gone, 
Berlin about to be the united capital of Germany, and the result, 
Germans participating with us in standing up against the very kinds of 
things that stained the history of this century and of their country 
during World War II. Is there a more beautiful circle in terms of 
understanding what is at stake? I do not think so.
  It seems to me, Mr. President, that an investment of some 5,000, 
6,000, 7,000 troops in southern Europe to guarantee that Greece, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania can remain stable and not be dragged 
into this, that is worthwhile.
  Some would say, Senator, we heard that old domino argument before; 
that is the one they gave us in Vietnam.
  Once again, the facts on the ground are proving the reality. Can 
anyone here tell me with a straight face that Montenegro, without our 
current efforts and involvement, could possibly withstand the strains 
of what is happening? Can anybody tell me that if the entire population 
of Kosovo were driven out into Albania, you wouldn't somehow see 
Macedonia, Greece, Albania dragged into this? Ultimately, there isn't a 
person in the Senate who doesn't understand that we would have been 
dragged into it, too. There was an inevitability that NATO would be 
called on to take a stand.
  How astonishing it is that people find some kind of moral equivalency 
here between some of the difficulties of waging a fairly carefully 
prosecuted--not fairly, a very carefully prosecuted war, and what we 
are trying to achieve. How astonishing that people are so concerned 
about finding that equivalency measured against what Mr. Milosevic has 
done.
  I believe if we will stand our ground and be steady and show the 
resolve that we need to show as a great country and the leader of the 
free world, that we have the ability, through this air campaign, to 
achieve ultimately the diplomatic outcome that we would like to 
achieve.
  But we have also learned through all of history--Henry Kissinger and 
Richard Nixon will tell you this, in dealing with the North Vietnamese 
in the Christmas bombing, and I hated it back then, but I have come to 
understand that there are, in fact, sometimes some things that do speak 
and make a difference to certain people. Like it or not, as I have been 
deeply involved in that part of the world in the last years, I have 
learned that that did help make a difference to people's decisions to 
try to come to some kind of resolution.
  The fact is that we are now backing up diplomacy with force. I have 
heard some people call for a stay in that force, that somehow it would 
be diplomatically nice if we were to turn around and have a bombing 
pause.
  My response to that is very simple: Do not let the politicians 
decide, after sending the military personnel in to risk their lives, 
when you are going to have a bombing pause, without adequately passing 
it by the military to ensure that you are not going to put your people 
at greater risk if you don't achieve your goals at the back side of it.
  I can't go into all the reasons for that, but people understand that 
there are a great many repercussions to a bombing halt which could have 
greater jeopardy to our pilots and greater jeopardy to the use of 
whatever force we need to use down the road. I am perfectly committed 
to having that happen at the right moment, but I want that to be driven 
by the military needs of achieving our goals and not simply the 
political imperatives at the time.
  Finally, Mr. President, let me say that I hear colleagues say: Well, 
we want to know what the end game is; we want to know what the strategy 
is. We have even heard mention of the Boland amendment and other 
things. Are we in this to win?
  There are only three or so choices in this, Mr. President. That is 
about it. Anybody ought to be able to figure them out. Stop the bombing 
and fail to achieve your goals. And if you stop the bombing; NATO would 
be irreparably damaged, if not simply finished. Mr. Milosevic can 
declare victory, do what he wants, and you will have no force in there. 
That is one choice.
  Another choice is that you continue to prosecute the air war as you 
press the diplomatic effort, with a guarantee that you are going to 
press that until you get that effort.
  The third is--and it is the best end game, best exit strategy of 
all--you win. That is the exit strategy. You achieve the simple stated 
goal of returning the Kosovars into Kosovo, allowing them to live in a 
protected structure where people won't be killing them, and at the same 
time have a force that has the capacity to prevent the UCK/KLA from 
also engaging in killing. It is called peace. I think that is an end 
game worth fighting for.

[[Page 8086]]

  If the impact of the air war is substantial enough to force Mr. 
Milosevic to yield and accept NATO's terms for ending the war, then we 
will have won. However, if bombing alone is not enough, then winning 
will require that we have the determination and resolve to do whatever 
is necessary on the ground to achieve these objectives--to win.
  I think when you measure the history of Europe and the importance of 
southern Europe, and the success of the integration process in Europe, 
you cannot question the need to achieve our stated goals in Kosovo. 
NATO has played an important role in the integration process--just talk 
to the officials in Spain or in other parts of Europe about the impact 
of NATO as an organizing principal, as a means of having brought 
countries together around democracy. They will tell you unequivocally 
of the degree to which the process of meeting, of coming together, of 
having mutual responsibilities, of needing to work together have had a 
profound impact on the capacity of Europe to develop so that they now 
have a common market and are working on the last efforts of 
integration, with more power in Brussels and more capacity as a 
European entity to speak to the world and to stand for these 
principles.
  Are we going to deny that to southeastern Europe? Are we going to 
ignore the lesson that we would sent to Baghdad or Pyongyang or Tripoli 
or to other parts of the world if we fail to do what is necessary to 
win in Kosovo? I hope the answer of the Senate would be unequivocally 
no. The lessons of history are such that they taught us that this is 
the right thing to be doing for the right reasons. They are, I think, 
efforts that are worthy of our commitment in order to see it through to 
the end.
  I am confident that if the Senate and the country were to speak with 
a single voice on this, in a short period of time we would see this 
resolved and, most likely, Mr. President, without recourse to ground 
troops or to prolonged war.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have been authorized, since nobody else 
is on the floor, to go down the list here. I believe I am to be yielded 
30 minutes at this point. I ask that I be able to proceed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized for 30 
minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there are few issues that this body debates 
which are of consequence equal to what we are debating today. We are 
literally talking about the life and death of thousands of people, 
including possibly American personnel, American soldiers.
  I have been here for 27 years, and on those occasions when I have 
been put in the position of having to vote on matters that relate to 
whether or not someone will live or die, I have tried my level best to 
be as intellectually honest and rigorous with myself as I possibly can. 
I have listened to the debate on the floor today with great interest 
and with some disappointment. It comes as no surprise to my colleagues 
that have served with me in the last 10 years or so, or even those in 
the last year or so, how strongly I feel about the Balkans. I am given 
blame, or credit, depending on the place from which you come, for 
getting us as involved in Bosnia as we are. I came back in the early 
nineties from a long, several-hour meeting late in the night in the 
office of Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Yugoslavia, and I came 
away convinced that this was a man with an agenda that was anathema to 
our interests and was literally genocidal.
  I wrote a report years ago, referred to as ``lift and strike,'' 
whereby I urged us to change our policy. And so I don't want to attempt 
to hide in any way the intensity of my feelings about what the 
appropriate action for the United States, NATO, and the world is 
relative to Mr. Milosevic. But when I recently got back from Macedonia 
late at night on a Sunday, I got home. After flying, I guess, for 12 or 
so hours--whatever the timeframe was--I did what most people do after a 
long trip. I took a shower and brushed my teeth and tried as quietly as 
I could to climb into bed and not disturb my wife, who was asleep.
  After I got settled, thinking I had accomplished not awakening her, 
she leaned over and said, ``Welcome home.'' Then she asked me a 
question, which I suspect the American people are asking. You are going 
to ask every one of us. My constituents are going to ask me. It was 
absolutely sincere. She said, in the dark of the night--and I could not 
even see her face--``Joe, are you sure you're correct?''
  That sort of cut right to the quick of things. I had been so 
outspoken on this issue, and that took me aback for a moment. I 
answered her with complete honesty and candor. I said, ``I don't know. 
I am not positive. I can't guarantee it, but I feel so strongly that 
I'm right, that I'm going to continue to pursue pushing us in the 
direction of doing what I think is right.''
  If my wife is asking me if I'm sure I'm right, and she is privy to my 
thoughts, concerns, and serious contemplations about whether or not I 
should be a party to causing some Americans to die, then I wonder what 
the majority of the American people must think. They must be moved by, 
or find appealing, the arguments of some of my colleagues today on the 
floor: It is not our fight. We should not be there. We are doing it the 
wrong way. The President of the United States is not worthy of our 
trust as Commander in Chief. We should bring the boys home. We have no 
vital interests.
  You know, I sit in a seat now that men such as Vandenberg sat in. I 
am a senior Senator. There is only one person on the Foreign Relations 
Committee that has been there as long as I have been there. When I was 
the age of these pages--this is the truth--I used to wonder, when I was 
in high school and college, as we studied about Hitler and Germany, why 
nobody did anything in 1934 or 1935 or 1937 or 1938 when the price 
would have been incredibly lower. You look back now and just think what 
would have happened had the world united and gone in and taken Hitler 
out. Just think how different it would have been.
  By the way, I note parenthetically that I am not equating Milosevic 
to Hitler in terms of his capacity, ability, or his danger. As the 
Senator from Massachusetts pointed out, he does not represent a country 
of 50 million people, an industrial giant. He does not have the 
military power of a country as great as Germany. He does not present 
the same threat.
  But it is analogous in the following way: In a closed meeting of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, with senior Members of the Senate in 
attendance from the Committee on Appropriations and, I believe, Armed 
Services, I was making a case several months ago about why we had to be 
involved.
  One of my colleagues, for whom I have an overwhelming amount of 
respect, a veteran who put his life on the line for this country, a 
very promilitary guy, looked at me and asked the following question, 
which answered for me that question I could never answer as a young 
man, Why did we not act? After listening to my case as to why we should 
be involved with NATO, he said, ``But, Joe, can you guarantee me no 
American will be killed?'' It was as if somebody took one of those 
little hammers that the doctors use to test your reflexes, those little 
rubber hammers, and went bing, and hit me right in the head. The light 
went on, and all of a sudden I realized why the Vandenbergs of the 
world didn't do anything.
  It is difficult to explain to the American people how you would risk 
even one American life, or more than that, how you would be able to say 
I can assure you that Americans will die for something that hasn't 
happened yet. How do you do that? I am sure somebody said, in 1935: If 
we go in after Hitler, it is going to cost 100 or 1,000 or 2,000 
American lives to get the job done.
  I am sure Senators like the Presiding Officer and me sat there and 
said, ``How am I going to go home and explain that to my folks? How can 
I go

[[Page 8087]]

home and explain we are going to lose several thousand American lives 
to take out a guy they do not know anything about, who is no immediate 
threat to them now, and all he is doing is beating up Jews and 
gypsies?'' Hard sell. That is where we are now. We have a guy who is 
doing more than beating up Jews and gypsies. We have a guy who, if you 
turn on your television, is loading thousands of people into railroad 
cars in the heart of Europe. He has corralled them like cattle, putting 
them in railroad cars. I looked at it, and I thought to myself: This is 
almost like a video game, or something. Is this real? This is 1999. 
They are loading people on railroad cars because of their ethnicity and 
religion.
  The Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Inhofe, said he was recently in the 
camps in Macedonia. So was I in the same camps. We came away with two 
different impressions. We agreed they were happy to be there. We agreed 
they were getting fed well. But do you know what struck me? As a 
Senator, I have been in refugee camps all over the world. It was the 
following. I was standing there talking to people. And there was 
thousands of people in line--like a long movie line. They were about 
six or eight wide, snaked all through this camp. I was standing there 
answering questions for people, and asking questions of refugees. All 
of a sudden it struck me. I was standing next to a guy who had on a 
sport coat that must have cost $750. Another guy--I looked down at his 
shoes. They had been to be $300 Italian-made leather shoes. In between 
them was an old lady in a babushka with her teeth missing. All of a 
sudden it came to me. This is the enormity of the cleansing. It had 
nothing to do with their economic station. It had nothing to do with 
the specific territory they lived in. It had to do with their religion 
and their ethnicity.
  It is as if someone marched into an office building in downtown 
Washington and took out the $400,000 lawyers along with the cleaning 
lady because they were both Moslem.
  People say ``no vital interest.'' Let me ask my colleagues who are 
listening and the staff of my colleagues who are monitoring this 
debate. Ask yourself the following question: Can anyone say that they 
will be leaving their children and grandchildren a more secure future 
if NATO and the United States do nothing to stop the ethnic cleansing 
in the heart of Europe? Forget for a moment whether or not I and others 
are right, that if we do not act, it will result in an open war and the 
split between Greece and Turkey, a division within Europe that is 
reminiscent of 1910 and 1915, although the Hapsburg, Ottoman, German, 
and Russian Empires were still in existence. Forget that. Assume we are 
wrong about that. Tell me, anybody explain to me, how my child and 
granddaughters are going to be more secure if, in fact, you have a 
million people displaced, you have thousands of people--at least now 
documented hundreds of people --brought out in the backyards of their 
homes and knelt down and had their heads blown off.
  There are 11 million ethnic Russians living in Ukraine. There are 
thousands, tens of thousands of Hungarians living in Romania. There are 
hundreds of thousands of Turks living in Bulgaria. Tell me how this 
works. Someone explain to me. And then, even if they can explain that, 
explain to me how the United States of America can be prevent itself 
from being dragged into a war in Europe.
  Look, I am not saying to you all that if we don't act right now, 
within the next 5 years our future is doomed. But tell me what Europe 
looks like in 20 years. Tell me how it is possible that the United 
States can conduct its foreign policy anywhere in the world without a 
stable and secure Europe, not because we are ``Europhile'' and we only 
think Europe is important or more important than Asia. But tell me how 
with our economic, political, cultural, and military ties there can be 
a Europe divided and our interests not be affected. I find it 
absolutely astounding that anyone in this Chamber could say we have no 
vital interest.
  I also find this moral relativism very fascinating. It kind of goes 
like this. If there is an injustice anywhere in the world and we can't 
deal with every injustice, then we should deal with no injustice. If in 
Rwanda African tribes are killing one another and the carnage is 
greater there, or in Cambodia where 2 million people were killed--and 
the list goes on--if we didn't get involved there, how did we get 
involved now?
  Well, I point out two little facts:
  One, we have the means in Europe that do not exist in those other 
parts of the world; two, we have the ability with the means available 
to us if we are willing to execute an outcome that we desire; and, 
three, if Europe begins to disintegrate, we are in trouble, because we 
are a European power.
  I said that I would try my best to be as honest with myself as I 
could because, by the way, I tell you we are political. I am not 
suggesting those who oppose our involvement in Kosovo do it for this 
reason. But I can tell you that it is a lot easier for me in my State 
to be for noninvolvement. That is a sacred place to be, Mr. President. 
That is the easier place to be. I didn't look for this fight. This is 
not why I came to the Senate at age 30 saying I want to be for pushing 
us to go to war. That is why I examine these arguments the best I can, 
because if there is a better way that doesn't include war, I am for it.
  I listened to all the arguments today. The only one, with all due 
respect, that I think made sense was Pete Domenici's. He is in 
opposition to the McCain-Biden resolution. What he said, from my 
perspective at least, adds up, and it makes sense. He said, ``Hey, 
look. The President didn't ask for this authority. Why are you forcing 
it on him? He doesn't want it yet. So don't give it to him.'' And we 
should send him a letter that says, ``If you want it, Mr. President, 
ask us and we will act on it quickly.''
  When the Senator from Arizona and I introduced this resolution, that 
was basically our intention. We didn't--at least I didn't--contemplate 
that the Parliamentarian would rule correctly--I am not challenging the 
ruling--that the War Powers Act was implicated and that we must vote on 
this resolution. That was not what we anticipated. We anticipated, when 
we introduced this, for it to be here on the floor ready and able to be 
brought up when it was needed, because we--at least I--concluded that 
we should give the air campaign a full opportunity to succeed--I 
haven't given up on that yet--but that Milosevic and the rest of the 
world should know we were prepared to do whatever it took to win.
  Here we are, voting on it because of the procedural rules not of the 
Senate, but of the statute, and thereby by the Senate rule.
  I understand Senator Domenici's argument. By the way, I believe, 
notwithstanding all the speeches today, if the President of the United 
States asks for ground troops with NATO, that this body will vote for 
it; that there are over 51 votes for it. When the rubber meets the road 
and Members have to vote yes or no, I predict we will see a lot of 
opinions change.
  Now, I heard today time and again the Gulf of Tonkin analogy. With 
all due respect, it is not at all analogous. In the Gulf of Tonkin 
resolution, the U.S. Congress said to the President, and I am 
paraphrasing, Mr. President, use whatever means at your disposal. It 
didn't say what the McCain-Biden resolution says; it didn't say use 
whatever means is at your disposal--assuming 18 other nations sign on 
with you. You do not, if McCain-Biden passes, Mr. President, have the 
authority to use force unilaterally. It is in conjunction with NATO; 
not alone, in conjunction with NATO.
  At the time of Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, we were 
essentially alone in the world in concluding that force need be used. 
With regard to Kosovo, we are in the majority. The entire civilized 
world, including the Russians, acknowledge that Milosevic is engaged in 
behavior that violates every notion of civilized conduct. They disagree 
on the means we should use to deal with that.
  I was in Macedonia. I went into a tent city about which my friend 
from Oklahoma talked. He is right, these are courageous young men and 
women. I

[[Page 8088]]

sat in a tent that housed about 20 military folks. I walked in and 
said, They make the analogy back home about Vietnam; what do you guys 
think of that? There were two women, as well. What do you think of 
that? A sergeant looked at me, he was 23, 24 years old, and he said the 
following:

       Senator, when you were 23 years old, if they had sent you 
     here, would you have any doubt about the morality of what you 
     were undertaking?

  The answer is no. It is not analogous to Vietnam. I was a student 
during Vietnam. We were told there was a monolithic communism that was 
going to roll out of Moscow and Beijing, roll down through Southeast 
Asia. Our history professors would say, Wait a minute, the Chinese and 
the Russians aren't getting along together. And, wait, the Chinese and 
the Vietnamese have been fighting each other for 300 years. So explain 
to me how this domino is going to fall.
  Did anybody notice fleets of Russians in Cam Ranh Bay? Not because of 
us, the Chinese weren't going to let them be there. This monolithic 
communism didn't exist.
  I don't want to relitigate Vietnam but it is not analogous, not only 
for the reasons my friend from Massachusetts stated--the size of the 
territory, the population, the availability of the arms materiel, the 
allies. Sure, China and Russia cooperated because it suited their 
interest to keep the Vietnamese fighting us but not because of the 
rationale we were given.
  I respectfully suggest there is nothing analogous. The Tonkin Gulf 
resolution is not analogous because it is not giving the President 
authority on his own in the McCain-Biden resolution as Tonkin Gulf did. 
It is a different continent, it is a different population, it is a 
different rationale. There is no doubt on the part of anyone about the 
morality of the undertaking.
  That old joke, and I am paraphrasing, Can 18 European countries that 
don't have a lot in common be wrong, all at once? Can they all be 
wrong?
  Listening to this debate, one would think the President of the United 
States just woke up one morning and said: ``You know, I need a war. I 
would like to have a war. I would like to test our new smart bombs. I 
would like to figure out if they work better than they did in Desert 
Storm. We put a lot of money and time into it, and I have just the guy 
to look to. Eighteen other nations said what this guy is doing is 
bad.''
  Some of my colleagues will say they have been fighting for thousands 
of years; all those people are the same. There are a lot of bad guys on 
all sides, but I don't see the Moslems loading up Serbs on cars and 
sending them off. I don't see this happening anywhere else in Europe.
  There is one remaining dictator in the region. His name is Slobodan 
Milosevic. He is a bad guy. He is a smart bad guy. He is doing very bad 
things. The idea that the United States of America, when all of Europe 
has stood up and said this must stop, will walk away, I think is 
absolutely bizarre.
  Does anybody here truly believe we could stand aside, let this 
happen, and it not affect our vital interests in the year 2010 and 2012 
and 2020 when my granddaughters and their husbands will be sent off?
  It seems to me we are making a gigantic mistake here to try to hide 
behind a lot of arguments. I raise this question with my friend. We use 
that phrase all the time--``my friend.'' This guy really is my friend. 
We have been friends for 27 years. We were back in the Cloakroom 
talking. I said, what the heck is going on here? I think we both came 
to a similar conclusion, at least in part. On both sides of the aisle 
people are using code words because they don't want to be isolationist. 
This is about isolationism or internationalism. That is what this is 
about.
  A lot of Republicans don't trust this President. I am not suggesting 
they trust him, but just sort of take that nickel when you do the cards 
at McDonald's for your kids and see whether you won a cup or something. 
Scrape it off a little bit and right below is the real link--
isolationism.
  On my side are a lot of the old antiwar Members. By the way, 
decorated veterans such as Senator McCain and Senator Kerry say we 
should be doing this.
  Look, folks, I don't know how to run an antiseptic foreign policy. I 
don't know how you can be President of the United States and make every 
decision you make based upon the following formula: If an American will 
lose their life, we can't get involved.
  Look, if there is any man in this Chamber, or woman, who understands 
the loss of life in war and the brutality of war, it is my colleague 
here, Senator McCain. I am not being gratuitous here. He may be the 
next President of the United States of America. Guys like him, and 
women like him, may have to say, ``I am going to have to do something 
that is going to cost American lives.''
  People who disagree with us, I say to my friend, act like we are 
cavalier about it. I don't understand it like my friend understands it, 
but I think I understand loss of life a little bit. It is not about 
that. It is about the recognition that this is a mean damn world out 
there.
  So I listen to my colleagues make the strangest arguments. I hear a 
Democrat stand up and say: You know, we should not be involved in this 
at all. This is a terrible thing. I voted against the bombing. And, by 
the way, we have to save the refugees. We are going to save the 
refugees.
  Where the heck are you going to save them?
  Mr. McCAIN. Will my colleague yield for a question?
  Mr. BIDEN. Sure, I am happy to yield.
  Mr. McCAIN. What does my friend from Delaware make of the argument 
that this is not the right time, this is not the right time to vote on 
this? So we are going to table this motion tomorrow and a whole bunch 
of our colleagues are going to say--including, by the way, my dear 
friend from Virginia: Yes, this is a problem. It has only been going on 
for 5 weeks now. Hundreds of thousands of people have been moved from 
their homes, thousands have been killed, massacres every day--but this 
is not the right time to vote on this particular issue. So we will vote 
tomorrow to table it and cut off debate and cut off discussion and 
abrogate the responsibilities that we have as Senators.
  Frankly, does my friend think that maybe they know better?
  Mr. BIDEN. I say to my friend from Arizona, and I spoke to this very 
briefly in his absence, it is the only argument that has any substance, 
in my view. I disagree with it. I disagree with it for a lot of reasons 
I have spoken to. I am going to vote and urge my colleagues not vote to 
table. We will do it the right way. But at least they have an argument 
that the President has not asked for it. I think we should be telling 
the President he has it.
  We are not demanding, the Senator from Arizona and I, that he use 
ground troops. We are saying to him: We want to make sure you 
understand that you have to win this and you can't come back to us and 
say you didn't do it because you didn't have the means. At least that 
is why this Senator is pushing this.
  The arguments I find totally disingenuous, though, are the ones that 
go like this. I heard today: You know, I voted against the bombing, but 
I tell you what, I am going to vote to table this use of the available 
ground troops to the President because I don't trust the President. But 
I tell you what, if this President were a leader, he would do whatever 
it took to stop this. But I am going to vote against giving him the 
authority it would take to stop it because I don't trust this 
President.
  How? I don't understand.
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield for one more question?
  Mr. BIDEN. I sure will.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I do not want to interrupt this important 
colloquy, but I believe I am up next.
  Mr. BIDEN. You are, but I don't believe my time is up yet. If it is--
apparently my time is up.
  Mr. WARNER. I would like to ask a question of you.

[[Page 8089]]


  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I believe I was asking a question. I do 
not believe the Senator from Virginia has the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. I did not mean to interrupt, Mr. President.
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes for 
Senator Biden--excuse me--I grant Senator Biden 3 additional minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. The White House, the National Security Adviser, the 
Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State are now frantically 
lobbying against this resolution, who are saying vote to table. Has my 
colleague ever heard of a time where the White House and the 
administration lobbied actively against obtaining more authority?
  Mr. BIDEN. Only on one occasion. The point the Senator is making I 
understand. But only on one occasion. Two other occasions I can think 
of where Presidents have asked not to have more authority--when they 
thought they were going to lose.
  I have personally spoken to the President. I have spoken to the 
National Security Adviser. The National Security Adviser would like to 
have this authority. But what he does not want to have is a vote that 
says he cannot have the authority. They are worried if there is a vote 
that is a straight up-and-down vote and it loses, that it will mean, in 
conjunction with the House vote last week, that the Congress is on 
record against ground troops.
  My argument to them is it does not mean that. It means they concluded 
they were not prepared to do it now without the White House asking for 
it. But I believe there have been circumstances in the past where 
Presidents have affirmatively suggested they not ask for authority and 
table something when they thought they did not have the votes.
  My colleagues on this side have told them they do not have the votes, 
as have your colleagues. I think my colleagues on this side are wrong, 
and I think the colleagues on the other side are wrong about the votes. 
Because I find an interesting thing, Senator. On very, very important 
matters--and everyone knows how important this is--Congress likes to 
avoid responsibility.
  I will take us back very briefly to the Persian Gulf. On the Persian 
Gulf we had great disagreement, and during that time I remember going 
to my caucus and saying: We must demand a vote. And my colleagues on my 
side, whose names I will not mention, but I give you my word to this, 
who were against the action in the Persian Gulf, said: No, no, don't 
ask for a vote, because they wanted to be in line. Because if it 
succeeded, they wanted to be able to say, ``Great job, Mr. President,'' 
and if it failed, they wanted to be able to say, ``Not me.'' I think 
that is at work here, I say to my friend from Arizona.
  But the bottom line of it is that the Senator from Arizona, in my 
opinion, is dead right. I think the amendment is dead right on. I think 
we do more to bring a successful conclusion to this war by giving that 
authority whether or not it is used. I think we would make a tragic 
mistake being apologists for a policy that in fact makes no civilized 
sense, when we make moral equivalence about the people in the region, 
when we argue that a bombing pause would not affect anything, when we 
argue--my time is up. Ten seconds.
  I compliment Reverend Jackson on bringing these folks home. But with 
all due respect, I can think of a lot of people with his standing who 
could have gone and probably gotten the same result, if in fact they 
were willing, and believed as he does, that we should stop the bombing.
  I think it is a mistake. It is a little bit like saying: Give me 
three people back and I will not do anything about the 300 you 
massacred--which they did, by the way, just 4 days earlier.
  I think it is a tragic mistake. I wish we would get our act together. 
I think the President is going to have to take the case to the Nation 
more forcefully than he has. I hope we do not table the McCain-Biden 
resolution, but it appears we are going to do that. As you can tell, I 
have spoken too long. But I think this is something in our vital 
interest with the capacity to affect the outcome that would be 
beneficial to all people, and the idea that it would be a failure if we 
had to have forces there in order to maintain the peace, who were not 
being killed, and the genocide stopped--I would consider that victory, 
not failure.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, with apologies and respect to my colleague 
from Virginia for going over time, I yield 15 minutes to the Senator 
from Virginia, Senator Warner.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my friend. Before he leaves the floor, I think a 
colloquy here--and I am very much interested in following the one you 
and Senator Biden had--might be helpful. This Senator intends to vote 
to table. I do so with a heavy conscience, because I have no better 
friend, nor a man I respect more, than my good friend, the Senator from 
Arizona. We sort of served in the Navy together. He had more rank than 
I did; at one point I had a little more authority than he did. And my 
good friend from Delaware, you do recall who was your cosponsor. It was 
Biden-Warner. So I think that points out there are differences of 
conscience, clear conscience now and then, where we differ.
  I want to ask both of you, on the condition you answer on your time, 
on such time you have, a very simple question: What does this 
resolution give the President of the United States that the 
Constitution has not clearly reposed in this President and in every 
other President since the beginning of this great Republic?
  I ask that question because to vote otherwise would possibly, if this 
were to carry, in my judgment, send a hollow message not only to the 
United States but across the world. He has the authority under the 
Constitution to do precisely what you state in here.
  I ask simply: What does this confer on the President that the 
Constitution has not already conferred?
  Mr. McCAIN. I will be brief in my response.
  Mr. WARNER. We have the understanding it is on their time, Mr. 
President.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute to respond to the 
question from Senator Warner.
  This is exactly the same as the authority that was granted to the 
President in the case of Bosnia, in the case of the Persian Gulf war, 
in the case of going all the way back to Beirut, exactly the same 
thing: Telling the President of the United States that Congress does 
play a role.
  We ignore the War Powers Act. We all know that. This is not a war in 
the classic sense, and we do not declare wars. This is a role for the 
Congress of the United States to play, endorsing the President's 
ability to use whatever force is necessary in order to bring the 
conflict to a conclusion. It is no different than that of the Persian 
Gulf war resolution, the Bosnia resolution, the Lebanon resolution, the 
Grenada resolution--there has been literally one in every conflict in 
which we have engaged.
  Finally, may I say that it is also an effort, frankly, to get the 
President of the United States to do the right thing.
  I yield my time.
  Mr. BIDEN. May I have 1 minute to respond?
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Delaware to 
respond.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator.
  I say to my friend from Virginia, I think it is constitutionally 
required. I am in the minority in that view. I do not think the 
President has the authority to commit ground troops without the consent 
of the Congress, but I think it is politically necessary. I think it is 
politically necessary because it is of great value to any President to 
have the Congress on the line with him as he prosecutes a war. I think 
it is constitutionally necessary and politically wise.
  I realize that there are those who disagree with me, that the war 
clause--not the War Powers Act, the war clause--of the Constitution I 
believe requires the consent of the Congress for the use of this force 
now, but it----
  Mr. WARNER. By ``this force,'' the Senator means what?

