[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 8013-8015]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




               DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES IN KOSOVO

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, on Monday, in the afternoon, the 
distinguished majority leader has scheduled a vote, so far denominated 
as a tabling motion on the pending S.J. Res. 20, concerning the 
deployment of United States Armed Forces in the Kosovo region of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
  Since Monday afternoon is likely to be crowded with debate on this 
subject and there is free time in the Senate Chamber today, I have 
decided to speak about this issue because I believe it is a matter of 
overwhelming importance for the United States, for NATO, for Europe 
and, for that matter, for the world.
  The resolution provides in a short statement worth reading in its 
entirety:

       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled, that the 
     President is authorized to use all necessary force and other 
     means, in concert with United States allies, to accomplish 
     United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
     Montenegro).

  Mr. President, I am strongly opposed to this resolution because it 
gives a total blank check to the President to involve the United States 
in any type of military action which he deems appropriate when it is 
the Congress of the United States that has the sole authority under the 
Constitution to declare war. In my view, the Congress ought not to give 
such a blank check, but instead ought to ask the President to come 
before the Congress, specifying what the President seeks to accomplish 
and what the means are for accomplishing that objective.
  I supported the resolution for airstrikes with a specific limitation 
that there would not be a deployment of ground forces. We have a great 
many very, very important questions, the answers to which ought to be 
provided, in my judgment, by the executive branch, by the President, to 
the Congress before the Congress exercises its authority to, in effect, 
declare war.
  Bear in mind at the outset, that the President has asked for no such 
authority, and that is a very important point and a threshold matter. 
But these are some of the questions which ought to be examined. I know 
that the distinguished Presiding Officer, Senator Roberts from Kansas, 
who is on the Armed Services Committee, has participated in offering 
legislation which conditions funding and conditions congressional 
authority on a number of similar issues.
  These questions are of such vital importance that they bear 
repetition and they bear analysis and understanding by the American 
people, at least the relatively few who are watching on C-SPAN2 today. 
But these are monumental matters. These are some of the issues which I 
think have to be answered before the Congress is in a position to 
decide what authorization is to be given to the President:
  First, to what extent have the forces of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia been degraded by the air attacks?
  Second, what would the projected resistance be of the armed forces of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
  Third, what is the President's plan? So far we do not know what the 
President would like to do. There is not agreement among the alliance. 
The

[[Page 8014]]