[[Page 8090]]


  Mr. BIDEN. I am sorry. If he were to use ground forces. But I 
acknowledge there is a constitutional argument that says that if the 
Congress had voted and the House did not, but if they had voted, as we 
had, for the use of air power, that he would not need that additional 
authority.
  I do think there is a constitutional requirement for the Congress to 
assent to this action. I understand I am in the minority. Beyond that, 
I think there is a political necessity that we be united.
  My friend and I have talked about this privately before. We can all 
disagree about the lessons from Vietnam, but I think we both agree that 
one of the lessons out of Vietnam was that no matter how smart, no 
matter how brilliant a foreign policy is, it cannot be sustained 
without the informed consent of the American people and their elected 
representatives being signed on to it.
  That is my primary motivation. The place my friend from Arizona and I 
disagree is, I am not doing this to embolden the President to do the 
right thing. The reason I signed on to it is to make sure the Congress 
goes on record saying that we will back whatever action the President 
takes to meet the four goals that he has stated. There is legitimate 
constitutional disagreement, but I fall down on the side that I think 
it is necessary.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will simply reply to my good friend, 
only four times in the history of the United States of America has 
Congress used that phrase, ``declare war.'' World War II is the last; 
am I not correct?
  Mr. BIDEN. You are.
  Mr. WARNER. How many times did we send out our troops? Are we 
suggesting each time, whether it was Vietnam in particular or Korea, 
that that wasn't the proper authority exercised by the President of the 
United States? You suggest that, I say to the Senator, when you say----
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, yes, I am. In the one case in Vietnam, it 
was given through the Tonkin Gulf. In Korea, I don't think it is 
constitutionally--by the way, I am not alone in this. I happen to 
teach--it does not make me an expert, but I happen to teach 
constitutional law and separation of powers now in law school. I can 
assure you one thing: The vast majority of constitutional scholars 
agree with me.
  The point being, you do not need to declare war. As Louis Henkin, who 
wrote the Restatement of International Law, pointed out, it does not 
require a declaration of war; it requires a consent of the Congress, 
which is equivalent to the authority required, just like what we did in 
the Persian Gulf. When the Congress went on record granting the 
authority to the President to use the force in the resolution, that is 
the equivalent of a declaration of war. All constitutional scholars 
agree on that point.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the resolution of the gulf in 1991 is one 
I remember, may I say with a lack of modesty.
  Mr. BIDEN. I think you drafted it.
  Mr. WARNER. I was the author of that resolution. I say to the Senator 
from Delaware and the Senator from Arizona, there is a clear 
distinction in that case. There the President of the United States 
asked the Congress; am I not correct? Did he not ask the Congress?
  Mr. BIDEN. He is correct, Mr. President. I am sounding too much like 
a lawyer now. From a constitutional standpoint, whether they are asked 
or not is irrelevant. The only relevant constitutional point--and this 
is getting us off the point here, but the only relevant constitutional 
point is whether or not the Congress granted authority, asked for or 
not. That is the only relevant constitutional point.
  With the Senator's permission, I would like to ask unanimous consent 
to print in the Record a legal brief which I have written on this point 
relative to the war powers clause and whether or not it is required and 
on the issue of whether or not there is the equivalency of a 
declaration of war by the consent of the Congress for the action 
specified.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, may that request be granted in such a way 
that it can appear after our colloquy and at the conclusion of my 
remarks?
  Mr. BIDEN. With the permission of the Senator, I will put it in 
tomorrow so there is no question that it is not interrupting his 
remarks.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, while I have the Senator's attention, 
though, he said--very interesting--I don't want to breach confidences, 
but he and I have been present at three very important consultations 
with the President of the United States.
  Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. My recollection is, the first one was an hour and a half; 
the second, almost 2; and the third, I think I was the last to leave 
after 2 hours.
  Mr. BIDEN. Long time.
  Mr. WARNER. I know my colleague from Oklahoma, who will next speak, 
was there throughout the 2 hours. I recall the Senator from Delaware 
was engaged in a very interesting colloquy with the President about the 
issue of asking and not asking. Does the Senator remember that 
colloquy?
  Mr. BIDEN. I do.
  Mr. WARNER. I thought he was quite accurate. My recollection is, did 
you not solicit?
  Mr. BIDEN. I did. Mr. President, again, I am sounding too much like a 
constitutional lawyer here. I don't want to mix apples and oranges.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let's talk like a Senator. We are all 
Senators here.
  Mr. BIDEN. If I may, the Senator makes a valid point. I will not tell 
you what the President said, because that will be inappropriate. I will 
tell you what I said. I am allowed to do that.
  Mr. WARNER. I remember it very well.
  Mr. BIDEN. There was an issue, and all the Senate and House Members 
were assembled, and they were about to vote on the floor of the House 
of Representatives on a resolution relating to whether or not the 
President would ask for consent to use ground troops. Let me be 
precise.
  A resolution was submitted characterized by the Speaker, as we sat 
there, as one that would say the following, and eventually was voted 
on. It said: Mr. President, before you introduce ground troops into 
Kosovo, you must come to us under the Constitution and ask for our 
permission.
  And the President--I can say this because he said it publicly. The 
President said, ``I didn't want to do something no President has 
acknowledged that he has to do in a debate with Congress.'' And I stood 
up, and I said, ``Mr. President, let me respectfully suggest you send 
the following letter to the House,'' because I didn't want the vote to 
turn into the debacle it did. And I suggested the President say the 
following: ``Notwithstanding the fact that I am not required to ask 
permission, I assure you that I will, in fact, ask the permission of 
the Congress before I use ground troops, if I make that decision.''
  That is exactly what I said. And then we got a letter from the 
President which said essentially that. My purpose was not relating to 
the Constitution. My purpose was trying to keep the House from doing 
the thing I found to be imprudent, because I was worried that if they 
passed the resolution, which in fact they have the authority to do--the 
Congress--it would send a message to Milosevic and others that we were 
unwilling to use ground troops if need be.
  The President was saying, ``I don't want ground troops now.'' So I 
said, ``The way to settle this, Mr. President, you don't have to give 
up what you think you're''--you may remember--I said, ``Mr. President, 
I think you do need authority from the Congress if you're going to send 
ground troops. But you don't have to give that up. You don't have to 
give up that legal argument. Say, `Notwithstanding the fact I, the 
President, don't think I need that, I promise you I will not introduce 
ground troops before I ask for your permission.' ''
  That is not a constitutional commitment he is making. It is a 
personal commitment he is making, as President.
  And my purpose, I say to my friend from Virginia, was to keep the 
House

[[Page 8091]]

from voting on that inappropriate resolution ahead of time, the very 
inappropriate resolution that the Congress introduced and passed. That 
is why.
  Mr. WARNER. To move this along, I want to pick up on a few words. You 
said, ``Mr. President, the way to settle this is to send a letter.''
  Mr. BIDEN. That is right.
  Mr. WARNER. Here is the letter.
  I ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                              The White House,

                                       Washington, April 28, 1999.
     Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
     Speaker, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: I appreciate the opportunity to continue 
     to consult closely with the Congress regarding events in 
     Kosovo.
       The unprecedented unity of the NATO Members is reflected in 
     our agreement at the recent summit to continue and intensify 
     the air campaign. Milosevic must not doubt the resolve of the 
     NATO alliance to prevail. I am confident we will do so 
     through use of air power.
       However, were I to change my policy with regard to the 
     introduction of ground forces, I can assure you that I would 
     fully consult with the Congress. Indeed, without regard to 
     our differing constitutional views on the use of force, I 
     would ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S. 
     ground forces into Kosovo into a non-permissive environment. 
     Milosevic can have no doubt about the resolve of the United 
     States to address the security threat to the Balkans and the 
     humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. The refugees must be allowed 
     to go home to a safe and secure environment.
           Sincerely,
                                                        Bill Clinton.  

  Mr. WARNER. He sent the letter. Why is that, then, the way to settle 
this as opposed----
  Mr. McCAIN. I have to call for the regular order here. The Senator 
from Virginia has 10 minutes, and the Senator from Oklahoma and others 
are waiting. So we have to proceed with the regular order.
  Mr. WARNER. Well, this is a time to do that, Senator. I think I am 
within my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona declines to yield 
further to the Senator from Delaware?
  Mr. McCAIN. I decline to yield.
  Mr. BIDEN. I am not seeking recognition.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. I will try and summarize.
  Mr. President, how much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator still has 11 minutes of the 
original 15 minutes remaining.
  Mr. WARNER. As a courtesy to the managers and the whip, I will not 
use all that time, but I would like to just finish our colloquy. 
Because I thought we were making a point, at least I felt very 
strongly, the President gave the assurances. And you said the way to 
settle this--and you wanted it for the House, the letter was sufficient 
for the House--why wouldn't this letter continue to be sufficient for 
the Senate? If it is sufficient for one body, it is sufficient for the 
other body. That is my point.
  Mr. BIDEN. Would the Senator like me to answer? I will try to do it 
quickly.
  Mr. WARNER. Put it on my time, Mr. President, so we do not interrupt 
the distinguished manager from Arizona.
  Mr. BIDEN. The House was trying to stop an action. The Senator from 
Arizona and I are trying to start an action. We are not asking for the 
President's permission. We are trying to encourage the President to use 
all the persuasion available to him with our NATO allies to let him, 
the President, know and our NATO allies know----
  Mr. WARNER. You are encroaching beyond the minute or two.
  Mr. BIDEN. That is my answer. They are trying to stop; we are trying 
to start. It is a different issue.
  Mr. WARNER. I simply say, with great respect to both you and Senator 
McCain, this does not grant the President of the United States one 
single bit of authority that he does not possess at this moment and 
that every President of the United States has possessed from the 
beginning of this great Republic. And, therefore, I fear that this 
could be a hollow message. It could be misunderstood, not only in the 
United States, but in the other 18 nations that are allied with us; my 
point being, the success thus far has been the ability--and, indeed, 
this President has been active, as have other heads of state--in 
keeping 19 nations solidly together to pursue this military action.
  And my concern is, if the Senate were to take a resolution like this, 
does that not say to the other nations, the 18, ``Well, go to your 
legislatures. And similarly, don't you have a responsibility comparable 
to what we have in the United States of America?''
  And, Senator, I say this respectfully to my colleague form Delaware, 
that other nations of that 18 group, their legislatures might well not 
act favorably on such a piece of legislation, and begin to start a 
fracturing of the solidarity of the NATO group.
  That is my great concern, Mr. President. Therefore, I feel that it is 
just most unwise. And I shall vote against it. I really salute the 
Senator from Arizona, as well as my colleague from Delaware, because I 
believe their steadfast stance on this gave backbone to NATO to begin 
to at least dust off the plans to look at the introduction of ground 
forces, both under a permissive and nonpermissive situation.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record remarks that I 
made as chairman of the Armed Services Committee when the Secretary of 
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs were before our committee, 
urging them to do just that.
  That was weeks ago, before and during the course of the summit the 
Secretary General announced they would take that step.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

      Statement of Senator Warner--Kosovo Hearing--April 15, 1999

       I start this morning by expressing my deepest regret for 
     the loss of innocent civilian lives--both Kosovar Albanian 
     and Serbian--in this conflict. I know our forces have done 
     their best to avoid such collatoral damage.
       I welcome our witnesses this morning and note that this is 
     the first public hearing before the Congress on the situation 
     in Kosovo since NATO began its military operation on March 
     24. I thank you, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton, for 
     your willingness to testify on this crucial issue.
       Since military operations began, the Armed Services 
     Committee has convened 5 closed briefings for Senators on 
     developments in Kosovo. I thank our witnesses for providing 
     officials to testify at those sessions. Today, the American 
     public will witness the first real public debate between 
     Administration officials and Members of Congress on this 
     issue. It is important that the American people have an 
     opportunity to see such an exchange of views. We have a duty 
     to keep our citizens well informed as our men and women in 
     uniform are in harms way.
       As we meet this morning, the NATO air operation against the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia--Operation Allied Force--is 
     entering its fourth week. I was, and continue to be, a 
     supporter of air strikes against Milosevic's military 
     machine. We must see this air campaign through.
       However, I have always believed that all options should 
     have been left on the table, including the planning necessary 
     to keep in place a ground option. By taking it off the table, 
     the wrong signal could have been sent to Milosevic.
       In the meantime, I believe that positioning NATO ground 
     forces in key locations on Yugoslavia's Serbian border--as is 
     being done now on a small scale--could limit Milosevic's 
     freedom in the disposition of his ground forces and, together 
     with the air campaign, force him to prepare for a possible 
     ground attack by NATO forces. NATO should begin now to move 
     heavy equipment into the region, within striking distance of 
     Yugoslavia, both to threaten Milosevic and to lend protection 
     to countries such as Albania which are now threatened by 
     Milosevic's troops. The decision to use NATO forces to attack 
     Yugoslav troops on the ground in Kosovo could be made later--
     but the deterrent effect of placing these forces in the 
     region would be, I believe, substantial.
       Since last September when I traveled to Kosovo and 
     Macedonia, I have advocated the use of U.S. ground troops in 
     Kosovo as a stabilizing force to allow the various 
     humanitarian organizations to assist the Kosovar Albanians 
     who, at that time, had been forced into the hills by the 
     brutal actions of Milosevic. And I supported the use of U.S. 
     ground troops to implement the peace agreement which was 
     under consideration at Rambouillet.

[[Page 8092]]

       There have been calls in Congress for a vote on legislation 
     authorizing the President to use ``all necessary means'' to 
     accomplish our objectives in Kosovo. The leadership of both 
     the Senate and the House have decided that such legislation 
     should not be considered this week. That gives all Members 
     the time to gather the necessary information on what it would 
     take to engage in a ground war against Yugoslavia. We need 
     the facts. What would be the basic parameters of such a 
     ground force--the size, type of forces and equipment 
     required, duration of the mission and exit strategy for such 
     an operation? A NATO assessment last summer estimated that it 
     might require 200,000 troops for NATO to fight its way into 
     Kosovo--and win. Is that estimate still valid, or has it 
     changed since the air strikes and Milosevic's intensive 
     military operations in Kosovo began? It is imperative for 
     Senators to have this information before we are called upon 
     to vote to authorize the use of ground troops against 
     Yugoslavia.
       It is my hope that we will continue to gather that vital 
     information today, for the Senate, for the American people.
       This hearing will also address future NATO strategy as we 
     approach the 50th anniversary Summit. In my view, the most 
     important issue to be discussed at that Summit is a revised 
     Strategic Concept for NATO--the document that spells out the 
     future Strategy and mission of the Alliance. I have recently 
     written to the President urging him NOT to adopt a final 
     version of a new Strategic Concept at the upcoming Summit in 
     Washington, given the uncertainty of events in Kosovo.
       The United States and our NATO allies will have many 
     ``lessons learned'' to assess from the Kosovo operation--
     lessons which will be a pivotal part of any future Strategic 
     Concept for NATO. If NATO is to continue to conduct such 
     ``out of area'' military operations in defense of ``common 
     interests'' in the future, we had better take the time to 
     carefully evaluate the Kosovo experience and incorporate the 
     ``lessons learned'' into any future strategy and doctrine for 
     the Alliance. NATO is simply too important for us to proceed 
     in haste on this key issue.

  Mr. WARNER. I am likewise concerned about consultation. The Senate 
and the House--the Congress--work very hard with this President, as 
they have with other Presidents, to get consultation on these key 
questions of our national security and foreign policy.
  Were we to pass this, coupled with what I predict will be a strong 
vote for the emergency supplemental, indeed, the President's advisers 
might say, ``We've got whatever we need now. Let's go about this. And 
we need not have the consultation.''
  We have had extensive consultation in the course of this very 
difficult military action, and that consultation has enabled this 
Senator--sometimes there were 30 other Members of Congress up with the 
President working in consultation for not just 15 or 20 minutes or a 
half-hour but hours on end.
  I commend the President for sitting there very patiently and entering 
into a strong colloquy and exchange of views throughout that 
consultation.
  We might well lose consultation. We will send out a message that 
could be misinterpreted. And, indeed, we could cast an affirmative 
responsibility on other legislatures which could cause a fracture and a 
breakdown of the 19 NATO nations standing together.
  So, Mr. President, I commend my two colleagues. This has been a good 
debate. It is going to go on for a while. We owe a great deal to both 
of you and others who wanted to have this debate. I think it has been a 
good one. I am pleased to have been a part of it.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank Senator Warner for his always 
insightful and well-thought-out debate and discussion. We appreciate 
his outstanding work as chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee.
  The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized for 20 minutes.
  Mr. NICKLES addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. NICKLES. I thank my friend and colleague, Senator McCain, for 
recognizing me, and I also compliment him for his leadership, although 
I oppose the resolution that is before us. I also wish to compliment 
Senator Warner for his comments. And I agree with his comments. I think 
we have had some good debate. I think it is an important debate.
  I have heard many things on both sides of the issues. I happen to 
concur with a lot of the statements that some of the proponents have 
made on this resolution. I just disagree with its conclusion. I think 
it is going to be interpreted, this resolution, as a blank check for 
the President to do whatever is necessary to win in Kosovo, whatever 
that means.
  ``If you win, you are going to own Kosovo.'' Are you going to occupy 
Kosovo? Maybe Kosovo is second prize; first prize will be Serbia. And 
then we get to run Serbia. I do not think we want to do that. I think 
it would be a mistake.
  I stated on the floor, prior to the bombing resolution, that I 
thought it was a mistake. And I think it really kind of resulted as a 
failure in diplomatic effort.
  As a matter of fact, I think the diplomatic mission in this area has 
been a disaster. Unfortunately, it has resulted in a humanitarian 
disaster.
  Mr. President, could we have order?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
  Mr. NICKLES. I thank the Chair.
  I want to go through a little bit of the chronology to show, at least 
in my opinion, how we got into the bombing campaign, because what this 
resolution is kind of implying is, well, the bombing campaign is not 
working. And we call it a campaign because the polls don't like the 
word ``war.''
  It is interesting, I was with some of our colleagues, and we went to 
the Kosovo region into the Balkans. We talked to our military planners. 
They use the word ``war.'' But the politicians do not use the word 
``war.'' It doesn't poll very well. People don't like war. So this is 
called an air campaign. This is a mission.
  I disagree with that terminology. How did we get into the air 
campaign? How did we get into this air war?
  I want to go through several statements, because, as I mentioned in 
my opening comment, I think this has been a diplomatic disaster that 
has led to a humanitarian disaster. It is not working, and some people 
are saying, let's double the ante again. Let's throw in troops now and 
then maybe we can win.
  I do not think that would be the result. I want to win, but I 
question, what is winning? Are we going to have a NATO presence, a U.S. 
presence in Kosovo forever? Are we going to go all the way into Serbia 
and occupy Belgrade and take Milosevic out and have him tried as a war 
criminal? He is a criminal. He is a thug. I have met with him. He 
doesn't tell the truth. He is responsible for a lot of serious 
atrocities, and he should be punished. But something tells me this body 
is not going to say, let's mount up 250,000 or 300,000 troops so we can 
invade Serbia and occupy Serbia and go door to door at the expense of 
that. So I just mention that.
  Let me go through a little chronology of how we got into the bombing 
campaign as classified by the State Department. Just to put this in 
context, we started bombing on March 24. The Senate voted on March 23.
  This is from the New York Times on February 19:

       As the deadline neared for a settlement in the Kosovo peace 
     talks, the military and diplomatic pressure mounted today on 
     President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia to choose between 
     tolerating NATO-led peacekeepers in Kosovo or suffering NATO 
     air strikes for refusing them.
       Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright said she had again 
     spelled out the choice in a telephone call to the Yugoslav 
     leader and that she would return Saturday to the talks, which 
     she visited last week.

  That was on February 19th. February 20th:

       President Clinton warned President Slobodan Milosevic of 
     Yugoslavia today not to ``stonewall'' a peace settlement in 
     Kosovo and threatened to bomb Serbia if Mr. Milosevic missed 
     the Saturday deadline for an end to the peace talks.

  So we are threatening bombing. ``Mr. Clinton said the two NATO 
allies''--in this case, he is talking about President Chirac of 
France--stood ``united in our determination to use force if Serbia 
fails to meet its previous commitment to withdraw forces from Kosovo 
and if it fails to accept the peace agreement.''
  I will talk about the peace agreement in a moment.
  He also says, this is President Clinton, ``I don't think there is an 
option other than NATO airstrikes.'' This was in the New York Times, 
February 20th.

[[Page 8093]]

  Also February 20th, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright says, at a 
press conference:

       Let me stress that we expect nothing less than a complete 
     interim agreement, including Belgrade's acceptance of a NATO-
     led force and a civilian mission building on OSCE's Kosovo 
     Verification Mission. Until the parties have accepted all 
     provisions of the agreement, preparations for NATO military 
     action will continue and if that agreement is not confirmed 
     by Tuesday, Secretary General Solana will draw the 
     appropriate conclusions.

  i.e., the bombing will begin. It is also interesting that on February 
21 she says, according to the New York Times, ``If this fails because 
both sides say `no,' there will be no bombing of Serbia.'' Mrs. 
Albright said that on February 21, as Rambouillet talks were winding 
down.
  It is also interesting to note that 2 days after Rambouillet ended, 
the European Union envoy to the talks, Mr. Petritsch, said, ``the 
Yugoslav President decided he was not going to accept NATO troops--and 
mustered his own forces and propaganda to prepare for this military 
showdown.''
  It is also interesting to note in this same article, it says, In a 
meeting with Italy's new Prime Minister in the Oval Office with the 
President on March 5, Mr. Clinton said Mr. Milosevic had ``accepted 
almost everything,'' according to Italian officials, except for the 
international peacekeeping force. I added that comment. That wasn't in 
the quote, but that is what he had not accepted.
  This individual was skeptical. He asked the President, what was the 
plan if there was no deal and NATO airstrikes failed to subdue the 
Serbian leader. The result, he said, would be 300,000 to 400,000 
refugees passing into Albania and crossing the Adriatic into Italy.
  ``What will happen then,'' Mr. D'Alema wanted to know, according to 
the Italian officials. Mr. Clinton looked at Mr. Berger for guidance; 
that is, Sandy Berger. ``NATO will keep bombing,'' Mr. Berger replied. 
After Rambouillet fell apart, a follow-up conference was called in 
Paris 3 weeks later. While the world waited, Mr. Milosevic continued to 
build up his forces in and around Kosovo.

       A defining moment came on March 18 at the International 
     Conference Center on the Avenue Kleber in Paris. To polite 
     applause, four ethnic Albanian delegates signed the peace 
     plan that would give their people broad autonomy for a three-
     year interim period. The Serbs did not sign. That paved the 
     way to airstrikes.
       Ms. Albright said that setting up a deal signed only by one 
     side was a crucial step forward. ``Signing Rambouillet was 
     crucial in getting Europeans two things,'' she said. 
     ``Getting them to agree to the use of force and getting the 
     Albanians on the side of this kind of a settlement.''

  February 23, this is, again, Secretary Albright talking about 
Rambouillet.

       Rambouillet talks to a close. The Kosovo Albanians have 
     requested two weeks for consideration. Belgrade must be ready 
     to move by then as well, or prepare to face the consequences. 
     This period of reflection should not be taken by either side 
     as an excuse for military activities on the ground. We're 
     particularly concerned by recent movements of Serb forces and 
     harassment of members of the Kosovo Verification Mission. The 
     mission's security must be assured, and there should be no 
     doubt that NATO's January 30th decision permitting Secretary 
     Solana to authorize airstrikes remains in force. We also call 
     on the Kosovo Liberation Army to refrain from provocations.

  So there is a 2- or 3-week period for the Kosovo representative to 
consider this negotiation.
  March 15, this is in the New York Times:

       A massacre in the Kosovo village of Racak of more than 40 
     ethnic Albanians by Serbian forces in January spurred the 
     current efforts of Ms. Albright to persuade NATO to authorize 
     air strikes against the Serbs if they reject a settlement.

  So there was a massacre, according to this press report, of 40 people 
who were killed in January. That led to this effort to use military 
force in a bombing campaign.
  March 18, again, this is Secretary Albright, State Department:

       So the situation is as clear as it could be. The Albanians 
     have said yes to the accords and the Serbs are saying no. At 
     the same time, Belgrade's security forces are stepping up 
     their unjustified and aggressive actions in Kosovo and if 
     Belgrade doesn't reverse course, the Serbs alone will be 
     responsible for the consequences.

  The war drums are rattling. This is March 19, a few days before the 
bombing commences. This is also in the New York Times.

       With the Kosovo talks at a dead end, and the Yugoslav 
     leader more recalcitrant than ever, the Clinton 
     Administration was publicly pushing the threat of airstrikes 
     today, but officials said they have no option but diplomacy, 
     at least for another week.
       Instead of responding to the threats, Mr. Milosevic has 
     moved in the opposite direction, building up his troops in 
     Kosovo to such an extent there are now deep concerns over 
     whether the 1,400 international monitors in Kosovo can leave 
     safely before his troops trap them by sealing their exit 
     route.

  Also in the same article it says, ``American military is warning that 
airstrikes may not be easy.''
  March 22, a couple of days before the bombing campaign begins.

       Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that Holbrooke 
     would warn Milosevic that the NATO allies are preparing 
     comprehensive missile and bombing strikes that could 
     devastate much of his military infrastructure. ``He will make 
     clear that Milosevic faces a stark choice: to halt aggression 
     against the Kosovar Albanians and accept an interim agreement 
     with a NATO-led implementation force, or bear the full 
     responsibility for NATO military action.''

  This is just a couple days before, the night before bombing began, on 
March 23, on Larry King's program. Mr. King asked Secretary Albright:

       Is there a timeframe here, Madam Secretary? Like you are 
     going to keep this up for 3, 4 days, let us know by Saturday? 
     Is there a plan?

  Secretary Albright:

       Well, again I am not going to reveal the operation time 
     line, this is a very well-thought-out military mission. I 
     think it would be a mistake. You wouldn't want me to give the 
     details here so that President Milosevic could hear 
     everything that is going on. But it is going to be a 
     sustained attack, and it is not going to go on for an overly 
     long time.

  Then she continues and says: ``No, I mean what we have said. 
Ambassador Holbrooke said to him''--talking about Milosevic--``he had 
an opportunity to accept accords signed by the Kosovar Albanians in 
Paris and have a peace agreement. He had an opportunity also to stop 
the fighting. Ambassador Holbrooke told him that if he did not do that, 
there would be very serious consequences. He has not accepted those two 
threshold objectives and, therefore, he knows there are now serious 
consequences.''

  The next day the bombing began. I might mention that Secretary 
Albright said, ``We are very well prepared. This is a well-thought-out 
campaign.'' I just take issue with that.
  I am not going to say I told you so, but on the debate we had on 
March 23, the day before the bombing campaign commenced, I made a 
speech. On the floor of the Senate, I urged colleagues to vote no 
because I said I was afraid it would be a mistake. I said--and history 
has proven--that bombing alone doesn't work. The President has said we 
are only going to bomb and not use ground troops. Then, I also said 
that I was afraid it might make things worse. Instead of stopping 
atrocities, it may turn a guerrilla war into an all-out war. I am 
afraid that is what has happened. I think we had a diplomatic failure 
and, as a result, now we have a humanitarian disaster, a catastrophe.
  I was in Kosovo a week or so ago with some colleagues and I saw some 
of these refugee camps. There are 600,000-plus people who are now 
outside of Kosovo, driven away from their homes--in my opinion, because 
of a diplomatic disaster. We turned a guerrilla war into a real war. We 
started the bombing campaign, and I stated this on the floor of the 
Senate before the bombing started. I said:

       Mr. Milosevic, instead of his response being to move back 
     into greater Serbia away from Kosovo, moving his forces out, 
     he may be more assertive and aggressive, and he may want to 
     strike out against the U.S. airplanes that are flying. He 
     might find that unsuccessful. He might have no success 
     against our pilots and our planes, but if he is not 
     successful against our planes, what can he be successful 
     against? Maybe the KLA, or maybe he would be more aggressive 
     in striking out where he can have results on the ground. So 
     by initiating the bombing instead of bringing stability, we 
     may bring instability. We may be igniting a tinderbox that 
     has been very, very explosive for a long time.


[[Page 8094]]


  I am afraid that is what happened. The bombing campaign has made 
things worse. I am afraid if we go in and say let's use all necessary 
force, send in 300,000 troops, we may make things worse. I don't want 
to compound a past mistake that was a mistake, in my opinion, 
diplomatically as well as a mistake now through the air campaign, and 
certainly has turned into a humanitarian disaster. I don't want to 
further compound that.
  Again, when I read the resolution it says to accomplish NATO 
objectives--we are going to use all necessary force and other means to 
accomplish United States and North Atlantic treaty objectives with the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
  I have the Rambouillet agreement. I wonder how many colleagues have 
read this thing. I urge you to do it. It is 44 pages.
  I am looking at some of the comments or statements made in this 
Rambouillet accord. They said, ``We negotiated and Mr. Milosevic would 
not sign this accord.'' I will read one paragraph. I brought this to 
the President's attention last week, and Secretary Albright said: Mr. 
Milosevic would not even talk to us about an international peacekeeping 
force. In one paragraph, we were insisting that if he didn't comply, we 
were going to bomb him. On page 41, paragraph 8 of the appendix B, it 
says this, talking about the NATO force--and some people say let's give 
NATO all necessary force. This is one of the things about which we said 
we are going to bomb you if you don't sign:

       NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, 
     vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted 
     passage and unimpeded access throughout the Federal Republic 
     of Yugoslavia, including associated airspace and territorial 
     waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right 
     of bivouac maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or 
     facilities as required for support, training, and operations.

  Basically, it says NATO gets to occupy not only Kosovo but Serbia as 
well. Isn't that interesting? I brought that to the President's 
attention. I don't know if he knew that was in there. I kind of doubt 
it. Secretary Albright almost acted taken aback. ``What are you doing 
reading the Rambouillet agreement?'' This is what we were saying he has 
to sign, or else ``we are going to bomb you.'' I think that is 
diplomacy failure. It has led to a bombing campaign. We threatened that 
we were going to bomb and now our credibility is at stake. I have heard 
that time and time again.
  I want NATO to be credible, but for crying out loud, when you are so 
arrogant to say here is our wisdom, here is this accord, we determined 
this is in your best interest and you must sign it or else we are going 
to bomb you--I stated in my speech on the bombing resolution that I 
don't think you can bomb a country into submission or into signing an 
agreement. I doubted then that Mr. Milosevic, after the bombs were 
going to fall, was going to raise the white flag and say: Now I see the 
wisdom. That didn't happen in Bosnia. It got his attention in Bosnia. 
In fact, the Croatian army was ethnically cleansing their own, and he 
was losing the war. He decided to be more interested in a peace 
agreement.
  I think Rambouillet was a diplomatic disaster and a failure and to 
say, OK, well, we tried to bomb them into agreeing to this, but I don't 
think that is going to work; maybe now we should use ground forces so 
they can sign onto NATO objectives. I think it is a mistake. What 
should we do? I don't want to just complain, but I think this is a 
disaster. If you had seen the refugee camps, you would know it is a 
disaster. There were several hundred thousand people. Senator McCain 
pointed out that it is not just the several hundred thousand people who 
are outside of Kosovo and Albania and Macedonia, but the hundreds of 
thousands who are displaced inside of Kosovo. What should we do? I have 
heard several people in the administration say that he must withdraw 
forces and accept this international peacekeeping force, and if he 
stops all the aggression, then we will stop the bombing.
  Mr. President, I think we need to have two or three things happen 
simultaneously. He needs to get his aggressive forces out. We need to 
have an international peacekeeping force to protect the returning 
refugees allowed back in. And simultaneously with that, we need to stop 
the bombing. We need to do all of them simultaneously.
  The big difference I can see going on now is the negotiation of who 
should compose the international peacekeeping force. I heard Secretary 
Cohen say, and I have read time and time again, that it must be NATO-
led or a NATO corps. They are talking about U.S. participation. I think 
our objective should not be so much just what is the composition of the 
peacekeepers; it should be to keep the Kosovars safe and sound and 
return them back to their homes. Those people are living in terrible 
conditions, living in tents. They have absolutely nothing to do. They 
are waiting hours to pick up food. They have to wait for a long time to 
use the restroom facilities--latrines would be a more accurate 
description. It is not a pretty sight.
  In the first place, I want to compliment many of the international 
relief agencies that are doing a miraculous job. They have a very 
difficult, if not impossible, job.
  Mr. President, I think we need a very aggressive diplomatic effort. I 
don't think this is a situation where one says, ``Well, let's just 
double up our military forces; well, if the bombing sorties''--and we 
are running so many thousands of these bombing sorties--``that is not 
working; let's throw in another three or four hundred planes, double up 
the bombing; let's get ready to have ground troop invasion into Kosovo, 
into Serbia.'' I don't think that is the solution. I think we need a 
diplomatic solution.
  I believe I heard Strobe Talbott, Under Secretary of State, yesterday 
say we are not negotiating. I almost fell off my chair when he said 
that. Obviously, Jesse Jackson did some negotiation. I want this 
administration to be negotiating. They need to be negotiating 
aggressively to save lives, to minimize the human disaster, the 
humanitarian disaster, the diplomatic disaster. Let's do everything we 
can to allow the Kosovars to return safely as soon as possible--
hopefully as soon as possible under the guise of an international 
peacekeeping force. And it can be with NATO participation. It can be 
U.N. led. It can be the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. But let's make it happen, and make it happen soon.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this resolution 
tomorrow.
  Again, my compliments to the sponsor of the resolution. I think this 
debate is important. He was requesting the debate, and I think we have 
had an excellent debate as well.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Congressional Record 
the text of the Rambouillet Agreement. It is 44 pages long.
  Consistent with the Standing Rules of the Senate, I ask unanimous 
consent that the text be printed in the Congressional Record. The cost 
of printing the text will total $3,758.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Rambouillet Agreement--Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government 
                               in Kosovo

       The Parties of the present Agreement,
       Convinced of the need for a peaceful and political solution 
     in Kosovo as a prerequisite for stability and democracy,
       Determined to establish a peaceful environment in Kosovo,
       Reaffirming their commitment to the Purposes and Principles 
     of the United Nations, as well as to OSCE principles, 
     including the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for 
     a new Europe,
       Recalling the commitment of the international community to 
     the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
     Republic of Yugoslavia,
       Recalling the basic Clements/principles adopted by the 
     Contact Group at its ministerial meeting in London on January 
     29, 1999,
       Recognizing the need for democratic self-government in 
     Kosovo, including full participation of the members of all 
     national communities in political decision-making,
       Desiring to ensure the protection of the human rights of 
     all persons in Kosovo, as well as the rights of the members 
     of all national communities, Recognizing the ongoing 
     contribution of the OSCE to peace and stability in Kosovo,

[[Page 8095]]

       Noting that the present Agreement has been concluded under 
     the auspices of the members of the Contact Group and the 
     European Union and undertaking with respect to these members 
     and the European Union to abide by this Agreement,
       Aware that full respect for the present Agreement will be 
     central for the development of relations with European 
     institutions,
       Have agreed as follows:

                               Framework

                         Article I: Principles

       1. All citizens in Kosovo shall enjoy, without 
     discrimination, the equal rights and freedoms set forth in 
     this Agreement.
       2. National communities and their members shall have 
     additional rights specified in Chapter 1. Kosovo, Federal, 
     and Republic authorities shall not interfere with the 
     exercise of these additional rights. The national communities 
     shall be legally equal as specified herein, and shall not use 
     their additional rights to endanger the rights of other 
     national communities or the rights of citizens, the 
     sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic 
     of Yugoslavia, or the functioning of representative 
     democratic government in Kosovo.
       3. All authorities in Kosovo shall fully respect human 
     rights, democracy, and the equality of citizens and national 
     communities.
       4. Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to democratic 
     self-government through legislative, executive, judicial, and 
     other institutions established in accordance with this 
     Agreement. They shall have the opportunity to be represented 
     in all institutions in Kosovo. The right to democratic self-
     government shall include the right to participate in free and 
     fair elections.
       5. Every person in Kosovo may have access to international 
     institutions for the protection of their rights in accordance 
     with the procedures of such institutions.
       6. The Parties accept that they will act only within their 
     powers and responsibilities in Kosovo as specified by this 
     Agreement. Acts outside those powers and responsibilities 
     shall be null and void. Kosovo shall have all rights and 
     powers set forth herein, including in particular as specified 
     in the Constitution at Chapter 1. This Agreement shall 
     prevail over any other legal provisions of the Parties and 
     shall be directly applicable. The Parties shall harmonize 
     their governing practices and documents with this Agreement.
       7. The Parties agree to cooperate fully with all 
     international organizations working in Kosovo on the 
     implementation of this Agreement.