President has stated that he wishes to proceed with the support of the 
alliance, just as he has had the support of the alliance up to date.
  Once we know what the plan is, the fourth question would be, what 
resources are necessary to implement a specific plan?
  Fifth, what would the risks be to U.S. military personnel in carrying 
out the plan?
  Next, what contributions would be made by others of the alliance?
  And an additional question: What other pressures are available to use 
against the forces of President Milosevic, such as the pressure of the 
War Crimes Tribunal?
  These are all vital questions which ought to be answered before the 
Congress of the United States plunges into this field precipitously, 
without a request by the President, without a request by NATO, without 
any plan for us to consider on issues which can be answered only by the 
President of the United States.
  What we are being asked for on this resolution is a blank check, and 
it is really an unusual form of a blank check because the check is not 
only blank as to amount, but the check is also blank as to the identity 
of the payee; that is, who receives the funds.
  A check has a number of ingredients. There is the party who writes 
the check. That would be the Congress of the United States in the case 
of this resolution. A check has the identification of the party who 
receives the check, the payee. And the check has the amount of the 
check. And this check is blank in both material aspects. What is the 
amount of the check and who is to receive the check?
  I think the Congress of the United States would be most unwise to 
enact such a resolution on the state of the record which exists at the 
present time.
  What we have in Kosovo, what we have with NATO, what we have in our 
military action against the Republic of Yugoslavia is really a 
constitutional crisis. It is a constitutional crisis of major import, 
if anybody would pay attention to the Constitution. Only by ignoring 
the Constitution are we able to ignore the constitutional crisis.
  But the Constitution is explicit that only the Congress of the United 
States has the authority to declare war. Only the Congress of the 
United States has the power, responsibility and authority to engage the 
U.S. Armed Forces in war. But what we have going on at the present time 
in Kosovo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a war.
  The military actions there are clear-cut acts of war. We have this 
war in process without the authority of the Congress of the United 
States.
  As of Wednesday of this week, we have the war in process with a 
specific action of the House of Representatives in rejecting the use of 
airstrikes by a tie vote of 213-213.
  It is true that the Senate authorized the use of airstrikes with the 
reservation against ground forces by a vote of 58-41. But we have, as 
we all know, a bicameral legislature. You cannot have a declaration of 
war by the Senate. You could only have a declaration of war by the 
Congress; and that means joint action of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives.
  And now we have the House of Representatives rejecting the 
President's authority to conduct air operations by a vote of 213-213. 
And that is as forceful a rejection as had it been 426-0. Unless it 
passes, albeit by as little as a single vote, it is a rejection.
  The House of Representatives had a curious legislative day on 
Wednesday, April 28, taking up a series of resolutions by Congressman 
Tom Campbell of California. And I compliment Congressman Campbell for 
bringing the issues to a head--or trying to bring the issues to a head.
  The House of Representatives rejected a resolution calling for a 
state of war by a vote of 2 in favor, 427 against.
  The House of Representatives then voted on a resolution directing the 
President, under the War Powers Resolution, to withdraw troops from the 
operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That, too, was 
rejected by a vote of 139-290.
  Then there was the resolution authorizing the President to conduct 
air operations similar to the one passed by the Senate on March 23. As 
previously noted, that was rejected 213-213.
  Then, the House passed a resolution 249-180, placing limitations on 
the funding of the President to use ground troops in Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia without prior congressional authority.
  When we read through the War Powers Act, the legislation which was 
passed to try to limit the erosion of Congress' authority to declare 
war with the taking on of that authority by the President under his 
constitutional powers as Commander in Chief, the provisions of 5c 
specify that ``at any time the United States Armed Forces are engaged 
in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its 
possessions and territories, without a declaration of war or specific 
statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President 
if a Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.''
  So here we have the anomalous situation that the House turns down a 
declaration of war, the House turns down the use of airstrikes, the 
Senate has authorized airstrikes with the reservation prohibiting the 
use of ground forces, and you do not have the Congress--even the 
House--directing the withdrawal of forces. So it is a quagmire, to say 
the least.
  And it is a constitutional confrontation and a constitutional crisis 
to identify it squarely, when you have the Constitution requiring 
action by the Congress to declare war to involve the United States in 
war, and you have one House of the Congress, the House of 
Representatives, failing to authorize the airstrikes which are 
currently underway.
  The resolution which is going to be voted on on Monday, Mr. 
President, bears a striking similarity to the infamous Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution, which was used to justify United States participation in 
the Vietnam war without a declaration of war.
  Section 2 of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution provides as follows:

       ``. . .The United States is, therefore, prepared, as the 
     President determines, to take all necessary steps, including 
     the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol 
     state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 
     requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.''

  And note with particularity the language ``to take all necessary 
steps, including the use of armed force'' from the Gulf of Tonkin 
resolution compared to the resolution to be voted on on Monday that the 
President is ``authorized to use all necessary force and other means.'' 
These are blank checks which are not in the interest of the United 
States, but these checks ought to be very carefully considered, and 
ought to be very carefully written before the United States is engaged 
in war with the authorization of the Congress of the United States.
  The President has, to his credit, held a series of meetings with 
Members of Congress, going really beyond notification and really beyond 
what is customarily regarded as consultation in seeking opinions of 
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. In one of these 
meetings, the President raised the issue of collateral activities, 
beyond or in addition to the use of military force, and made a specific 
reference to the War Crimes Tribunal. We have had President Milosevic 
denominated as early as the end of 1992, by then-Secretary of State 
Eagleburger, as, in effect, being a war criminal.
  We know that the War Crimes Tribunal has successfully completed 
prosecutions arising out of the incidents in Bosnia. There has been a 
very noteworthy plea of guilty and a life sentence for the Prime 
Minister of Rwanda for the genocide which occurred there, a guilty 
plea, a conviction, and a life sentence--the life sentence now being 
under appeal--of enormous importance, although hardly noticed by the 
press in the United States or the press in Europe. Somehow a matter of 
genocide or a matter of a conviction or a matter of a prosecution of a 
war criminal in Rwanda is of lesser status. It should not be, but that 
happens to be the practical fact of life.