                Article II: Confidence-Building Measures


                          End of Use of Force

       1. Use of force in Kosovo shall cease immediately. In 
     accordance with this Agreement, alleged violations of the 
     cease-fire shall be reported to international observers and 
     shall not be used to justify use of force in response.
       2. The status of police and security forces in Kosovo, 
     including withdrawal of forces, shall be governed by the 
     items of this Agreement. Paramilitary and irregular forces in 
     Kosovo are incompatible with the terms of this Agreement.


                                 Return

       3. The Parties recognize that all persons have the right to 
     return to their homes. Appropriate authorities shall take all 
     measures necessary to facilitate the safe return of persons, 
     including issuing necessary documents. All persons shall have 
     the right to reoccupy their real property, asset their 
     occupancy rights in state-owned property, and recover their 
     other property and personal possessions. The Parties shall 
     take all measures necessary to readmit returning persons to 
     Kosovo.
       4. The Parties shall cooperate fully with all efforts by 
     the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
     other international and non-governmental organizations 
     concerning the repatriation and return of persons, including 
     those organizations monitoring of the treatment of persons 
     following their return.


                  Access for International Assistance

       5. There shall be no impediments to the normal flow of 
     goods into Kosovo, including materials for the reconstruction 
     of homes and structures. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
     shall not require visas, customs, or licensing for persons or 
     things for the Implementation Mission (IM), the UNHCR, and 
     other international organizations, as well as for non-
     governmental organizations working in Kosovo as determined by 
     the Chief of the Implementation Mission (CIM).
       6. All staff, whether national or international, working 
     with international or non-governmental organizations 
     including with the Yugoslav Red Cross, shall be allowed 
     unrestricted access to the Kosovo population for purposes of 
     international assistance. All persons in Kosovo shall 
     similarly have safe, unhindered, and direct access to the 
     staff of such organizations.


                              other issues

       7. Federal organs shall not take any decisions that have a 
     differential, disproportionate, injurious, or discriminatory 
     effect on Kosovo. Such decisions, if any, shall be void with 
     regard to Kosovo.
       8. Martial law shall not be declared in Kosovo.
       9. The Parties shall immediately comply with all requests 
     for support from the Implementation Mission (IM). The IM 
     shall have its own broadcast frequencies for radio and 
     television programming in Kosovo. The Federal Republic of 
     Yugoslavia shall provide all necessary facilities, including 
     frequencies for radio communications, to all humanitarian 
     organizations responsible for delivering aid to Kosovo.


               detention of combatants and justice issues

       10. All abducted persons or other persons held without 
     charge shall be released. The Parties shall also release and 
     transfer in accordance with this Agreement all persons held 
     in connection with the conflict. The Parties shall cooperate 
     fully with the International Committee of the Red Cross 
     (ICRC) to facilitate its work in accordance with its mandate, 
     including ensuring full access to all such persons, 
     irrespective of their status, wherever they might be held, 
     for visits in accordance with the ICRC's standard operating 
     procedures.
       11. The Parties shall provide information, through tracing 
     mechanisms of the ICRC, to families of all persons who are 
     unaccounted for. The Parties shall cooperate fully with the 
     ICRC and the International Commission on Missing Persons in 
     their efforts to determine the identity, whereabouts, and 
     fate of those unaccounted for.
       12. Each Party:
       (a) shall not prosecute anyone for crimes related to the 
     conflict in Kosovo, except for persons accused of having 
     committed serious violations of international humanitarian 
     law. In order to facilitate transparency, the Parties shall 
     grant access to foreign experts (including forensics experts) 
     along with state investigators;
       (b) shall grant a general amnesty for all persons already 
     convicted of committing politically motivated crimes related 
     to the conflict in Kosovo. This amnesty shall not apply to 
     those properly convicted of committing serious violations of 
     international humanitarian law at a fair and open trial 
     conducted pursuant to international standards.
       13. All Parties shall comply with their obligation to 
     cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of serious 
     violations of international humanitarian law.
       (a) As required by United Nations Security Council 
     resolution 827 (1993) and subsequent resolutions, the Parties 
     shall fully cooperate with the International Criminal 
     Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in its investigations and 
     prosecutions, including complying with its requests for 
     assistance and its orders.
       (b) The Parties shall also allow complete, unimpeded, and 
     unfettered access to international experts--including 
     forensics experts and investigators to investigate 
     allegations of serious violations of international 
     humanitarian law.


                           independent media

       14. Recognizing the importance of free and independent 
     media for the development of a democratic political climate 
     necessary for the reconstruction and development of Kosovo, 
     the Parties shall ensure the widest possible press freedoms 
     in Kosovo in all media, public and private, including print, 
     television, radio, and Internet.

                               CHAPTER 1

                              Constitution

       Affirming their belief in a peaceful society, justice, 
     tolerance, and reconciliation,
       Resolved to ensure respect for human rights and the quality 
     of all citizens and national communities,
       Recognizing that the preservation and promotion of the 
     national, cultural, and linguistic identity of each national 
     community in Kosovo are necessary for the harmonious 
     development of a peaceful society,
       Desiring through this interim Constitution to establish 
     institutions of democratic self-government in Kosovo grounded 
     in respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
     the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and from this Agreement, 
     from which the authorities of governance set forth herein 
     originate,
       Recognizing that the institutions of Kosovo should fairly 
     represent the national communities in Kosovo and foster the 
     exercise of their rights and those of their members,
       Recalling and endorsing the principles/basic elements 
     adopted by the Contact Group at its ministerial meeting in 
     London on January 29, 1999,

     Article I: Principles of Democratic Self-Government in Kosovo

       1. Kosovo shall govern itself democratically through the 
     legislative, executive, judicial, and other organs and 
     institutions specified herein. Organs and institutions of 
     Kosovo shall exercise their authorities consistent with the 
     terms of this Agreement.
       2. All authorities in Kosovo shall fully respect human 
     rights, democracy, and the equality of citizens and national 
     communities.
       3. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has competence in 
     Kosovo over the following areas, except as specified 
     elsewhere in this Agreement: (a) territorial integrity, (b) 
     maintaining a common market within the

[[Page 8096]]

     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which power shall be 
     exercised in a manner tat does not discriminate against 
     Kosovo, (c) monetary policy, (d) defense, (e) foreign policy, 
     (f) customs services, (g) federal taxation, (h) federal 
     elections, and (i) other areas specified in this Agreement.
       4. The Republic of Serbia shall have competence in Kosovo 
     as specified in this Agreement, including in relation to 
     Republic elections.
       5. Citizens in Kosovo may continue to participate in areas 
     in which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic 
     of Serbia have competence through their representation in 
     relevant institutions, without prejudice to the exercise of 
     competence by Kosovo authorities set forth in this Agreement.
       6. With respect to Kosovo:
       (a) There shall be no changes to the borders of Kosovo;
       (b) Deployment and use of police and security forces shall 
     be governed by Chapters 2 and 7 of this Agreement; and
       (c) Kosovo shall have authority to conduct foreign 
     relations within its areas of responsibility equivalent to 
     the power provided to Republics under Article 7 of the 
     Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
       7. There shall be no interference with the right of 
     citizens and national communities in Kosovo to call upon 
     appropriate institutions of the Republic of Serbia for the 
     following purposes:
       (a) assistance in designing school curricula and standards;
       (b) participation in social benefits programs, such as care 
     for war veterans, pensioners, and disabled persons; and
       (c) other voluntarily received services, provided that 
     these services are not related to police and security matters 
     governed by Chapters 2 and 7 of this Agreement, and that any 
     Republic personnel serving in Kosovo pursuant to this 
     paragraph shall be unarmed service providers acting at the 
     invitation of a national community in Kosovo.
       The Republic shall have the authority to levy taxes or 
     charges on those citizens requesting services pursuant to 
     this paragraph, as necessary to support the provision of such 
     services.
       8. The basic territorial unit of local self-government in 
     Kosovo shall be the commune. All responsibilities in Kosovo 
     not expressly assigned elsewhere shall be the responsibility 
     of the communes.
       9. To preserve and promote democratic self-government in 
     Kosovo, all candidates for appointed, elective, or other 
     public office, and all office holders, shall meet the 
     following criteria:
       (a) No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the 
     International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
     and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who 
     has failed to comply with an order to appear before the 
     Tribunal, may stand as a candidate or hold any office; and
       (b) All candidates and office holders shall renounce 
     violence as a mechanism for achieving political goals; past 
     political or resistance activities shall not be a bar to 
     holding office in Kosovo.

                        Article II; The Assembly


                                General

       1. Kosovo shall have an Assembly, which shall be comprised 
     of 120 Members.
       (a) Eighty Members shall be directly elected.
       (b) A further 40 Members shall be elected by the members of 
     qualifying national communities.
       (i) Communities whose members constitute more than 0.5 per 
     cent of the Kosovo population but less than 5 per cent shall 
     have ten of these seats, to be divided among them in 
     accordance with their proportion of the overall population.
       (ii) Communities whose members constitute more than 5 per 
     cent of the Kosovo population shall divide the remaining 
     thirty seat equally. The Serb and Albanian national 
     communities shall be presumed to meet the 5 per cent 
     population threshold.


                            Other Provisions

       2. Elections for all Members shall be conducted 
     democratically, consistent with the provisions of Chapter 3 
     of this Agreement. Members shall be elected for a term of 
     three years.
       3. Allocation of seats in the Assembly shall be based on 
     data gathered in the census referred to in Chapter 5 of this 
     Agreement. Prior to the completion of the census, for 
     purposes of this Article declarations of national community 
     membership made during voter registration shall be used to 
     determine the percentage of the Kosovo population that each 
     national community represents.
       4. Members of the Assembly shall be immune from all civil 
     or criminal proceedings on the basis of words expressed or 
     other acts performed in their capacity as Members of the 
     Assembly.


                         Powers of the Assembly

       5. The Assembly shall be responsible for enacting laws of 
     Kosovo, including in political, security, economic, social, 
     educational, scientific, and cultural areas as set out below 
     and elsewhere in this Agreement. This Constitution and the 
     laws of the Kosovo Assembly shall not be subject to change or 
     modification by authorities of the Republic or the 
     Federation.
       (a) The Assembly shall be responsible for:
       (i) Financing activities of Kosovo institutions, including 
     by levying taxes and duties on sources within Kosovo;
       (ii) Adopting budgets of the Administrative organs and 
     other institutions of Kosovo, with the exception of communal 
     and national community institutions unless otherwise 
     specified herein;
       (iii) Adopting regulations concerning the organization and 
     procedures of the Administrative Organs of Kosovo;
       (iv) Approving the list of Ministers of the Government, 
     including the Prime Minister;
       (v) Coordinating educational arrangements in Kosovo, with 
     respect for the authorities of national communities and 
     Communes;
       (vi) Electing candidates for judicial office put forward by 
     the President of Kosovo;
       (vii) Enacting laws ensuring free movement of goods, 
     services, and persons in Kosovo consistent with this 
     Agreement;
       (viii) Approving agreements concluded by the President 
     within the areas of responsibility of Kosovo;
       (ix) Cooperating with the Federal Assembly, and with the 
     Assemblies of the Republics, and conducting relations with 
     foreign legislative bodies;
       (x) Establishing a framework for local self-government;
       (xi) Enacting laws concerning inter-communal issues and 
     relations between national communities, when necessary;
       (xii) Enacting laws regulating the work of medical 
     institutions and hospitals;
       (xiii) Protecting the environment, where inter-communal 
     issues are involved;
       (xiv) Adopting programs of economic, scientific, 
     technological, demographic, regional, and social development, 
     as well as urban planning;
       (xv) Adopting programs for the development of agriculture 
     and of rural areas;
       (xvi) Regulating elections consistent with Chapters 3 and 
     5;
       (xvii) Regulating Kosovo-owned property; and
       (xviii) Regulating land registries.
       (b) The Assembly shall also have authority to enact laws in 
     areas within the responsibility of the Communes if the matter 
     cannot be effectively regulated by the Communes or if 
     regulation by individual Communes might prejudice the rights 
     of other Communes. In the absence of a law enacted by the 
     Assembly under this subparagraph that preempts communal 
     action, the Communes shall retain their authority.


                               procedure

       6. Laws and other decisions of the Assembly shall be 
     adopted by majority of Members present and voting.
       7. A majority of the Members of a single national community 
     elected to the Assembly pursuant to paragraph 1(b) may adopt 
     a motion that a law or other decision adversely affects the 
     vital interests of their national community. The challenged 
     law or decision shall be suspended with regard to that 
     national community until the dispute settlement procedure in 
     paragraph 8 is completed.
       8. The following procedure shall be used in the event of a 
     motion under paragraph 7:
       (a) The Members making the vital interest motion shall give 
     reasons for their motion. The proposers of the legislation 
     shall be given an opportunity to respond.
       (b) The Members making the motion shall appoint within one 
     day a mediator of their choice to assist in reaching an 
     agreement with those proposing the legislation.
       (c) If mediation does not produce an agreement within seven 
     days, the matter may be submitted for a binding ruling. The 
     decision shall be rendered by a panel comprising three 
     Members of the Assembly: one Albanian and one Serb, each 
     appointed by his or her national community delegation; and a 
     third Member, who will be of a third nationality and will be 
     selected within two days by consensus of the Presidency of 
     the Assembly.
       (i) A vital interest motion shall be upheld if the 
     legislation challenged adversely affects the community's 
     fundamental constitutional rights, additional rights as set 
     forth in Article VII, or the principle of fair treatment.
       (ii) If the motion is not upheld, the challenged 
     legislation shall enter into force for that community.
       (d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply to the selection of 
     Assembly officials.
       (e) The Assembly may exclude other decisions from this 
     procedure by means of a law enacted by a majority that 
     includes a majority of each national community elected 
     pursuant to paragraph 1(b).
       9. A majority of the Members shall constitute a quorum. the 
     Assembly shall otherwise decide its own rules of procedure.


                               leadership

       10. The Assembly shall elect from among its Members a 
     Presidency, which shall consist of a President, two Vice-
     Presidents, and other leaders in accordance with the 
     Assembly's rules of procedure. Each national community 
     meeting the threshold specified in paragraph 1(b)(ii) shall 
     be represented in the leadership. the President of the 
     Assembly shall not be from the same national community as the 
     President of Kosovo.
       The President of the Assembly shall represent it, call its 
     sessions to order, chair its meetings, coordinate the work of 
     any committees it may establish, and perform other tasks 
     prescribed by the rules of procedure of the Assembly.

[[Page 8097]]



                    Article III: President of Kosovo

       1. There shall be a President of Kosovo, who shall be 
     elected by the Assembly by vote of a majority of its Members. 
     The President of Kosovo shall serve for a three-year term. No 
     person may serve more than two terms as President of Kosovo.
       2. The President of Kosovo shall be responsible for:
       (i) Representing Kosovo, including before any international 
     or Federal body or any body of the Republics;
       (ii) Proposing to the Assembly candidates for Prime 
     Minister, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and 
     other Kosovo judicial offices;
       (iii) Meeting regularly with the democratically elected 
     representatives of the national communities;
       (iv) Conducting foreign relations and concluding agreements 
     within this power consistent with the authorities of Kosovo 
     institutions under this Agreement. Such agreements shall only 
     enter into force upon approval by the Assembly;
       (v) Designating a representative to serve on the Joint 
     Commission established by Article 1.2 of Chapter 5 of this 
     Agreement;
       (vi) Meeting regularly with the Federal and Republic 
     Presidents; and
       (vii) Other functions specified herein or by law.

            Article IV: Government and Administrative Organs

       1. Executive power shall be exercised by the Government. 
     The Government shall be responsible for implementing the laws 
     of Kosovo, and of other government authorities when such 
     responsibilities are devolved by those authorities. The 
     Government shall also have competence to propose laws to the 
     Assembly.
       (a) The Government shall consist of a Prime Minister and 
     Ministers, including at least one person from each national 
     community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph 
     1(b)(ii) of Article II. Ministers shall head the 
     Administrative Organs of Kosovo.
       (b) The candidate for Prime Minister proposed by the 
     President shall put forward a list of Ministers to the 
     Assembly. The Prime Minister, together with the list of 
     Ministers, shall be approved by the majority of those present 
     and voting in the Assembly. In the event that the Prime 
     Minister is not able to obtain a majority for the Government, 
     the President shall propose a new candidate for Prime 
     Minister within ten days.
       (c) The Government shall resign if a no confidence motion 
     is adopted by a vote of a majority of the members of the 
     Assembly. If the Prime Minster or the Government resigns, the 
     President shall select a new candidate for Prime Minister who 
     shall seek to form a Government.
       (d) The Prime Minister shall call meetings of the 
     Government, represent it as appropriate, and coordinate its 
     work. Decisions of the Government shall require a majority of 
     Ministers present and voting. The Prime Minister shall cast 
     the deciding vote in the event Ministers are equally divided. 
     The Government shall otherwise decide its own rules of 
     procedure.
       2. Administrative Organs shall be responsible for assisting 
     the Government in carrying out its duties.
       (a) National communities shall be fairly represented at all 
     levels in the Administrative Organs.
       (b) Any citizen in Kosovo claiming to have been directly 
     and adversely affected by the decision of an executive or 
     administrative body shall have the right to judicial review 
     of the legality of that decision that exhausting all avenues 
     for administrative review. The Assembly shall enact a law to 
     regulate this review.
       3. There shall be a Chief Prosecutor who shall be 
     responsible for prosecuting individuals who violate the 
     criminal laws of Kosovo. He shall head an Office of the 
     Prosecutor, which shall at all levels have staff 
     representative of the population of Kosovo.

                          Article V: Judiciary


                                General

       1. Kosovo shall have a Constitutional Court, a Supreme 
     Court, District Courts, and Communal Courts.
       2. The Kosovo courts shall have juridiction over all 
     matters arising under this Constitution or the laws of Kosovo 
     except as specified in paragraph 3. The Kosovo courts shall 
     also have jurisdiction over questions of federal law, subject 
     to appeal to the Federal courts on these questions after all 
     appeals available under the Kosovo system have been 
     exhausted.
       3. Citizens in Kosovo may opt to have civil disputes to 
     which they are party adjudicated by other courts in the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which shall apply the law 
     applicable in Kosovo.
       4. The following rules will apply to criminal cases:
       (a) At the start of criminal proceedings, the defendant is 
     entitled to have his or her trial transferred to another 
     Kosovo court that he or she designates.
       (b) In criminal cases in which all defendants and victims 
     are members of the same national community, all members of 
     the judicial council will be from a national community of 
     their choice if any party so requests.
       (c) A defendant in a criminal case tried in Kosovo courts 
     is entitled to have at least one member of the judicial 
     council hearing the case to be from his or her national 
     community. Kosovo authorities will consider and allow judges 
     of other courts in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to 
     serve as Kosovo judges for these purposes.


                          Constitutional Court

       5. The Constitutional Court shall consist of nine judges. 
     There shall be at least one Constitutional Court judge from 
     each national community meeting the threshold specified in 
     paragraph 1(b)(ii) of Article II. Until such time as the 
     Parties agree to discontinue this arrangement, 5 judges of 
     the Constitutional Court shall be selected from a list drawn 
     up by the President of the European Court of Human Rights.
       6. The Constitutional Court shall have authority to resolve 
     disputes relating to the meaning of this Constitution. That 
     authority shall include, but is not limited to, determining 
     whether laws applicable in Kosovo, decisions or acts of the 
     President, the Assembly, the Government, the Communes, and 
     the national communities are compatible with this 
     Constitution.
       (a) Matters may be referred to the Constitutional Court by 
     the President of Kosovo, the President or Vice-Presidents of 
     the Assembly, the Ombudsman, the communal assemblies and 
     councils, and any national community acting according to the 
     democratic procedures.
       (b) Any court which finds in the course of adjudicating a 
     matter that the dispute depends on the answer to a question 
     within the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction shall refer 
     the issue to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary 
     decision.
       7. Following the exhaustion of other legal remedies, the 
     Constitutional Court shall at the request of any person 
     claiming to be victim have jurisdiction over complaints that 
     human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rights of 
     members of national communities set forth in this 
     Constitution have been violated by a public authority.
       8. The Constitutional Court shall have such other 
     jurisdiction as may be specified elsewhere in this Agreement 
     or by law.


                             Supreme Court

       9. The Supreme Court shall consist of nine judges. There 
     shall be at least one Suprme Court judge from each national 
     community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph 
     1(b)(ii) of Article II.
       10. The Supreme Court shall hear appeals from the District 
     Courts and the Communal Courts. Except as otherwise provided 
     in this Constitution, The Supreme Court shall be the court of 
     final appeal for all cases arising under law applicable in 
     Kosovo. Its decisions shall be recognized and executed by all 
     authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.


                       functioning of the courts

       11. The Assembly shall determine the number of District and 
     Communal Court judges necessary to meet current needs.
       12. Judges of all courts in Kosovo shall be distinguished 
     jurists of the highest moral character. They shall be broadly 
     representative of the national communities of Kosovo.
       13. Removal of a Kosovo judge shall require the consensus 
     of the judges of the Constitutional Court. A Constitutional 
     Court judge whose removal is in question shall not 
     participate in the decision on his case.
       14. The Constitutional Court shall adopt rules for itself 
     and for other courts in Kosovo. The Constitutional and 
     Supreme Courts shall each adopt decisions by majority vote of 
     their members.
       15. Except as otherwise specified in their rules, all 
     Kosovo courts shall hold public proceedings. They shall issue 
     published opinions setting forth the reasons for their 
     decisions.

           Article VI: Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

       1. All authorities in Kosovo shall ensure internationally 
     recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms.
       2. The right and freedoms set forth in the European 
     Convention for the Protection of Human Right and Fundamental 
     Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Kosovo. 
     Other internationally recognized human rights instruments 
     enacted into law by the Kosovo Assembly shall also apply. 
     These rights and freedoms shall have priority over all other 
     law.
       3. All courts, agencies, governmental institutions, and 
     other pubic institutions of Kosovo or operating in relation 
     to Kosovo shall conform to these human rights and fundamental 
     freedoms.

                   Article VII: National Communities

       1. National communities and their members shall have 
     additional rights as set forth below in order to preserve and 
     express their national, cultural, religious, and linguistic 
     identities in accordance with international standards and the 
     Helsinki Final Act. Such rights shall be exercised in 
     conformity with human rights and fundamental freedoms.
       2. Each national community may elect, through democratic 
     means and in a manner consistent with the principles of 
     Chapter 3 of this Agreement, institutions to administer its 
     affairs in Kosovo.

[[Page 8098]]


       3. The national communities shall be subject to the laws 
     applicable in Kosovo, provided that any act or decision 
     concerning national communities must be non-discriminatory. 
     The Assembly shall decide upon a procedure for resolving 
     disputes between national communities.
       4. The additional rights of the national communities, 
     acting through their democratically elected institutions, are 
     to:
       (a) preserve and protect their national, cultural, 
     religious, and linguistic identities, including by:
       (i) inscribing local names of towns and villages, of 
     squares and streets, and of other topographic names in the 
     language and alphabet of the national community in addition 
     to signs in Albanian and Serbia, consistent with decisions 
     about style made by the communal institutions;
       (ii) providing information in the language and alphabet of 
     the national community;
       (iii) providing for education and establishing educational 
     institutions, in particular for schooling in their own 
     language and alphabet and in national culture and history, 
     for which relevant authorities will provide financial 
     assistance; curricula shall reflect a spirit of tolerance 
     between national communities and respect for the rights of 
     members of all national communities in accordance with 
     international standards;
       (iv) enjoying unhindered contacts with representatives of 
     their respective national communities, within the Federal 
     Republic of Yugoslavia and abroad;
       (v) using and displaying national symbols, including 
     symbols of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
     Republic of Serbia;
       (vi) protecting national traditions on family law by, if 
     the community decides, arranging rules in the field of 
     inheritance; family and matrimonial relations; tutorship; and 
     adoption;
       (vii) the preservation of sites of religious, historical, 
     or cultural importance to the national community in 
     cooperation with other authorities;
       (viii) implementing public health and social services on a 
     non-discriminatory basis as to citizens and national 
     communities;
       (ix) operating religious institutions in cooperation with 
     religious authorities; and
       (x) participating in regional and international non-
     governmental organizations in accordance with procedures of 
     these organizations;
       (b) be guaranteed access to, and representation in, public 
     broadcast media, including provisions for separate 
     programming in relevant languages under the direction of 
     those nominated by the respective national community on a 
     fair and equitable basis; and
       (c) finance their activities by collecting contributions 
     the national communities may decided to levy on members of 
     their own communities.
       5. Members of national communities shall also be 
     individually guaranteed:
       (a) the right to enjoy unhindered contacts with members of 
     their respective national communities elsewhere in the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and abroad;
       (b) equal access to employment in public services at all 
     levels;
       (c) the right to use their languages and alphabets;
       (d) the right to use and display national community 
     symbols;
       (e) the right to participate in democratic institutions 
     that will determine the national community's exercise of the 
     collective rights set forth in this Article; and
       (f) the right to establish cultural and religious 
     association, for which relevant authorities will provide 
     financial assistance.
       (6) Each national community and, where appropriate, their 
     members acting individually may exercise these additional 
     rights through Federal institutions and institutions of the 
     Republics, in accordance with the procedures of those 
     institutions and without prejudice to the ability of Kosovo 
     institutions to carry out their responsibilities.
       7. Every person shall have the right freely to choose to be 
     treated or not to be treated as belonging to a national 
     community, and no disadvantage shall result from that choice 
     or from the exercise of the rights connected to that choice.

                         Article VIII: Communes

       1. Kosovo shall have the existing communes. Changes may be 
     made to communal boundaries by act of the Kosovo Assembly 
     after consultation with the authorities of the communes 
     concerned.
       2. Communes may develop relationships among themselves for 
     their mutual benefit.
       3. Each commune shall have an Assembly, and Executive 
     Council, and such administrative bodies as the commune may 
     establish.
       (a) Each national community whose membership constitutes at 
     least three percent of the population of the commune shall be 
     represented on the Council in proportion to its share of the 
     communal population or by one member, whichever is greater.
       (b) Prior to the completion of a census, disputes over 
     communal population percentages for purposes of this 
     paragraph shall be resolved by reference to declarations of 
     national community membership in the voter registry.
       4. The communes shall have responsibility for:
       (a) law enforcement, as specified in Chapter 2 of this 
     Agreement;
       (b) regulating and, when appropriate, providing child care;
       (c) providing education, consistent with the rights and 
     duties of national communities, and in a spirit of tolerance 
     between national communities and respect for the rights of 
     the members of all national communities in accordance with 
     international standards;
       (d) protecting the communal environment;
       (e) regulating commerce and privately-owned stores;
       (f) regulating hunting and fishing;
       (g) planning and carrying out public works of communal 
     importance, including roads and water supplies, and 
     participating in the planning and carrying out of Kosovo-wide 
     public works projects in coordination with other communes and 
     Kosovo authorities;
       (h) regulating land use, town planning, building 
     regulations, and housing construction;
       (i) developing programs for tourism, the hotel industry, 
     catering, and sport;
       (j) organizing fairs and local markets;
       (k) organizing public services of communal importance, 
     including fire, emergency response, and police consistent 
     with Chapter 2 of this Agreement; and
       (l) financing the work of communal institutions, including 
     raising revenues, taxes and preparing budgets.
       5. The communes shall also have responsibility for all 
     other areas within Kosovo's authority not expressly assigned 
     elsewhere herein, subject to the provisions of Article 
     II.5(b) of this Constitution.
       6. Each commune shall conduct its business in public and 
     shall maintain publicly available records of its 
     deliberations and decisions.

                       Article IX: Representation

       1. Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to participate 
     in the election of:
       (a) At least 10 deputies in the House of Citizens of the 
     Federal Assembly; and
       (b) At least 20 deputies in the National Assembly of the 
     Republic of Serbia.
       2. The modalities of elections for the deputies specified 
     in paragraph 1 shall be determined by the Federal Republic of 
     Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia respectively, under 
     procedures to be agreed with the Chief of the Implementation 
     Mission.
       3. The Assembly shall have the opportunity to present to 
     the appropriate authorities a list of candidates from which 
     shall be drawn:
       (a) At least one citizen in Kosovo to serve in the Federal 
     Government, and at least one citizen in Kosovo to serve in 
     the Government of the Republic of Serbia; and
       (b) At least one judge on the Federal Constitutional Court, 
     one judge on the Federal Court, and three judges on the 
     Supreme Court of Serbia.

                          Article X: Amendment

       1. The Assembly may by a majority of two-thirds of its 
     Members, which majority must include a majority of the 
     Members elected from each national community pursuant to 
     Article II.1(b)(ii), adopt amendments to this Constitution.
       2. There shall, however, be no amendments to Article I.3-8 
     or to this Article, nor shall any amendment diminish the 
     rights granted by Articles VI and VII.

                      Article XI: Entry into Force

       This Constitution shall enter into force upon signature of 
     this Agreement.