[[Page 8015]]

  This morning there was a bipartisan meeting with Justice Louise 
Arbour, the chief prosecutor in the War Crimes Tribunal. Justice Arbour 
made a strong point of seeking support for the arrest of Karadzic, who 
is under indictment for war crimes in Bosnia, and for seeking an arrest 
for others in cases where there are sealed indictments arising from war 
crimes in Bosnia.
  Justice Arbour described the number of these cases, by the reference 
that there are only a handful, but she made the point--and I think it 
is a very valid point--that IFOR should proceed to arrest those 
individuals--even those under sealed indictment who have been 
identified to the military forces now in Bosnia, and Karadzic is an 
especially prominent war criminal under indictment, where the 
indictment has been outstanding for some 4 years. Not only has Karadzic 
thumbed his nose at the War Crimes Tribunal, but the reality is that 
the IFOR troops who have a responsibility to execute those warrants 
have, in effect, similarly thumbed their nose at the War Crimes 
Tribunal. The military commanders on the scene have been heard to say 
that they could make these arrests, that they could make the arrest of 
Karadzic who is, according to reportedly reliable information, in the 
French quarter. A real question arises as to the willingness of the 
French to cooperate in the arrest of Karadzic, but this is something 
which could be accomplished.
  Justice Arbour makes the point, and I think with great validity, that 
it would send a very strong message and have a chilling effect on the 
military and political leaders under Milosevic, if they saw that the 
War Crimes Tribunal had the skill to acquire evidence to bring forth 
indictments and then to follow with convictions; and, if the NATO and 
the IFOR forces had the political courage to execute those warrants of 
arrest by taking those indictees into custody. This would be a very, 
very strong deterrent to the continuation of the criminal activity by 
the Serbian forces and by the forces of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.
  The War Crimes Tribunal has done its job. Now it is a matter of 
courage, the political courage and the military courage to serve those 
warrants of arrest and take those individuals into custody.
  By way of a footnote, Justice Arbour outlined the need for some $18 
million in funding. The entire War Crimes Tribunal has only 17 
investigators, an amazingly small number, to carry out the sort of work 
which has to be undertaken. For example, investigating overhead 
satellites intelligence which is telling something about the mass grave 
sites. This funding is something which will be coming before the 
Appropriations Committee next week, soon before the full Senate, and 
then the Congress. And at least judging from the reaction of the 
Senators who were present at the meeting today with Justice Arbour, 
there will be a favorable response. Certainly $18 million for the War 
Crimes Tribunal and an additional $2 million for extra State Department 
officials and extra help from the Central Intelligence Agency is a very 
small amount of the $6 billion requested by the President and the 
additions which have been made by the House of Representatives.
  Mr. President, in conclusion--the two most popular words of any 
speech--I urge my colleagues to focus with great care on this 
resolution. I have a strong sense that it won't be possible to make 
extended remarks on Monday, when a vote grows nearer. The number of 
Senators will increase, from the presiding Senator and the one Senator 
on the floor making a speech, to a fair number of Senators who will be 
seeking recognition. When we had the resolution authorizing the use of 
force with the airstrikes, there was a limited time agreement. Speakers 
were limited to 2 minutes in the final stage of that debate before the 
vote, not too much time to express a Senatorial judgment on an 
important issue, but more time than many of us were accorded later when 
the time was so limited that we couldn't even speak. So seeing an empty 
Chamber, and in attendance an attentive Presiding Officer, I thought I 
would take this opportunity to speak at some length on this important 
subject.
  I thank the Chair for his attention. The Chair is customarily in 
attendance, infrequently at attention.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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