                               CHAPTER 2

                    Police and Civil Public Security

                     Article I: general Principles

       1. All law enforcement agencies, organizations and 
     personnel of the Parties, which for purposes of this Chapter 
     will include customs and border police operating in Kosovo, 
     shall act in compliance with this Agreement and shall observe 
     internationally recognized standards of human rights and due 
     process. In exercising their functions, law enforcement 
     personnel shall not discriminate on any ground, such as sex, 
     race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
     national or social origin, association with a national 
     community, property, birth or other status.
       2. The Parties invite the Organization for Security and 
     Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) through its Implementation 
     Mission (IM) to monitor and supervise implementation of this 
     Chapter and related provisions of this Agreement. The Chief 
     of the Implementation Mission (CIM) or his designee shall 
     have the authority to issue binding directives to the Parties 
     and subsidiary bodies on police and civil public security 
     matters to obtain compliance by the Parties with the terms of 
     this Chapter. The Parties agree to cooperate fully with the 
     IM and to comply with its directives. Personnel assigned to 
     police-related duties within the IM shall be permitted to 
     wear a uniform while serving in this part of the mission.
       3. In carrying out his responsibilities, the CIM will 
     inform and consult KFOR as appropriate.
       4. The IM shall have the authority to:
       (a) Monitor, observe, and inspect law enforcement 
     activities, personnel, and facilities, including border 
     police and customs units, as well as associated judicial 
     organizations, structures, and proceedings;
       (b) Advise law enforcement personnel and forces, including 
     border police and customs units, and, when necessary to bring 
     them

[[Page 8099]]

     into compliance with this Agreement, including this Chapter, 
     issue appropriate binding directions in coordination with 
     KFOR;
       (c) Participate in and guide the training of law 
     enforcement personnel;
       (d) In coordination with KFOR, assess threats to public 
     order;
       (e) Advise and provide guidance to governmental authorities 
     on how to deal with threats to public order and on the 
     organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies;
       (f) Accompany the Parties' law enforcement personnel as 
     they carry out their responsibilities, as the IM deems 
     appropriate;
       (g) Dismiss or discipline public security personnel of the 
     Parties for cause; and
       (h) Request appropriate law enforcement support from the 
     international community to enable IM to carry out the duties 
     assigned in this Chapter.
       5. All Kosovo, Republic and Federal law enforcement and 
     Federal military authorities shall be obligated, in their 
     respective areas of authority, to ensure freedom of movement 
     and safe passage for all persons, vehicles and goods. This 
     obligation includes a duty to permit the unobstructed passage 
     into Kosovo of police equipment which has been approved by 
     the CIM and COMKFOR for use by Kosovo police, and of any 
     other support provided under subparagraph 4(h) above.
       6. The Parties undertake to provide one another mutual 
     assistance, when requested, in the surrender of those accused 
     of committing criminal acts within a Party's jurisdiction, 
     and in the investigation and prosecution of offenses across 
     the boundary of Kosovo with other parts of the FRY. The 
     Parties shall develop agreed procedures and mechanisms for 
     responding to these requests. The CIM or his designee shall 
     resolve disputes on these matters.
       7. The IM shall aim to transfer law enforcement 
     responsibilities described in Article II below to the law 
     enforcement officials and organizations described in Article 
     II at the earliest practical time consistent with civil 
     public security.

                      Article II: Communal Police

       1. As they build up, communal police units, organized and 
     stationed at the communal and municipal levels, shall assume 
     primary responsibility for law enforcement in Kosovo. The 
     specific responsibilities of the communal police will include 
     police patrols and crime prevention, criminal investigations, 
     arrest and detention of criminal suspects, crowd control, and 
     traffic control.
       2. Number and Composition. The total number of communal 
     police established by this Agreement operating within Kosovo 
     shall not exceed 3,000 active duty law enforcement officers. 
     However, the CIM shall have the authority to increase or 
     decrease this personnel ceiling if he determines such action 
     is necessary to meet operational needs. Prior to taking any 
     such action, the CIM shall consult with the Criminal Justice 
     Administration and other officials as appropriate. The 
     national communities in each commune shall be fairly 
     represented in the communal police unit.
       3. Criminal Justice Administration.
       a. A Criminal Justice Administration (CJA) shall be 
     established. It shall be an Administrative Organ of Kosovo, 
     reporting to an appropriate member of the Government of 
     Kosovo as determined by the Government. The CJA shall provide 
     general coordination of law enforcement operations in Kosovo. 
     Specific functions of the CJA shall include general 
     supervision over, and providing guidance to, communal police 
     forces through their commanders, assisting in the 
     coordination between separate communal police forces, and 
     oversight of the operations of the police academy. In 
     carrying out these responsibilities, the CJA may issue 
     directives, which shall be binding on communal police 
     commanders and personnel. In the exercise of its functions, 
     the CJA shall be subject to any directions given by CIM.
       b. Within twelve months of the establishment of the CJA, 
     the CJA shall submit for review by the CIM a plan for the 
     coordination and development of law enforcement bodies and 
     personnel in Kosovo within its jurisdiction. This plan shall 
     serve as the framework for law enforcement coordination and 
     development in Kosovo and be subject to modification by the 
     CIM.
       c. The IM will endeavor to develop the capacities of the 
     CJA as quickly as possible. Prior to the point when the CJA 
     is able to properly carry out the functions described in the 
     preceding paragraph, as determined by the CIM, the IM shall 
     carry out these functions.
       4. Communal Commanders. Subject to review by the CIM, each 
     commune will appoint, and may remove for cause, by majority 
     vote of the communal council, a communal police commander 
     with responsibility for police operations within the commune.
       5. Service in Police.
       (a) Recruitment for public security personnel will be 
     conducted primarily at the local level. Local and communal 
     governments, upon consultation with communal Criminal Justice 
     Commissions, will nominate officer candidates to attend the 
     Kosovo Police Academy. Offers of employment will be made by 
     communal police commanders, with the concurrence of the 
     academy director, only after the candidate has successfully 
     completed the academy basic recruit course.
       (b) Recruitment, selection and training of communal police 
     officers shall be conducted under the direction of the IM 
     during the period of its operation.
       (c) There shall be no bar to service in the communal police 
     based on prior political activities. Members of the police 
     shall not, however, be permitted while they hold this public 
     office to participate in party political activities other 
     than membership in such a party.
       (d) Continued service in the police is dependent upon 
     behavior consistent with the terms of this Agreement, 
     including this Chapter. The IM shall supervise regular 
     reviews of officer performance, which shall be conducted in 
     accordance with international due process norms.
       6. Uniforms and Equipment.
       (a) All communal police officers, with the exception of 
     officers participating in crowd control functions, shall wear 
     a standard uniform. Uniforms shall include a badge, picture 
     identification, and name tag.
       (b) Communal police officers may be equipped with a 
     sidearm, handcuffs, a baton, and a radio.
       (c) Subject to authorization or modification by the CIM, 
     each commune may maintain, either at the communal 
     headquarters or at municipal stations, no more than one long-
     barreled weapon not to exceed 7.62 mm for every fifteen 
     police officers assigned to the commune. Each such weapon 
     must be approved by and registered with the IM and KFOR 
     pursuant to procedures established by the CIM and COMKFOR. 
     When not in use, all such weapons will be securely stored and 
     each commune will keep a registry of these weapons.
       (i) In the event of a serious law enforcement threat that 
     would justify the use of these weapons, the communal police 
     commander shall obtain IM approval before employing these 
     weapons.
       (ii) The communal police commander may authorize the use of 
     these weapons without prior approval of the IM for the sole 
     purpose of self-defense. In such cases, he must report the 
     incident no later than one hour after it occurs to the IM and 
     KFOR.
       (iii) If the CIM determines that a weapon has been used by 
     a member of a communal police force in a manner contrary to 
     this Chapter, he may take appropriate corrective measures; 
     such measures may include reducing the number of such weapons 
     that the communal police force is allowed to possess or 
     dismissing or disciplining the law enforcement personnel 
     involved.
       (d) Communal police officers engaged in crowd control 
     functions will receive equipment appropriate to their task, 
     including batons, helmets and shields, subject to IM 
     approval.

                  Article III: Interim Police Academy

       1. Under the supervision of the IM, the CJA shall establish 
     an interim Police Academy that will offer mandatory and 
     professional development training for all public security 
     personnel, including border police. Until the interim police 
     academy is established, IM will oversee a temporary training 
     program for public security personnel including border 
     police.
       2. All public security personnel shall be required to 
     complete a course of police studies successfully before 
     serving as communal police officers.
       3. The Academy shall be headed by a Director appointed and 
     removed by the CJA in consultation with the Kosovo Criminal 
     Justice Commission and the IM. The Director shall consult 
     closely with the IM and comply fully with its recommendations 
     and guidance.
       4. All Republic and Federal police training facilities in 
     Kosovo, including the academy at Vucitrn, will cease 
     operations within 6 months of the entry into force of this 
     Agreement.

                Article IV: Criminal Justice Commissions

       1. The parties shall establish a Kosovo Criminal Justice 
     Commission and Communal Criminal Justice Commissions. The CIM 
     or his designee shall chair meetings of these Commissions. 
     They shall be forums for cooperation, coordination and the 
     resolution of disputes concerning law enforcement and civil 
     public security in Kosovo.
       2. The functions of the Commissions shall include the 
     following:
       (a) Monitor, review, and make recommendations regarding the 
     operation of law enforcement personnel and policies in 
     Kosovo, including communal police units;
       (b) Review, and make recommendations regarding the 
     recruitment, selection and training of communal police 
     officers and commanders;
       (c) Consider complaints regarding police practices filed by 
     individuals or national communities, and provided information 
     and recommendations to communal police commanders and the CIM 
     for consideration in their reviews of officer performance; 
     and
       (d) In the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission only: In 
     consultation with designated local, Republic and Federal 
     police liaisons, monitor jurisdiction sharing in cases of 
     overlapping criminal jurisdiction between Kosovo, Republic 
     and Federal authorities.
       3. The membership of the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission 
     and each Communal Criminal Justice Commission shall be 
     representative of the population and shall include:

[[Page 8100]]

       (a) In the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission:
       (i) a representative of each commune;
       (ii) the head of the Kosovo CJA;
       (iii) a representative of each Republic and Federal law 
     enforcement component operating in Kosovo (for example, 
     Customs police and Border police);
       (iv) a representative of each national community;
       (v) a representative of the IM, during its period of 
     operation in Kosovo;
       (vi) a representative of the VJ border guard, as 
     appropriate;
       (vii) a representative of the MUP, as appropriate, while 
     present in Kosovo; and
       (viii) a representative of KFOR, as appropriate.
       (b) In the Communal Criminal Justice Commissions:
       (i) the communal police commander;
       (ii) a representative of any Republic and Federal law 
     enforcement component operating in the commune;
       (iii) a representative of each national community;
       (iv) a civilian representative of the communal government;
       (v) a representative of the IM, during its period of 
     operation in Kosovo;
       (vi) a representative of the VJ border guard, who shall 
     have observer status, as appropriate; and
       (viii) A representative of KFOR, as appropriate.
       4. Each Criminal Justice Commission shall meet at least 
     monthly, or at the request of any Commission member.

                 Article V: Police Operations in Kosovo

       1. The communal police established by this Agreement shall 
     have exclusive law enforcement authority and jurisdiction and 
     shall be the only police presence in Kosovo following the 
     reduction and eventual withdrawal from Kosovo by the MUP, 
     with the exception of border police as specified in Article 
     VI and any support provided pursuant to Article I(3)(h).
       (a) During the transition to communal police, the remaining 
     MUP shall carry out only normal policing duties, and shall 
     draw down, pursuant to the schedule described in Chapter 7.
       (b) During the period of the phased drawdown of the MUP, 
     the MUP in Kosovo shall have authority to conduct only civil 
     police functions and shall be under the supervision and 
     control of the CIM. The IM may dismiss from service, or take 
     other appropriate disciplinary action against, MUP personnel 
     who obstruct implementation of this Agreement.
       2. Concurrent Law Enforcement in Kosovo.
       (a) Except as provided in Article V.1 and Article VI, 
     Federal and Republic law enforcement officials may only act 
     within Kosovo in cases of hot pursuit of a person suspected 
     of committing a serious criminal offense.
       (i) Federal and Republic authorities shall as soon as 
     practicable, but in no event later than one hour after their 
     entry into Kosovo while engaged in a hot pursuit, notify the 
     nearest Kosovo law enforcement officials that the pursuit has 
     crossed into Kosovo. Once notification has been made, further 
     pursuit and apprehension shall be coordinated with Kosovo law 
     enforcement. Following apprehension, suspects shall be placed 
     into the custody of the authorities originating the pursuit. 
     If the suspect has not been apprehended within four hours, 
     the original pursuing authorities shall cease their pursuit 
     and immediately depart Kosovo unless invited to continue 
     their pursuit by the CJA or the CIM.
       (ii) In the event the pursuit is of such short duration as 
     to preclude notification, Kosovo law enforcement officials 
     shall be notified that an apprehension has been made and 
     shall be given access to the detainee prior to his removal 
     from Kosovo.
       (iii) Personnel engaged in hot pursuit under the provisions 
     of this Article may only be civilian police, may only carry 
     weapons appropriate for normal civilian police duties 
     (sidearms, and long-barreled weapons not to exceed 7.62mm), 
     may only travel in officially marked police vehicles, and may 
     not exceed a total of eight personnel at any one time. Travel 
     in armored personnel carriers by police engaged in hot 
     pursuit is strictly prohibited.
       (iv) The same rules shall apply to hot pursuit of suspects 
     by Kosovo law enforcement authorities to Federal territory 
     outside of Kosovo.
       (b) All Parties shall provide the highest degree of mutual 
     assistance in law enforcement matters in response to 
     reasonable requests.

             Article VI: Security on International Borders

       1. The Government of the FRY will maintain official border 
     crossings on its international borders (Albania and FYROM).
       2. Personnel from the organizations listed below may be 
     present along Kosovo's international borders and at 
     international border crossings, and may not act outside the 
     scope of the authorities specified in this Chapter.
       (a) Republic of Serbia Border Police.
       (i) The Border Police shall continue to exercise authority 
     to Kosovo's international border crossings and in connection 
     with the enforcement of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
     immigration laws. The total number of border police shall be 
     drawn down to 75 within 14 days of entry into force of this 
     Agreement.
       (ii) While maintaining the personnel threshold specified in 
     subparagraph (i), the ranks of the existing Border Police 
     units operating in Kosovo shall be supplemented by new 
     recruits so that they are representative of the Kosovo 
     population.
       (iii) All Border Police stationed in Kosovo must attend 
     police training at the Kosovo police academy within 18 months 
     of the entry into force of this Agreement.
       (b) Customs Officers.
       (i) The FRY Customs Service will continue to exercise 
     customs jurisdiction at Kosovo's official international 
     border crossings and in such customs warehouses as may be 
     necessary within Kosovo. The total number of customs 
     personnel shall be drawn down to 50 within 14 days of the 
     entry into force of this Agreement.
       (ii) Kosovar Albanian officers of the Customs Service shall 
     be trained and compensated by the FRY.
       (c) The CIM shall conduct a periodic review of customs and 
     border police requirements and shall have the authority to 
     increase or decrease the personnel ceilings described in 
     paragraphs (a)(i) and (b)(i) above to reflect operational 
     needs and to adjust the composition of individual customs 
     units.

                   Article VII: Arrest and Detention

       1. Except pursuant to Article V, Article I(3)(h), and 
     sections (a)-(b) of this paragraph, only officers of the 
     communal police shall have authority to arrest and detain 
     individuals in Kosovo. (a) Border Police officers shall have 
     authority within Kosovo to arrest and detain individuals who 
     have violated criminal provisions of the immigration laws.
       (b) Officers of the Customs Service shall have authority 
     within Kosovo to arrest and detain individuals for criminal 
     violations of the customs laws.
       2. Immediately upon making an arrest, the arresting officer 
     shall notify the nearest Communal Criminal Justice Commission 
     of the detention and the location of the detainee. He 
     subsequently shall transfer the detainee to the nearest 
     appropriate jail in Kosovo at the earliest opportunity.
       3. Officers may use reasonable and necessary force 
     proportionate to the circumstances to effect arrests and keep 
     suspects in custody.
       4. Kosovo and its constituent communes shall establish 
     jails and prisons to accommodate the detention of criminal 
     suspects and the imprisonment of individuals convicted of 
     violating the laws applicable in Kosovo. Prisons shall be 
     operated consistent with international standards. Access 
     shall be provided to international personnel, including 
     representatives of the International Committee of the Red 
     Cross.

                Article VIII: Administration of Justice

       1. Criminal Jurisdiction over Persons Arrested within 
     Kosovo.
       (a) Except in accordance with Article V and subparagraph 
     (b) of this paragraph, any person arrested within Kosovo 
     shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Kosovo courts.
       (b) Any person arrested within Kosovo, in accordance with 
     the law and with this Agreement, by the Border Police or 
     Customs Police shall be subject to be jurisdiction of the FRY 
     courts. If there is no applicable court of the FRY to hear 
     the case, the Kosovo courts shall have jurisdiction.
       2. Prosecution of Crimes.
       (a) The CJA shall, in consultation with the CIM, appoint 
     and have the authority to remove the Chief Prosecutor.
       (b) The IM shall have the authority to monitor, observe, 
     inspect, and when necessary, direct the operations of the 
     Office of the Prosecutor and any and all related staff.

                Article IX: Final Authority To Interpret

       The CIM is the final authority regarding interpretation of 
     this Chapter and his determinations are binding on all 
     Parties and persons.

                               CHAPTER 3

                  Conduct and Supervision of Elections

                  Article I: Conditions for Elections

       1. The Parties shall ensure that conditions exist for the 
     organization of free and fair elections, which include but 
     are not limited to:
       (a) freedom of movement for all citizens;
       (b) an open and free political environment;
       (c) an environment conducive to the return of displaced 
     persons;
       (d) a safe and secure environment that ensures freedom of 
     assembly, association, and expression;
       (e) an electoral legal framework of rules and regulations 
     complying with OSCE commitments, which will be implemented by 
     a Central Election Commission, as set forth in Article III, 
     which is representative of the population of Kosovo in terms 
     of national communities and political parties; and
       (f) free media, effectively accessible to registered 
     political parties and candidates, and available to voters 
     throughout Kosovo.
       2. The Parties request the OSCE to certify when elections 
     will be effective under current conditions in Kosovo, and to 
     provide assistance to the Parties to create conditions for 
     free and fair elections.
       3. The Parties shall comply fully with Paragraphs 7 and 8 
     of the OSCE Copenhagen Document, which are attached to this 
     Chapter.

[[Page 8101]]



                      Article II: Role of the OSCE

       1. The Parties request the OSCE to adopt and put in place 
     an elections program for Kosovo and supervise elections as 
     set forth in this Agreement.
       2. The Parties request the OSCE to supervise, in a manner 
     to be determined by the OSCE and in cooperation with other 
     international organizations the OSCE deems necessary, the 
     preparation and conduct of elections for:
       (a) Members of the Kosovo Assembly;
       (b) Members of Communal Assemblies;
       (c) other officials popularly elected in Kosovo under this 
     Agreement and the laws and Constitution of Kosovo at the 
     discretion of the OSCE.
       3. The Parties request the OSCE to establish a Central 
     Election Commission in Kosovo (``the Commission'').
       4. Consistent with Article IV of Chapter 5, the first 
     elections shall be held within nine months of the entry into 
     force of this Agreement. The President of the Commission 
     shall decide, in consultation with the Parties, the exact 
     timing and order of elections for Kosovo political offices.

                Article III: Central Election Commission

       1. The Commission shall adopt electoral Rules and 
     Regulations on all matters necessary for the conduct of free 
     and fair elections in Kosovo, including rules relating to: 
     the eligibility and registration of candidates, parties, and 
     voters, including displaced persons and refugees; ensuring a 
     free and fair elections campaign; administrative and 
     technical preparation for elections including the 
     establishment, publication, and certification of election 
     results; and the role of international and domestic election 
     observers.
       2. The responsibilities of the Commission, as provided in 
     the electoral Rules and Regulations, shall include:
       (a) the preparation, conduct, and supervision of all 
     aspects of the electoral process, including development and 
     supervision of political party and voter registration, and 
     creation of secure and transparent procedures for production 
     and dissemination of ballots and sensitive election 
     materials, vote counts, tabulations, and publication of 
     elections results;
       (b) ensuring compliance with the electoral Rules and 
     Regulations established pursuant to this Agreement, including 
     establishing auxiliary bodies for this purpose as necessary;
       (c) ensuring that action is taken to remedy any violation 
     of any provision of this Agreement, including imposing 
     penalties such as removal from candidate or party lists, 
     against any person, candidate, political party, or body that 
     violates such provisions; and
       (d) accrediting observers, including personnel from 
     international organizations and foreign and domestic non-
     governmental organizations, and ensuring that the Parties 
     grant the accredited observers unimpeded access and movement.
       3. The Commission shall consist of a person appointed by 
     the Chairman-in-Office (CIO) of the OSCE, representatives of 
     all national communities, and representatives of political 
     parties in Kosovo selected by criteria to be determined by 
     the Commission. The person appointed by the CIO shall act as 
     the President of the Commission. The rules of procedure of 
     the Commission shall provide that in the exceptional 
     circumstance of an unresolved dispute within the Commission, 
     the decision of the President shall be final and binding.
       4. The Commission shall enjoy the right to establish 
     communication facilities, and to engage local and 
     administrative staff.

                               CHAPTER 4

                            Economic Issues

                               Article I

       1. The economy of Kosovo shall function in accordance with 
     free market principles.
       2. The authorities established to levy and collect taxes 
     and other charges are set forth in this Agreement. Except as 
     otherwise expressly provided, all authorities have the right 
     to keep all revenues from their own taxes or other charges 
     consistent with this Agreement.
       3. Certain revenue from Kosovo taxes and duties shall 
     accrue to the Communes, taking into account the need for an 
     equalization of revenues between the Communes based on 
     objective criteria. The Assembly of Kosovo shall enact 
     appropriate non-discriminatory legislation for this purpose. 
     The Communes may also levy local taxes in accordance with 
     this Agreement.
       4. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be responsible 
     for the collection of all customs duties at international 
     borders in Kosovo. There shall be no impediments to the free 
     movement of persons, goods, services, and capital to and from 
     Kosovo.
       5. Federal authorities shall ensure that Kosovo receives a 
     proportionate and equitable share of benefits that may be 
     derived from international agreements concluded by the 
     Federal Republic and of Federal resources.
       6. Federal and other authorities shall within their 
     respective powers and responsibilities ensure the free 
     movement of persons, goods, services, and capital to Kosovo, 
     including from international sources. They shall in 
     particular allow access to Kosovo without discrimination for 
     person delivering such goods and services.
       7. If expressly required by an international donor or 
     lender, international contracts for reconstruction projects 
     shall be concluded by the authorities of the Federal Republic 
     of Yugoslavia, which shall establish appropriate mechanisms 
     to make such funds available to Kosovo authorities. Unless 
     precluded by the terms of contracts, all reconstruction 
     projects that exclusively concern Kosovo shall be managed and 
     implemented by the appropriate Kosovo authority.

                               Article II

       1. The Parties agree to reallocate ownership and resources 
     in accordance insofar as possible with the distribution of 
     powers and responsibilities set forth in this Agreement, in 
     the following areas:
       (a) government-owned assets (including educational 
     institutions, hospitals, natural resources, and production 
     facilities);
       (b) pension and social insurance contributions;
       (c) revenues to be distributed under Article 1.5; and
       (d) any other matters relating to economic relations 
     between the Parties not covered by this Agreement.
       2. The Parties agree to the creation of a Claim Settlement 
     Commission (CSC) to resolve all disputes between them on 
     matters referred to in paragraph 1.
       (a) The CSC shall consist of three experts designated by 
     Kosovo, three experts designated jointly by the Federal 
     Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, and three 
     independent experts designated by the CIM.
       (b) The decisions of the CSC, which shall be taken by 
     majority vote, shall be final and binding. The Parties shall 
     implement them without delay.
       3. Authorities receiving ownership of public facilities 
     shall have the power to operate such facilities.

                               CHAPTER 4A

    Humanitarian Assistance, Reconstruction and Economic Development

       1. In parallel with the continuing full implementation of 
     this Agreement, urgent attention must be focused on meeting 
     the real humanitarian and economic needs of Kosovo in order 
     to help create the conditions for reconstruction and lasting 
     economic recovery. International assistance will be provided 
     without discrimination between national communities.
       2. The Parties welcome the willingness of the European 
     Commission working with the international community to co-
     ordinate international support for the parties' efforts. 
     Specifically, the European Commission will organize an 
     international donors' conference within one month of entry 
     into force of this Agreement.
       3. The international community will provide immediate and 
     unconditional humanitarian assistance, focusing primarily on 
     refugees and internally displaced persons returning to their 
     former homes. The Parties welcome and endorse the UNHCR's 
     lead role in co-ordination of this effort, and endorse its 
     intention, in close co-operation with the Implementation 
     Mission, to plan an early, peaceful, orderly and phased 
     return of refugees and displaced persons in conditions of 
     safety and dignity.
       4. The international community will provide the means for 
     the rapid improvement of living conditions for the population 
     of Kosovo through the reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
     housing and local infrastructure (including water, energy, 
     health and local education infrastructure) based on damage 
     assessment surveys.
       5. Assistance will also be provided to support the 
     establishment and development of the institutional and 
     legislative framework laid down in this Agreement, including 
     local governance and tax settlement, and to reinforce civil 
     society, culture and education. Social welfare will also be 
     addressed, with priority given to the protection of 
     vulnerable social groups.
       6. It will also be vital to lay the foundations for 
     sustained development, based on a revival of the local 
     economy. This must take account of the need to address 
     unemployment, and to stimulate the economy by a range of 
     mechanisms. The European Commission will be giving urgent 
     attention to this.
       7. International assistance, with the exception of 
     humanitarian aid, will be subject to full compliance with 
     this Agreement as well as other conditions defined in advance 
     by the donors and the absorptive capacity of Kosovo.

                               CHAPTER 5

                            Implementation I

                        Article I: Institutions


                         Implementation Mission

       1. The Parties invite the OSCE, in cooperation with the 
     European Union, to constitute an Implementation Mission in 
     Kosovo. All responsibilities and powers previously vested in 
     the Kosovo Verification Mission and its Head by prior 
     agreements shall be continued in the Implementation Mission 
     and its Chief.


                            Joint Commission

       2. A Joint Commission shall serve as the central mechanism 
     for monitoring and coordinating the civilian implementation 
     of this Agreement. It shall consist of the Chief of the 
     Implementation Mission (CIM), one Federal and one Republic 
     representative, one representative of each national community

[[Page 8102]]

     in Kosovo, the President of the Assembly, and a 
     representative of the President of Kosovo. Meetings of the 
     Joint Commission may be attended by other representatives of 
     organizations specified in this Agreement or needed for its 
     implementation.
       3. The CIM shall serve as the Chair of the Joint 
     Commission. The Chair shall coordinate and organize the work 
     of the Joint Commission and decide the time and place of its 
     meetings. The Parties shall abide by and fully implement the 
     decisions of the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission shall 
     operate on the basis of consensus, but in the event consensus 
     cannot be reached, the Chair's decision shall be final.
       4. The Chair shall have full and unimpeded access to all 
     places, persons, and information (including documents and 
     other records) within Kosovo that in his judgment are 
     necessary to his responsibilities with regard to the civilian 
     aspects of this Agreement.


                    joint council and local councils

       5. The CIM may, as necessary, establish a Kosovo Joint 
     Council and Local Councils, for informal dispute resolution 
     and cooperation. The Kosovo Joint Council would consist of 
     one member from each of the national communities in Kosovo. 
     Local Councils would consist of representatives of each 
     national community living in the locality where the Local 
     Council is established.

                Article II: Responsibilities and Powers

       1. The CIM shall:
       (a) supervise and direct the implementation of the civilian 
     aspects of this Agreement pursuant to a schedule that he 
     shall specify;
       (b) maintain close contact with the Parties to promote full 
     compliance with those aspects of this Agreement;
       (c) facilitate, as he deems necessary, the resolution of 
     difficulties arising in connection with such implementation;
       (d) participate in meetings of donor organizations, 
     including on issues of rehabilitation and reconstruction, in 
     particular by putting forward proposals and identifying 
     priorities for their consideration as appropriate;
       (e) coordinate the activities of civilian organizations and 
     agencies in Kosovo assisting in the implementation of the 
     civilian aspects of this Agreement, respecting fully their 
     specific organizational procedures;
       (f) report periodically to the bodies responsible for 
     constituting the Mission on progress in the implementation of 
     the civilian aspects of this Agreement; and
       (g) carry out the functions specified in this Agreement 
     pertaining to police and security forces.
       2. The CIM shall also carry out other responsibilities set 
     forth in this Agreement or as may be later agreed.

             Article III: Status of Implementation Mission

       1. Implementation Mission personnel shall be allowed 
     unrestricted movement and access into and throughout Kosovo 
     at any time.
       2. The Parties shall facilitate the operations of the 
     Implementation Mission, including by the provision of 
     assistance as requested with regard to transportation, 
     subsistence, accommodation, communication, and other 
     facilities.
       3. The Implementation Mission shall enjoy such legal 
     capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its 
     functions under the laws and regulations of Kosovo, the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Serbia. 
     Such legal capacity shall include the capacity to contract, 
     and to acquire and dispose of real and personal property.
       4. Privileges and immunities are hereby accorded as follows 
     to the Implementation Mission and associated personnel:
       (a) the Implementation Mission and its premises, archives, 
     and other property shall enjoy the same privileges and 
     immunities as a diplomatic mission under the Vienna 
     Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
       (b) the CIM and professional members of his staff and their 
     families shall enjoy the same privileges and immunities as 
     are enjoyed by diplomatic agents and their families under the 
     Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and
       (c) other members of the Implementation Mission staff and 
     their families shall enjoy the same privileges and immunities 
     as are enjoyed by members of the administrative and technical 
     staff and their families under the Vienna Convention on 
     Diplomatic Relations.

                 Article IV: Process of Implementation


                                General

       1. The Parties acknowledge that complete implementation 
     will require political acts and measures, and the election 
     and establishment of institutions and bodies set forth in 
     this Agreement. The Parties agree to proceed expeditiously 
     with these tasks on a schedule set by the Joint Commission. 
     The Parties shall provide active support, cooperation, and 
     participation for the successful implementation of this 
     Agreement.


                          election and census

       2. Within nine months of the entry into force of this 
     Agreement, there shall be elections in accordance with and 
     pursuant to procedures specified in Chapter 3 of this 
     Agreement for authorities established herein, according to a 
     voter list prepared to international standards by the Central 
     Election Commission. The Organization for Security and 
     Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) shall supervise those elections 
     to ensure that they are free and fair.
       3. Under the supervision of the OSCE and with the 
     participation of Kosovo authorities and experts nominated by 
     and belonging to the national communities of Kosovo, Federal 
     authorities shall conduct an objective and free census of the 
     population in Kosovo under rules and regulations agreed with 
     the OSCE in accordance with international standards. The 
     census shall be carried out when the OSCE determines that 
     conditions allow an objective and accurate enumeration.
       (a) The first census shall be limited to name, place of 
     birth, place of usual residence and address, gender, age, 
     citizenship, national community, and religion.
       (b) The authorities of the Parties shall provide each other 
     and the OSCE with all records necessary to conduct the 
     census, including data about places of residence, 
     citizenship, voters' lists, and other information.


                        transitional provisions

       4. All laws and regulations in effect in Kosovo when this 
     Agreement enters into force shall remain in effect unless and 
     until replaced by laws or regulations adopted by a competent 
     body. All laws and regulations applicable in Kosovo that are 
     incompatible with this Agreement shall be presumed to have 
     been harmonized with this Agreement. In particular, martial 
     law in Kosovo is hereby revoked.
       5. Institutions currently in place in Kosovo shall remain 
     until superseded by bodies created by or in accordance with 
     this Agreement. The CIM may recommend to the appropriate 
     authorities the removal and appointment of officials and the 
     curtailment of operations of existing institutions in Kosovo 
     if he deems it necessary for the effective implementation of 
     this Agreement. If the action recommended is not taken in the 
     time requested, the Joint Commission may decide to take the 
     recommended action.
       6. Prior to the election of Kosovo officials pursuant to 
     this Agreement, the CIM shall take the measures necessary to 
     ensure the development and functioning of independent media 
     in keeping with international standards, including allocation 
     of radio and television frequencies.

                   Article V: Authority To Interpret

       The CIM shall be the final authority in theater regarding 
     interpretation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement, and 
     the Parties agree to abide by his determinations as binding 
     on all Parties and persons.

                               CHAPTER 6

                             The Ombudsman

                           Article I: General

       1. There shall be an Ombudsman, who shall monitor the 
     realization of the rights of members of national communities 
     and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
     in Kosovo. The Ombudsman shall have unimpeded access to any 
     person or place and shall have the right to appear and 
     intervene before any domestic, Federal, or (consistent with 
     the rules of such bodies) international authority upon his or 
     her request. No person, institution, or entity of the Parties 
     may interfere with the functions of the Ombudsman.
       2. The Ombudsman shall be an eminent person of high moral 
     standing who possesses a demonstrated commitment to human 
     rights and the rights of members of national communities. He 
     or she shall be nominated by the President of Kosovo and 
     shall be elected by the Assembly from a list of candidates 
     prepared by the President of the European Court of Human 
     Rights for a non-renewable three-year term. The Ombudsman 
     shall not be a citizen of any State or entity that was a part 
     of the former Yugoslavia, or of any neighboring State. 
     Pending the election of the President and the Assembly, the 
     CIM shall designate a person to serve as Ombudsman on an 
     interim basis who shall be succeeded by a person selected 
     pursuant to the procedure set forth in this paragraph.
       3. The Ombudsman shall be independently responsible for 
     choosing his or her own staff. He or she shall have two 
     Deputies. The Deputies shall each be drawn from different 
     national communities.
       (a) The salaries and expenses of the Ombudsman and his or 
     her staff shall be determined and paid the Kosovo Assembly. 
     The salaries and expenses shall be fully adequate to 
     implement the Ombudsman's mandate.
       (b) The Ombudsman and members of his or her staff shall not 
     be held criminally or civilly liable for any acts carried out 
     within the scope of their duties.

                        Article II: Jurisdiction

       1. The Ombudsman shall consider:
       (a) alleged or apparent violations of human rights and 
     fundamental freedoms in Kosovo, as provided in the 
     Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
     Republic of Serbia, and the European Convention for the 
     Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the 
     Protocols thereto; and
       (b) alleged or apparent violations of the rights of members 
     of national communities specified in this Agreement.
       2. All persons in Kosovo shall have the right to submit the 
     complaints to the Ombudsman. The Parties agree not to take 
     any

[[Page 8103]]

     measures to punish persons who intend to submit or who have 
     submitted such allegations, or in any other way to deter the 
     exercise of this right.

                     Article III: Powers and Duties

       1. The Ombudsman shall investigate alleged violations 
     falling within the jurisdiction set forth in Article II.1. He 
     or she may act either on his or her own initiative or in 
     response to an allegation presented by any Party or person, 
     non-governmental organization, or group of individuals 
     claiming to be the victim of a violation or acting on behalf 
     of alleged victims who are deceased or missing. The work of 
     the Ombudsman shall be free of charge to the person 
     concerned.
       2. The Ombudsman shall have complete, unimpeded, and 
     immediate access to any person, place, or information upon 
     his or her request.
       (a) The Ombudsman shall have access to and may examine all 
     official documents, and he or she can require any person, 
     including officials of Kosovo, to cooperate by providing 
     relevant information, documents, and files.
       (b) The Ombudsman may attend administrative hearings and 
     meetings of other Kosovo institutions in order to gather 
     information.
       (c) The Ombudsman may examine facilities and places where 
     persons deprived of their liberty are detained, work, or are 
     otherwise located.
       (d) The Ombudsman and staff shall maintain the 
     confidentiality of all confidential information obtained by 
     them, unless the Ombudsman determines that such information 
     is evidence of a violation of rights falling within his or 
     her jurisdiction, in which case that information may be 
     revealed in public reports or appropriate legal proceedings.
       (e) The Parties undertake to ensure cooperation with the 
     Ombudsman's investigations. Willful and knowing failure to 
     comply shall be criminal offense prosecutable in any 
     jurisdiction of the Parties. Where an official impedes an 
     investigation by refusing to provide necessary information, 
     the Ombudsman shall contact that official's superior or the 
     public prosecutor for appropriate penal action to be taken in 
     accordance with the law.
       3. The Ombudsman shall issue findings and conclusions in 
     the form of a published report promptly after concluding an 
     investigation.
       (a) A Party, institution, or official identified by the 
     Ombudsman as a violator shall, within a period specified by 
     the Ombudsman, explain in writing how it will comply with any 
     prescriptions the Ombudsman may put forth for remedial 
     measures.
       (b) In the event that a person or entity does not comply 
     with the conclusions and recommendations of the Ombudsman, 
     the report shall be forwarded for further action to the Joint 
     Commission established by Chapter 5 of this Agreement, to the 
     President of the appropriate Party, and to any other 
     officials or institutions that the Ombudsman deems proper.

                               CHAPTER 7

                           Implementation II

                     Article I: General Obligations

       1. The Parties undertake to recreate, as quickly as 
     possible, normal conditions of life in Kosovo and to co-
     operate fully with each other and with all international 
     organizations, agencies, and non-governmental organizations 
     involved in the implementation of this Agreement. They 
     welcome the willingness of the international community to 
     send to the region a force to assist in the implementation of 
     this Agreement.
       a. The United Nations Security Council is invited to pass a 
     resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter endorsing and 
     adopting the arrangements set forth in this Chapter, 
     including the establishment of a multinational military 
     implementation force in Kosovo. The Parties invite NATO to 
     constitute and lead a military force to help ensure 
     compliance with the provisions of this Chapter. They also 
     reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
       b. The Parties agree that NATO will establish and deploy a 
     force (hereinafter ``KFOR'') which may be composed of ground, 
     air, and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations, 
     operating under the authority and subject to the direction 
     and the political control of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
     through the NATO chain of command. The Parties agree to 
     facilitate the deployment and operations of this force and 
     agree also to comply fully with all the obligations of this 
     Chapter.
       c. It is agreed that other States may assist in 
     implementing this Chapter. The Parties agree that the 
     modalities of those States' participation will be the subject 
     of Agreement between such participating States and NATO.
       2. The purposes of these obligations are as follows:
       a. to establish a durable cessation of hostilities. Other 
     than those Forces provided for in this Chapter, under no 
     circumstances shall any armed Forces enter, reenter, or 
     remain within Kosovo without the prior express consent of the 
     KFOR Commander (COMKFOR). For the purposes of this Chapter, 
     the term ``Forces'' includes all personnel and organizations 
     with military capability, including regular army, armed 
     civilian groups, paramilitary groups, air forces, national 
     guards, border police, army reserves, military police, 
     intelligence services, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local, 
     Special, Riot and Anti-Terrorist Police, and any other groups 
     or individuals so designated by COMKFOR. The only exception 
     to the provisions of this paragraph is for civilian police 
     engaged in hot pursuit of a person suspected of committing a 
     serious criminal offense, as provided for in Chapter 2;
       b. to provide for the support and authorization of the KFOR 
     and in particular to authorize the KFOR to take such actions 
     as are required, including the use of necessary force, to 
     ensure compliance with this Chapter and the protection of the 
     KFOR, Implementation Mission (IM), and other international 
     organizations, agencies, and non-governmental organizations 
     involved in the implementation of this Agreement, and to 
     contribute to a secure environment;
       c. to provide, at no cost, the use of all facilities and 
     services required for the deployment, operations and support 
     of the KFOR.
       3. The Parties understand and agree that the obligations 
     undertaken in this Chapter shall apply equally to each Party. 
     Each Party shall be held individually responsible for 
     compliance with its obligations, and each agrees that delay 
     or failure to comply by one Party shall not constitute cause 
     for any other Party to fail to carry out its own obligations. 
     All Parties shall be equally subject to such enforcement 
     action by the KFOR as may be necessary to ensure 
     implementation of this Chapter in Kosovo and the protection 
     of the KFOR, IM, and other international organizations, 
     agencies, and non-governmental organizations involved in the 
     implementation of this Agreement.

                  Article II: Cessation of Hostilities

       1. The Parties shall, immediately upon entry into force of 
     this Agreement (EIF), refrain from committing any hostile or 
     provocative acts of any type against each other or against 
     any person in Kosovo. They shall not encourage or organize 
     hostile or provocative demonstrations.
       2. In carrying out the obligations set forth in paragraph 
     1, the Parties undertake in particular to cease the firing of 
     all weapons and explosive devices except as authorized by 
     COMKFOR. They shall not place any mines, barriers, 
     unauthorized checkpoints, observation posts (with the 
     exception of COMKFOR-approved border observation posts and 
     crossing points), or protective obstacles. Except as provided 
     in Chapter 2, the Parties shall not engage in any military, 
     security, or training-related activities, including ground, 
     air, or air defense operations, in or over Kosovo, without 
     the prior express approval of COMKFOR.
       3. Except for Border Guard forces (as provided for in 
     Article IV), no Party shall have Forces present within a 5 
     kilometer zone inward from the international border of the 
     FRY that is also the border of Kosovo (hereinafter ``the 
     Border Zone''). The Border Zone will be marked on the ground 
     by EIF + 14 days by VJ Border Guard personnel in accordance 
     with direction from IM. COMKFOR may determine small scale 
     reconfigurations for operational reasons.
       4. a. With the exception of civilian police performing 
     normal police duties as determined by the CIM, no Party shall 
     have Forces present within 5 kilometers of the Kosovo side of 
     the boundary of Kosovo with other parts of the FRY.
       b. The presence of any Forces within 5 kilometers of the 
     other side of that boundary shall be notified to COMKFOR; if, 
     in the judgment of COMKFOR, such presence threatens or would 
     threaten implementation of this Chapter in Kosovo, he shall 
     contact the authorities responsible for the Forces in 
     question and may require those Forces to withdraw from or 
     remain outside the area.
       5. No party shall conduct any reprisals, counter-attacks, 
     or any unilateral actions in response to violations of this 
     Chapter by another Party. The Parties shall respond to 
     alleged violations of this Chapter through the procedures 
     provided in Article XI.

 Article III: Redeployment, Withdrawal, and Demilitarization of Forces

       In order to disengage their Forces and to avoid any further 
     conflict, the Parties shall immediately upon EIF begin to re-
     deploy, withdraw, or demilitarize their Forces in accordance 
     with Articles IV, V, and VI.

                         Article IV: VJ Forces


                            I. VJ Army Units

       a. By K-Day + 5 days, all VJ Army units in Kosovo (with the 
     exception of those Forces specified in paragraph 2 of this 
     Article) shall have completed redeployment to the approved 
     cantonment sites listed at Appendix A to this Chapter. This 
     senior VJ commander in Kosovo shall confirm in writing to 
     COMKFOR by K-Day + 5 days that the VJ is in compliance and 
     provide the information required in Article VII below to take 
     account of withdrawals or other changes made during the 
     redeployment. This information shall be updated weekly.
       b. By K-Day + 30 days, the Chief of the VJ General Staff, 
     through the senior VJ commander in Kosovo, shall provide for 
     approval by COMKFOR a detailed plan for the phased withdrawal 
     of VJ Forces from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia to 
     ensure the following timelines are met:

[[Page 8104]]

       (1) By K-Day + 90 days, VJ authorities must, to the 
     satisfaction of COMKFOR, withdraw from Kosovo to other 
     locations in Serbia 50% of men and materiel and all 
     designated offensive assets. Such assets are taken to be: 
     main battle tanks; all other armored vehicles mounting 
     weapons greater than 12.7mm; and, all heavy weapons (vehicle 
     mounted or not) of over 82mm.
       (2) By K-Day + 180 days, all VJ Army personnel and 
     equipment (with the exception of those Forces specified in 
     paragraph 2 of this Article) shall be withdrawn from Kosovo 
     to other locations in Serbia.


                       2. VJ Border Guard Forces

       a. VJ Border Guard forces shall be permitted but limited to 
     a structure of 1500 members at pre-February 1998 Border Guard 
     Battalion facilities located in Djakovica, Prizren, and 
     Urosevac and subordinate facilities within the 5 kilometer 
     Border Zone, or at a limited number of existing facilities in 
     the immediate proximity of the Border Zone subject to the 
     prior approval of COMKFOR, with that number to be reached by 
     K-Day + 14 days. An additional number of VJ personnel--
     totaling no more than 1000 C2 and logistics forces--will be 
     permitted to remain in the approved cantonment sites listed 
     at Appendix A to fulfill brigade-level functions related only 
     to border security. After an initial 90 day period from K-
     Day, COMKFOR may at any time review the deployments of VJ 
     personnel and may require further adjustments to force level, 
     with the objective of reaching the minimum force structure 
     required for legitimate border security, as the security 
     situation and the conduct of Parties warrant.
       b. VJ elements in Kosovo shall be limited to weapons of 
     82mm and below. They shall possess neither armored vehicles 
     (other than wheeled vehicles mounting weapons of 12.7mm or 
     less) nor air defense weapons.
       c. VJ Border Guard units shall be permitted to patrol in 
     Kosovo only within the Border Zone and solely for purpose of 
     defending the border against external attack and maintaining 
     its integrity by preventing illicit border crossings. 
     Geographic terrain considerations may require Border Guard 
     maneuver inward of the Border Zone; any such maneuver shall 
     be coordinated with and approved by COMKFOR.
       d. With the exception of the Border Zone, VJ units may 
     travel through Kosovo only to reach duty stations and 
     garrisons in the Border Zone or approved cantonment sites. 
     Such travel may only be along routes and in accordance with 
     procedures that have been determined by COMKFOR after 
     consultation with the CIM, VJ unit commanders, communal 
     government authorities, and police commanders. These routes 
     and procedures will be determined by K-Day + 14 days, subject 
     to re-determination by COMKFOR at any time. VJ forces in 
     Kosovo but outside the Border Zone shall be permitted to act 
     only in self-defense in response to a hostile act pursuant to 
     Rules of Engagement (ROE) which will be approved by COMKFOR 
     in consultation with the CIM. When deployed in the Border 
     Zone, they will act in accordance with ROE established under 
     control of COMKFOR.
       e. VJ Border Guard forces may conduct training activities 
     only within the 5 kilometer Border Zone, and only with the 
     prior express approved of COMKFOR.


             3. Yugoslav air and air defense forces (yaadf)

       All aircraft, radars, surface-to-air missiles (including 
     man-portable air defense systems {MANPADS ) and anti-aircraft 
     artillery in Kosovo shall immediately upon EIF begin 
     withdrawing from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia outside 
     the 25 kilometer Mutual Safety Zone as defined in Article X. 
     This withdrawal shall be completed and reported by the senior 
     VJ commander in Kosovo to the appropriate NATO commander not 
     more than 10 days after EIF. The appropriate NATO commander 
     shall control and coordinate use of airspace over Kosovo 
     commencing at EIF as further specified in Article X. No air 
     defense systems, target tracking radars, or anti-aircraft 
     artillery shall be positioned or operated within Kosovo or 
     the 25 kilometer Mutual Safety Zone without the prior express 
     approval of the appropriate NATO commander.

                        Article V: Other Forces

       1. The actions of Forces in Kosovo other than KFOR, VJ, 
     MUP, or local police forces provided for in Chapter 2 
     (hereinafter referred to as ``Other Forces'') shall be in 
     accordance with this Article. Upon EIF, all Other Forces in 
     Kosovo must immediately observe the provisions of Article I, 
     paragraph 2, Article II, paragraph 1, and Article III and in 
     addition refrain from all hostile intent, military training 
     and formations, organization of demonstrations, and any 
     movement in either direction or smuggling across 
     international borders or the boundary between Kosovo and 
     other parts of the FRY. Furthermore, upon EIF, all Other 
     Forces in Kosovo must publicly commit themselves to 
     demilitarize on terms to be determined by COMKFOR, renounce 
     violence, guarantee security of international personnel, and 
     respect the international borders of the FRY and all terms of 
     this Chapter.
       2. Except as approved by COMKFOR, from K-Day, all Other 
     Forces in Kosovo must not carry weapons:
       a. within 1 kilometer of VJ and MUP cantonments listed at 
     Appendix A;
       b. within 1 kilometer of the main roads as follows:
       (1) Pec--Lapusnik--Pristina.
       (2) border--Djakovica--Klina.
       (3) border--Prizren--Suva Rika--Pristina.
       (4) Djakovica--Orahovac--Lapusnik--Pristina.
       (5) Pec--Djakovica--Prizren--Urosevac--border.
       (6) border--Urosevac--Pristina--Podujevo--border.
       (7) Pristina--Kosovska Mitrovica--border.
       (8) Kosovka Mitrovica--(Rakos)--Pec.
       (9) Pec--Border with Montenegro (through Pozaj).
       (10) Pristina--Lisica--border with Serbia.
       (11) Pristina--Gnjilane--Urosevac.
       (12) Gnjilane--Veliki Trnovac--border with Serbia.
       (13) Prizren--Doganovic.
       c. within 1 kilometer of the Border Zone;
       d. in any other areas designated by COMKFOR.
       3. By K-Day+5 days, all Other Forces must abandon and close 
     all fighting positions, entrenchments, and checkpoints.
       4. By K-Day+5 days, all Other Forces' commanders designated 
     by COMKFOR shall report completion of the above requirements 
     in the format at Article VII to COMKFOR and continue to 
     provide weekly detailed status reports until demilitarization 
     is complete.
       5. COMKFOR will establish procedures for demilitarization 
     and monitoring of Other Forces in Kosovo and for the further 
     regulation of their activities. These procedures will be 
     established to facilitate a phased demilitarization program 
     as follows:
       a. By K-Day+5 days, all Other Forces shall establish secure 
     weapons storage sites, which shall be registered with and 
     verified by the KFOR;
       b. By K-Day+30 days, all Other Forces shall store all 
     prohibited weapons (any weapon 12.7mm or larger, any anti-
     tank or anti-aircraft weapons, grenades, mines or explosives) 
     and automatic weapons in the registered weapons storage 
     sites. Other Forces commanders shall confirm completion of 
     weapons storage to COMKFOR no later than K-Day+30 days;
       c. By K-Day+30 days, all Other Forces shall cease wearing 
     military uniforms and insignia, and cease carrying prohibited 
     weapons and automatic weapons;
       d. By K-Day+90 days, authority for storage sites shall pass 
     to the KFOR. After this date, it shall be illegal for Other 
     Forces to possess prohibited weapons and automatic weapons, 
     and such weapons shall be subject to confiscation by the 
     KFOR;
       e. By K-Day+120 days, demilitarization of all Other Forces 
     shall be completed.
       6. By EIF+30 days, subject to arrangements by COMKFOR is 
     necessary, all Other Forces personnel who are not of local 
     origin, whether or not they are legally within Kosovo, 
     including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, 
     volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other States, 
     shall be withdrawn from Kosovo.

                            Article VI: MUP

       1. Ministry of Interior Police (MUP) is defined as all 
     police and public security units and personnel under the 
     control of Federal or Republic authorities except for the 
     border police referred to in Chapter 2 and police academy 
     students and personnel at the training school in Vucitrn 
     referred to in Chapter 2. The CIM, in consultation with 
     COMKFOR, shall have the discretion to exempt any public 
     security units from this definition if he determines that it 
     is in the public interest (e.g. firefighters).
       a. By K-Day+5 days, all MUP units in Kosovo (with the 
     exception of the border police referred to in Chapter 2) 
     shall have completed redeployment to the approved cantonment 
     sites listed at Appendix A to this Chapter or to garrisons 
     outside Kosovo. The senior MUP commander in Kosovo or his 
     representatives shall confirm in writing by K-Day+5 days to 
     COMKFOR and the CIM that the MUP is in compliance and update 
     the information required in Article VII to take account of 
     withdrawals or other changes made during the redeployment. 
     This information shall be updated weekly. Resumption of 
     normal communal police patrolling will be permitted under the 
     supervision and control of the IM and as specifically 
     approved by the CIM in consultation with COMKFOR, and will be 
     contingent on compliance with the terms of this Agreement.
       b. Immediately upon EIF, the following withdrawals shall 
     begin:
       (1) By K-Day+5 days, those MUP units not assigned to Kosovo 
     to 1 February 1998 shall withdraw all personnel and equipment 
     from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia.
       (2) By K-Day+20 days, all Special Police, including PJP, 
     SAJ, and JSO forces, and their equipment shall be withdrawn 
     from their cantonment sites out of Kosovo to other locations 
     in Serbia. Additionally, all MUP offensive assets (designated 
     as armored vehicles mounting weapons 12.7mm or larger, and 
     all heavy weapons {vehicle mounted or not  of over 82mm) 
     shall be withdrawn.
       c. By K-Day+30 days, the senior MUP commander shall provide 
     for approval by COMKFOR, in consultation with the CIM, a 
     detailed plan for the phased drawdown of the remainder of MUP 
     forces. In the event that

[[Page 8105]]

     COMKFOR, in consultation with the CIM, does not approve the 
     plan, he has the authority to issue his own binding plan for 
     further MUP drawdowns. The CIM will decide at the same time 
     when the remaining MUP units will wear new insignia. In any 
     case, the following time-table must be met:
       (1) by K-Day+60 days, 50% drawdown of the remaining MUP 
     units including reservists. The CIM after consultations with 
     COMKFOR shall have the discretion to extend this deadline for 
     up to K-Day+90 days if he judges there to be a risk of a law 
     enforcement vacuum;
       (2) by K-Day+120 days, further drawdown to 2500 MUP. The 
     CIM after consultations with COMKFOR shall have the 
     discretion to extend this deadline for up to K-Day+180 days 
     to meet operational needs;
       (3) transition to communal police force shall begin as 
     Kosovar police are trained and able to assume their duties. 
     The CIM shall organize this transition between MUP and 
     communal police;
       (4) in any event, by EIF+one year, all Ministry, of 
     Interior Civil Police shall be drawn down to zero. The CIM 
     shall have the discretion to extend this deadline for up to 
     an additional 12 months to meet operational needs.
       d. The 2500 MUP allowed by this Chapter and referred to in 
     Article V.1(a) of Chapter 2 shall have authority only for 
     civil police functions and be under the supervision and 
     control of the CIM.

                       Article VII: Notifications

       1. By K-Day+5 days, the Parties shall furnish the following 
     specific information regarding the status of all conventional 
     military; all police, including military police, Department 
     of Public Security Police, special police; paramilitary; and 
     all Other Forces in Kosovo, and shall update the COMKFOR 
     weekly on changes in this information:
       a. location, disposition, and strengths of all military and 
     special police units referred to above;
       b. quantity and type of weaponry of 12.7mm and above, and 
     ammunition for such weaponry, including location of 
     cantonments and supply depots and storage sites;
       c. positions and descriptions of any surface-to-air 
     missiles/launchers, including mobile systems, anti-aircraft 
     artillery, supporting radars, and associated command and 
     control systems;
       d. positions and descriptions of all miners, unexploded 
     ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, obstacles, booby 
     traps, wire entanglements, physical or military hazards to 
     the safe movement of any personnel in Kosovo, weapons 
     systems, vehicles, or any other military equipment; and
       e. any further information of a military or security nature 
     requested by the COMKFOR.

           Article VIII: Operations and Authority of the KFOR

       1. Consistent with the general obligations of Article I, 
     the Parties understand and agree that the KFOR will deploy 
     and operate without hindrance and with the authority to take 
     all necessary action to help ensure compliance with this 
     Chapter.
       2. The Parties understand and agree that the KFOR shall 
     have the right:
       a. to monitor and help ensure compliance by all Parties 
     with this Chapter and to respond promptly to any violations 
     and restore compliance, using military force if required. 
     This includes necessary action to:
       1) enforce VJ and MUP reductions; 2) enforce 
     demilitarization of Other Forces; 3) enforce restrictions of 
     all VJ, MUP and Other Forces' activities, movement and 
     training in Kosovo;
       b. to establish liaison arrangements with IM, and support 
     IM as appropriate;
       c. to establish liaison arrangements with local Kosovo 
     authorities, with Other Forces, and with FRY and Serbian 
     civil and military authorities;
       d. to observe, monitor, and inspect any and all facilities 
     or activities in Kosovo, including within the Border Zone, 
     that the COMKFOR believes has or may have military 
     capability, or are or may be associated with the employment 
     of military or police capabilities, or are otherwise relevant 
     to compliance with this Chapter;
       e. to require the Parties to mark and clear minefields and 
     obstacles and to monitor their performance;
       f. to require the Parties to participate in the Joint 
     Military Commission and its subordinate military commissions 
     as described in Article XI.
       3. The Parties understand and agree that the KFOR shall 
     have the right to fulfill its supporting tasks, within the 
     limits of its assigned principal tasks, its capabilities, and 
     available resources, and as directed by the NAC, which 
     include the following:
       a. to help create secure conditions for the conduct by 
     others of other tasks associated with this Agreement, 
     including free and fair elections;
       b. to assist the movement of organizations in the 
     accomplishment of humanitarian missions;
       c. to assist international agencies in fulfilling their 
     responsibilities in Kosovo;
       d. to observe and prevent interference with the movement of 
     civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to 
     respond appropriately to deliberate threat to life and 
     person.
       4. The Parties understand and agree that further directives 
     from the NAC may establish additional duties and 
     responsibilities for the KFOR in implementing this Chapter.
       5. KFOR operations shall be governed by the following 
     provisions:
       a. KFOR and its personnel shall have the legal status, 
     rights, and obligations specified in Appendix B to this 
     Chapter;
       b. the KFOR shall have the right to use all necessary means 
     to ensure its full ability to communicate and shall have the 
     right to the unrestricted use of the entire electromagnetic 
     spectrum. In implementing this right, the KFOR shall make 
     reasonable efforts to coordinate with the appropriate 
     authorities of the Parties;
       c. The KFOR shall have the right to control and regulate 
     surface traffic throughout Kosovo including the movement of 
     the Forces of the Parties. All military training activities 
     and movements in Kosovo must be authorized in advance by 
     COMKFOR;
       d. The KFOR shall have complete and unimpeded freedom of 
     movement by ground, air, and water into and throughout 
     Kosovo. It shall in Kosovo have the right to bivouac, 
     maneuver, billet, and utilize any areas or facilities to 
     carry out its responsibilities as required for its support, 
     training, and operations, with such advance notice as may be 
     practicable. Neither the KFOR nor any of its personnel shall 
     be liable for any damages to public or private property that 
     they may cause in the course of duties related to the 
     implementation of this Chapter. Roadblocks, checkpoints, or 
     other impediments to KFOR freedom of movement shall 
     constitute a breach of this Chapter and the violating Party 
     shall be subject to military action by the KFOR, including 
     the use of necessary force to ensure compliance with its 
     Chapter.
       6. The Parties understand and agree that COMKFOR shall have 
     the authority, without interference or permission of any 
     Party, to do all that he judges necessary and proper, 
     including the use of military force, to protect the KFOR and 
     the IM, and to carry out the responsibilities listed in this 
     Chapter. The Parties shall comply in all respects with KFOR 
     instructions and requirements.
       7. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, the 
     Parties understand and agree that COMKFOR has the right and 
     is authorized to compel the removal, withdrawal, or 
     relocation of specific Forces and weapons, and to order the 
     cessation of any activities whenever the COMKFOR determines 
     such Forces, weapons, or activities to constitute a threat or 
     potential threat to either the KFOR or its mission, or to 
     another Party. Forces failing to redeploy, withdraw, 
     relocate, or to cease threatening or potentially threatening 
     activities following such a demand by the KFOR shall be 
     subject to military action by the KFOR, including the use of 
     necessary force, to ensure compliance, consistent with the 
     terms set forth in Article I, paragraph 3.

                       Article IX: Border Control

       The Parties understand and agree that, until other 
     arrangements are established, and subject to provisions of 
     this Chapter and Chapter 2, controls along the international 
     border of the FRY that is also the border of Kosovo will be 
     maintained by the existing institutions normally assigned to 
     such tasks, subject to supervision by the KFOR and the IM, 
     which shall have the right to review and approve all 
     personnel and units, to monitor their performance, and to 
     remove and replace any personnel for behavior inconsistent 
     with this Chapter.

                  Article X: Control of Air Movements

       The appropriate NATO commander shall have sole authority to 
     establish rules and procedures governing command and control 
     of the airspace over Kosovo as well as within a 25 kilometer 
     Mutual Safety Zone (MSZ). This MSZ shall consist of FRY 
     airspace within 25 kilometers outward from the boundary of 
     Kosovo with other parts of the FRY. This Chapter supersedes 
     the NATO Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement of October 12, 
     1998 on any matter or area in which they may contradict each 
     other. No military air traffic, fixed or rotary wing, of any 
     Party shall be permitted to fly over Kosovo or in the MSZ 
     without the prior express approval of the appropriate NATO 
     commander. Violations of any of the provisions above, 
     including the appropriate NATO commander's rules and 
     procedures governing the airspace over Kosovo, as well as 
     unauthorized flight or activation of FRY Integrated Air 
     Defense (IADS) within the MSZ, shall be subject to military 
     action by the KFOR, including the use of necessary force. The 
     KFOR shall have a liaison team at the FRY Air Force HQ and a 
     YAADF liaison shall be established with the KFOR. The Parties 
     understand and agree that the appropriate NATO commander may 
     delegate control of normal civilian air activities to 
     appropriate FRY institutions to monitor operations, 
     deconflict KFOR air traffic movements, and ensure smooth and 
     safe operation of the air traffic system.

        Article XI: Establishment of a Joint Military Commission

       1. A Joint Military Commission (JMC) shall be established 
     with the deployment of the KFOR to Kosovo.

[[Page 8106]]


       2. The JMC shall be chaired by COMKFOR or his 
     representative and consist of the following members:
       a. the senior Yugoslav military commander of the Forces of 
     the FRY or his representative;
       b. the Ministers of Interior of the FRY and Republic of 
     Serbia or their representatives;
       c. a senior military representative of all Other Forces;
       d. a representative of the IM;
       e. other persons as COMKFOR shall determine, including one 
     or more representatives of the Kosovo civilian leadership.
       3. The JMC shall:
       a. serve as the central body for all Parties to address any 
     military complaints, questions, or problems that require 
     resolution by the COMKFOR, such as allegations of cease-fire 
     violations or other allegations of non-compliance with this 
     Chapter;
       b. receive reports and make recommendations for specific 
     actions to COMKFOR to ensure compliance by the Parties with 
     the provisions of this Chapter;
       c. assist COMKFOR in determining and implementing local 
     transparency measures between the Parties.
       4. The JMC shall not include any persons publicly indicted 
     by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
     Yugoslavia.
       5. The JMC shall function as a consultative body to advise 
     COMKFOR. However, all final decisions shall be made by 
     COMKFOR and shall be binding on the Parties.
       6. The JMC shall meet at the call of COMKFOR. Any Party may 
     request COMKFOR to convene a meeting.
       7. The JMC shall establish subordinate military commissions 
     for the purpose of providing assistance in carrying out the 
     functions described above. Such commissions shall be at an 
     appropriate level, as COMKFOR shall direct. Composition of 
     such commissions shall be determined by COMKFOR.

                     Article XII: Prisoner Release

       1. By EIF + 21 days, the Parties shall release and 
     transfer, in accordance with international humanitarian 
     standards, all persons held in connection with the conflict 
     (hereinafter ``prisoners''). In addition, the Parties shall 
     cooperate fully with the International Committee of the Red 
     Cross (ICRC) to facilitate its work, in accordance with its 
     mandate, to implement and monitor a plan for the release and 
     transfer of prisoners in accordance with the above deadline. 
     In preparation for compliance with this requirement, the 
     Parties shall:
       a. grant the ICRC full access to all persons, irrespective 
     of their status, who are being held by them in connection 
     with the conflict, for visits in accordance with the ICRC's 
     standard operating procedures;
       b. provide to the ICRC any and all information concerning 
     prisoners, as requested by the ICRC, by EIF + 14 days.
       2. The Parties shall provide information, through the 
     tracing mechanisms of the ICRC, to the families of all 
     persons who are unaccounted for. The Parties shall cooperate 
     fully with the ICRC in its efforts to determine the identity, 
     whereabouts, and fate of those unaccounted for.

                       Article XIII: Cooperation

       The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities 
     involved in implementation of this settlement, as described 
     in the Framework Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized 
     by the United Nations Security Council, including the 
     International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

             Article XIV: Notification to Military Commands

       Each Party shall ensure that the terms of this Chapter and 
     written orders requiring compliance are immediately 
     communicated to all of its Forces.

                Article XV: Final Authority To Interpret

       1. Subject to paragraph 2, the KFOR Commander is the final 
     authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Chapter 
     and his determinations are binding on all Parties and 
     persons.
       2. The CIM is the final authority in theater regarding 
     interpretation of the references in this Chapter to his 
     functions (directing the VJ Border Guards under Article II, 
     paragraph 3; his functions concerning the MUP under Article 
     VI) and his determinations are binding on all Parties and 
     persons.

                           Article XVI: K-Day

       The date of activation of KFOR--to be known as K-Day--shall 
     be determined by NATO.

                               Appendices

       A. Approved VJ/MUP Cantonment Sites
       B. Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force

              Appendix A: Approved VJ/MUP Cantonment Sites

       1. There are 13 approved cantonment sites in Kosovo for all 
     VJ units, weapons, equipment, and ammunition. Movement to 
     cantonment sites, and subsequent withdrawal from Kosovo, will 
     occur in accordance with this Chapter. As the phased 
     withdrawal of VJ units progresses along the timeline as 
     specified in this Chapter, COMKFOR will close selected 
     cantonment sites.
       2. Initial approved VJ cantonment sites:
       (a) Pristina SW 423913NO210819E.
       (b) Pristina Airfield 423412NO210040E
       (c) Vuctrin North 424936NO205227E.
       (d) Kosovska Mitrovica 425315NO205227E.
       (e) Gnjilane NE 422807NO212845E.
       (f) Urosevac 422233NO210753E.
       (g) Prizren 421315NO204504E.
       (h) Djakovica SW 422212NO202530E.
       (i) Pec 423910NO201728E.
       (j) Pristina Explosive Storage Fac 423636NO211225E.
       (k) Pristina Ammo Depot SW 423518NO205923E.
       (l) Pristina Ammo Depot 510 424211NO211056E.
       (m) Pristina Headquarters facility 423938NO210934E.
       3. Within each cantonment site, VJ units are required to 
     canton all heavy weapons and vehicles outside of storage 
     facilities.
       4. After EIF + 180 days, the remaining 2500 VJ forces 
     dedicated to border security functions provided for this 
     Agreement will be garrisoned and cantoned at the following 
     locations: Djakovica, Prizren, and Ursoevac; subordinate 
     border posts within the Border Zone; a limited number of 
     existing facilities in the immediate proximity of the Border 
     Zone subject to the prior approval of COMKFOR; and 
     headquarters/C2 and logistic support facilities in Pristina.
       5. There are 37 approved cantonment sites for all MUP and 
     Special Police force units in Kosovo. There are seven (7) 
     approved regional SUP's. Each of the 37 approved cantonment 
     sites will fall under the administrative control of one of 
     the regional SUPs. Movement to cantonment sites, and 
     subsequent withdrawal of MUP from Kosovo, will occur in 
     accordance with this Chapter.
       6. Approved MUP regional SUPs and cantonment sites:
       (a) Kosovska Mitrovica SUP 425300NO205200E.
       (1) Kosovska Mitrovica (2 locations)
       (2) Leprosavic
       (3) Srbica
       (4) Vucitrin
       (5) Zubin Potok
       (b) Pristina SUP 424000NO211000E.
       (1) Pristina (6 locations)
       (2) Glogovac
       (3) Kosovo Polje
       (4) Lipjan
       (5) Obilic
       (6) Podujevo
       (c) Pec SUP 423900NO201800E.
       (1) Pec (2 locations)
       (2) Klina
       (3) Istok
       (4) Malisevo
       (d) Djakovica SUP 422300NO202600E.
       (1) Djakovica (2 locations)
       (2) Decani
       (e) Urosevac SUP 422200NO2111000E.
       (1) Urosevac (2 locations)
       (2) Stimlje
       (3) Strpce
       (4) Kacanik
       (f) Gnjilane SUP 422800NO212900E.
       (1) Gnjilane (2 locations)
       (2) Kamenica
       (3) Vitina
       (4) Kosovska
       (5) Novo Brdo
       (g) Prizren SUP 421300NO204500E.
       (1) Prizxen (2 locations)
       (2) Orahovac
       (3) Suva Reka
       (4) Gora
       7. Within each cantonment site, MUP units are required to 
     canton all vehicles above 6 tons, including APCs and BOVs, 
     and all heavy weapons outside of storage facilities.
       8. KFOR will have the exclusive right to inspect any 
     cantonment site or any other location, at any time, without 
     interference from any Party.

   Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force

       1. For the purposes of this Appendix, the following 
     expressions shall have the meetings hereunder assigned to 
     them
       a. ``NATO'' means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     (NATO), its subsidiary bodies, its military Headquarters, the 
     NATO-led KFOR, and any elements/units forming any part of 
     KFOR or supporting KFOR, whether or not they are from a NATO 
     member country and whether or not they are under NATO or 
     national command and control, when acting in furtherance of 
     this Agreement.
       b. ``Authorities in the FRY'' means appropriate 
     authorities, whether Federal, Republic, Kosovo or other.
       c. ``NATO personnel'' means the military, civilian, and 
     contractor personnel assigned or attached to or employed by 
     NATO, including the mililtary, civilian, and contractor 
     personnel from non-NATO states participating in the 
     Operation, with the exception of personnel locally hired.
       d. ``the Operation'' means the support, implementation, 
     preparation, and participation by NATO and NATO personnel in 
     furtherance of this Chapter.
       e. ``Military Headquarters'' means any entity, whatever its 
     denomination, consisting of or constituted in part by NATO 
     military personnel established in order to fulfill the 
     Operation.
       f. ``Authorities'' means the appropriate responsible 
     individual, agency, or organization of the Parties.
       g. ``Contractor personnel'' means the technical experts or 
     functional specialists whose services are required by NATO 
     and who are in the territory of the FRY exclusively to

[[Page 8107]]

     serve NATO either in an advisory capacity in technical 
     matters, or for the setting up, operation, or maintenance of 
     equipment, unless they are:
       (1) nationals of the FRY; or
       (2) persons ordinarily resident in the FRY.
       h. ``Official use'' means any use of goods purchased, or of 
     the services received and intended for the performance of any 
     function as required by the operation of the Headquarters.
       i. ``Facilities'' means all buildings, structures, 
     premises, and land required for conducting the operational, 
     training, and administrative activities by NATO for the 
     Operation as well as for accommodation of NATO personnel.
       2. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities 
     under this Appendix, all NATO personnel shall respect the 
     laws applicable in the FRY, whether Federal, Republic, 
     Kosovo, or other, insofar as compliance with those laws is 
     compatible with the entrusted tasks/mandate and shall refrain 
     from activities not compatible with the nature of the 
     Operation.
       3. The Parties recognize the need for expeditious departure 
     and entry procedures for NATO personnel. Such personnel shall 
     be exempt from passport and visa regulations and the 
     registration requirements applicable to aliens. At all entry 
     and exit points to/from the FRY, NATO personnel shall be 
     permitted to enter/exit the FRY on production of a national 
     identification (ID) card. NATO personnel shall carry 
     identification which they may be requested to produce for the 
     authorities in the FRY, but operations, training, and 
     movement shall not be allowed to be impeded or delayed by 
     such requests.
       4. NATO military personnel shall normally wear uniforms, 
     and NATO personnel may posses and carry arms if authorized to 
     do so by their orders. The Parties shall accept as valid, 
     without tax or fee, drivers' licenses and permits issued to 
     NATO personnel by their respective national authorities.
       5. NATO shall be permitted to display the NATO flag and/or 
     national flags of its constituent national elements/units on 
     any NATO uniform, means of transport, or facility.
       6. a. NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether 
     civil, administrative, or criminal.
       b. NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all 
     times, shall be immune from the Parties' jurisdiction in 
     respect of any civil, administrative, criminal, or 
     disciplinary offenses which may be committed by them in the 
     FRY. The Parties shall assist States participating in the 
     Operation in the exercise of their jurisdiction over their 
     own nationals.
       c. Notwithstanding the above, and with the NATO Commander's 
     express agreement in each case, the authorities in the FRY 
     may exceptionally exercise jurisdiction in such matters, but 
     only in respect of Contractor personnel who are not subject 
     to the jurisdiction of their nation of citizenship.
       7. NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest, 
     investigation, or detention by the authorities in the FRY. 
     NATO personnel erroneously arrested or detained shall 
     immediately be turned over to NATO authorities.
       8. NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their 
     vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and 
     unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY 
     including associated airspace and territorial waters. This 
     shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, 
     maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities 
     as required for support, training, and operations.
       9. NATO shall be exempt from duties, taxes, and other 
     charges and inspections and custom regulations including 
     providing inventories or other routine customs documentation, 
     for personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, 
     supplies, and provisions entering, exiting, or transiting the 
     territory of the FRY in support of the Operation.
       10. The authorities in the FRY shall facilitate, on a 
     priority basis and with all appropriate means, all movement 
     of personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, or 
     supplies, through or in the airspace, ports, airports, or 
     roads used. No charges may be assessed against NATO for air 
     navigation, landing, or takeoff of aircraft, whether 
     government-owned or chartered. Similarly, no duties, dues, 
     tolls or charges may be assessed against NATO ships, whether 
     government-owned or chartered, for the mere entry and exit of 
     ports. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft used in support of the 
     Operation shall not be subject to licensing or registration 
     requirements, nor commercial insurance.
       11. NATO is granted the use of airports, roads, rails, and 
     ports without payment of fees, duties, dues, tolls, or 
     charges occasioned by mere use. NATO shall not, however, 
     claim exemption from reasonable charges for specific services 
     requested and received, but operations/movement and access 
     shall not be allowed to be impeded pending payment for such 
     services.
       12. NATO personnel shall be exempt from taxation by the 
     Parties on the salaries and emoluments received from NATO and 
     on any income received from outside the FRY.
       13. NATO personnel and their tangible moveable property 
     imported into, acquired in, or exported from the FRY shall be 
     exempt from all duties, taxes, and other charges and 
     inspections and custom regulations.
       14. NATO shall be allowed to import and to export, free of 
     duty, taxes and other charges, such equipment, provisions, 
     and supplies as NATO shall require for the Operation, 
     provided such goods are for the official use of NATO or for 
     sale to NATO personnel. Goods sold shall be solely for the 
     use of NATO personnel and not transferable to unauthorized 
     persons.
       15. The Parties recognize that the use of communications 
     channels is necessary for the Operation. NATO shall be 
     allowed to operate its own internal mail services. The 
     Parties shall, upon simple request, grant all 
     telecommunications services, including broadcast services, 
     needed for the Operation, as determined by NATO. This shall 
     include the right to utilize such means and services as 
     required to assure full ability to communicate, and the right 
     to use all of the electro-magnetic spectrum for this purpose, 
     free of cost. In implementing this right, NATO shall make 
     every reasonable effort to coordinate with and take into 
     account the needs and requirements of appropriate authorities 
     in the FRY.
       16. The Parties shall provide, free of cost, such public 
     facilities as NATO shall require to prepare for and execute 
     the Operation. The Parties shall assist NATO in obtaining, at 
     the lowest rate, the necessary utilities, such as 
     electricity, water, gas and other resources, as NATO shall 
     require for the Operation.
       17. NATO and NATO personnel shall be immune from claims of 
     any sort which arise out of activities in pursuance of the 
     Operation; however, NATO will entertain claims on an ex 
     gratia basis.
       18. NATO shall be allowed to contract directly for the 
     acquisition of goods, services, and construction from any 
     source within and outside the FRY. Such contracts, goods, 
     services, and construction shall be subject to the payment of 
     duties, taxes, or other charges. NATO may also carry out 
     construction works with their own personnel.
       19. Commercial undertakings operating in the FRY only in 
     the service of NATO shall be exempt from local laws and 
     regulations with respect to the terms and conditions of their 
     employment and licensing and registration of employees, 
     businesses, and corporations.
       20. NATO may hire local personnel who on an individual 
     basis shall remain subject to local laws and regulations with 
     the exception of labor/employment laws. However, local 
     personnel hired by NATO shall:
       a. be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken 
     or written and all acts performed by them in their official 
     capacity;
       b. be immune from national services and/or national 
     military service obligations;
       c. be subject only to employment terms and conditions 
     established by NATO; and
       d. be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments 
     paid to them by NATO.
       21. In carrying out its authorities under this Chapter, 
     NATO is authorized to detain individuals and, as quickly as 
     possible, turn them over to appropriate officials.
       22. NATO may, in the conduct of the Operation, have need to 
     make improvements or modifications to certain infrastructure 
     in the FRY, such as roads, bridges, tunnels, buildings, and 
     utility systems. Any such improvements or modifications of a 
     non-temporary nature shall become part of and in the same 
     ownership as that infrastructure. Temporary improvements or 
     modifications may be removed at the discretion of the NATO 
     Commander, and the infrastructure returned to as near its 
     original condition as possible, fair wear and tear excepted.
       23. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with the regard 
     to the interpretation or application of this Appendix shall 
     be settled between NATO and the appropriate authorities in 
     the FRY.
       24. Supplementary arrangements with any of the Parties may 
     be concluded to facilitate any details connected with the 
     Operation.
       25. The provisions of this Appendix shall remain in force 
     until completion of the Operation or as the Parties and NATO 
     otherwise agree.

                               CHAPTER 8

         Amendment, Comprehensive Assessment, and Final Clauses

           Article I: Amendment and Comprehensive Assessment

       1. Amendments to this Agreement shall be adopted by 
     agreement of all the Parties, except as otherwise provided by 
     Article X of Chapter 1.
       2. Each Party may propose amendments at any time and will 
     consider and consult with the other Parties with regard to 
     proposed amendments.
       3. Three years after the entry into force of this 
     Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to 
     determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on 
     the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant 
     authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the 
     implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, 
     and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the 
     implementation of this Agreement and to consider proposals by 
     any Party for additional measures.

                       Article II: Final Clauses

       1. This Agreement is signed in the English language. After 
     signature of this Agreement,

[[Page 8108]]

     translations will be made into Serbian, Albanian, and other 
     languages of the national communities of Kosovo, and attached 
     to the English text.
       2. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

  Mr. NICKLES. I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma. I 
appreciate his involvement, and deep involvement, in this issue. I 
respect his views.
  I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Illinois, Senator Durbin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator from Arizona and ask if I may enlarge 
that time to 20 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. I have no objection.
  Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. President, I am joining today in this discussion and debate on 
what is a critically important issue not just for the current challenge 
facing America in the Balkans but also, frankly, in terms of the 
history of Congress and this Nation.
  I feel very strongly about that provision of the Constitution which 
gives to Congress, and Congress alone, the authority to declare war. It 
is, unfortunately, a power allotted to Congress which for the past 50 
years has been largely ignored.
  One day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, President Franklin 
Roosevelt hobbled to the podium of the House of Representatives and 
gave his memorable speech referring to a day which would ``live in 
infamy.'' He then asked from a joint session of Congress for a 
declaration of war, first against Japan and then later against Germany 
and Italy.
  That was literally the last time a President came before Congress and 
recognized the authority of Congress to declare war. Every subsequent 
President--Democrat and Republican alike--found an excuse not to come 
before Congress and to wage wars of varying magnitude.
  It is curious, when you look back after World War II, at the debate 
on the formation of NATO and of the United Nations, how careful the 
Members of Congress from both political parties were to preserve the 
authority of Congress to declare war, to make certain that we would not 
delegate that authority to any international institution or any treaty 
organization. Time and time again during the course of that debate we 
were reminded that even as members of the United Nations, even as 
members of NATO, we were not ceding the power of Congress under the 
Constitution to declare war.
  The steady decline of congressional involvement in the war-making 
process resulted, of course, in our participation in Korea, in Vietnam, 
in a dozen other military undertakings without the express approval of 
Congress.
  Last year, I stood on the floor of this institution and asked my 
colleagues--Democrats and Republicans alike--to join me in reasserting 
the principle that Congress, and Congress alone, has the authority to 
declare war and to engage in any offensive military action. Yes, the 
President is Commander in Chief and defends American personnel, 
American territory, and does it without coming to Congress waiting for 
a quorum and a debate and a final vote before he acts. No one would 
ever demand that a President restrain that authority to defend this 
country or its people. But in the case of an offensive military action, 
one where we were not defending Americans, or our territory, or engaged 
in some peacekeeping permissive activity, I felt the Constitution was 
clear. I offered that amendment to the defense appropriations bill last 
year.
  For those who are keeping score at home, they might be interested to 
know that 15 of the 100 Senators voted in favor of my resolution, and 
84 in opposition.
  It will be interesting to take the debate on this resolution and the 
statements made by so many of my colleagues and put them next to that 
vote and ask them if there has been a change of heart. I think to some 
extent there has been. I think it is unfortunate that we are 
considering this particular resolution and that we will have little 
chance to amend it.
  I strongly agree with my colleagues who drafted the resolution that 
Congress must vote to authorize any escalation of this conflict to 
include ground troops. I filed an amendment that would prohibit the use 
of ground troops to invade Yugoslavia unless specifically authorized by 
Congress. The President said he doesn't intend to use ground troops. He 
has promised in a letter to congressional leaders that he will ask for 
a vote of Congress before introducing United States ground forces into 
Kosovo in a nonpermissive environment.
  I think the President must come to Congress before committing us to 
any ground war. I think it would better for us to vote on that 
specifically. But I understand that a motion to table Senate Joint 
Resolution 20 will be made and that it is not likely that I will be 
able to offer this amendment.
  I did vote for Senate Concurrent Resolution 21 on March 23 that 
supported airstrikes against Yugoslavia. It passed by a vote of 58 to 
41. I commend the President and this administration for giving the 
Senate at least an opportunity to vote before any action was taken. 
That is a concession that has rarely been made by any President. Most 
Presidents moved forward as if the Constitution did not exist in terms 
of congressional authority.
  I support the President and NATO's policy. I think we need to have 
patience and resolve to see the air campaign through. Many have 
questioned the strategy of conducting an air campaign without 
committing ground troops.
  This is an important debate. But I believe we had no choice but to 
start the bombing campaign in an attempt to respond to ethnic 
cleansing, the genocide in Kosovo. We could not stand idly by and watch 
it happen.
  I have listened to the speeches on the floor from some of my 
colleagues who take exception to the premise that the United States 
should even be involved in this conflict. I do not agree with that. 
Frankly, having been there, having seen literally thousands of people 
in a refugee camp in Brazda in Macedonia, it is clear to me what is 
going on. The policies of Milosevic in Yugoslavia are directed toward 
innocent people.
  Time and time again I asked these innocent Kosovars why they left 
Kosovo--an open-ended question. Time and time again the response was 
exactly the same. In the middle of the night a knock on the door, 
people in black ski masks, or otherwise concealed identity, gave them 
literally minutes to leave: Pick up your babies, pick up your 
grandparents and whatever you can hold, and leave, because we are going 
to burn down or blow up your home. If they were lucky, they got out. 
They got out with a family intact. But many were not so fortunate. They 
were victims of ethnic cleansing--not just displacement but murder. So 
many times over and over we hear these stories of murder, of genocide 
against people, not because they have done anything wrong but because 
they are of the wrong ethnic persuasion, the wrong culture, the wrong 
religious belief.
  I am not sure what the word ``genocide'' means technically. But what 
I have seen is the closest I may come to it in my lifetime in that 
refugee camp in Macedonia--victims of murder, rape, displacement, 
genocide, suffering. These are the people forced out of Kosovo.
  Some of my colleagues will come to the floor and say that is none of 
our business, we can't be the policeman to the world; the United States 
has limited capability, limited responsibility. That is a point of view 
that I would disagree with but I understand. We certainly cannot police 
the world. But the fact is, we are part of a NATO alliance which is 
being tested in terms of its existence and its future. If NATO does not 
come forward at this moment in time unified and determined to rid 
Milosevic of his killing fields in Kosovo, the NATO alliance is all but 
moribund and dead and pointless.
  For the 20th century, we have invested so much in American treasures, 
in American lives to preserve Europe: World War I, World War II, and 
the cold war--thousands and thousands of Americans fighting and dying 
for the

[[Page 8109]]

stability and safety and security of Europe.
  Now in the closing moments of this century are we to walk away from 
this corner of the world which has been so important in our alliance in 
the past? Are we to ignore the barbarism being practiced by Slobodan 
Milosevic? Are we to say that a man who has initiated four wars in 10 
years can now start another war if he cares to, find more innocent 
victims for his policy of ethnic cleansing? Should we, as the United 
States, step back as the lead nation in this important alliance and 
declare it is over? I hope not.
  I think President Clinton is right. Fighting this war at this moment 
in time is critically important because it will validate the future of 
NATO. I hope for a generation, perhaps even a century of peace in a 
Europe that has been torn with warfare too many times.
  The critical question in Senate Joint Resolution 20 is how far do we 
go. I voted for airstrikes, I mentioned earlier. But this resolution 
goes further. I read it in its entirety in the resolution clause:

       That the President is authorized to use all necessary force 
     and other means in concert with United States allies to 
     accomplish United States and North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization objectives in the Federal Republic of 
     Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro.

  I cannot support that. As much as I support the current air war, as 
much as I support our efforts to stop ethnic cleansing by Slobodan 
Milosevic, I cannot support committing ground troops. I think that is a 
mistake.
  I made a point during my recent visit to ask military experts how it 
would be accomplished. How can we send troops in the field and 
accomplish this goal? Time and time again the answer came back: With 
great difficulty. We don't have the port facility that we can rely on. 
Frankly, we can't look at the nations surrounding Yugoslavia and find a 
ready entry strategy. What we would have to do would be elaborate, 
costly, expensive, time consuming, and dangerous.
  That is why, though I support the air war, I don't support the 
concept of sending ground troops. I don't believe it is necessary nor 
practical, and I don't think we should do it. This resolution is open 
ended and gives the President authority for ground troops and beyond.
  Just last week, the House of Representatives considered this issue. I 
am sorry to say, about an institution where I served for 14 years and 
one which I hold in the highest regard, that it was not one of their 
finer moments. It was an aimless, pointless, confusing debate. At a 
time when the American people needed clarity and leadership from the 
Congress, they received neither. They voted not to expand the war; they 
voted not to pull out; and then by a tie vote they failed to pass a 
resolution even supporting the current air war in place in Kosovo and 
in Yugoslavia.
  I am not sure what message was sent. We spend a lot of time here on 
Capitol Hill talking about sending messages as if we are some sort of 
e-mail source or Western Union. But that was a very confused day for 
America, and I am sure the confusion was felt around the world.
  I hope our vote here does not lead to the same misunderstanding. I 
think it is likely that this resolution, because it is so broad and 
open ended, will be tabled. The decision made by that, I believe, that 
we will continue the Senate approval of the air war, we will not give 
to this President something he has not asked for--the authority to 
commit ground troops or whatever other power is in his hands.
  How did we reach this point where we have to debate whether Congress 
will exercise its constitutional authority? I think there are several 
reasons. By attrition we have given back to the executive branch the 
conduct not only of foreign policy but of the military as well, without 
any real reference for the language of the Constitution. We have said 
fundamentally, Mr. President, it is your decision to make.
  I think it reflects many things. I think it reflects historical 
attrition. I think it also reflects a timidity on the part of Congress 
in terms of getting its hands dirty, involved in a military struggle 
that might result in American casualties. That is a sad commentary 
because the American people count on us to come forward during the 
course of debate and with as much clarity as possible to explain the 
choices and to make the call in terms of our military and foreign 
policy.
  I think, unfortunately, this resolution by Senators McCain, Biden, 
and others, does not express the feelings of Congress today. I think if 
there were a resolution in the Senate as to whether or not we should 
continue this air war, as the President has proposed, it again will 
pass as it did on March 23. This idea of expanding beyond goes too far.
  I listened to the Senator from Virginia argue earlier that Congress 
has a very limited, if any, role, when it comes to the declaration of 
war. I disagree with him on that score. I believe there is an important 
element here that must be remembered. The words of James Madison aptly 
summarize the founders of this country and their thinking on this point 
when he said:
  In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in 
the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the 
legislature, and not to the executive department. . .[T]he trust and 
the temptation would be too great for any one man. . ..Hence it has 
grown into an axiom that the executive is the department of power most 
distinguished by its propensity to war; hence it is the practice of all 
states, in proportion as they are free, to disarm this propensity of 
its influence.

  It is hard to imagine a clearer situation for acting on the Congress' 
war power than the situation we face with Yugoslavia and Kosovo today.
  I have offered a resolution which states that if the President seeks 
to expand this war beyond the current air war approved earlier by 
Senate resolution, it would require Senate approval. I think with that 
type of resolution we would continue to assert our constitutional 
authority to authorize military activity and to draw clear, bright 
lines as to the extent that the President can go.
  I understand the Senator from Arizona, and I have heard him speak 
many times on the floor and in the press about his belief that we 
should give to this President all power necessary to complete the war. 
I appreciate his point of view, though I respectfully disagree with 
him. I think that involvement in a ground war could be costly and, 
frankly, not the result for which the American people are looking.
  I hope during the course of this debate several things come through 
loudly and clearly. First, regardless of your point of view on this 
resolution, we support the men and women in uniform. Regardless of 
party preference, we are here in support of their actions. I am proud 
of what I have seen and what I am sure will continue in their service 
to this country.
  Second, we condemn the ethnic cleansing policy of Slobodan Milosevic. 
He has picked on innocent victims time and time again, and this type of 
genocide must come to an end.
  Third, any expansion of this war beyond the current military 
undertaking must be with the consent of the American people through 
their elected Representatives in Congress. I hope, regardless of what 
the vote may be on this resolution tomorrow, that that will be a 
principle which the President will continuing to abide by.
  I believe NATO has a future. I certainly believe that America has a 
future in its leadership in the world. We are being tested in the 
Balkans. I want to pass that test so the 21st century is a century of 
peace.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise today as a cosponsor of the 
pending resolution authorizing the use of ``all necessary force and 
other means'' to address the crisis in Kosovo. I know our vote will be 
a procedural one, and that the Senate may well vote to table the 
resolution.
  I would therefore urge my colleagues to demonstrate their support for 
the resolution by joining the distinguished senior Senator from 
Arizona, Senator McCain, and the Ranking Member of

[[Page 8110]]

the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Biden, and others who have 
cosponsored this legislation.
  I am heartened by this bipartisan support for President Clinton's 
leadership of NATO efforts to stop the killing in Kosovo and allow 
ethnic Albanians to return and rebuild their homes under the protection 
of a NATO-led peacekeeping force.
  Mr. President, we are not debating whether our values and interests 
merit the engagement of our armed forces.
  President Bush first issued the so-called Christmas warning in 1992, 
threatening the use of force if Yugoslav forces moved against Kosovo. 
President Clinton renewed that pledge soon after taking the oath of 
office for the first time. Unlike our colleagues in the other body, the 
Senate clearly voted to authorize the President to conduct air 
operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavia.
  Why did we do so? Why does the fate of ethnic Albanians in a province 
of what remains of Yugoslavia matter to the American people?
  Because fundamental United States interests and values are at stake.
  The first is the credibility of the United States as a moral leader 
in establishing rules of civilized behavior among countries, to take a 
stand against mass killings and mass rapes and mass expulsions of 
innocent civilians wherever they occur.
  The second is the promise of developed nations banding together to 
enforce these standards of conduct, as members of NATO are doing 
through joint military action against Belgrade.
  At the fiftieth anniversary Summit, the leaders of nineteen 
democracies strengthened the Euro-Atlantic partnership so we can more 
often act--particularly in Europe--in concert with allies who generally 
share our interests and values and who have the capability to undertake 
fully integrated military operations alongside U.S. armed forces.
  Those nineteen heads of state and government were joined by the 
leaders of many other nations in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
expressing solidarity to address the threat to European security from 
the Milosevic regime in Belgrade.
  Third is the credibility of United States threatening the use of 
force when appropriate.
  We have followed through on declarations made by President Bush and 
President Clinton. Now we must prevail. Otherwise, our leadership 
around the world will not be taken seriously, and we may find our 
interests threatened more in the future.
  Fourth, we must stop conflicts early, before a small but intense fire 
becomes a widespread conflagration.
  We must help neighboring states, particularly Albania and Macedonia 
and Montenegro, confront the challenge of helping hundreds of thousands 
of ethnic Albanians driven out of their native Kosovo. We have already 
seen the pressure which Belgrade has brought to bear by flooding these 
countries with refugees.
  One cannot fully predict what will happen if we do not prevail, 
stopping these crimes against humanity, this genocide in the Balkans, 
rather than permitting this abhorrent behavior to become an ordinary 
means of controlling events.
  Finally, I would remind my colleagues, Mr. President, that Milosevic 
and his police and military forces are killing people and raping women 
and driving families from their homes based on their ethnicity--they 
are committing unacceptable acts. We have an obligation and a 
responsibility to act to stop genocide.
  We cannot stand by and allow these massacres to continue and claim to 
stand for what is right in this world?
  Mr. President, the United States Senate has already decided that our 
national interests and values justify the engagement of our armed 
forces. NATO air power has struck targets in Yugoslavia for more than a 
month now.
  There are signs Belgrade's will to resist may be faltering. 
Therefore, we should not be showing weakness, because civilized values 
will certainly be under assault.
  We must have history reflect that such appalling behavior will 
trigger sharp rebuff by democratic, life-respecting nations.
  Milosevic cannot seriously question the military superiority of NATO. 
Despite some losses, we have managed to sustain a serious air campaign 
with relative impunity. We have overwhelming force on our side.
  Milosevic is instead pinning his hopes on NATO lacking the unity and 
political will to use the necessary force to prevail.
  The time has come to disabuse him of these delusions. This resolution 
will tell Milosevic that we are prepared to do whatever it takes to 
halt and reverse his campaign of terror against the people of Kosovo.
  Let me address some of the questions raised by my colleagues who may 
not support the pending legislation: Does this Resolution mean the 
United States and our NATO allies will fight their way into Kosovo on 
the ground? Should we not give air power more time to be effective? Why 
not negotiate an end to the conflict?
  The resolution would authorize the President ``to use all necessary 
force and other means, in concert with United States allies. . . .'' 
That would authorize use of resources if the President determines this 
is necessary. The President has asked us to be patient, to give air 
power time to achieve Belgrade's acceptance of NATO conditions.
  While I am reluctant to wait while the killing and the rapes and the 
expulsions continue, as a practical matter it will take some time--
perhaps months--to plan and mount a ground campaign. NATO Secretary 
General Solana has rightly decided to update plans for the use of 
ground forces to liberate Kosovo and escort more than a million 
displaced Kosovars back to their homes.
  By signaling our readiness to commit ground forces if necessary, we 
can actually improve prospects for Belgrade's capitulation. In any 
case, the United States should participate in an international force to 
maintain stability and protect the civilian population of Kosovo, 
though our European partners will appropriately take the lead in such 
an effort.
  Negotiations are taking place. Former Russian Prime Minister Victor 
Chernomyrdin, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, and others 
are trying to mediate a solution. This is all well and good, so long as 
these mediators understand that we will not negotiate away the 
principles NATO has set out as conditions for an end to the bombing.
  We all appreciate Reverend Jesse Jackson's courageous intervention to 
secure the release of the three American soldiers captured on the 
Yugoslav/Macedonian border. However, we cannot accept the ostensibly 
humane act of their release as a license for Milosevic's forces to 
continue the mayhem, rape, and killing they are committing even as we 
speak.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
a description from the New York Times of a singular atrocity.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                 [From the New York Times, May 3, 1999]

              Survivor Tells of Massacre at Kosovo Village

                          (By Anthony DePalma)

       Kukes, Albania, May 2--It lasted no more than three 
     minutes, three minutes of savagery unleashed without even a 
     word. ``They just started shooting and I got hit in the 
     shoulder. the dead bodies behind me pushed me over the cliff 
     and into the stream. I was lucky because all of the dead 
     bodies fell on top of me.''
       Isuf Zheniqi, who said he survived when 58 men died in a 
     massacre near Bela Crkva in southwestern Kosovo more than a 
     month ago, speaks out hesitantly, fearing Serbian forces 
     might take revenge on members of his family still in Kosovo.
       But after crawling out from under the bodies of his 
     relatives, neighbors and friends, with a bullet from a 
     Serbian automatic rifle embedded in his right shoulder and 
     horrors filling his head, he has carried around the names of 
     almost all the men who died that day.
       In crimped handwriting he puts them down on the pages of an 
     address book, name after name of old men, young boys, 
     teenagers and men, like himself, who were suspected by the 
     Serbs of belonging to the Kosovo Liberation Army, which is 
     fighting to make Kosovo independent from Serbia.
       He remembers the names of all but one. But he knows there 
     were 58 because he

[[Page 8111]]

     helped bury them, each one with a written name.
       As refugees from Kosovo continue to flee across the border, 
     the accounts of atrocities committed by Serbian forces in 
     Kosovo multiply: a killing spree in the village of Velika 
     Krusa, the rampage of troops through the streets of 
     Djakovica, the slaughter of up to 100 men in the village of 
     Meja.
       Accounts from different refugees are consistent enough to 
     lend a great deal of credibility to some. But eyewitness 
     accounts by survivors like Mr. Zheniqi are rare, either 
     because the killing was done efficiently enough to prevent 
     survivors, or because the sheer terror of minutes like those 
     on the embankment at Bela Crkva prevents survivors from 
     recounting their ordeals.
       Mr. Zheniqi said that when he was brought across the border 
     by relatives he told human rights investigators what had 
     happened at Bela Crkva. But until now, he has not given 
     journalists a full account of his experience.
       Human Rights Watch separately interviewed Mr. Zheniqi and 
     four other witnesses, who corroborated parts of his account.
       Mr. Zheniqi was the only one who testified that he saw the 
     actual killing, Human Rights Watch officials said. Four women 
     who were separated from the men at Bela Crkva heard the shots 
     as they were walking to Zrze and later returned to see the 
     bodies.
       And other refugees told Human Rights Watch that they were 
     among the group of 20 or so people who returned the day after 
     the killings to bury the bodies.
       ``All the witnesses gave us highly credible and unusually 
     consistent accounts of what happened at Bela Crkva,'' said 
     Fred Abrahams of Human Rights Watch. ``They corroborated what 
     the eyewitness told us.''
       The other witnesses appear to have left Kukes since they 
     were interviewed. It was impossible to confirm the killings 
     independently, beyond the refugee accounts, since reporters 
     and independent investigators have been unable to visit that 
     area of Kosovo since the bombing started.
       Today Mr. Zheniqi lives in a Kukes pool hall, with his 
     daughter and her family. He cannot use his right arm because 
     of the bullet wound, and during the days he can often be seen 
     dozing in the sun outside the pool hall, trying to steal some 
     moments of the rest that eludes him every night because of 
     his terrible dreams.
       ``My daughter tells me `Father, sleep, why don't you 
     sleep?' '' Mr. Zheniqi said. ``But I can't. All those dead 
     bodies on top of mine. When I meet someone from Kosovo and 
     they ask me what happened, I cry. I'm embarrassed, because 
     I'm 39 years old and I'm crying.''
       The slightly built farmer, who worked for eight years in 
     Switzerland before returning to the fertile soil of 
     southwestern Kosovo, said that before the turmoil in Kosovo 
     began over a year ago, he had almost no contact with Serbs 
     living nearby.
       But the area was a known stronghold of the Kosovo 
     Liberation Army, and the Serbs were advancing ruthlessly on 
     rebel positions, including the area of Bela Crkva. Mr. 
     Zheniqi said that he was not a member of the rebel force and 
     that none of those killed had any connection to the Kosovo 
     Liberation Army.
       At 9:30 in the morning, Mr. Zheniqi said, 16 special 
     policemen appeared, shooting their automatic weapons in the 
     air. Two families had strayed from the group and Mr. Zheniqi 
     said the Serbs opened fire, killing every member of both 
     except for a 2-year-old boy who had been protected by his 
     mother.
       ``She hid the baby in front of her and saved him,'' Zheniqi 
     said, His lips quivered and he could not talk. When he 
     continued, he said, ``I saw this with my own eyes, maybe 150 
     feet from me.
       The Serbs then shot their rifles in the air again and 
     shouted, in Albanian, ``Get up and come here.''
       The villagers climbed up the banks of the stream with their 
     hands over their heads. When they reached the train trestle, 
     the men were separated from the women and children, and 
     ordered to strip down to their undershorts.
       About 3:30 A.M. on March 25, on the First night of NATO 
     bombings in Yugoslavia, Serbian forces started their 
     operation, Mr. Zheniqi said. He said he saw about a dozen 
     Serbian tanks take positions in Bela Crkva. ``One was in 
     front of my house,'' he said. Anticipating violence, he took 
     his family and his brother's family--17 people in all--and 
     ran to the nearby mountains to hide.
       When the streets again fell silent, they returned, thinking 
     the tanks has moved on. But they hadn't. Smoke soon rose from 
     the houses of Bela Crkva that were closest to the road from 
     Prizren to Rahovec. Mr. Zheniqi and his family fled again, 
     this time scrambling down the deep banks of a large nearby 
     stream. It was about 4:30 A.M.
       ``The people from the whole village started to collect 
     there in the stream,'' he said. They went to a place he 
     called Ura e Bellase, where a train trestle crossed the 
     stream. About 800 villagers tried to hide beneath the bridge.
       After daybreak, the villagers tried to move toward Zrze and 
     Rogovo, two nearby hamlets they thought would be safe. But 
     Serbian snipers followed their movements.
       The police then went through their belongings, Mr. Zheniqi 
     said, taking anything of value. A local doctor trainee, Nesim 
     Popaj, tried to talk to the police in Serbian because his 
     nephew, Shendet Popaj, 17, had been thrown on the ground and 
     was under a policeman's boot.
       ``The Serb looked at the doctor, said just two or three 
     words, and told him to move over a bit,'' Mr. Zheniqi said. 
     ``Then he shot him. We were shocked. The man was a captain 
     using an automatic rifle. He wore a green camouflage uniform, 
     and on his shoulders were stars. I don't know his name, but 
     he was tall and he had a scrunched-up mouth. I could 
     recognize his picture easily.''
       The women and children were sent to Zrze. The men were 
     allowed to get dressed and then were forced to move over to 
     the high ground above the stream. Mr. Zheniqi was in the 
     first line, at the edge of the stream bank, with many men 
     behind him.
       ``We tried to say something to the Serbs but they didn't 
     let us,'' Mr. Zheniqi said. ``If we tried they just said, 
     `Shut up.' We all cried. Sahid Popaj cried from the moment we 
     were forced to take off our clothes to the moment he died. He 
     just cried.''
       The shooting started without a word from the policemen. 
     Several of them standing just behind the villagers opened 
     fire with automatic weapons. Being farthest away from the 
     gunmen provided Mr. Zheniqi with some cover, but he was 
     struck by a bullet in his right shoulder. The shooting lasted 
     about three minutes, he said. The weight of the men falling 
     behind him pushed him over into the stream.
       He fell about six feet, landing in the water. ``At that 
     moment, I was just thinking of getting to one stone and from 
     there holding my head above the water. I stayed there like a 
     dead man for a total of maybe 20 minutes.''
       The terror has not ended. The policemen lowered themselves 
     down the embankment.
       ``I heard someone telling a guy in the stream: `He's 
     breathing, shoot him; he's breathing, shoot him,' '' Mr. 
     Zheniqi said. They found nine men who had hidden themselves 
     in the bushes, and killed them.
       He waited another 15 minutes, and when all was quiet he 
     pull himself out from under the weight of his dead friends 
     and relatives. That was when he saw the extent of what had 
     happened in Bela Crkva. ``There in the stream, I saw terrible 
     things: men without eyes, men with half their heads blown 
     off.''
       He staggered to Zrze, where he found some of his family and 
     told them about the killing. He said the men organized a 
     group to go back to the stream, but Mr. Zheniqi was not among 
     them. He said they found four other survivors, and piled them 
     into the wagon behind their tractor, dodging sniper fire. On 
     the way back, two of the survivors died.
       The following day, about 20 villagers from Bela Crkva 
     returned to the stream to bury the dead. Already, they were 
     thinking of justice and the memory of those who had been 
     mowed down in three minutes.
       ``We wrote the names of all the dead on separate pieces of 
     paper,'' Mr. Zheniqi said. Then we put the papers inside 
     plastic soda bottles. There was one name in each bottle. We 
     put the bottle inside the grave, not on top. And we buried 
     them, not far from the stream.''

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, our cause is just. Our objectives are 
reasonable. President Clinton has thus far insisted that Kosovo be 
granted substantial autonomy within the borders of Yugoslavia.
  We should be prepared to do whatever is necessary to prevail, to stop 
the killing and the rapes and the expulsions, to reverse ethnic 
cleansing.
  We must stand up for what is right. I hope my colleagues will agree 
and will join me in supporting this legislation.
  Mr. President, I plan to vote against the motion to table the 
Resolution. I believe the Senate has the right and the responsibility 
to clearly address this issue.
  And I hope that this Senate, given the opportunity to vote on the 
Resolution, will rise to the occasion and clearly authorize the 
President to do what it takes, together with our NATO allies, to 
prevail over the Milosevic regime, to stop the killing in Kosovo and 
help bring peace and stability to a troubled region of Europe.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, on its face, this resolution is hard to 
challenge. Of course, we want to do whatever it takes to win a conflict 
we are engaged in. However, voting for this Resolution, while appealing 
to my instincts, would go against what I believe to be my obligation. 
This Resolution is essentially a Declaration of War--a Declaration of 
War that the President hasn't even requested. It would give to the 
President a blank check for an indefinite period of time, regardless of 
any changes in circumstances. It does not even require that we act in 
concert with our NATO allies.
  Congress's Constitutional authority to declare war presupposes that 
the

[[Page 8112]]

President will support such action. In each of the five wars for which 
Congress has passed Declarations of War, none have come without a 
specific presidential request. This resolution today, however, would 
grant the President authority he has not sought, based on the War 
Powers Resolution he does not recognize, to fight a ground war he has 
promised he will not undertake.
  If the Commander in Chief decides that we need ground troops in 
Yugoslavia, then he should come to the Congress and request them. At 
that time, the Congress would have the opportunity to ask certain 
questions, such as:
  What are our vital national interests here?
  What are our military and political objectives?
  Do we propose to take Belgrade or parts or all of Kosovo?
  How do we propose to get our troops into the battle area?
  How many troops will it take?
  How many casualties do we expect?
  What will be the make up of the NATO ground forces?

       e.g., how many U.S. troops?

  How long will it take us to achieve our objectives?
  How thinly spread will we be left in other places in the world where 
we have military commitments?
  What is the overall commitment level of our NATO allies, both with 
regard to such an operation and with regard to its aftermath?
  When and if that time comes, I will ask these questions and others 
and listen carefully to the answers. I will give it careful 
consideration and cast my vote depending upon the circumstances that 
exist at that time. If we pass this Resolution now, however, I fear 
that these important questions will never be answered.
  When Congress was first consulted with regard to the air campaign in 
Yugoslavia, it was done almost as an afterthought, after the 
Administration had already made its decision to begin bombing. Many of 
us felt at the time what we should all now know with certainty--that 
Administration officials had not adequately considered all of the 
ramifications of what they were doing. On the heels of that experience, 
should Congress now, when the stakes have been raised much higher, 
authorize and even pressure the Administration to fight a ground war 
that they are clearly not prepared to fight? Does the Senate not want 
answers to why and how a ground campaign would work--the kind of 
answers that we should have demanded before the Senate voted to approve 
the air campaign?
  And with regard to the timing of this resolution, some now suggest 
that more time should be devoted to debating this issue and I agree. 
However, this argument is being made a little late. It would have been 
more helpful if we had had a more extended discussion of this issue at 
a time when it might have had more relevance--before the final decision 
for the bombing campaign was made. At that time, the President should 
have explained to the Congress and the American people why going to war 
in the Balkans was in our national interest. We should have demanded 
it. However, he didn't and the Senate, after a debate under a 30 minute 
time agreement, gave pro forma approval to a decision that had already 
been made.
  And now in the middle of a bombing campaign that the President still 
says will achieve our objectives, we are asked to cast another vote 
that will have no effect. So be it. But I would hope that in the future 
we would take up these matters earlier in the process and not let the 
President present them to us as a fait accompli. Perhaps then the two 
branches of government could come together with some unity of purpose 
and we could all go to the American people with a clear message about 
our intent and about our interests. What we are witnessing now in the 
disunity of the Congress and among the American people is the result of 
our failure to do that.
  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I will be voting to table S.J. Res. 20, 
which would authorize the President to use all necessary force against 
Yugoslavia.
  On March 23, I voted along with 58 of my colleagues to authorize the 
use of air strikes against Yugoslavia. I deplore the actions of 
Slobodan Milosevic, a dictator who has caused pain and suffering for 
all the peace-loving people of the region. The decision to launch 
airstrikes was made only after the Administration and NATO worked 
diligently to bring a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Kosovo. 
There was, and continues to be, an international consensus that 
Milosevic's actions demand our continued use of air power. I continue 
to hope that air strikes will pave the way for an end to hostilities in 
the region, a return of refugees to Kosovo, and an autonomy arrangement 
that can be supported by all. The possibility of a diplomatic 
resolution to this conflict is very much alive.
  Thus, the resolution before us today is premature. The President has 
not indicated that he intends to expand the use of force here, he has 
not indicated any immediate plans to use ground troops, nor has he 
asked us to fund such an expansion of the conflict in Kosovo. Thus, I 
must vote to table this resolution.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise today with deep concern over the 
Clinton Administration's policy regarding Yugoslavia and Kosovo.
  I have observed, over the past year, an Administration policy 
characterized by a lack of vision regarding events in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. In recent months, the American public has seen 
the conflict in Kosovo explode onto the front pages of newspapers and 
dominate primetime television news. This conflict, however, is not new. 
It stems from centuries of tension and a decade of deteriorating 
relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, made worse because of 
Slobodan Milosevic's rule over the country.
  I do not want to downplay the seriousness of Milosevic's action in 
Kosovo. Milosevic has treated the Kosovar Alabnians in a barbarous 
manner. But, have NATO airstrikes solved this problem? No. And the sad 
fact is: United States policy has--if nothing else--unfortunately 
speeded up Milosevic's campaign of terror in Kosovo.
  And now, with our men and women risking their lives over the skies 
and on the ground in the Balkan region--we must take time to evaluate 
past policy and determine how best to move forward toward peace while 
making wise use of limited military resources.
  Military intervention should be the method of last resort in any 
conflict. Once all efforts have been made to resolve a conflict 
peaceably--the only way to conduct military operations is with a clear 
vision of goals to be achieved--goals backed up by sound military 
advice, common-sense wisdom with maximum objectivity based upon factual 
evidence.
  I follow the Colin Powell doctrine on military operations--you should 
not get into a military situation you don't know how to exit. In other 
words, have plans on how you're going to get out of the situation. And, 
if you do initiate a military operation--you should go in at the 
beginning with enough force to ensure victory.
  A critical miscalculation in Clinton's Kosovo policy was the 
president's outright statement that ground troops would not be 
introduced into the region. It was an impassioned, emphatic statement. 
And it signaled to the world that--right out of the gate--the United 
States was not serious about this mission. Not only were the military 
goals vague, but the means to achieve those goals were laid out clearly 
for Slobodan Milosevic to see. Milosevic knew he had time to further 
his own twisted goals in Kosovo and has succeeded in wreaking havoc on 
the region while dodging NATO missiles.
  Therefore, we are in a situation where ``gradualism'' is being 
practiced. This was Clinton's only way of his misstatement regarding 
ground troops. I say ``gradualism'' because the Administration has 
already set the stage for troops to be on the ground--regardless of 
what Congress says about it. First, United States ground forces were 
sent to surrounding countries to aid in humanitarian efforts. They were 
followed up by support troops for air divisions--

[[Page 8113]]

troops to support the Apache helicopter division--troops to support 
artillery to support the Apache helicopters. Soon, we will need troops 
on the ground to protect troops already on the ground. I think it's 
fair to say we are in a ground war even though we don't have United 
States military forces on the ground within the geographical confines 
of Kosovo.
  Today we are debating a resolution to give President Clinton the 
authority to use ``all necessary force'' to achieve Clinton 
Administration goals in Kosovo. I understand this resolution 
inadvertently triggered the War Powers Act, which requires a vote. But, 
the president not only hasn't asked for this broad-ranging authority, 
he still maintains it isn't needed. Some of my colleagues wish to 
affirm the president's authority regarding our involvement in Kosovo. I 
cannot support such a resolution.
  I cannot support a policy lacking common sense. I cannot--with a 
clear conscience--provide limitless authority to an Administration 
which has failed to demonstrate an understanding of the consequences of 
its policies. We must have a defined goal--and I'm talking more defined 
than the United States diminishing Slobodan Milosevic's ``capacity to 
maintain his grip and impose his control on Kosovo.''
  What is our goal? To destroy all Yugoslav military forces and control 
the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? To occupy Belgrade? To expel 
Milosevic's forces from Kosovo?
  This resolution will not move us closer to a clear goal--a clear 
strategy.
  I support our men and women who are risking their lives--even at this 
moment--for the sake of NATO's reputation and Clinton's military 
policy. I condemn Slobodan Milosevic's reprehensible actions in the 
Kosovo region.
  I seek clear military goals and concise, appropriate communication 
from our nation's commander-in-chief. Congress and the people of the 
United States are waiting.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to S.J. Res. 20 to 
authorize the use of all necessary force in the NATO operation against 
Yugoslavia. Taking such a step at this time is imprudent, particularly 
in light of the poor management of the ongoing air campaign against 
President Milosevic. Nothing in the operation to date indicates we have 
defined strategic goals in Kosovo or summoned the political will to 
achieve those goals. Clearly, this is not the time to authorize the 
Administration to escalate a strategically flawed and poorly managed 
campaign in the Balkans.
  A lack of foresight and planning has defined both the air war and the 
refugee relief effort, allowing Milosevic to seize and keep the 
initiative. The air war has been waged in a classic Vietnam-style 
fashion of escalation. Two principle elements of war, surprise and 
overwhelming force, have been sacrificed to the political whims of our 
European allies. The first three weeks of bombing in Allied Force were 
comparable to one day of bombing in the Gulf War. NATO has waited a 
full month before targeting Yugoslavia's electrical and television 
networks. In the Gulf War, such assets were destroyed in the first two 
days of the conflict.
  Even as the President sends additional planes and personnel to 
enhance NATO's firepower, a lack of leadership continues to undermine 
our efforts to punish Milosevic. According to statements by NATO 
Military Committee Chairman, General Klaus Naumann, Apache helicopters 
will not be sent into Kosovo, but fire into the province from Albania. 
NATO Commander General Wesley Clark is requesting additional planes, 
but NATO is running out of basing areas in the Balkans. A lack of 
preparatory work to have these facilities ready has delayed 400 planes 
being deployed to the region. NATO has an oil embargo on Yugoslavia but 
will not use force to stop shipments into the country.
  The refugee crisis has been compounded by poor planning for the 
relief effort. Before the air campaign began on March 24, the 
Administration had enough food in the region to feed 500,000 people for 
five months. Almost two-thirds of that amount was stationed in 
Yugoslavia, however. For relief supplies such as tents and blankets, 
Belgrade was the only staging area for the U.S. Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance.
  Clearly, the Administration's record to date on Kosovo is not a basis 
upon which to authorize the use of ``all necessary force.'' The 
Administration misjudged the enemy and started this war with inadequate 
means. Now that we are engaged, we need to deploy overwhelming air 
power to accomplish our objectives. I want to see an aggressive air 
campaign waged before we take the next step of deploying thousands of 
ground troops to the Balkans.
  We should be patient and allow an aggressive air campaign to take its 
toll, but the air war must be combined with better political leadership 
if our objectives are to be achieved. An inability to explain why the 
United States is engaged in Kosovo has plagued this operation from the 
beginning. Until the Administration has demonstrated the political 
leadership to define and achieve clear objectives in Kosovo, 
authorizing the use of ground forces is ill-advised.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, as a strong critic of the Administration's 
policy in the Balkans, I am uncomfortable expressing my reservations 
now that we are in a state of war. The U.S. forces conducting air 
strikes against Serbia have my full support as they go into battle even 
though I do not support what I believe to be an ill-defined mission.
  Mr. President, I opposed the resolution authorizing the President to 
bomb Serbia, because I did not see how bombing Serbia would end the 
atrocities being committed, bring about stability in the region, or 
lead to greater political autonomy for Kosovo. And I am going to oppose 
this resolution as well. The Senate should not be moving to authorize 
the President ``to use all necessary force''--when the President has 
not asked us for that authority--and when the President has given every 
indication that he has no intention of moving in that direction. I know 
that the authors of this resolution have the best intentions, but I do 
not think that it is prudent to push the Commander-in-Chief towards 
putting U.S. troops on the ground. If the President believes that 
ground troops are necessary, the President should come to the Congress, 
clearly explain his objectives and how the use of force can achieve 
those specific goals. Then, and only then, should the President ask 
Congress for authorization to use ground troops. That is the way to 
proceed.
  Mr. President, the only lasting solution to this conflict in the 
Balkans is a negotiated agreement where both sides agree to live with 
the results. It is inevitable that Russia, and other traditional Serb 
allies, will play a role in this process. But given the record of the 
UN in Bosnia, the peacekeeping force would be more credible if it was 
under a different organization's control. OSCE member nations who did 
not participate in the NATO bombing campaign could provide a credible 
force. The conflict between the Serbs and the Kosovars will not end 
with a NATO defeat of the Serbs, just as it didn't end with the defeat 
of the Serbs by the Turks in Kosovo in 1389. The conflict will continue 
to flare unless a political solution is found to this intractable 
problem, so I urge the Administration to actively engage in finding a 
negotiated settlement to this conflict which will lead to a sustainable 
peace in the Balkan region.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, for a deliberative democracy, going to war 
is an agonizing task. It is a slow, cumbersome, sometimes combative 
process itself. It is discomforting to all.
  With regards to Kosovo, I understand the President's vision of what 
our world should be and what the United States' role in such a world 
should be. I believe I also understand the foundations of his vision of 
the role of the United States in a Europe fundamentally different than 
the one into which NATO was born--where barbarians are not allowed to 
butcher, and where long term stability on the continent must be 
defended to maintain the standard

[[Page 8114]]

of living we have fought so hard to achieve.
  I also understand the intent of the authors and sponsors of this 
resolution. For our Nation to prevail in war, both the citizenry and 
the Congress must be united behind the Commander in Chief during times 
of war. I commend my colleague from Arizona for his intent.
  As Members of the Senate, we must make no mistake about the 
importance of this vote, but we must also keep in mind the three 
critical interpretations this vote represents, regardless of the 
specific wording of the resolution:
  First, this vote will be interpreted as a vote on whether we approve 
of the President's strategy so far--a strategy which seems to have 
initially failed to achieve at least one of our primary goals: to stop 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
  Second, this vote will be interpreted as a vote on what we believe 
the role of the Congress should be in the future prosecution of this 
unfolding war.
  Third, and most important, this vote will be interpreted as a 
statement on whether we are willing to commit ground troops to invade 
Yugoslavia, and whether we are willing to risk a considerable sum in 
blood and treasure to meet those goals.
  On all three accounts, the vote on this resolution is premature. The 
wisdom or failure of the President's strategy cannot yet be fully 
determined. More important, at the current time in our military 
campaign, with the decision of what means will be employed to achieve 
our ends still undetermined, it is premature for Congress to relinquish 
any future authority to say how this war will or will not be conducted.
  While I said that I fully appreciate the importance of an 
unencumbered Commander in Chief, I also believe it is necessary for 
Congress to retain its limited but critical Constitutional role in 
declaring war. Such a vote, where that limited authority would be 
relinquished now at a time prior to the President specifically seeking 
it from the Congress, is tantamount to approval of the deployment of 
ground troops to invade Kosovo or other parts of Yugoslavia. That is a 
blessing I am not willing to give at this time--when the Commander in 
Chief has not even sought that approval.
  Because the resolution is premature, I will not support it now. If 
the Commander in Chief believes this war must be expanded beyond the 
air campaign, he will have every opportunity to seek that authority. I 
will listen thoroughly and fulfill my Constitutional duties at that 
time.
  For now, I will vote to table this resolution because such a vote 
does not tie the President's hands more that he has already. I 
certainly will not give aid and comfort to our enemies by voting 
against the possibility of using ground troops. My vote allows the 
President full range of options but does underscore my insistence that 
he more adequately address his rationale before the U.S. Congress and 
the American people before committing ground troops to battle.
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut, 
Senator Lieberman.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I have been privileged to join with the 
Senator from Arizona, the Senator from Delaware and others, in 
cosponsoring this resolution. So I have listened with considerable 
personal interest as one after another of our colleagues have expressed 
their points of view. I joined with Senator McCain and Senator Biden 
and the others in cosponsoring this resolution as a way to express my 
personal support, and hopefully on a bipartisan basis--and the 
cosponsors of this resolution are a broad and bipartisan group--to give 
the Senate an opportunity to express our support for the objectives 
that NATO has adopted in entering the conflict in the Balkans and that 
the United States and this administration have, of course, subscribed 
to. Let me read what those objectives are:

       That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (Serbia and 
     Montenegro) . . . withdraw its military, paramilitary and 
     security forces from the province of Kosovo, [that the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] allow the return of ethnic 
     Albanian refugees to their homes, and [that Serbia] permit 
     the establishment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

  In light of all the blood that has been spilled, in light of the 
horrific scenes that we have all not just heard about, not just heard 
rumored, not heard speculated about, but seen with our own eyes on 
television, heard the eye-witness reports on television; of all the 
horrors that we have been forced to witness again that have occurred in 
Kosovo--when we think of all of those objectives of the NATO campaign, 
the NATO effort, the NATO war in the Balkans, they are extremely 
reasonable and extremely just.
  So I joined with my colleagues in offering this resolution as a way 
to restate clearly and simply what our objectives are here and to say 
that we want to support the President of the United States. We want to 
support the President of the United States in the decision he has made 
to join with our allies in NATO to carry out this cause. We want to say 
by this resolution, so strongly do we believe in this cause, that we 
are prepared to give this President, as the resolution says, 
authorization ``to use all necessary force and other means, in concert 
with the United States allies, to accomplish United States and NATO 
objectives,'' that I have just described.
  To me, it is an opportunity, broad-based, simple, fair, direct, not 
just to stand together on a bipartisan basis in this Senate, but to 
stand together in support of the policy that this administration has 
adopted in support of our NATO allies and, in doing so, to send a 
message to the enemy, to Mr. Milosevic--who we are reliably informed 
began this invasion of Kosovo, this massacre, this massive expulsion, 
as others have said before me tonight and earlier today, based on the 
ethnic history, identity and religion of the people being expelled--to 
say to Mr. Milosevic, who, again, we are reliably informed, began his 
evil deeds in Kosovo with the hope and the belief that the NATO allies 
would soon break their cohesiveness, would not hold in the face of this 
onslaught and his clever diplomatic moves, he was wrong.
  The NATO allies were here just a week ago. They spoke with unity. 
They strengthened their ranks. They came together. They agreed to 
intensify the effort against Milosevic and they have done so in the 
ensuing week. Those of us who have brought this resolution before the 
Senate have done so with the hope that we might also make clear to 
Milosevic that the other belief he had, that he could divide the 
American people and their Representatives here in Congress, was false. 
It was in vain. It was folly.
  That is the spirit in which this resolution was offered. I have 
listened to my colleagues speak, and, as others who have spoken before 
me, it seems clear to me the motion to table this resolution will be 
agreed to tomorrow. I have heard three or four different reasons given 
for that. I would say the majority of reasons are procedural, and I 
understand those. They are not substantive. They do not go to the heart 
of the policy that we, the sponsors of this resolution, have intended 
to convey. Some of my colleagues have said the resolution is not 
needed; it is premature.
  What NATO is doing now is carrying out the aerial bombardment of 
Serbia and military sites in Kosovo. The Senate has already authorized 
that, to our great credit, on a bipartisan basis. Almost 60 percent of 
the Senate voted almost a month ago, as the air campaign began, to 
authorize and support, if you will, the President and NATO in that 
effort--that valiant effort, that effort that has been conducted by the 
men and women in uniform for all the NATO countries and for ourselves. 
I am proud to cite the tremendous courage and skill with which our 
military personnel have carried out that effort. The Senate 
distinguished itself in support of that effort. Unfortunately, the 
House did not do so last week and sent a mixed signal. But I understand 
some of my colleagues have said tonight the Senate has already spoken 
on the military effort that is part of this battle against Milosevic, 
so we need not speak now in more width or depth.

[[Page 8115]]

  What others have said--the second reason I can hear--is that the 
President is not asking for this authorization. In fact, since we 
introduced this resolution, S.J. Res. 20, the President has indicated 
both at meetings in the White House with a broad, bipartisan group of 
Senators, and publicly, if it came to a point, which he hopes and 
believes we will not reach--and of course we all hope we will not 
reach--when it became clear, tragically, that the Milosevic leadership 
in Serbia was remaining what I would describe as insanely intransigent 
in the face of a devastating air campaign against that country--which 
some experts say, analysts say has already set back the Serbian economy 
a decade, some say even more--if Milosevic remained intransigent, the 
President has said, and he was forced to reconsider the statement he 
has made that he does not believe we need to employ ground forces 
there, that he would come to Congress and ask for our consent. So I 
understand some of our colleagues have said, therefore, that this 
resolution is premature.
  There are others, and I hope and believe, as I will say a little bit 
later on, that they are in the minority here, who do not support this 
effort at all, who want to see us negotiate a settlement or, worse, 
negotiate a settlement with a regime that has blood on its hands, that 
has violated the values that we hold dear, the humanitarian values, as 
we have all seen. We know what is happening. This is a regime in 
Belgrade that has carried out aggression, that has aimed at 
destabilizing Europe; a regime that, over the last decade, successively 
has invaded Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and now Kosovo.
  This is a regime that, evidence leads us to conclude, by its policies 
has brought about the death of hundreds of thousands of people. That is 
what this is about: Destabilization, aggression, ethnic cleansing and 
genocide in Europe at the end of this century, challenging the premise 
that brought about the creation of NATO 50 years ago, which was not 
just to defend against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, but was to 
uphold the principles for which the then recently completed Second 
World War was fought, which were freedom, human dignity, democracy. 
Sometimes, as I watch the slaughter continuing, the expulsions 
continuing in Kosovo, as I think of the history of Serbia and Milosevic 
for these last 10 years, I just say to myself: Have we not learned the 
lessons of this century, of the last 60 years of this century?
  Why did we fight the Second World War and the cold war if not to 
establish the principle that it was in America's security interest and, 
of course, even more intensely and intimately in the security interest 
and the principal interest of our allies in Europe not to allow 
tyranny, brutality, communism to exist in Europe? It threatened the 
stability of that great region with which we have historic ties, with 
which we have extraordinary economic ties, which contains the heart of 
our alliance, the strength of the partners we would turn to, not just 
when in crisis in Europe, but when in crisis anywhere in the world, as 
we did in the gulf war. Whom did we ask to stand by our fight, to fight 
by our side? Our allies in Europe, first and most significantly.
  Will we allow this century to end having fought the Second World War, 
made vivid in the Spielberg movie, ``Saving Private Ryan''--did those 
Americans fight that extraordinary fight with that unbelievable 
courage, lose their lives, so that a dictator, bent on the same kind of 
aggression and ethnic genocide at the end of the century, would be 
allowed to work his evil will in Europe?
  Did we spend billions of dollars and stand face to face with 
Communist tyranny for the long years of the cold war, did President 
Reagan lead us to the great final victories in the cold war, so less 
than a decade later we would allow a Communist--what is Milosevic? He 
is an unreconstructed Communist dictator--that we would allow a 
Communist dictator to work his will in the heart of Europe and in the 
backyard of NATO, that we would stand by and do nothing? I hope not.
  I take issue respectfully on the merits, as I see them, with those 
who oppose this resolution because they do not think we should be 
involved. But I understand those who say, as my colleague from Illinois 
said a moment ago, that the Senate is not ready to make the statement 
contained in this resolution.
  As a cosponsor of this resolution, as one who worked with Senator 
McCain, Senator Biden, and others to fashion this resolution, I have 
already made the statement, I have already come to the conclusion, so I 
will stand with all of my colleagues who have cosponsored this 
resolution and whom I heard speak up to now on this debate, who say 
they will oppose the motion to table.
  We are ready to vote, and we will vote tomorrow morning against the 
tabling of this resolution. We will vote against the tabling of the 
resolution with the confidence that if the President is wrong and the 
air campaign does not bring this war to an end, not on any weakened 
terms, but on the terms we clearly state in this resolution--the Serbs 
out, the Kosovars back in to live in peace, and an international 
peacekeeping force there--then we will return.
  Those who have said that they are not prepared now to vote for this 
resolution, those who have said this is merely a procedural vote--and I 
understand that--those who are essentially voting to table not because 
they are against, as I hear them speak, the substance of this 
resolution----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield 3 additional minutes to the 
Senator.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator.
  I am confident if that day comes--and, of course, I hope it does not 
come. But if we are not able to achieve the victory we must have here, 
that NATO must have to remain credible, the United States must have to 
remain credible, that we must achieve so that all the bullies, the 
thugs and the dictators, wherever they may be--in Asia, the Middle East 
or anywhere else--will not see an opportunity to take advantage of us, 
if we return at that point to the Senate and ask for support for the 
next necessary means to achieve our objectives, I am confident that on 
that day a bipartisan majority in the Senate will not walk away from 
the field of battle with the enemy having achieved the victory, will 
not yield to the forces of ethnic cleansing and ethnic slaughter and 
ethnic expulsion but will stand together, united across party lines, to 
support our soldiers in uniform, yes, indeed, our NATO allies, of 
course, to support the principles upon which this country was founded, 
which are at stake in Kosovo today, and to support the administration 
in the full conduct of this effort.
  This is one of those defining moments. Tomorrow's vote is not the 
defining moment. Tomorrow's vote is, if you will, an early round in the 
debate in which a majority of Members are not prepared to vote for this 
resolution. If necessary, I am convinced on another day that they will, 
and I am convinced that that is very much in the national security 
interest and in the national moral interest of the United States of 
America.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I continue to be pleased and proud of the 
Senator from Connecticut for his intellect, his insight, and his 
courage. I thank him for his remarks tonight, but also his steadfast 
adherence to lessons of history. May I point out that he is joined in 
his views by former Secretary of State Eagleburger, former National 
Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, former Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger, former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and a broad 
array of other leaders who have led this country throughout the last 
three decades. I am proud Senator Lieberman is one of those as well.
  I yield 10 minutes to my dear and beloved friend from Georgia, 
Senator Cleland.
  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona, my dear colleague and friend and fellow Vietnam veteran, for 
pushing to make sure that this issue of war in Kosovo, war in 
Yugoslavia, war in

[[Page 8116]]

the Balkans receives the time and attention from this great and august 
body that I think it truly deserves.
  I am struck by the fact that in the earlier weeks of this year, all 
of my colleagues in the Senate gathered on a question of serious 
constitutional gravity: impeachment of the President of the United 
States. This is a serious matter equivalent to that, Mr. President, 
that is, sending young Americans into harm's way. It is a 
constitutional matter, one that I personally feel strongly about and 
one on which I am personally conflicted.
  As the distinguished Senator from Arizona, I served in Vietnam. I 
cannot help but think back, on the presentation of this resolution, to 
the fact that some 35 years ago the Senate voted 88-2 in favor of the 
Tonkin Gulf resolution which authorized the President to ``take all 
necessary steps, including the use of armed forces,'' in Vietnam. The 
House approved that resolution unanimously, 416-0.
  It is fascinating that my colleague, my friend, my mentor, Senator 
Russell, in those days chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and a 
great student of history, actually succeeded in attaching language 
which gave Congress the right to terminate the authorization of the 
Tonkin Gulf resolution at any time by concurrent resolution.
  Senator Russell, in those days, certainly spoke against open-ended 
conflict where the Congress gave wide open authority to the President. 
He tried to rein in the Executive and preserve the ability of the 
Senate, particularly, to exercise its constitutional authority and 
exercise its constitutional role.
  But this vote on the Tonkin Gulf resolution served as an unchallenged 
congressional authorization of war until 1970, by which time, of 
course, we were deeply involved in the conflict, but no closer, 
unfortunately, to our political objectives. The way out was long and 
difficult.
  The near unanimous votes in favor of war against North Vietnam in the 
mid-1960s reflected an apparent certainty of purpose and clarity of 
message to the President, our adversaries, the American people, and our 
service men and women. However, future events, as they unraveled, were 
to show that this hasty congressional action, done for the best of 
intentions, to display national unity, eventually produced exactly the 
opposite result--national disunity. And we gave an uncertain reaction 
to the service men and women--and I was one of those servicemen--who 
carried out the Government's policies and came back to a divided nation 
and a nation on its way out of war, not in it. But that process took 10 
years, Mr. President.
  Growing out of our Vietnam experiences, the Senator from Arizona and 
I have taken the Kosovo issue very seriously. For us, it is not an 
issue--it is a war, a war in which young men and women's lives are at 
stake. And we come to very different conclusions about what should be 
done in that war in terms of further military conflict. But we both 
believe the same thing in one sense, and that is, above all, the Senate 
must speak, the Senate must debate, the Senate must stand up and be 
counted in terms of the policy that we are to follow in the Balkans.
  For that reason, Mr. President, I urge that the motion to table this 
resolution be defeated. I shall be voting against the motion to table. 
We cannot just table a war. We cannot just shunt aside the future lives 
of young men and women as they are risked at this hour.
  It is fascinating how the resolution reads, the last sentence of 
which says that the President is authorized to ``use all necessary 
force and other means in concert with United States allies to 
accomplish United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.'' ``All necessary 
force and other means.''
  Mr. President, to me, that is an echo, a strange ominous echo of the 
language in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution that passed this body 
overwhelmingly in the mid-1960s. This got us into deep trouble in 
Southeast Asia. I see too many similarities between that experience 
then and the war in the Balkans now. I see a similarity in an open-
ended conflict--one with no real military solution in sight, a conflict 
with no real military strategy to win, and certainly a conflict in 
which we have no exit strategy from which to disengage ourselves from 
the war in the Balkans.
  Instead, I see a greater Americanized war. I see a doubling of the 
warplanes--almost to 1,000 now--with the heavy majority of those 
airplanes being from the United States. I see 5,000 muddy boots on the 
ground in Albania, all of them American forces, up cheek to jowl, right 
across the line, with Serbian forces in tanks and dug into the 
mountains with armored personnel carriers and hand-held missiles, and a 
tremendous capability of ground fire. God forbid if we launch the 
Apache helicopters into that forbidden zone.
  I say to you, Mr. President, I support further debate. I will oppose 
the tabling motion, but I will also oppose this resolution on its 
merits.
  I thank the President, and I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona for the time to speak on this important matter.
  Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from Georgia for his always very 
perceptive and enlightening debates.
  I yield the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first, I thank my good friend from Arizona. 
Always, he puts his finger on an issue--in this case, on an issue of 
war and an issue of conscience. And this is an issue of both.
  There is nobody who more eloquently or doggedly pursues both issues--
war and conscience--and the implications of both. And the experience 
that he brings--as does our good friend from Georgia, and others--to 
this body is absolutely indispensable in trying to work its way towards 
the right conclusion in many of these issues. And I just, again, add my 
gratitude to what he adds to this body, to this Nation.
  Mr. President, while I favor the thrust of the resolution before us, 
I do not favor its timing, and I will vote to table. I want to just 
take a few moments this evening to explain this.
  The stakes are tremendously high in Kosovo. We simply must not fail. 
We cannot fail to succeed in Kosovo. NATO must not fail to succeed in 
Kosovo.
  Even before I visited the refugee camps a week or so ago, I felt 
strongly about this. But meeting with the refugees, of course, 
reinforces my conclusion about the nature of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic 
cleansing.
  This century of ours began with a genocide against Armenians; it is 
ending with an ethnic cleansing against the Kosovars; and there was a 
holocaust in between.
  If we want the next century to be freer of the slaughter that this 
century has seen in so many wars, we simply must support the united 
action of a united Europe to stop the success of Milosevic in his goals 
in Kosovo.
  Of course, when you read about what the refugees have gone through, 
and you talk to refugees, it reinforces that determination--the stories 
of mass executions, mass rapes, the burning of 400 villages by forces 
that presumably should be protecting those villages, since Milosevic 
claims sovereignty in Kosovo. But instead of pursuing what sovereigns 
historically have done, which is to protect people they claim 
sovereignty over, this particular dictator is trying to destroy the 
very people of Kosovo.
  NATO made a statement last week which is of critical importance. It 
restates a decision on the part of NATO to prevail. And the only way--
the best way, but perhaps the only way--that we are going to have a 
century next which is more peaceful in Europe and elsewhere than the 
current century, is if NATO succeeds in its unified determination, as 
stated in Washington just about a week ago.
  Two sentences kind of say it all. And those two sentences are these: 
``We will not allow Milosevic's campaign of terror to succeed. NATO is 
determined to prevail.''

[[Page 8117]]

  This has rarely been true in Europe. I am not sure it has ever been 
true where we have 19 nations, including the United States and Canada, 
that have come together to try to stop a genocide from succeeding in 
their backyard.
  Europe has been divided before now--France, England on one side, 
sometimes Germany on another, countries divided into blocs against each 
other. But now what we have in Europe is the coming together of all of 
the European nations, making one joint statement about what they will 
not permit in their own land. ``We will not allow Milosevic's campaign 
of terror to succeed. NATO is determined to prevail.''
  But that unity which is so critical to the success of the mission, I 
believe, will be negatively impacted if the Senate adopts this 
resolution that is before us, because this resolution would put this 
Senate and this Nation ahead of NATO. And we have to work in harmony 
with NATO, in unity with NATO, in harness with 18 other democracies 
that have taken a position. And that position is that we are going to 
pursue, relentlessly, doggedly the success of the military mission and 
air campaign, the purpose of which is to significantly diminish 
Milosevic's military capability.
  That is the current mission.
  It is hoped the success of that mission will achieve the broader 
policy objective of being able to return refugees, now over 1 million, 
to their homes in Kosovo. If that military mission and its success in 
reducing Milosevic's capability to keep a stranglehold on Kosovo does 
not achieve the broader mission of being able to return these refugees, 
at that point we can consider changing the military mission. At that 
point we can consider the use of ground troops by NATO.
  Is it prudent to plan for that? Yes, it is. In my judgment, it is 
prudent to plan for it. Would it be prudent, in fact, to carry it out 
once the groundwork has been laid and Milosevic's military capability 
has been significantly weakened? Yes, in my judgment it would be. Most 
important to the success of this mission, broad and narrow, is NATO's 
unity. It is my fear that the adoption of this resolution will put us 
in a significantly different position than the rest of NATO, in advance 
of a need to do so.
  NATO is unified on an air campaign. It is not yet unified on a ground 
campaign. The Apaches alone, after their employment begins, will take 
30 to 60 days before they have a significant impact on the ground. That 
is what General Clark, the commander, has told us. That may not be the 
common wisdom, common understanding, common media message, but that is 
the truth, as General Clark believes it--that it will take 30 to 60 
days for the Apaches to have an effect after they begin to be employed. 
So the debate over authorizing ground forces is a premature debate. I 
believe it will distract us from a current unified mission while we are 
in the middle of an air campaign.
  It is for that reason that, with some reluctance, I am going to vote 
to table the resolution, the general direction of which I support, 
because it is so critically important that we be unified and united 
with NATO allies, that we stay together in planning and in execution of 
a mission which must succeed. We must not be distracted by a premature 
debate about ground forces. Prudence and common sense would indicate 
that we plan for such a contingency, but there is no need for us to 
authorize it at this time. It seems to me, if anything, it will divide 
and distract, rather than protect that critical unity which is so 
essential to the success of this mission.
  Again, I commend my good friend from Arizona and Senator Biden, 
Senator Lieberman, and the other cosponsors for their support of a very 
important position, which is that we now must win. That is the thrust 
of this resolution. Again, while I support that thrust, I will vote to 
table for the reasons indicated.
  I thank the Chair and, again, thank my good friend from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank my friend, the Senator from 
Michigan. May I just point out, he made the point that it took a month 
or two to get the Apaches there. The reason I am urging that 
preparations be made in case we have to exercise the option is exactly 
the reason he stated concerning the Apaches. It would take 6 to 8 weeks 
now for us to assemble ground forces if we decide to use the option.
  I am told by some military experts that we now have to worry about 
the onset of bad weather in the fall, but I do appreciate the remarks 
of the Senator from Michigan, and I appreciate the results of his trip 
that he made and the information that he brought back, which I think 
was very helpful to the entire Senate.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank my good friend. Again, I happen to 
concur that the planning is prudent and should be underway. It is the 
commitment to the utilization that I think might divide and distract. 
Again, I thank him.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I note the belated appearance of my dear 
friend from Kansas. I yield him however much time he may consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, thank you very much for allowing me to 
speak tonight. I recognize my distinguished colleague from Arizona for 
all he has done on this issue but, more than that, for what he has 
given to his country. He chairs the Commerce Committee, which I serve 
on with him, but I have enormous respect for what he has already given 
to his Nation, the sacrifice where he put his life on the line in a 
previous war. Actions speak louder than words, and he spoke with his 
actions many times. I am enormously proud to know and be associated 
with him in this body.
  Mr. President, the situation in Kosovo is clearly a very serious one 
deserving of our deliberation and vigorous debate. To this point in 
time, though, the administration, for my satisfaction, has certainly 
not provided the Members of the full Senate body with the information 
needed to make an informed decision on this matter. Therefore, I will 
vote to table the resolution.
  One month ago, I wrote to the President asking that he respond to 
certain fundamental questions regarding the objectives and the 
implementation of the NATO mission in Kosovo. To date, I have not 
received a response to those questions.
  What is the objective, I put forward? They have been responding and 
defining some of that as we have gone along, but more specifically, how 
do we define success? Is there a coherent and achievable plan of action 
in place? What price would we pay for this in terms of potential loss 
of lives? What about the monetary cost? Is escalation in the true 
national interest of the United States? Those simple, basic questions 
that I have put forward have not been answered.
  Not until we understand the objective of NATO and how that objective 
will be attained can we make an informed determination with respect to 
S.J. Res. 20. The administration must provide the answers to these 
questions, with clarity, with satisfaction, and to the satisfaction of 
all Members of the Senate. Until that happens, I cannot give my support 
to the administration in this broad, open resolution.
  At such time that it is shown how granting the President the 
authority to use all necessary force and other means will bring us to a 
resolution more quickly, or at less expense or other means, then we 
would be able to consider this proposal in some context.
  I note, Mr. President, that I fully support our troops. I appreciate 
the sacrifices that they are being asked to make to stop Milosevic and 
the atrocities he has perpetrated against the people of Kosovo. It was 
several weeks ago that I was in Wichita at the McConnell Air Base 
meeting with some of the troops and their families before they were 
shipping off. You could see in their eyes their willingness, their 
commitment to see this action on through. They asked a number of the 
same questions that I continue to ask of the President, that I continue 
not to get satisfactory answers.
  Until those are answered, I cannot give my support to this type of 
authority. It is appreciation for these troops

[[Page 8118]]

that makes it impossible for me to support this resolution, until we 
understand the full plan. Once we know it, then we can debate its 
merits and determine how best to support the President and our troops. 
Without that and in clarity of what that plan is, we are making a 
decision in a vacuum. The situation merits more attention than that.
  Again, I note, as I did at the outset, my enormous respect for my 
colleague from Arizona who has put forward this resolution and his 
wisdom. His support of this makes me give much more pause to my 
statement. But these questions have not been answered to my 
satisfaction. While I respect that and I respect enormously the Senator 
from Arizona, I cannot in good conscience vote for this resolution at 
this time.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, may I say to my dear young friend, who I 
see as one of the rising stars in this Senate--and I can say that with 
confidence because I have watched very closely, as a member of the 
Commerce Committee, his involvement with a number of issues--I respect 
his dissatisfaction with the failure to get an answer to certain 
fundamental questions that he and, frankly, the people of Kansas and of 
this country have a right to get the answers to. I understand his 
position on this issue, and I am in deep sympathy with it.
  He makes a compelling case that we should be better informed before 
we embark on a ground war or consider the likelihood of a ground war. I 
appreciate his views. The realities on the battlefield, I say to my 
friend from Kansas, are that it requires a minimum of 6 to 8 weeks to 
get some forces assembled. So if we don't begin preparations--and I am 
not saying we would have to use them, but it is of the utmost 
importance that we do that; otherwise, we will lose the opportunity.
  A person that Senator Brownback and I respect enormously, Henry 
Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, testified before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee last week. I quote him saying:

       On the issue of ground forces, my view is as follows: I 
     have no way of judging what will ultimately be necessary. 
     That is a military decision. But first, it is a mistake to 
     preclude any category of forces and to turn the conflict into 
     an endurance contest.
       Secondly, even if one believes that air power will 
     ultimately succeed, which it well may, we nevertheless should 
     make clear not only that we are planning to use ground 
     forces; we should assemble the ground forces that will be 
     needed. This will put a safety net under the bombing campaign 
     because under present circumstances, it is a question of 
     endurance. Thus, Milosevic and the Serbian leadership believe 
     that they can simply outlast us.
       If they know that at the end--not even at the end, at some 
     stage in this process--we will insist on using ground forces, 
     I think it will shorten the air campaign.

  That was the testimony last week of Dr. Kissinger before the Armed 
Services Committee. I know of no wiser man than Henry Kissinger, a 
person who has a great appreciation for history and its challenges.
  Because of our failure to even plan, much less prepare ground forces, 
as Dr. Kissinger, Larry Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft, et cetera, seek 
us to do, this gives rise to articles such as were in the New York 
Times this morning by William Safire. William Safire, who I think is 
one of the most thoughtful and informed columnists in America, states:

       Congress is not only ambivalent about buying into 
     ``Clinton's War,'' it is also of two minds about being 
     ambivalent.
       That is because the war to make Kosovo safe for Kosovars is 
     a war without an entrance strategy. By its unwillingness to 
     enter Serbian territory to stop the killing at the start, 
     NATO conceded defeat. The bombing is simply intended to 
     coerce the Serbian leader to give up at the negotiating table 
     all he has won on the killing field. He won't.
       He will make a deal. By urging that Russia be the broker, 
     Clinton knows he can do no better than compromise with 
     criminality. That means we are not fighting to win, but are 
     merely punishing to settle.
       * * * Clinton has so few followers in Congress because he 
     is himself the world's leading follower. He steers not by the 
     compass but by the telltale, driven by polls that dictate 
     both how far he can go and how little he can get away with.
       The real debate, then, is not intervention vs. isolation, 
     not sanctity of borders vs. self-determination of nations, 
     not Munich vs. Vietnam, not NATO credibility vs. America the 
     globocop. The central question is: Do we trust this President 
     to use all force necessary to establish the principle that no 
     nation can drive out an unwanted people?

  It goes on, Mr. President, in this article to describe exactly the 
deal that will be cut over time.

       * * * Perhaps Britain's Tony Blair will prod Clinton to do 
     better, and all Serbian troops and paramilitary thugs will be 
     invited out of Kosovo. But the returning K.L.A will find mass 
     graves and will likely lash out at Serbs; after an indecent 
     interval, Belgrade will assert sovereignty with troops in 
     police uniforms.
       And what will happen to the principle of no reward for 
     internal aggression? It will be left for resolution to our 
     next President, who, in another test, will have the strength 
     of the people's trust.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this entire article, 
along with these other documents, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                 [From the New York Times, May 3, 1999]

                         The Price of Distrust

                          (By William Safire)

       Washington.--Congress is not only ambivalent about buying 
     into ``Clinton's War,'' it is also of two minds about being 
     ambivalent.

       That is because the war to make Kosovo safe for Kosovars is 
     a war without an entrance strategy. By its unwillingness to 
     enter Serbian territory to stop the killing at the start, 
     NATO conceded defeat. The bombing is simply intended to 
     coerce the Serbian leader to give up at the negotiating table 
     all he has won on the killing field. He won't.
       He will make a deal. By urging that Russia be the broker, 
     Clinton knows he can do no better than compromise with 
     criminality. That means we are not fighting to win but are 
     merely punishing to settle.
       Small wonder that no majority has formed in Congress to 
     adopt the McCain-Biden resolution giving the President 
     authority to use ``all necessary force'' to achieve a clear 
     victory. Few want to go out on a limb for Clinton knowing 
     that he is preparing to saw that limb off behind them.
       Clinton has so few followers in Congress because he is 
     himself the world's leading follower. He steers not by the 
     compass but by the telltale, driven by polls that dictate 
     both how far he can go and how little he can get away with.
       The real debate, then, is not intervention vs. isolation, 
     not sanctity of borders vs. self-determination of nations, 
     not Munich vs. Vietnam, not NATO credibility vs. America the 
     globocop. The central question is: Do we trust this President 
     to use all force necessary to establish the principle that no 
     nation can drive out an unwanted people?
       The answer is no. The distrust is palpable. Give him the 
     tools and he will not finish the job.
       Proof that such distrust is well founded is in the erosion 
     of NATO's key goal: muscular protection of refugees trusting 
     enough to return to Kosovo.
       At first, that was to be done by ``a NATO force,'' rather 
     than U.N. peacekeepers. The fallback was to ``a NATO-led 
     force,'' including Russians. Now the formulation is ``ready 
     to lead,'' if anybody asks, or ``a force with NATO at its 
     core,'' which means Serb-favoring Russians, Ukrainians and 
     Argentinians, with Hungarians and Czechs to give the illusion 
     of ``a NATO core.''
       If you were an ethnic-Albanian woman whose husband had been 
     massacred, sister raped, children scattered and house burned 
     down on orders from Belgrade--would you go back home under 
     such featherweight protection?
       Only a fool would trust an observer group so rotten to its 
     ``core.'' And yet that is the concession NATO has made even 
     before formal negotiations begin.
       What can we expect next? After a few more weeks of feckless 
     bombing while Milosevic completes his dirty work in Kosovo, 
     Viktor Chernomyrdin or Jimmy Carter or somebody will 
     intercede to arrange a cease-fire. Film will be shot of 
     Serbian tanks (only 30 were hit in a month of really smart 
     bombing) rolling back from Kosovo as bombardment halts and 
     the embargo is lifted.
       Sergei Rogov, the Moscow Arbatovnik, laid out the Russian 
     deal in yesterday's Washington Post: (1) autonomy for Kosovo 
     but no independence or partition; (2) Milosevic troops out 
     but Serbian ``border guards'' to remain in Kosovo, and (3) 
     peace ``enforcers'' under not NATO but U.N. and Helsinki Pact 
     bureaucrats. As a grand concession, NATO would be allowed to 
     care for refugees in Albania and Macedonia.
       That, of course, would be a triumph for mass murderers 
     everywhere, and Clinton will insist on face-savers: war-
     crimes trials for sergeants and below, a Brit and a Frenchman 
     in command of a NATO platoon of Pomeranian grenadiers, no 
     wearing of blue helmets and absolutely no reparations to 
     Serbia to rebuild bridges in the first year.
       Perhaps Britain's Tony Blair will prod Clinton to do 
     better, and all Serbian troops

[[Page 8119]]

     and paramilitary thugs will be invited out of Kosovo. But the 
     returning K.L.A. will find mass graves and will likely lash 
     out at Serbs; after an indecent interval Belgrade will assert 
     sovereignty with troops in police uniforms.
       And what will happen to the principle of no reward for 
     internal aggression?
       It will be left for resolution to our next President, who, 
     in another test, will have the strength of the people's 
     trust.
                                  ____

       Dear Senator McCain: If the 21st Century is to be a 
     peaceful and stable time, only the steadiness and power of 
     the United States will make it so. That steadiness and power 
     is now being tested; we must not fail. If ground forces are 
     essential to assuring our success, then we must use them.
           Sincerely,
     Lawrence S. Eagleburger.
                                  ____

       I strongly support Senate Joint Resolution 20. Its passage 
     will be a strong message of our determination to Milosevic--
     who may be doubting our resolve. It will also encourage the 
     President to do what is necessary to prevail.
                                                  Brent Scowcroft.

  Mr. McCAIN. Finally, Mr. President, a person that I know the Senator 
from Kansas and I and the Senator from Illinois have enjoyed and 
appreciated over many years, Margaret Thatcher, who once counseled 
during the Persian Gulf war for President Bush not to ``go wobbly''--I 
believe she said, ``Don't go wobbly now, George''--made a speech the 
other night for ``Project for the New American Century.''
  I ask unanimous consent that her statement be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Margaret Thatcher: Last September I went to Vukovar, a city 
     destroyed and its inhabitants butchered by the soldiers of 
     Slobodan Milosevic. The place still smells of death, the 
     windows weep, and the ruins gape. Around Srebrenica, where 
     neither I nor many other Westerners have gone, the bodies of 
     thousands of slaughtered victims still lie in unmarked 
     graves. In Kosovo, we can only imagine what depravities of 
     human wickedness, what depths of human degradation, those 
     endless columns of refugees have fled. Mass rape, mass 
     graves, death camps, historic communities wiped out by ethnic 
     cleansing--these are the monuments to Milosevic's triumphs.
       They are also, let's remember and admit, the result of 
     eight long years of Western weakness. When will they ever 
     learn?
       Appeasement has failed in the 90s, as it failed in the 30s. 
     Then, there were always politicians to argue that the madness 
     of Nazism could be contained and that a reckoning could 
     somehow be avoided. In our own day too there has never been a 
     lack of politicians and diplomats willing to collaborate with 
     Milosevic's Serbia. At each stage, both in the thirties and 
     in the nineties, the tyrant carefully laid his snares, and 
     naive negotiators obligingly fell into them.
       For eight years I have called for Serbia to be stopped. 
     Even after the massacre of Srebrenica I was told that my 
     calls for military action were mere ``emotional nonsense,'' 
     words which, I think, only a man could have uttered.
       But there were also good reasons for taking action early. 
     The West could have stopped Milosevic in Slovenia or Croatia 
     in 1991, or in Bosnia in 1992. But instead we deprived his 
     opponents of the means to arm themselves, thus allowing his 
     aggression to prosper.
       Even in 1995, when at last a combination of airstrikes and 
     well-armed Croat and Muslin ground forces broke the power of 
     the Bosnian-Serb aggressors, we intervened to halt their 
     advance onto Banja Luka, and so avoid anything that might 
     threaten Milosevic. Even then, Western political leaders 
     believed that the butcher of Belgrade could be a force for 
     stability. So here we are now, fighting a war eight years too 
     late, on treacherous terrain, so far without much effective 
     local support, with imperfect intelligence, and with war aims 
     that some find unclear and unpersuasive.
       But with all that said--and it must be said, so that the 
     lessons are well and truly learned--let there be no doubt: 
     this is a war that must be won.
       I understand the unease that many feel about the way in 
     which this operation began. But those who agonize over 
     whether what is happening in Kosovo today is really of 
     sufficient importance to justify our military intervention, 
     gravely underestimate the consequences of doing nothing. 
     There is always method in Milosevic's madness. He is a master 
     at using human tides of refugees to destabilize his neighbors 
     and weaken his opponents. And that we simply cannot now 
     allow. The surrounding countries just can't absorb two 
     million Albanian refugees without provoking a new spiral of 
     violent disintegration, possibly involving NATO members.
       But the over-riding justification for military action is 
     quite simply the nature of the enemy we face. We are not 
     dealing with some minor thug whose local brutalities may 
     offend our sensibilities from time to time. Milosevic's 
     regime and the genocidal ideology that sustains it represent 
     something altogether different--a truly monstrous evil; one 
     which cannot with safety be merely checked or contained; one 
     which must be totally defeated and be seen by the Serbs 
     themselves to be defeated.
       When that has been done, we need to learn the lessons of 
     what has happened and of the warnings that were given but 
     ignored. But this is not the time. There has already been too 
     much media speculation about targets and tactics, and some 
     shameful and demoralizing commentary which can only help the 
     enemy. So I shall say nothing of detailed tactics here 
     tonight.
       But two things more I must say.
       First, about our fundamental aims. It would be both cruel 
     and stupid to expect the Albanian Kosovans now to return to 
     live under any form of Serbian rule. Kosovo must be given 
     independence, initially under international protection. And 
     there must be no partition, a plan that predictable siren 
     voices are already advancing. Partition would only serve to 
     reward violence and ethnic cleansing. It would be to concede 
     defeat. And I am unmoved by Serb pleas to retain their grasp 
     on most of Kosovo because it contains their holy places. 
     Coming from those who systematically leveled Catholic 
     churches and Muslim mosques wherever they went, such an 
     argument is cynical almost to the point of blasphemy.
       Second, about the general conduct of the war. There are, in 
     the end, no humanitarian wars. War is serious and it is 
     deadly. In wars risk is inevitable and casualties, including 
     alas civilian casualties, are to be expected. Trying to fight 
     a war with one hand tied behind your back is the way to lose 
     it. We always regret the loss of the lives. But we should 
     have no doubt that it is not our troops or pilots, but the 
     men of evil, who bear the guilt.
       The goal of war is victory. And the only victory worth 
     having now is one that prevents Serbia ever again having the 
     means to attack its neighbors and terrorize its non-Serb 
     inhabitants. That will require the destruction of Serbia's 
     political will, the destruction of its war machine and all 
     the infrastructure on which these depend. We must be prepared 
     to cope with all the changing demands of war--including, if 
     that is what is required, the deployment of ground troops. 
     And we must expect a long haul until the job is done.

  Mr. McCAIN. Those are Margaret Thatcher's remarks. They were 
delivered at the Institute for Free Enterprise on the 20th anniversary 
of her becoming Great Britain's Prime Minister.
  I hope that all of my colleagues before voting tomorrow will read her 
remarks--Brent Scowcroft, Lawrence Eagleburger, and virtually every 
person who has held a position of authority on national security 
matters, both Republican and Democrat, for more than two decades.
  Mr. President, the hour is late. I will move to the closing remarks 
in just a moment.
  We have had a good debate today. I wish it had been longer. I think 
it should go on for several more days. But it won't.
  Tomorrow we will have a tabling motion which may be one of the more 
bizarre scenarios that I have seen in my 13 years here in the Senate, 
with an administration lobbying feverishly to defeat a resolution which 
gives it more authority. I have never seen that before in my years in 
the Senate.
  I believe we could have carried this resolution if the administration 
had supported it. I can only conclude that the reason for it is that 
the President of the United States is more interested in his own 
Presidency than the institution of the Presidency. Mr. President, that 
is indeed a shame.

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